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Former Gov. John De Jongh And His Battle With Epstein Survivors Over Jurisdiction · The Epstein Chronicles

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Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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So we've been focusing a little bit on the Diddy situation,
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but don't think for a minute that I haven't been
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paying attention to what's going on down in the US
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Virgin Islands as a lawsuit continues to make its way
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through the system. And today we have a letter from
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Jean de Jong's lawyers address to Judge Submaranian. So let's
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just dive right in and let's see what John Dejeong
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has to say for himself. Case number one twenty three
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DASH CV DASH one zero three zero one. Dear Judge Submaranian,
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we represent defendant, Governor John Dejeong, Junior, and we submit
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this supplemental briefing on topic discussed at the conference pursuant
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to this Court's order and to highlight particular cases or arguments,
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including those made at the conference by a plaintiff's council.
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We also join in and in corporate the other arguments
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made by the code defendants in their respective letter submissions.
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While Jean DeJong JDJ has elected to focus here primarily
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on venue arguments, JDJ still maintains that the second amended
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complaint should be dismissed for the reasons argued by JDJ
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and other defendants. If it is not dismissed, including for
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improper venue, the case should be transferred to the District
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of the Virgin Islands one plaintiffs inadequate responses to venue questions.
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This case should be dismissed or transferred because plaintiffs file
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this case in the wrong venue US Code twenty eight
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section fourteen oh six A thirteen ninety one B, and
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this court lacks jurisdiction US Code twenty eight section sixteen
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thirty one. Even if venue is proper in the SDNY,
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the case should still be transferred pursuant to US Code
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twenty eight section fourteen oh four A. The court addressed
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the venue issues at the hearing, asking plaintiff's council, mister Murson,
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let me ask you a practical question. You could avoid
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all of these personal jurisdiction issues simply by filing this
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case in the US Virgin Islands or by consenting to
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transfer to the US Virgin Islands. Is there a reason
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why you don't want to do that. The court appears
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to have determined that the first part of the two
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part test under US Code twenty eight, Section fourteen oh
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four is satisfied the case might have been brought in
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the transfer revenue the USVII Franswais versus BAC Servicing twenty
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fourteen WL one three eight three two six zero at
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one SDNY twenty fourteen. Mister Merson did not dispute that
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the case might have been brought in the USVII either. Instead,
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mister Merson responded claiming there's a whole bunch of reasons
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why plaintiffs didn't file in the USVII, but in fact
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that bunch of reasons does not support venue in the
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SDNY A conclusiory statements about fear of the DVII. Mister
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Merson's lead argument was a k pclusiony assertion that all
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plaintiffs are afraid to go back to the DVII. Mister Merson,
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the main reason is we have clients who are afraid
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to go back to the US Virgin Islands and litigate
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their case there. First, Mister Merson's conclusiory statements that the
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plaintiffs are afraid to go back to the USVII is
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not evidence. See big Vision verse ei DuPont d no.
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Moor's one F dot supp three D two twenty four
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two fifty five N thirty six, SDNY twenty fourteen, noting
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the lack of any evidence in the record supporting a
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party's allegations other than Council's conclusiory assertions at oral argument,
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which of course is not evidence. LCM twenty two, verse
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Curtis Simmons Betting twenty twenty one, WL nine one eight
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seven five four SDNY twenty twenty one. Statements at oral
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arguments are not evidence. Second, the plaintiff's apprehension about litigating
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in a forum where she was injured cannot categorically render
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the forum and proper, especially because the citis of the
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incident is normally the basis of the venue. In Paigic
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versus Choice Hotels International, the plaintiff brought claims related to
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sexual assault against the defendant, who sought a venue transfer
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pursuant to us CO twenty eight Section fourteen oh four A.
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The plaintiff and the conclusiony assertion that San Juan, Puerto
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Rico is not the proper forum for this matter twenty
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nineteen w L one three two three four one oh
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five at three Southern District, Florida, twenty nineteen and in
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response to defendants analysis of the public and private factors
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under section fourteen oh four A, plaintiff merely stated she
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suffered severe physical and emotional trauma at the hands of
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defendants in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and so should not
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be forced to litigate in Puerto Rico. The district Court
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concluded that in short, plaintiff fell to aid the court
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in any other respect in explaining why a transfer of
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venue should not be granted. Similarly, in Montante versus La Hood,
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the district court granted the defendant's motion to transfer venue
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pursuing the US Code twenty eight Section fourteen oh four A.
