Latest / No Way Out / From Battlefields to Boardrooms: Leadership Lessons from Vietnam to Modern Business with Bing West
Transcript
- 0:21Mark McGrath: So Big as we were saying.
- 0:22Mark McGrath: I was commissioned from 98 to 04, and I was reading a lot of your work.
- 0:29Mark McGrath: I've been familiar with the Village and, of course, read your book that you co-authored with General Mattis about small unit action and other things strike teams that I wish I would have read at OCS or Naval ROTC.
- 0:47Mark McGrath: I couldn't believe that I was reading it in 2025.
- 0:52Mark McGrath: I thought that this stuff is really profound and there's a lot of lessons that are applicable not just to military action but to companies and working with teams and things like that.
- 1:00Mark McGrath: What's?
- 1:00Mark McGrath: that again yeah, how did you know?
- 1:03Mark McGrath: That's really an interesting transition.
- 1:05Mark McGrath: So you're commissioned, you're fighting in Vietnam, you're involved with the CAP program, which we want to go in great depth.
- 1:13Mark McGrath: You know we just published a podcast with General David Petraeus that was very positive about CAP and he has CAP featured in his book and of course I said CAP for our listeners, I mean the Combined Action Program featured in his book.
- 1:25Ponch Rivera: And of course I said CAP for our listeners.
- 1:26Ponch Rivera: I mean the Combined Action Program.
- 1:27Ponch Rivera: Before we dive into that, mark, let's kind of explain what CAP is from the perspective of a business.
- 1:31Ponch Rivera: So you know we have a lot of business leaders listening in on this.
- 1:34Ponch Rivera: What does that mean, mark, or Bing?
- 1:38Mark McGrath: So, bing, how I position CAP.
- 1:40Mark McGrath: When I talk about CAP with clients, I talk about the principles of integrating inside of a culture and working from a culture, from within, rather than something top down rather than without, such that there's shared experience.
- 1:55Mark McGrath: And thereia, the Marines were with the village, they were with the people, they were working together, meeting them where they were at, versus a top-down, heavy-fisted imposition.
- 2:16Bing West: Let me back off and come at it this way by asking why was I a Marine and why did I end up in that village?
- 2:24Bing West: And I was born in 1940.
- 2:28Bing West: And I was really lucky because you know, irish Catholic Boston was named, baptized Francis Joseph.
- 2:37Bing West: But fortunately I had a aunt who was a sister of St Joseph, sister Bunny.
- 2:44Bing West: My aunt was a sister of St Joseph, sister Bunny and Sister Bunny it was the year I was born was when Bing Crosby had made Bells of St Mary's and he was Father O'Brien and I had red hair and I was born on his birthday.
- 2:56Bing West: So she did me the wonderful favor of saying, well, he should have a nickname, bing.
- 3:02Bing West: And fortunately I went through life as Bing rather than Franny or Francis.
- 3:08Bing West: So here's Bing, 1940, and my mother is about to have another baby and then another baby, typical Irish.
- 3:16Bing West: We ended up with six.
- 3:17Bing West: I was the oldest boy and my uncles, whom I was very close to.
- 3:25Bing West: They were part of a baseball team and when World War II began the Marines allowed entire baseball and football teams to volunteer together and they sent them in together.
- 3:37Bing West: They learned never to do that again about what happened.
- 3:40Bing West: But all of these guys go off to Guadalcanal.
- 3:44Bing West: And then they come back and of course that was a rough battle.
- 3:48Bing West: They were out of ammunition, they were out of food.
- 3:51Bing West: They did an awful lot of killing and they came back totally traumatized and they didn't want to go to their individual houses and they had a clubhouse on the top floor of our house because my dad was the doctor in town.
- 4:05Bing West: So they all went up there.
- 4:07Bing West: Well, my mother thinking, well, my brothers are home, they can take care of Bing, not, because she had other kids.
- 4:14Bing West: So she sent me up to the attic and from you know, for every day and all the Marines, anytime they came home, they were my babysitters.
- 4:22Bing West: So from 1942 to 1947, I was surrounded by Marines and I remember distinctly they would sneak down the back stairs, wrap me in a blanket and bring me to a bar and then put me on the bar while they're drinking and then smuggle me back into the house.
- 4:41Bing West: My mother was just flawless.
- 4:43Bing West: What was happening until 1945, when they're in the battle for Okinawa?
- 4:47Bing West: And I had a blanket that she told me I used to suck all the time.
- 4:52Bing West: She wanted to cure me of that and she said your two uncles are over there fighting and you're not doing anything to help them.
- 4:58Bing West: And she said with that I threw the blanket out the window and I said that's for the dirty yellow baskets.
- 5:04Bing West: And then she knew something was happening up there.
- 5:07Bing West: And so when I graduated from Georgetown and I was supposed to go to Columbia Law School, I said goodbye and took my suitcase and went down to South Station and I looked across the street and it said Marine Corps recruiting.
- 5:20Bing West: And I walked in with my suitcase and the captain sitting at the desk said well, you don't have to be in that much of a rush.
- 5:28Bing West: And just like that the DNA 30, 25 years later had kicked in.
- 5:33Bing West: And when I went home my mother said you joined the Marines, didn't you?
- 5:37Bing West: She?
- 5:38Ponch Rivera: knew.
- 5:38Bing West: I was in the Marines as an infantry officer.
- 5:41Bing West: This is just pre-Vietnam.
- 5:42Bing West: There was this wonderful colonel who was in charge of the regiment and I had the duty where you'd have to get up and check the mess hall on a Sunday morning when you were the second lieutenant.
- 5:53Bing West: So I'm in the mess hall at three o'clock looking around, not knowing what am I doing, and here's this colonel with all his ribbons on and he said you want to know what's going on?
- 6:04Bing West: You come to the mess hall before it opens.
- 6:07Bing West: And he became my mentor.
- 6:11Bing West: And then when I was at Princeton I saw that my unit had sent back to.
- 6:16Bing West: That was at Princeton grad school.
- 6:18Bing West: I saw my unit had been sent back to Vietnam and I was reading SLA Marshall Men Against Fire.
- 6:25Bing West: And I said to the colonel I said you know, colonel, it'd be interesting to know, are we shooting our rifles?
- 6:32Bing West: Because in World War II something like only one out of every four infantry actually fired their rifles.
- 6:38Bing West: And he said you know, that'd be interesting to find out.
- 6:41Bing West: He got a hold of the commandant and he said Wes knows how to write, he's willing to take his time and go back over there.
- 6:49Bing West: And the next thing I know I'm assigned in Vietnam to General Wall.
- 6:53Bing West: They promote me to captain for some reason and they said okay, you're an infantry officer, you go out to the battlefields and we'll send you and you write up the descriptions and we'll turn that into a tactical training manual.
- 7:08Bing West: And that's how I I got all of a sudden, everywhere there's a firefight.
- 7:12Bing West: They're sending me there to see what's going on, because they had the honesty to know that from world war ii they didn't understand this war.
- 7:20Bing West: They're now the generals, but their war was entirely different.
- 7:23Bing West: And one of the places they sent me, this colonel said every night we're getting into a fight in this village.
- 7:29Bing West: We want you to get down there and find out why.
- 7:32Bing West: And I went to this remote village and there is a sergeant with 15 Marines and 5,000 Vietnamese 15 Marines.
- 7:43Bing West: And I thought what?
- 7:46Bing West: And during the daytime we're sitting around, we're eating duck eggs, we're chatting with people, everything seems normal.
- 7:53Bing West: And the minute the sun went down, the sergeant said all right, sir, strap it on.
- 7:59Bing West: Eight magazines and four grenades were going out.
- 8:04Bing West: And we didn't get 400 yards before we were in a ferocious firefight.
- 8:09Bing West: And that happened night after night after night, and that was called the Combined Action Platoon, where we were actually taking squads just normal squads that had some firefight experience, just normal squads that had some firefight experience and sending them into villages where the district chief had said this village is more pro our side and they're not really VC, but the Viet Cong are picking on them, they're really after them and that's how we ended up there.
- 8:42Bing West: But what made the difference, I think, was that the Marines came in recognizing from the start what do we have as a 19-year-old, 20-year-old American that they don't have?
- 8:56Bing West: They knew how to fight.
- 8:58Bing West: The Marines knew how to fight.
- 8:59Bing West: They knew how to shoot.
- 9:00Bing West: That's especially what we had.
- 9:09Bing West: And the other thing we had do you know that that only the dominican republic and maybe cuba in the united states throw baseballs and footballs by by getting their entire body into it?
- 9:18Bing West: And therefore, when you'd be in firefights and you're in firefights at night, less than 50 yards and you don't have any night vision devices they don't You're shooting back and forth.
- 9:31Bing West: We were able to throw grenades.
- 9:34Bing West: I'd say we could throw a grenade 40 yards, but the other side could only throw a grenade, maybe 10.
- 9:40Bing West: So we had a huge advantage because we had our own mortars.
- 9:44Bing West: We could throw farther in a night fight.
- 9:48Bing West: When we first started, the farmers we were taking out to try to train were scared to death.
- 9:55Bing West: But after a while we never went into the kill zone.
- 10:00Bing West: After a firefight we went.
- 10:02Bing West: That's stupid.
- 10:03Bing West: And I remember we came home a couple of times back to our base and the colonel would call down because there'd be a ferocious fight.
- 10:12Bing West: And he'd say what happened, Sir?
- 10:15Bing West: We got into a fight.
- 10:15Bing West: Well, how much did you kill, sir?
- 10:18Bing West: We have no idea what do you mean.
- 10:20Bing West: And they'd say how much ammunition did you use?
- 10:23Bing West: And we'd say something like 1,000, 2,000 rounds.
- 10:26Bing West: He said no Marine can fire 2,000 rounds and not kill somebody.
- 10:30Bing West: I'm putting you down to seven kills.
- 10:31Bing West: So you have that kind of stuff going on.
- 10:33Bing West: We learned later, much later, that we really were doing damage.
- 10:39Bing West: We just didn't know it.
- 10:42Bing West: And gradually the culture was such that the Vietnamese got to know every one of us as an individual, because we went around during the daytime and they realized that we were there because we had one specialty we were better fighters than the Viet Cong and they accepted us that way.
- 11:08Bing West: Now consider if you're a 19-year-old American.
- 11:12Bing West: You graduated from high school and all of a sudden you're in this environment and you have 5,000 people who admire you.
