Latest / Faster, Please! — The Podcast / ⚠ My chat (+transcript) with BCG economist Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak on dealing with macroeconomic risk
Transcript
- 0:06SPEAKER_01: Welcome to Faster Please, the podcast.
- 0:09SPEAKER_01: I'm your host, Jim Pethokoukis.
- 0:12SPEAKER_01: Several times a month,
- 0:13SPEAKER_01: I'll feature a lively conversation with a fascinating and provocative guest about
- 0:18SPEAKER_01: how to make the world a better place through scientific discovery,
- 0:21SPEAKER_01: technological innovation,
- 0:23SPEAKER_01: and economic growth.
- 0:24SPEAKER_01: You're also going to want to check out my Faster Please newsletter.
- 0:27SPEAKER_01: You're on Substack throughout the week for fresh essays,
- 0:30SPEAKER_01: Q&As,
- 0:31SPEAKER_01: and stories from around the internet and around the world.
- 0:38SPEAKER_01: In our highly globalized economy, exogenous shocks and unsettling headlines are everywhere.
- 0:45SPEAKER_01: It makes sense that market forecasters should be biting their nails,
- 0:48SPEAKER_01: but so often their prophecies of doom prove completely false.
- 0:53SPEAKER_01: Philip Carlson Slezak is a proponent of rational optimism.
- 0:57SPEAKER_01: He believes there's a calmer,
- 0:58SPEAKER_01: more measured way of going about predictions that sets us up to be more flexible to
- 1:03SPEAKER_01: the highs and lows of the economy.
- 1:06SPEAKER_01: Today on Faster Please,
- 1:07SPEAKER_01: the podcast,
- 1:08SPEAKER_01: I talk with Carlson Slezak about why an over-reliance on models and a tendency to
- 1:14SPEAKER_01: assume the worst can impair our ability to roll with unexpected events.
- 1:20SPEAKER_01: Carlson Slezak is the chief global economist at Boston Consulting Group and leads
- 1:24SPEAKER_01: the Center for Macroeconomics at their Henderson Institute.
- 1:28SPEAKER_01: He's the co-author of the new book, Shocks, Crises, and False Alarms.
- 1:33SPEAKER_01: How to Assess True Macroeconomic Risk.
- 1:36SPEAKER_01: Philip, welcome to the podcast.
- 1:37SPEAKER_01: Thanks for having me.
- 1:39SPEAKER_01: It seems as if there are multiple challenges facing the world and the global economy simultaneously.
- 1:50SPEAKER_01: People described it as a poly crisis,
- 1:53SPEAKER_01: and it could be everything from trying to navigate economies to a soft landing
- 1:59SPEAKER_01: after a bout of inflation,
- 2:01SPEAKER_01: Part of it, I guess, is the big rise in debt.
- 2:06SPEAKER_01: We have war in Europe, maybe eventually war in Asia over Taiwan.
- 2:10SPEAKER_01: And of course, climate change, aging population, falling birth rates.
- 2:15SPEAKER_01: And some people seem to view AI as more of a threat than a positive.
- 2:22SPEAKER_01: It's going to take jobs and perhaps other bad things.
- 2:27SPEAKER_01: If I've given a sensible description of the world,
- 2:30SPEAKER_01: how can one be a rational optimist in a world of polity crisis?
- 2:37SPEAKER_00: I mean, just taking maybe two of your examples, the soft landing that was supposed to be impossible.
- 2:43SPEAKER_00: Remember that we need, what was it, 6% unemployment for how many years to bring inflation down?
- 2:48SPEAKER_00: So clearly that didn't pan out like the pessimist said.
- 2:52SPEAKER_00: Or think about the war in Ukraine that you mentioned, which of course is a tragedy.
- 2:57SPEAKER_00: But the fact is that there is no recession in the Eurozone so far.
- 3:00SPEAKER_00: The fact is that industrial production has held up rather well, even in the heartland region.
- 3:05SPEAKER_00: of industrial production in Germany.
- 3:08SPEAKER_00: So real industrial output is actually remarkably resilient.
- 3:12SPEAKER_00: Overall, there's little doubt that there are many, many risks.
- 3:18SPEAKER_00: There are crises,
- 3:20SPEAKER_00: but more often than not,
- 3:21SPEAKER_00: we're focusing on the tail ends of the distribution and pretend that those risks
- 3:27SPEAKER_00: are at the very center of the risk distribution.
- 3:31SPEAKER_01: It sort of reminds me, it's not a perfect analogy,
- 3:35SPEAKER_01: of sort of where we were in the early 1990s.
- 3:38SPEAKER_01: I suppose you can always point to,
- 3:40SPEAKER_01: and maybe this is part of your point,
- 3:41SPEAKER_01: if you want to focus on bad news,
- 3:44SPEAKER_01: the world will give you plenty of bad news to focus on.
- 3:46SPEAKER_01: But I remember at the beginning of the 1990s,
- 3:50SPEAKER_01: Very bad recession here in the United States.
