Latest / The Epstein Chronicles / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 41-44) (7/28/26)

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Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 41-44) (7/28/26) · The Epstein Chronicles

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
• 0:03
  Speaker 1: This episode, we're picking up with the OIG report into
• 0:07
  Speaker 1: Jeffrey Epstein's NPA. D Acosta's decisions led to difficulties enforcing
• 0:13
  Speaker 1: the NPA. After the agreement was reached, the collateral attacks
• 0:17
  Speaker 1: and continued appeals raised the specter that the defense had
• 0:21
  Speaker 1: negotiated in bad faith. At various points, individual members of
• 0:25
  Speaker 1: the USAO team became frustrated by defense tactics, and in
• 0:29
  Speaker 1: some instances consideration was given till whether the USAO should
• 0:33
  Speaker 1: declare a unilateral breach. Indeed, on November twenty fourth, two
• 0:37
  Speaker 1: thousand and eight, the USAO gave notice that it deemed
• 0:40
  Speaker 1: Epstein's participation and work release to be a breach of
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: the agreement with a failure to report on October twentieth,
• 0:48
  Speaker 1: and had envisioned that entire collateral attack. I think would
• 0:52
  Speaker 1: have looked at this very differently. Once the NPA was signed,
• 0:55
  Speaker 1: the COSTA could have ignored Epstein's request for further review
• 0:58
  Speaker 1: by the department, and if Epstein failed to fulfill his
• 1:01
  Speaker 1: obligations under the NPA to enter his state guilty plea
• 1:05
  Speaker 1: declared Epstein to be in breach and proceeded to charge
• 1:08
  Speaker 1: him federally. When questioned about this issue, Acosta explained that
• 1:12
  Speaker 1: he believed the department had the right to address Epstein's concerns.
• 1:17
  Speaker 1: He told OPR that, because the USAO is part of
• 1:20
  Speaker 1: the Department of Justice, if a defendant asked for a
• 1:23
  Speaker 1: departmental review, it would be unseemly to object. During his
• 1:28
  Speaker 1: OPR interview, Sloman described a Costa as very process oriented,
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: which he attributed to Acosta's prior department experience. Sloman, however,
• 1:37
  Speaker 1: believed the USAO gave Epstein too much process, a result
• 1:41
  Speaker 1: of the usao's desire to do the right thing and
• 1:44
  Speaker 1: to the defense team's ability to keep pressing for more
• 1:47
  Speaker 1: process without triggering a breach of the NPA. Furthermore, Epstein's
• 1:51
  Speaker 1: defense counsel repeatedly and carefully made clear that they were
• 1:55
  Speaker 1: not repudiating the agreement. A Costa told OPR that the
• 1:59
  Speaker 1: USAO would have had to declare Epstein in breach of
• 2:02
  Speaker 1: the NPA in order to proceed to file federal charges,
• 2:06
  Speaker 1: and Epstein would undoubtedly have litigated whether his effort to
• 2:09
  Speaker 1: obtain departmental review constituted a breach. A Costa recalled that
• 2:14
  Speaker 1: he was concerned, as with Slowman, that a unilateral decision
• 2:18
  Speaker 1: to rescind the non prosecution agreement would result in collateral
• 2:21
  Speaker 1: litigation that would further delay matters and make what was
• 2:25
  Speaker 1: likely a difficult trial even harder. A Costa in Slowman's
• 2:28
  Speaker 1: concerns about declaring a breach were not unreasonable. A court
• 2:32
  Speaker 1: would have been unlikely to have determined that defense counsel's
• 2:36
  Speaker 1: appeal of the NPA to the Department and an unwillingness
• 2:39
  Speaker 1: to set a plea date while the appeal was ongoing,
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: was sufficient to negate the agreement. However, some of the
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: difficulty the USAO faced in declaring a breach was caused
• 2:49
  Speaker 1: by decisions Acosta made before and shortly after the NPA
• 2:53
  Speaker 1: was signed. For example, and significantly, it was a Costa
• 2:56
  Speaker 1: who changed the language Epstein shall enter his guilty please
• 3:00
  Speaker 1: and be sentenced not later than October twenty six, two
• 3:03
  Speaker 1: thousand and seven, to Epstein shall use his best efforts
• 3:07
  Speaker 1: to enter his guilty plea and be sentenced not later
• 3:09
  Speaker 1: than October twenty six, two thousand and seven. Acosta also
• 3:13
  Speaker 1: agreed not to enforce the NPA's October twenty six, two
• 3:17
  Speaker 1: thousand and seven deadline for entry of Epstein's plea, and
• 3:20
  Speaker 1: he told defense counsel that he had no objection if
• 3:23
  Speaker 1: they decided to pursue an appeal to the department. Following
• 3:27
  Speaker 1: these decisions, the USAO would have had significant difficulty trying
• 3:31
  Speaker 1: to prove that Epstein was not using his best efforts
• 3:34
  Speaker 1: to comply with the NPA and was intentionally failing to comply,
• 3:38
  Speaker 1: as opposed to pursuing a course to which the us
• 3:41
  Speaker 1: Attorney had at least implicitly agreed. E Acosta did not
• 3:45
  Speaker 1: exercise sufficient supervisory review over the process. The question at
• 3:50
  Speaker 1: the center of much of the public controversy concerning the
• 3:53
  Speaker 1: usao's handling of its criminal investigation of Epstein is why
• 3:56
  Speaker 1: the USAO agreed to resolve the case in which the
• 4:00
  Speaker 1: defendant faced decades in prison for sexual crimes against miners
• 4:03
  Speaker 1: with such an insignificant term of incarceration and made numerous
• 4:08
  Speaker 1: other concessions to the defense. As OPR set forth in
• 4:12
  Speaker 1: substantial detail in this report, OPR did not find evidence
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: to support allegations that the prosecutors sought to benefit Epstein
• 4:19
  Speaker 1: at the expense of the victims. Instead, the result can
• 4:23
  Speaker 1: more appropriately be tied to Acosta's misplaced concerns about interfering
• 4:27
  Speaker 1: with a traditionally staid crime and intruding on state authority.
• 4:30
  Speaker 1: Acosta was also unwilling to abandon the path that he
• 4:34
  Speaker 1: had set, even when Villa Fauna and Lori advocated to
• 4:37
  Speaker 1: end the negotiations, even though Acosta himself learned that the
• 4:41
  Speaker 1: state authorities may not have been a reliable partner, Many
• 4:45
  Speaker 1: of the problems that developed might have been avoided had
• 4:48
  Speaker 1: Acosta engaged in greater consultation with his staff before making
• 4:51
  Speaker 1: key decisions. The contemporaneous records revealed problems with communication and
• 4:57
  Speaker 1: coordination among the five key participants. Acosta was involved to
• 5:01
  Speaker 1: a greater extent and made more decisions than he did
• 5:04
  Speaker 1: in a typical case. Laurie told OPR that it was
• 5:08
  Speaker 1: unusual to have a US attorney get involved with this
• 5:11
  Speaker 1: level of detail. Metchell told OPR, I know we would
• 5:14
  Speaker 1: have spoken about this case a lot, okay, And I'm
• 5:17
  Speaker 1: sure with Jeff as well, that there were conversations a
• 5:20
  Speaker 1: meeting that I had with Marie and Andy as well.