- 11:21Bing West: That causes you to think that you're really somebody special, because you have a specialty.
- 11:28Bing West: They don't.
- 11:28Bing West: You know how to fight, and so they were looked up to and we found it to be a welcoming environment, because they didn't like the Viet Cong and the Viet Cong were taxing them and beheading them because they were tougher.
- 11:47Bing West: And all of a sudden they had these guys.
- 11:49Bing West: It was like, uh, what was that movie, the Magnificent Seven with Ewell Brenner, when, when the west, you know the western, and all of a sudden these guys rode into right into town.
- 11:59Bing West: Who can shoot the bad guys?
- 12:01Bing West: So what we brought was a skill and after a while the village was our village and so there weren't any incidents of calling in fire or anything.
- 12:14Bing West: You weren't going to call fire in on your own village, so they were protected from any untoward events by the Americans and they're protected against the Viet Cong.
- 12:33Bing West: And then the Viet Cong in our village.
- 12:34Bing West: They took 200 one night and got us.
- 12:36Bing West: They killed.
- 12:38Bing West: We had 15, they killed seven of us in one night and the rest of us said the heck with it, we're staying.
- 12:41Bing West: And we got reinforcements and we just kept plugging away and plugging away and plugging away.
- 12:48Bing West: We were in that village for about a year and two months and then the the high command said okay, you're not and there's no more firefights, so you've done your job, so it's time to leave.
- 13:59Bing West: And I remember song, who was in charge of the popular forces, the farmers he said no, no, no, you can't leave because they're just waiting for you to leave.
- 14:09Bing West: Then they're going to come back.
- 14:10Bing West: And after we left, years later, they did come back.
- 14:14Mark McGrath: You know.
- 14:15Mark McGrath: So, boy, so many directions to go.
- 14:18Mark McGrath: So you mentioned General Walt.
- 14:19Mark McGrath: So Louis Walt, who was the commander of the Marines in Vietnam, eventually became the assistant commandant.
- 14:25Mark McGrath: He wrote a book called Strange War.
- 14:28Mark McGrath: Right Like Strange Strategy, strange War.
- 14:31Mark McGrath: It seemed like that General Walt and General Kulak had a pretty good understanding of what actually had to be done to turn the tide amongst the people.
- 14:41Mark McGrath: They understood that the war was in the minds, the cognitive capabilities of the people, not so necessarily the way maybe like a Westmoreland would look at it, right, like more of a kinetic body count, like a force on force exercise.
- 14:57Mark McGrath: It seems like the Kulak and Walt had a different path.
- 15:02Mark McGrath: That got overridden.
- 15:04Bing West: The answer is yes, and I was also sent up with the main forces.
- 15:09Bing West: I was sent everywhere to fight.
- 15:10Bing West: So I was out with our main forces as well, and General Walt did believe what you just articulated, that the secret was winning the people.
- 15:23Bing West: That was true, but not true, and that is.
- 15:27Bing West: We succeeded eventually in doing that and wiping out the guerrillas, but we did it because we were better fighters.
- 15:36Bing West: Now the big difference between General Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan and Vietnam is simple.
- 15:43Bing West: As I said, when we went in to the villages in Vietnam, we went in as the better fighters to engage and kill the guerrillas.
- 15:54Bing West: Somewhere it got warped that people had this idea we were in there handing out candy and getting along and the people were going to come over and fight the Viet Cong.
- 16:07Bing West: That was never true, but it got distorted.
- 16:10Bing West: So in Iraq and Afghanistan they said to our troops you're nation builders.
- 16:17Bing West: No, no, no.
- 16:18Bing West: We wouldn't have a nation builders with the combat action platoons.
- 16:22Bing West: We were fighters.
- 16:24Ponch Rivera: Yeah.
- 16:24Bing West: And so they told our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan you have to give $2,500 a month to the villages, you have to sip tea with the elders, you have to help with construction, you have to help with school, blah, blah, blah, blah blah.
- 16:40Bing West: That had nothing to do with killing the Al-Qaeda and it had nothing to do with killing the Taliban, and it distracted tremendously because they got mixed up.
- 16:52Bing West: The people were the prize, not the mechanism for winning the war, and the big difference was especially in Afghanistan.
- 17:03Bing West: When we were in Vietnam, eventually, the people who really disliked the Viet Cong came over to our side.
- 17:11Bing West: They did that because they saw that the Americans were the better fighters.
- 17:18Bing West: However, the problem in Vietnam was that the North Vietnamese it was like a civil war.
- 17:25Bing West: The North Vietnamese had an iron will and they kept sending people down, hundreds of thousands to die.
- 17:34Bing West: So you had the truth, on the one hand, that you could win the people, which is what General Walt wanted to do, one hand, that you could win the people, which is what General Walt wanted to do.
- 17:46Bing West: But in the end it was a conventional war that could be won only by destroying the North Vietnamese army, which was a separate issue than the guerrillas.
- 17:55Bing West: And I look back on that whole issue and I say the only way, given the iron will of the North Vietnamese and their willingness to have millions die, we were not willing to have millions die.
- 18:10Bing West: Therefore getting into a war of attrition the way General Westmoreland wanted to do with his search and destroy, inevitably we were going to lose because the American people at some point would say going to lose because the American people at some point would say this isn't worth all the people we're losing.
- 18:25Bing West: The only way we could have won in the end in Vietnam was a very simple way, but we didn't have quite then the political will to do it.
- 18:36Bing West: The way to win was to do what we did in Korea and you make a demilitarized zone from the South China Sea to Thailand, which is about, let's say, 100 miles, whereas the demilitarized zone in Korea is 150 miles, actually technically dividing North Vietnam from South Vietnam by putting in a huge demilitarized zone and manning it with a couple of divisions, the way we did eventually in Korea.
- 19:09Bing West: We could have done that, but nobody looked at it in those terms.
- 19:13Bing West: And so in the end in Vietnam, it was the will of the North to win that gradually wore us down Because we had a bad strategy to begin with.
- 19:24Bing West: Just thinking the Westmoreland strategy of thinking we can continue to lose people forever was not going to work with the American people.
- 19:31Bing West: General Walt's strategy of winning over the Vietnamese people succeeded, but that didn't mean that they had the iron will to fight the North Vietnamese, because the fighters, as we know, the fighters are less than 1% of your population.
- 19:51Bing West: The Marine Corps is something like one half of one half of 1% of the American population.
- 19:55Bing West: And everyone says, oh, the Marines are tough.
- 19:58Bing West: Yes, we are, and therefore if you have a problem, you send in the Marines because they're your tough guys.
- 20:03Bing West: So you send in the Army Rangers or something.
- 20:06Bing West: So you have a very small cadre of very, very tough guys to do the job.
- 20:10Bing West: So you could handle that.
- 20:12Bing West: You don't expect the population to rise up against them.
- 20:24Bing West: So then you go to Iraq and Afghanistan, where I spent a lot of time in both those countries too, all together writing about a dozen books.
- 20:27Bing West: In Iraq, what happened was that we first went in to throw out Saddam, and we did that very quickly.
- 20:32Bing West: Now Iraq had, say, 60% Shiites that were dominated by 30% Sunnis, and the Sunnis were Saddam's gang.
- 20:45Bing West: So the minute we got rid of Saddam.
- 20:49Bing West: Fortunately, president Bush changed the mission from just destroying Saddam and turning it over to the United Nations to saying we build a democratic nation.
- 20:58Bing West: Well, the minute the Shiites got into power they said the hell with these Sunnis who've been putting us down.
- 21:05Bing West: So then Al-Qaeda, who are Sunni, come in and they start to kill all the Shiites.
- 21:12Bing West: And they try to get the Sunnis to say you're opposed to the Shiites, the Shiites are going to dominate you.
- 21:18Bing West: The Americans are your enemy.
- 21:19Bing West: And we went through about three years of that and that's why there was a lot of fighting.
- 21:24Bing West: And then finally, the tribes themselves, the Sunni tribes, said wait a minute, maybe we have this wrong.
- 21:32Bing West: Maybe the Americans and we were the strongest tribe are actually pretty good guys and if they help us we can offset the power of the Shiites who have the government, because we now have the protection of the Americans.
- 21:48Bing West: And once the Sunnis switched over that's when General Petraeus came on scene, but it was already done before he got there they had begun to come over.
- 21:58Bing West: Then he paid them to have neighborhood watches which are really militia in their own neighborhoods.
- 22:06Bing West: He paid them a hundred dollars a month and all of a sudden the sunni said fine, we have the americans with us, we'll have our territory, the shiites have their territory.
- 22:16Bing West: And all of a sudden, because they had come over, the wall was won.
- 22:20Bing West: But then, then President Obama pulled us all out, pulled us all out, and he was warned not to, and the whole place caved.
- 22:30Bing West: Now in Afghanistan, when General McChrystal was there and General Petraeus, they tried to apply the same thing that had worked in Iraq, which was persuade the tribes to come over to our side.
- 22:47Bing West: But the Sunni tribes did come over to our side.
- 22:52Bing West: In Afghanistan, the Pashtun tribe that was along the Pakistani border never came over to our side and, as a result, we were never able to stop the Taliban from using Pakistan to continue to attack until they finally won.
- 23:11Bing West: And the mistake, the huge mistake in Afghanistan was believing that if you sat down with the village chiefs and had tea and you gave them money, that somehow they would come over to your side and everything would be good by.
- 23:30Bing West: And that just wasn't true, because ideologically, the Pashtun tribe was always aligned with the Taliban, who were protected by Pakistan, with the Taliban who were protected by Pakistan.
- 23:44Bing West: So my objection to the generals, whom I get along with but I have grave reservations.
- 23:51Bing West: In three different wars I never saw them articulate an understanding of what the basic problem was and go after that.
- 24:02Bing West: So being there, they tried to take what they believed they had learned from one war, transfer it to another, and they were mistaken in what they did.
- 24:11Ponch Rivera: So, Bing, I got a question on this Practical application, thinking about you know if there's fundamental principles behind this type of thinking, understanding the context, embedding troops, maybe going to the Gemba, going to see for yourself.
- 24:31Ponch Rivera: Do you have any heuristics or rules or principles that you can pull from this so you can help future leaders and current leaders understand how to increase the likelihood of success in the next war or next business cycle or whatever it may be?
- 24:42Bing West: Yes, you start with what is your relative advantage?
- 24:46Bing West: What do you bring to the table that they don't have?
