Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / 2025 Employment Law Year In Review
Transcript
- 0:03Welcome, everyone. Welcome to the Employment
- 0:05Law Year in Review. We're going to go over the
- 0:082025 year here. And I am Mekhan Shelton. I'm
- 0:13a mediator with ADR Services, and I'm the programs
- 0:16chair of the Beverly Hills Bar Association's
- 0:19Labor and Employment Law section. And I am delighted
- 0:22to introduce our speakers, Andrew Friedman and
- 0:25Anthony or Tony, on CD. Andrew Friedman is a
- 0:28partner at Helmer Friedman. I think his reputation
- 0:31precedes him, but I'll give you a little bio.
- 0:34He primarily represents employees in employment
- 0:36law matters, including discrimination, harassment,
- 0:39retaliation, and complex wage and hour class
- 0:41actions. He also conducts neutral investigations
- 0:44into workplace disputes and occasionally represents
- 0:46employers and individual defendants. Thank you
- 0:49for being with us, Andrew. We also have Tony
- 0:53Ansidi, who is a partner at Proskauer Rose, where
- 0:56he co -chairs the Labor and Employment Law Department
- 0:58and leads the West Coast Labor and Employment
- 1:00Group in Los Angeles. He represents employers
- 1:03in all areas of labor and employment law, including
- 1:06class actions, discrimination, wrongful termination,
- 1:09and trade secret protection. He's been recognized
- 1:11as a top attorney by Chambers USA, The Hollywood
- 1:14Reporter, and the Los Angeles Daily Journal.
- 1:17Tony holds a band one ranking for labor and employment.
- 1:20So we are so lucky to have you here, Tony. Thank
- 1:22you very much for presenting. And now let's get
- 1:25started. Over to you, Andrew. All right. You
- 1:31all see my screen share. So good afternoon. Today,
- 1:35Tony and I will be providing you with a discussion
- 1:39of those employment law cases from the past 12
- 1:42months that we deem to be the most important.
- 1:45As always, I will be providing a clear -eyed,
- 1:49level -headed summary of those decisions, while
- 1:52Tony will provide a bombastic, flame -throwing,
- 1:56off -the -rails color commentary from the perspective
- 1:59of the true believing defense attorney that he
- 2:02is. Shall we begin, Tony? Yes, let's go, Andrew.
- 2:06All right, you're up first. Yes, we're going
- 2:10to start with a couple of... guidances that have
- 2:14been issued by the EEOC. Of course, if you practice
- 2:18in this area, as I assume most of you do, what
- 2:22happens at the EEOC for the most part stays at
- 2:25the EEOC and has very little effect on what happens
- 2:29in California because we have, of course, a very
- 2:31well -developed set of statutes, regulations,
- 2:34and case law. in California, but it's also of
- 2:37interest, I think, to sort of keep up with this,
- 2:40because there clearly are occasionally cases
- 2:42in which a federal claim is asserted under Title
- 2:47VII, for example, or the ADEA. This first guidance
- 2:53was issued last November, right before Thanksgiving.
- 2:57It is a discrimination against American workers
- 3:00statement. identifying the fact that American
- 3:03workers are protected from discrimination in
- 3:06the same way that others of other national origins
- 3:09are. Again, I don't think this really makes that
- 3:12much of a difference in terms of what even occurs
- 3:15under Title VII, but it is the EEOC's statement,
- 3:19of course, consistent with the administration
- 3:20that Americans are people too. It talks about
- 3:25discriminatory job advertisements and what they
- 3:29should and should not include. disparate treatment,
- 3:33including harassment and retaliation. And then
- 3:36it also says that, for example, common business
- 3:40reasons that might be used to justify national
- 3:43origin discrimination are not defensible or not
- 3:47defensive in these kinds of cases. They don't
- 3:50excuse an employer's decision to hire. And they
- 3:53give examples, for example, for customer or client
- 3:57preferences, lower cost of labor. for non -American
- 4:01workers and beliefs that workers from one or
- 4:03more national origin groups are more productive,
- 4:06excuse me, or possess a better work ethic than
- 4:09another national origin group. Again, I don't
- 4:11think that adds much, if anything, to the law
- 4:14in the area, but it is obviously a policy statement
- 4:16by the EOC. This rescission referenced here happened
- 4:24just last week on January 22nd. Again, I don't
- 4:28think it's going to have really that much of
- 4:30an impact. This was a statement by the EOC essentially
- 4:35saying that an April 2024 Biden -era enforcement
- 4:40guidance on harassment in the workplace, which
- 4:43was deliberately extended to sexual orientation
- 4:48and gender identity, has been rescinded as a
- 4:53result of this action of the EOC last week. This
- 4:57primarily reaches examples that are included
- 5:02in this, such as outing, a disclosure of an individual's
- 5:05sexual orientation or gender identity without
- 5:08permission. Again, that is no longer supposedly
- 5:12a basis under this guidance for a discrimination
- 5:17claim or harassment claim or misgendering, which
- 5:21is defined as the intentional use of a name or
- 5:26pronoun inconsistent with the individual's known
- 5:28gender identity. That talks about inevitably
- 5:32bathrooms and sex segregated facilities and individual's
- 5:36gender identity. The problem with this, of course,
- 5:40from a legal standpoint, among perhaps other
- 5:42problems is that it runs probably directly in
- 5:47the teeth of the Bostock opinion, which came
- 5:50out from the United States Supreme Court in 2020,
- 5:53in which the court and an opinion by Justice
- 5:56Gorsuch interpreted Title VII and its prohibition
- 6:00against discrimination and harassment based on
- 6:03sex to include gender and transgender individuals,
- 6:08as well as gay and lesbian employees, saying
- 6:14that that was on the basis of sex and therefore
- 6:17protected under the statute. The suspicion is
- 6:20that this will not be litigated much by the EEOC
- 6:25because the composition of the court has changed
- 6:30in the following way since 2020. When Bostock
- 6:33was decided, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, both
- 6:38who voted in favor of the Bostock opinion, have
- 6:41been since replaced by Justices Barrett and Jackson.
- 6:44The suspicion is that Justice Jackson would probably
- 6:47vote the same way that Justices Ginsburg and
- 6:50Breyer. And I don't think anyone really knows
- 6:51how Justice Barrett might vote. But in any event,
- 6:55at best, the court would probably come down five
- 6:58to four at the best for someone trying to undo
- 7:02both stock, because that was a six to three decision.
- 7:06So this rescission will stay as it is. It's interesting,
- 7:10but I think, again, it's not going to have much.
- 7:12applicability in terms of litigation, nor especially
- 7:15will it have any applicability here in California.
- 7:18So speaking of Chair Lucas ripping up these rights
- 7:21for the LGBTQ community, do we really need her
- 7:25to post on X the following? Quote, are you a
- 7:29white male who has experienced discrimination
- 7:32at work based on your race or sex? question mark.
- 7:36You may have a claim to recover money under federal
- 7:38civil rights laws," end quote. That's what she's
- 7:41posting at the same time she's ripping up these
- 7:43rights. Perhaps it would be better for Chair
- 7:46Lucas, who is an attorney, to spend her time
- 7:49doing better things, such as a helping the Department
- 7:53of Justice wade through the millions and millions
- 7:56of Epstein files so that they can be released
- 7:59as they were supposed to be released last December
- 8:0119th. Or perhaps she could help ICE comply with
- 8:06the 90 -plus court orders that they're violating
- 8:09in Minnesota alone, according to George W. Bush
- 8:13appointed Patrick J. Schlitz in an opinion that
- 8:16he issued yesterday. At the state level, California,
- 8:24of course, is always busy both at the court and
- 8:29in the administrative and legislative branches.
- 8:33Here, I think this new requirement kind of snuck
- 8:38up on some employers. This obligation was created
- 8:43as a result of a statute that was passed and
- 8:46signed by Governor Newsom late last year. The
- 8:50timeframe, however, within which to do what I'm
- 8:54about to describe is relatively short because
- 8:58the state didn't issue the proposed template
- 9:02that employers are supposed to send to their
- 9:06employees in the form of a notice. You see here
- 9:10a reference to it. The actual template is, we've
- 9:17got it listed in our blog, and I'm assuming that
- 9:21it's fairly easily found if you do Google it,
- 9:25the California. Department of Industrial Relations
- 9:28issued it in early January. And essentially,
- 9:32it is a fairly comprehensive list of all the
- 9:36things that an employer can be sued for and then
- 9:40kind of topped off with. And if you want to union
- 9:42employees, this is how you get one. So obviously,
- 9:45probably not a lot of employers are that happy
- 9:48having to... turn this over to every single employee.
- 9:50But I think those days are long gone when employers
- 9:53could be offended by something like this. Among
- 9:57other things, it talks about workplace protections
- 9:59relating to immigration status. In fact, that
- 10:02probably is the bulk of what's in this, talking
- 10:04about what employees' rights are, regardless
- 10:08of their immigration status. There's also an
- 10:11obligation to tell employees they have a right
- 10:13to designate an emergency contact, and how to
- 10:16do that, and what that must include. That is
- 10:19if they end up getting arrested by ICE or border
- 10:22patrol. There's also, as I said, a statement
- 10:25about your right to organize a union or engage
- 10:28in protected activity in the workplace. And then
- 10:32once again, references to the Fourth Amendment
- 10:35of the Constitution and what you do or don't
- 10:37have to do in the event that immigration authorities
- 10:41attempt to arrest you and your right to remain
- 10:45silent. So it's a, and workers come. And then
- 10:48at the very end, it's got website links and telephone
- 10:52numbers for all of the California entities that
- 10:55are responsible for enforcing these rights. So
- 10:58if you've attended our... Sorry, one last thing.
- 11:00And this is all supposed to be distributed to
- 11:02employees by February 1st. So that's Sunday.
- 11:06If you haven't done it or if you haven't told
- 11:08your clients to do it, it's a good time to let
- 11:10them know. As I say, we've got a pretty comprehensive
- 11:12list of what all this is on our blog if you're
- 11:15in need of more information. If you've attended
- 11:18our programs in the past year or so, you'll have
- 11:21noted that Tony and I, before we really get to
- 11:23the meat, like to provide some public service
- 11:25announcements to attorneys. And here's our first
- 11:28one. Dovereye, no Provereye. That's a famous
- 11:35Russian proverb that was uttered by Tony's hero.