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: A lot of concerns about the ability for rich economies to grow quickly.
- 3:59SPEAKER_01: Again, debt was an issue.
- 4:01SPEAKER_01: And though looking back, it may seem like, wow, people should have been really excited.
- 4:05SPEAKER_01: End of the Cold War.
- 4:06SPEAKER_01: There was a lot of uncertainty.
- 4:09SPEAKER_01: What would happen to the former Soviet Union?
- 4:11SPEAKER_01: A lot of talk back then about suitcase nukes.
- 4:15SPEAKER_01: You know, who knew what was going to happen in the world?
- 4:17SPEAKER_01: Of course, all of this kind of concern and uncertainty led right into a big economic boom.
- 4:25SPEAKER_01: So to kind of get back to what you're saying,
- 4:29SPEAKER_01: why are we sort of,
- 4:30SPEAKER_01: it seems to me that rather than being rational optimists,
- 4:33SPEAKER_01: we're sort of naturally irrational pessimists.
- 4:36SPEAKER_00: Yeah, but we shouldn't be.
- 4:38SPEAKER_00: I think your example of the 90s and what the mid and late 90s delivered,
- 4:43SPEAKER_00: I think,
- 4:43SPEAKER_00: is not a bad analogy for what I think will play out in the 2020s,
- 4:48SPEAKER_00: the rest of the decade.
- 4:50SPEAKER_00: We're in an era of tightness,
- 4:53SPEAKER_00: is what we call it in the book,
- 4:55SPEAKER_00: which is really a structural condition of the labor market.
- 4:58SPEAKER_00: Lots of people think that shortages in the labor market are a byproduct of COVID, but that's not true.
- 5:05SPEAKER_00: The labor market turned tight already in 2017.
- 5:07SPEAKER_00: So in technical language, that's when unemployment dropped below U star.
- 5:12SPEAKER_00: COVID was an interruption of this tightness.
- 5:15SPEAKER_00: Unemployment went to almost 15%, and then it came down just as fast.
- 5:20SPEAKER_00: But we are in this tightness, in this era of tightness.
- 5:24SPEAKER_00: And I think it will persist.
- 5:25SPEAKER_00: I mean,
- 5:25SPEAKER_00: to be clear,
- 5:26SPEAKER_00: even if and when you get another recession,
- 5:28SPEAKER_00: I think even after that,
- 5:29SPEAKER_00: you will return to a tight stance.
- 5:32SPEAKER_00: And there are a lot of silver linings that come with errors of tightness.
- 5:35SPEAKER_00: It translates into better real wage growth.
- 5:38SPEAKER_00: It nudges and forces firms to do capital for labor substitution.
- 5:43SPEAKER_00: It pushes them towards the technological frontier in their respective areas.
- 5:49SPEAKER_00: And all of that should lead into some boost of productivity growth.
- 5:54SPEAKER_00: I'm not of the kind where we're predicting sort of this big jump in productivity growth.
- 5:59SPEAKER_00: I think that's too hyped.
- 6:02SPEAKER_00: But I do believe that the structural tightness,
- 6:05SPEAKER_00: which is almost like a spark to the fuel of technology,
- 6:11SPEAKER_00: I think that will push gradually and measurably over the years to come.
- 6:16SPEAKER_00: And the driving forces of that tightness are what?
- 6:21SPEAKER_00: Well, we have a number of things going.
- 6:25SPEAKER_00: Essentially, you had a mismatch of demand and supply already in the late 10s, as I described.
- 6:31SPEAKER_00: So there's a supply issue.
- 6:34SPEAKER_00: We don't have enough labor supply.
- 6:36SPEAKER_00: You have certain forces on the demographic side that constrain that.
- 6:44SPEAKER_00: And I think often we hear the story that AI is going to produce so much
- 6:49SPEAKER_00: unemployment that there will be mass unemployment.
- 6:52SPEAKER_00: And I don't believe any of this.
- 6:56SPEAKER_00: I think that will play out very differently.
- 7:00SPEAKER_00: Historically, technology has never given us structural or technological unemployment.
- 7:05SPEAKER_00: On the contrary,
- 7:07SPEAKER_00: Technology is the deflationary force in the medium and long run.
- 7:12SPEAKER_00: Firms that can deliver cost savings, they can lower prices, they will do so to grab market share.
- 7:18SPEAKER_00: That is a real income boost for consumers.
- 7:21SPEAKER_00: So when their real incomes grow,
- 7:24SPEAKER_00: they redeploy that gained real income to new services,
- 7:27SPEAKER_00: new goods,
- 7:28SPEAKER_00: purchase and consumption.
- 7:31SPEAKER_00: And that leads to new
- 7:33SPEAKER_00: And so I think essentially you will remain with a story where labor is tight.
- 7:40SPEAKER_00: And that is, I think, the defining underpinnings of what's coming.
- 7:47SPEAKER_01: I want to talk a bit about AI labor, just since you brought it up.