- 24:49Bing West: Because if you bring nothing, well, why do they care about you?
- 24:52Bing West: And what's your relative advantage?
- 24:55Bing West: Well, your relative advantage in war is that you can kill better.
- 25:01Bing West: War is the act of killing until the other side agrees with your terms.
- 25:08Bing West: That's what it's all about.
- 25:10Bing West: And if you lose sight of that and think you're a nation builder or something, no, you're not a nation builder.
- 25:17Bing West: The only reason you're there as a 19 year old is that you have a rifle and you know how to fight better than the other side.
- 25:23Bing West: You're there as a 19-year-old is that you have a rifle and you know how to fight better than the other side.
- 25:25Bing West: So you have to, number one, understand what's your relative advantage.
- 25:27Bing West: What do you bring that other people want?
- 25:29Bing West: And then you work from there.
- 25:34Bing West: You work from the fact that you have a skill they do not have, and then you determine how are you going to meld that toward whatever your mission is?
- 25:43Bing West: Look at Musk today.
- 25:45Bing West: Musk is going to be very interesting.
- 25:47Bing West: Now we're talking about business.
- 25:49Bing West: Okay, but what made Musk a success?
- 25:53Bing West: Two things.
- 25:54Bing West: First, he was an engineer and he took on projects of engineering, building rockets and building cars.
- 26:04Bing West: So his relative specialty was engineering and what he bolted onto that was a determination to really succeed, period.
- 26:18Bing West: But no one.
- 26:21Bing West: In all the different endeavors that he undertook he did PayPal too, but every single time people recognized he had an expertise that they didn't have.
- 26:35Bing West: His engineers said it has to look like a bubble, because we need to put a lot of batteries in the bottom of the car and therefore we have to raise the top so people can get up, get into the car.
- 26:51Bing West: And he said baloney, we're going to come up with a battery that's very thin because I'm not going to have people going around in a clown car.
- 27:03Bing West: And they said well, we need 9,000 battery volts.
- 27:05Bing West: And he said no, I've done the calculations, you need 7,200.
- 27:10Bing West: And he had a huge argument with his own engineers and he said I'm the boss, you get that down to 7,200.
- 27:16Bing West: Well, he got it down and they came out with this slick car, the Tesla.
- 27:20Bing West: So what Musk brought as the leader was a true competence that exceeded the competence of the others, and that's why he was.
- 27:32Bing West: Everyone says he's a real jerk and I don't mean that way, but you know he is a jerk, I guess you know.
- 27:37Bing West: But personality, you put all that aside.
- 27:39Bing West: The fact is, he had more expertise and he applied it the right way.
- 27:47Bing West: Now it's going to be interesting to see what happens now when he tries to go into bureaucracies.
- 27:54Ponch Rivera: And.
- 27:54Bing West: I notice he's put together these teams, like he's going to go to the Pentagon with one guy who's going to be in charge, with three others One is an engineer, one is a human resource person and one, of course, is a lawyer.
- 28:09Bing West: Well, this is going to be interesting to see what happens, because he was used to taking a blueprint, the design and the actual manufacturing and putting it all together.
- 28:25Bing West: So it was one team.
- 28:26Bing West: They're all together.
- 28:27Bing West: That's not how the Pentagon works.
- 28:29Bing West: The military have all these officers who say we need a drone Okay, they're the blueprint guys.
- 28:38Bing West: Then they go to another set of people inside the Pentagon they say now give me specifications.
- 28:46Bing West: All right, that's the engineering outline.
- 28:49Bing West: Then they turn to a company like boeing and they say now you manufacture it.
- 28:57Bing West: So what they've done is they divided the people who are the blueprint and and top engineers from the actual manufacturing, and then it's up to Boeing, without these guys being with them, to go ahead and build it.
- 29:12Bing West: And then Boeing comes back with well, I have to change this, have to change that.
- 29:15Bing West: And every time you change something, you add layers of bureaucracy, you need more money and the whole thing gradually becomes the mess it is Now what the heck is Trump going to I mean Musk going to do when he gets into the Pentagon?
- 29:31Bing West: The problem is that he's used to pulling everyone together so they're one team.
- 29:35Bing West: He's going to go in with four guys and say, okay, boeing, you're not doing it that way anymore.
- 29:41Bing West: No, I don't understand.
- 29:43Bing West: I don't mean to criticize.
- 29:45Bing West: I just mean objectively to say, the model that made him successful was that he had a special skill engineering and software and he insisted that everyone work as one team.
- 29:59Bing West: So he'd even go down to the floor and he'd walk around to the different workers and say what do you think?
- 30:06Bing West: So everyone was one team.
- 30:08Bing West: The Pentagon isn't one team, it's two or three different teams.
- 30:11Bing West: You have the civilians, you have the military and then you have the Boeings of the world.
- 30:16Bing West: And he doesn't have the authority to change that.
- 30:18Bing West: So I'm indicating for business of the military you better start with what's your mission, what's my specialty that causes me to have value added, and how do I build my value added to the mission with the group I'm given.
- 30:38Ponch Rivera: So those lessons are directly connected back to what you talked about with CAP in Vietnam and the lessons we learned in Afghanistan, Iraq.
- 30:44Ponch Rivera: I mean, that's the connection.
- 30:46Ponch Rivera: Here is what I'm hearing is there is no difference, correct?
- 30:49Mark McGrath: Yeah, yeah, I mean, like in the CAP case, I always believe.
- 30:52Bing West: Excuse me oh yeah, go ahead.
- 30:53Bing West: My problem with a lot of the generals from the start was their baloney.
- 30:59Bing West: When they said you can't win this war by killing.
- 31:03Bing West: I said, yes, you can, that's why you were there.
- 31:06Bing West: And the minute you start that baloney of saying it's drinking tea, it's persuading them.
- 31:13Bing West: You have lost your relative advantage.
- 31:16Bing West: Get the hell out of there.
- 31:17Bing West: You're not doing anything.
- 31:18Bing West: You're coming in with a rifle and a rifle does one thing it kills.
- 31:22Bing West: And if you say my rifle isn't no, no, I'm here because I can really give you money and I'm really a good guy, you just give you.
- 31:30Bing West: You have no specialty.
- 31:31Bing West: You, you have no value added.
- 31:34Mark McGrath: You have lost focus, dispersed from cap that way, so it didn't follow what cap like, cap was putting adept war fighters inside of the village.
- 31:42Mark McGrath: There was never any question that these were tactically professional warfighters.
- 31:47Mark McGrath: At the same time, the Cap Marines were able to own the strategy, own the big picture and be responsible for the strategy, even if there were 15 of them in a group of 5,000 villagers.
- 31:59Bing West: Because they knew they were there for one thing.
- 32:01Bing West: They only had one mission Be better than the Viet Cong.
- 32:04Bing West: Drive the Viet Cong out by killing them and then teach the farmers how to drive them out, nothing else.
- 32:18Bing West: 15 months Our civic action consisted that we built one.
- 32:22Bing West: Well, in 14 months.
- 32:24Bing West: I mean we were there for one thing we went out to shoot the enemy and we lost sight of that in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
- 32:35Bing West: And by the way, you could never do it in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- 32:39Bing West: The culture was so different in the Muslim religion that there's no way infidels, who are males, who are armed, are welcomed into the families inside.
- 32:53Bing West: Their entire culture was different, so you could never apply the combined action platoon the way it was done in vietnam.
- 33:04Bing West: Even if you gave the mission of saying I want to send in a squad, the squad would have been killed within a week and everyone what?
- 33:11Mark McGrath: about?
- 33:11Mark McGrath: What about?
- 33:12Mark McGrath: Uh, like the one tribe at a time with james gant and and he was still fighting, I mean he was he, was he never compromised that idea that you say about, like they had to have been warfighters first and they fought alongside the tribe, I mean, was that kind of the middle, I guess, between, say, cap and the other extreme of sort of the conventional approach in Afghanistan Was Gant on to something in Afghanistan?
- 33:39Bing West: No, it was the exception.
- 33:41Bing West: That proves the rule.
- 33:42Bing West: Look, I've never met Jim, but I'm sure I really like him.
- 33:46Bing West: He was his character.
- 33:47Bing West: But he had the balls to go into a small tribe and somehow he he sensed he might be accepted and risked his life and his small team in one small setting and he was successful.
- 34:05Bing West: But you could not duplicate that across all of Afghanistan because you wouldn't find that kind of acceptability in most of the tribes and in most of the villages.
- 34:18Bing West: Gant was truly an exceptional human being but he happened to stumble on.
- 34:27Bing West: I knew another guy like him, jake Kerr, who brought me to his village Same kind of thing, not that far from Jim Gant, about 10 miles away.
- 34:38Bing West: And Dangham was where he brought me and Jake was very, very proud and his battalion commander was really proud of him and he had a platoon and they were big strapping guys.
- 35:02Bing West: They were part of the 300 pound club, you know, where everyone has to be able to bench press 300 pounds.
- 35:04Bing West: You, the battalion commander, said you got to bring out there and show them what you're doing.
- 35:06Bing West: Well, jake was really proud and out we went and everyone's waving at him along the road.
- 35:12Bing West: Then we get to where he had built the outpost and he had done everything for the district and it's beginning to decay.
- 35:21Bing West: And he says what are you guys doing?
- 35:23Bing West: You know, I did all this work for you.
- 35:27Bing West: And then it began to get dark and somebody said well, we'll give you some bread.
- 35:31Bing West: Then they charged us $6 for each flat piece of bread and Jake got really mad.
- 35:39Bing West: He said I've done all this work for me and you're jacking up the prices.
- 35:43Bing West: And then we're looking at the Taliban who come up on the radio and say hey, lieutenant Kerr, let's see you come across the border into Pakistan fell.
- 35:54Bing West: Because the basic kinds of people we were dealing with were willing to take our money, but in their hearts they hadn't changed.
- 36:15Bing West: They believed the Taliban were going to win.
- 36:16Bing West: They're right on the border.
- 36:16Bing West: Some of their cousins and sons were working for the Taliban, so they played us.
- 36:20Bing West: So one recipe doesn't fit everywhere, but overall Jim Gant, who was so successful, it's because he hit one of those small tribes that was willing to take a risk with us, but overall 95% of them were not.
- 36:40Bing West: And we never, never sent our squads into the villages to live.
- 36:46Bing West: We just didn't do.
- 36:47Bing West: It Never happened.
- 36:48Bing West: It wasn't scalable, correct, it never happened.