• 5:23
  Speaker 1: Laurie similarly told OPR, well, he would have been talking
• 5:27
  Speaker 1: to Jeff and Matt, talking to me to the extent
• 5:29
  Speaker 1: that he did, and he would have been looking at
• 5:31
  Speaker 1: the pro's memo and the guidance from CEOs. He would
• 5:35
  Speaker 1: have been reading the defense attorney's letters, maybe talking to
• 5:38
  Speaker 1: the state attorney. I don't know, just all these different
• 5:41
  Speaker 1: sources of information. He was uncomfortable that he knew the case.
• 5:45
  Speaker 1: You know that he was. He was reading everything. Apparently
• 5:48
  Speaker 1: he read the prose memo, He read all the stuff.
• 5:52
  Speaker 1: At the same time, Acosta was significantly removed in physical
• 5:56
  Speaker 1: distance and in levels in the supervisory chain from the
• 6:00
  Speaker 1: individuals with the most knowledge of the facts of the case,
• 6:03
  Speaker 1: Villa Fauna and to the lesser extent Lori. Lorii normally
• 6:06
  Speaker 1: would have signed off on the prosecution memorandum on his own, but,
• 6:10
  Speaker 1: as he told OPR, recognized that the case was going
• 6:14
  Speaker 1: to go through the front office, because there was front
• 6:16
  Speaker 1: office involvement from the get go. Yet, although Acosta became
• 6:20
  Speaker 1: involved at certain points in order to make decisions, he
• 6:23
  Speaker 1: did not view himself as overseeing the investigation or the
• 6:26
  Speaker 1: details of implementing his decisions. OPR observed that, as a consequence,
• 6:31
  Speaker 1: management of the case suffered from both an absence of
• 6:34
  Speaker 1: ownership of the investigation and failures in communication that affected
• 6:39
  Speaker 1: critical decisions. On occasion, Villa Fauna included Acosta directly in emails,
• 6:44
  Speaker 1: but often information upon which a Costa relied for his decisions,
• 6:48
  Speaker 1: and information about the decisions Acosta had made traveled through
• 6:52
  Speaker 1: multiple layers between Acosta and Villa Fauna. Villa Fauna did
• 6:57
  Speaker 1: draft a detailed analytical prosecution memoranda, but it's not clear
• 7:01
  Speaker 1: that a Costa reddit and instead may have relied on
• 7:03
  Speaker 1: conversations primarily with Menchell and later with Sloman after Menchel's departure.
• 7:09
  Speaker 1: Despite these discussions, though it is not clear that a
• 7:12
  Speaker 1: Costa was aware of certain information such as Ostraband's strong
• 7:15
  Speaker 1: opinion from the outset in favor of the prosecution, or
• 7:19
  Speaker 1: of Villa Fauna's concerns and objections to state based resolutions
• 7:23
  Speaker 1: or the final NPA. Acosta interpreted the state indictment on
• 7:27
  Speaker 1: only one charge as a sign that the case was
• 7:29
  Speaker 1: weak evidentially, but it's not clear that when making his
• 7:33
  Speaker 1: decision to resolve the matter through a state based plea,
• 7:36
  Speaker 1: he knew the extent to which both Villa Fauna and
• 7:38
  Speaker 1: Laurie believed that the state had intentionally failed to aggressively
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: pursue a broader state indictment. One example illustrates this communication
• 7:47
  Speaker 1: gap in September twentieth, two thousand and seven email to
• 7:50
  Speaker 1: Louri asking him to read the latest version of the
• 7:53
  Speaker 1: proposed hybrid federal plea agreement calling for Epstein to plead
• 7:57
  Speaker 1: to both state and federal charges. V I don't typically
• 8:01
  Speaker 1: sign plea agreements. We should only go forward if the
• 8:03
  Speaker 1: trial team supports and signs this agreement. I didn't even
• 8:07
  Speaker 1: sign the public Corruption or CALI cartel agreements, so this
• 8:10
  Speaker 1: should not be the first. In his email to Villa Fauna,
• 8:13
  Speaker 1: Lorie attached to Costa's email and instructed Villa Fauna to
• 8:17
  Speaker 1: change the signature block to your name and send as
• 8:19
  Speaker 1: a final to Jay Lefkowitz. Fila Fauna raised no objections
• 8:23
  Speaker 1: to signing the agreement. A Costa told OPR that he
• 8:26
  Speaker 1: wanted to give the trial team a chance to speak
• 8:28
  Speaker 1: up and let him know if they did not feel
• 8:31
  Speaker 1: comfortable with the agreement. Phila Fauna, however, told OPR that
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: she did not understand that she was being given an
• 8:38
  Speaker 1: opportunity to object to the agreement. Rather, she believed a
• 8:41
  Speaker 1: Costa wanted her to sign it because he was taking
• 8:44
  Speaker 1: an arm's length approach and signaling that this was not
• 8:48
  Speaker 1: his deal. The fact that the top decision makers believed
• 8:51
  Speaker 1: he was giving the line Ausa an opportunity to reflect
• 8:55
  Speaker 1: and stop the process if she believed the deal was inappropriate,
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: but the line Ausa believed she was being ordered to
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: sign the agreement because her boss wanted to distance himself
• 9:05
  Speaker 1: from the decision reflects a serious communication gap. As another example,
• 9:10
  Speaker 1: At one point, Villa Fauna, frustrated and concerned about the
• 9:13
  Speaker 1: decisions being made concerning a possible resolution, requested a meeting
• 9:18
  Speaker 1: with Acosta. In a sternly worded rebuke. Menchell rejected the request.
• 9:23
  Speaker 1: Although Menchell told OPR that he was not prohibiting Villa
• 9:26
  Speaker 1: Fauna from speaking with Acosta, Villa Fauna interpreted Menchell's email
• 9:30
  Speaker 1: to mean that she could not seek a meeting with Acosta.
• 9:33
  Speaker 1: As a consequence, Acosta made his decision about a state
• 9:36
  Speaker 1: resolution and the term of incarceration without any direct input
• 9:40
  Speaker 1: from Villa Fauna. Acosta told OPR that he was unaware
• 9:44
  Speaker 1: that Villa Fauna had sought a meeting with him, and
• 9:46
  Speaker 1: he would have met with her if she had asked
• 9:48
  Speaker 1: him directly. OPR did not find any written evidence of
• 9:52
  Speaker 1: a meeting involving both Acosta, the final decision maker, and
• 9:56
  Speaker 1: Villa Fauna, the person most knowledgeable about the facts and
• 9:59
  Speaker 1: the law before Acosta made his decision to resolve the
• 10:02
  Speaker 1: case through state charges or to offer a two year term,
• 10:06
  Speaker 1: and Villa Fauna said she did not have any input
• 10:09
  Speaker 1: into that decision. Although a US attorney is certainly not
• 10:12
  Speaker 1: required to have such direct input, and it may be
• 10:15
  Speaker 1: that Mentchell presented what he believed to be Villafana's views,
• 10:19
  Speaker 1: OPR found no evidence that Acosta was aware of Villafauna's
• 10:23
  Speaker 1: strong views about and objections to the proposed resolution. All right, folks,
• 10:28
  Speaker 1: we're gonna wrap up right here, and then the next
• 10:30
  Speaker 1: episode we're going to pick up where we left off.