- 7:50SPEAKER_01: If you don't think sort of mass unemployment is a valid concern,
- 7:54SPEAKER_01: could there be other downsides from deployment of generative AI in economy?
- 8:01SPEAKER_01: Could it be instead of higher employment, might it just be
- 8:06SPEAKER_01: greater you know greater inequality maybe maybe before we had technology hurting
- 8:11SPEAKER_01: the hurting blue collar workers certainly there's a lot of white collars worried
- 8:14SPEAKER_01: about it i was just reading a story in new york times all these people in hollywood
- 8:18SPEAKER_01: are just terrified whether they're whether they're doing special effects or their
- 8:21SPEAKER_01: sound others they're all terrified their their white collar jobs are going away so
- 8:26SPEAKER_01: do you see in the near term any downside from uh from ai
- 8:33SPEAKER_00: Well,
- 8:33SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 8:33SPEAKER_00: in macro,
- 8:34SPEAKER_00: there's always this tension between the aggregate,
- 8:37SPEAKER_00: which is what macroeconomics is about,
- 8:40SPEAKER_00: and then the distribution of experiences under the hood of macro,
- 8:44SPEAKER_00: if you will.
- 8:45SPEAKER_00: So there will be winners and losers, and there will be those that are harder hit than others.
- 8:50SPEAKER_00: But I think when you look at the aggregate,
- 8:52SPEAKER_00: you add it all up,
- 8:53SPEAKER_00: the net-net,
- 8:55SPEAKER_00: I don't anticipate this being a structural or technological unemployment situation.
- 9:02SPEAKER_00: To go to the micro level, you can take the other side of that argument too.
- 9:06SPEAKER_00: I mean, this is not a big area of research for me, so I'm straying outside of my field of expertise here.
- 9:13SPEAKER_00: But plenty of people have argued that perhaps AI will give a lift to those least skilled.
- 9:20SPEAKER_00: Why?
- 9:20SPEAKER_00: Because AI is a companion for them.
- 9:23SPEAKER_00: that makes them more productive and allows them to create more value and therefore to be paid better.
- 9:28SPEAKER_00: So I think the jury is out on that.
- 9:30SPEAKER_00: I don't anticipate a smooth ride where everyone will be a winner and everything
- 9:37SPEAKER_00: will be just plain sailing.
- 9:38SPEAKER_00: Of course, this is disruptive.
- 9:40SPEAKER_00: Of course, there will be gyrations.
- 9:42SPEAKER_00: But the story about technological unemployment has been told for so long.
- 9:49SPEAKER_00: I mean, today, people don't remember
- 9:52SPEAKER_00: that even in the 2010s, I mean, I think it was Bill Gates, he wanted a robo tax, a robot tax.
- 10:00SPEAKER_00: Because why?
- 10:00SPEAKER_00: Because automation was taking over the assembly lines and we're gonna have to
- 10:04SPEAKER_00: provide for all these people who are gonna lose their jobs.
- 10:07SPEAKER_00: Well, where are we today?
- 10:08SPEAKER_00: Near record low unemployment.
- 10:10SPEAKER_00: And this is in a line of a long tradition where Nobel Prize winners and
- 10:16SPEAKER_00: technologists and politicians,
- 10:19SPEAKER_00: they've all predicted technological unemployment.
- 10:21SPEAKER_00: There's a nice story.
- 10:25SPEAKER_00: Vasily Leontiev, if I say his name right, a Nobel Prize winner in economics.
- 10:30SPEAKER_00: He said in the 70s that human labor was going to go the way of the horse,
- 10:33SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 10:34SPEAKER_00: after the introduction of the automobile.
- 10:37SPEAKER_00: Well, you know, 50 years on, we're here with very tight labor markets.
- 10:41SPEAKER_00: And Kennedy was worried about it too, and others before him.
- 10:44SPEAKER_00: And so I think we have to point to something that's truly different about AI to tell that story.
- 10:52SPEAKER_00: I think we can potentially find some reasons that are genuinely different about AI.
- 10:57SPEAKER_00: But before we all become hysterical about it, I think we should take a deep breath.
- 11:03SPEAKER_01: Does it strike you as odd that in a world of
- 11:08SPEAKER_01: low unemployment, and if you're correct, perhaps a sort of a longer term structural tightness.
- 11:16SPEAKER_01: That we see that it's at this moment that people are very worried about technological unemployment.
- 11:20SPEAKER_01: It's at this very moment that they're very worried about,
- 11:23SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 11:24SPEAKER_01: immigration coming in and taking jobs.
- 11:26SPEAKER_01: You would think these would be concerns at periods of very high unemployment.
- 11:30SPEAKER_01: You know, people standing in line around the block to get a job.
- 11:33SPEAKER_01: But that's not where we're at.
- 11:35SPEAKER_01: Yet the public mood seems to not be in sync with that.
- 11:40SPEAKER_00: Yeah, I think that's a good observation.