- 11:38No, not Justice Scalia, who Tony will tell you
- 11:41within five minutes of talking to you that he
- 11:43was Justice Scalia's student, but rather his
- 11:46other hero, President Ronald Reagan, in describing
- 11:49the arms negotiations process with the Soviet
- 11:53Union, which is trust, but verify. However, when
- 11:57it comes to AI, Tony and I would like to change
- 11:59that a little bit, which is don't trust, but
- 12:02verify. The other quick public service announcement
- 12:06is that the courts are rightfully getting sick
- 12:10and tired of attorneys prosecuting or defending
- 12:15cases without factual support. And this is the
- 12:18first case I've really seen where the California
- 12:20courts come out and really lambast attorneys
- 12:23for doing that. I think in the future, both the
- 12:26plaintiff side and the defendant side should
- 12:29be really careful about not pleading anything
- 12:32unless there is factual support. One comment
- 12:35that I'll insert on the last Russian saying that
- 12:40you've said, although I assume you'll say more
- 12:41as we proceed today. This notion of citing cases
- 12:48that don't exist that are the subject of hallucinations
- 12:51by AI, which for whatever reason still exists.
- 12:54I don't know why you can't tell AI not to hallucinate,
- 12:56but apparently that doesn't work. There was an
- 12:59opinion that was published just this past week,
- 13:05or I think it actually was earlier this week,
- 13:07called Lifetime Well versus IBSspot .com. There's
- 13:14a Westlaw site, 2026 Westlaw 195644. It's from
- 13:20the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It's a
- 13:21case in which, it's a tale as old as six months,
- 13:26which is, lawyers cited a bunch of nonexistent
- 13:32made -up cases to a United States district court.
- 13:35Not a good idea. That was the first sin. The
- 13:38second sin is the same one that appeared in the
- 13:40case that, go back to the last slide, Andrew,
- 13:44if you would. In this Nolan versus Land of the
- 13:48Free, the same thing happened in that case as
- 13:50happened in this. district court case from the
- 13:53Eastern District of Pennsylvania. And that is
- 13:55that the opposing counsel failed to find the
- 13:59fact that there were fake cases cited. That's
- 14:03a really bad thing. And that makes the court
- 14:05even matter when its own staff has to find them.
- 14:09In fact, what the district court said is, our
- 14:12bar member admittedly did not read or study the
- 14:14case law. He simply signed his name. The paper
- 14:17he signed, along with a New York attorney, contained
- 14:19at least eight false case citation hallucinations
- 14:23generated by artificial intelligence. Our talented
- 14:27lawyers in chambers caught these hallucinations
- 14:29and we directed counsel to show cause as to why
- 14:32we should not impose sanctions and they did in
- 14:34fact do just that. So I assume that everybody
- 14:38on this webinar doesn't cite cases that they've
- 14:42not read and have not verified are real, but
- 14:45if there is anybody that still is doing that,
- 14:47stop it. And if you have done it, Look at my
- 14:52materials. I quote extensively from a bunch of
- 14:54cases and from a Eugene Bullock blog where he
- 14:58talks about what you should do to fess up to
- 15:01the court so that you minimize your chances of
- 15:03getting sanctioned. We're going to move on now
- 15:09to our fun topic whistleblowers 1102 .95 and
- 15:14wrongful termination claims. So this case, Lamkin
- 15:19versus County of Los Angeles is an interesting
- 15:21one. And it's part of a series of cases that
- 15:24have come down since everyone sort of rediscovered
- 15:30what the actual requirements were for whistleblower
- 15:33claim to be asserted under 1102 .5 of the labor
- 15:38code. Those of you who've been to our seminars
- 15:41in the past will recall that for the longest
- 15:44time, people were prosecuting and defending against,
- 15:48it was true on both sides, and having courts
- 15:50decide whistleblower cases based on the shifting
- 15:54burden analysis of McDonnell Douglas. No one
- 15:57seemingly ever actually spent time reading the
- 15:59statute, which has its own requirements and its
- 16:03own burdens within it. Somebody finally did do
- 16:05that. And in the Lawson case, L -A -W -S -O -N,
- 16:08the California Supreme Court said, yeah, that's
- 16:10right. That's what the statute provides. I was
- 16:14skeptical that employers would do as well, and
- 16:17I actually thought they'd do worse under the
- 16:19actual statutory framework. It turns out, though,
- 16:21that employers are winning, certainly at the
- 16:24appellate level, a number of these cases, and
- 16:26this is no exception. Here, this was a rather
- 16:31tortured tale. Andrew brought up Justice Scalia,
- 16:34so I'll have to, of course, mention him. He used
- 16:37to say in our contracts case that... cases like
- 16:40this were a slice of life and would revel in
- 16:44the facts themselves. This was a case involving
- 16:46an employee who was a deputy in the LA County
- 16:48Sheriff's Department. He investigated a man whom
- 16:51he believed was soliciting a prostitute. In reality,
- 16:54the suspect was one of his retired law enforcement
- 16:57colleagues having lunch with his girlfriend.
- 17:02An altercation of some sort, which isn't described
- 17:04in the opinion, then breaks out between the employee
- 17:08Lampkin and the suspect, and then Lampkin reports
- 17:11the incident to his supervisor, presumably who
- 17:14probably knew better about this former colleague
- 17:19who had this girlfriend allegedly that he was
- 17:22talking to at lunch. The employee then claimed
- 17:25that he suffered retaliatory actions by others
- 17:27in the sheriff's department, and then he sued
- 17:29the county under the whistleblower statute. The
- 17:33statute provides in this machinery that I've
- 17:36mentioned, an affirmative defense for employers,
- 17:40that it would have made the same decision, the
- 17:42employer would have made the same decision and
- 17:44taken the same actions, quote, for legitimate
- 17:46independent reasons. That's known as the same
- 17:48decision defense. And as I said, employers seem
- 17:51to be winning at least their share of those kinds
- 17:54of cases with that defense. In this case, the
- 17:57jury kind of, they kind of went down the middle
- 17:59and they said, well, on the one hand, the plaintiff
- 18:03had proven the required elements of a whistleblower
- 18:07claim, but it also found, the jury did, that
- 18:10the county had successfully met its burden to
- 18:13establish the same decision defense. And so they
- 18:17found liability, but they awarded the employee
- 18:20no damages, and he was seeking only damages.
- 18:23The trial court, I think, wasn't exactly sure
- 18:25what to do with that. So what they did, the judge
- 18:27awarded the... the employee $450 ,000 in attorney's
- 18:32fees and costs after having, quote, successfully,
- 18:35unquote, proven a whistleblower claim. But the
- 18:38Court of Appeal reversed that award of fees and
- 18:42costs, finding that by definition, the employee
- 18:45had not been successful despite proving the elements
- 18:47of the claim because he had failed. to prove
- 18:50any damages and the county had prevailed in its
- 18:53same decision affirmative defense. So all kind
- 18:55of a mess, but a win for the employer nonetheless.
- 19:02The next case is another interesting case under
- 19:05the whistleblower statute. And we see this a
- 19:09lot. It's I think by nature of the statute, something
- 19:13that we're going to continue to see. And that
- 19:15is an employee has a thought in his or her mind
- 19:19about what is or is not against the law and believes
- 19:23that they are a whistleblower. The conundrum
- 19:28that comes up, of course, is that very few employees
- 19:30are actually employees and also lawyers. And
- 19:34so it is not unusual for an employee who is not
- 19:37a lawyer to think probably after a Google search
- 19:40or not that they have actually asserted a claim
- 19:44that is backed up in law. A perfect example of
- 19:49this, this was an individual who mistakenly determined
- 19:51that his former employer was violating the state's
- 19:55equal pay act by paying him less than his coworkers
- 19:58who were performing similar duties. Anyone who's
- 20:01looked at the EPA knows that there is another
- 20:04element that this employee was unaware of, which
- 20:07is that those differences must be, in terms of
- 20:10the wages, must be based on gender, race, or
- 20:13ethnicity. He did not have any evidence of that,
- 20:15though he believed Nonetheless, the statute had
- 20:19been violated. Hays goes to trial. There's a
- 20:24verdict of more than $182 ,000 from the jury,
- 20:27who also apparently didn't care that there was
- 20:29no real violation of the statute. And then the
- 20:33employer filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
- 20:35the verdict, claiming that the verdict on the
- 20:38whistleblower claim was unsupported because the
- 20:41employee had misunderstood the EPA. And again,
- 20:44you can imagine that it's somewhat of a difficult
- 20:46claim to make. That's why these claims, I think,
- 20:49inherently can lead to these kinds of results.
- 20:51The Court of Appeal reversed the grant of the
- 20:53JNOV and held that the employee who had a 10th
- 20:57grade education, though I don't think that really
- 20:58mattered in the end, had, quote, reasonable cause
- 21:01to believe that his former employer had violated
- 21:03the EPA, even though they had not. So employers
- 21:07face liability for whistleblower. claims in this
- 21:11kind of situation, even when the employee has
- 21:13only a good faith but mistaken belief that there's
- 21:16a violation of the law. As you can imagine, that
- 21:18opens up the field for a lot of mischief. I'm
- 21:21not sure this case was an example of that, but
- 21:23I certainly have seen cases that were. management
- 21:32is a marijuana growing facility. It hires a guy
- 21:35named Stephen McDonald as an assistant grower.
- 21:38There's a robbery. Armed masked men break in
- 21:42and steal about $70 ,000 in cash. Cavrey decides
- 21:46to administer lie detector tests to all of its
- 21:50employees, including McDonald. It does not inform
- 21:53them of their rights under Labor Code Section
- 21:55432 .2, as they're required to do. When McDonald
- 22:00purportedly fails the polygraph test twice, they
- 22:03fire him. He then sues for wrongful termination
- 22:06using Labor Code Section 432 .2 as the source
- 22:10of the public policy on which his wrongful term
- 22:13claim relies. The company moves to dismiss. The
- 22:18court denies it. The jury awards him $100 ,000.
- 22:22The employer appeals it. And the Court of Appeal
- 22:25affirms, in a case of first impression, finding
- 22:28that Labor Code Section 432 .2 does, in fact,
- 22:32provide a source of public policy for a wrongful
- 22:34termination claim. Just in the category of slice
- 22:40of life, this is my favorite part of this opinion.
- 22:43McDonnell had failed the polygraph exam twice,
- 22:47which caused him to be, quote, shocked beyond
- 22:49belief, scared, and, quote, this is the best
- 22:53part, worried that the career he had planned
- 22:55in the marijuana cultivation industry would be
- 22:58over. It probably was. All right. Our next case.
