Latest / Views and News with Clarence Ford / Koeberg Safety Concerns
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: But a warm welcome to Peter Beck up on the
- 0:03Speaker 1: line with us at this moment in time.
- 0:05Speaker 2: It's good to have you back, Peter.
- 0:07Speaker 3: Thank you for having me.
- 0:10Speaker 2: Peter.
- 0:10Speaker 1: What we've been reading of late, we've heard about what
- 0:15Speaker 1: we've we've heard about some some some toxic leaks there
- 0:18Speaker 1: from from from Cooburg. What does that point to? I
- 0:22Speaker 1: believe they were at a level that that that was
- 0:26Speaker 1: kind of what nearly not noticeable. What are your views
- 0:33Speaker 1: on on those leaks as reported.
- 0:36Speaker 3: Yeah, so what we found out is that actually there'd
- 0:40Speaker 3: been a sequence of four leaks, the first on the
- 0:43Speaker 3: thirtieth of June, and gradually there was leaks about that,
- 0:48Speaker 3: sorry for the pun from the to the public that
- 0:51Speaker 3: something had happened, but there'd be no announcement from ESCOM
- 0:54Speaker 3: about it. And after there had been queries from uh
- 0:59Speaker 3: Report and so on, then there was a press release
- 1:02Speaker 3: organized on the Sunday, the nineteenth of July where they
- 1:05Speaker 3: said that actually been four such leaks from within the plant.
- 1:10Speaker 3: So the amount of leaks, as you say, was not high,
- 1:13Speaker 3: but it was concerning that there were well two things
- 1:16Speaker 3: were concerning. Firstly, there were four leaks in the period
- 1:20Speaker 3: of two three weeks, the same problem occurred again and again,
- 1:23Speaker 3: which does raise some questions about the quality of the
- 1:26Speaker 3: machines and the start. The secondly, the delay between the
- 1:32Speaker 3: leaks happening and the public actually being informed was concerning
- 1:37Speaker 3: concerning how long that was.
- 1:39Speaker 1: Yeah, so our reports are that they were negligible these
- 1:43Speaker 1: leaks and maybe points to their safety capability within the
- 1:50Speaker 1: Kuba Nuclear Power Station.
- 1:52Speaker 3: Yes, And what happened is that these leaks were picked
- 1:56Speaker 3: up by radiation monitoring equipment within the containment structure, so
- 2:00Speaker 3: nothing was leaked externally. But what the question in ray
- 2:04Speaker 3: if there can be full failures in the space in
- 2:07Speaker 3: the space of three weeks, what would have happened if
- 2:10Speaker 3: the radiation monitoring equipment has also failed, because obviously they're
- 2:13Speaker 3: using unreliable equipment, so if that had happened, those leaks
- 2:17Speaker 3: would not have been picked up.
- 2:20Speaker 1: Okay, So and that does yeah, yeah, So then let's
- 2:23Speaker 1: move on and let's establish what that global safety context is.
- 2:30Speaker 1: And of course South Africa's nuclear balance and we know
- 2:32Speaker 1: that Fukushima or post Fukushima standards have been updated by
- 2:37Speaker 1: the Atomic Energy Agency and essentially they are mandating for
- 2:43Speaker 1: the complete independence between the nuclear regulators and energy producers
- 2:49Speaker 1: or promoters or policy makers, and you have been at
- 2:53Speaker 1: the forefront of that particular debate in South Africa.
- 2:57Speaker 2: That is still not the case, is it.
- 2:59Speaker 3: Yeah, very much so so, and your excellent introduction described
- 3:03Speaker 3: it well. In nineteen ninety six there was a Convention
- 3:06Speaker 3: on Nuclear Safety, which was an international treaty signed by
- 3:10Speaker 3: several countries, South Africa included, and that was ratified by
- 3:13Speaker 3: parliament as well, and that means that the government is
- 3:17Speaker 3: obliged to implement it. And the wording of that is
- 3:19Speaker 3: very clear. It says that there should be a regulator
- 3:22Speaker 3: which is independent of any influence from any other government
- 3:26Speaker 3: body that utilizes or promotes nuclear power. So that was ignored.