- 11:41SPEAKER_00: I don't have a great explanation for it.
- 11:45SPEAKER_00: I guess the technology that's on display is impressive.
- 11:49SPEAKER_00: It is novel.
- 11:51SPEAKER_00: And what's different generally is that it makes a credible promise to impact the service economy.
- 12:01SPEAKER_00: In our book, the way we position the slump in productivity growth
- 12:05SPEAKER_00: has little to do with high debt and all those explanations that are occasionally fashionable,
- 12:10SPEAKER_00: has a lot to do with the fact that the US economy transitioned from being a
- 12:15SPEAKER_00: physical economy to a service economy.
- 12:18SPEAKER_00: And in the physical economy,
- 12:19SPEAKER_00: the production of goods,
- 12:20SPEAKER_00: you always had pretty respectable productivity growth,
- 12:23SPEAKER_00: including the last few decades.
- 12:25SPEAKER_00: But because of this mix shift into services where you did not have the technology
- 12:28SPEAKER_00: to make progress on the productivity side,
- 12:32SPEAKER_00: this mix shift dragged down aggregate productivity growth,
- 12:35SPEAKER_00: right?
- 12:35SPEAKER_00: If you have zero or very little productivity growth in services,
- 12:38SPEAKER_00: which is like 65,
- 12:38SPEAKER_00: 70% of the economy,
- 12:40SPEAKER_00: and you have very high productivity growth and the part that is 30 or 35% of the economy,
- 12:44SPEAKER_00: well,
- 12:44SPEAKER_00: the blended average is going to be low.
- 12:49SPEAKER_00: And so as we now have productivity growth promises from AI and services, I think a lot can change there.
- 12:58SPEAKER_00: Again, not in a step change way.
- 13:00SPEAKER_00: It's not like flipping a switch.
- 13:02SPEAKER_00: It's going to be hard slog and incremental and cumulative, but something will happen there.
- 13:06SPEAKER_01: Just take a quick step back.
- 13:10SPEAKER_01: Describe your process for assessing risk.
- 13:16SPEAKER_01: Like where do you begin?
- 13:19SPEAKER_01: What are the factors?
- 13:20SPEAKER_01: Do you have sort of this fundamental baseline model of the way the world works?
- 13:28SPEAKER_01: How does that process start and work for you?
- 13:33SPEAKER_00: The way we go about risk in the book is to say macroeconomic risk should be viewed
- 13:41SPEAKER_00: both as the downside,
- 13:42SPEAKER_00: which is how we commonly view risk,
- 13:44SPEAKER_00: like a recession or even a structural downside,
- 13:47SPEAKER_00: like a deflation or depression.
- 13:49SPEAKER_00: These are downsides.
- 13:50SPEAKER_00: But for practitioners, for practitioners,
- 13:53SPEAKER_00: uh risk is also hidden in potential upside if you miss out on it right and both the
- 13:59SPEAKER_00: downside and the upside they come in two flavors tactical short-term stuff cyclical
- 14:03SPEAKER_00: stuff and the more structural strategic kind like shifts that happen happen over
- 14:08SPEAKER_00: longer periods of time and so we like to think of macro risk in in those four
- 14:14SPEAKER_00: flavors um you know the short the long term and the upside and the downside if you
- 14:19SPEAKER_00: will um generally when when we look at risk
- 14:23SPEAKER_00: It's very seductive and tempting to focus on bad outcomes and then start analyzing
- 14:30SPEAKER_00: how bad will it be and how quickly they're going to happen.
- 14:34SPEAKER_00: In most situations,
- 14:36SPEAKER_00: it pays off to take a step back and take a deep breath and say,
- 14:40SPEAKER_00: well,
- 14:40SPEAKER_00: how is the system constructed?
- 14:42SPEAKER_00: What are the drivers?
- 14:44SPEAKER_00: What is the history of this thing?
- 14:46SPEAKER_00: And an important question,
- 14:48SPEAKER_00: what would it take to get that outcome from the edges of the risk distribution?
- 14:53SPEAKER_00: What does it take to get there?
- 14:55SPEAKER_00: Too often in public discourse, we jump straight to the tails of the risk distribution.
- 14:59SPEAKER_00: We're immediately obsessing with the cliff edge and the fall into
- 15:04SPEAKER_00: economic death.
- 15:06SPEAKER_00: And then we're pretending that,
- 15:09SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 15:09SPEAKER_00: that risk outcome,
- 15:10SPEAKER_00: which is part of the distribution,
- 15:11SPEAKER_00: so we can't ignore it,
- 15:12SPEAKER_00: but we're pretending that the edges of the distribution are the very center.
- 15:16SPEAKER_00: And so what we do in the book for a number of areas of risk in the real economy,
- 15:21SPEAKER_00: the financial economy,
- 15:22SPEAKER_00: the global economy,
- 15:23SPEAKER_00: we go over and over again into these approaches of asking,
- 15:28SPEAKER_00: how is this thing constructed?
