Latest / TFTC: A Bitcoin Podcast / #697: The Legal Fight Against UK Online Censorship with Preston Byrne

Transcript

#697: The Legal Fight Against UK Online Censorship with Preston Byrne · TFTC: A Bitcoin Podcast

• 0:00
  You've had a dynamic where money has become freer than free.
• 0:10
  You talk about a Fed just gone nuts.
• 0:13
  All the central banks going nuts.
• 0:16
  So it's all acting like safe haven.
• 0:18
  I believe that in a world where central bankers are tripping over themselves to devalue their
• 0:23
  currency, Bitcoin wins.
• 0:25
  In the world of fiat currencies, Bitcoin is the victor.
• 0:28
  I mean, that's part of the bull case for Bitcoin.
• 0:31
  If you're not paying attention, you probably should be.
• 0:36
  Preston Byrne, it's been too long.
• 0:38
  Welcome back.
• 0:39
  Hey, great to be here.
• 0:40
  Great to see you.
• 0:41
  It's great to see you too.
• 0:42
  I mean, we've got a lot to talk about.
• 0:45
  What the hell is going on in Europe and the UK with speech?
• 0:50
  Yeah, they need to be put back in their box.
• 0:54
  And they get back in their box, back in their kennel.
• 0:59
  And we can talk about that at length.
• 1:03
  Yeah, I guess I think maybe the best jumping off point is 4chan and Ofcom.
• 1:11
  You're very intimately connected with that.
• 1:16
  You're representing 4chan.
• 1:18
  For those in the audience who may be unaware of what's happening,
• 1:22
  why don't we just start there and then we'll get into the broader topic of speech
• 1:27
  sure so i think i think you know as with all bitcoin stories um you know our story begins
• 1:33
  on the aisle of yap but i was i've been active in cryptocurrency since 2013 mostly as a lawyer
• 1:42
  for crypto companies i also had a an early enterprise blockchain startup we forked to
• 1:46
  ETHPOC2 and built really complicated financial services automation things on it. And that didn't
• 1:52
  succeed. So I went back into private practice. And one of the first things I did when I went back
• 1:56
  into private practice, because it had been a sort of longtime interest of mine, was represent U.S.
• 2:01
  companies that were focused on free speech. And at the time, back in 2017, 18, U.S. companies that
• 2:07
  had free speech moderation policies were being targeted by the American government, right? And
• 2:11
  they were being targeted by American service providers. And it wasn't such a big problem
• 2:16
  the foreign governments weren't quite the problem they are now. But what has happened is,
• 2:22
  is that because the United States has this thing, right, the First Amendment, which protects speech
• 2:26
  here, and that includes the right to host whatever you want, essentially, as long as it's legal,
• 2:32
  the right to publish software, you know, in the terms that you want, the right not to be told by
• 2:35
  the government what kind of software you run or how you choose to run it or who you choose to
• 2:40
  allow to access it. There were forces both in the American government during the Biden
• 2:46
  administration and the Obama administration. And there are forces outside of the American
• 2:50
  government in the NGO space. And there are, of course, foreign countries who want to take that
• 2:54
  away from the United States. And so one of their strategies was to try to achieve via the back
• 3:00
  door what they couldn't achieve via the front, because the US government can't boss around
• 3:03
  American citizens and tell us what we can and can't say. The First Amendment, of course,
• 3:08
  is geographically bounded. It is limited to the United States. So there were a series of legal
• 3:13
  regimes that have been stood up across the world. One of them in Europe is called the Digital
• 3:17
  Services Act. One of them in the United Kingdom is called the Online Safety Act. Another one in
• 3:20
  Australia is also called the Online Safety Act and is substantially very similar to the UK regime.
• 3:26
  And all of those regimes came online at the beginning of 2025. And the UK was the first out
• 3:31
  the gate to try to enforce them. So they started sending letters in late February to American
• 3:37
  companies. The first one was a mental health discussion board called SASU. Second one was a
• 3:41
  company called Gab, which is a social network. The third one was a discussion board called Kiwi Farms.
• 3:47
  And the fourth one was a was 4chan, which I think requires no introduction for most people. But it's
• 3:52
  a it's an image board and it's the source of a lot of Internet culture, completely anarchic.
• 3:57
  Everybody is anonymous on the website. There are no usernames. And, you know, that's it's it's a
• 4:03
  totally, it's not lawless, right? They certainly obey American law. But compared to something like
• 4:08
  Facebook or X or Reddit or YouTube or any other mainstream social media platform, there's
• 4:14
  significantly less content moderation that occurs there. And so the UK targeted these companies and
• 4:20
  said, okay, well, listen, you guys are the worst of the worst from our perspective. You host speech
• 4:25
  and conduct that we would prefer not exist. And so when their censorship law came online,
• 4:31
  they started targeting these four companies, tiny, tiny, tiny companies. I mean, at one point,
• 4:36
  you know, it's not that way anymore, but at one point 4chan was described
• 4:39
  accurately as just a bunch of Mac minis running in a closet. And so essentially like that was the
• 4:46
  infrastructure that ran the site. And to prove the principle that they could take on what the UK
• 4:53
  and its political class regarded as the worst actors on the internet, and it could make them
• 4:58
  obey the UK's rules. And so these companies are targeted one by one. I was put in touch because
• 5:03
  I've been active in the free speech internet space for nearly 10 years with these companies one by
• 5:08
  one. And, you know, their clients made the decision, each one of them, one at a time,
• 5:14
  right? They said, listen, we believe that the principle here is the idea that American civil
• 5:20
  rights on the internet require defending is so important that we cannot give an inch to the
• 5:27
  United Kingdom on this front. And, you know, certainly I'm sympathetic, right, to foreign
• 5:32
  governments, you know, foreign countries have their own rules, they have their own ways of doing
• 5:35
  things, the world is not the United States. But the thing that distinguishes these four targets
• 5:39
  from, you know, a company like an X or a Facebook or a Google is that they have absolutely no
• 5:44
  operational footprint outside of the United States. And so when the UK was trying to censor
• 5:49
  these targets, as it continues to do to this day, the UK was essentially saying our rules,
• 5:55
  which are expressed to be applicable outside of the jurisdiction. There's a language in the
• 6:00
  statute which says this is extraterritorially applicable outside of the UK. Our rules get to
• 6:05
  govern what Americans do on American servers, and you have to answer to us. And the principle of
• 6:11
  that, if we concede it, the First Amendment ceases to exist effectively as something which exists
• 6:17
  online. And so these four clients decided to fight back. 4chan and Kiwi Farms in particular
• 6:22
  decided to bring a lawsuit against Ofcom in the District of Columbia, which we brought in August.
• 6:29
  And also what we've been doing in parallel to that is we've been advancing both communication
• 6:34
  with the executive branch. We've been ensuring that the executive branch knows what's going on,
• 6:38
  that they receive copies of these censorship notices. Obviously, we have no visibility into
• 6:42
  what the executive branch chooses to do and how it chooses to do it. But we have been serving as a
• 6:47
  source of information for them. We've been also ensuring that these censorship notices
• 6:51
  get presented to Congress. We now know as a matter of public record that Congress is considering
• 6:56
  introducing a foreign censorship shield statute. We don't know what's in it. And we ourselves,
• 7:02
  the legal team for 4chan and Kiwi Farms developed in coordination with a fellow named Colin Crossman,
• 7:08
  who's the deputy secretary of state for the state of Wyoming, a draft bill called the Granite Act,
• 7:13
  like the ROC, which stands for Guaranteeing Rights Against Novel International Tyranny and Extortion.
• 7:19
  And what Granite does is it provides a censorship shield law, which would effectively blunt any further attempts to enter the United States by one of these foreign countries.
• 7:30
  We know the federal government has seen a copy of that law.
• 7:32
  We don't know whether they're going to choose to follow the form of that law themselves and any legislative reform that they're going to proceed with in the new year.
• 7:41
  But essentially, it's been a multi front.
• 7:43
  This year has been it started out as just one guy repairing foreign censorship demands.
• 7:51
  And the whole process has snowballed to the point where now we're seeing executive action on this.
• 7:56
  We have confirmation from members of Congress, including Senator Eric Schmidt, that their own legislative solutions will be forthcoming.
• 8:04
  We have our shield bill proceeding in Wyoming.
• 8:07
  We have strategic litigation being waged by ourselves and also by other entities like NetChoice.
• 8:14
  They're not part of the effort, but they have been fighting UK online safety act style laws in accordance with their mandate.
• 8:21
  And recently, just this week, in fact, it's today's what?
• 8:24
  Today's the 19th of December.
• 8:26
  So on the 15th, they got an age verification mandate, which is very similar to the OSA struck down by a federal judge in Louisiana.
• 8:33
  then on the 17th so two days ago they had another rule which was a content mandate in the state of
• 8:39
  Arkansas very similar to the UK online safety act that was preliminarily enjoined so they got an
• 8:44
  injunction a temporary injunction in that case which means it's very likely that they're going
• 8:48
  to get a permanent injunction and that law will be struck down so what we've seen is you know the
• 8:53
  foreign governments have been pushing pushing pushing this content this way of looking at the
• 8:58
  internet and saying, you know what, the internet should not be a free place. It should be a place
• 9:04
  which is regulated and tightly controlled by us and not in accordance with the First Amendment,
• 9:08
  but by our rules. And what's happened is there's been a response across the board, legislation,
• 9:14
  litigation, and executive action, and also education, right? Letting the American bar know
• 9:20
  and letting the American populace know what's going on overseas, how they're trying to enter
• 9:24
  the United States, the manner in which they're doing it. And we're starting to really reach some
• 9:28
  some inflection points where that that process now effectively is moving under its own power.