- 23:06is a little bit of a confusing holding. I'll
- 23:09do my best to try to simplify it, but Zoe Hollis
- 23:12worked as a stripper or an exotic dancer at a
- 23:15strip club named Sassy's. Hollis prefers the
- 23:18pronouns they and them, so I'll follow that preference
- 23:22throughout the summary I'm about to give you.
- 23:26Hollis sues Sassy's for violating the FLSA by
- 23:31misclassifying them as an independent contractor
- 23:34rather than an employee and not paying them appropriate
- 23:38wage and hours as the FLSA requires. Hollis,
- 23:43after they were fired, applies to work at another
- 23:47strip club called Dante's. Unfortunately for
- 23:50Hollis, the general manager of Sassy's was the
- 23:55same general manager at Dante's, a guy named
- 23:58Frank Felace. He rescinded her offer of employment
- 24:03at the second club, Dante's, telling them that
- 24:08the reason was they were protecting the clubs
- 24:12from potential future lawsuits. That second they
- 24:17you just used was not referencing the plaintiff,
- 24:20though, that way. Yeah, it's kind of confusing.
- 24:22Herein is the problem, yes. And hard to do. So
- 24:25then Hollis amends their complaint suing Sassi's
- 24:30to allege retaliation. The district court grants
- 24:35Sassi's motion to dismiss because Sassi's was
- 24:40not a current employer at the time of the retaliation,
- 24:44nor was Dante's. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
- 24:48reverses saying that the employer does not have
- 24:52to be the current employer. It drew, the Ninth
- 24:58Circuit did, on the broad remedial language of
- 25:01the FLSA and the remedial purpose to allow the
- 25:06suit to go forward, at least for purposes of
- 25:09proving that Hollis was an employee, in which
- 25:13case the FLSA would apply, as opposed to an independent
- 25:16contractor, in which case it wouldn't. The only
- 25:20thing I would add to that near perfect explanation
- 25:23of the case, Andrew, is this important detail,
- 25:25which is the weekly variety show at which Hollis
- 25:29was supposed to work but was prevented from doing
- 25:33so at Dante's was Sinferno, S -I -N -F -E -R
- 25:38-N -O, Sinferno. And what's really interesting
- 25:41to me, Tony, is that you can't find that information
- 25:45in anywhere in either of the decisions. Moving
- 25:49on to - I found it somewhere. We're going to
- 25:54move on to discrimination and reasonable accommodation
- 25:56cases. I'm not going to really talk about this
- 26:01case that much because we talked about it ad
- 26:03nauseam in 2023, 2024, and maybe even last year.
- 26:08But basically, the plaintiff, twice lost before
- 26:12the Ninth Circuit on a finding that the plaintiff
- 26:14was unable to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden
- 26:17shifting test. The plaintiff files a petition
- 26:20for cert with the US Supreme Court, which denies
- 26:24the petition. However, two justices, very unlikely
- 26:28duo, come riding to the rescue. of the plaintiff,
- 26:31issuing a dissent from the denial of justices
- 26:34Thomas and Gorsuch. And they say they would have
- 26:37accepted the petition to, among other things,
- 26:40clarify or overrule McDonnell Douglas. It's too
- 26:43narrow of a test. It's too employer protective
- 26:47for them. So that happens in, I think, January
- 26:52or February of 2025. Then a couple of months
- 26:55later, another decision comes down. This aims
- 26:58versus the Ohio Department of Youth Services
- 27:02and they still have such a burr in their bonnet
- 27:06about this that they issue. I think you mean,
- 27:07I think you mean saddle. Thank you. A burr in
- 27:11their saddle. What would be in your bonnet or
- 27:13maybe they had both. that they issue a concurrence,
- 27:17again, specifically calling for this McDonnell
- 27:19Douglas burden shifting test to be reevaluated
- 27:22because it favors employers too much. They keep
- 27:28telling people, file petitions for cert, either
- 27:31the California Supreme Court or the US Supreme
- 27:34Court is going to take up a position, take up
- 27:37a petition for cert in one of these cases. Now,
- 27:41there was a little bit of a setback earlier this
- 27:44month when the Supreme Court denied a petition
- 27:47for cert in a case specifically asking them to
- 27:51overturn McDonnell Douglas. But keep filing those
- 27:53petitions if you want to argue before either
- 27:55the California or US Supreme Court cases because
- 27:58you'll get there. Now, what everybody probably
- 28:01knows this case for is that it was called upon
- 28:04to decide a question of whether a majority group
- 28:09plaintiff had a greater burden in proving a discrimination
- 28:14claim than a minority group plaintiff. The thinking
- 28:20being that it would be a very rare employer who
- 28:23would actually discriminate against a majority
- 28:26group plaintiff as opposed to a minority group
- 28:29plaintiff. The Supreme Court issued a unanimous
- 28:32decision saying, no, a majority group plaintiff
- 28:35does not have any extra special burden because
- 28:38of this unremarkable proposition, discrimination
- 28:42is discrimination. So I'll start this one with
- 28:50the graphic, which I actually designed on our
- 28:53AI platform. And this appeared when Andrew stole
- 28:57it from my blog. But interesting case, this one
- 29:02is Sexton versus Apple Studios. This is a situation
- 29:06in which it sort of delves into the mysteries
- 29:12and delights of Hollywood. Apple was filming
- 29:17in early 2022 the limited streaming series called
- 29:24Man Hunt, which is, I believe, still running
- 29:26on Apple. If you haven't seen it, I do recommend
- 29:27it. It actually is really good. And it's about
- 29:30the hunt for John Wilkes Booth in the days and
- 29:34I think weeks maybe following the assassination
- 29:36of President Abraham Lincoln in April of 1865.
- 29:41One of the conditions of the casting for at the
- 29:46very least the Vice President Andrew Johnson
- 29:49was that he be fully vaccinated. Remember this
- 29:53was in early 2022 when all of that still made
- 29:56a lot of difference in the world. And Sexton,
- 30:00the plaintiff in the case, who had been conditionally
- 30:04approved for the role, refused to get vaccinated.
- 30:08And he sought an exemption on medical grounds.
- 30:11After considering Sexton's request, Apple ultimately
- 30:15decided that an unvaccinated actor could not
- 30:18safely be accommodated on the set of manhunt.
- 30:22And they withdrew his offer so that he did what
- 30:25any good red -blooded Californian would do under
- 30:27the circumstances, he of course filed a lawsuit
- 30:29claiming disability discrimination and related
- 30:32claims. In response, Apple cleverly filed a motion
- 30:36to strike his complaint under California's anti
- 30:41-SLAPP law, which of course stands for the anti
- 30:43-strategic lawsuit against public participation.
- 30:46It's a mouthful. And as you probably know, that's
- 30:50usually something that surfaces in exactly this
- 30:53kind of situation where there's casting being
- 30:55done by an entertainment -related company and
- 30:59there are cases involving Broadway productions
- 31:01and television productions and motion picture
- 31:03productions, that those instances are situations
- 31:07in which the producers have a First Amendment
- 31:10right, essentially, to choose who to cast and
- 31:14that the anti -slap statute usually slaps out
- 31:17of existence claims that are based even on discrimination.
- 31:21and related claims if there is this exercise
- 31:25of the First Amendment. This case is interesting
- 31:28in that the trial court denied the motion, but
- 31:31the Court of Appeal reversed and held that Apple's
- 31:34decision not to cast Sexton was in fact protected
- 31:38expressive conduct under the First Amendment
- 31:40and also that his claims lacked merit because
- 31:43by remaining unvaccinated, he failed to meet
- 31:45the safety qualification requirement for the
- 31:48job. In terms of the First Amendment elements
- 31:53to this, there were two grounds. One was that
- 31:57Apple was exercising creative control and decision
- 32:04-making with respect to the selection of actors
- 32:07who would be contributing to the public issue
- 32:10of how contemporary viewers might conceive of
- 32:14Andrew Johnson. And so therefore they had maximum
- 32:18discretion essentially in choosing the person
- 32:20who would be personifying Andrew Johnson. And
- 32:25then second by, and this is the part that actually
- 32:27goes beyond the realm of just entertainment.
- 32:30Here the court said that by making a vaccination
- 32:33mandatory on the manhunt set, Apple took a stand
- 32:37on the ongoing public debate about vaccination
- 32:40policy, which of course was a raging debate and
- 32:43the subject of litigation already. back in 2022.
- 32:47So that second element is something that would
- 32:48apply potentially to all employers, certainly
- 32:51with respect to Apple, which was obviously a
- 32:55very high profile, is a very high profile entity
- 32:57and employer. But I suspect other employers might
- 33:00be able to come within that element that might
- 33:05actually be able to, they might be able to rely
- 33:07on the anti -slab statute if they are taking
- 33:09a public stance on a controversial public issue.
- 33:17Speaking of COVID, all these cases are now percolating
- 33:22through the appellate courts now, all the ones
- 33:24that got filed back in 19, back in 2020, 2021,
- 33:302022, et cetera. In this case, against the Poway
- 33:33Unified School District, a plaintiff by the name
- 33:36of Alos sued the employer based on the district's
- 33:41refusal to allow her to work exclusively from
- 33:44home. So something that we've all... probably
- 33:46either litigated or heard about, or maybe it's
- 33:49happened in a workplace you may be familiar with,
- 33:51that is your own. She worked as a senior business
- 33:55systems analyst and refused to return to work
- 33:57after the stay at home order was lifted in late
- 33:592020, which was actually relatively early for
- 34:03that. Recall that we're now at almost the six
- 34:06year mark of the beginning of the COVID situation.
- 34:11The trial court granted summary judgment to the
- 34:14district based on statutory immunity because
- 34:16it was and is a public entity. More importantly,
- 34:21for our purposes, the court also said that Alice
- 34:24was not disabled under the FIHA based upon a
- 34:28suspected or self -diagnosed allergy to vaccine.
- 34:32So again, this is something that pops up all
- 34:34the time. People can find just about anything
- 34:35on the internet. And these kinds of self -diagnoses
- 34:40were were all the rage back in 21, 22, when people
- 34:44would go online and they figure out they would
- 34:47download a statement from a group or an entity
- 34:50or a person that they would then be able to put
- 34:53in. Now they could probably use a chat GPT to
- 34:56do the exact same thing and make it look somewhat
- 34:59real. But at the end of the day, what the employer
- 35:04did here was, I think the right thing, which
- 35:05was to actually scrutinize the reason that was
- 35:08being given and again, made the argument that
- 35:11this was a suspected self -diagnosed allergy
- 35:15to vaccines. And the court backed them up and
- 35:19affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer.