- 3:31Speaker 3: And at the time Minister Mantasha was in charge of
- 3:34Speaker 3: appointing board members to the n and I also appointing
- 3:37Speaker 3: the CEO and could also dismiss the CEO or any
- 3:41Speaker 3: board members. So that is clearly in contravention of what
- 3:45Speaker 3: nineteen ninety six treaty actually says. When the post Tukushima,
- 3:50Speaker 3: the IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency whether it's a South Africa,
- 3:55Speaker 3: and they pointed out that this independence wasn't in place.
- 3:59Speaker 3: Now say that their new standards mandated. And just to
- 4:02Speaker 3: be clear, the international bodies do not control nuclear standards.
- 4:07Speaker 3: That's purely up to the country, right. We all have
- 4:09Speaker 3: sovereign independence as a country, so there's no international rule
- 4:13Speaker 3: or mandates or things like that. It's up to the country.
- 4:17Speaker 3: And in fact, in this case the IAEA, the UN
- 4:20Speaker 3: body actually pointed out in twenty thirteen in the visit
- 4:25Speaker 3: that there was insufficient independence, but that is still the case.
- 4:29Speaker 3: And how that manifested in my particular situation is that
- 4:33Speaker 3: Minister Mantasha at the time said anyone who's on there
- 4:36Speaker 3: in our board who obstructs or doesn't advocate for nuclear
- 4:39Speaker 3: power will be fired. And that was a manifestation of
- 4:43Speaker 3: this incorrect structure that we have. That means we cannot
- 4:46Speaker 3: have the confidence in nuclear safety that we should have.
- 4:50Speaker 1: But for you being on the board means that you
- 4:52Speaker 1: do see a role for nuclear energy in the MEGS.
- 4:56Speaker 1: You just want that oversee a role to be completely independent.
- 5:00Speaker 3: Yeah, I think those are two. There are two different issues.
- 5:04Speaker 3: The issue of is does it make economic sense for
- 5:08Speaker 3: us to run nuclear power in this country And that
- 5:10Speaker 3: is nothing to do with the National Nuclear Regulator. That
- 5:13Speaker 3: is purely to do with the economics and the planning
- 5:17Speaker 3: of the country's energy mix. Where the regulator comes in
- 5:20Speaker 3: is that if any nuclear activity happens, it should be
- 5:24Speaker 3: done in the way that's safe, and that means in
- 5:26Speaker 3: our should be completely independent and not appointed by the
- 5:29Speaker 3: minister who is energetically promoting nuclear power and saying it
- 5:34Speaker 3: must be part of our mix.
- 5:36Speaker 1: Okay, let's look at our aging infrastructure that has been
- 5:38Speaker 1: part of the debate, and I have no doubts informs
- 5:42Speaker 1: your position on matters as well. We know that extending
- 5:46Speaker 1: a forty year old power plant requires a very significant plan,
- 5:50Speaker 1: maybe comprehensive replacements, structural testing, full public safety disclosure.
- 5:55Speaker 2: Did we get that for Kuburg that was built in
- 5:58Speaker 2: the eighties?
- 5:59Speaker 3: Yeah, known, we did not get that at all. So
- 6:02Speaker 3: Kuberg was a nineteen sixty design, Construction started in the
- 6:06Speaker 3: seventies and it started operation in the eighties. And if
- 6:10Speaker 3: you can just think back to a car, or a
- 6:12Speaker 3: calculator or even a washing machine that is hails from
- 6:15Speaker 3: the nineteen seventies, you can imagine the age of the
- 6:19Speaker 3: equipment and how outdated that equipment is at the moment.
- 6:22Speaker 3: So when we look at the actual output of Kubu.
