Latest / Saladin: The Muslim Leader Who Defeated Crusaders — Fexingo History / Saladin's Navy: How Sea Power Shaped the Crusades
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- Lucas: When we think of Saladin, we picture cavalry charges at Hattin or negotiating the surrender of Jerusalem. But there's a whole other dimension to his military leadership that often gets overlooked — his navy. Luna: I didn't even know Saladin had a navy. Lucas: Most people don't. And frankly, for a long time historians didn't pay much attention to it either. But Saladin understood that if he wanted to challenge the Crusader states, he couldn't just fight on land. The Franj — the Crusaders — controlled the sea, and that gave them a lifeline to Europe. Lucas: So early in his reign, after he became sultan of Egypt in 1171, he launched an ambitious shipbuilding program. Egypt had a long maritime tradition — the Nile and the Red Sea were natural highways. But Saladin wanted a Mediterranean fleet that could go toe-to-toe with the Italians and the Franj. Luna: Where did he build the ships? Lucas: Mainly in Alexandria and in the Nile Delta. He established new arsenals, or dar al-sina'a, where they could construct galleys and transports. He also ordered timber from Anatolia and the Levant — good shipbuilding wood was scarce in Egypt, so it was a logistical challenge from the start. Lucas: By the 1170s, Saladin's fleet had grown to about 60 ships, with around 20 permanent galleys and the rest transports. He appointed a capable admiral named Lu'lu' — that means 'pearl' in Arabic — to command them. Luna: Lu'lu' — I like that. Lucas: Lu'lu' was a former slave soldier who rose through the ranks, and he proved to be a daring naval commander. In 1179, he led a raid that burned a Crusader fleet near Acre, just as reinforcements were arriving from Europe. That was a major blow to Crusader morale. Lucas: But Saladin's real test came during the Siege of Acre in 1189–1191. After his victory at Hattin in 1187, he had captured most of the Crusader strongholds — but Acre was the key port. The Crusaders under Guy de Lusignan laid siege to the city, and Saladin's army besieged the besiegers. Luna: So it was a double siege. Lucas: Exactly. And the Crusaders could only hold out because they received constant supplies by sea from the Italian city-states — Genoa, Pisa, Venice. Saladin's navy tried to blockade the port, but the Crusader ships were more numerous and better built. The Ayyubid fleet just couldn't match them. Lucas: In 1190, a major naval battle took place off the coast of Acre — the Battle of the Sea of Jaffa, as some call it. Saladin's fleet attempted to break through and resupply the garrison, but the Crusaders used a new tactic: they chained their ships together to form a floating wall. The Ayyubid galleys couldn't penetrate it, and many were sunk or captured. Luna: That sounds devastating. Lucas: It was. After that, Saladin's navy never fully recovered. He lost about half his ships. And without control of the sea, he couldn't prevent the Crusaders from landing more troops and supplies. Acre fell in July 1191, and that was a turning point — it handed the momentum back to the Crusaders. Lucas: But here's something interesting: Saladin also used his navy in a more unconventional way. He launched expeditions down the Red Sea to threaten Crusader shipping and even raided the coast of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from the south. In 1182, a small Ayyubid squadron raided as far as the port of Ayla — modern Aqaba — and disrupted trade routes. Luna: So he was trying to strangle their economy. Lucas: Exactly. And it worked to some extent. The Crusader states were never self-sufficient; they relied on imports from Europe. By harassing their shipping, Saladin made it more expensive and dangerous to trade. But he never achieved the kind of decisive naval victory that would have cut them off entirely. Lucas: The chronicler Ibn al-Athir, who was no fan of the Franj, admitted that the Crusaders' naval superiority was a key reason they survived. He wrote, 'If the Muslims had controlled the sea, they would have taken every Crusader castle within a year.' That's a pretty stark assessment. Luna: Why did the Ayyubids fall so short at sea? Lucas: Several reasons. First, shipbuilding timber was scarce in Egypt and Syria — they had to import it from the Black Sea or the Balkans, and that was expensive. Second, the Ayyubid navy relied on conscripted sailors and soldiers who weren't as experienced as the Italian mariners, who had been sailing the Mediterranean