- 35:23And then also, COVID -19, you'll recall most
- 35:27of the claims by employees for accommodation
- 35:32either rested on religious points of view, which
- 35:36this case involves, or some kind of medical excuse.
- 35:41This one has actually both, and it's a very good,
- 35:45I think, example of it. It's from the Ninth Circuit
- 35:47here. The employee said that she is a practicing
- 35:51Christian who believes her body is a temple of
- 35:54the Holy Spirit and sincerely believes she has
- 35:57a, quote, religious duty to avoid defiling her
- 35:59temple, that is her body, by taking in substances
- 36:03that the Bible explicitly condemns or which could
- 36:06potentially cause harm to her body. Again, a
- 36:08lot of this I'm suspecting probably was backed
- 36:11up by things found on the internet. This took
- 36:14place in Oregon and it was involving Oregon's,
- 36:19the Oregon Health Authority's administrative
- 36:21rule, which required healthcare workers, which
- 36:24she was, to be vaccinated against COVID -19 absent
- 36:27and approved exemption. So she does find these
- 36:31sources on the internet and she says, that COVID
- 36:34-19, she had concluded that COVID -19 vaccines
- 36:37were created from fetal cell lines. I think you
- 36:39probably all have heard about this and contain
- 36:41quote neurotoxins and quote, and other potentially
- 36:44harmful substances. So then they tried to come
- 36:49up with a reasonable accommodation. She said
- 36:52she wanted a religious exemption from vaccinations,
- 36:55but they then said, well, how about, And then
- 36:58she said, sorry, she said, I will wear personal
- 37:01protective equipment while in the office and
- 37:03I will submit to weekly testing for the virus.
- 37:07However, she has a problem with the testing because
- 37:10the exemption from the antigen testing she wanted,
- 37:14she concluded was based on these multiple sources.
- 37:17something that involved ethylene oxide, which
- 37:20is on the cotton swab inserted into the nostril
- 37:23for the antigen test. And she, of course, concluded
- 37:26that, based on her sources, was a carcinogenic
- 37:29substance. So it went back and forth in terms
- 37:30of things she was finding on the internet. So
- 37:32anyway, they eventually fired her. And she then
- 37:36sues for religious discrimination under Title
- 37:38VII. And under Oregon law, the court backs up
- 37:42the employer, as has happened in most of these
- 37:44cases. And summary judgment. or actually I think
- 37:48it was the 12b6, yeah, it was the 12b6, is affirmed
- 37:51the dismissal is based on the fact that her,
- 37:55quote, specific determination of what is harmful
- 37:57was not in this case, premise on the Bible or
- 38:00any other religious tenet or teaching, but rather
- 38:02on her research -based scientific medical judgments.
- 38:06And the Ninth Circuit said that is not sufficient
- 38:08to be the foundation for a religious or health
- 38:13-related exception. Our next two cases illustrate
- 38:18the mischievousness of the McDonnell -Douglas
- 38:23burden shifting test and how it causes district
- 38:26courts to inappropriately grant summary judgment.
- 38:29So in this Liu case, the plaintiff, Don Liu,
- 38:32was a woman of Chinese ancestry who was suing
- 38:36the postmaster general, alleging that she was
- 38:39demoted because of her race and gender and replaced
- 38:44by a white man. The Postmaster General moved
- 38:47for summary judgment, arguing that she could
- 38:50not satisfy her prima facie case under the McDonald
- 38:54Douglas burden shifting test because she couldn't
- 38:57show that a white man who had complained of gender
- 39:03and race discrimination was not demoted, whereas
- 39:08she had complained and she was demoted. So they're
- 39:11saying you can't find a comparable that's the
- 39:14same as you. The district court bought that argument,
- 39:18granted summary judgment, it goes up on appeal.
- 39:20And the Ninth Circuit sort of apologetically
- 39:23says, you know what, we're not really blaming
- 39:25the district court for this. Yeah, we see why
- 39:28the district court kind of ruled this way. Some
- 39:30of our opinions are pretty darn confusing on
- 39:33this subject. But no, to satisfy the McDonnell
- 39:35Douglas burden shifting test in a termination
- 39:38or demotion, you don't have to find a comparable
- 39:41person. You just have to find someone who wasn't
- 39:44within the protected status who replaced you.
- 39:48The next case, Calderon versus Circle Pay Stores
- 39:51Inc, involved a couple of people who were let
- 39:56go and they were claiming that they were let
- 39:58go because of their protected status, in this
- 40:01case, their age. The employer moved for summary
- 40:06judgment contending They also didn't get promotions
- 40:10that they couldn't sue for the promotion aspect
- 40:13of the case because they never applied for the
- 40:16promotion. And the district court bought that
- 40:18argument. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
- 40:21that. finding that you don't have an obligation
- 40:25under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test
- 40:27to show that you applied for a promotion unless
- 40:31the employer was actively advertising for it.
- 40:34In this case, the plaintiffs were alleging that
- 40:37nobody knew there was this vacant position that
- 40:40people were available to apply to. They would
- 40:43have applied had they known, but it was secret.
- 40:47Now we move on to the more interesting cases
- 40:50in my view. This one is a very boring, uninteresting
- 40:55one. I don't think so. This is a great case.
- 41:00Well, it's actually for employers, it's half
- 41:02great. And the part that's not so great for employers,
- 41:05I think most employers would not run into trouble
- 41:08with, and I'll explain that in a second. So this
- 41:10is a situation where it's a coworker against
- 41:13coworker on a sexual harassment claim. Of course,
- 41:18there's no strict liability in that kind of a
- 41:20case where there is no supervisor involved. It
- 41:22is whether the employer knew or should have known
- 41:25that the harassment was going on. And with respect
- 41:27to the first element of this, whether the employer
- 41:31knew or should have known, the employee fails
- 41:35to be able to show that on summary judgment that
- 41:40all of this sexual harassment that was allegedly
- 41:44going on was taking place outside of work and
- 41:47that the employer was not in any way involved.
- 41:50This was actually a female defendant who was
- 41:53sexually harassing, allegedly, a male plaintiff.
- 41:58And he alleged that he was subjected to crude
- 42:00sexual advances at his home and via his personal
- 42:04cell phone away from the premises of the employer.
- 42:08This all takes place in Bakersfield. Specifically,
- 42:12the employee said that the female defendant had
- 42:16sent multiple unsolicited nude pictures of herself,
- 42:20showed up uninvited to his house, and repeatedly
- 42:23propositioned him for sex. When he reported this
- 42:27conduct to Human Resources, the HR rep told him
- 42:30there was nothing that could be done ostensibly
- 42:32because the alleged activity occurred off work
- 42:35premises. Probably most employers would not say
- 42:38or act that way, but in a moment, you'll maybe
- 42:40understand the HR function at this employer.
- 42:44That part of the case, in terms of the sexual
- 42:46harassment itself, the court says no liability
- 42:49for the employer because it did take place off
- 42:51of company premises. Rarely, by the way, in my
- 42:55experience at least, is it so clearly defined
- 43:00that the activity was not at all related to the
- 43:04employment. And of course, plaintiffs' lawyers,
- 43:07such as Andrew, are going to do everything they
- 43:08can under their power to try to connect this
- 43:10in some way to the employer. Andrew perhaps would
- 43:14have been able to do so even in this case, who
- 43:16knows. But in any event, the plaintiff was not
- 43:19able to establish any connection with respect
- 43:21to the harassment to the workplace. Where things
- 43:25go awry for the employer involves what happens
- 43:28next, and that is the HR rep not only says nothing
- 43:33I can do about it off premises, she then posts
- 43:37a video on social media depicting whining dogs
- 43:41and states, quote, this is a workday at THR.
- 43:45I think it's supposed to be the office. And then
- 43:48LMBO, laughing my B, I assume, his butt. We don't
- 43:52know for sure. I'm not even sure it's defined
- 43:53in the opinion, but pretty sure that's what that
- 43:57means. And so the plaintiff sees that. Obviously,
- 44:01he finds that to be somewhat mocking of him and
- 44:04isn't pleased by it. And then the HR rep, to
- 44:07put a cherry on top of all this, then sarcastically
- 44:10comments to the plaintiff, as he's complaining
- 44:13about how she's not paying attention to the complaint,
- 44:16she writes, I think, in a text to him, I hope
- 44:20you don't get no more pictures, because that's
- 44:24good English. And so as a result of that, the
- 44:28court says, no, no, no, no. That's not how HR
- 44:31should react in a situation like that. So yeah,
- 44:34we got you out of the soup with respect to the
- 44:36harassment. But then you unfortunately ratified
- 44:38it and did all the wrong things when he did complain
- 44:41about it. So the court said that the hostile
- 44:44environment claim that he was claiming was viable
- 44:47insofar as the employer's response to the complaint
- 44:51altered his work environment in an objectively
- 44:54severe manner. Given the totality of the circumstances,
- 44:58the court held that the employer's refusal to
- 45:01take any action while simultaneously mocking
- 45:04the employee's concerns could indicate to a reasonable
- 45:06person that the employer had no objection. So
- 45:10everything was going fine until the employer
- 45:12was, their HR people were notified of this and
- 45:14then of course they destroyed whatever defense
- 45:17the employer would have had based upon how they
- 45:19reacted to the complaint. Carranza is another
- 45:23terrific sexual harassment case where the employer
- 45:25gets into trouble because HR and management doesn't
- 45:29do anything. So in this case, Lillian Carranza
- 45:32was a police captain and she heard, remember,
- 45:36heard, she didn't see, she didn't witness, she
- 45:38heard that people were sharing a photograph of
- 45:43a topless woman with the head cut off and that
- 45:47people were saying it was her. She went to HR
- 45:51and to her bosses and other managers saying that
- 45:54she heard that people are spreading this rumor.
- 45:57The woman in the picture isn't her. She wanted
- 46:00them to notify everyone that she's not in the
- 46:03picture. She wanted them to order everyone to
- 46:06stop distributing the photo. And she wanted them
- 46:10to discipline whoever was distributing the photo.
- 46:17did nothing. So she sues. Wasting taxpayer dollars,
- 46:22the city defends itself. They lose $4 million
- 46:27a trial. The city then gets it with $641 ,000
- 46:33in attorney's fees. Sorry about that. The city
- 46:37moves to set aside the verdict. And on appeal
- 46:40argues that the woman, the plaintiff, did not
- 46:44establish severe or pervasive work environment
- 46:47because what happened to her was not hellish,
- 46:51quote unquote, hellish. That was the city's position.
