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071 - Lxxi That God Knows Evil Things · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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  Speaker 1: Chapter seventy one of Summa Contra Gentilees, First Book on God,
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  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
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  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public
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  Speaker 1: domain Chapter seventy one. That God knows evil things, It
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  Speaker 1: remains now to be proved that God knows evil things.
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  Speaker 1: For if a good be known, the opposite evil is known.
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  Speaker 1: Now God knows all the particular goods to which evils
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  Speaker 1: are opposed. Therefore God knows evil things. Further, the notions
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  Speaker 1: of contraries in the mind are not opposed to one another,
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  Speaker 1: else they would not be together in the mind, nor
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  Speaker 1: would they be known at the same time. Therefore, the
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  Speaker 1: aspect under which we know evil is not repugnant to good. Rather,
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  Speaker 1: is it connected with the idea of good. Accordingly, if
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  Speaker 1: as we have proved above, all the aspects of goodness
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  Speaker 1: are to be found in God by reason of his
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  Speaker 1: absolute perfection, it follows that in him is the notion
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  Speaker 1: by which evil is known. Therefore he knows evils. Also again,
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  Speaker 1: the true is the good of the intellect. For an
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  Speaker 1: intellect is said to be good forasmuch as it knows
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  Speaker 1: the true Now it is not only true that good
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  Speaker 1: is good, but also that evil is evil. For just
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  Speaker 1: as it is true that what is is, so is
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  Speaker 1: it true that what is not is not. Hence, the
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  Speaker 1: good of the intellect consists even in the knowledge of evil.
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  Speaker 1: But since the divine intellect is perfect in goodness, it
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  Speaker 1: cannot possibly lack any intellectual perfection. Therefore it has the
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  Speaker 1: knowledge of evils. Moreover, God knows the distinction between things,
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  Speaker 1: as shown above. Now, the notion of distinction includes negation,
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  Speaker 1: for when things are distinct, the one is not the other. Hence,
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  Speaker 1: primaries which are distinguished by themselves include mutual negation of
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  Speaker 1: one another. As for this reason, negative propositions about them
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  Speaker 1: are self evident. For instance, no quantity is a substance.
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  Speaker 1: Therefore God knows negation. Now, privation is negation in a
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  Speaker 1: definite subject, as is proved in the Fourth Book of Metaphysics. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: he knows privation and consequently evil, which is nothing else
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  Speaker 1: than the privation of due perfection. Further, if God knows
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  Speaker 1: all the species of things, as was proved above, and
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  Speaker 1: as granted and proved even by some philosophers, it follows
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  Speaker 1: that he knows contraries both because the species of certain
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  Speaker 1: genera are contrary, and because the differences of genera are contrary,
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  Speaker 1: as stated in the Tenth Book of Metaphysics. Now contraries
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  Speaker 1: include opposition of form and of privation according to the
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  Speaker 1: same authority. Therefore, it follows that God knows privation and
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  Speaker 1: consequently evil. Again, God knows not only form, but also matter,
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  Speaker 1: as was proved above. Now, matter, since it is being
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  Speaker 1: in potentiality, cannot be known perfectly unless it be no
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  Speaker 1: to what its potentiality extends. And this applies to all
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  Speaker 1: kinds of power. But the potentiality of matter extends to
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  Speaker 1: both form and privation, for that which can be can
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  Speaker 1: also not be. Therefore, God knows privation, and consequently he
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  Speaker 1: knows evil. Again, if God knows anything besides himself, most
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  Speaker 1: of all he knows that which is best, and this
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  Speaker 1: is the order of the universe, to which as their
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  Speaker 1: end all particular goods are directed. Now in the order
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  Speaker 1: of the universe, there are certain things intended for the
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  Speaker 1: removal of harms that might result from certain other things,
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  Speaker 1: as evidenced by the means of defense with which animals
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  Speaker 1: are provided. Therefore, God knows these harms, and thus he
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  Speaker 1: knows evils. Further, we are never blamed for knowing evils
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  Speaker 1: as regards that which belongs essentially to knowledge, that is,
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  Speaker 1: as regards judgment about evil, but only accidentally, forasmuch as
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  Speaker 1: sometimes one is inclined to evil through thinking about it,
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  Speaker 1: but it is not so in God, for he is unchangeable,
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  Speaker 1: as was proved above. Nothing therefore hinders God from knowing evils.
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  Speaker 1: In agreement with this, it is written in Wisdom chapter
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  Speaker 1: eight that no evil can overcome God's wisdom, and in
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  Speaker 1: Proverbs fifteen eleven that hell and destruction are before the Lord.