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The plaintiff opposed, stating that she feared emotional and physical
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harm from an unknown public that may disagree with her.
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Case twenty thirteen w. L. One two one eight four
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to one four nine at four and two, Southern District
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of California, twenty thirteen. However, because plaintiff did not explain
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why she feared such harm in the transferree diistrict, the
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court did not afford strong weight to plaintiff's contention. Mister
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Merson's lead argument against transfer is his conclusiony assertion in
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open Court that the plaintiff's all fear of returning to
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the USVII, this statement is not evidence and not a
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sufficient ground for opposing a venue transfer. B Everything did
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not happen in New York. Mister Myerson stated that the
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second reason plaintiffs chose not the file in the SDNY
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was that with respect to Epstein, everything has happened to
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New York. Where was Epstein? Where did Epstein live? Where
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was he supposed to stand trial? Later, mister Meerson repeated,
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everything has happened to New York. At another point, mister
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Merson qualified his position somewhat, asserting everything occurred in New
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York except the actual sexual abuse tr At fifty one,
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apparently admitting no alleged sexual abuse occurred in New York.
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Plaintiff's position at oral argument is directly refuted by plaintiff's
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own opposition and the sac itself. In the opposition, the
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plaintiff concedes that the immunity afforded to Epstein also occurred
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in the USVII ecf at one forty eight through and
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one at ten emphasis added. Taken together, the plaintiff concedes
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that the abuse and the acts of many, mostly John
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Doe defendants conferred immunity on Epstein all in the USVII,
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but the SAC itself ultimately conflicts with councils in court
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statements and their own opposition. The SAC alleges substantial conduct
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exclusively in the USVII. For example, the defendants John Doe's
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one through one hundred constitute ninety two percent of the
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one hundred and eight defendants. Everything the SAC alleges the
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John Doe defendants did necessarily occurred only in the USVII.
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This is because the SAC alleges their conduct as USVII
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customs agents and or officers at fifty one USVII air
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traffic controllers and employees of the USVII Airport baggage check agent,
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employees of the USVII, employees of the USVII and USVII
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Coast Guard Agents. There are many other examples of substantial
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conduct in addition to the sex abuse alleged to have
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occurred exclusively in the USVII. For example, SAC one twenty
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six alleges no sexual assault, but instead alleges Jane Doe
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three and Epstein's substantial interactions with unidentified USVI officials in
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the USVII to procure travel documents in the USVII. The
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SAC alleges that US Customs officials on the USVII never
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examined either the passport or luggage of anyone arriving on
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Epstein's private jet. USVI officials directed law enforcement officers, airport personnel,
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customs officials, and any other government employees to extend any
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courtesy or assistance to Abstein and as affluent customers and
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guests as part of their official duties. Sac At one
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seventy three. All of these things happened only in the USVII.
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The alleged efforts to protect Ebstein procure as travel documents,
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communications with non party customs, airport and other officials occurred
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nearly entirely in the USVII, according to the SAC. The
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SAC itself negates mister Mersan's assertion that everything has happened
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in New York. Nearly everything occurred in the USVII. According
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to the SAC, CEG Crinberg First Dow Chemical Company nine
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forty six f DOT supp two D three twenty nine
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three thirty one SDNY two thousand and seven transferring Venue,
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after finding that most of the operative events at issue
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took place in the transferree venue and concluding that it's
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likely that most of the witnesses and documents are located there.
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Collins Verus Aikman Corporation Secretary Litt. Four thirty eight Ft supp.
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Two d three ninety two, three ninety five, three ninety seven,
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SDNY two thousand and six. Transfer motion granted where numerous
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party and non party witnesses resided in the transferree forum,
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most relevant documents were located in the transferree forum, and
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the transferre reforum is where the subject conduct alleged happened.