- 46:54The court of appeal, citing the wonderful, terrific,
- 46:59fantastic government's code section 12923, rejected
- 47:03the city's argument. and said that even one incident
- 47:06of harassment may constitute a viable harassment
- 47:10claim. Then what I love at the end is the Court
- 47:13of Appeal writes, quote, FIHA does not reward
- 47:17discretion in harassing behaviors. Rather, it
- 47:21protects victims from workplace environments
- 47:23poisoned by inappropriate conduct, whether sung,
- 47:28shouted, or whispered. Bivens isn't a Ninth Circuit
- 47:34case or within our jurisdiction, obviously, so
- 47:37we won't spend very much time talking about it.
- 47:39I just want to cite it as a harbinger of things
- 47:41to come. Tony and I have previously talked about
- 47:44how Looper Bright Enterprises versus Raimondo
- 47:47got rid of Chevron deference, and now courts
- 47:51are free to make up whatever they want as to
- 47:54what they think statutes mean. So in this case,
- 47:58the Sixth Circuit abandons every other circuit's
- 48:01view and the EEO circuit's view of third party,
- 48:05of employer liability for third party harassment.
- 48:09Under the new test that the sixth circuit thinks
- 48:12it knows better than the EEOC, employers will
- 48:15only be liable for third party harassment, you
- 48:18know, like the FedEx woman or the postal service.
- 48:23if the employer intends for the third party to
- 48:26harass the employee. I think it's a troubling
- 48:28development that we're going to see spreading
- 48:31to all sorts of areas in employment law. Next.
- 48:41Yep, there you go. OK, so this is the court of
- 48:45appeal opinion. It has been. Review has been
- 48:51granted by the Supreme Court in this case. So
- 48:53this is interesting. But as we indicate here,
- 48:57this won't be the final word on it. It will come
- 48:59from the Supreme Court. I will say, in full disclosure,
- 49:02we are firm. In fact, my name was probably on
- 49:05it. We filed an amicus brief. in the Court of
- 49:08Appeal, and we will also be filing one in the
- 49:11Supreme Court in support of the employer's position.
- 49:15This is an interesting case in that it goes back
- 49:18to first principles when Andrew first started
- 49:20practicing so many decades ago when Foley versus
- 49:24Interactive came out. Remember that, Andrew,
- 49:26back in 1988? 47 Cal Thord 654. I was in third
- 49:29grade. What Foley was all about was talking about,
- 49:35and nobody ever talked about Foley anymore, but
- 49:37it was groundbreaking at the time. And that is,
- 49:41if you are suing your employer essentially for
- 49:43a breach of contract, under what circumstances,
- 49:45if any, can you get tort damages other than under
- 49:48a statute or under a defamation claim as there
- 49:51existed here? Why this case was so peculiar,
- 49:55it did go to trial on claims for retaliation
- 49:59violation of the whistleblower statute, 11 -02
- 50:02.5, and defamation. At trial, the jury found
- 50:08against the plaintiff on the retaliation claim,
- 50:11but found it his favor on the defamation claim
- 50:13and awarded him $2 .16 million in compensatory
- 50:17damages. But the jury specifically found that
- 50:20the investigative report that resulted in the
- 50:23termination of the employee was a source of the
- 50:26purportedly defamatory statements. The employer
- 50:29moved for JNOV on the ground that the employee
- 50:33had conceded that his damages for the alleged
- 50:35defamation were simply his termination related
- 50:38damages. And of course they won on the termination
- 50:41related claim. So basically as a result of that
- 50:45they had that he had suffered no distinct reputational
- 50:48harm or other damages specifically attributable
- 50:51to the allegedly defamatory conduct. So in a
- 50:56two to one ruling in this appellate court opinion,
- 51:00they reversed the trial court's judgment entered
- 51:02in the plaintiff's favor on the defamation claim
- 51:05and agreed with the employer that the employee
- 51:07could not pursue a tort claim against the employer
- 51:10based on the same conduct and seeking no distinct
- 51:13damages from his unsuccessful wrongful termination
- 51:17claim. So it's a good law review article, I think,
- 51:21because it really does go back to first principles
- 51:23of tort contract, foley, all that. And so we'll
- 51:28see what happens. We're all hoping, of course,
- 51:30Supreme Court doesn't reopen this can of worms
- 51:32in terms of forgetting the difference between
- 51:34contract claims and tort claims, and then suddenly
- 51:37throwing everything into pipe or overdrive, because
- 51:41every plaintiff's lawyer then will have a potential
- 51:43tort claim. based on a breach of contract or
- 51:47some other non -tort related claim. And what
- 51:49would be the problem with that? I don't know.
- 51:52I'm waiting to hear from you. All right. Moving
- 51:56on to attorney's fees, this next case, Bronstein,
- 51:59was an early Christmas and early Hanukkah gift
- 52:04for the defense bar and the plaintiff's bar.
- 52:07So for Christmas, the defense bar got a whopping
- 52:11lump of coal. You got a lump of coal in terms
- 52:15of several warnings from the Court of Appeal.
- 52:18One is, quote, when the plaintiff files a case
- 52:21with the prospect of recovering attorney's fees,
- 52:24the defense is fully entitled to fight hard,
- 52:27but the defense does so knowing it might end
- 52:31up paying for all of the work on both sides.
- 52:35And quote, the fact that the defendant did not
- 52:38settle the case early might or might not be good
- 52:41litigation strategy or bad litigation strategy.
- 52:45But the biggest thing it does is it makes it
- 52:47hard for the defendant to claim that the plaintiff
- 52:50shouldn't have spent money litigating to try
- 52:52the case, which is reflected in the number of
- 52:55hours that counsel build. For the plaintiffs,
- 52:58there are so many things here, I can't tell you
- 53:00all of them. Here are some of them. Court of
- 53:02Appeal affirms $4 .9 million in attorney's fees
- 53:07to take a case through trial. Court of Appeal
- 53:10holds that $1 ,200 is not unreasonable for a
- 53:15Los Angeles attorney. Court of Appeal holds that
- 53:18just because you're at a small law firm, that
- 53:21does not mean your hourly rate should be lower
- 53:24than some big palatial law firm. I won't mention
- 53:28any names, Tony. And the court said that if a
- 53:33plaintiff has to turn down other work because
- 53:36it's handling a contingency fee case, the plaintiff's
- 53:40entitled to a multiplier. And there's so many
- 53:43other good holdings that we'll skip it and move
- 53:45on. But look at this if you're ever thinking
- 53:47about attorney's fees. I'll just say, just briefly,
- 53:51I won't criticize anything in this opinion, because
- 53:53it was written by the santa justice John Shepherd
- 53:56Wiley Jr., my favorite appellate court judge
- 53:59anywhere, justice, sorry. And he does say there's
- 54:05a holding in the case that fees, in this case,
- 54:09the plaintiff's fees, excuse me, in excess of
- 54:12$1 ,000 per hour is basically the going rate
- 54:15in Los Angeles. When we put this case up on our
- 54:19blog. That was the part that got highlighted
- 54:22by plaintiff's lawyers, defense lawyers, insurance
- 54:25companies got mad, all kinds of hell broke loose.
- 54:29But Justice Wiley, hallowed be his name, has
- 54:34said it, and there it is still published in the
- 54:35case. All right, employees file with the labor
- 54:40commissioner to get some unpaid wages. They lose.
- 54:44They appeal it to the trial court for a trial,
- 54:47Del Nova, which gives them $140 ,000. They then
- 54:50ask for their attorney's fees, and the trial
- 54:52court gives them $200 ,000. The employer appealed,
- 54:56arguing that if you lose your Berman hearing,
- 54:59the hearing before the labor commissioner, you
- 55:01don't get fees after that. The court of appeal
- 55:03basically said that's nonsense. Of course you
- 55:05do. So arbitration continues to royal R -O -I
- 55:14-L, everyone's daily nine to five or nine to
- 55:2012 or whatever it is that we're all working these
- 55:22days. And this is perhaps the poster child for
- 55:28how far the US rather than the California Supreme
- 55:32Court will go to try to save a case from being
- 55:35decided by the US Supreme Court because They
- 55:38have a really, really, really, really bad record
- 55:40in front of the US Supreme Court on arbitration
- 55:44issues. In this case, Hohenschelt involved this
- 55:49very, very bad, horrible, can't believe it exists
- 55:53statute, Section 1281 .98 of the California Code
- 56:00of Civil Procedure. And this was, I view it almost
- 56:03as a tantrum from the California. legislature
- 56:06saying, we are trying our best to make arbitration
- 56:11illegal in California. We've tried it 12 different
- 56:13ways. Here's the 13th way we're going to go.
- 56:16And what they did is they passed this ridiculous
- 56:18statute, which says that if an employer in an
- 56:22employment case or a non -consumer business in
- 56:27a consumer case fails to pay the fees that are
- 56:32charged by the arbitrator or the arbitration
- 56:36agency that is handling the arbitration within
- 56:3830 days, within 30 days, it can't be 31 days
- 56:42and you don't get any extra credit for mailing.
- 56:46You waive, somehow you waive your right to arbitrate.
- 56:50They just invented this from nowhere. They actually
- 56:52say it is a material breach of the agreement,
- 56:54although of course that provision doesn't appear
- 56:56in anybody's arbitration agreement anywhere.
- 57:00So that statute comes out and then for whatever
- 57:02reason, this became a favorite hobby, I think,
- 57:05of the California Court of Appeal, because there
- 57:07were no fewer than 12, and I think there actually
- 57:10might've been more than 12 at the end of the
- 57:12day, published opinions on this statute. And
- 57:16almost all of them, there was one or two exceptions,
- 57:18but almost all of them said that this statute
- 57:21means what it says, and employers, you're gonna
- 57:24waive your right if you don't pay by return mail,
- 57:27basically, the fees for the arbitration. And
- 57:32again, Justice Wiley, I already told you what
- 57:33I think about him. He wrote a dissent, or actually
- 57:37maybe it was a current, current opinion in the
- 57:40lower court opinion that appeared in this case
- 57:43before the Supreme Court took it up. And he said
- 57:45that, that by effectively imposing a time is
- 57:50of the essence default presumption with respect
- 57:52to arbitration agreements, but not any other
- 57:55type of contract because, That's a no -no. This
- 57:58Supreme Court of the United States has already
- 58:00said an arbitration contract is a contract like
- 58:03any other, so you can't pick and choose. It wasn't
- 58:08a sent, sorry. It wasn't a sent. He said in the
- 58:09lower court, by again putting arbitration on
- 58:12the chopping block, this statute invites a seventh
- 58:15reprimand from the Supreme Court of the United
- 58:18States. That was the setup before this case goes
- 58:20to the California Supreme Court. And then in...