- 6:25Speaker 3: There's a big question marking my mind, independent of the
- 6:28Speaker 3: safety issues, is does it make economic sense to try
- 6:31Speaker 3: and keep it running. I don't know if you've seen
- 6:33Speaker 3: the recent announcements that we have too much energy, We've
- 6:36Speaker 3: got a lot of stations that aren't actually running, and
- 6:41Speaker 3: is it really been necessary to spend so much money
- 6:45Speaker 3: on refurbishing Kuburg in order to have power that we
- 6:49Speaker 3: don't really need. Kudberg at the moment is generating about
- 6:52Speaker 3: six hundred megawatts. The country users somewhere around twenty three
- 6:56Speaker 3: twenty five thousand megawatts. It requires that level of power,
- 7:00Speaker 3: so it's really an insignificant a month. And you're to
- 7:03Speaker 3: answer your previous point about transparency the safety case for Quebec.
- 7:09Speaker 3: Initially es COM wanted to keep that from the public
- 7:11Speaker 3: and not share it, and we actually engaged in about
- 7:13Speaker 3: a year long legal battle for them to make that public.
- 7:16Speaker 3: They claimed it was something that was only between s
- 7:19Speaker 3: COM and in R, which of course is not the
- 7:22Speaker 3: case because for transparency's sake, if the plant and the
- 7:26Speaker 3: extension was safe, then why not to release that information
- 7:29Speaker 3: to the public. On the economics of it, there was
- 7:33Speaker 3: dramatic overruns and we know from Castilia Mdupi that SCOM
- 7:36Speaker 3: is quite famous for cost overruns, and the job was
- 7:40Speaker 3: said to take about five months per unit, and it's
- 7:43Speaker 3: taken over eighteen months per unit. And s COM's been
- 7:46Speaker 3: very secretive about what the actual cost is. The estimated
- 7:49Speaker 3: cost was twenty billion and twenty ten, but obviously that
- 7:52Speaker 3: still can't apply, so we don't actually know what it
- 7:55Speaker 3: costs for that six hundred megawats that it's putting out
- 7:57Speaker 3: at the moment.
- 7:59Speaker 1: Yeah, I think I think we could look at the
- 8:01Speaker 1: economics of all of that. Most of the Africans would
- 8:04Speaker 1: prefer to see the costs come down, given.
- 8:07Speaker 2: The overproduction of electricity or overgeneration thereof.
- 8:11Speaker 3: Yeah, and that's actually quite a technical issue because the
- 8:15Speaker 3: price is set by nose of the National Energy Regulator
- 8:18Speaker 3: and that's based on something called the regulated acid base.
- 8:21Speaker 3: And unfortunately there's a bit of a perverse incenter there
- 8:24Speaker 3: because the more acids that ESCOM build, the more it
- 8:28Speaker 3: can charge for electricity, and the higher the taroscope. And
- 8:31Speaker 3: that might be something to do with why they want
- 8:33Speaker 3: to spreend five hundred billion or maybe up to a
- 8:36Speaker 3: trillion on building a new news air plant next to
- 8:38Speaker 3: Kribon and also one o Art's a tasement because the
- 8:42Speaker 3: more more they build, the more the regulator will allow
- 8:45Speaker 3: them to charge for electricity power.
- 8:47Speaker 1: Okay, so let's just look at location, because that was
- 8:50Speaker 1: a big issue in the eighties, albeit that Koberg was
- 8:55Speaker 1: very far away, very rudal. It is just what thirty
- 8:59Speaker 1: killer is from Cape Town City center. Modern even small
- 9:03Speaker 1: modular reactors and new bills are located very further away
- 9:11Speaker 1: from major populations. Do you still perceive its threating terms
- 9:15Speaker 1: of location? And you've just mentioned the possibility of one
- 9:18Speaker 1: another one alongside.
- 9:21Speaker 3: Yeah, and that's a major concern of many people in
- 9:23Speaker 3: the area. There should be an evacuation plan which gets
- 9:27Speaker 3: everybody out of a sixteen k radius within a certain
- 9:31Speaker 3: number of hours. And there's been such an explosion of
- 9:35Speaker 3: population in that area and housing developments and more housing
- 9:38Speaker 3: developments planned and also informal housing that many people are
- 9:43Speaker 3: pretty convinced that it's not actually going to be possible
- 9:46Speaker 3: to implement an evacuation plan if it becomes necessary. And
- 9:50Speaker 3: there's something called a traffic evacuation model, which is what
- 9:53Speaker 3: the city model how traffic would flow if, for example,
- 9:58Speaker 3: people had to evacuate at a large gale from Kubug.