• 9:33
  Whereas a year ago, really, there were only a handful of people pushing.
• 9:36
  So if I, you know, if I dropped dead of a heart attack tomorrow,
• 9:39
  this is whatever is going to happen is still going to happen, which is great,
• 9:43
  because it means that, you know, my efforts representing these four clients
• 9:47
  will not have been in vain. But it's because now the whole American system is waking up and
• 9:53
  a legal response is beginning to form. So that's the view from 30,000 feet is that the foreign
• 9:59
  censors coordinated a series of, and this has been planned for years, many, many years. The
• 10:04
  first call I had with the UK on the topic of the Online Safety Act was in 2023 in relation to a US
• 10:10
  company, a free speech oriented social media company. And a senior civil servant at the home
• 10:15
  office said, listen, how are you planning to implement the Online Safety Act? And I responded
• 10:20
  to him that, you know, we're not planning to implement the Online Safety Act. And if you want
• 10:25
  to censor my client, word for word, essentially, I said, you're going to have to land ground troops
• 10:29
  on the East Coast and seize their servers by force. And to be blunt, I don't think the UK is
• 10:33
  prepared to do that at the present time. But essentially, yeah, that's that's it's been a
• 10:38
  long, long, long fight. And finally, we're starting to see traction at the federal level
• 10:44
  in state legislatures. And I'm very optimistic that over the course of the next year, we're going
• 10:49
  to see meaningful legislative developments, which will essentially redraw the rules of
• 10:54
  the internet in America's favor.
• 10:57
  Well, first off, thank you for your service.
• 10:59
  It's incredibly important work because it seems existential.
• 11:02
  So is the UK and, you know, I mean, Europe with their Online Safety Act, are they essentially
• 11:09
  assuming that the US government should cooperate with them?
• 11:13
  And I think, yeah, I think they're assuming that the US government doesn't have the
• 11:19
  capacity to respond to them. I don't think they're assuming that there will be cooperation.
• 11:23
  If the Biden administration had continued, or if we were under a Harris administration,
• 11:27
  I think you would see, if not active cooperation, then you'd certainly see willful blindness to
• 11:32
  their activities and you wouldn't see any legislative or executive momentum to stop it.
• 11:37
  As was indeed the case under the Biden administration, they were serving notices,
• 11:41
  they were giving reciprocal treatment to notices that the Germans were serving on American citizens
• 11:46
  under the German censorship law, something called the Network Enforcement Act or the NETS-DG.
• 11:50
  And so they, you know, they largely ignored this. And we told them, listen, this violates the First
• 11:54
  Amendment. What are you doing? And they ignored our correspondence. We told the Trump administration
• 11:59
  about this, right? And the notices, we didn't, you know, hear anything back, but the notices from
• 12:04
  the German government against this particular target immediately stopped being served. So,
• 12:08
  you know, that's the difference in the change at the top. The U.S. government certainly,
• 12:13
  you know, it can't tell these countries what to do, but it has the option to decide whether it's
• 12:19
  going to resist. And I think under a Biden administration, it would not have resisted at
• 12:24
  all. I think it would have just kind of let them roll over Americans' rights because it serves
• 12:28
  their political interests and their political objectives to do so. There are forces in the
• 12:33
  US government on both parties who are very much not in favor of free speech on the internet as
• 12:38
  the First Amendment understands that term. So yeah, I think that's the answer to that question.
• 12:46
  I'm not sure if it satisfactorily answers that. No, it does. And this goes far beyond just free
• 12:50
  speech too, because I know a lot of these acts from UK and European Union, the European Parliament
• 12:58
  more broadly, they want to basically kill encryption too, and then encryption, introduce
• 13:04
  these back doors to any app that is allowing their users to use and then encryption to communicate
• 13:11
  with each other. And so, I mean, this is not only an attack on free speech, but also a surveillance
• 13:18
  mechanism on top of it. And it's pretty egregious. Yeah. And I mean, I think we've had those,
• 13:24
  we've had the encryption wars here in the United States for 30, 40 years as well, right? There
• 13:28
  There have been attempts to break encryption at various times by various administrations.
• 13:34
  And there are always people I guarantee you there are people within the current Trump administration who aren fans of encryption But ultimately we have a system That system has constitutional guardrails And the job of the First Amendment lawyers to enforce those guardrails whenever
• 13:49
  possible, as robustly as possible, as quickly as possible to prevent encroachment on Americans'
• 13:54
  individual rights. And so from our point of view, it's something which is just so important
• 14:00
  that you have to get involved immediately. You have to stop it immediately. And I don't think
• 14:05
  the UK was expecting. I don't think they're used to that in their own country. I think what they're
• 14:09
  used to is lengthy judicial review procedures. Those judicial review procedures take forever to
• 14:14
  resolve. It results in minor modifications to the scheme. They're not used to the idea of
• 14:19
  Americans riding into battle and getting a TRO, a temporary restraining order, to tell a random
• 14:25
  federal judge telling the entire federal government in all 50 states, guess what? You can't do this
• 14:30
  on a nationwide basis anymore. That's not something that they're accustomed to because
• 14:33
  the judicial system doesn't have the power to do it. So I think what we've seen is a clash of
• 14:39
  systems, a clash of cultures, legal cultures, and foreign governments that really didn't understand
• 14:46
  that just because, for example, with the GDPR, the data protection, the European data protection
• 14:52
  rule, just because all of America rolled over when they decided to roll that out on a global basis
• 14:56
  didn't also mean that we would roll over when they decided to go after the First Amendment on
• 15:02
  a global basis. I think they're qualitatively different rules. And so they should have expected
• 15:08
  a qualitatively different response. But their experience dealing with the Americans and
• 15:13
  internet, European internet regulation before, taught them that that wasn't something that we
• 15:18
  were going to do. And I think that that was a mistake. Yeah. So bringing this back to 4chan and
• 15:24
  Kiwi, you guys sued in DC federal court on August 28th, alleging Ofcom's orders, do not bind them in
• 15:31
  the United States that the orders were not properly served. Interesting to learn more about
• 15:35
  how they were served, that any attempt by U.S. court to enforce them would violate the first,
• 15:40
  fourth, and fifth amendments. So let's talk about how they were not properly served.
• 15:46
  And then from there, what's happened since August 28th? What has the back and forth been like,
• 15:51
  if there has been any? Sure. So we filed, Ofcom announced that they were going to fine
• 15:56
  4chan 20,000 pounds sterling on August 13th or 14th. Two days later, Kiwi and 4chan,
• 16:04
  through a press release that my law firm issued, announced their intention to file suit in DC.
• 16:10
  We then did file suit in DC on the 28th. And when you've got an entity on the other side,
• 16:17
  which is potentially, right? So they're arguing that there is sovereign instrumentality in the
• 16:22
  United Kingdom, which presents some interesting problems from a litigation standpoint, because
• 16:26
  they may benefit from sovereign immunity. Now, that's a live issue in the case. I'm not going to
• 16:30
  go into that in too much depth, because we've yet to file our opposition, and they're going to file
• 16:34
  their reply. But the issue there, right, from our perspective, is that they sent these notices by
• 16:42
  email to the United States. They just said, hey, here's an email, you must do this. And we want
• 16:47
  confirmation, as is the established legal position here in the United States time and time and time
• 16:53
  again, that if you want to get an American to do something, you cannot just send them a letter from
• 16:57
  overseas. You have to serve them a legal process. That legal process has to comport with American
• 17:03
  due process requirements and generally speaking also has to comport with the requirements under
• 17:07
  an applicable international treaty, whether it be the Hague Service Convention or the Mutual
• 17:12
  Legal Assistance Treaty procedure between the two countries or letters rogatory between two courts.
• 17:16
  And so none of that was used. It was just sent by email. So we are highly confident that these orders, if Ofcom came over here and tried to say, hey, 4chan and Kiwi Farms are now obliged to follow our instructions, a U.S. court would say with Ofcom as the plaintiff and rather than with us as the plaintiffs, that they would say, listen, no, this order was not validly served.
• 17:39
  So there are two questions we've asked the court to resolve.
• 17:41
  The first one is, were the orders validly served?
• 17:43
  And if the orders were validly served, right, then we have to answer the second question.
• 17:48
  We don't think they were.
• 17:49
  So at that point, we're going to be asking the court, listen, the order wasn't validly
• 17:53
  served.
• 17:54
  So from our perspective, the second question about whether it's constitutional to enforce
• 17:58
  here is moot, right, effectively, because the case should end, because we should just
• 18:02
  say, listen, the order wasn't validly served.
• 18:04
  There's no ripeness on the second question.
• 18:07
  And the case ends.
• 18:08
  And that's really all we're asking for. We're not asking for damages. We're not asking for injunctions, various other things. We're just asking for confirmation. As a practical matter, we're asking for confirmation that these orders weren't validly served, which would then confirm the position that my clients aren't obliged to follow them.
• 18:25
  Now, in response to that, obviously, very legal, correct, legally correct position.
• 18:31
  Ofcom responded by alleging that they are completely immune from suit.