- 58:23what can only be described as an act of ledger
- 58:26domain, the California Supreme Court says, you
- 58:29know what, this statute is not preempted by the
- 58:32FAA, which of course is what Justice Wiley and
- 58:36others said that it would be. And there's no
- 58:38doubt that the US Supreme Court would view it
- 58:40that way, but there's only so much time in the
- 58:42US Supreme Court's day. So they can't spend all
- 58:44their time trying to fix California. And. So
- 58:48the California Supreme Court said, this is not
- 58:51preempted by the FAA. But you know what? The
- 58:54statute doesn't really mean what it says. Yeah,
- 58:56yeah, yeah. We know it says that you waive your
- 58:58right after 30 days. But that's not really what
- 58:59it means. They cite all of these provisions of
- 59:03contract law that are not ever referenced in
- 59:06the statute and are not made anywhere a part
- 59:09of the opinion. And they say that these generally
- 59:11applicable state law contract principles against
- 59:15forfeiture all apply. And as a result of that,
- 59:19unless the employer can be shown to have engaged
- 59:22in something other than a good faith mistake,
- 59:26in other words, if there is some activity on
- 59:29the part of the employer of bad faith and it's
- 59:32not a good faith mistake or if it's inadvertence
- 59:34or some other accusable neglect, then the employer
- 59:37doesn't lose its right to to arbitrate. So essentially
- 59:41what they do is they rewrote the statute. I don't
- 59:43know what this does to statutory interpretation
- 59:46law now, which says that a subsequent statute
- 59:49is presumed to know about existing statutes already
- 59:52and supersedes generally those pre -existing
- 59:55statutes if it has a different outcome, but the
- 59:58Supreme Court has made the bet and now it's lying
- 1:00:00in it. I guess this won't go to the US Supreme
- 1:00:02Court, but one day probably this statute will
- 1:00:06in some form or another. Wilson is the first
- 1:00:12case I believe that's been published after Hohenschelt
- 1:00:15applying Hohenschelt. They got with the program
- 1:00:19and now the court of appeal sees after all, this
- 1:00:22is a dumb statute. And unless there is quote,
- 1:00:25willful or grossly negligent or fraudulent activity
- 1:00:29on the part of the employer, the employee cannot
- 1:00:32get attorney's fees and cannot essentially access
- 1:00:36back into the court. if there is a arbitration
- 1:00:40agreement that is otherwise enforced. Let me
- 1:00:44just briefly mention this Avery case. It's fresh
- 1:00:46off the presses. It came out yesterday afternoon.
- 1:00:49It's fascinating the machinations that employers
- 1:00:53will go through to avoid wage and hour cases
- 1:00:57and imposing arbitration. So with a class action
- 1:01:01certification motion pending, the employer rushes
- 1:01:06out by email a statement saying that every single
- 1:01:10employee is now covered by a binding arbitration
- 1:01:13agreement with a class action waiver unless you
- 1:01:17quit immediately. Then maybe someone at the company
- 1:01:20thought, huh, did we run this by the lawyers?
- 1:01:23All of a sudden, they rush out another email
- 1:01:25that says, but if you're a member of this putative
- 1:01:29class and this Avery putative class, you can
- 1:01:32opt out by filling out the attached form and
- 1:01:34sending it in. They then file a motion to force
- 1:01:40to arbitration all of the putative class members,
- 1:01:43or actually by this time the class is certified,
- 1:01:45so all of the class members who failed to opt
- 1:01:48out of the arbitration agreement. The district
- 1:01:51court and then the Ninth Circuit said, no, no,
- 1:01:54no, you're playing games, that your attempt to
- 1:01:57get these people to opt out. of your arbitration
- 1:02:00agreement violates the class action procedures,
- 1:02:04and it's not going to be enforceable. Do you
- 1:02:09want to talk about? What's that? Do you want
- 1:02:12to talk about this Hofer case? Yeah, just briefly.
- 1:02:15I mean, this plays right into Andrew's ridiculous
- 1:02:18theory of the world, which is that every employer
- 1:02:21always does this, which is they have in their
- 1:02:23back pocket an arbitration agreement. They're
- 1:02:26sneakily keeping it there and just waiting for
- 1:02:30the moment in which they can drop the arbitration
- 1:02:32agreement, only when they think they're not going
- 1:02:35to do better in court than they would otherwise
- 1:02:37do in art. Some ridiculous theory. Ask him about
- 1:02:40it. He'll tell you probably all about it in an
- 1:02:43email that's about 12 pages long. But it does
- 1:02:46look like something weird like that happened
- 1:02:47here, although it wasn't a dastardly defendant.
- 1:02:52It was a dastardly plaintiff. Here they initiated
- 1:02:55litigation against the defendants, notwithstanding
- 1:02:57the existence of binding arbitration. For six
- 1:03:00months following the filing of the litigation,
- 1:03:03They sought two forms, that is, the plaintiffs
- 1:03:05sought two forms of preliminary injunctive relief,
- 1:03:07opposed a demurrer, propounded more than 700
- 1:03:10discovery requests, demanded a jury trial in
- 1:03:13their case management conference statement, and
- 1:03:15represented that they would be litigating substantive
- 1:03:17motions in court, and then they posted jury fees.
- 1:03:20It was not until the opposing party filed a cross
- 1:03:23complaint that plaintiffs got religion, and they
- 1:03:26filed a motion to compel arbitration. As you
- 1:03:28can see. That really shouldn't be. I don't care
- 1:03:30if it's the plaintiff or the defendant that does
- 1:03:32it. The trial court, I think, properly denied
- 1:03:35the motion on the ground that plaintiff's conduct
- 1:03:36in the case constituted a waiver, citing quatch,
- 1:03:39Q -U -A -C -H, versus California Commerce Club,
- 1:03:43California Supreme Court case from 2024. The
- 1:03:46court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion
- 1:03:50to compel. This is a really fascinating case.
- 1:03:54The plaintiff sues for sexual orientation harassment.
- 1:03:58The employer moves to compel arbitration. The
- 1:04:02employee opposes the motion to compel arbitration,
- 1:04:06but does not mention the ending forced arbitration
- 1:04:10of Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment Act of 2021.
- 1:04:14Instead, the court, trial court, brings it up
- 1:04:18on its own and denies the motion to compel arbitration.
- 1:04:23It goes up to the Court of Appeal and the Court
- 1:04:25of Appeal said, well, yeah, of course a court
- 1:04:28in determining whether the FAA is applicable
- 1:04:32has to look at any carve -outs to the FAA. So
- 1:04:35this was a perfectly good reason to deny arbitration.
- 1:04:40So let me stop on this. This is one of my pet
- 1:04:43peeves these days. And Andrew and I co -authored
- 1:04:48an article that I think is in the materials that
- 1:04:51have been distributed for this webinar. And in
- 1:04:58our article, we talk about this very issue, which
- 1:05:02is that there are a bunch of things that are
- 1:05:05happening now that this Ending Forced Arbitration
- 1:05:07Act, the EFAA, got passed. And among other things,
- 1:05:14the plaintiff's lawyers now are sprinkling, or
- 1:05:17maybe I should say bombarding, every case that
- 1:05:20they file no matter what it involves. If there's
- 1:05:23employers on the other side, it could be a wage
- 1:05:25and hour case. It could be a whistleblower case.
- 1:05:29It could be a religious discrimination case.
- 1:05:32They now somehow find sexual harassment and sexual
- 1:05:35assault under every rock imaginable. And then
- 1:05:39they drop one of these causes of action in the
- 1:05:41case. Now, the case law in California is uniform
- 1:05:44on this, which says, number one, employers, if
- 1:05:47there is a sexual harassment or sexual assault
- 1:05:49claim in the complaint, in the case, because
- 1:05:52that's the ridiculous language Congress used,
- 1:05:55there's all kinds of ridiculous language in the
- 1:05:56statute. The entire case is immune from arbitration.
- 1:06:02So guess what? All the plaintiff's lawyers now
- 1:06:04are finding reasons to put sexual harassment
- 1:06:05and sexual assault in all of their cases because
- 1:06:08one little tiny allegation of sexual harassment
- 1:06:11or sexual assault is enough to poison the well
- 1:06:14and prevent arbitration because there's nothing
- 1:06:17plaintiff's lawyers hate more, hate more. than
- 1:06:20arbitration. They will do anything under the
- 1:06:23sun to try to prevent it. And so that's happening
- 1:06:26a lot. And so we see that a lot. We're seeing
- 1:06:28those. One of the questions that always arises
- 1:06:31now is, what if it's not really a substantial
- 1:06:35harassment claim, and that it's really just put
- 1:06:39in there for these kinds of purposes? I deal
- 1:06:42with that on my section of the article. I'm not
- 1:06:45going to go into that right now, but that's one
- 1:06:47defense that employers have that it's gotta be
- 1:06:50something more than just non -frivolous, which
- 1:06:52some of the courts are now saying. Secondly,
- 1:06:55the thing that happens in this Colala case, which
- 1:06:58I had come up in the L .A. Superior Court just
- 1:07:01a week or so ago, is that the case, rather the
- 1:07:06statutory language says sexual harassment or
- 1:07:09sexual assault. Plaintiff's lawyers now have
- 1:07:11somehow forgotten how to distinguish between
- 1:07:14a sexual harassment claim and a gender related
- 1:07:18discrimination claim. To them, they're profoundly
- 1:07:21confused by this. No one can understand it. And
- 1:07:24so anything that involves sexual anything, they're
- 1:07:27now saying is sexual harassment. This is a perfect
- 1:07:29example of it. This gentleman claims that he
- 1:07:33was discriminated against or harassed on the
- 1:07:35basis of his sexual orientation. But if you read
- 1:07:37this, there's not really any sexual harassment
- 1:07:40in here. He says, among other things, that the
- 1:07:42supervisors ask, quote, intrusive questions.
- 1:07:45about his sexual activity and mocked him by referring
- 1:07:48to him as Mrs. Kalala before he was fired. Those
- 1:07:52things, I submit, do not have anything to do
- 1:07:54with sexual harassment. That is, if anything,
- 1:07:57discrimination or harassment based on sexual
- 1:07:59orientation. That is not sexual harassment. It's
- 1:08:01not what Congress meant. It's not even what Joe
- 1:08:03Biden meant when he signed the EFAA. My example
- 1:08:07I had a couple of weeks ago, the judge in the
- 1:08:09tentative ruling, which was 15 pages against
- 1:08:11us, didn't even for whatever reason analyze this.