• 10:33
  Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
• 10:36
  Speaker 1: be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
• 10:39
  Speaker 1: welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. This episode, we're picking
• 10:43
  Speaker 1: up where we left off with the Jeffrey Epstein OIG
• 10:47
  Speaker 1: report into the NPA. Two logistical problems hindered effective communication. First,
• 10:53
  Speaker 1: the senior managers involved in the case, Acosta, Sloman and
• 10:57
  Speaker 1: Menchell had offices located in Miami, while the offices of
• 11:01
  Speaker 1: the individuals most familiar with the facts of the case,
• 11:03
  Speaker 1: Villa Fauna and to a lesser extent, Lori, were located
• 11:07
  Speaker 1: in West Palm Beach. Consequently, Villa Fauna's discussions with their
• 11:11
  Speaker 1: senior managers required more effort than in other offices, where
• 11:15
  Speaker 1: a line ausa can more easily just stop by a
• 11:18
  Speaker 1: supervisor's office to discuss the case. Second key personnel were
• 11:22
  Speaker 1: absent at varying times. Menchell's last day in the office
• 11:26
  Speaker 1: was August third, two thousand and seven, the day he
• 11:28
  Speaker 1: sent to the defense's letter making the initial offer, and
• 11:31
  Speaker 1: presumably in the immediate period before his departure date, Menchell
• 11:36
  Speaker 1: would have been trying to wrap up his outstanding work.
• 11:39
  Speaker 1: Yet this was also the time when Acosta was deciding
• 11:42
  Speaker 1: how to resolve the matter. Similarly, in the critical month
• 11:45
  Speaker 1: of September, the NPA and plea negotiations intensified and the
• 11:49
  Speaker 1: NPA evolved significantly, with the USAO having to consider multiple
• 11:54
  Speaker 1: different options as key provisions were continuously added or modified,
• 11:58
  Speaker 1: while Villa Fauna pressed him meet her late September deadline.
• 12:02
  Speaker 1: Although Lorie was involved with the negotiations during this period,
• 12:05
  Speaker 1: he was at the same time transitioning not only to
• 12:08
  Speaker 1: a new job, but to one in Washington, d C.
• 12:11
  Speaker 1: And was traveling between the two locations. Slowman was on
• 12:14
  Speaker 1: vacation in the week preceding the signing, when many significant
• 12:18
  Speaker 1: changes were made to the agreement. Andy did not participate
• 12:22
  Speaker 1: in drafting or reviewing the NPA before it was signed. Accordingly,
• 12:26
  Speaker 1: during the key negotiation period for a significant case involving
• 12:30
  Speaker 1: a unique resolution, no one involved had both a thorough
• 12:34
  Speaker 1: understanding of the case and full ownership of the decisions
• 12:37
  Speaker 1: that were being made. Villafana certainly felt that during the
• 12:40
  Speaker 1: negotiations she was only implementing decisions made by Acosta. Acosta, however,
• 12:46
  Speaker 1: told OPR that when reviewing the NPA, I would have
• 12:49
  Speaker 1: reviewed this for the policy concerns, did it do the
• 12:53
  Speaker 1: bullet points? And my assumption, rightly or wrongly, would have
• 12:56
  Speaker 1: been that Andy and Marie would have looked at this
• 13:00
  Speaker 1: and that this was appropriate. The consequences flowing from the
• 13:04
  Speaker 1: lack of ownership and effective communication can be seen in
• 13:07
  Speaker 1: the NPA itself, as demonstrated by the contemporaneous communications. The
• 13:12
  Speaker 1: negotiations were at times confusing, as the parties considered multiple
• 13:16
  Speaker 1: options and even revisited proposals previously rejected. Meanwhile, Villa Fauna
• 13:21
  Speaker 1: sought to keep to a deadline that would allow her
• 13:24
  Speaker 1: to charge Epstein when she planned to if the parties
• 13:27
  Speaker 1: did not reach agreement. In the end, Acosta accepted several
• 13:30
  Speaker 1: terms with little apparent discussion or consideration of the ramifications.
• 13:35
  Speaker 1: The usao's agreement not to prosecute any potential co conspirators
• 13:40
  Speaker 1: is a notable example. As previously noted, the only written
• 13:43
  Speaker 1: discussion about the term that OPR found was Villafana's email
• 13:47
  Speaker 1: to Lori and the incoming West Palm Beach manager with
• 13:50
  Speaker 1: copies to her co council and direct supervisors, stating that
• 13:54
  Speaker 1: she did not believe the provision hurts us, and neither Acosta,
• 13:57
  Speaker 1: Lori nor Villa Fauna recalled any further discussions about the provision.
• 14:01
  Speaker 1: Although OPR did not find evidence showing that Acosta, Lori
• 14:05
  Speaker 1: or Villa Fauna intended the scope of the provision to
• 14:09
  Speaker 1: protect anyone other than Epstein's for assistance, the planned language
• 14:12
  Speaker 1: of the provision precluded the USAO from prosecuting anyone who
• 14:16
  Speaker 1: engaged with Epstein in his criminal conduct within the limitations
• 14:20
  Speaker 1: set by the overall agreement. This broad prosecution declination would
• 14:25
  Speaker 1: likely be unwise in most cases, but in this case,
• 14:28
  Speaker 1: in particular, the USAO did not have a sufficient investigative
• 14:31
  Speaker 1: basis from which it could conclude with any reasonable certitude
• 14:35
  Speaker 1: that there were no other individuals who should be held
• 14:38
  Speaker 1: accountable along with Epstein, or that evidence might not be
• 14:41
  Speaker 1: developed implicating others. Prosecutors rarely promised not to prosecute unidentified
• 14:47
  Speaker 1: third parties. The rush to reach resolution should not have
• 14:51
  Speaker 1: led the USAO to agree to such a significant provision
• 14:54
  Speaker 1: without a full consideration of the potential consequences in justification
• 14:58
  Speaker 1: for the provision. It's highly doubtful that the usao's refusal
• 15:03
  Speaker 1: to agree to that term would of itself cause the
• 15:05
  Speaker 1: negotiations to fail. The usao's rejection of the defense proposal
• 15:10
  Speaker 1: concerning immigration consequences did not affect Epstein's willingness to sign
• 15:14
  Speaker 1: the agreement. The possibility that individuals other than Epstein's for
• 15:18
  Speaker 1: female assistants, could have criminal culpability for their involvement in
• 15:22
  Speaker 1: his scheme, could have been anticipated and should have caused
• 15:26
  Speaker 1: more careful consideration of the provision. Similarly, the confidentiality provision
• 15:32
  Speaker 1: was also accepted with little apparent consideration of the implications
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: of the provision for the victims, and it eventually became
• 15:39
  Speaker 1: clear that the defense interpreted the provision as precluding the
• 15:42
  Speaker 1: USAO from informing the victims about the status of the investigation.