- 15:30SPEAKER_00: What are the drivers?
- 15:31SPEAKER_00: What do you have to believe for the truly bad outcome?
- 15:34SPEAKER_00: There's plenty of risk out there.
- 15:36SPEAKER_00: New crises will come and happen.
- 15:38SPEAKER_00: But for every true crisis, there are many false alarms.
- 15:42SPEAKER_00: And that is something that I think we need to internalize more.
- 15:46SPEAKER_00: And that is something that can help us see risk a little more calmly and in a measured way.
- 15:53SPEAKER_01: How well did markets, investors, economists, how well was their
- 16:02SPEAKER_01: risk assessment process in 2020, given where we are today.
- 16:09SPEAKER_01: My guess is that the global economy is better in 2024 than people thought in
- 16:15SPEAKER_01: February or March or April of 2020 as the pandemic was kicking in.
- 16:21SPEAKER_01: Did we do a good job assessing risk and reward back then?
- 16:25SPEAKER_00: No.
- 16:26SPEAKER_00: Public discourse did a terrible job at that.
- 16:29SPEAKER_00: I mean,
- 16:30SPEAKER_00: the conventional wisdom and received wisdom in March and April,
- 16:34SPEAKER_00: May,
- 16:34SPEAKER_00: even June,
- 16:35SPEAKER_00: July,
- 16:35SPEAKER_00: and even August,
- 16:36SPEAKER_00: the summer when you had the first signs of recovery,
- 16:40SPEAKER_00: the conventional wisdom was,
- 16:41SPEAKER_00: this is worse than 2008,
- 16:42SPEAKER_00: and this could be as bad as the Great Depression.
- 16:45SPEAKER_00: We have a great collection of headlines that we keep.
- 16:49SPEAKER_00: There are lots of them in the book as well.
- 16:52SPEAKER_00: It was, in my mind, a prediction failure.
- 16:55SPEAKER_00: Why?
- 16:56SPEAKER_00: Because what happened is that a lot of the commentary,
- 17:00SPEAKER_00: a lot of the thinking was too model-based,
- 17:03SPEAKER_00: what we call master model mentality in the book.
- 17:06SPEAKER_00: So how do you project a recovery, typically?
- 17:10SPEAKER_00: you look at the unemployment rate as a proxy for the health of the economy.
- 17:14SPEAKER_00: And if you have a high unemployment rate and a recession,
- 17:17SPEAKER_00: well,
- 17:18SPEAKER_00: it can take a long time to bring that down.
- 17:20SPEAKER_00: After 2008, it took the better part of the 2010s to bring unemployment down.
- 17:25SPEAKER_00: And you had only, in quotation marks, only unemployment of 10% after the global financial crisis.
- 17:31SPEAKER_00: Now with COVID, you almost went to 15%, right?
- 17:35SPEAKER_00: So the models extrapolated outside their empirical range.
- 17:38SPEAKER_00: They said,
- 17:39SPEAKER_00: well,
- 17:39SPEAKER_00: if it took almost a decade to bring down this unemployment rate after 10%
- 17:44SPEAKER_00: unemployment and after 15% unemployment,
- 17:46SPEAKER_00: well,
- 17:46SPEAKER_00: it's going to take even longer.
- 17:47SPEAKER_00: Hence the narrative of worse than 2008, as bad as the 1930s and blah, blah, blah.
- 17:52SPEAKER_00: Even at the time, you could ask exactly these questions.
- 17:56SPEAKER_00: And I'm not saying this with hindsight bias.
- 17:58SPEAKER_00: We did a piece on March 28,
- 18:01SPEAKER_00: 2020,
- 18:02SPEAKER_00: in Harvard Business Review,
- 18:04SPEAKER_00: where we did exactly that thought experiment.
- 18:06SPEAKER_00: We said, what does it take for this to be a structural downgrade for the US economy?
- 18:10SPEAKER_00: What does it take for this to be worse than 2008?
- 18:11SPEAKER_00: You're going to need to see damage on the supply side of the economy.
- 18:16SPEAKER_00: You're going to need to see the downgrading of the labor market,
- 18:20SPEAKER_00: of a window of capital investment that isn't happening,
- 18:23SPEAKER_00: and the loss of skills,
- 18:25SPEAKER_00: etc.
- 18:26SPEAKER_00: And we asked, well, how likely is that?
- 18:28SPEAKER_00: And of course it comes down to stimulus.
- 18:30SPEAKER_00: Of course it does.
- 18:31SPEAKER_00: And it comes down to how innovative, fast, and big are we in backstopping the real economy?
- 18:38SPEAKER_00: And we were.
- 18:39SPEAKER_00: And so even in March and this is not even this is shelter in place phase.
- 18:43SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 18:44SPEAKER_00: This is not even sort of the full lockdown.
- 18:45SPEAKER_00: Even then, you could ask sober questions about very bad risks.