- 1:08:14It was a similar, it was a gender discrimination
- 1:08:17case in which the employees were, the employee,
- 1:08:22a single employee, was claiming that female employees,
- 1:08:26they were security guards, got less favorable
- 1:08:28assignments than male security guards. Sexual
- 1:08:31harassment. And so they said, that's sexual harassment.
- 1:08:34The judge, in the first go round, in the tentative
- 1:08:37ruling that I was facing with 24 Hours, to go
- 1:08:40said, yeah, that's close enough sexual harassment.
- 1:08:42I spent the entire 10 minutes or so allotted
- 1:08:46to me during oral argument and convinced the
- 1:08:48judge in his final ruling that that wasn't sexual
- 1:08:51harassment. We actually now have that right up
- 1:08:54on our blog. Again, I would recommend anybody
- 1:08:56who's facing this because it's all over the place.
- 1:08:58They're all doing it in every case. This is one
- 1:09:01way out. The judge's ultimate order was a very
- 1:09:03good one. It's very long and meanie. And it talks
- 1:09:06all about the difference between sexual harassment
- 1:09:09and sexual assault, rather sexual harassment
- 1:09:13and assault on the one hand and gender discrimination
- 1:09:16on the other. And it's also published on Westlaw,
- 1:09:20so you can cite it for whatever it's worth. It's
- 1:09:22an L .A. Superior Court opinion, which obviously
- 1:09:24only has persuasive value. In our next case,
- 1:09:28Carla Velarde started work at this company and
- 1:09:31she was presented with a stack of documents,
- 1:09:3431 documents that she was told to review and
- 1:09:38sign them quickly so that she could start work
- 1:09:41and start earning money. As she was signing the
- 1:09:44documents, she was actually reading them and
- 1:09:47she saw that one of them was an arbitration agreement.
- 1:09:50And she said to the HR person who was hovering
- 1:09:52over her, I can't sign this. I don't know what
- 1:09:55it means. And the HR person says, oh, oh, this
- 1:09:59just means if there's ever a dispute between
- 1:10:01us, we can resolve the thing really quickly.
- 1:10:04Neither one of us are going to have to hire lawyers.
- 1:10:07It's all kumbaya, my friend. So the person signs
- 1:10:11the thing. And she actually asked, do I have
- 1:10:14to sign it? The HR person says yes. Later, of
- 1:10:16course, there's a dispute. She files a lawsuit,
- 1:10:19the company moves to compel arbitration, and
- 1:10:21she argues that the agreement was procedurally
- 1:10:24unconscionable because she was forced to quickly
- 1:10:27sign it and it was contained in a pile of 31
- 1:10:30other documents. Court of Appeal agreed with
- 1:10:33that. The Court of Appeal also found procedural
- 1:10:36unconscionability because she was misrepresented
- 1:10:39about what the arbitration agreement actually
- 1:10:42stood for. And the court of appeals sort of double
- 1:10:45dipped and found substantive unconscionability
- 1:10:48because she was misrepresented as to what the
- 1:10:51arbitration agreement meant. And then basically
- 1:10:53the court of appeals said arbitration agreements
- 1:10:56aren't going to get you a fast, speedy resolution
- 1:10:59contrary to the promises of the HR person. And
- 1:11:03in all likelihood, both sides are actually going
- 1:11:06to have to hire lawyers rather than just doing
- 1:11:08it themselves. So the Court of Appeal sustained
- 1:11:12the decision not to compel arbitration. I would
- 1:11:17say on this, there's much to be learned for employers
- 1:11:20in this case. the court actually said, had the
- 1:11:24employer either correctly explained the terms
- 1:11:27of the agreement, which it didn't, or had not
- 1:11:30explained them at all, which it could have done,
- 1:11:33and had given Velarde a reasonable opportunity
- 1:11:36to review the agreement and to consult counsel,
- 1:11:38this would be a different case. But that is not
- 1:11:41what happened here. So this is a good opportunity
- 1:11:43to train the HR. people who are interacting with
- 1:11:47employees under these circumstances or prospective
- 1:11:49employees, not to try to characterize what's
- 1:11:51in an agreement, because it will be used against
- 1:11:54the employer, obviously, as it was in this situation.
- 1:11:58So they should not attempt to play armchair lawyer
- 1:12:01in inducing an employee to sign something like
- 1:12:04this. They should say, the agreement is what
- 1:12:06it is. I can't really give you advice on it.
- 1:12:09If you want. a week, 10 days, whatever, to look
- 1:12:11at. You can do that. I mean, I know a lot of
- 1:12:13employers really can't do that in their onboarding,
- 1:12:15but something along those lines so that they're
- 1:12:17not being tagged with a misrepresentation or
- 1:12:20an alleged misrepresentation about the meaning
- 1:12:23of what is otherwise a potentially complicated
- 1:12:25document. The other thing I'll say is we're going
- 1:12:27to get to it, I think, but we're running out
- 1:12:29of time here. Another case called Wise versus
- 1:12:32Tesla Motors, which we've got further on in the
- 1:12:35outline here, that was a similar situation where
- 1:12:37there was a motion to compel arbitration. and
- 1:12:40the court severed the provisions that were in
- 1:12:45a nondisclosure agreement that were problematic
- 1:12:48and then did enforce the arbitration agreement.
- 1:12:52So that's sort of the last refuge of an employer
- 1:12:56in these circumstances to say, no, no, no, no,
- 1:12:58nothing wrong with the agreement, nothing wrong
- 1:12:59with the agreement. But if there's something
- 1:13:00wrong with the agreement or other agreements,
- 1:13:03they should be severed. Sometimes you win that,
- 1:13:05sometimes you don't. The Wise versus Tesla case,
- 1:13:09It's 2025 Westlaw 3707196. 3707196 is a good
- 1:13:17example of severing the problematic provisions.
- 1:13:24Really quickly on a few of these arbitration
- 1:13:26cases, Tesla wins an arbitration award. It moves
- 1:13:29to federal court to confirm the award. The district
- 1:13:32court confirms the award. There's an appeal.
- 1:13:34The Ninth Circuit reverses and instructs the
- 1:13:36district court to dismiss because since Tesla
- 1:13:39won, they won a $0 award. There wasn't $75 ,000
- 1:13:44at stake, so there's no jurisdiction in the federal
- 1:13:46courts. rebuffs employer attempts to get around
- 1:13:53the FAA and the EFAA. So some employers are now
- 1:13:56saying that arbitration agreements are governed
- 1:13:59solely by the California Arbitration Act, and
- 1:14:02therefore the Federal Arbitration Act doesn't
- 1:14:05apply, and therefore the EFAA doesn't apply,
- 1:14:08and sexual harassment cases have to be arbitrated.
- 1:14:11The court of appeals said no, you can't, federal
- 1:14:14law preempts state law, you can't get around
- 1:14:16the EFAA that way. This is one of those cases
- 1:14:20where Tony kind of highlighted what I was gonna
- 1:14:22argue, which is that employers wait for years
- 1:14:24and years and years to see how things are going
- 1:14:26in court before they move to compel arbitration.
- 1:14:30Here, it proves my point exactly. The lawsuit
- 1:14:33was filed in October of 2018, 2018, and the employer
- 1:14:38did not move to compel until 2023. All right,
- 1:14:43here's the Weiss case that Tony was gonna talk
- 1:14:45about. which also addresses another issue, and
- 1:14:49I'll let Tony have the floor, really. But what
- 1:14:51this addresses, employers realizing that arbitration
- 1:14:54agreements can be voided out if they contain
- 1:14:57unconscionable terms. They're moving those unconscionable
- 1:15:00terms to other documents that they make the employees
- 1:15:04sign at the same time they sign the arbitration
- 1:15:06agreement. And the courts are saying, no, no,
- 1:15:09no. Anything that's signed at the same time as
- 1:15:11the arbitration agreement needs to be examined
- 1:15:14for unconscionability purposes. Do you want to
- 1:15:18add anything? No. Okay. P mortgage is a recent
- 1:15:25Ninth Circuit opinion. This just reaffirms what
- 1:15:27we already all know, I think, which is that one
- 1:15:31of the darker alleys in arbitration has to do
- 1:15:35with seeking appeal when something goes wrong
- 1:15:37in the arbitration. In this case, the arbitrator,
- 1:15:41quote, forgot about a stipulation that had been
- 1:15:45brought to her attention. in which that stipulation
- 1:15:49provided that the attorney's fees would be borne
- 1:15:53by each side. And she did award attorney's fees,
- 1:15:57irrespective of the provisions of the stipulation,
- 1:16:02to her credit, or I guess in her defense, really.
- 1:16:07The Ninth Circuit said that the district court
- 1:16:10was correct in not upsetting the award of the
- 1:16:16arbitrator even though there was clearly an error
- 1:16:18with respect to attorney's fees because the arbitrator
- 1:16:20had previously approved that stipulation, but
- 1:16:23the parties had failed to bring it to the attention,
- 1:16:28I guess, to remind the arbitrator because they
- 1:16:31had briefed that issue over a year previously.
- 1:16:34I don't know why an arbitration would take a
- 1:16:36year, but sometimes I guess they do get elongated.
- 1:16:37I've had that situation not as long as a year,
- 1:16:40but in any event, this whole issue of the stipulation
- 1:16:44had been brought to the arbitrator's attention
- 1:16:45a year before And it wasn't something that either
- 1:16:49side reminded the arbitrator about before she
- 1:16:51issued her award. And so therefore, the court
- 1:16:54held that the vacateur, I think that's how you
- 1:16:56pronounce it, V -A -C -A -T -U -R, was properly
- 1:16:59denied because the error was not so obvious and
- 1:17:02undisputed that the arbitrator must have known
- 1:17:04about it when she decided the legal issue. So
- 1:17:07again, a very, very pro arbitration anti -reversal
- 1:17:14bias that is just built into the law in these
- 1:17:16areas. Tony, don't you want to comment about
- 1:17:23the cat images? No? OK. This is one of a couple
- 1:17:28of recent cases in which volunteers are at issue.
- 1:17:34And here, these two are actually three plaintiffs
- 1:17:38were full time. workers for the Salvation Army
- 1:17:42at one of their retail thrift stores. They worked
- 1:17:44without wages as part of a six month residential
- 1:17:47substance abuse rehabilitation program. Then
- 1:17:51of course they did what any good red blooded
- 1:17:53California would do after that and sued for wages
- 1:17:55that they apparently never should have thought
- 1:17:58they were going to get. The trial court determined
- 1:17:59that the wage and hour laws do not apply because
- 1:18:02these three individuals were volunteers. for
- 1:18:04a nonprofit and not employees based principally
- 1:18:06upon the absence of an agreement for compensation.