- 36:52Bing West: And it did it.
- 36:52Bing West: And I understand that, gant really.
- 36:54Bing West: Maybe he disobeyed orders when he did it too, but most of the time in Iraq and Afghanistan, the vast majority of the time, you did not send a 15-man unit into a village to live there.
- 37:07Bing West: You didn't do it because you knew they wouldn't make it.
- 37:09Ponch Rivera: And this goes back to understanding first principles, understanding the why.
- 37:13Ponch Rivera: We know in business right now people will look to other organizations and copy what they did and hope it works for them, but that doesn't scale and the reason for that is you have to understand the why.
- 37:23Ponch Rivera: And you gave me a good context on on what happened with the scenario with Grant I'm sorry, what's his name?
- 37:29Ponch Rivera: Again, Grant.
- 37:30Bing West: Yeah, jim, grant Jim.
- 37:31Ponch Rivera: Grant, Sorry, I got that wrong there, and that's that's something that is happening all the time is listen to how we did it and you should do it this way too.
- 37:39Ponch Rivera: That may work for you, but what I understand from your experiences is, again you got to understand the why, got to understand the context and apply the right approach based off that context.
- 37:53Bing West: And what do you have to offer that's different than what already exists?
- 37:57Bing West: Right, and you also have to have an idea.
- 37:59Bing West: Define for me mission success.
- 38:03Bing West: Now, once you define mission success as I'm pulling the Americans out and what we've done will remain intact then you're saying I have to have trained a system that doesn't need me anymore.
- 38:21Bing West: And that means I have to have and here's where we fail I have to have authority to select the right fighters among the Iraqis and Afghanis and Vietnamese.
- 38:35Bing West: But that's called the British colonial model, where they selected the officers and NCOs.
- 38:46Bing West: And we said well, we're not colonialists, we won't do that.
- 38:50Bing West: So we had inherently, from the top down, from the start, a mix-up between our democratic principles and what we thought we were doing, and by that I mean we did all the work and we turned it over to a bunch of punks.
- 39:06Bing West: I mean, there's no other way you can put it.
- 39:09Bing West: The prime minister of Iraq that was finally thrown out when ISIS took over everything, Maliki.
- 39:17Bing West: Maliki was a cunning Shiite who hated the Sunnis, and yet Karzai in Afghanistan.
- 39:26Bing West: He had a screw loose, but he was more pro-Taliban.
- 39:31Bing West: And he's the president.
- 39:33Bing West: And yet President Bush, he believed there are different theories of history.
- 39:39Bing West: Most people have the idea that President Bush has that only a few people change history.
- 39:47Bing West: A Napoleon changes history, a Churchill or Roosevelt or Stalin or Mao Zedong or Trump?
- 39:56Bing West: It is the worship of the people at the top as the true leaders, rather than the culture.
- 40:05Bing West: Now, tolstoy had a different viewpoint, which I share much more, that history is driven much more by the cultures of people than it is by the individual leaders.
- 40:15Bing West: But Bush didn't.
- 40:18Bing West: I'm sure Bush never had this conversation with anybody.
- 40:21Bing West: But Bush believed because he was at the top and he seems like a good guy.
- 40:25Bing West: But he had this idea so does General Petraeus and a lot of them that I'm better and I'm smarter of Iraq and the prime minister of Afghanistan once a week on a televideo.
- 40:36Bing West: And we'll get to know each other as the men at the top and I'll wink at him and he'll wink at me and I'll gradually shape him so that he accepts my values.
- 41:00Bing West: And then I've succeeded and built a democratic nation.
- 41:04Bing West: And here's do you know that Maliki used to laugh?
- 41:08Bing West: He used to laugh at President Bush.
- 41:11Bing West: When he'd hang up the phone He'd say that fool he's doing it again and Karzai would explode and complain I love the American people but I hate you at the top.
- 41:24Bing West: You cannot change the character of a 50-year-old.
- 41:29Mark McGrath: So it seems like in the case of, say, cap, where General Walt and General Krulak, they're relying in a model, they're creating or allowing for a model that was decentralized, that we have professional Marines, from the commandant all the way down to the lowest rifleman.
- 41:47Mark McGrath: Every Marine's a rifleman, every Marine can own the strategy.
- 41:50Mark McGrath: There's a system of behaviors in place such that small units can be empowered and decentralized to carry out a mission, versus having a top-down sort of I'm in control, sort of, say, westmoreland approach or the others that you've mentioned.
- 42:05Mark McGrath: That the bottom-up marine approach, in that system that we have always, is going to potentially have an advantage in chaotic, non-linear environments like villages in a country like Vietnam.
- 42:19Bing West: Let's make two distinctions.
- 42:20Bing West: Okay, if it is a war where it is the American military, the Marines, or the army, but the Marines with their own mission, then the whole concept of what you just articulated is correct, mark, that you decentralize.
- 42:38Bing West: You say, look guys, this is our objective, I'm not going to tell you.
- 42:42Bing West: You have commander's intent, you let them do it, and you definitely do not have people at the top with their powerpoint trying to tell you, when you patrol all that kind of crap, you, you don't do that okay, yes, yeah, now that works because you have your own culture.
- 42:59Bing West: You're, you're, you're inside your own culture okay, it's a marine culture.
- 43:02Bing West: You're out there and you have an enemy culture.
- 43:03Bing West: You're inside your own culture, okay, it's a Marine culture.
- 43:04Bing West: You're out there and you have an enemy and you're going to destroy them and you say, okay, guys, this is how we're going to do it.
- 43:10Bing West: That's the Mattis approach.
- 43:11Bing West: If you will, jim Mattis, that works.
- 43:14Bing West: If it is you as an integral unit.
- 43:19Bing West: Now that's different than if you say to me I want a nation build and have others do this rather than me.
- 43:27Bing West: Once you've said it, I want the combined action platoon somehow to become the vietnamese platoon after I leave.
- 43:35Bing West: Once you do that, then you have to say no matter how good my individual squad is in the village, there has to be connecting rods in the Vietnamese system that work so that they have the same support and dedication all the way up that you have in the Marine Corps.
- 43:56Bing West: And that's where we failed, but not as badly.
- 44:00Bing West: Where we failed, but not as badly.
- 44:01Bing West: Actually, we did a better job in Vietnam.
- 44:05Bing West: But still, always you get back to this and I don't think we're going to repeat it again.
- 44:10Bing West: But you have three instances Vietnam, iraq and Afghanistan, where we thought we were going to build another nation, but we weren't going to determine who their leaders were.
- 44:23Bing West: No, I mean, you end up with punks at the top, and so you have to be willing to take the old English model, and then that's unacceptable now in our culture.
- 44:37Bing West: So you're stuck, but going forward.
- 44:41Bing West: It seems to me that, yeah, let's look at the world as we go forward.
- 44:46Bing West: In what we're facing, china is coming at us.
- 44:50Bing West: There's no doubt in my mind, sooner or later over Taiwan.
- 44:54Bing West: And the big issue there to me more than anything else is if our American system has said, we will not say whether or not we're going to defend Taiwan, well, in my judgment, if we're called out, we will not defend Taiwan, because you put yourself into a position where, at the last minute, you have to say to the American people we have to fight for this tiny little island in the middle of nowhere, but you've done nothing to articulate that the threat is so great that you have to take this last stand.
- 45:27Bing West: So you'd have to begin to change your entire way in which you're talking about China, or you could do something else you could say to the Taiwanese look, you're a freeloader the way the Germans are, but we're not going to come.
- 45:46Bing West: You should smarten up, because there's a good chance we won't be there for you.
- 45:51Bing West: However, there's no way that China can have an amphibious assault that works.
- 46:00Bing West: Amphibious assault that works.
- 46:07Bing West: China is building an amphibious system of boats and vessels as large as our Normandy invasion in 1944.
- 46:12Bing West: They're looking at 2,000 vessels moving at once.
- 46:17Bing West: But?
- 46:18Bing West: But the Ukraine has shown us that most people the Ukraine is turning out 1 million to 2 million drones a year and the Ukraine has no money.
- 46:33Bing West: Taiwan only spends 2.5% of its gross national product for its own defense because it thinks we're going to do it for them.
- 46:40Bing West: Taiwan leads the world in semiconductor chips.
- 46:46Bing West: If Taiwan wanted to for above 4% of its gross national product, it could have 2 million drones a year.
- 46:56Bing West: With artificial intelligence, that would mean it was sending 2,000 to 4,000 drones against every Chinese ship.
- 47:07Bing West: It'd be impossible to invade Taiwan, but the Taiwanese won't do it and we will not, in my judgment, over the next four years, do anything to really say hey, smutting up, you're going to have to do this.
- 47:29Bing West: So I see, when I look at the next four years, the Middle East is going to be a mess, but President Trump has pretty much promised he's not going to get involved militarily anywhere.
- 47:39Bing West: Okay, so you slide by, but we are headed for a huge disaster, I think in about 2032 because of our debt.
- 47:49Bing West: He's going to add to our debt about $2 trillion because he has to pay for Social Security and Medicare that are now out of money.
- 47:58Bing West: We spend 30 cents on every dollar of our gross national product on welfare, transferring money to those who don't do as well, and you can't run a system like that forever and, as a result, our debt is going to be.
- 48:16Bing West: If you're a bondholder, the Wharton School has done an interesting study.
- 48:20Bing West: When do people decide that America has too much debt and what do they do about it?
- 48:25Bing West: Well, the answer is that if you're going to invest in a company, let alone a nation, it turns out the break point where people no longer will pay into that company and the company goes bankrupt is when a company has to use more than 30% of its revenues to pay for its debt every year.
- 48:50Bing West: Okay, right now we're paying.
- 48:52Bing West: 25% of all the money that comes in to our federal treasury from taxes is going out about 22 to 25% in interest for our debt.
- 49:06Bing West: Well, at some point you have to say I'm holding a bond, maybe I'm better off taking my money while the dollar is very sound and putting it into Bitcoin or putting it into real estate or putting it into some other countries, you know doing something with it because I'm afraid that other people are going to start pulling out their money.
- 49:30Bing West: And when you hit that tip over point the Wharton School indicates now you've got a real problem because everyone's stampeding to get out of the bonds at the same time and when that happens, you have to print more money and then you're in a vicious cycle.
- 49:45Bing West: At that particular point, I think is when China will say put up a shut up about Taiwan.
- 49:53Bing West: So I see a crisis coming, but it won't come under President Trump.