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: Agreeing to a provision that restricted the usao's ability to
• 15:51
  Speaker 1: disclose or release information as it deemed appropriate mired the
• 15:55
  Speaker 1: USAO in disputes about whether it was or would be
• 15:58
  Speaker 1: violating the terms of the end by disclosing information to
• 16:02
  Speaker 1: victims or the Special Master. Decisions about disclosure of information
• 16:06
  Speaker 1: should have remained within the authority and the province of
• 16:09
  Speaker 1: the USAO to decide as it saw fit. There is
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: nothing improper about a us attorney not having a meeting
• 16:15
  Speaker 1: with the line USA or other involved members of the
• 16:18
  Speaker 1: prosecution team before he or she makes a decision in
• 16:22
  Speaker 1: a given case. Indeed, US attorneys often make decisions without
• 16:26
  Speaker 1: having direct input from line Ausas and Acosta did have
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: discussions with Menchel and possibly Slowman before making the critical
• 16:34
  Speaker 1: decision to resolve the matter through a state plea, although
• 16:37
  Speaker 1: the specifics of those discussions cannot be recalled by the
• 16:40
  Speaker 1: participants due to the passage of time. This case, however,
• 16:44
  Speaker 1: was different from the norm, and Acosta was considering a
• 16:47
  Speaker 1: resolution that was significantly different from the usual plea agreement.
• 16:52
  Speaker 1: Contemporaneous records show that Acosta believed the case should be
• 16:56
  Speaker 1: handled like any other, but Acosta's decision to fashion and
• 16:59
  Speaker 1: unorthance dooxed resolution made the case unlike any other, and
• 17:03
  Speaker 1: it therefore required appropriate oversight. Acosta may well have decided
• 17:08
  Speaker 1: to proceed in the same fashion even if he sought
• 17:11
  Speaker 1: and received a full briefing from Villafauna and others, but
• 17:14
  Speaker 1: given the highly unusual procedure being considered, his decision should
• 17:18
  Speaker 1: have been made only after a full consideration of all
• 17:21
  Speaker 1: of the possible ramifications and consequences of pushing the matter
• 17:25
  Speaker 1: into the state court system, with which neither Villa, Fauna
• 17:29
  Speaker 1: nor other subjects had experience, along with consideration of the
• 17:33
  Speaker 1: legal and evidentiary issues and possible means of overcoming those issues.
• 17:39
  Speaker 1: OPR did not find evidence indicating that such a meeting
• 17:42
  Speaker 1: or discussion with the full team was held before the
• 17:45
  Speaker 1: decision was made to pursue the state based resolution, before
• 17:48
  Speaker 1: the decision was made to offer a two year term
• 17:51
  Speaker 1: of incarceration, or before the NPA with its unusual terms,
• 17:55
  Speaker 1: was signed, as a Costa later recognized and told OPR
• 17:59
  Speaker 1: and a question that I think is a valid one
• 18:01
  Speaker 1: in my mind is did the focus on let's just
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: get this done and get a jail term mean that
• 18:07
  Speaker 1: we didn't take a step back and say, let's evaluate
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: how this train is moving. Many features of the NPA
• 18:13
  Speaker 1: were given inadequate consideration, including core provisions like the term
• 18:17
  Speaker 1: of incarceration and sexual offender registration, with the result that
• 18:21
  Speaker 1: Epstein was able to manipulate the process to his benefit.
• 18:25
  Speaker 1: Members of his senior staff held differing opinions about some
• 18:28
  Speaker 1: of the issues that a Costa felt were important and
• 18:31
  Speaker 1: that factored into his decision making. There does not seem
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: to be a point, however, at which those differing opinions
• 18:37
  Speaker 1: were considered when forming strategy. Rather, a Costa seems to
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: have made a decision that everyone beneath him followed and
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: attempted to implement, but without a considered strategy beyond detaining
• 18:48
  Speaker 1: the three core elements. As US attorney, a Costa had
• 18:52
  Speaker 1: authority to proceed in this matter, but many of the
• 18:54
  Speaker 1: problems that developed with the NPA might have been avoided
• 18:57
  Speaker 1: with a more thoughtful approach as a cost so belatedly recognized.
• 19:01
  Speaker 1: If I was advising a fellow US attorney today, I
• 19:04
  Speaker 1: would say, think it through. No one of the individual
• 19:08
  Speaker 1: problems discussed above necessarily demonstrates poor judgment by itself. However,
• 19:13
  Speaker 1: in combination, the evidence shows that the state based resolution
• 19:17
  Speaker 1: was ill conceived from the start and that the NPA
• 19:20
  Speaker 1: resulted from a flawed decision making process. From the time
• 19:24
  Speaker 1: the USAO opened its investigation, a Costa recognized the federal
• 19:28
  Speaker 1: interest in prosecuting Epstein, yet after that investigation had run
• 19:32
  Speaker 1: for more than a year, he set the investigation on
• 19:35
  Speaker 1: a path not originally contemplated. Having done so, he had
• 19:40
  Speaker 1: responsibility for ensuring that he received and considered all of
• 19:43
  Speaker 1: the necessary information before putting an end to the federal
• 19:47
  Speaker 1: investigation into serious criminal conduct. A Costa's failure to adequately
• 19:52
  Speaker 1: consider the full ramifications of the NPA contributed to a
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: process and ultimately a result that left not only the
• 19:59
  Speaker 1: Line and the FBI case agents dissatisfied, but also cause
• 20:04
  Speaker 1: victims and the public to question the motives of the
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: prosecutors and whether any reasonable measure of justice was achieved. Accordingly,
• 20:13
  Speaker 1: OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment in that he
• 20:17
  Speaker 1: chose a course of action that was in market contrast
• 20:21
  Speaker 1: to the action that the Department would reasonably expect an
• 20:24
  Speaker 1: attorney exercising good judgment to take. Chapter three, Issues relating
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: to the Government's interactions and communications with victims, Part one
• 20:34
  Speaker 1: Factual Backgrounds one Overview. Chapter three describes the events pertaining
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: to the federal government's interactions and communications with the victims
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: in the Epstein case and should be read in conjunction
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: with the factual background set forth in Chapter two, Part one.
• 20:50
  Speaker 1: This chapter sets forth the pertinent legal authorities and department
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: policies and practices regarding victim notification and consultation, as well
• 20:59
  Speaker 1: as oprs and now in conclusions, OPR discusses key events
• 21:03
  Speaker 1: relating to the USAOs and the FBI's interactions with victims
• 21:07
  Speaker 1: before and after the signing of the NPA, beginning with
• 21:10
  Speaker 1: the FBI's initial contact with victims through letters informing them
• 21:14
  Speaker 1: that the FBI had initiated an investigation. A timeline of
• 21:19
  Speaker 1: key events is provided on the following page. All right,
• 21:22
  Speaker 1: we're going to wrap up this episode here and in
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: the next episode we're going to pick up with two
• 21:27
  Speaker 1: the CVRA US Code eighteen, Section thirty seven seventy one.