• 18:35
  Right. So there's no there's there's there's no way that we can sue them because they're saying that they're a sovereign instrumentality of the United Kingdom.
• 18:42
  And the way that works is we have a law called the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
• 18:45
  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act says that subject to certain limited exceptions, if an entity is a sovereign entity or in conducting sovereign things engaged in sovereign activity, it is immune from suit in American courts.
• 18:59
  And that means that even though we're not asking for financial damages or anything else, if it's a threshold issue, it's a jurisdictional issue.
• 19:06
  So if Ofcom is a sovereign instrumentality and if Ofcom is engaged in sovereign conduct that is not subject to one of the exclusions under the FSIA, then what happens is the case is dismissed, right? It goes away forever.
• 19:20
  And so they're entitled to do that. But part of the reason we brought the suit was to demonstrate to legislators in Washington that law reform was needed in order to head this off because this is the expected response if an American goes to court and seeks an order from a US court.
• 19:37
  not seeking very much, right? Just confirmation. Listen, we just want the court to confirm
• 19:41
  that this order wasn't validly served. Can you please tell us that, that a sovereign on the
• 19:46
  other end of that lawsuit is going to turn around and seek to have the case dismissed
• 19:50
  and is going to use every legal lever available to avoid a US court from reaching that determination.
• 19:57
  And so we've also done parallel to this as we proposed a law, the Granite Act that I referred
• 20:01
  to earlier, which would take sovereign immunity away from these foreign sovereigns if they attempt
• 20:07
  to get into the United States and push around American citizens. And it would also create a
• 20:10
  civil cause of action that allows an American citizen to sue that entity and obtain financial
• 20:16
  damages against them. So the case is the case. We have the issues. They've made their arguments.
• 20:21
  We're in the process of making ours. They're going to make some more arguments still after that.
• 20:25
  But one of the purposes of bringing the lawsuit was to demonstrate to Washington,
• 20:29
  which I'm very confident we have done, and I'm very confident the message has been heard,
• 20:34
  that American law currently disadvantages the American defender and massively advantages the
• 20:40
  foreign attacker. Because if the foreign attacker comes in, you have this enormous threshold issue
• 20:45
  to get over of sovereign immunity. And that limitation is self-imposed. It's not imposed
• 20:50
  by foreign law. It's imposed by American domestic law. And so that's one of the reasons we brought
• 20:56
  the suit is to ensure that there's a record, a comprehensive documentary record showing
• 21:00
  that this is the case and to and to tell Washington, listen, this is the problem.
• 21:05
  And this is exactly where you need to get involved and apply a fix, because ultimately,
• 21:09
  if it's federal legislation, you can pass all the state legislation you want, as we
• 21:14
  are indeed trying to do with the Wyoming Credit Act.
• 21:16
  But the fix has to be at the federal level.
• 21:19
  And and we you know, I'm very, very, very confident that a fix along.
• 21:23
  I haven't seen the federal bill.
• 21:25
  I do know that one is being worked on because it's public information that one is being
• 21:28
  worked on, but I'm very confident that the federal government is going to be commencing
• 21:34
  a legislative response to this problem in due course.
• 21:37
  Something along the lines of the Granite Act.
• 21:40
  So ideally, right, it's going to be along the lines of the Granite Act. The federal government
• 21:44
  has definitely seen the Granite Act, including its most recent iterations, which are currently
• 21:49
  non-public. But yeah, we'll see what they do. I'm optimistic that we're going to see some action in
• 21:54
  new year um but it really that's i don't have a lot a ton of visibility in that process because
• 21:59
  that's about i'm a solo practitioner you know working working nights and weekends from my house
• 22:05
  and so drafting federal legislation is a little bit above my pay grade yeah but if it is aligned
• 22:11
  with what you presented in the granite your proposal for the granite act you describe it as
• 22:17
  mutually assured destruction a system of this mutually destruction yeah so if if they follow
• 22:24
  Well, so what the Granite Act does, it has really two pieces, a shield and a sword.
• 22:28
  So the shield states that an entity operating in the United States, a foreign order, which
• 22:34
  has served on that entity, which would, if served by an American government entity, violate
• 22:38
  their constitutional rights, is not enforceable here, right?
• 22:41
  Which is already the position.
• 22:43
  But if you set it out in a statute and make it very clear, instead of responding to a
• 22:47
  foreign censor with a 20-page memo, what you do is, which we have done, right?
• 22:51
  What you do is you respond to the foreign censor by saying, here's the statute, go away.
• 22:54
  Right. So please stop sending us stupid letters. The letters are stupid now. Right. To be clear.
• 22:59
  But but it's a little more complicated to exhibit its stupidity as it would than it would be if we had a statute which which set out the position very clearly.
• 23:08
  The second thing it does on the shield side is it prevents any U.S. government agency from cooperating or serving or giving effect to those notices.
• 23:16
  And it basically says that a U.S. state actor can't cooperate with like the Biden administration did.
• 23:22
  It says you can't give effect to an order.
• 23:24
  And if you do give effect to that order, Zorro, will you stop it?
• 23:27
  My dog is whimpering at the bottom of the stairs in the background.
• 23:31
  So it says that if you do cooperate with that notice, then what will happen is, you know,
• 23:37
  there's a civil cause of action against the government agency that did it.
• 23:40
  So that'll prevent any cooperation from the DOJ or the Department of State or something
• 23:43
  like that.
• 23:44
  It also creates a sword, right?
• 23:46
  I call it a turbo laser, a thermonuclear civil cause of action in podcasts and things like
• 23:50
  that.
• 23:51
  And what that does is it allows the American to counter sue or sue because it's not, you know, it's a separate proceeding. So it allows an American to sue a European censor for three times the amount of the threatened fine in an American court. And it takes sovereign immunity away from that European censor with respect to, you know, with respect to that claim.
• 24:12
  So essentially, if you send a letter to an American citizen under this regime, the American citizen on receiving the letter will know that letter is not going to be whatever that threat that letter contains.
• 24:23
  It's not going to be enforceable in the United States.
• 24:25
  And moreover, because they receive the letter, they now have a civil cause of action where they can bring it against the sovereign entity, the agency and anyone working for the agency jointly and separately.
• 24:35
  And they can seek to make them liable for damages in an American court.
• 24:38
  and those damages would be then recoverable in principle against sovereign assets custodied
• 24:43
  at American banks. So all told, this is not designed to create a lucrative practice suing
• 24:49
  foreign governments in American courts. It is designed to deter foreign notices from ever being
• 24:54
  sent in the first place because they know that firstly, they're never going to get those orders
• 24:59
  enforced here. And secondly, that if they attempt to enforce them at all or even threaten them,
• 25:04
  right, they will have to pay a very steep political price for that, which is not the
• 25:08
  case now, right? Now they can send as many letters as they want. It costs them nothing.
• 25:12
  The response is in fact very expensive from the American side of the equation because you have to
• 25:18
  get highly specialized lawyers willing to work for free for small targets running, you know,
• 25:23
  federal litigation in our federal courts, you know, without compensation, right? So that's not
• 25:28
  a sustainable or scalable way to defend the American constitutional perimeter. If however,
• 25:35
  you turn around and you say, okay, well, this is now catnip for a plaintiff's council and it's
• 25:40
  really worthwhile and you can do the work on contingency. And there's a big pot of gold at
• 25:44
  the end of the rainbow. You're going to have lawyers, you know, queuing up around the block
• 25:47
  to defend American civil rights. And it's going to communicate to these foreign governments that
• 25:51
  even if, right, for whatever reason, they decide it's worth their while to send these notices into
• 25:56
  the U S they're not going to get anything, right? They're not going to be able to enforce them here.
• 26:01
  So it's designed to redraw the boundary, tell foreign governments within this red line, right, that's America's turf. Don't cross it. If you have a question or a query and you're really interested in knowing whether the communication you're sending to an American citizen violates their First Amendment rights, that's not the American citizen's problem anymore. It's your problem, which is exactly how it should be.
• 26:22
  So if the federal government copies that approach in any meaningful way, I think that the foreign censorship problem will end largely. And I think it will end more or less overnight. And then we will have a new operating system, legal operating system for the Internet. And it'll be really interesting to see what happens over the course of the next 30 years with a law like that in the books.
• 26:42
  So that's the objective is basically to prevent this from happening anymore because it's the threat.
• 26:47
  It's the intimidation.
• 26:48
  It's not necessarily the enforcement because Ofcom can't enforce their orders here.
• 26:52
  We know that.
• 26:52
  Ofcom knows it.
• 26:53
  The U.K. knows it.
• 26:54
  The U.S. government knows it.
• 26:55
  Everybody knows it.
• 26:56
  But what happens is you go to a tech company.
• 26:58
  You talk to their highly risk averse legal team that likes occasionally going to London for a conference or something like that.
• 27:05
  And you say, hey, we're going to throw you in jail if you don't follow our rules.
• 27:07
  And guess what?
• 27:08
  They follow the rules.
• 27:09
  And their constitutional rights are limited.
• 27:11
  as a result.
• 27:22
  203 multi-sig. You have one key on the hardware wallet, one key on your mobile device, and Block
• 27:28
  stores a key in the cloud for you. This is an incredible hardware device for your friends and
• 27:33
  family, or maybe yourself who have Bitcoin on exchanges and have for a long time, but haven't
• 27:39
  taken a step to self-custody because they're worried about the complications of setting up a
• 27:43
  private public key pair, securing that seed phrase, setting up a pin, setting up a passphrase. Again,
• 27:47
  And BitKey makes it easy to use, hard to lose.