- 10:01Speaker 3: But there's been a tremendous amount of secrecy around that,
- 10:04Speaker 3: and I know that people have actually done Promotion of
- 10:07Speaker 3: Access to Information Act requests for the results of that modeling,
- 10:11Speaker 3: and the city, es Com and the National Nuclear Regulator
- 10:14Speaker 3: have all refused to release that information, which does raise
- 10:18Speaker 3: the question because if that information showed evacuation was possible,
- 10:22Speaker 3: you'd expect them to be delighted to release it. So
- 10:25Speaker 3: the fact that they want to keep it secret does
- 10:27Speaker 3: raise serious questions.
- 10:29Speaker 2: Okay, voice, I think from Obama, let's take a listen.
- 10:38Speaker 4: For if it's actually worth it. You know, it's done
- 10:41Speaker 4: to servicing. So often they're like what one doumega? What
- 10:44Speaker 4: reactors each only one kind of ever running at one time?
- 10:48Speaker 2: Is the risk worth the return?
- 10:50Speaker 4: No? No, we stuck on on our electricity supply. But
- 10:57Speaker 4: should we not maybe look at one of the new,
- 10:59Speaker 4: newer safe A modulary actors, which is a bit more
- 11:02Speaker 4: idiot proof for the you know us, because we're not
- 11:06Speaker 4: the most organized. Let's be honest.
- 11:09Speaker 1: Yeah, I think you've answered that question, Peter, but maybe
- 11:11Speaker 1: you want to respond again to Obama.
- 11:14Speaker 3: Yes, sure, so exactly. Technology has moved on considerably since
- 11:19Speaker 3: the sixties and the seventies, and there are new models. Unfortunately,
- 11:23Speaker 3: a new model doesn't guarantee safety. And a good example
- 11:26Speaker 3: of that is if you remember the Triple seven, the
- 11:28Speaker 3: seventy seven max, which was a new technology that caused
- 11:31Speaker 3: three planes to crash. So if there is going to
- 11:34Speaker 3: be a new technology, I would say, let's not have
- 11:37Speaker 3: South Africa as the guinea thing. Let it run in
- 11:39Speaker 3: the US or wherever it's coming from, and after ten
- 11:42Speaker 3: years or so we can make a judgment high effective.
- 11:45Speaker 3: And I'll say that actually is what does happen is
- 11:48Speaker 3: when you do a small modular reactor, you lose economies
- 11:51Speaker 3: of scale, so the electricity is more expensive. Yeah.
- 11:55Speaker 1: I don't know if that seven three seven example is
- 11:56Speaker 1: a good one because what we have found and we
- 11:59Speaker 1: find we're finding it also with AI that preoccupation with
- 12:03Speaker 1: speed taking product to market has come at the cost
- 12:07Speaker 1: of safety concerns.
- 12:09Speaker 2: And that's really what the issues are with Boeing at
- 12:12Speaker 2: this moment in time. But we cannot sacrifice safety for speed,
- 12:16Speaker 2: certainly not in this industry can we.
- 12:19Speaker 3: No, I mean, and the consequences are unimaginable. Of a
- 12:23Speaker 3: large scale nuclear disaster, and of course no one thinks
- 12:27Speaker 3: it would happen to them. If you'd ask the plant
- 12:30Speaker 3: manager at the for Kushima plants in Japan the day
- 12:32Speaker 3: before the accident, will you ever have a large accident
- 12:35Speaker 3: here tomorrow, of course they would have said no, everyone
- 12:38Speaker 3: thinks it's not going to happen. It's a low probability
- 12:41Speaker 3: but very high consequence event that actually happens. The consequences
- 12:48Speaker 3: of an accident at kubric would be phenomenal. Firstly, purvem
- 12:53Speaker 3: would collapse an area. Secondly, exports such as wine dairy
- 12:57Speaker 3: products obviously it would have a taint and people would
- 13:00Speaker 3: not want to drink wine from the Western Cape. Fukushima
- 13:03Speaker 3: is actually a province Centerpan but there's only one association
- 13:07Speaker 3: we have with Fukashima, and that is a nuclear disaster internationally.
