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065 - Lxv That God Knows Singulars · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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  Speaker 1: Chapter sixty five of Summa Contragentilees, First Book on God,
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  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
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  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public
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  Speaker 1: domain chapter sixty five that God knows singulars. Accordingly, we
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  Speaker 1: shall prove first that God cannot be lacking in the
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  Speaker 1: knowledge of singulars. For it has been shown that God
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  Speaker 1: knows other things inasmuch as he is their cause. Now
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  Speaker 1: God's effects are singular things, because God causes things in
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  Speaker 1: the same way as he makes them to be actual,
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  Speaker 1: and universals are not subsistent, but have their being only
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  Speaker 1: in singulars, as is proved in the Seventh Book of Metaphysics. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: God knows things other than himself, not only in the universal,
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  Speaker 1: but also in the singular. Again, as as soon as
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  Speaker 1: one knows the constituent principles of a thing's essence, one
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  Speaker 1: must needs know that thing. Thus, knowledge of the rational
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  Speaker 1: soul and of such a body implies knowledge of man. Now,
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  Speaker 1: the essence of a singular is made up of signate
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  Speaker 1: matter and an individual form. Thus the essence of Socrates
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  Speaker 1: is made up of this particular body and this particular soul,
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  Speaker 1: even as the essence of man in general is made
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  Speaker 1: up of soul and body, as stated in the Seventh
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  Speaker 1: Book of Metaphysics. Wherefore, since the latter are included in
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  Speaker 1: the definition of man in general, so would the former
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  Speaker 1: be included in the definition of Socrates if he could
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  Speaker 1: be defined. Hence, whoever has knowledge of matter and of
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  Speaker 1: those things whereby matter is designated, and of the form
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  Speaker 1: individualized by matter, cannot be lacking in knowledge of the singular. Now,
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  Speaker 1: God's knowledge reaches to matter, individualizing accidents and forms. For
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  Speaker 1: since his act of understanding is his essence, it follows
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  Speaker 1: that he understands all that is in any way whatever
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  Speaker 1: in his essence, wherein are virtually as in their first origin,
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  Speaker 1: all that have being in any way whatever, forasmuch as
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  Speaker 1: he is the first and universal principle of being, and
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  Speaker 1: among these we must include matter and accident, since matter
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  Speaker 1: is being in potentiality and accident being in another. Therefore
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  Speaker 1: God lacks not knowledge of singulars. Moreover, the nature of
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  Speaker 1: a genus cannot be known perfectly unless its first differences
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  Speaker 1: and proper passions be known. Thus, the nature of number
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  Speaker 1: would not be perfectly known if odd and even were unknown.
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  Speaker 1: Now universal and singular are differences or proper passions of being. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: in God, in knowing his essence, knows perfectly the common
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  Speaker 1: nature of being. It follows that he knows perfectly the
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  Speaker 1: universal and the singular. But just as he would not
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  Speaker 1: know the universal perfectly if he knew the intention of
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  Speaker 1: universality without knowing the thing in the universal such as
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  Speaker 1: man or animal, so two, he would not know the
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  Speaker 1: singular perfectly if he knew the nature of singularity without
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  Speaker 1: knowing this or that singular thing. Therefore, God must needs
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  Speaker 1: no singulars. Again, just as God is his very being,
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  Speaker 1: so is he his own act of knowledge. As we
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  Speaker 1: have proved from the fact that He is his own being,
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  Speaker 1: it follows that in him are all the perfections of being,
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  Speaker 1: as in the first source of being. As we have
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  Speaker 1: shown above, Therefore it follows that every perfection of knowledge
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  Speaker 1: is found in his knowledge, as in the first fount
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  Speaker 1: of knowledge. But this would not be if he were
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  Speaker 1: lacking in the knowledge of singulars, since the perfection of
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  Speaker 1: some knowers consists in this. Therefore, it is impossible for
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  Speaker 1: him not to have knowledge of singulars. Further, in every
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  Speaker 1: order of powers. It is universally found that the higher
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  Speaker 1: power extends to more things, and yet is but one,
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  Speaker 1: whereas the lower power extends to fewer things, and yet
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  Speaker 1: is multiple in relation to them. This appears in the
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  Speaker 1: imaginative power and sense. For the one power of a
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  Speaker 1: man imagination extends to all the things of which the
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  Speaker 1: five senses take cognizance, and to more. Besides, Now, the
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  Speaker 1: cognitive power in God is higher than in man. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: whatever man knows by various powers his intellect, namely imagination
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  Speaker 1: and sense, God considers it by his one simple intellect.
