Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Mastermind] 1957 Warren Buffett to Partnership Letter
Transcript
- 0:001957 letter Warren E Buffett 52O2 Underwood Ave.
- 0:06Omaha, NE's second annual letter to limited partners The general
- 0:10stock market picture in 1957 in last year's letter to partners,
- 0:15I said the following my view of the general market level is that
- 0:18it is priced above intrinsic value.
- 0:21This view relates to blue chip securities.
- 0:23This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a
- 0:27substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and
- 0:32otherwise. In any event, I think the
- 0:34probability is very slight that current market levels will be
- 0:38thought of as cheap five years from now.
- 0:40Even a full scale bear market, however, should not hurt the
- 0:44market value of our workouts substantially.
- 0:47If the general market were to return to an undervalued status,
- 0:50our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues
- 0:54and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation
- 0:57at that time. Conversely, if the market should
- 1:00go considerably higher, our policy will be to reduce our
- 1:03general issues as profits present themselves and increase
- 1:07the workout portfolio. All of the above is not intended
- 1:10to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind.
- 1:14Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of
- 1:18substantially undervalued securities.
- 1:21The past year witnessed A moderate decline in stock
- 1:23prices. I stress the word moderate since
- 1:26casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have
- 1:30had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an
- 1:33impression of a much greater decline.
- 1:36Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has
- 1:39been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning
- 1:43power under present business conditions.
- 1:45This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip
- 1:49stocks and the general economic picture.
- 1:51I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock
- 1:55market. The above is simply intended to
- 1:57dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic
- 2:01decline or that the general market is at a low level.
- 2:05I still consider the general market to be priced on the high
- 2:08side based on long term investment value.
- 2:11Our activities in 1957. The market decline has created
- 2:15greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that
- 2:19generally our portfolio is heavier in undervalued
- 2:23situations relative to workouts than it was last year.
- 2:27Perhaps an explanation of the term workout is an order.
- 2:31A workout is an investment which is dependent on a specific
- 2:34corporate action for its profit, rather than a general advance in
- 2:38the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations.
- 2:42Workouts come about through sales, mergers, liquidations,
- 2:47tenders, etcetera. In each case, the risk is that
- 2:51something will upset the apple cart and cause the abandonment
- 2:54of the planned action, not that the economic picture will
- 2:57deteriorate and stocks decline generally.
- 3:00At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70 to 30 between
- 3:05general issues and workouts. Now it is about 85 to 15.
- 3:10During the past year, we have taken positions in two
- 3:12situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take
- 3:16some part in corporate decisions.
- 3:18One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the
- 3:22portfolio of the various partnerships and the other
- 3:25accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take
- 3:28in the neighborhood of three to five years of work, but they
- 3:32presently appear to have potential for a high average
- 3:34annual rate of return with a minimum of risk.
- 3:38While not in the classification of workouts, they have very
- 3:41little one dependence on the general action of the stock
- 3:44market. Should the general market have a
- 3:46substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our
- 3:51portfolio to lag behind the action of the market results for
- 3:541957. In 1957, the three partnerships
- 3:58which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the
- 4:02general market. At the beginning of the year,
- 4:05the Dow Jones Industrial stood at 499 and at the end of the
- 4:10year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points.
- 4:14If one had owned the averages, he would have received 22 points
- 4:18in dividends, reducing the overall loss to 42 points or
- 4:228.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent
- 4:27to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment
- 4:30funds, and to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in
- 4:34stocks showed a gain for the year.
- 4:37All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain
- 4:40during the year amounting to about 6.2 percent, 7.8% and 25%
- 4:45on year end 1956 net worth. Naturally, a question is created
- 4:50as to the vastly superior performance of the last
- 4:54partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the 1st
- 4:572:00. This performance emphasizes the
- 5:00importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to
- 5:03when funds are received. The third partnership was
- 5:07started the latest in 1956, when the market was at a lower level
- 5:11and when several securities were particularly attractive.
- 5:14Because of the availability of funds, large positions were
- 5:18taken in these issues, whereas the two partnerships formed
- 5:21earlier were already substantially invested so that
- 5:25they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.
- 5:29Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities
- 5:33and in approximately the same percentages.
- 5:35However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes
- 5:39available at varying times and varying levels of the market, so
- 5:43there is more variation in results than is likely to be the
- 5:46case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite
- 5:50satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than
- 5:53the averages. So in respect to these three
- 5:56partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better
- 6:00than average Year. 2 partnerships were started during
- 6:03the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the
- 6:07year were roughly the same as the performance of the averages,
- 6:11which were down about 12% for the period since inception of
- 6:15the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now
- 6:19starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and
- 6:23performance of the entire group should be much more comparable
- 6:26in the future. Interpretation of results.
- 6:29To some extent, our better than average performance in 1957 was
- 6:33due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most
- 6:36stocks. Our performance relatively is
- 6:39likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market, so
- 6:43that deductions made from the above results should be tempered
- 6:46by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done
- 6:50relatively well. In a year when the general
- 6:52market had a substantial advance, I would be well
- 6:55satisfied to match the advance of the averages.
- 6:58I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better
- 7:01value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956.
- 7:06This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that
- 7:10we have had more time to acquire the more substantially
- 7:13undervalued securities, which can only be acquired with
- 7:16patients. Earlier, I mentioned our largest
- 7:19position, which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various
- 7:24partnerships. In time, I plan to have this
- 7:26represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships, but this
- 7:30cannot be hurried. Obviously, during any
- 7:33acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do
- 7:37nothing or decline rather than advance.
- 7:40Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio
- 7:44may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring
- 7:47patience, should maximize long term profits. 2 I have tried to
- 7:52cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as
- 7:56much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of
- 7:59individual issues. If there are any questions
- 8:02concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome
- 8:05hearing from you 3.