- 49:57Bing West: It'll come about two years after President Trump.
- 50:01Bing West: It'll be the next president, because we're just going to continue to add to the debt.
- 50:05Bing West: So people say well, ben, you're talking about the debt.
- 50:08Ponch Rivera: That's not national security, and I say yes, it is, yes, it is, it is our national security.
- 50:13Ponch Rivera: I think it's our biggest threat right now, I would say as far.
- 50:16Mark McGrath: I agree.
- 50:17Mark McGrath: Well, so we're talking about the Marine Corps.
- 50:19Mark McGrath: We're talking about the Marine Corps.
- 50:21Mark McGrath: We're talking about how the Marine Corps has modified itself or changed itself through the years.
- 50:28Mark McGrath: There's a book, first to Fight by Joe Krulak about how the Marine Corps and it seems that there's a couple of different arguments about that.
- 50:35Mark McGrath: Some may be more of the traditional mindset of that we're losing our mission, we're losing our identity as warfighters.
- 50:54Mark McGrath: Others that say you know, we have to change, we have to adapt to a specific threat.
- 51:03Ponch Rivera: And Moose.
- 51:04Ponch Rivera: From my perspective, the battle lines between what is right and wrong is really about those that are still inside and those that are outside.
- 51:11Ponch Rivera: That's kind of what I'm seeing.
- 51:11Ponch Rivera: I don't know if Bing shares the same view as that, but those that are inside the system are saying that FD2030 is the right path, and then there are others that you know on the outside that are probably going to question it.
- 51:23Ponch Rivera: So how do you see that forces?
- 51:27Bing West: on 2030 playing out.
- 51:28Bing West: Let me go back a little bit and come forward.
- 51:31Bing West: Okay, about six or seven years ago, the commandant before the current commandant said our national security strategy is to be prepared for a conflict with China.
- 51:44Bing West: The Marine Corps has done nothing about that.
- 51:47Bing West: Therefore, I'm going to change and we're going to have what he called littoral regiments, and our contribution is going to be that I'm going to use Marines to go forward into small islands in the Philippines and go ashore with about altogether 400 anti-ship missiles, but I'll spread them out and therefore I'll be right near China and when war comes, we can strike at some of the naval vessels of China, and this will be the contribution that the Marine Corps makes to the larger effort he said.
- 52:30Bing West: However, in order to do that, we don't have money, so I'm going to have to reduce our infantry and I don't believe we need artillery anymore because we're in a different kind of environment.
- 52:43Bing West: So we're going to do away with most of our artillery and replace it with some rockets, but we won't need as many rockets and our tactical air.
- 52:52Bing West: We'll have to reduce our tactical air to get some money and we don't need tanks on these islands, so we'll do away with our tanks and we don't need bridging because we're not going into places with rivers.
- 53:06Bing West: So we'll do away with our bridges and I will do that.
- 53:11Bing West: So I will take the money from the Marine Corps to do a mission that is paramount.
- 53:16Bing West: And he did this without consulting.
- 53:19Bing West: He had a very small group and he said one way people believe they have to change is you have to do it suddenly and you can't involve everybody, because if you do, there'll be antibodies, so you just do it as a fait accompli.
- 53:33Bing West: So he overrode the system they didn't know what was happening and announced this Well, there are 24 retired four-stars, the 24 retired four-stars, and they don't.
- 53:46Bing West: It's a small outfit, but not that small.
- 53:48Bing West: All of them were shaking their heads and looking at this different ways and finally, gradually, all 24 said this is crazy, that what he has done is he has made us, the Marines, not capable of fighting in an urban area because we no longer have tanks.
- 54:09Bing West: He's cut back our infantry, so he's made us less valuable to small conflicts anywhere in order to have the ability to kill some Chinese ships.
- 54:20Bing West: And that began a big debate.
- 54:23Bing West: However, now let's look at what happened.
- 54:26Bing West: That was six years ago.
- 54:28Bing West: Then that commandant chose the next commandant who's now there, and he said we're going to continue with this and if you're inside the Marine Corps, you better listen up, otherwise get out, get on board or get out.
- 54:41Bing West: In the meantime, all the people who are outside are saying you're cuckoo and and when you're not gonna, you're sending us down a cul-de-sac.
- 54:50Bing West: And now it's come to an end.
- 54:52Bing West: I mean, I think it's over, because in order to do this, there were, there were three, three things that had to be done.
- 55:02Bing West: First, you had to assume they want 36 ships to bring the missiles forward, okay, and each ship will carry roughly four missiles.
- 55:15Bing West: So each ship that don't exist turns out.
- 55:20Bing West: They said well, it'll cost $200, $300, $400 million.
- 55:24Bing West: Well, it turns out, altogether that's $13 billion for these ships with one mission, $13 billion that the Navy has to put up with the Marine Corps.
- 55:38Bing West: Then they bought missiles that can shoot 100 miles.
- 55:43Bing West: Well, technology, that was four years ago.
- 55:47Bing West: Technology now has missiles that go 2,500 miles for the same cost.
- 55:54Bing West: So they ended up getting themselves way out of position where they need ships that the navy is not going to build, that the whole system doesn't work and they have missiles that are obsolete.
- 56:10Bing West: So it's going to crash.
- 56:14Bing West: It has crashed.
- 56:16Bing West: It's just a question when people admit that it's crashed, not that it because the Navy under this administration.
- 56:24Bing West: The chances of the Navy putting $13 billion into vulnerable ships to go forward.
- 56:32Ponch Rivera: The chances are zero With one mission.
- 56:34Ponch Rivera: That's not what we do.
- 56:35Ponch Rivera: We don't do that.
- 56:36Ponch Rivera: We can't do that.
- 56:38Bing West: It makes no sense.
- 56:39Bing West: And whether the commandant even makes it through four years would be interesting, because he's way out over his skis Wow.
- 56:49Ponch Rivera: And I mean we were talking about bombardments from space.
- 56:52Ponch Rivera: You know, that's something that just popped up on our radar in the last few years, or last few weeks actually.
- 56:56Ponch Rivera: So, going back to Bing's point about something being obsolete, the life cycle of a product, of a weapon, is so short right now, right, so the technology that we have today that we want to implement in three years, will be obsolete in three years.
- 57:09Bing West: Yeah, yes, again, ukraine is out in front of us.
- 57:13Bing West: Ukraine now has a system where if you're producing drones and the Russians are figuring out how to counter them, that they have a loop where they immediately keep adjusting practically every day in their factories as the iteration from the battlefield comes in.
- 57:31Bing West: It's a wonderful system, but our structure, with 70% of all the contracts that are given out for our procurement come through five corporations five.
- 57:43Bing West: It's an oligopoly that has controlled things for the last 30 years.
- 57:48Bing West: That system is stunted and it's too vertical and disconnected.
- 57:54Bing West: The idea of saying to that system get into a loop where you can, you can quickly change in a month or less as you're getting feedback.
- 58:03Bing West: You can't do it now.
- 58:05Bing West: Musk if you're doing a musk approach.
- 58:07Bing West: You could yeah, yeah and.
- 58:09Bing West: And therefore this deputy secretary of defense that's coming in, this guy Feinstein.
- 58:14Bing West: He's supposedly a very tough guy and supposedly he's going to divest himself of almost a billion dollars to take that job.
- 58:26Bing West: If he comes in, I'm sure that he's going to be ruthless toward the obsolete system we now have.
- 58:35Mark McGrath: Do you think the Marine Corps is to the point of no return?
- 58:39Bing West: It's hovering there.
- 58:40Bing West: I believe the anti-Chinese ship mission has failed.
- 58:46Bing West: They have not yet acknowledged it and, like any good bureaucracy, they'll try to get off that diving board without admitting.
- 58:54Bing West: They're out there on that diving board which will mean that it may take another five years for them to recover in a lot of ways, especially not having artillery, and they gave up having drones.
- 59:07Bing West: I mean, the whole thing is crazy.
- 59:08Bing West: Do you realize that that the ukraine, the average cost of a drone in the ukraine is 750?
- 59:15Bing West: And okay, they, you know the pieces of junk, blah, blah, blah, but they get the job done yeah we have something like one one hundredth.
- 59:23Bing West: We have something like 50 000 drones that cost 50 000 each.
- 59:27Bing West: I mean, you know, come on, where are we?
- 59:31Bing West: We, we're so gold-plated, and then we say we don't have the munitions.
- 59:35Bing West: Well, we don't have the munitions because we have a system that is so speltified and so filled with bureaucracy that we can't do things cheaply.
- 59:58Mark McGrath: Yeah.
- 59:58Mark McGrath: Do you think we've lost our?
- 59:59Bing West: I don't mean the Marine Corps, I just mean the larger establishment.
- 1:00:01Bing West: You know, have we really lost our way as like a warfighter culture?
- 1:00:03Bing West: Well, I think the jury is out because we haven't gone to war, but it's going to be a close thing.
- 1:00:13Bing West: Look, we're up to what?
- 1:00:13Bing West: 20% of the force is female, and I don't mean that in itself, but there've been a lot of studies on the bat, but they're not on the battlefield.
- 1:00:22Bing West: So let's just put that aside.
- 1:00:23Bing West: Let's say we job is lethality.
- 1:00:25Bing West: Do they all believe I am here not to have a job?
- 1:00:39Bing West: I'm here because I am a warfighter who believes that I have to prevail in war and that means killing the enemy Is the lodestar of the military lethality and I believe we lost that yeah.
- 1:00:55Ponch Rivera: I think we lost that years ago too.
- 1:00:57Bing West: Reverend Austin did a terrible job, but he's gone.
- 1:00:59Bing West: Now I don't know what to think of the new secretary coming in.
- 1:01:03Bing West: I'll hope that he says a lot of the right things, maybe, but the whole idea of our culture, which is what you're asking.
- 1:01:09Bing West: Has our culture changed so that we really can't bring ourselves as a nation to be united for our own self and fight when we have to?
- 1:01:21Bing West: The historian Toynbee said no great civilization has ever been murdered.
- 1:01:29Bing West: They all commit suicide.
- 1:01:31Bing West: And what he means is every civilization, every great power at some point tilts over and becomes too self-indulgent and it loses its focus, it loses its vigor and it'll happen eventually to the United States.
- 1:01:48Bing West: There's no such thing as saying we're the one nation, that is.
- 1:01:52Bing West: 10,000 years of history don't pertain to us.