• 27:50
  It's the easiest zero to one step, your first step to self-custody.
• 27:54
  If you have friends and family on the exchanges who haven't moved it off, tell them to pick up a BitKey.
• 27:58
  Go to BitKey.World.
• 27:59
  Use the key TFTC20 at checkout for 20% off your order.
• 28:04
  That's BitKey.World, code TFTC20.
• 28:07
  What's up, Freaks?
• 28:07
  Have you noticed that governments have become more despotic?
• 28:11
  They want to surveil more.
• 28:12
  They want to take more of your data.
• 28:13
  They want to follow you around the internet as much as possible so they can control your speech,
• 28:17
  to control what you do. It's imperative in times like this to make sure that you're running a VPN
• 28:21
  as you're surfing the web, as we used to say back in the 90s. And it's more imperative that you use
• 28:27
  the right VPN, a VPN that cannot log because of the way that it's designed. And that's why we
• 28:32
  have partnered with Obscura. That is our official VPN here at TFTC built by a Bitcoiner, Carl Dung,
• 28:39
  for Bitcoiners focused on privacy. You can pay Bitcoin over the lightning. So not only are you
• 28:43
  private while you're perusing the web with Obscura. But when you actually set up an account,
• 28:48
  you can acquire that account privately by paying in Bitcoin over the Lightning Network. Do not
• 28:53
  be complacent when it comes to protecting your privacy on the internet. Go to Obscura.net,
• 28:59
  set up an Obscura account, use the code TFTC for 25% off. When I say account, you just get a token.
• 29:07
  It's a string of token. It's not connected to your identity at all. Token sign up,
• 29:12
  pay with bitcoin completely private turn on obscura surf the web privately obscura.net use
• 29:17
  the code tftc for 25 off i think one of the more important things to really dig into here is this
• 29:23
  is all rooted in poor free speech laws in the countries that are bringing these lawsuits against
• 29:30
  american companies i think you're particularly well suited to critique uh british and the
• 29:38
  that's speech laws in the uk because you practiced over there you got um you you know that that system
• 29:44
  very well and i think this is something you've been highlighting recently um is the fact that
• 29:50
  the uk free speech framework is broken beyond repair and so i think diving into what the
• 29:58
  landscape of free speech if it even exists in the uk looks like today obviously a ton of headlines
• 30:04
  over the last year with British citizens going and put in prison for social media posts
• 30:10
  and other things.
• 30:11
  It seems completely insane to somebody like myself who lives in America and expects Western
• 30:17
  democracies to respect free speech as much as we do here in the United States.
• 30:24
  But I think it's becoming clear that free speech is something that is somewhat unique,
• 30:28
  at least in the way that it was written in our Constitution, is somewhat unique here in
• 30:33
  the United States.
• 30:33
  Free speech, free speech in the UK. I mean, it exists the way they define it, but it doesn't
• 30:38
  exist the way that Americans define it. There's an old joke about an American and a Russian having
• 30:44
  a drink together at a bar. And the American says to the Russians back during the Cold War,
• 30:48
  you know, America is such a free country. I can walk right up to the gates of the White House and
• 30:52
  I can curse out and criticize the president of the United States right in front of the White
• 30:56
  House. And they can't do anything to me. And the Russian says, well, we have free speech, too.
• 31:00
  And the American says, really? He goes, yeah, I can walk right down to Red Square, right up to the front gates of the Kremlin, and I can criticize President Reagan all I want.
• 31:08
  And so that's the difference is that there's a there's a realm of political.
• 31:14
  The United Kingdom has certain qualitative judgments by which the content of the content of speech can be regarded as sufficiently offensive or insulting or abusive.
• 31:27
  and what those terms mean is generally defined by the current accepted political and cultural
• 31:34
  consensus in the government. The United States doesn't have that because our rules focus on
• 31:39
  making sure that speech rules are content neutral, right? So you ask, what is the character of the
• 31:44
  speech, right? Rather than what is the content of the speech before you proceed to the analysis of
• 31:49
  whether you can regulate it. So in the United States, I can walk up to the White House and I
• 31:53
  and say, you know, I think, you know, I think President Trump is a dummy, for example, I'm
• 31:57
  something I'm allowed to say, but what I can't do is threaten him, right? I can't, and I'm not going
• 32:01
  to say what that threat might look like because it's the internet, but I can't threaten the
• 32:04
  president, right? I can't threaten the cop standing outside the door, but regardless of who is in the
• 32:09
  White House, it should be possible to assess whether a threat has been made or not, right?
• 32:13
  So that's, that's something which is objectively verifiable, whether a threat has taken place.
• 32:17
  Now, the criticism piece, right, is something where, again, regardless of who is in the White
• 32:23
  house, you can change the criticism all you want, but the identity of the target and the content of
• 32:28
  speech doesn't change its nature, which is that it's critique or it's criticism. In the United
• 32:33
  Kingdom, however, they have rules, particularly on the internet, section 127 of the Communications
• 32:37
  Act 2003 is a good example, where grossly offensive speech is something which the state
• 32:43
  is permitted to intervene on. That is inherently a subjective judgment, whether something is grossly
• 32:47
  offensive or not. And if you then go and you ask a British judge, right, well, where's the line
• 32:52
  between offensive and grossly offensive, they kind of shrug and they say, well, you know,
• 32:56
  it sounds grossly offensive to me because, you know, anyone who heard that statement would
• 33:01
  doubtlessly be offended by it when they heard it. And so that's been used. That's in other cases,
• 33:07
  right? In the real world, you have abusive, threatening or insulting words of behavior,
• 33:12
  right? And abusive, threatening and insulting. Those are also terms which are inherently
• 33:17
  subjective, right? Abusive or insulting particularly. And you've seen cases where
• 33:21
  someone burned a Quran outside of the Turkish embassy in London, right? There was a very
• 33:26
  specific political act derived from, you know, Turkey has a long history of a complicated
• 33:31
  relationship between secularism on which the state was founded and more religiously motivated
• 33:36
  politics, which is currently running the state. And so it was an inherently political act going
• 33:41
  to the embassy and burning a Quran saying, listen, I disagree with the involvement of religion
• 33:45
  in Turkish national politics. So that guy, Hamid Koskin was his name. He was arrested,
• 33:52
  right? And he was tried and convicted, I believe, or no, he was tried and acquitted of a public
• 33:59
  order offense. But now the crown is appealing, right? They said, well, actually, no, we think
• 34:02
  that was sufficiently abusive and insulting because anyone would have been. And we think
• 34:08
  the judge wrongly decided this case. And in the United States, that would fall squarely within
• 34:13
  protected speech. Was anyone being threatened? No. Was he threatening to cause him physical
• 34:18
  harm to anybody? No. Was it his Quran that he was burning? Yes. So regardless of the subjective
• 34:23
  perception of offense or abuse or insult being felt by anyone who is watching it, in the United
• 34:29
  States, we'd say, well, that was still a protected act of expression, right? Because it's not within
• 34:33
  the categories of speech which we seek to control under our constitutional system, which look at the
• 34:38
  content of the speech, which is the necessary inquiry if you're asking, well, is someone offended
• 34:42
  by the speech, inherently what you're doing there is you're looking into the content of
• 34:46
  the conduct, the substance of the idea that's being communicated, and you're punishing the
• 34:51
  person for the substance, right, rather than the nature of the speech itself.
• 34:55
  And so they don't really have our doctrine there.
• 34:58
  And the UK Online Safety Act requires American companies to remove speech, which is illegal
• 35:03
  there, which effectively ports their domestic speech regime as an internet regulatory regime,
• 35:10
  which obliges Americans to remove speech, which is illegal in the UK, but perfectly legal in the
• 35:15
  United States. And that is one of the, incidentally, we haven't even, in the 4chan case, we haven't
• 35:21
  even reached that point in the analysis, right? Because they haven't rolled out and started
• 35:25
  seeking to enforce those content moderation rules. What they sought to do was to compel 4chan
• 35:30
  to produce a risk assessment, an audit, an internal audit, essentially, where they were going to write
• 35:36
  a document where they confessed their sins, said how they complied with the rules and said how they
• 35:40
  were going to not – said how they weren't complying with the rules and how they intended
• 35:44
  to come into compliance. And we looked at that and we said, sorry, that's compelled speech under
• 35:48
  the First Amendment. We don't have to explain our content moderation decisions to you. And
• 35:52
  threatening us by saying that if you don't produce this report, confessing your sins,
• 35:56
  well, that violates the Fifth Amendment. And moreover, you're asking for an internal document
• 36:00
  that we may or may not have produced and you're doing it without a judicial warrant. That violates
• 36:05
  It's the Fourth Amendment, right?
• 36:07
  So it's the First, Fourth, Fifth Amendment.
• 36:08
  We have cases on all of these things that tell us that here in the U.S., the conduct
• 36:15
  of refusing a foreign censor's order to testify against yourself, admit your sins and explain
• 36:22
  your content moderation practices violates our constitution at multiple points.
• 36:26
  And we just decided, OK, we can either sit here and wait and ignore the notices or we
• 36:31
  can punch them on the nose.