• 21:32
  Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
• 21:35
  Speaker 1: be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
• 21:38
  Speaker 1: welcome back to the program. This episode, we're picking up
• 21:41
  Speaker 1: where we left off with the OIG report into Jeffrey
• 21:45
  Speaker 1: Epstein's NPA B Enumerated Rights. The CVRA defines the term
• 21:51
  Speaker 1: crime victim as a person directly and proximately harmed as
• 21:54
  Speaker 1: a result of the commission of a federal offense or
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: an offense in the District of Columbia initially at the
• 22:00
  Speaker 1: time relevant to the federal Epstein investigation. The cvr A
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: afforded crime victims the following eight rights. One the right
• 22:09
  Speaker 1: to be reasonably protected from the accused. Two the right
• 22:12
  Speaker 1: to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of public court proceeding
• 22:16
  Speaker 1: or any parole proceeding involving the crime, or of any
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: release or escape of the accused. Three the right not
• 22:24
  Speaker 1: to be excluded from any such public court proceedings unless
• 22:27
  Speaker 1: the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that
• 22:31
  Speaker 1: testimony by the victim would be materially altered. If the
• 22:34
  Speaker 1: victim heard of their testimony at the proceeding four, the
• 22:38
  Speaker 1: right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
• 22:41
  Speaker 1: the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. Five,
• 22:47
  Speaker 1: the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: government in the case. Six, The right to full and
• 22:52
  Speaker 1: timely restitution as provided in law. Seven. The right to
• 22:56
  Speaker 1: proceedings free from unreasonable delay. The right to be treated
• 23:01
  Speaker 1: with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: Although many of the rights included in the CVRA already
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: existed in federal law, as part of the VRR, the
• 23:13
  Speaker 1: CVR afforded crime victims standing to assert their rights in
• 23:16
  Speaker 1: federal court or by administrative complaint to the Department, and
• 23:20
  Speaker 1: obligated the court to ensure that such rights were afforded.
• 23:24
  Speaker 1: The passage of the CVRA repealed the rights portion of
• 23:28
  Speaker 1: the VRRA US Code forty two, Section ten six zero six,
• 23:32
  Speaker 1: but kept intact the portion of the VRRA directing federal
• 23:36
  Speaker 1: law enforcement agencies to provide certain victim services, such as
• 23:40
  Speaker 1: counseling and medical care referrals. US Code forty two, Section
• 23:44
  Speaker 1: one zero six zero seven. C Department training emphasizes that
• 23:49
  Speaker 1: VRRA obligates the Department to provide victim services which attach
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: upon the detection of a crime, while the CVRA contains
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: court enforceable rights that attack upon the filing of a
• 24:01
  Speaker 1: charging instrument. In twenty fifteen, Congress amended the CVRA and
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: added the following rights. Nine the right to be informed
• 24:10
  Speaker 1: in a timely manner of any plea, bargain or deferred
• 24:13
  Speaker 1: prosecution agreement. Ten, the right to be informed of the
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: rights under this section and the services described in Section
• 24:20
  Speaker 1: five oh three C of the Victims Rights and Restitution
• 24:23
  Speaker 1: Act of nineteen ninety US Code forty two, Section ten
• 24:28
  Speaker 1: six zero seven C. And provided contact information for the
• 24:32
  Speaker 1: Office of the Victims Rights on Budsman of the Department
• 24:35
  Speaker 1: of Justice. Part three. The Department's interpretation of the cvra's
• 24:40
  Speaker 1: definition of crime victim at the time of the Epstein
• 24:43
  Speaker 1: investigation a April one, two thousand and five Office of
• 24:48
  Speaker 1: Legal Council preliminary review. In two thousand and five, Department
• 24:53
  Speaker 1: management requested in formal guidance from the Department's Office of
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: Legal Counsel OLC regarding interpretation of the cvra's definition of
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: crime victim. On April one, two thousand and five, OLC
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: provided preliminary and informal guidance by email, concluding that the
• 25:10
  Speaker 1: status of a crime victim may be reasonably understood to
• 25:14
  Speaker 1: commence upon the filing of a complaint, and the status
• 25:17
  Speaker 1: ends if there is a subsequent decision not to indict
• 25:19
  Speaker 1: or prosecute the federal offense that directly caused the victim's arm.
• 25:23
  Speaker 1: OLC concluded that because the CVRA defines crime victim as
• 25:28
  Speaker 1: a person directly and proximately harmed by the commission of
• 25:31
  Speaker 1: a federal offense, the definition of victim is thus tethered
• 25:34
  Speaker 1: to the identification of a federal offense, an event that
• 25:37
  Speaker 1: occurs with the filing of a complaint. OLC further concludes
• 25:42
  Speaker 1: that because the House Report stated that the CVRA codifies
• 25:46
  Speaker 1: the rights of crime victims in the federal judicial system,
• 25:49
  Speaker 1: and the complaint commences the judicial process and places an
• 25:52
  Speaker 1: offense within the judicial system, the legislature must have intended
• 25:57
  Speaker 1: for CVR rights to commence upon the filing of a complaint.
• 26:01
  Speaker 1: OLC also found that the language of the CVR rights
• 26:05
  Speaker 1: supported its interpretation. For example, the first right grants a
• 26:09
  Speaker 1: victim protection from the accused, not a suspect. Additionally, the second, third,
• 26:13
  Speaker 1: and fourth rights referred to victim notification and access to
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: public proceedings involving release, plea, sentencing, or parole, none of
• 26:21
  Speaker 1: which commence prior to the filing of a complaint. B
• 26:25
  Speaker 1: two thousand and five Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and
• 26:28
  Speaker 1: Witness Assistants. In May two thousand and five, Department updated
• 26:32
  Speaker 1: its Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistants, the
• 26:36
  Speaker 1: two thousand and five Guidelines to include the CVRA. The
• 26:39
  Speaker 1: two thousand and five guidelines specifically cited the CVRA requirements
• 26:44
  Speaker 1: that agencies engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of
• 26:48
  Speaker 1: crimes shall make their best efforts to see that crime
• 26:51
  Speaker 1: victims are notified of and accorded their CVR rights, which
• 26:55
  Speaker 1: in two thousand and five encompassed the initial eight CVRA rights.
• 27:00
  Speaker 1: The two thousand and five guidelines provide details regarding implementation
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: of the Department CVRA duties and divided criminal cases into
• 27:08
  Speaker 1: an investigation stage, a prosecution stage, and a correction stage.
• 27:13
  Speaker 1: The individual responsible for notifying crime victims of their CVRA
• 27:17
  Speaker 1: rights varied depending on the stage of the proceedings. During
• 27:21
  Speaker 1: the investigation stage of cases in which the FBI has
• 27:24
  Speaker 1: the investigative agency. The special Agent in charge was responsible
• 27:29
  Speaker 1: for identifying victims at the earliest opportunity after the detection
• 27:33
  Speaker 1: of a crime and notifying them of their rights under
• 27:36
  Speaker 1: the CVRA services available under the VRRA and other federal statutes.
• 27:41
  Speaker 1: During the investigative stage, the Department mandates compliance with the
• 27:45
  Speaker 1: Victims' Rights and Restitution Act US Code forty two, Section
• 27:49
  Speaker 1: ten six zero seven, which requires federal officials to, among
• 27:53
  Speaker 1: other things, identify victims, protect victims, arrange for victims to
• 27:57
  Speaker 1: receive reasonable protection from soil expected offenders, and provide information
• 28:02
  Speaker 1: about available services for victims. Therefore, even though the Department
• 28:06
  Speaker 1: may not afford CVRA rights to the victims if charges
• 28:10
  Speaker 1: have not been filed in their cases, the Department may
• 28:13
  Speaker 1: provide certain services to victims that may serve the same
• 28:16
  Speaker 1: function as some CVRA rights. The two thousand and five
• 28:20
  Speaker 1: guidelines stated that the prosecution stage of the case began
• 28:24
  Speaker 1: when charges are filed and continued through pre sentencing legal proceedings.
