Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The ICO's verdict on a twelve-year-old test account called Test2
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Tuesday, the twentieth of October, twenty twenty-six.
- 0:09This is the evening edition.
- 0:13The I C O's verdict on a twelve-year-old test account called Test2.
- 0:20The Information Commissioner's Office, the UK's data regulator, has published reprimands over a ransomware
- 0:28attack on Data Cymru, the Local Government Data Unit for Wales, and its I T supplier, Ogi Networks Limited.
- 0:36The way in was a test account called Test2.
- 0:40Its password was Password1.
- 0:42It's easy to dismiss that as carelessness.
- 0:46It's better read as a design failure that sat unnoticed for more than twelve years, and plenty of organisatio
- 0:53ns could reproduce it. So, how did the attack actually work?
- 0:59On 1 November 2024, an attacker used the Test2 account to get into Data Cymru's network.
- 1:07The I C O said the account had existed for over twelve years.
- 1:11It also said a third-party tool rated the password very weak, crackable in under a second.
- 1:18The attacker took 42 gigabytes of data, then encrypted 182.
- 1:247 gigabytes. Personal information of 3,300 people was taken, most of them children.
- 1:31Think of a contractor who cuts a spare key during a building fit-out, labels it "test" and leaves it under t
- 1:39he mat. Twelve years later nobody remembers it exists, because nobody owns the list of keys.
- 1:46The lock was never the problem.
- 1:49The missing inventory was.
- 1:52Now, whose job was it to catch this?
- 1:56The I C O said Ogi Networks created the account, while Data Cymru controlled the wider network.
- 2:02Neither had clear, effective measures to find and remove old accounts.
- 2:07Each side could reasonably assume the other was watching.
- 2:11Supplier contracts rarely say who audits accounts, so often nobody does.
- 2:16Both bodies got reprimands rather than fines.
- 2:20But a reprimand is a public record that customers, insurers and auditors can read.
- 2:26What would a defender have seen?
- 2:29Very little. A forgotten test account logging in looks like ordinary activity to a system built to trust it.
- 2:36So detection comes from inventory rather than alerts.
- 2:40Every account, who owns it, when it was last used.
- 2:44The I C O's own recommendations are plain.
- 2:47Remove unneeded test, dormant and former-user accounts.
- 2:52Block weak and commonly used passwords.
- 2:55Require M F A, multi-factor authentication, a second check on top of the password, for remote access.
- 3:03Review all accounts, permissions and security groups, not a sample.
- 3:08And give privileged accounts unique credentials rather than shared ones.
- 3:12So what's the Secure by Design lesson?
- 3:16It means the safe state is the default, not a clean-up project.
- 3:21Test accounts should be created with an expiry date.
- 3:24Weak passwords should be refused by the system, not discouraged by a policy document.
- 3:30Contracts with I T providers and sub-processors should say who owns security duties and data protection terms
- 3:37, which is again the I C O's advice.
- 3:40The cost is modest. An afternoon to export every account, a quarterly review, and a clause in the supplier c
- 3:48ontract. The cost of skipping it was a regulator's name on your file and the data of children in an attacker'
- 3:54s hands. Ask your I T provider this week for a list of every account on your network, and who they think owns
- 4:01each one. As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 4:06That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:11Thanks for listening.