- 18:52SPEAKER_00: And if you did that, you arrived at answers that weren't sort of
- 18:57SPEAKER_00: predictive in this will happen at a point forecast level of accuracy.
- 19:02SPEAKER_00: But there was clearly a path and a narrative in March 2020 that was consistent with
- 19:07SPEAKER_00: what actually happened.
- 19:09SPEAKER_00: The tightest recovery on record,
- 19:11SPEAKER_00: and a US economy that was not pushed off its trend path.
- 19:16SPEAKER_00: So after 2008,
- 19:16SPEAKER_00: the US economy was actually pushed off its prior trend path,
- 19:20SPEAKER_00: never made it back in terms of what the trend was.
- 19:23SPEAKER_00: It did make it back in terms of growth rates after 2008,
- 19:26SPEAKER_00: but it never made this levels recovery in that sense.
- 19:29SPEAKER_00: All of that was avoided in 2020,
- 19:32SPEAKER_00: and you didn't have to be a magician to at least entertain the possibility that
- 19:38SPEAKER_00: that was a meaningful part of the outcome distribution.
- 19:44SPEAKER_01: Speaking of models, how has the Fed's model performed?
- 19:47SPEAKER_01: which is another way of saying how has the Fed performed and continues to perform?
- 19:52SPEAKER_00: In the recent inflation surge,
- 19:53SPEAKER_00: et cetera,
- 19:54SPEAKER_00: I think the Fed has taken too much flack for what happened in the inflation spike.
- 20:01SPEAKER_00: The inflation spike,
- 20:04SPEAKER_00: by the way,
- 20:04SPEAKER_00: again,
- 20:05SPEAKER_00: was immediately spun into a structural inflection point,
- 20:09SPEAKER_00: the 1970s narrative,
- 20:11SPEAKER_00: right?
- 20:11SPEAKER_00: Off to the races, wage price spirals, all that nonsense.
- 20:15SPEAKER_00: um it was an idiosyncratic mismatch of demand and supply it's an overshooting
- 20:20SPEAKER_00: consumption following stimulus and you had a supply chain crunch and then you had a
- 20:27SPEAKER_00: number of exogenous shocks that nobody could foresee and and those who who like to
- 20:32SPEAKER_00: take credit for having predicted the spike that they're they didn't foresee the
- 20:36SPEAKER_00: ukraine war the the shock and oil that followed and many other the things that
- 20:40SPEAKER_00: played into the spike the bigger story though
- 20:44SPEAKER_00: is quite simply that as this mismatch of demand and supply unwound,
- 20:49SPEAKER_00: well,
- 20:49SPEAKER_00: inflation also came down pretty fast.
- 20:52SPEAKER_00: Now, back to the Fed, yes, they were slow in responding.
- 20:56SPEAKER_00: Would it have been better for them to go early?
- 20:59SPEAKER_00: Perhaps, yes.
- 21:00SPEAKER_00: Let's say yes.
- 21:02SPEAKER_00: But at the same time,
- 21:03SPEAKER_00: the idea that they would be,
- 21:05SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 21:07SPEAKER_00: that they would fail to step up and act and reign this in and stand by and watch
- 21:13SPEAKER_00: this whole thing go to hell.
- 21:15SPEAKER_00: I mean, that was never credible.
- 21:17SPEAKER_00: Right.
- 21:17SPEAKER_00: I mean, this was never.
- 21:18SPEAKER_00: And they did step up and they did what they had to do.
- 21:21SPEAKER_00: And.
- 21:23SPEAKER_00: You know, I think also attempting the soft landing was the right thing.
- 21:28SPEAKER_00: You could have people at the time did say we need a draconian recession right now
- 21:31SPEAKER_00: to sort of remove all the risk of a regime break and inflation.
- 21:35SPEAKER_00: Well,
- 21:35SPEAKER_00: you would have cut short a really tight labor market that has a lot of real wage
- 21:38SPEAKER_00: gain that delivers a lot of good things for particularly the bottom of the labor market.
- 21:43SPEAKER_00: So it was the right call to attempt a soft landing rather than saying,
- 21:47SPEAKER_00: look,
- 21:47SPEAKER_00: we're going to cut the cycle short right now to remove any risk of inflation
- 21:51SPEAKER_00: spiraling out of control.
- 21:53SPEAKER_00: They did the right thing.
- 21:55SPEAKER_00: They're successful at it.
- 21:57SPEAKER_00: The soft landing is a success.
- 21:58SPEAKER_00: We're well into it.
- 22:00SPEAKER_00: And so I give them more credit.
- 22:03SPEAKER_01: Well,
- 22:04SPEAKER_01: is that what you think is sort of the biggest mistake people are making,
- 22:07SPEAKER_01: is that they're still asking,
- 22:10SPEAKER_01: what about the soft landing?
- 22:11SPEAKER_01: And what you're saying is, we're already into it.
- 22:13SPEAKER_01: You sort of missed it.
- 22:15SPEAKER_01: It happened.