• 28:28
  Speaker 1: The U S attorney in whose district the prosecution is
• 28:31
  Speaker 1: pending was responsible for making the best efforts to see
• 28:35
  Speaker 1: that crime victims are notified of their rights under the
• 28:38
  Speaker 1: CVRA during the prosecution stage. The two thousand five guidelines
• 28:42
  Speaker 1: required the U S Attorney or a designee to notify
• 28:46
  Speaker 1: crime victims of case events such as the filing of charges,
• 28:49
  Speaker 1: the release of an offender, the schedule of court proceedings,
• 28:52
  Speaker 1: the acceptance of a guilty plea or no low contendre,
• 28:56
  Speaker 1: or rendering of a verdict, and any sentence imposed. The
• 29:00
  Speaker 1: two thousand and five guidelines required the responsible official to
• 29:04
  Speaker 1: provide the victim with reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
• 29:07
  Speaker 1: any public court proceeding that involves a crime against the victim.
• 29:12
  Speaker 1: The two thousand and five guidelines specifically required federal prosecutors
• 29:16
  Speaker 1: to be available to consult with victims about their major
• 29:19
  Speaker 1: case decisions, such as dismissals, releases of the accused, plea negotiations,
• 29:25
  Speaker 1: and pre trial diversion. In particular, in two thousand and
• 29:28
  Speaker 1: five guidelines required the responsible official to make reasonable efforts
• 29:32
  Speaker 1: to notify the identified victims of and considered victims views
• 29:36
  Speaker 1: about perspective plea agreements. Nevertheless, the two thousand and five
• 29:40
  Speaker 1: guidelines caution prosecutors to consider a factor as relevant to
• 29:44
  Speaker 1: the wisdom and the practicality of giving notice and considering
• 29:47
  Speaker 1: the victim's views in light of various factors such as
• 29:50
  Speaker 1: whether the proposed plea involves confidential information or conditions, and
• 29:55
  Speaker 1: whether the victim is a possible witness in the case,
• 29:58
  Speaker 1: and the effect that relaying any information may have on
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: the defendant's rights to a fair trial. Lastly, the two
• 30:04
  Speaker 1: thousand and five guidelines stated that a strong presumption exists
• 30:08
  Speaker 1: in favor of providing, rather than withholding, assistants and services
• 30:12
  Speaker 1: to victims and witnesses of crimes. The correction stage involved
• 30:16
  Speaker 1: both pre trial detention and the defendant and incarceration following
• 30:20
  Speaker 1: a conviction, depending on the agency having custody of the defendant.
• 30:24
  Speaker 1: The u S attorney or other agencies were responsible for
• 30:27
  Speaker 1: victim notifications during this stage. USAO and the FBI victim
• 30:32
  Speaker 1: witness notification practice. At the time of the Epstein investigation,
• 30:37
  Speaker 1: a USAO training as us attorney Alex Acosta, disseminated the
• 30:43
  Speaker 1: May two thousand and five updated guidelines to USAO personnel
• 30:47
  Speaker 1: with a transmittal memorandum dated February twenty seventh, two thousand
• 30:51
  Speaker 1: and six, stating that he expected each recipient to read
• 30:55
  Speaker 1: and become familiar with the two thousand and five guidelines.
• 30:58
  Speaker 1: Acosta noted in the memorandum that the USAO had recently
• 31:02
  Speaker 1: held an all office training addressing the two thousand and
• 31:05
  Speaker 1: five guidelines, and that new USAO attorneys who missed the
• 31:09
  Speaker 1: training were required to view a videotape version of the
• 31:12
  Speaker 1: training immediately. Acosta further noted that the usao's Victim Witness
• 31:17
  Speaker 1: staff were ready to assist with details of victim notification
• 31:21
  Speaker 1: and other areas for which United States Attorney's Offices are
• 31:25
  Speaker 1: now explicitly responsible under the Act. The usao's Victim Witness
• 31:29
  Speaker 1: Program coordinator told OPR that the USAO provided annual mandatory
• 31:34
  Speaker 1: office wide training on victim witness issues and training for
• 31:39
  Speaker 1: new employees b the Automated Victim Notification System. Both the
• 31:44
  Speaker 1: FBI and the USAO managed contacts with crime victims through
• 31:47
  Speaker 1: the Victim Notification System, an automated system maintained by the
• 31:51
  Speaker 1: Executive Office for the United States Attorney The two thousand
• 31:55
  Speaker 1: and five guidelines mandated that victims, contact information, and noticed
• 31:58
  Speaker 1: to victims of events shall, absent exceptional circumstances, such as
• 32:03
  Speaker 1: cases involving juvenile or foreign victims, be conducted and maintained
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: using VNS. The VNS is separate from agency case management
• 32:11
  Speaker 1: systems maintained by the FBI and the USAO. Both the
• 32:15
  Speaker 1: FBI and the USAO use the VNS to generate form
• 32:18
  Speaker 1: letters to victims at various points in the investigation and
• 32:22
  Speaker 1: the prosecution of a criminal case. Although each form letter
• 32:25
  Speaker 1: can be augmented to add some limited individual matter specific content,
• 32:29
  Speaker 1: the letters contain specific language concerning the purpose of the
• 32:33
  Speaker 1: contact and cannot be removed, such as the arrest of
• 32:36
  Speaker 1: the defendant or the scheduling of a sentencing hearing. In
• 32:40
  Speaker 1: the usual course of a criminal case, the FBI collects
• 32:43
  Speaker 1: victim contact information during the investigation stage, which it stores
• 32:47
  Speaker 1: in its case management system. The FBI Victims Specialist exports
• 32:51
  Speaker 1: the victim's information data from the FBI's case management system
• 32:55
  Speaker 1: into the VNS database. Victim information stored in the VNNA
• 33:00
  Speaker 1: is linked to the investigations VNS case number at the
• 33:04
  Speaker 1: time of Epstein's investigation. The FBI Victim Specialist could use
• 33:08
  Speaker 1: the VNS to generate seven different form notification letters one
• 33:12
  Speaker 1: initial notification, two cases under investigation, three arrest of the defendant,
• 33:18
  Speaker 1: four declination of prosecution, five other, six advice for victims rights,
• 33:24
  Speaker 1: and seven Investigation closed. After a charging document has been
• 33:28
  Speaker 1: filed and the prosecution stage begins, the usao's Victim Witness
• 33:32
  Speaker 1: Specialist assumes responsibility for victim notification. The USAO imports data
• 33:38
  Speaker 1: from the Case Management System into the VNS. The USAO
• 33:42
  Speaker 1: Victims Witness Specialist uses the VNS to generate form letters
• 33:46
  Speaker 1: providing notice of case events such as charges filed, an arrangement,
• 33:50
  Speaker 1: a proposal, plea agreement, change of plea hearings, sentence hearings,
• 33:54
  Speaker 1: and the result of sentencing hearings. All right, we're going
• 33:57
  Speaker 1: to wrap this episode up right here and then the
• 33:59
  Speaker 1: next up. So we're going to pick up with part
• 34:01
  Speaker 1: C FBI Victim Notification Pamphlets. All of the information that
• 34:05
  Speaker 1: goes with this episode can be found in the description box.