- 1:18:09That's kind of where the trial court went off
- 1:18:11the rails. The court of appeal didn't like that
- 1:18:13and held that the existence of an agreement for
- 1:18:15compensation is not a dispositive test as to
- 1:18:17whether the individual is a volunteer or an employee.
- 1:18:20So the appellate court remanded the case back
- 1:18:22to the trial court to determine whether there
- 1:18:25are tribal issues of fact as to whether these
- 1:18:27were actually volunteers who freely agreed to
- 1:18:31work without pay and whether Overall, the Salvation
- 1:18:34Army's use of volunteer labor was used as a subterfuge
- 1:18:38to evade the wage laws, so more work to be done
- 1:18:41on that. Okay, if attorney solicitation was not
- 1:18:46unethical, I would advise every defense attorney
- 1:18:50in the room to rush out and seek to represent
- 1:18:53Bridgeville Property, Inc. and its owner or manager,
- 1:18:57Cynthia LaPelli, because Rather than pay an employee
- 1:19:02$100 ,000, they must have paid their defense
- 1:19:05lawyers millions of dollars to take this case
- 1:19:08up to the Court of Appeal, not once or twice,
- 1:19:12but two times, and to the California Supreme
- 1:19:15Court twice. Now, in this decision, Which was
- 1:19:19by the California Supreme Court in August of
- 1:19:21last year the Supreme Court in the case of first
- 1:19:24impression Basically said that in order for an
- 1:19:27employer to establish a good -faith defense to
- 1:19:30a liquidated damages claim It has to show that
- 1:19:34it actually made some type of reasonable Inquiry
- 1:19:38or determination to show that it tried to comply
- 1:19:41with the law It can't just sort of think that
- 1:19:44it's complying with the law and be entitled to
- 1:19:47the good faith Then in the follow -up to the
- 1:19:52Supreme Court decision in December of last year,
- 1:19:55the Court of Appeal held that the CEO of the
- 1:19:58corporation who had not paid or basically made
- 1:20:04sure the employee didn't get paid, that that
- 1:20:07CEO was personally liable for the wage claims
- 1:20:11of the employee. Is this you? Yeah, let's skip
- 1:20:18this one. OK, so this one I love just because
- 1:20:22the title, The Merchant of Tennis, get it? Versus
- 1:20:26Superior Court. Here, this is an example of something
- 1:20:29that employers try to do. I tried to do it once.
- 1:20:31It almost always goes awry. And this is a situation
- 1:20:34where there's a punitive class action and the
- 1:20:38employer decides they don't want to be involved
- 1:20:40in this class action nonsense. And they go and
- 1:20:42they try to settle individually with employees
- 1:20:46that sometimes referred to as a pick up stick
- 1:20:48settlement because the original case or one of
- 1:20:51the original cases where this was tried and upheld
- 1:20:54actually involved the restaurant. I don't know
- 1:20:59that it's still in business, pick up sticks.
- 1:21:02Here, the employer entered into approximately
- 1:21:04954 individual settlement agreements with employees
- 1:21:09by which it had paid $875 ,000 in these individually
- 1:21:14negotiated settlement agreements, but something
- 1:21:18went wrong as it almost always does in these
- 1:21:20kinds of situations. And the trial court concluded
- 1:21:23that the ISAs, the individual settlement agreements
- 1:21:26were voidable due to alleged coercion and fraud
- 1:21:29that existed. And then they ordered the parties
- 1:21:32to give a curative notice to all putative class
- 1:21:34members. advising that they could revoke their
- 1:21:37ISAs and join the class action lawsuit. Of course,
- 1:21:39the employer is like, I just paid $875 ,000 and
- 1:21:42all I got was this t -shirt. So they wanted to
- 1:21:44know what was next in terms of trying to get
- 1:21:47out of this case. There's a lot of back and forth
- 1:21:49about what the curative statement needs to be
- 1:21:51or what it doesn't need to be. But ultimately,
- 1:21:55what the court of appeal said was they did grant
- 1:21:57a writ and they said that the required notice,
- 1:22:00the curative notice that employees who rescinded
- 1:22:02their ISAs They could be responsible for repayment
- 1:22:05of the settlement proceeds at the conclusion
- 1:22:07of the litigation, which wasn't exactly what
- 1:22:09the employer wanted, because the employer was
- 1:22:11of course trying to make the employees think
- 1:22:14that they may immediately lose what they had
- 1:22:17been paid. And then this was subject to the trial
- 1:22:21court's discretion to adjust the equities between
- 1:22:23the parties. So it was kind of not exactly what
- 1:22:25the employer was looking for under those circumstances.
- 1:22:27I only have one other case I want to mention.
- 1:22:29Andrew, do you have one last one you want to
- 1:22:31talk about? Yeah, I know what you want to talk
- 1:22:33about. You want to talk about this one. You love
- 1:22:37this case. I love this case. So this was not
- 1:22:41an employment case. This was a defamation case.
- 1:22:45But it hit a nerve with me because I've had several
- 1:22:48of these cases, both in California and in New
- 1:22:51York, where every plaintiff now is coming up
- 1:22:53with this brilliant idea of suing pseudonymously.
- 1:22:59Pseudonymously. When's the last time you heard
- 1:23:00that word? P -S -E -U -D -O -N -Y Musli. And
- 1:23:06that basically means that the plaintiff sues
- 1:23:08as a pseudonym, usually as John Doe or Jane Roe,
- 1:23:13whatever, and, of course, doesn't provide the
- 1:23:17same benefit to the defendant. In this case,
- 1:23:18actually, they did. Both the plaintiffs and the
- 1:23:21defendants were not identified in the complaint.
- 1:23:25But this involved the non -party that the defendant
- 1:23:34had a motion that was basically filed to unseal.
- 1:23:40And this motion to unseal was filed by the First
- 1:23:42Amendment Coalition, a third party nonprofit.
- 1:23:46And the idea was to unseal the plaintiff's true
- 1:23:48names, which the trial court denied as being
- 1:23:50premature. Trial court then directed plaintiffs
- 1:23:52to file a motion to maintain their anonymity.
- 1:23:55All parties filed motions to proceed under pseudonyms,
- 1:23:57both the defendants and the defendants. plaintiffs,
- 1:23:59which the trial court granted. The coalition
- 1:24:01filed an appeal as to the granting of plaintiff's
- 1:24:04motion only, and the court of appeal reversed
- 1:24:07the trial court's grant of plaintiff's motion,
- 1:24:08holding that a party's possible personal embarrassment
- 1:24:12standing alone does not justify concealing their
- 1:24:15identity from the public. Further, the court
- 1:24:16disagreed that a, quote, reasonable fear of one's
- 1:24:19employer, so employment is mentioned, learning
- 1:24:21about allegations of a private nature overcame
- 1:24:24the public's right of access. That does not,
- 1:24:27in fact, occur under most circumstances. So what
- 1:24:31does all this mean? It just means that if you
- 1:24:33are facing a case, as is very common now, where
- 1:24:37the plaintiff wants to proceed anonymously but
- 1:24:39wants to smear the defendants all over the place
- 1:24:42with all kinds of allegations that are subject
- 1:24:44to the litigation privilege so they can't be
- 1:24:46sued for it, consider very seriously filing a
- 1:24:50motion like this using the Roe versus Smith case.
- 1:24:54I just have one brief one. Is there one you wanted
- 1:24:56to cover in addition to this one? No, I'll talk
- 1:24:58about this one again though. Okay. All right.
- 1:25:01So I want to just talk about, where are we? Ah,
- 1:25:07this one. Sorry, this one. So in this case, this
- 1:25:12is not an employment case. The lawyer for the
- 1:25:15deponent is sitting in the same room with the
- 1:25:18deponent. The lawyer for the deponent though,
- 1:25:22It does not have, I think it's a his, does not
- 1:25:25have his video on. So the person taking the depot
- 1:25:28only sees the deponent. And I guess there was
- 1:25:31some concern on the person taking the depot's
- 1:25:34part that the lawyer was coaching the deponent
- 1:25:37because the deponent kept looking away from the
- 1:25:39camera, pausing, and then giving answers. So
- 1:25:42they asked the deponent's lawyer to go on camera.
- 1:25:46The lawyer refused. They file a motion for discovery
- 1:25:50sanctions and not surprisingly and I think properly
- 1:25:53the the lawyer for the deponent was ordered to
- 1:25:56have his or her camera on when they're in the
- 1:25:59same room as the deponent and was awarded or
- 1:26:02was ordered to pay $9 ,981 to the lawyer taking
- 1:26:08the deposition That could be it I think that
- 1:26:14is it that's all the Let's stall it out till
- 1:26:185 .30. We have three more minutes. This is an
- 1:26:21interesting case that everyone should read because
- 1:26:24it's going to happen more and more often. Let's
- 1:26:26say there's a settlement and there's a check
- 1:26:29that goes out or an electronic funds transfer
- 1:26:32that goes out from the defendant or the defendant's
- 1:26:35counsel or insurance company to the plaintiff,
- 1:26:38but somehow a scammer gets it. Whose fault is
- 1:26:41that? I mean, is the defendant or the plaintiff
- 1:26:44out of luck? Is the insurance company gonna have
- 1:26:46to write another check? Well, this case walks
- 1:26:48you through, it's a non -employment case, but
- 1:26:51it walks you through how to figure out who is
- 1:26:54liable. And one of the things it does is a very
- 1:26:57common sense thing, which is that, If you're
- 1:27:00the one writing the check, you get a phone call
- 1:27:03saying to send the check somewhere else other
- 1:27:06than what the settlement agreement says, you
- 1:27:08should probably pick up the phone and call the
- 1:27:12plaintiff's lawyer and say, hey, I got this weird
- 1:27:16phone call. They want the check to go to this
- 1:27:18Chinese bank or this Russian bank. Is that really
- 1:27:22where you want the funds to go to? All right.
- 1:27:27Thank you all for coming. Unfortunately, we can't
- 1:27:29see you, but you can see us, and we'll wave goodbye.
- 1:27:32We're really happy to have been invited back.
- 1:27:35Andrew wasn't as rude as he typically is, so
- 1:27:37maybe we'll be invited again next year. Hopefully
- 1:27:40so.