• 36:32
  Right. And we can say, OK, we're going to explain to the entire American bar that the case has been viewed tens of thousands of times, the documents on that case.
• 36:41
  So we can explain to the entire American bar. We can explain to Washington, D.C.
• 36:45
  We can explain to you and we can explain to anyone else who might be interested all in one in one clean sweep.
• 36:52
  Exactly what you're asking, exactly why we object and exactly how what kind of law reform is needed in order to prevent this from happening again.
• 37:00
  through the simple act of filing a lawsuit, which is published in the District of Columbia,
• 37:04
  which a lot of lawyers are going to read. And that's another part of the reason why we did it.
• 37:09
  So the hurdles that we have to get over on the sovereign immunity point, I'm not going to beat
• 37:15
  around the bush. They are substantial. We do have arguments. We will be making them.
• 37:20
  But the sovereign immunity's defense that they raised is a formidable one.
• 37:25
  And our point that we've been making to Washington is that when you have a coordinated global effort from 31 different sovereigns, 30 different countries, the member states of the EU, the United Kingdom, Australia, and there are some smaller entities that have similar rules that might want to try the same thing, New Zealand and Singapore in particular, and that are purporting to have extraterritorial effect in the United States.
• 37:47
  when you that is the problem that you face it is not sufficient to be sitting here and saying okay
• 37:54
  we're going to tie americans hands behind their back with our own rules and sovereign immunity
• 37:58
  defenses and that's something which is going to be sustainable in the long run we need some
• 38:02
  major major law reform changes in order to arrest this conduct and prevent it from becoming common
• 38:07
  place for companies large and small and so you know the lawsuit was really designed to illustrate
• 38:12
  the nature of that problem we think we've done that very successfully we know for a fact that
• 38:17
  the lawsuit has been noticed at the very highest levels of American government. I'm not going to
• 38:21
  say where or among whom, but we think we made our point and we think we've made it very well.
• 38:26
  And of course, we're going to assert our claims and defenses, make our arguments and all the rest
• 38:30
  of it. But the name of the game here has always been for years now, it has always been, we need
• 38:35
  to change the structure of American law in order to prevent this sort of thing from happening again.
• 38:40
  And I think where we are now, I sit at this very strange point where not a lot of lawyers
• 38:45
  or not a lot of people have been involved, but there is a process and it is very advanced.
• 38:49
  So it sounds a little crazy when you, when you say, oh, I'm really optimistic that something's
• 38:53
  going to happen, but I am extremely optimistic that something's going to happen on this front.
• 38:57
  And I think it's probably going to happen in Q1 of 2026, maybe Q2 at the latest. So it's,
• 39:04
  so yeah, that's where we are. If that is in terms of the summary.
• 39:09
  Yeah. Well, you mentioned companies, both large and small. And earlier, you mentioned the fact
• 39:14
  that 4chan was described as their servers being a bunch of mac minis connected to each other in a
• 39:20
  in a closet uh obviously uh elon and x have been in the news in recent months because the european
• 39:27
  parliament i don't know if they sued them they're simply finding them yeah the commission the
• 39:32
  european commission which is the uh executive branch agency of the european union just issued
• 39:37
  a fine for violating their various rules um and that completely violates the first amendment it's
• 39:43
  not enforceable here. So there's no, since X has business operations around the world,
• 39:47
  maybe servers and other places that doesn't, it's still the first amendment still protects them.
• 39:52
  It protects them in the United States. Um, and it certainly doesn't protect them in the EU.
• 39:57
  Right. But the, the issue with the global companies that they have is they, so my clients,
• 40:02
  I have a very easy job, right? They're entirely us based. All of their assets are us situs. All
• 40:08
  of their servers are in the United States. And so from our point of view, when you have that
• 40:12
  foreign intrusion. It's a very simple analysis, right? The analysis is, no, thanks. We're not
• 40:19
  doing this. You have no power here. Well, the company like X or Google or Facebook, they have
• 40:23
  very meaningful footprints outside of the United States. So it is somewhat more complicated for them
• 40:28
  to push back against these demands because there are assets against which a foreign state can
• 40:33
  enforce a judgment or a ruling or a fine or whatever else. We think that this should be
• 40:39
  resolved as a diplomatic matter between the United States and these countries, and that they should
• 40:43
  respect the way that we do things, because those are usually branch offices and subsidiaries that
• 40:48
  don't actually serve and operate the app itself. I know in X's case, the contractual counterparty
• 40:54
  is an Irish entity, and I think they probably also have servers in Ireland, and there are tax
• 40:59
  reasons why they do that. Ireland is a tax shelter for a lot of these companies, but for various
• 41:05
  various reasons that don bear going into here So their picture is somewhat more complicated But with the Granted Act as we drafted it it would actually protect American companies with those foreign operations and subsidiaries because it would say listen what you still seeking to do
• 41:20
  when you're targeting the sub is you're actually really seeking to target the parent.
• 41:24
  And you're telling the parent entity, listen, if you don't do this, your entire global business is
• 41:29
  going to suffer consequences. And at the moment, they can do that for free and it doesn't affect
• 41:33
  them at all. And there's no real pushback or response from the United States. There's no real
• 41:37
  resistance that we can offer except full withdrawal from the European Union and then daring them to
• 41:44
  come over here to enforce the fine, which, of course, if they were to do that, they wouldn't.
• 41:48
  They wouldn't be able to. So it's a complicated picture for a company like X and certainly more
• 41:54
  complicated than it would be for a client like 4chan or Kiwi Farms or Gab. And so we are, you
• 42:00
  know, to a certain extent, we're in a privileged position because we're able to be the tip of the
• 42:04
  spear because we have these structured, you know, the operations of my clients are structured in
• 42:10
  such a way that it offers a very significant and meaningful defense to these foreign censorship
• 42:14
  attempts that a company like Google or Facebook is vulnerable to. So, you know, it's and it's a
• 42:20
  whole because we're not doing this, you know, I am doing this just for my clients. Right. But it
• 42:25
  It just so happens that the solution that would save my clients from this sort of thing
• 42:29
  would also save any other American company at the same time.
• 42:33
  So the entire tech industry will benefit if a law is enacted which protects these tiny
• 42:38
  American companies as we proposed it, because ultimately a law that protects a tiny American
• 42:43
  company should also protect a big one in exactly the same way that it protects the small one.
• 42:49
  What's up, Freaks?
• 42:49
  When you take Bitcoin seriously, you start with custody.
• 42:51
  You want to control your keys, avoid single points of failure, and make sure your savings cannot disappear because you or someone else screwed up.
• 42:57
  That is what Unchained has been focused on since 2016.
• 43:00
  Unchained is the leader in collaborative multi-sig custody and Bitcoin financial services that keep you in control.
• 43:05
  They secure over $12 billion in Bitcoin for more than 12,000 clients.
• 43:08
  That means about one out of every 200 Bitcoin sits inside an Unchained vault.
• 43:12
  Their model is simple.
• 43:13
  You hold two keys, they hold one key.
• 43:15
  And it always takes two keys to move Bitcoin, meaning their single key can't access your Bitcoin on its own.
• 43:19
  Just resilient, shared custody that gives you institutional-grade security while keeping you sovereign.
• 43:23
  Unchain also lets you trade straight from your vault, access Bitcoin-backed commercial loans, open a Bitcoin IRA where you hold your own keys, and set up personal, business, trust, or retirement vaults.
• 43:32
  They even offer inheritance solutions built for long-term hodlers.
• 43:35
  Or opt for the highest-level private client service with Unchain Signature and get a dedicated account manager, discounted trading fees, exclusive access to events and features, and much, much more.
• 43:44
  If you want a partner that helps you secure and grow your Bitcoin without giving up control, go to Unchained.com and use the code TFTC10 at checkout to get 10% off your new Bitcoin multisig vault.
• 43:53
  That's TFTC10 at Unchained.com.
• 43:56
  What's up, freaks? This rep was brought to you by good friends at Silent.
• 43:58
  Silent creates everyday, faraday gear that protects your hardware.
• 44:01
  We're in Bitcoin. We have a lot of hardware that we need to secure.
• 44:04
  Your wallet emits signals that can leave you vulnerable.
• 44:07
  You want to pick up Silent's gear, put your hardware in that.
• 44:10
  I have a tap signer right here.
• 44:11
  I got the silent card holder replaced my wallet. I was using Ridge wallet because it's secured
• 44:15
  against RFID signal jacking. Silent, the card holder does the same thing. It's much sleeker,
• 44:21
  fits in my pocket much easier. I also have the Faraday phone sleeve, which you can put a hardware
• 44:25
  wallet in. We're actually using it for our keys at the house too. There's been a lot of robberies.
• 44:28
  They have essential Faraday slings, Faraday backpacks. It's a Bitcoin company. They're
• 44:33
  running on a Bitcoin standard. They have a Bitcoin treasury. They accept Bitcoin via strike. So go to
• 44:37
  slnt.com slash tftc to get 15% off anything or simply just use the code tftc when shopping at
• 44:44
  slnt.com. Patented technology, special operations approved. It has free shipping as well. So go
• 44:49
  check it out. It's so crazy that we've gotten to this point because it seems like in looking at
• 44:52
  this, it seems existential for free speech on the internet. And I think it's not going to go one of
• 44:59
  two ways. I think there's many ways it can go. Do you see the potential for bifurcation of the
• 45:07
  internet, particularly on the lines of free speech? I do. But I think if what Granite is
• 45:13
  designed to do is it's designed to make the Europeans own the consequences of their censorship.