- 1:01:55Bing West: The question you're asking, mark, is have we gotten near that point?
- 1:02:00Bing West: I say yes, we have.
- 1:02:01Mark McGrath: If you carry that analogy, does it apply to the Marine Corps?
- 1:02:04Mark McGrath: Is the Marine Corps committing suicide?
- 1:02:06Bing West: I believe, from what I hear, the answer is no.
- 1:02:09Bing West: No, that inside the ranks it's still pretty good, it just has gone a little bit in the wrong strategic direction.
- 1:02:19Bing West: But this gets all the way back to a fundamental question that the Pentagon will not undertake to answer, which is why do people join the military?
- 1:02:31Bing West: And do you know that overall those joining, the propensity to join, has dropped dramatically?
- 1:02:39Bing West: And then the question becomes why and how did this happen?
- 1:02:43Bing West: And there are surveys indicating that the military has been a family business for generations, that something in the order of 70% of those who come in come in because somebody, an uncle, an aunt, somebody, was in the military and says you know they're pretty good.
- 1:03:06Mark McGrath: I'm guilty of that.
- 1:03:06Mark McGrath: My dad was a retired army officer.
- 1:03:08Bing West: Exactly army officer, exactly that cohort.
- 1:03:20Bing West: Okay, the, the veterans, their support for joining the military has dropped from something like 85 to 60 percent in the last three years.
- 1:03:26Bing West: That is extraordinary, and it was due basically to dei.
- 1:03:31Bing West: Now they done away, because people were cynical about it.
- 1:03:34Bing West: Now they've done away with DEI or they're about to.
- 1:03:37Bing West: But you're asking, does our culture, our America, have a cohesion so that we have a subset of people that really, really feel compelled to serve and, by gosh, they understand that they are there with one mission and that is to be lethal?
- 1:03:57Bing West: I can't answer that, mark, but I'm worried about it.
- 1:04:01Mark McGrath: Yeah Well, I wanted to tie a couple things back just to questions about CAP, because I think, again, it's something that needs a lot more study.
- 1:04:13Mark McGrath: When Ponch and I were in the archives at Marine Corps University in Quantico, you know and we do a lot of research on the theories of John Boyd and how to apply the theories of John Boyd.
- 1:04:25Mark McGrath: Incidentally, did you ever interact with Boyd or meet with Boyd?
- 1:04:35Bing West: Fortunately I never met with him and he had died, you know.
- 1:04:36Bing West: But I was very, very close with the commandant at the time.
- 1:04:38Bing West: He was just, you know, a real character, but he had tremendous influence.
- 1:04:41Bing West: Tremendous influence and I can't speak highly enough about him, you know just.
- 1:04:49Mark McGrath: Today's.
- 1:04:49Mark McGrath: Well, today would have been his 98th birthday when we're recording, so we're fitting that, we're glad that we have you.
- 1:04:54Mark McGrath: I should point out too that a book that cites your work of the army in vietnam, by andrew kropinovich, was one of boyd's favorites that he would discuss in patterns of conflict, um, and they cite one of your rand reports about small unit.
- 1:05:07Mark McGrath: Andrew kropinovich used one of your rand reports on uh, on small unit action, in his book and I, of course, as you started off, I figured it out Well, fj West, yeah, that's big, so what I was saying?
- 1:05:22Mark McGrath: So Potch and I were in the archives a couple of years ago and one of the things that they were giving out, the history division had a booklet.
- 1:05:29Mark McGrath: It was a blue cover and it's the United States Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam March 65 to March 66.
- 1:05:37Mark McGrath: And it was written by a then-Captain, russell Stolfi, who I understand became a professor at Naval Postgraduate School for many, many years.
- 1:05:47Mark McGrath: And what was interesting about it is that it was signed for approval january of 68, that general nickerson approved it on 9 january 1968, the month of tet.
- 1:06:00Mark McGrath: Right, that's what I was looking at it, the month of the tet offensive.
- 1:06:03Mark McGrath: And what was interesting too about the booklet about civic action was in the back there were the principles of cap you know ponch had asked about.
- 1:06:14Mark McGrath: You know are their first principles were.
- 1:06:16Mark McGrath: There were their concepts that were driving and captain stolfi.
- 1:06:20Mark McGrath: Then captain stolfi had six.
- 1:06:22Mark McGrath: Are you familiar with that, with that booklet or that, that historical rendition?
- 1:06:28Bing West: I'm not, mark, no no, anyway.
- 1:06:30Mark McGrath: The first one was uh, continuous action, like I think you kind of hit on this, like if it's not continuous and you leave, you're opening yourself up for failure because the consistency is lost.
- 1:06:40Mark McGrath: That was the first one.
- 1:06:43Mark McGrath: The second one was local, that it had to be functioned through the local people.
- 1:06:48Mark McGrath: We had to meet them where they were.
- 1:06:51Mark McGrath: The third one was that the programs had to be related to basic needs, so in addition to security, as you say from very adept warfighters, that the local needs still had to be met.
- 1:07:03Mark McGrath: Anyway, no, I was just pulling that out because it did look like the Marine Corps was trying to talk about this.
- 1:07:08Mark McGrath: But I guess I'd ask you when Tet happened, did the mindset and the thinking about Cap kind of take a backseat?
- 1:07:17Mark McGrath: Did people stop thinking about that because the war got so kinetic?
- 1:07:20Bing West: No it was the exact opposite.
- 1:07:22Bing West: It's the opposite that Tet proved combined action platoon.
- 1:07:27Bing West: What happened in Tet stunned everybody.
- 1:07:33Bing West: But the objective of the North Vietnamese was to seize Hue City and to seize Da Nang.
- 1:07:39Bing West: Da Nang was bigger than Hue City.
- 1:07:42Bing West: Da Nang was the headquarters.
- 1:07:43Bing West: They sent probably maybe 30 or 40 battalions toward Da Nang.
- 1:07:52Bing West: They never got there.
- 1:07:54Bing West: They never got to the city because they kept bumping into the combined action platoons and what had happened was, as they were moving in units of 500 to a thousand, with a couple of local guides, all the village, the villages you're out there, and the whole place lit up.
- 1:08:11Bing West: Everyone out in the field said Holy smokes and they all ran home.
- 1:08:15Bing West: Everywhere, the word spread throughout the villages.
- 1:08:20Bing West: So here are all the combined action platoons.
- 1:08:23Bing West: There are about 30 or 40 of them over the course of about 10 by 10 miles, in about 10 by 10 miles.
- 1:08:31Bing West: So they're not integrated one with the other, but they're close enough.
- 1:08:35Bing West: So the word spread in the course of eight hours my God, all of these people are coming.
- 1:08:42Bing West: So everyone buttoned up and then immediately went to full alert and all of a sudden the North Vietnamese had a plan that said you overrun the combined action platoons because they're the outposts.
- 1:08:53Bing West: And then you mass against the city.
- 1:08:56Bing West: They never got through the combined action platoons.
- 1:09:01Bing West: Not one combined action platoon out of something like 32 fell, but some of them fought without stop for seven days.
- 1:09:10Bing West: And the North Vietnamese high command the communications going back and forth was unbelievable because the North Vietnamese were saying, holy smokes, you know, we've run into a beehive.
- 1:09:23Bing West: And then they were getting all.
- 1:09:25Bing West: Every single combined action platoon, of course, already had all their fire registration points on their maps, you know.
- 1:09:32Bing West: So all they had to do was call for Bravo Zulu 172, bravo Zulu 174, and they were getting continuous artillery and air support.
- 1:09:41Bing West: And these guys were right exactly where the arty spots were, because it was where you would think the troops were coming to try to take you.
- 1:09:49Bing West: And after the battle was over, the combined action platoons were lauded by everybody and suddenly wanted, even General Westmoreland changed his mind a little bit about the combined action platoons and began something called the MTTs, because everyone said look at what happened.
- 1:10:07Bing West: I mean, it was amazing.
- 1:10:09Bing West: Now, it couldn't have happened if it weren't for artillery and air support.
- 1:10:13Bing West: But we all know every single squad.
- 1:10:16Bing West: When you go somewhere, you immediately take your artillery points and put them on a map so you have them all, so you don't have to be scrambling if you hit at night, and then you simply put the aircraft where the artillery is.
- 1:10:30Bing West: It was, I mean, the North Vietnamese.
- 1:10:32Bing West: 10,000 to 20,000 North Vietnamese were incapable of getting through.
- 1:10:37Bing West: It was amazing.
- 1:10:39Mark McGrath: So is it fair to sum up and say that a decentralized approach with small teams upheld a massive chaotic onslaught from a much larger superior force?
- 1:10:50Bing West: Absolutely.
- 1:10:51Bing West: I mean all the data.
- 1:10:52Bing West: The data is overwhelming.
- 1:10:53Mark McGrath: Yeah, it's amazing, a couple of questions of names.
- 1:10:57Mark McGrath: So one name that kept emerging in a lot of my study on CAP was Paul Eck.
- 1:11:01Mark McGrath: Yes, did you know him?
- 1:11:04Bing West: I did not.
- 1:11:04Bing West: I never had the honor of personally knowing Paul.
- 1:11:07Bing West: He was the one who really began it up near Way City.
- 1:11:09Bing West: Everyone spoke very highly of him.
- 1:11:13Mark McGrath: Yeah, and it seems he died quite young.
- 1:11:15Mark McGrath: Uh, that's yeah, yeah, the colonel.
- 1:11:16Bing West: Another name, uh, william corson, that wrote a I knew, I knew wild bill, of course everyone uh, now he.
- 1:11:23Mark McGrath: Now he wrote a couple of famous books.
- 1:11:25Mark McGrath: He did one.
- 1:11:26Bing West: One was called the betrayal, what maybe you could unpack a little about, a little about, because the betrayal came out in 1968 as well yeah, well, I mean bill corson was, I think he was a full colonel and he was put in charge of all of us in the small different areas and he was a true believer and he felt that general westmoreland was a terrible human being.
- 1:11:47Bing West: But what bill never quite got was that general Walt never ordered the Combined Action Platoon to be a strategy.
- 1:11:58Bing West: It always remained a tactic.
- 1:12:00Bing West: That is the word in the Marine Corps.
- 1:12:03Bing West: Never was look, let's pull them all together and integrate them and have a strategy.
- 1:12:09Bing West: So we do this systematically.
- 1:12:11Bing West: The General Walt left it up to every battalion commander what he wanted to do.