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  Speaker 1: Therefore he knows singulars, which we apprehend by sense and imagination. Moreover,
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  Speaker 1: God's intellect does not derive its knowledge from things, as
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  Speaker 1: ours does. Rather, is he the cause of things by
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  Speaker 1: his knowledge, as we shall prove further on. Wherefore his
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  Speaker 1: knowledge of other things is after the manner of practical knowledge. Now,
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  Speaker 1: practical knowledge is not perfect unless it extend to say,
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  Speaker 1: because the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is
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  Speaker 1: about singulars. Therefore, the divine knowledge of other things extends
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  Speaker 1: to singulars. Again, the first movable is moved by a
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  Speaker 1: motor that moves by intellect. And appetite, as was shown above. Now,
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  Speaker 1: a motor by intellect cannot cause movement unless it knows
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  Speaker 1: the movable has naturally inclined to local movement, and that
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  Speaker 1: is as existing here and now, and consequently as a singular. Wherefore,
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  Speaker 1: the intellect that is the motor of the first movable
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  Speaker 1: knows the first movable as a singular. But this motor
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  Speaker 1: is either supposed to be God, and thus our point
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  Speaker 1: is proved, or else it is something beneath God. And
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  Speaker 1: if the intellect of this motor is able by its
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  Speaker 1: own power to know it singular, which our intellect is
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  Speaker 1: unable to know, much more will the divine intellect be
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  Speaker 1: able to do so. Again, the agent is more excellent
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  Speaker 1: than the patient, and the thing done as act is
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  Speaker 1: more excellent than potentiality. Wherefore a form of lower degree cannot,
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  Speaker 1: by its action, transmit its likeness to a higher degree,
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  Speaker 1: whereas a higher form is able by its action to
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  Speaker 1: transmit its likeness to a lower degree. Thus, corruptible forms
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  Speaker 1: are produced in this lower world by the incorruptible agency
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  Speaker 1: of the stars, while a corruptible agency cannot produce an
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  Speaker 1: incorruptible form. Now, all knowledge is the result of assimilation
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  Speaker 1: between knower and known. Yet there is this difference that
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  Speaker 1: in human knowledge, assimilation is brought about by the action
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  Speaker 1: of sense on the human cognitive powers, whereas contrariwise, in
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  Speaker 1: God's knowledge it arises from the action of the form
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  Speaker 1: of the divine intellect on things known. Accordingly, the form
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  Speaker 1: of a sensible object, being individualized by its materiality, is
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  Speaker 1: unable to transmit the likeness of its singularity to that
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  Speaker 1: which is altogether immaterial, and it can only reach those
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  Speaker 1: powers which use material organs. But it is transmitted to
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  Speaker 1: the intellect by virtue of the active intellect in so
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  Speaker 1: far as it is wholly stripped of material conditions, and
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  Speaker 1: so the likeness of the singularity of a sensible form
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  Speaker 1: cannot reach as far as the human intellect. On the
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  Speaker 1: other hand, the likeness of the form in the divine intellect,
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  Speaker 1: since it extends to the smallest details to which his
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  Speaker 1: causality extends, reaches to the singularity of a sensible and
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  Speaker 1: material form. Therefore, the divine intellect can know singulars, whereas
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  Speaker 1: the human intellect cannot. Further, if God knows not singulars
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  Speaker 1: which even men know, this would involve the absurdity which
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  Speaker 1: the philosopher urges against Empedocles, namely that God is most foolish.
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  Speaker 1: The truth which we have established is confirmed by the
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  Speaker 1: authority of Holy writ, for it is written in Hebrews
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  Speaker 1: four thirteen. Neither is there any creature invisible in his sight.
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  Speaker 1: The contrary error is rejected in Ecclesiasticus sixteen sixteen. Say
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  Speaker 1: not I shall be hidden from God, and who shall
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  Speaker 1: remember me from on high? From what we have said,
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  Speaker 1: it is also clear how the objection raised in the
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  Speaker 1: contrary sense does not conclude a rite, for that which
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  Speaker 1: the divine intellect understands, although immaterial, is nevertheless the likeness
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  Speaker 1: of both the matter and the form as the first
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  Speaker 1: productive principle of both. End of Chapter sixty five read
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  Speaker 1: by Michael Shane, Craig, Lambert Elsie