- 13:10Speaker 3: So if there was a disaster in the Western Cape,
- 13:13Speaker 3: it would mean any product or any trip to the
- 13:15Speaker 3: Western Cape would be something people wouldn't want and that
- 13:18Speaker 3: would impact the tourism industry, a knock on effect on employment.
- 13:22Speaker 3: That would have a knock on effect on the drain
- 13:25Speaker 3: on social services, on crime. It would be a massive
- 13:28Speaker 3: economic disaster. Never mind the cost of actually cleaning it
- 13:32Speaker 3: up and finding alternative houses for the people who had
- 13:35Speaker 3: to be evacuated and stay away from their area for
- 13:38Speaker 3: actually hundreds of years while the radiation disperses.
- 13:42Speaker 1: We chatting to Peter Becker, anti nuclear activist Kolberg Alert Alliance,
- 13:46Speaker 1: the organization that Peter represents.
- 13:49Speaker 2: I want to just go back to the court matter.
- 13:53Speaker 1: Yeah, following that court victory over your dismissal from then
- 13:57Speaker 1: are board. That dismissal came about because you want a
- 14:03Speaker 1: cliant board member. You you wouldn't support the uh, the
- 14:09Speaker 1: the want for nuclear power as a generation as a
- 14:14Speaker 1: generating means. And of course your court victory over that,
- 14:20Speaker 1: I think vindicates your your position nearly or does it?
- 14:24Speaker 2: Is it about the politicians wanting a nuclear solution.
- 14:27Speaker 1: To our mix and it not being necessary and and
- 14:31Speaker 1: that's why you were chucked out and again reinstated by
- 14:33Speaker 1: the court.
- 14:35Speaker 3: Yes, So why exactually I was removed as a very
- 14:38Speaker 3: difficult question because we have to speculate what other people's
- 14:41Speaker 3: motivations are. What we do know is what the court
- 14:44Speaker 3: sound is that people within the N and R and
- 14:47Speaker 3: the Department acted quote in bad faith with an ultario motive.
- 14:52Speaker 3: So that was what the court sound and that finding
- 14:55Speaker 3: was was not contradicted by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
- 14:58Speaker 3: But actually it was a bit of of a mixed
- 15:00Speaker 3: victory when you say I won the court case, because
- 15:03Speaker 3: what the N and R and the Department did is
- 15:05Speaker 3: they kept the appeal processes going until my term expired.
- 15:10Speaker 3: So by the time I actually got the Supreme Court's verdict,
- 15:13Speaker 3: it was about a week after my term expired, so
- 15:16Speaker 3: they never actually allowed me to continue with my functioning
- 15:20Speaker 3: as a board member, and that position, which is the
- 15:23Speaker 3: community representation on the board, they left baken for at
- 15:26Speaker 3: least four years. I haven't actually heard yet if there's
- 15:29Speaker 3: been someone appointed. I know they're in the process of it,
- 15:32Speaker 3: but basically it's clear that they decided a community representation
- 15:37Speaker 3: on the board is not something that they want. And
- 15:39Speaker 3: what concerns me as well is that you would think
- 15:44Speaker 3: if there was a court finding that people that acted
- 15:46Speaker 3: in bad faith with an ultario motive, there would be
- 15:48Speaker 3: some kind of inquiry as to who those people are.
- 15:51Speaker 3: Are they still there, are they still acting in bad
- 15:53Speaker 3: faith with an ulterior motive? And how close is an
- 15:57Speaker 3: ulterior motive and bad faith to stake a cat and
- 16:00Speaker 3: what is going on? But for some reason, there's been
- 16:03Speaker 3: no inquiry, there's been nobody publicly blamed for this. There's
- 16:07Speaker 3: been nothing. It's almost as if there's a subtle nod
- 16:10Speaker 3: in a wink that these people who acted in bad
- 16:13Speaker 3: faith may still be there and they acted with the
- 16:16Speaker 3: approval of the authorities.
- 16:17Speaker 1: And we perceived we perceived it as the politicians wanting
- 16:21Speaker 1: a client board first, and foremostly I think we perceived
- 16:24Speaker 1: it also as a culture of institutional capture that came
- 16:28Speaker 1: with the time as well.