• 45:19
  So at the moment, the Europeans have sought to outsource censorship through they've introduced
• 45:24
  several layers of intermediation between themselves and the censorship by saying, well, we expect a
• 45:29
  tech company to comply with these duties. And if you don't comply, these duties require you,
• 45:34
  right, ipso facto, to commit acts of censorship in the European Union, in the UK, and on your
• 45:40
  servers in the United States. If you don't comply with those duties, we won't necessarily order you
• 45:44
  to remove a particular piece of content, but we will fine you, right, to disincentivize you from
• 45:49
  disobeying us again or not carrying out those duties sufficiently well. And so rather than
• 45:54
  specifically targeting individual pieces of content for removal, what they do is they create
• 45:59
  mechanisms whereby third parties, trusted flaggers, independent entities called super
• 46:04
  complainers in the UK, they have a super complaints regime for NGOs over there to complain about
• 46:08
  particular content. And they already have sent some of these complaints in, even though the regime
• 46:13
  isn't live, saying, look at all this bad content on X, look at all these posts that need to be
• 46:16
  removed. And what they do is they say, well, we've found this bad post. This NGO found this bad post.
• 46:22
  You didn't remove this bad post. So you're getting fined for not removing it because we've
• 46:26
  assess that you violated your duties. And so they never actually want to get their hands dirty doing
• 46:31
  the censorship themselves. Something like Granite changes that, right? It says, okay, well, listen,
• 46:35
  this is an American company. If you try to censor the American company or violate their rights,
• 46:39
  you will see you in court. But it is still within your sovereign power, if you wish,
• 46:45
  in a European country, United Kingdom, France, Germany. You control the pipes leading into and
• 46:50
  out of your country. And something the United States has no say over is whether you DNS block,
• 46:55
  particular pieces of content or domain. So if you want to, if you really think censorship is
• 47:00
  that important, what you need to do is you need to do it yourself. You need to hire armies of
• 47:04
  state-employed moderators. You need to troll the internet for content you disagree with.
• 47:09
  You need to block it. And when a user seeks to navigate to it, it won't get served.
• 47:12
  That is the type of censorship that we have no say over because it is purely domestic and it
• 47:18
  doesn't extend outside of your borders. Now, the reason the Europeans don't do that is because
• 47:22
  that's politically insane. Because it puts the censorship directly in the hands of the government
• 47:28
  and the attribution is directly in the hands of the government. So if a user navigates
• 47:32
  to a website or to a link or to a particular post that's been banned or a particular tweet,
• 47:37
  every tweet has its own URL, and they try to get that and they try to access it and it says,
• 47:42
  won't resolve, this content is 404 or whatever it is. Then they say, okay, well, the government
• 47:46
  has stepped in here. And there's a direct chain of causation between a government employee and a
• 47:52
  government rule and the content that the user isn't allowed to see. So what they've done is
• 47:56
  instead they've set up this very passive aggressive regime where they say we were going to launder
• 48:00
  that censorship through a third party and we're going to conscript the American to carry it out
• 48:04
  for us. And what we'll do is we'll just lord over it and we'll issue fines if we think that the
• 48:08
  censorship isn't sufficient and doesn't meet our standards or isn't otherwise to our satisfaction.
• 48:13
  And that's fine. They're certainly welcome to do that. But our position is that if that's the
• 48:21
  approach they're going to take. The American government needs to punch them on the nose,
• 48:24
  say, no, you can't do that. If you really want to censor, you are going to have to bear the full
• 48:28
  political cost of that censorship yourself. And we're not going to allow our companies to be
• 48:33
  forcibly conscripted into those efforts so that you can avoid the full political consequences of
• 48:38
  your actions. And I think that if they were forced to do that, and we're starting to see that in the
• 48:42
  UK, actually, because now they're starting to talk about client side scanning instead of server side
• 48:47
  scanning. There was a discussion in parliament yesterday about this, and the prime minister
• 48:52
  started to talk about this because they know that server-side scanning isn't going to work.
• 48:56
  And also they attempted to do the server-side enforcement against my four clients, every
• 49:00
  American target, known American target to date. And when they did that, they got stopped at the
• 49:05
  shoreline by a solo practitioner with an ex-accent who was working nights and weekends for free.
• 49:12
  So part of the reason we did that, so I've gotten a lot of criticism for being very vocal
• 49:17
  in how we, in writing funny emails and sending Pepe memes to them and all the rest of it.
• 49:22
  But the humiliation is the point, right?
• 49:23
  We are sending them Pepe memes and we are sending them funny emails and we are not treating
• 49:27
  this seriously because they're not treating it seriously because they're not using international
• 49:31
  procedures to serve these notices.
• 49:33
  They're not bringing lawsuits in the United States as plaintiffs, as we would expect to
• 49:37
  enforce their fines.
• 49:38
  they're just pretending that they can go do whatever they want in the uk and that whatever
• 49:42
  they do in the uk is going to have domestic effect in the u.s which for any lawyer who has ever done
• 49:47
  anything cross-border ever yeah any lawyer who's done that will know right that's not how this that's
• 49:52
  not how this game is played so if they want to get serious and start bringing their own lawsuits in
• 49:56
  american courts which of course they're likely destined to lose then then i will respond seriously
• 50:01
  right but if they're going to send emails over international boundaries and say we've sent you
• 50:06
  this email and it is legally binding and effective on your client in the US, I'm going to send them
• 50:11
  a Pepe meme, right? Which we have done. It was a Pepe, a little baby Pepe holding sparklers in
• 50:16
  front of a glorious fluttering American flag. And because the legal effect of their email is
• 50:23
  roughly the same as the legal effect of mine, which is none. And so if they want to get serious,
• 50:28
  which they're not going to on that front, then they're going to have to change their tactics.
• 50:31
  But I think they've recognized now that the, and they'll never admit it, but they've recognized
• 50:36
  that the solution of bullying Americans into compliance is not a solution which is durable,
• 50:42
  and it is one which exposes them to political costs both here in the United States and in the
• 50:48
  UK. If they turn around and do client-side scanning, that's something where, from a legal
• 50:53
  perspective, it's very different because they can simply say to Apple and Google, and I don't think
• 50:57
  there's a whole lot of constitutional objection that we can raise, if you want to sell your device
• 51:01
  here in the UK, you have to have this particular type of client-side scanning available for our
• 51:06
  use. And we will prohibit the sale of phones here. I disagree with that, right? I don't think that's
• 51:11
  the right approach at all. But it is something which is pretty unquestionably in their sovereign
• 51:15
  power to do that doesn't intrude on American sovereignty and doesn't require Americans to
• 51:21
  surrender their First Amendment rights. It simply says that any device which is sold in the UK
• 51:25
  is going to have to participate in our totalitarian panopticon that we have legislated
• 51:30
  for ourselves. And ideally, right, by doing that, what we do is we raise the political temperature
• 51:34
  in the UK for law reform, because people will navigate something on their phone, it'll get
• 51:38
  intercepted, there will be mistakes, there will be errors. And they'll say, this is crazy. Why can,
• 51:43
  you know, why in the United States, am I allowed to have a phone that doesn't do this? But in the
• 51:47
  UK, I've got this Nerf device that's run by the state and that, you know, calls home to the police.
• 51:52
  Yeah. Anytime I decide to go look at a porn website. I think that that's, that's where we're,
• 51:57
  But if the UK wants to do that, that is their decision.
• 52:01
  But we need them to be owning the political cost of it rather than imposing that cost on American citizens.
• 52:07
  Yeah.
• 52:09
  Yeah, I want to go down now.
• 52:10
  Is the NGO thing?
• 52:11
  Because we were in the United States, TFTC, this channel, we were subject to this type of mechanism.
• 52:19
  The Center for Countering Digital Hate.
• 52:21
  They came after you?
• 52:22
  They put us on a list of climate deniers because we've had climate scientists who disagree with the mainstream idea behind cataclysmic climate change.
• 52:37
  And so they put us on the list and they sent it to YouTube and they had algorithms that were scraping our transcripts.
• 52:45
  And they highly recommended to YouTube that they demonetize the channel and take down our climate related content.
• 52:50
  But I mean, the point being is like this, this NGO sort of layered mechanism existed here in the United States to not too long ago.
• 52:59
  I mean, you're allowed to advocate for censorship in the United States.
• 53:02
  That's something that you're permitted to do.
• 53:04
  But I think the problem with a group like CCTH is that they work hand in glove with the foreign regulators to censor American citizens.
• 53:12
  Right. So they consult with groups with Ofcom and with the European Commission and groups like that.
• 53:17
  And they will doubtlessly be one of the entities that Ofcom listens to under the super complaints regime where they're seeking to censor content in the United States.
• 53:26
  And so, you know, you can advocate for censorship here.
• 53:29
  Right. There was actually a lawsuit over this.
• 53:32
  X sued CCDH and X lost the lawsuit because they said, listen, this is a strategic lawsuit against public participation.
• 53:39
  There's protective activity and they're trying to use a breach of contract claim to without commenting on the merits myself.
• 53:44
  That was the ruling.