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In this case, the ties to the USVII outweigh any
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connection this litigation may have to New York see. Plaintiff's
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council admits to forum shopping. The third reason mister Mrson
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offered for why the plaintiffs filed in the SDNY and
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instead of the DVII was that if the case is
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bumped to the US Virgin Islands, the next thing you
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are going to hear is that the cases should have
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a twenty five thousand dollars limit under the Virgin Islands
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Toward Act. So that is clearly inadequate compensation for my clients.
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Mister Myersan admits to form shopping in the SDNY for
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advantageous state law. However, mister Myerson is wrong on the
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law that will apply. It's true that after a transfer
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from an improper venue to a proper venue under section
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fourteen oh six A, the transferre court applies its own
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law as if the case had been originally filed there Ie,
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the plaintiff does not get the benefit of form shopping
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Grant vers Kia Motors twenty fourteen, WL six sixty eight
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zero six eighty six, at two, citing GBJ versus East
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Ohio Paving one thirty nine ft three d ten eighty
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ten eighty five six Circuit nineteen ninety eight. If the
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state law in them in which the action was originally
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commenced is applied following a Section sixteen thirty one or
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fourteen oh six transfer, the plaintiff would benefit from having
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brought the action in an impermissible forum. Choquette vers San Felipo,
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two thousand and one w. L one two six six
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three zero five, at four. As the Sixth Circuit and
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Martin Verse Stokes recognized, plaintiffs would thereby be encouraged to
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file their actions in federal district court, where the state
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law was most advantageous, regardless of whether that district court
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was the proper forum. If venue is improper in the SDNY,
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plaintiffs were never entitled to New York law to begin with,
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they have lost nothing. In that event, plaintiffs would not
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be harmed by the DVII applying USVII law. However, if
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the court determines venue was proper in the SDNY but
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transfers for convenience, a court receiving a matter from a
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transfer of court under section fourteen oh four A applies
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to the law of the transferer court. Kelly Brown versus
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Winfrey twenty thirteen w L six five seven four nine
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one eight at one, SDNY twenty fourteen. The plaintiff gets
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the benefit of forum shopping Grant twenty fourteen six sixty
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eight zero six eighty six at two. So if the
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case is transferred, mister Merson's clients may still seek the
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benefit of the New York law they perceive as more advantageous.
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D Epstein and Wealthy Abuser Friends are not parties. While
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the SAC alleges substantial conduct by Epstein and as wealthy
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abuser friends, none of them are named as defendants. The
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SAC fails to allege a sufficient nexus conspiracy or otherwise
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between the name defendants in Epstein and his abuser friends.
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Without this nexus, the plaintiffs cannot use non party conduct
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as a jurisdictional hook upon JDJ and other named USVII
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defendants if the sac does not allege a conspiracy. At best,
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it alleges a conspiracy by non parties and not JDJ
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or the name defendants. In the case e sexual abuse
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is the most substantial part of the case. Mister Merson's
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argument that everything occurred in New York except the actual
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sexual abuse minimizes the fact that the alleged sexual abuse
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is the most substantial part of the case. Gray versus
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Acadia Healthcare four oh eight f DOT supp three D
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twelve fifty twelve fifty five DNM twenty nineteen venue proper
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in district where rape occurred. Gold Schmeade versus Brifel, twenty
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eighteen w L six four three zero five four five
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at four c D, California, twenty eighteen VENU proper where
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sex harassment and assault occurred. Gerson versus Logan River Academy
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twenty twenty WL four seven three one three four at
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three Central District California, twenty twenty. Although plaintiff was kidnapped
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from California and transported to Utah, each of her claims
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stem from the alleged sexual child abuse that took place
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at Logan's academy. Accordingly, the operative facts did not substantially
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occur in the forum selected by plaintiff. Moreover, because plaintiff
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was sexually abused in Utah, the subject matter of the
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litigation is not substantially connected to California. Therefore, the Core
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finds that plaintiff's choice of forum is diminished and is
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entitled to only minimal consideration. Chesapeake Climate Action Network versus
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Imperial Bank, twenty thirteen WL six zero five seven eight
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two four AT two Northern District, California, twenty thirteen, noting
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that deference to plaintiff's choice of forum is substantially reduced
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where the forum lacks a significant connection to the activity
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is alleged in the complaint, even if the plaintiff is
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a resident of that forum. FSAC one hundred and seven Defendants,
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Evidence and Incident Sights in the USVII. Each of the
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one hundred and eight defendants, including John Doe's one through
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one hundred, are potential witnesses, they are all located in
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the USVII, save plasket. All their evidence and documents are
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located in the USVII. Furthermore, the SAC identifies critical locations
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in the USVII which may be the location of documents,
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the subjects of inspection during discovery, or even a site
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visit at trial. These include Cyril King Airport, Epstein's private Island,
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Epstein's RedHook office. And Although it's likely that all relevant
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documents can be transported from the state to state, at
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least in some fashion for purposes of deciding transfer, the
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fact that the documents are all currently located in Ohio
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favors transfer to Ohio Royal Insurance versus US nine ninety
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eight ft. Supp. Three fifty one, three fifty three and
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fifty four SDNY nineteen ninety eight. While photos or videotapes
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of the scene could be introduced at trial in any forum,
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inspection of the site by the trier of fact could
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only be accomplished if the case were tried in California
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g Court in power to transfer even if no personal jurisdiction.