- 16:29Speaker 2: And I think the question is does that culture remain intact?
- 16:33Speaker 3: Yes? And I mean that is that crucial question. And
- 16:36Speaker 3: also just to make one thing playing, when I sat
- 16:38Speaker 3: on the board, that was not a place to discuss
- 16:41Speaker 3: my anti nuclear views. That was only one thing that
- 16:45Speaker 3: we were allowed to discuss, and I was very clear
- 16:48Speaker 3: about that myself is nuclear safety. My announcements about the
- 16:51Speaker 3: economics of nuclear power and other things were done outside
- 16:55Speaker 3: of that. So those are two separate things. So obviously
- 16:59Speaker 3: I can't go to a board meeting and start saying
- 17:02Speaker 3: the country shouldn't been doing nuclear power, and I didn't
- 17:04Speaker 3: do that. I focused only on the issues around nuclear safety,
- 17:09Speaker 3: because there were also people on the board who had
- 17:11Speaker 3: publicly announced that nuclear is a very good idea and
- 17:13Speaker 3: we should go ahead, which for some reason they weren't
- 17:16Speaker 3: removed for the same reason that I was removed, which
- 17:19Speaker 3: is something the court case focused on.
- 17:21Speaker 1: I think you flagged the possibilities, and you know, given
- 17:25Speaker 1: just our perception of nuclear you made us very skeptical,
- 17:30Speaker 1: maybe even paranoid about its.
- 17:32Speaker 2: Proximity so close to the city.
- 17:35Speaker 1: But the track record shows a very safe kind of
- 17:39Speaker 1: generating capability over there.
- 17:41Speaker 2: And I think this voice notart is maybe going to
- 17:43Speaker 2: talk to it as well. Is it a case of
- 17:45Speaker 2: two truths here that we need to listen to. Let's
- 17:47Speaker 2: take a listen to Tohin Hi.
- 17:51Speaker 5: If your guest has any understanding of the engineering of
- 17:53Speaker 5: how that Pawer station was built, you will know and
- 17:56Speaker 5: you'll be able to tell the public that actually it's
- 17:58Speaker 5: one of the most safe styles of power stations ever
- 18:03Speaker 5: and they are very very hard to get a melt down.
- 18:06Speaker 5: In fact, it could not create a melt on like
- 18:09Speaker 5: Fukashina because of the design and the way the rods
- 18:13Speaker 5: are positioned to inside the reactor. He's putting out scare
- 18:19Speaker 5: tactics to try and scare the public for what agenda.
- 18:22Speaker 5: I don't know, but it doesn't seem like a lot
- 18:25Speaker 5: of engineering based conversation going on there and a lot
- 18:29Speaker 5: about scare tactics to try and get popularity.
- 18:32Speaker 2: Peter. They say you were scare manger and I want
- 18:36Speaker 2: to be popular.
- 18:37Speaker 3: Well, it certainly hasn't worked. I'm not very popular at all. So,
- 18:41Speaker 3: just to respond to Hain's points, of course, everyone who
- 18:44Speaker 3: builds a nuclear reactor or anything else for that mate,
- 18:47Speaker 3: so try to make it as safe as possible. So
- 18:49Speaker 3: there are many mechanisms in place, but obviously those are
- 18:52Speaker 3: dated mechanisms. And one example is modern reactor designed require
- 18:57Speaker 3: there to be a what they call a core catcher advice,
- 19:00Speaker 3: so that if there is a meltdown there's actually a
- 19:03Speaker 3: mechanism to disperse the heat and quibal.
- 19:05Speaker 1: It doesn't have that, So, Peter, I think with a
- 19:09Speaker 1: relative thing we need, we need to wrap it. Their
- 19:12Speaker 1: safety is a relative thing. I'd much on the side
- 19:16Speaker 1: of caution. I think that's my position, Peter Becker. As always,
- 19:18Speaker 1: thank you for telling us your mind. It's an important
- 19:22Speaker 1: part of the of course conclusions that we need to
- 19:24Speaker 1: reach