• 34:10
  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
• 34:14
  Speaker 1: This episode, we're picking up where we left off with
• 34:16
  Speaker 1: the OIG Report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA c FBI Victim
• 34:22
  Speaker 1: Notification Pamphlets. The two thousand and five guidelines recommended that
• 34:27
  Speaker 1: victims be given a printed brochure or a card that
• 34:30
  Speaker 1: briefly describes their rights and available services and contact information
• 34:35
  Speaker 1: for the victim, witness coordinator, or specialist. At the time
• 34:38
  Speaker 1: of the Epstein investigation, FBI agents nationwide routinely followed a
• 34:43
  Speaker 1: practice of providing victims with pamphlets entitled Help for Victims
• 34:47
  Speaker 1: of Crime and the Department of Justice Victim Notification System.
• 34:51
  Speaker 1: The Help for Victims of Crime pamphlet contained a listing
• 34:54
  Speaker 1: of the eight CVRA rights. The pamphlets stated, most of
• 34:58
  Speaker 1: these rights pertain to events occurring after the indictment of
• 35:01
  Speaker 1: an individual for the crime, and it will be the
• 35:03
  Speaker 1: responsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney's Office to ensure
• 35:07
  Speaker 1: you are afforded those rights. The case agent in the
• 35:10
  Speaker 1: Epstein investigation told OPR that she provided victims with the
• 35:15
  Speaker 1: FBI pamphlet upon the conclusion of an interview. The pamphlet,
• 35:19
  Speaker 1: entitled the Department of Justice Victim Notification System, provided an
• 35:23
  Speaker 1: overview of the VNS and the instructions on how to
• 35:26
  Speaker 1: access the system. Five. The introductory USAO and FBI Letters
• 35:33
  Speaker 1: to victims a August two thousand and six. The FBI
• 35:37
  Speaker 1: Victim Notification Letters on August Day, two thousand and six,
• 35:41
  Speaker 1: shortly after the FBI opened its investigation into Abstein. The
• 35:45
  Speaker 1: victim specialist for the West Palm Beach FBI office, under
• 35:49
  Speaker 1: the case agent's direction, prepared a victim notification form, naming
• 35:53
  Speaker 1: thirty victims in the Epstein investigation and stating that additional
• 35:57
  Speaker 1: pertinent information about them was available in them. Thereafter, the
• 36:02
  Speaker 1: victim specialist entered individual victim contact information she received from
• 36:06
  Speaker 1: the case agent into the VNS. Whenever the case agent
• 36:10
  Speaker 1: directed the victim specialist to generate an initial letter to
• 36:13
  Speaker 1: a particular victim, the FBI case agent told OPR that
• 36:18
  Speaker 1: formal victim notification was always handled by the FBI victim specialist.
• 36:23
  Speaker 1: According to the VNS records, beginning on August twenty eight,
• 36:27
  Speaker 1: two thousand and six, the FBI Victim specialist used the
• 36:30
  Speaker 1: VNS to generate FBI letters to be sent to the
• 36:34
  Speaker 1: victims over her signature, identifying eight CVR rights and inviting
• 36:39
  Speaker 1: victims to provide updated contact information in order to receive
• 36:43
  Speaker 1: current status information about the matter. The FBI letters described
• 36:47
  Speaker 1: the case as currently under investigation and noted that this
• 36:51
  Speaker 1: can be a lengthy process and we request your continued
• 36:54
  Speaker 1: patients while we conduct a thorough investigation. The letters also
• 36:58
  Speaker 1: stated that some of the cvras did not take effect
• 37:01
  Speaker 1: until after an arrest or an indictment. We will make
• 37:04
  Speaker 1: our best efforts to ensure you were accorded the same
• 37:07
  Speaker 1: rights described. Most of these rights pertain to events occurring
• 37:11
  Speaker 1: after the arrest or indictment of an individual for the crime,
• 37:14
  Speaker 1: and it will become the responsibility of the prosecuting United
• 37:17
  Speaker 1: States Attorney's Office to ensure you were accorded those rights.
• 37:21
  Speaker 1: A sample letter follows. The ns data logues, correspondence maintained
• 37:26
  Speaker 1: in the FBI's case management system, and the FBI interview
• 37:30
  Speaker 1: reports for the Epstein investigation reflect that during the Epstein investigation,
• 37:34
  Speaker 1: the FBI generally issued its victim notification letters after the
• 37:38
  Speaker 1: victim had been interviewed by the FBI case agents, but
• 37:42
  Speaker 1: its practice was not uniform. B August two thousand and
• 37:45
  Speaker 1: six the usao's letters to the victims. During the time
• 37:49
  Speaker 1: that the FBI Victims Specialist was preparing and sending FBI
• 37:52
  Speaker 1: victim notification letters, Villafauna was also preparing her own introductory
• 37:57
  Speaker 1: letter in anticipation of meeting with each vis victim receiving
• 38:00
  Speaker 1: the letter, Villa Funa told OPR that she was generally
• 38:04
  Speaker 1: aware that the FBI sends letters, but believe the FBI's
• 38:07
  Speaker 1: process didn't have anything to do with my process, Villa
• 38:10
  Speaker 1: Fanna told the OPR the FBI had their own victim
• 38:14
  Speaker 1: notification system and their own guidelines for them and when
• 38:17
  Speaker 1: the information had to be provided and what that information
• 38:20
  Speaker 1: had to be provided. Moreover, Villa Fauna didn't know when
• 38:24
  Speaker 1: FBI letters went out or what they said. Nevertheless, Villa
• 38:28
  Speaker 1: Fanna told OPR that she did not intend for letters
• 38:32
  Speaker 1: she drafted to interfere with the FBI's notification responsibilities. In
• 38:36
  Speaker 1: August of two thousand and six, Villa Fauna drafted her
• 38:39
  Speaker 1: letters to victims who had initially been identified by the
• 38:43
  Speaker 1: FBI based on the Palm Beach investigative file. Villa Fauna
• 38:47
  Speaker 1: told OPR that she made the decision to make contact
• 38:50
  Speaker 1: with victims early, and she composed the introductory letter and
• 38:54
  Speaker 1: determined to whom they would be sent. Although these letters
• 38:57
  Speaker 1: contained CVR rights information, Villa fon 'a mainly intended to
• 39:01
  Speaker 1: use them as a vehicle to introduce herself and let
• 39:04
  Speaker 1: the victims know the federal investigation would be a different
• 39:07
  Speaker 1: process from the State Attorney's office investigation in which the
• 39:10
  Speaker 1: victims felt they had not been particularly well treated. Villafana
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: told OPR that in the case in which she needed
• 39:17
  Speaker 1: to be talking to young girls frequently and asking them
• 39:20
  Speaker 1: really intimate questions, she wanted to make sure that they
• 39:23
  Speaker 1: feel like they can trust me. Villafana directed the FBI
• 39:26
  Speaker 1: case agents to hand deliver the letters as they were
• 39:29
  Speaker 1: conducting interviews. Villafuna told OPR that the USAO had no
• 39:34
  Speaker 1: standardized way to do any victim notifications prior to filing
• 39:38
  Speaker 1: of federal charges, and therefore Villa Fauna did not use
• 39:41
  Speaker 1: a template or VNS generated letter for content, but instead
• 39:45
  Speaker 1: used a letter she had created and crafted herself for
• 39:48
  Speaker 1: another case. The letters contained contact information for Villa Fauna,
• 39:53
  Speaker 1: the FBI case agent, and the Department's Office for Victims
• 39:56
  Speaker 1: of Crime in Washington, DC, and itemized the sea v rights.