- 1:12:18Bing West: Well, some battalion commanders wanted to do it, some didn't, so it was patchwork.
- 1:12:24Mark McGrath: I see.
- 1:12:25Bing West: Corson liked General Walt, so he didn't complain about that.
- 1:12:29Bing West: Instead, he just complained about General Westmoreland not being behind him.
- 1:12:34Bing West: But in truth, the Marines themselves never took the combined action platoon from a tactic to a strategy.
- 1:12:41Bing West: I see.
- 1:12:43Mark McGrath: Now imagine Monday morning quarterback that one.
- 1:12:46Mark McGrath: So had they done that, I think it's probably a safe historical bet to say that things would have turned out a lot differently in Vietnam who was the ops officer, a Marine down at headquarters with General Westmoreland.
- 1:13:14Bing West: We never really got it to his attention, but the proposition was to do exactly what you're saying Instead of making them individual, put them all out there but then tie them all together and you would save dramatically on your manpower.
- 1:13:27Bing West: It was the exact opposite of intuitively what people thought.
- 1:13:31Bing West: But if they looked at it for a moment, we did the mathematics.
- 1:13:34Bing West: If I take 10 squads and put them in, each squad has two kilometers by two kilometers, then for the sake of 150, I'm doing the job of a battalion with a thousand.
- 1:13:47Bing West: Unfortunately, we never had a strategic thinker at the level to say come on, we can do this and it would benefit us more and we would save manpower.
- 1:14:02Bing West: Instead, they believed the opposite.
- 1:14:04Bing West: They believed it had to be added on to keeping all the battalions on the hillside and they never said let's have a trade-off here.
- 1:14:13Mark McGrath: Was General Krulak trying to drive that as a strategy, and is that why he got relieved?
- 1:14:18Bing West: No, Krulak really wasn't relieved.
- 1:14:23Bing West: Krulak was angling with President Kennedy for big things.
- 1:14:29Bing West: General Krulak thought in big terms.
- 1:14:31Bing West: He was thinking far beyond the Marine Corps.
- 1:14:33Bing West: He was thinking of where he might go.
- 1:14:35Bing West: You know that sort of thing.
- 1:14:37Bing West: So no, and he was in Hawaii.
- 1:14:39Bing West: General Kulak was in Hawaii.
- 1:14:44Bing West: General Kulak's focus was really at the very high level.
- 1:14:46Bing West: It was trying to persuade the president and then Johnson I'm sorry I got it a little mixed up Kulak and Kennedy.
- 1:14:53Bing West: President Kennedy got along very, very well.
- 1:14:56Bing West: General Krulak was never able to penetrate Lyndon Johnson's gang and Lyndon Johnson never wanted to be in the war.
- 1:15:06Bing West: He was a terrible president in terms of wartime, terrible, terrible.
- 1:15:10Ponch Rivera: Hey Bing, I really enjoyed your New Killer Apps article that you pushed out in the last 10 days or so talking about Defense in terms of wartime Terrible, terrible.
- 1:15:13Ponch Rivera: Hey Bing, I really enjoyed your new killer apps article that you pushed out in the last 10 days or so talking about defense innovation unit.
- 1:15:19Ponch Rivera: Oh right, yeah, yeah.
- 1:15:19Ponch Rivera: So that was my last assignment in the Navy Reserve.
- 1:15:22Ponch Rivera: I was assigned to what we identified as a brokerage it's not an innovation unit.
- 1:15:26Ponch Rivera: And then in your article, you have a great line in here that I just want to read out.
- 1:15:30Ponch Rivera: At least have a great line in here that I just want to read out at least some of it.
- 1:15:38Ponch Rivera: The Pentagon is producing several thousand exquisite Lamborghinis instead of a million cheap but solid Mustangs, and that's again I think it's an article that I want everybody to read who's listening to this episode, and we'll put that link into the episode notes.
- 1:15:47Mark McGrath: Thank you, punch Question.
- 1:15:49Mark McGrath: Now, this is just a historical curiosity now, and also being a fellow Marine, there's another Marine Vietnam very controversial that also worked with Rand was Daniel Ellsberg.
- 1:15:59Mark McGrath: Did you ever know him or interact with him at Rand?
- 1:16:04Bing West: Yeah, I did.
- 1:16:05Mark McGrath: All right, I'll tell you.
- 1:16:07Bing West: Yeah, let's hear it.
- 1:16:08Bing West: Rand hired me because I had gone to Princeton, the Wilson School, etc.
- 1:16:14Bing West: But they hired me to go right back to Vietnam.
- 1:16:17Bing West: So I did for them for years and when I first got there, jim Schlesinger who later became the Secretary of Defense and I was his special assistant when Saigon fell and Albert Wohlstetter and Charlie Wolfe some of the big gurus at RAND, and RAND was very highly thought of.
- 1:16:37Bing West: Now we're back in 1967.
- 1:16:40Bing West: They brought me down a corridor in RAND and they said oh, we'd like you to meet a very special analyst.
- 1:16:47Bing West: And with that that was all they said.
- 1:16:49Bing West: They brought me to the cubicle of dan ellsberg and opened the door, said hi, dan, you know this is bing wesley said hi and they left.
- 1:17:00Bing West: I thought they left and I sat there and and we began to talk he had been a marine and, uh, he's a very intense, wiry little guy.
- 1:17:11Bing West: And I look and he has a photograph in black and white and it shows him in camis, with a helmet, with a Thompson submachine gun from World War II and a helmet that is filled with water and froth and a K-bar big knife and it shows that he's shaving.
- 1:17:35Bing West: And I burst out laughing and I said that's a great send-up.
- 1:17:40Bing West: And he looked at me indignantly and he said well, I guess you don't have too much field time.
- 1:17:46Bing West: And I thought, are you thing me?
- 1:17:50Bing West: And it was the end of the conversation, turned off and I walked out.
- 1:17:55Bing West: I walked down the corridor and there are these three old Randites, you know, schlesinger and Wellstetter and Wolf.
- 1:18:03Bing West: And they said what'd you think?
- 1:18:04Bing West: Yeah, and I was young and I didn't.
- 1:18:08Bing West: And I said he's a fake.
- 1:18:09Bing West: And they almost applauded.
- 1:18:12Bing West: Well, it turns out that he was the favorite inside um rand at the time, the brilliant guy, etc.
- 1:18:22Bing West: And he was the one who then leaked the pentagon papers and all kinds of terrible things.
- 1:18:28Bing West: But he really, he really was a faker.
- 1:18:33Bing West: These, these old ran guys, sensed that that, that what he was saying about vietnam and his real experience was different.
- 1:18:40Bing West: But because I had been in the field, suddenly they had a guy there confirming but dan ellsberg never spoke to me again for the time.
- 1:18:48Bing West: We're in.
- 1:18:49Bing West: Did you know, john Paul Vann?
- 1:18:53Bing West: I did, I did, wow, oh, I was in Vietnam, for God.
- 1:18:59Mark McGrath: So many years.
- 1:18:59Mark McGrath: Where did he think a cap?
- 1:19:01Mark McGrath: Like you know, somebody like John Paul Vann.
- 1:19:04Bing West: I looked at him like he was one of these real, I stated.
- 1:19:09Bing West: He had me over his house.
- 1:19:11Bing West: He had a great villa, but it was way outside in the province he was in.
- 1:19:16Bing West: He had his own helicopter, he was his own warlord.
- 1:19:20Bing West: To a certain extent he was a true, true believer.
- 1:19:25Bing West: He didn't want to hear anything, he wanted to lecture you all the time, but his he wore his hat on his sleeve.
- 1:19:32Bing West: You couldn't help but to like him.
- 1:19:34Bing West: But he was a real apostle.
- 1:19:37Bing West: I mean, he was on a mission and I wondered about his not rationality, but that he was too emotional.
- 1:19:44Bing West: But he was very good to me.
- 1:19:46Bing West: He brought me around in his helicopter, blah, blah, blah.
- 1:19:49Bing West: It's just that he was a little bit too infectious for my taste in terms of a true believer.
- 1:19:58Bing West: He was going to get this accomplished huh, and he and he was.
- 1:20:02Mark McGrath: Was he pro cap?
- 1:20:03Mark McGrath: Was he positively?
- 1:20:05Mark McGrath: Oh yeah, oh yeah, he was.
- 1:20:07Mark McGrath: I would say he was, he was the.
- 1:20:09Bing West: He was the real deal.
- 1:20:10Bing West: So much the real deal that he became, I guess, almost an apostle, but he was.
- 1:20:14Bing West: He was the real deal.
- 1:20:15Bing West: So much the real deal that he became.
- 1:20:17Mark McGrath: I guess almost an apostle, but he was the real deal industries could take too.
- 1:20:32Mark McGrath: They can start extracting principles and concepts that help them better understand, that really tell the story effectively, and it may or may not have to be about CAP per se, of course.
- 1:20:39Mark McGrath: We recommend the Village by Bing West, as well as your rant papers.
- 1:20:43Ponch Rivera: I thought your work with Mattis was phenomenal with talking about effects-based operations and how we got rid of that.
- 1:20:48Ponch Rivera: Well, thank you, that is huge, because that was you know.
- 1:20:51Ponch Rivera: When we try to use that in a complicated or, excuse me, a complex space, it doesn't work.
- 1:20:55Ponch Rivera: I'm right here outside of Norfolk and we grew up with effects-based operation through JPME.
- 1:21:00Ponch Rivera: We saw a value-focused thinking in industry and we use that to explain to folks.
- 1:21:05Ponch Rivera: You can't use this in a complex space.
- 1:21:08Ponch Rivera: General Mattis did so eloquently inside that book and and thank you for doing that that's something.
- 1:21:13Ponch Rivera: Again, do you have any more insights on EBO and why it didn't work, or it did work in some?
- 1:21:19Bing West: context Two different things.
- 1:21:20Bing West: Lou Sorley's book S-O-R-L-E-Y about General Abrams is definitely worth reading.
- 1:21:30Bing West: Relative to General Mattis, that general is the worth reading.
- 1:21:32Bing West: Relative to General Mattis, that general is the real deal and his notion always was when he had a battalion first went into Desert Storm decentralize, but understand that everyone understands what the operation, the mission is, and then let them go.
- 1:21:48Bing West: For God's sakes, don't try to second-guess them.
- 1:21:52Bing West: And the other interesting thing is he never wanted to know the names of those who were killed while something was going on.