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  Speaker 1: Also in the Psalm it is said, my offenses are
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  Speaker 1: not hidden from thee and in Job eleven eleven, for
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  Speaker 1: he knoweth the vanity of men, and when he seeth iniquity,
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  Speaker 1: doth he not consider it. It must, however, be observed,
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  Speaker 1: that with regard to the knowledge of evil and privation,
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  Speaker 1: there is a difference between the divine intellect and ours.
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  Speaker 1: For seeing that our intellect knows each thing by its
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  Speaker 1: respective proper and distinct species, it knows that which is
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  Speaker 1: in act by an intelligible species, whereby the intellect is
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  Speaker 1: made actual. Hence it is able to know potentiality inasmuch
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  Speaker 1: as it is sometimes in potentiality to such a species.
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  Speaker 1: And thus, just as it knows act by means of
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  Speaker 1: an act, so it knows potentiality by means of potentiality.
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  Speaker 1: And since potentiality belongs to the notion of privation, for
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  Speaker 1: privation is a negation of the subject, whereof is a
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  Speaker 1: being in potentiality, it follows that it is becoming to
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  Speaker 1: our intellect to no privation in some way, inasmuch as
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  Speaker 1: it is naturally fitted to be in potentiality. Although we
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  Speaker 1: may also say that the mere knowledge of actuality leads
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  Speaker 1: to the knowledge of potentiality and privation. On the other hand,
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  Speaker 1: the divine intellect, which is no wise in potentiality, knows
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  Speaker 1: neither privation nor anything else in the above manner. For
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  Speaker 1: if he knew anything by a species other than himself,
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  Speaker 1: it would follow of necessity that he is compared to
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  Speaker 1: that species as potentiality to act. It follows therefore that
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  Speaker 1: he understands only by a species that is his essence,
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  Speaker 1: and consequently that he understands himself as the first object
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  Speaker 1: of his understanding. And yet in understanding himself he understands
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  Speaker 1: other things. As shown above, and not only acts, but
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  Speaker 1: potentialities and privations. This is what the philosopher means when
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  Speaker 1: he says in the third book of Deanima, how does
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  Speaker 1: it know evil or black? For it knows contraries somewhat,
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  Speaker 1: and it must know them by a potentiality that is
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  Speaker 1: in itself. But if anything there be in which the
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  Speaker 1: contrary is not namely in potentiality, it knows itself and
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  Speaker 1: is in act and separable. Nor is it necessary to
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  Speaker 1: admit the explanation of a Veroez, who maintains that it
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  Speaker 1: follows from the above that the intellect, which is pure act,
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  Speaker 1: knows a privation not at all. But the sense is
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  Speaker 1: that it knows privation not through being in potentiality to
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  Speaker 1: something else, but through knowing itself and being always in act. Again,
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  Speaker 1: it must be observed that if God knew himself in
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  Speaker 1: such a way that by knowing himself he knew not
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  Speaker 1: other beings, which are particular goods, he would have no
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  Speaker 1: knowledge whatever of privation or evil, because there is no
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  Speaker 1: privation contrary to the good that is himself. Since a
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  Speaker 1: privation and its contrary are naturally adapted to be in
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  Speaker 1: relation to the same thing, and so no privation, and
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  Speaker 1: therefore no evil is opposed to that which is pure act. Wherefore,
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  Speaker 1: supposing God to know himself alone, he would not know
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  Speaker 1: evil through knowing the good, which is himself. But since
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  Speaker 1: by knowing himself he knows things in which there is
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  Speaker 1: a natural aptness for privations, follows of necessity that he
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  Speaker 1: knows the opposite privation and the evils contrary to particular goods.
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  Speaker 1: It must also be observed that just as God, by
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  Speaker 1: knowing himself, knows other things without any discursion of his
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  Speaker 1: intellect is shown above, so two, there is no need
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  Speaker 1: for his knowledge to be discursive if he knows evil
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  Speaker 1: through good, for good is the ratio, as it were,
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  Speaker 1: of the knowledge of evil, So that evil is known
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  Speaker 1: through good as a thing through its definition, and not
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  Speaker 1: as conclusions through their premisses. Nor does it argue imperfection
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  Speaker 1: in the divine knowledge if God knows evil through the
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  Speaker 1: privation of good, because evil does not indicate being, except
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  Speaker 1: in so far as it is a privation of good. Wherefore,
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  Speaker 1: in this way alone is it knowable. Since a thing
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  Speaker 1: is so far knowable as it has been. End of
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  Speaker 1: Chapter seventy one read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, Elsie