- 22:15SPEAKER_01: You're still looking for it.
- 22:18SPEAKER_00: Every so often, you still see the headline, are we going to get a soft landing?
- 22:21SPEAKER_00: And I'm like, well, I mean, let's just take a step back.
- 22:24SPEAKER_00: What is a soft landing?
- 22:25SPEAKER_00: The task was to cool down the labor market.
- 22:29SPEAKER_00: best seen through the eyes of job openings, to cool that down without pushing up the unemployment rate.
- 22:35SPEAKER_00: These two are mirror images of each other.
- 22:38SPEAKER_00: When firms stop hiring, they usually also start firing.
- 22:42SPEAKER_00: So we had to pull off this trick.
- 22:44SPEAKER_00: You stop hiring, but you don't start firing.
- 22:48SPEAKER_00: That was the soft landing.
- 22:49SPEAKER_00: That's the definition of a soft landing, nothing else.
- 22:52SPEAKER_00: And that is what happened.
- 22:54SPEAKER_00: Job openings are down more than 3.5 million or so.
- 22:57SPEAKER_00: Don't nail me on the decimal.
- 23:01SPEAKER_00: And the unemployment rate is up a little,
- 23:03SPEAKER_00: but as you and I know,
- 23:04SPEAKER_00: the unemployment rate is not up because of firings.
- 23:07SPEAKER_00: The unemployment rate is up for compositional and participation reasons.
- 23:11SPEAKER_00: So
- 23:12SPEAKER_00: If that is not a soft landing,
- 23:13SPEAKER_00: at least sort of,
- 23:14SPEAKER_00: I would call it the second of three stages,
- 23:16SPEAKER_00: if you will,
- 23:17SPEAKER_00: I don't know what it is.
- 23:18SPEAKER_00: And back to the topic of headlines,
- 23:21SPEAKER_00: most of them are just confusing people more than they're helping them.
- 23:24SPEAKER_00: You know,
- 23:24SPEAKER_00: it's always nice to write something click baity,
- 23:26SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 23:26SPEAKER_00: that people will be scared off and think this is the cliff edge.
- 23:32SPEAKER_00: How about a headline?
- 23:33SPEAKER_00: Wow, this is a really great soft landing.
- 23:35SPEAKER_00: This is remarkably good.
- 23:37SPEAKER_00: Well, why don't we acknowledge that for a moment?
- 23:40SPEAKER_01: I mean, the name of the book is Shocks, Crises, and False Alarms.
- 23:44SPEAKER_01: As I look over the rest of this decade,
- 23:46SPEAKER_01: if you take the most sort of bullish and extravagant predictions about AI,
- 23:53SPEAKER_01: it's not clear to me what the economy sort of looks like a decade from now.
- 24:00SPEAKER_01: Again, if you take the most bullish kind of, we get the human level AI and all that.
- 24:07SPEAKER_01: I'm also not quite sure...
- 24:10SPEAKER_01: what the world looks like if some of these worst case scenarios with Taiwan and the
- 24:18SPEAKER_01: US and China,
- 24:19SPEAKER_01: because that seems to me to be in sort of like so potentially bad,
- 24:24SPEAKER_01: like I don't want to think about it.
- 24:26SPEAKER_01: I don't know what the global economy looks like on the other side.
- 24:29SPEAKER_01: So what are sort of the big risks or the things which you believe pose the greatest risk of disruption
- 24:40SPEAKER_01: with disruptions are going to be good and bad.
- 24:41SPEAKER_01: If you're really worried about AI, that must mean AI is very powerful.
- 24:46SPEAKER_01: It can do a lot of good things too.
- 24:48SPEAKER_01: So what out there do you really worry about that the disruption will be just bad
- 24:53SPEAKER_01: and have far more downside?
- 24:55SPEAKER_00: Well, you know, you can always speculate.
- 24:57SPEAKER_00: You can speculate on, for example, exogenous shocks.
- 25:00SPEAKER_00: I mean, COVID is an exogenous shock and there are others.
- 25:03SPEAKER_00: There are solar flares and there are new pandemics and there are,
- 25:06SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 25:07SPEAKER_00: things that can do immediate damage and you can spend millions of dollars on models
- 25:13SPEAKER_00: and they simply won't capture that exogenous risk.
- 25:15SPEAKER_00: So that's one story.
- 25:17SPEAKER_00: You know,
- 25:18SPEAKER_00: geopolitics,
- 25:19SPEAKER_00: since you mentioned it,
- 25:20SPEAKER_00: a third of the book,
- 25:22SPEAKER_00: roughly,
- 25:23SPEAKER_00: the third part is about those types of risks.
- 25:25SPEAKER_00: And they can be devastating.
- 25:28SPEAKER_00: There's no doubt about it.
- 25:30SPEAKER_00: But would you build a central case around this and make that sort of the base case
- 25:36SPEAKER_00: and expectation of how to view the future?