• 53:44
  so ccdh can advocate for censorship all they want what happens is for a while they had a
• 53:51
  cooperative u.s tech industry when elon bought x or when you bought twitter and turned it into x
• 53:56
  a big piece of that industry ceased to be cooperative and particularly the piece of
• 54:00
  the industry which kind of operates as an incubator for policy ideas that then spread out
• 54:05
  across the rest of the ecosystem um and so then facebook of course after elon bought x and then
• 54:10
  president trump was re-elected um you know facebook then said we're going to be listening
• 54:14
  to these people less. So one thing that these foreign regimes do is they create another avenue
• 54:19
  for these entities and organizations to apply coercive influence on American platforms to
• 54:25
  censor protected speech and conduct in the United States. And they can advocate for that all they
• 54:30
  want, right? If they're here, an American citizen here in the United States, and you work for CCDH,
• 54:34
  and you think censorship is good, and you think the content that X or Facebook or someone else
• 54:40
  host is bad, you have a First Amendment right to run around and advocate for that speech
• 54:45
  to be removed.
• 54:46
  However, what they're also doing is they're calling down coercive state power from abroad
• 54:51
  on these same American companies, and that's something that we have the power to prohibit.
• 54:55
  particularly the coercive power in particular, not necessarily the advocacy.
• 54:59
  So yeah, these organizations have been doing this for a long time. I've been doing this for 10 years.
• 55:03
  There's never been any meaningful legislative intervention to prevent them from using foreign
• 55:08
  sovereign power. Basically, the way to think about it is they do the targeting, right? So
• 55:14
  they're the guy with the laser targeter, and they're painting the target. And they tell the
• 55:18
  foreign states, hey, come after this particular company, right? We want that company taken out.
• 55:24
  They went after gab.com, right?
• 55:26
  And they said, well, it's content which is harmful for children, right, on Gab.
• 55:29
  Well, Gab is an 18-plus website, doesn't focus on children's content, doesn't permit adult content, and its content moderation policy is aligned with the First Amendment.
• 55:40
  The likelihood, right, then it doesn't have any apps in app stores or anything like that.
• 55:44
  It's not widely used.
• 55:45
  That company was targeted for political reasons because they host the wrong thing, the UK state, and that the NGOs who advise the British state don't like.
• 55:52
  and that is the function that they serve. They point to the target. The regulator listens to
• 55:59
  the NGO. They launder it and they say, listen, this is research. This is independent study.
• 56:03
  It's something like that. Disinformation studies people at Stanford, basically just chronically
• 56:09
  online sociology PhDs who troll the internet all day and confuse that for original research,
• 56:17
  which advances the human species. Then they turn around, they write sophisticated,
• 56:21
  well-cited reports, cherry-picking content, which they don't like, out of tens of millions or
• 56:27
  hundreds of millions of posts. And then they use that to paint a picture of these sites as these
• 56:32
  lawless anarchic wastelands that need to be brought under control. When I, the lawyer,
• 56:39
  one of the few lawyers willing to represent them, I know for a fact that some of these websites,
• 56:43
  you get a law enforcement request, let's say from the FBI, you get a subpoena or an emergency
• 56:49
  requests, right? Prime example. These companies are so small, they can turn around those requests
• 56:53
  in 15 minutes, which is the height of corporate responsibility, right? If the police approach and
• 56:58
  they say, we've got an emergency and we need you to do something, you go to Meta, you go to Google,
• 57:02
  you go to X, it'll take days. You go to one of these tiny websites, there's not a huge amount of,
• 57:08
  you know, it's a tiny team. They know where everything is. Executive decisions can be made
• 57:13
  very quickly. You can get CEO attention on something very quickly and it doesn't take up
• 57:16
  a ton of bandwidth. And they respond to these requests in under 30 minutes. There's one case
• 57:21
  for one of these companies. We sent a tip to FBI NTOC, the National Threat Operations Center,
• 57:27
  because a post was reported by a user as potentially presenting a threat. The tip went to FBI NTOC at
• 57:34
  10 o'clock on a Saturday night, 10.22 on the Saturday night. We get a phone call back from
• 57:39
  the National Threat Operations Center in West Virginia saying, hey, could you please send us
• 57:43
  the relevant data were on the job, right? So you have this, these companies are actually really
• 57:47
  responsible and they're actually very efficient at responding when it matters, which is when you
• 57:51
  actually have a crime being committed where they are not responsible, right? Is when they're hosting
• 57:55
  wrong thing that the British state thinks is corrosive to British society, but which in the
• 58:00
  United States is constitutionally protected. And so that is, that is why they've been targeted.
• 58:04
  Not because they're non-cooperative with police and not because they're not responsive, because
• 58:07
  in fact, these smaller, these smaller websites generally are highly responsive when you have a,
• 58:12
  When the rubber meets the road and when it actually matters.
• 58:16
  But of course, the regulators don't think this because what they've done is they've
• 58:19
  seen reports that were commissioned to make these websites look like they're run by the
• 58:23
  spawn of Satan.
• 58:24
  And they're evil incarnate and their sole purpose is the destruction of all that is
• 58:30
  good in the world.
• 58:31
  Because what they did is they cherry picked content that's been read, maybe posts that
• 58:36
  have been read maybe three times by obscure accounts spouting silly ideas, right?
• 58:40
  Okay, well, my client's got 100 million users.
• 58:42
  Are there a population of 100 million people? How many of them are going to say stupid things?
• 58:48
  How many of them are going to say that per day? It's going to be a lot. And we don't turn around
• 58:53
  and hook everyone up to a Neuralink and start censoring their thoughts as a result.
• 58:57
  So the NGO sector is corrosive, but it's particularly corrosive because it has been
• 59:03
  married to foreign state power and because they are steering these foreign regulators in making
• 59:09
  targeting decisions against American citizens. We know that for a fact. And so they can do that,
• 59:15
  right? If you're Americans and you're an American organization, you can call for all the censorship
• 59:18
  you want because the First Amendment protects your right to do so. But I think what we can do,
• 59:23
  right, in terms of intervening is we can prevent foreign regulators from being an effective tool
• 59:27
  to achieve via foreign coercive force what they are unable to achieve by U.S. domestic coercive
• 59:33
  force yeah i wear my ccdh um being on that list with as a badge of honor you should i'm a new
• 59:42
  climate denier according to them um but again thing of solutions it would be ideal if we didn't
• 59:49
  have to do any of this and if these countries would just enact better free speech laws and
• 59:54
  moving back to the uk you have sort of um you presented a free speech law for the uk that
• 1:00:03
  I have.
• 1:00:04
  You can fix this problem.
• 1:00:05
  What's going on there?
• 1:00:06
  So I'm pretty active in the UK free speech movement.
• 1:00:09
  I could have been a British citizen.
• 1:00:10
  My father was a British citizen.
• 1:00:12
  I elected not to do that because I kind of saw the way the wind was blowing at the relevant
• 1:00:17
  time.
• 1:00:18
  And I said, you know, I think having a British passport is really not in my interest.
• 1:00:22
  So maybe at some point I'll go back, you know, naturalize and become a citizen again or become
• 1:00:26
  a citizen for the first time.
• 1:00:28
  But in the meantime, you know, I enjoy the diplomatic and legal cover that the United
• 1:00:32
  States affords me.
• 1:00:33
  But I wrote something called the UK Free Speech Act in 2020, which essentially creates a First Amendment style principle. It's not the same. It's not go extensive. The language isn't the same. It's not designed to be as extensive because that's a different country with different rules and different practices.
• 1:00:47
  But essentially it says that the First Amendment should apply to spoken or written expression. So you should be able to say anything and you should be able to write anything in accordance. So other kinds of expressive conduct, we can leave that to one side. It's up to their courts to figure out whether they want to extend that principle that way or not.
• 1:01:03
  and repeals large swathes of British speech codes in one go, right? It just says, listen,
• 1:01:09
  here are the laws that need to disappear. And it's big chunks, right? So it's part three of
• 1:01:14
  the Public Order Act in its entirety. It's large sections of Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006 in their
• 1:01:19
  entirety. It's largely the entire Communications Act would disappear. Or, you know, I want to
• 1:01:25
  disappear the entire Communications Act and start from scratch. But, you know, at least Section 127
• 1:01:30
  of the Communications Act would have to go. Bits of the Contemptive Court Act for reporting on
• 1:01:34
  judicial proceedings would go. Bits of the Protection from Harassment Act would go and be
• 1:01:38
  replaced by other more robust provisions that, you know, more robust provisions that would protect
• 1:01:46
  free speech, but also prevent harassment. And so those are really thought experiments, right,
• 1:01:52
  for teaching, for demonstrating, much like the Granted Act was, right, illustrating, listen,
• 1:01:56
  here's a thought experiment. Here's what the world could look like, right? So we're going to
• 1:02:00
  just create the idea and then introduce the possibility that this thing could exist. And
• 1:02:05
  now what we're seeing is the thing is on the verge of existing, right? So with the UK Free
• 1:02:09
  Speech Act, it's similar, right? It's saying, listen, here's the UK Free Speech Act. Here's
• 1:02:13
  what could exist. Now take that away and go consider how you would adapt it and what you
• 1:02:18
  think you can get over the line in a politically acceptable fashion. So I'm not going to say who's
• 1:02:24
  working on it or what stage those things are at. But I do know that that proposal has been ingested
• 1:02:30
  by more than one and fewer than three political organizations in the United Kingdom.