- 1:22:00Bing West: He didn't want the distraction of knowing the cost of the Joint Forces Command.
- 1:22:14Bing West: He looked at what they were doing and he said wait a minute, wait a minute, you guys really think.
- 1:22:19Bing West: And then he broke the code very quickly.
- 1:22:21Bing West: He said the Air Force at that time in warfare knew exactly what the targets were and they had more targets than they had bombs and planes at any given time.
- 1:22:31Bing West: So they had to figure out they had bombs and planes at any given time, so they had to figure out which targets were most important and then they hit them first.
- 1:22:38Bing West: So then they said therefore, we do our targeting based on effects, right?
- 1:22:43Ponch Rivera: So I was the reason I bring this up.
- 1:22:45Bing West: Effects-based operations.
- 1:22:47Ponch Rivera: Right and it worked well inside an aerospace operations center.
- 1:22:50Bing West: It was fantastic, yeah, mattis said well, that's just commonsensical if you're a bomber and you're in working in that kind of an environment, he said but are you asking me you're going to apply that to infantry warfare?
- 1:23:06Bing West: He said get out of here.
- 1:23:07Bing West: So he said look guys.
- 1:23:09Bing West: He said this doesn't work and I'm not going to fool around with it on the margin.
- 1:23:12Bing West: I'm killing it, period.
- 1:23:14Bing West: We are not warfighting according to that concept.
- 1:23:18Bing West: And then I really like Jim.
- 1:23:19Bing West: I mean he's sitting there, but he hated being away from the troops to begin with.
- 1:23:26Bing West: So here he is as a four-star.
- 1:23:28Bing West: He's supposedly in charge of all this stuff.
- 1:23:31Bing West: He knows he really isn't and he knows that he has an entire staff.
- 1:23:37Bing West: And the danger of staffs is, if they're smart they'll figure out something to do, even if they don't really have a job.
- 1:23:40Bing West: So he's sitting in a meeting with the Secretary of Defense, gates, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mullen, and several others.
- 1:23:53Bing West: Gates said we've got to cut something.
- 1:23:55Bing West: It's all over the place, this damn bureaucracy.
- 1:23:58Bing West: Mattis writes on a napkin and hands it to the chairman and says abolish my command.
- 1:24:07Bing West: And he said Mullen looked at him like this for a minute and Mattis nodded.
- 1:24:15Bing West: And so Mullen turned to Secretary Gates and said sir, let's abolish the Joint Forces Command.
- 1:24:23Bing West: With that, mattis said well, if you have to, you have to.
- 1:24:27Bing West: And Gates walked out and said I got rid of all these bureaucrats, et cetera, and, madison, I got rid of that command.
- 1:24:37Mark McGrath: Nice.
- 1:24:37Ponch Rivera: That's pretty rare yeah.
- 1:24:40Mark McGrath: Well, that's certainly a book we recommend.
- 1:24:42Mark McGrath: You're also too.
- 1:24:43Mark McGrath: You're not the only West that writes.
- 1:24:45Mark McGrath: You're not the only West who's a Marine, who writes novels and books about counterinsurgency and other things.
- 1:24:51Bing West: Well, my son Owen, he's written some really good books about his experiences, so he's carried on the tradition.
- 1:24:59Bing West: You know, his force recon, all that kind of stuff.
- 1:25:01Bing West: So we again it's you know, marines, it's the whole notion that the military is a family.
- 1:25:07Bing West: You know you hand it down in your family, you know.
- 1:25:10Mark McGrath: so yeah, Well, I got a question this came up the other day uh, there's a, there's a sub stack that we get a lot of uh traffic from, called the military reading room, and they had asked you know what?
- 1:25:19Mark McGrath: What books are?
- 1:25:20Mark McGrath: Are you know the best ones on the commandant's reading list?
- 1:25:23Mark McGrath: Of course I said the village it was taken off.
- 1:25:26Bing West: They took it off, they took it off.
- 1:25:28Bing West: So you know why they.
- 1:25:30Bing West: I call it up.
- 1:25:31Bing West: It turns out the commandant's reading list is put together by the staff and the colonel said to me we don't do counterinsurgency anymore, so we took it off the list.
- 1:25:42Bing West: And I said but this is the only example you have.
- 1:25:46Bing West: There were no officers.
- 1:25:48Bing West: Every combined action platoon was a sergeant and a corporal and and this stands the test of time about a concept of war, fighting where you trust your ncos to do the job, and you eliminated it and you said yeah, this is leadership.
- 1:26:07Mark McGrath: We didn't say it came up to our standards, I thought okay because the star, the star of the village, is really the corporals, right they?
- 1:26:15Bing West: travel.
- 1:26:15Mark McGrath: Yeah, it's the most important rank in the Marine Corps, correct?
- 1:26:18Mark McGrath: Okay?
- 1:26:22Mark McGrath: So let me rephrase the question.
- 1:26:23Mark McGrath: In addition to the village, what are the books that are not on the list that Marine leaders should be reading and not just Marines, but, of course, in business?
- 1:26:32Mark McGrath: But if you had the books that are not there anymore, what should it be?
- 1:26:37Bing West: Well, I saw these books about Abrams, so I wouldn't have that one.
- 1:26:41Bing West: If I had to choose them on my own, I would actually put the last platoon before I put the village, because the last platoon I tried to take everything that had happened in Afghanistan over 20 years and put it into one seven-day mission for one platoon, where the platoon is dealing with the drug dealers, dealing with the insurgents, dealing with the Pakistanis, and I bring it all the way up to the president at the same time, and the huge disconnect at the same time.
- 1:27:11Bing West: And the huge disconnect.
- 1:27:11Bing West: My new book that's coming out is called Winning Battles, losing Wars, where I indicate that the reason we lost three wars Vietnam, iraq and Afghanistan wasn't really, it was never our troops.
- 1:27:32Bing West: Our troops could do the job, our generals were okay, but the policy coming from the White House was so disconnected that it killed all three efforts.
- 1:27:41Bing West: And so I've written a book about that and I try to explain what I saw on the ground in all three wars versus what was happening in the White House.
- 1:27:49Bing West: And it bothers me very much and I said look, every policymaker and every president should have only one thing when he sends people into major combat, and that is that he is sending them out there to kill others and to risk dying themselves dying himself.
- 1:28:08Bing West: So he should envision himself as swinging an axe and decapitating another human being.
- 1:28:16Bing West: He should recognize that his hands are as bloody as those of a corporal and therefore he cannot.
- 1:28:26Bing West: My biggest problem at the top was that the policymakers become so conceited about their own theories that they swap theories around, realizing that somebody else is bleeding because of this, and they take their eye off the fact that if you go to war, you're going out there expecting that some of yours are going to die in order to kill the other people so that they will come to your conclusions and do your policies.
- 1:28:53Bing West: And when you get so convoluted, you keep changing your own policies and why they're out there while they're still dying.
- 1:29:08Bing West: You have betrayed not betrayed them, but you've entered a world where you shouldn't be.
- 1:29:10Bing West: Many times as the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the biggest problem is you get into an atmosphere that wreaks power.
- 1:29:17Bing West: When you walk into the White House, west Wing, and you walk into the Oval Office, I don't care who you are suddenly you realize this is the big time and you become very careful with every word that you utter, and it's very easy to get into theories at the top that have nothing to do with what's going on and believe them.
- 1:29:40Bing West: I mean like President Obama convincing himself to pull us all out of Iraq after everything we did, because he sat around with a few people and had this vision, even when the generals were telling him, sir, don't do that.
- 1:29:56Bing West: And then President Biden saying let's just get out of within a couple of months, let's just get out, period, get out.
- 1:30:05Bing West: And he ordered President Biden ordered that the embassy would stay.
- 1:30:11Bing West: Most people don't realize this.
- 1:30:13Bing West: The embassy would stay and operate as our military left.
- 1:30:19Bing West: What world was he in?
- 1:30:21Bing West: And unfortunately, I guess nobody said to him sir, what you just ordered, it just can't be done.
- 1:30:28Bing West: And that relates back to what President Bush said to a group at one point after he was finished serving, and he said you know, one of the biggest problems looking back was everyone always agreed with me and I didn't have no people.
- 1:30:42Bing West: But it's so easy when you're in that environment and it is very hierarchical.
- 1:30:50Bing West: General Mattis told me you know, there he is as a four-star.
- 1:30:54Bing West: Okay, when he was, what was he?
- 1:30:58Bing West: He was in charge of CENTCOM and in meetings with President Obama he was at the end of the table and he said he can't recall ever speaking up.
- 1:31:10Bing West: He was never asked anything.
- 1:31:12Ponch Rivera: As CENTCOM.
- 1:31:13Ponch Rivera: Wow, he was never asked anything.
- 1:31:13Ponch Rivera: Has CENTCOM said that Wow?
- 1:31:15Mark McGrath: Yeah, man, yeah Wow.
- 1:31:17Bing West: I'm so, so hierarchical.
- 1:31:19Bing West: And then, when you walk out of the meeting, the person, the people who stay behind, are the assistants to the president, and then they talk to him after everyone else has left.
- 1:31:31Bing West: In other words, we've become extremely vertical and President Trump probably reinforced this even more extremely vertical toward one person, and our democracy wasn't designed to be that.
- 1:31:47Mark McGrath: Well, bing man, I mean we could go for, I think, days on this, because I tell you there's no more fitting guest I have on John Boyd's birthday to record today, on John Boyd's birthday, january 23rd, to really get us thinking about.
- 1:32:01Mark McGrath: We've covered so many, we've covered so many topics and the beauty of, I guess the beauty of the history is that you've shared with us, that you've written about is that there's so many things that leaders can extract a lot of these lessons and apply them in whatever they're doing, and it's not really necessarily only pertinent to the military, the military profession of arms.
- 1:32:23Mark McGrath: It extends to others and it's unbelievable.
- 1:32:29Mark McGrath: We really thank you for your time today.
- 1:32:33Bing West: It's my pleasure and best of luck.
- 1:32:35Bing West: Thanks, punch, thanks, thank you.
- 1:32:37Mark McGrath: We want to uh, we want to definitely have you back to talk about winning battles and losing wars.
- 1:32:41Mark McGrath: By the way, when is the publishing date of that?
- 1:32:43Mark McGrath: I don't know.
- 1:32:44Bing West: I have to have to put my agent deal with certain things okay okay, all right, well, we'll stop the recording.
- 1:32:49Mark McGrath: Stay with us one second bing.