- 25:40SPEAKER_00: Geopolitics is extremely treacherous when it comes to translating its impact on the economy.
- 25:47SPEAKER_00: It's fascinating to me often how little the complexity is acknowledged and understood.
- 25:53SPEAKER_00: And in the book, we use an example juxtaposing the start of World War I and World War II.
- 26:01SPEAKER_00: So when World War I breaks out, the Dow is down 10%.
- 26:05SPEAKER_00: They close it for 136 days.
- 26:06SPEAKER_00: And when they reopen it, it's down another 20%.
- 26:13SPEAKER_00: exactly as you would expect, right?
- 26:15SPEAKER_00: I mean, that makes a lot of sense.
- 26:16SPEAKER_00: A world war and, you know, the market's, you know, in the gutter.
- 26:20SPEAKER_00: Yet, when World War II breaks out in 1939, the market jumps 10% and stays up.
- 26:27SPEAKER_00: Why?
- 26:27SPEAKER_00: It ends the Great Depression.
- 26:29SPEAKER_00: It puts to use labor.
- 26:31SPEAKER_00: It has capital expenditure and investment.
- 26:35SPEAKER_00: And it single-handedly ends a decade of malaise.
- 26:39SPEAKER_00: And there is a silver lining to this.
- 26:41SPEAKER_00: And all of this doesn't sit well with how we want to think and should also think
- 26:44SPEAKER_00: about geopolitics,
- 26:45SPEAKER_00: which is in humanitarian terms and also values and idealistic views.
- 26:52SPEAKER_00: All of this is true and correct.
- 26:54SPEAKER_00: But if we are to assess the impact on the economy,
- 26:59SPEAKER_00: We're going to have to restrain some of these instincts.
- 27:01SPEAKER_00: And we're going to have to say,
- 27:02SPEAKER_00: what are the transmission channels from geopolitics to the real economy,
- 27:08SPEAKER_00: to the financial economy,
- 27:10SPEAKER_00: and to the institutions that we have in place that govern our economy?
- 27:14SPEAKER_00: What are those transmission channels?
- 27:15SPEAKER_00: And often, the bar is higher than you think.
- 27:18SPEAKER_00: I mean, just think about the Ukraine war.
- 27:20SPEAKER_00: I mean, it's left no mark on the US economy at all.
- 27:24SPEAKER_00: um virtually uh why because the real linkages weren't there virtually no trade into
- 27:30SPEAKER_00: this part of the world either ukraine or russia uh the financial linkages weren't
- 27:35SPEAKER_00: really there it's not like balance sheets of u.s banks were impaired by you know
- 27:39SPEAKER_00: shutting off that that part of the world
- 27:41SPEAKER_00: And on the institutional side,
- 27:43SPEAKER_00: we can discuss sanctions and we discuss using the US dollar as a means of punishing
- 27:49SPEAKER_00: Russia and all that.
- 27:50SPEAKER_00: But essentially,
- 27:52SPEAKER_00: once you think soberly about,
- 27:54SPEAKER_00: well,
- 27:54SPEAKER_00: how is that shock supposed to transmit to the economy?
- 27:58SPEAKER_00: Well, it looks a lot different.
- 28:01SPEAKER_00: The same could be said about
- 28:03SPEAKER_00: The tragedy in the Middle East, the oil price is lower than before the attack on Israel, right?
- 28:10SPEAKER_00: If you look at futures and forward pricing or the price of insurance against swings
- 28:14SPEAKER_00: in the oil price is lower today than before the attack on Israel and before the
- 28:19SPEAKER_00: retaliation that Israel enacted.
- 28:23SPEAKER_00: any of these geopolitical risks and hotspots, they are to be taken seriously.
- 28:29SPEAKER_00: I'm not saying they don't matter,
- 28:31SPEAKER_00: but when we extrapolate from them straight to the economy,
- 28:35SPEAKER_00: it more often goes wrong than it goes right.
- 28:38SPEAKER_00: And a final thought,
- 28:39SPEAKER_00: look,
- 28:41SPEAKER_00: I'm not a Taiwan and China watcher,
- 28:44SPEAKER_00: but one thing that's also clear to me,
- 28:46SPEAKER_00: since you mentioned sort of the unthinkable and the worst case scenario,
- 28:50SPEAKER_00: my next question would be,
- 28:52SPEAKER_00: okay,
- 28:53SPEAKER_00: what shape would that take?
- 28:55SPEAKER_00: Would that be, you know...
- 28:58SPEAKER_00: a blockade?
- 28:59SPEAKER_00: Would that be an actual invasion?
- 29:00SPEAKER_00: Would it be something that involves airlifting semiconductors out of the island?
- 29:05SPEAKER_00: There's a myriad ways of how such a thing could play out.
- 29:10SPEAKER_00: It'd be a big shock and terrible,
- 29:15SPEAKER_00: but I can't say with confidence what it would do linearly to an economy like the US economy.
- 29:22SPEAKER_00: It would come down to the details of that.
- 29:28you