for generations. And third, the Crusaders had better ships — the round-hulled cogs and the sleek galleys of the Italians were more maneuverable and could carry more cargo. Lucas: Saladin also made a strategic choice to prioritize land warfare. His core army was cavalry and infantry, and he poured resources into fortifications and siege engines. The navy was always a secondary concern, even though he recognized its importance. Luna: So it was a kind of catch-22: he needed the navy to win, but he couldn't afford to build a proper one. Lucas: Exactly. And there's another layer: after Saladin's death, his successors — his brother al-Adil and his sons — squabbled over the empire and neglected the fleet. By the 13th century, the Ayyubid navy had dwindled to almost nothing. It was the Mamluks who eventually rebuilt it, but that's a story for another time. Lucas: There's a poignant detail from the chronicler Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, who was Saladin's close advisor. He describes how Saladin, during the Siege of Acre, would stand on the shore and watch the Crusader ships bringing in supplies. He knew he couldn't stop them, and it pained him deeply. Luna: That's heartbreaking. Lucas: It is. And it reminds us that even the greatest commanders have limits. Saladin could unite the Muslim world, win stunning victories on land, and show chivalry that became legend — but he couldn't build a navy that could match the Italian maritime republics. That failure had real consequences. Lucas: If you look at the whole picture, the Crusades were ultimately decided by sea power. The First Crusade succeeded because the Crusaders could land supplies and reinforcements along the coast. And when Saladin tried to reverse that, he couldn't overcome the naval gap. It's a classic case of how geography and technology shape history. Luna: I never thought of it that way. So when we say the Crusaders won at Arsuf or held on at Acre, it was really the ships that won. Lucas: In many ways, yes. The Battle of Arsuf in 1191 is often seen as a tactical draw, but it was a strategic victory for Richard because he kept his army alive and marching south. And he could only do that because his supply line by sea was secure. Saladin knew that, and it frustrated him. Lucas: There's also a fascinating story from the 1180s about Saladin's attempt to build a fleet in the Red Sea to threaten Crusader shipping to the Holy Land from the south. He had ships transported overland from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea — a precursor to the Suez Canal idea — but the project was plagued by technical problems and never fully realized. Luna: Wait — they carried ships overland? Lucas: They disassembled them and moved the timbers by camel, then reassembled them on the Red Sea coast. It was an enormous undertaking, and it shows how creative Saladin was in trying to outflank the Crusaders. But ultimately, it was just too difficult to maintain a fleet in two seas. Lucas: One more thing: after Saladin's death, the Ayyubid navy became a victim of political infighting. His son al-Afdal, who inherited Syria, didn't prioritize the fleet, and al-Adil in Egypt focused on internal consolidation. So the naval program that Saladin had started just fizzled out. Luna: So his vision of a Muslim navy died with him. Lucas: Pretty much. But it's worth remembering that Saladin did achieve some naval successes. In 1179, his fleet raided the coast of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and burned a Crusader fort. And during the Siege of Acre, his ships did manage to get supplies into the city a few times, though never enough to break the siege. Lucas: The historian al-Maqrizi, writing in the 15th century, notes that Saladin's naval expenditures were enormous — he spent over 200,000 dinars a year on the fleet at one point. That's a staggering sum, comparable to what he spent on his land armies. But it still wasn't enough. Luna: So the lesson is that you can't win a war on one front if you're losing on another. Lucas: Exactly. And that's the legacy of Saladin's navy — a crucial, underappreciated part of his story that shows both his ambition and the limits of his power. It's a reminder that even the greatest leaders are constrained by resources, geography, and the hard realities of logistics. Luna: I'll never look at the Crusades the same way again. Lucas: Neither will I. And maybe that's the most important thing — to see that history is never just about great men and battles. It's also about the ships they couldn't build and the seas they couldn't control.