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Even if this court determines it does not have personal
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jurisdiction over the defendants, it may still transfer this case
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to the DVII. This court has the power to transfer
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this suit to a district where it might have been brought,
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even though the court does not have personal jurisdiction over
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the defendants. Two Sovereign immunity applies to Governor JDJ. JDJ
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joins the GVII and other defendants sovereign immunity agreements. Territorial
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sovereign immunity applies not only to the GVII, but also
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to the individuals sued in their official capacities as territorial officials.
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Three response to plaintiffs CPLR three zero two A one
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personal jurisdiction argument. In their ten to four to twenty
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four letter, plaintiffs continue to argue that receiving a single
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payment in another state without maintaining a New York account
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gives rise to jurisdiction. Again, this is not always true.
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It can be true based on the nature of the
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financial relationship. Plaintiff's site to the first Manhattan Energy one
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Meyer one fifty A D three five twenty one. But
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Meyer was designated in the escro agreement as the assigned
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escrow agent, and he accepted the funds pursuant to the agreement.
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This is very different from a defendant receiving payment from
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Epstein that happens to come from a New York bank,
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especially when it's simply not plausible that any defendant requested
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money from a New York account. Four not plausible that
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defendants requested money specifically from New York accounts. Plaintiffs argue
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in their letter brief that requesting money from New York
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accounts in exchange for unrestricted trafficking of New York women
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with New York customers via a New York plane is
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sufficient for personal jurisdiction. It is not plausible that defendants
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requested money specifically from New York bank accounts, are knew
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or cared from what state the money came. It's also
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not plausible that defendants specifically knew that the customers were
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New York customers or that the plane was a New
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York plane. Indeed, the SAC itself alleges that conduct happened
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in New York, Florida, USVII, and around the world SAC
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three oh one through three five. The SAC also alleges
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that the defendants sought access to money and influential people
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from around the world and not just n Y. Plaintiff's
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argument of targeted and y conduct in their letter brief
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is directly contradicted by the allegations in the SAC. The
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alleged payments and conclusiony statements are insufficient to show that
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the defendants elicited money specifically from NY Bank accounts. Rosner
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Versus Boc. Three forty nine Federal Appendix six thirty seven,
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six thirty nine, Second Circuit, two thousand and nine, finding
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a lack of factual allegations that point to actual knowledge
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of the fraudulent source of the deposited money. Since the
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bank's relationship with the perpetrators of the underlying fraud did
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not extend beyond the banking relationship in Agapi of Litigation
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seven seventy three Ft. Supp. Two d. Two ninety eight,
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three seventeen Eastern District, twenty eleven, a banking relationship alone
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is insufficient to show that the funds held that the
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bank were obtained through fraudulent means. Defendant JDJ respectfully requests
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that the SAC be dismissed or, in the alternative, transferred
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to the District Court of the Virgin Island Saint Thomas Vicinity.
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This was signed by Daniel Savalos and it was dated
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October fourth, twenty twenty four. All of the information that
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goes with this episode can be found in the description
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box