• 40:01
  Speaker 1: The USAO letters described the case as under investigation and
• 40:05
  Speaker 1: stated that the victims would be notified if anyone is
• 40:08
  Speaker 1: charged in connection with the investigation. The letters stated that
• 40:13
  Speaker 1: in addition to their rights under the CVRA, victims were
• 40:16
  Speaker 1: entitled to counseling, medical services, and potential restitution from the perpetrator,
• 40:21
  Speaker 1: and that upon request, the government would provide a list
• 40:24
  Speaker 1: of counseling and medical services. Lastly, the letter advised that
• 40:29
  Speaker 1: investigators for the defense might contact the victims, and those
• 40:32
  Speaker 1: who felt threatened or harassed should contact Villa Fauna or
• 40:36
  Speaker 1: the FBI case agent. Although the USAO letters did not
• 40:40
  Speaker 1: contain any language limiting CVRA rights to the post arrest
• 40:44
  Speaker 1: or indictment stage, Bili Fauna told OPR that she did
• 40:48
  Speaker 1: not intend for the letters to activate the usao's CVR obligations,
• 40:53
  Speaker 1: which she believed attached only after filing of criminal charge.
• 40:57
  Speaker 1: Bila Fauna told OPR that she did not think that
• 41:00
  Speaker 1: the victims potentially receiving both an FBI letter and a
• 41:04
  Speaker 1: USAO letter would be confused about their CVRA rights because
• 41:08
  Speaker 1: the USAO letter was coming with an introduction from the
• 41:12
  Speaker 1: agents who were hand delivering them. Later in the course
• 41:15
  Speaker 1: of the CVR litigation, Villa Fauna stated that she and
• 41:18
  Speaker 1: the investigative team adopted an approach of providing more notice
• 41:23
  Speaker 1: and assistance to potential victims than the CVRA may have required,
• 41:27
  Speaker 1: even before the circumstances of those individuals had been fully
• 41:30
  Speaker 1: investigated and before any charging decisions had been made. Villa
• 41:35
  Speaker 1: Fauna informed Lori and Sloman about the letters, but the
• 41:38
  Speaker 1: letters were not reviewed by any of Villa Fauna's supervisors,
• 41:41
  Speaker 1: who considered such correspondence to be a non management task.
• 41:46
  Speaker 1: Acosta told OPR, I've had no other case where I'm
• 41:49
  Speaker 1: even aware of victims being notified, because i assume it
• 41:53
  Speaker 1: all operates without it rising to management level. Similarly, Menchell
• 41:58
  Speaker 1: told OPR, as to chief of the Criminal Division of
• 42:01
  Speaker 1: the USAO, I did not consider it to be within
• 42:03
  Speaker 1: my purview to ensure that appropriate victim notifications occurred in
• 42:08
  Speaker 1: every matter investigated or brought by the office. I also
• 42:11
  Speaker 1: recalled that the USAO employed one or more victim witness
• 42:15
  Speaker 1: coordinators to work with line prosecutors to ensure that appropriate
• 42:18
  Speaker 1: victim notifications occurred in every matter investigated or brought by
• 42:22
  Speaker 1: the office. C USAO and FBI letters are hand delivered.
• 42:28
  Speaker 1: The FBI case agent told OPR that the FBI made
• 42:31
  Speaker 1: its notifications at the time that we met with the girls.
• 42:35
  Speaker 1: The case agent recalled that she had delivered the USAO
• 42:38
  Speaker 1: letters to the FBI letters to some victims following in
• 42:42
  Speaker 1: person interviews, and in the instances where she did not
• 42:45
  Speaker 1: provide a victim with a letter she provided an FBI
• 42:48
  Speaker 1: pamphlet containing CVR rights information similar that set forth in
• 42:53
  Speaker 1: the FBI letters. The COCSE agent also recalled that he
• 42:57
  Speaker 1: may have delivered a few letters to victims. The FBI
• 43:01
  Speaker 1: Victim specialist told OPR that she mailed some FBI letters
• 43:04
  Speaker 1: to victims, and she provided some FBI letters to the
• 43:07
  Speaker 1: case agent for hand delivery. Nevertheless, the case agent told
• 43:12
  Speaker 1: OPR that she did not sit there and go through
• 43:14
  Speaker 1: every rite with victims. She stated, however, in the beginning,
• 43:18
  Speaker 1: whether it was through the FBI victim specialist giving the letter,
• 43:22
  Speaker 1: me giving a letter the pamphlet, I believe that the
• 43:24
  Speaker 1: girls knew that they were victims and they had rights,
• 43:27
  Speaker 1: and they had a resource the FBI victim Specialist that
• 43:31
  Speaker 1: they could call for that. The FBI case agent further
• 43:34
  Speaker 1: explained that once the case agents connected the FBI victim
• 43:38
  Speaker 1: specialist with each victim, the victim specialist handled the victims
• 43:41
  Speaker 1: rights and resources. Six August two thousand and six to
• 43:45
  Speaker 1: September two thousand and seven FBI and USAO contacts with
• 43:50
  Speaker 1: victims before the NPA was signed. Early in the investigation,
• 43:54
  Speaker 1: Villa Fauna informed her supervisors that up to that point,
• 43:58
  Speaker 1: everyone whom the agents have spoken with so far has
• 44:01
  Speaker 1: been willing to tell her story. Getting them to tell
• 44:03
  Speaker 1: their stories in front of a jury ed trial may
• 44:06
  Speaker 1: be much harder. Between August two thousand and six and
• 44:09
  Speaker 1: September twenty fourth, two thousand and seven, when the NPA
• 44:12
  Speaker 1: was signed, the FBI case agents interviewed twenty two victims.
• 44:17
  Speaker 1: On a few occasions, Villa Fauna met with victims together
• 44:20
  Speaker 1: with the FBI. Villa Fauna's May first, two thousand and
• 44:23
  Speaker 1: seven draft indictment included substantative crimes against multiple victims, and
• 44:28
  Speaker 1: Villa Fauna described the circumstances of each of their encounters
• 44:31
  Speaker 1: with Epstein in our prosecution memorandum. There is some evidence
• 44:36
  Speaker 1: indicating that during interviews, some of the victims expressed to
• 44:39
  Speaker 1: the FBI case agents and Villa Fauna concerns about participating
• 44:43
  Speaker 1: in a federal trial of Epstein, and those discussions touched
• 44:46
  Speaker 1: upon in broad terms, the victim's views regarding the desired
• 44:50
  Speaker 1: outcome of the investigation. Before the USAO entered into the NPA, however,
• 44:56
  Speaker 1: no one from the government informed any victim about the
• 44:59
  Speaker 1: potential for RAZ revolving the federal investigation through a state plea.
• 45:03
  Speaker 1: All right, we're going to wrap up this episode right here,
• 45:05
  Speaker 1: and in the next episode, we're going to pick up
• 45:07
  Speaker 1: with a the case. Agents in Villa Fauna solicit some
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: victims' opinions about resolving the federal investigation. All of the
• 45:14
  Speaker 1: information that goes with this episode can be found in
• 45:17
  Speaker 1: the description box.