• 1:02:36
  And there are people within those organizations who are looking at it very seriously,
• 1:02:40
  not for immediate enactment, because the Labour government is never going to do it because they
• 1:02:45
  don't believe in free speech. But after a general election, that is something which might be on the
• 1:02:50
  table as part of a great repeal bill and potentially doing a large reform of the UK institutions and its laws to make the place freer more competitive and just generally a nicer place to live So that proposal is out there It been chewed on by relevant people
• 1:03:06
  I'm very active in the UK free speech movement. I'm a legal advisory council of the UK free speech
• 1:03:11
  union, which is the nation's premier free speech advocacy organization. And essentially when these
• 1:03:17
  issues come up, my free speech practice is not a money making practice. It has not been a money
• 1:03:22
  making practice for a very long time. And so I provide pro bono assistance to lawyers who are
• 1:03:27
  representing companies that have been targeted under these rules, because I do so much of it,
• 1:03:33
  that basically just reading a lawyer in and saying, okay, here's the back. It almost wouldn't
• 1:03:38
  be fair to charge for it. At some point, I'll charge for it, but not until we're done winning
• 1:03:42
  the fight. So that process is moving. It's still very prototypical. We haven't got any draft
• 1:03:49
  legislation. Nothing's been introduced. There are some MPs who have considered introducing
• 1:03:54
  something like the Free Speech Act as a private member's bill, but those efforts would largely be
• 1:03:58
  symbolic until such time as you have a change of government. I'm optimistic that if the reform
• 1:04:03
  government gets elected, that something like the Free Speech Act would be enacted fairly quickly.
• 1:04:10
  And currently, they're projected to win the election by 400 seats. So, you know, if one
• 1:04:15
  were held tomorrow, right? But of course, one is not legally required to be held until 2028 or 29.
• 1:04:21
  So yeah, that's where things are there. There's a long way to go. But I think the censorship has
• 1:04:26
  finally reached the point where the party in waiting, right, that's waiting for the election
• 1:04:32
  to occur by one means or another, is very much on board with loosening up speech controls.
• 1:04:40
  And these kinds of fights, when you're trying to... I've been doing this, as I said, I've been a free
• 1:04:44
  speech activist for 15 years, and I've been pushing on the foreign free speech issue as a
• 1:04:49
  practitioner for 10. These fights play out over decades, right? And so the objective that I have
• 1:04:56
  is not, you can't, how to put it, how to put this, when you're trying to steer a state in a
• 1:05:05
  particular direction, you cannot do it yourself to start, and you cannot do it at once, right?
• 1:05:11
  So what we've seen with the federal response to what's going on with the foreign censorship, this has been a very, very, very, very, very long process involving a lot of different people in a lot of different places, both writers and journalists like Mike Benz and Mike Schellenberger, lawyers like myself and Ron Coleman, you know, politicians and political activists throughout the federal system have been aware of this.
• 1:05:33
  And it's been a question of just kind of creating groundwork, laying traps for the foreign
• 1:05:39
  censors to fall into, waiting for circuits.
• 1:05:41
  It's a waiting game, right?
• 1:05:42
  So the Online Safety Act, we knew that was coming in 2019 when it was called the Online
• 1:05:47
  Harms Bill.
• 1:05:48
  And then, of course, they enacted it in 2023 when it was finally called the Online Safety
• 1:05:51
  Act.
• 1:05:52
  That was not the right time to launch a counteroffensive, right?
• 1:05:55
  We had to wait for them to try to enforce it.
• 1:05:57
  And then when they tried to enforce it, that is when we could launch the counteroffensive
• 1:06:01
  and go strike.
• 1:06:02
  So there's a lot of timing involved and the time scales that are involved are multi-year invariably.
• 1:06:08
  And frankly, they're multi-decade.
• 1:06:11
  So the UK's free speech fight is nowhere near over.
• 1:06:15
  The European speech fight is nowhere near over.
• 1:06:17
  But a lot of it is just a question of doing very unglamorous preparatory work in the shadows, right?
• 1:06:24
  And watching and observing and gathering evidence and figuring out strategy and figuring out what weak points are and waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting.
• 1:06:32
  until eventually the moment arrives. And then what you do is you move. So I expect that that,
• 1:06:37
  I expect we'll probably, if there is going to be a UK free speech act, I would put the timetable
• 1:06:41
  on a five to 10 year timetable, probably close. If electoral trends continue, it's going to be
• 1:06:47
  closer to five. If reform for some reason falls apart and doesn't get elected, I'd put it at
• 1:06:51
  closer to 10 to 15, but you just have to stay in the fight and keep pushing. And eventually you get
• 1:06:57
  your moment. Is the political will there from the populace in the UK? Are people fed up with this,
• 1:07:02
  or is there a lot of cognitive dissonance sort of just go along? I think that there's a lot of
• 1:07:09
  muddling along. I think that most people don't care enough because it doesn't affect them.
• 1:07:13
  The issue is, does it affect enough people? Does it affect a substantial enough minority
• 1:07:20
  of the population enough for that minority to exercise the political will to overcome the
• 1:07:26
  political apathy of the majority? And I think the answer to that question right now is yes.
• 1:07:31
  So you don't need to get free speech over the line in the UK. You do not need to have 90%
• 1:07:36
  of the country turning into ardent First Amendment activists. You need about 50 to 60% to not care.
• 1:07:43
  And then you need about 30% to have it be a foundational part of their political identity.
• 1:07:51
  And you then need to have them get a parliamentary majority. Because for most people,
• 1:07:54
  the First Amendment doesn't really, for most Americans, the First Amendment is not something
• 1:07:59
  which they recognize as being operative on a daily basis, right? It's kind of, it's really,
• 1:08:04
  really deep down in the system. It's part of the kernel, right? So you'll notice it if it's gone,
• 1:08:08
  but you're not sitting there thinking to yourself, gee, I really used the First Amendment a lot today.
• 1:08:13
  And I think in the UK, it's kind of similar, but the reverse. There's a lot of censorship and
• 1:08:16
  people have self-censored in order to stay within the guardrails. So they're not really aware of how
• 1:08:22
  much better things could be for the country and for themselves if you remove the guardrails.
• 1:08:26
  And you're never going to be able to convince them that that's the case. But I think the
• 1:08:29
  censorship has gotten bad enough that you probably have 25 to 30 percent of the British population
• 1:08:34
  that now thinks that free speech is a critical national issue. And they're willing to, you know,
• 1:08:39
  they're willing to make that voice heard at the ballot box and they're willing to make the voice
• 1:08:42
  heard in a very specific way. So it depends on what, you know, what happens politically over the
• 1:08:47
  next two years. But I think if we, looking at current trends, it seems probable that reform
• 1:08:53
  will be elected. And I'm reliably informed that reform is very pro-free speech.
• 1:08:58
  Good. No, because Matt O'Dell and I were joking about it yesterday on Rapid Hall Recap. We were
• 1:09:03
  highlighting Peter McCormick's nonviolent sort of opt-out campaign that he's been on. And if you
• 1:09:09
  go and read, he's trying, he's basically throwing his hands up and saying, this isn't working.
• 1:09:15
  Like we need to protest peacefully and nonviolently to make a change here in the UK.
• 1:09:24
  And we were joking about how it was so obvious that he was self-censoring himself on the website.
• 1:09:29
  I think Peter's going to be – I'm going to put this on the record.
• 1:09:33
  I think Peter's going to be prime minister one day.
• 1:09:35
  You think so?
• 1:09:36
  Really?
• 1:09:37
  I actually think that one day he's going to be prime minister.
• 1:09:40
  um that's that's my my most controversial english political opinion is i think one day he's gonna
• 1:09:46
  he's just so he's just so he's such a good guy right and he's such a good communicator and that
• 1:09:54
  i've known him for years and years when he was doing you know his own bitcoin specific podcast
• 1:09:59
  before he became the big you know the uk's version of joe rogan and um he's just such a good guy that
• 1:10:05
  Like he's the kind of person where you said you want to where I'd like to be is in 15 years.
• 1:10:10
  Right. Looking back. And Peter's the prime minister because he's just such a good guy and he cares so much about the country that for whatever reason, circumstances and and his and Peter collide.
• 1:10:23
  And he winds up becoming PM. I think that that's that's my long shot for PM in 15 years.
• 1:10:27
  I think that I think that he's actually going to do it. That's my hunch.
• 1:10:31
  I would love to see that. It's been incredible watching his progression.
• 1:10:34
  I mean, obviously, he's moved back to Bedford and really walking away from what Bitcoin did, launching the Peter McCormick show and really leaning into the political topics of the day over in the UK to try and make a difference.
• 1:10:47
  It's been it's admirable at the very least.
• 1:10:51
  Right. It's been fun to watch.
• 1:10:53
  Well, I think he's learning he's learning a lot about politics by keeping it hyper local on Bedford.
• 1:10:58
  Right And so what he doing it an interesting kind of exercise in in teaching himself Right Exactly what he what he doing is he mapping the battle space right So he running into all of the craziness about how UK local government works and figuring
• 1:11:15
  out how everything's broken and how all their attitudes are attitudes of learned helplessness.
• 1:11:20
  So like Keir Starmer is a prime example. Parliament, in theory, legal theory, right,
• 1:11:25
  has absolute power to do whatever it wants. It could proclaim, right, by an act of parliament
• 1:11:30
  that the moon is made of cheese and that everyone has to refer to the moon being made of cheese.
• 1:11:34
  And everyone in the UK would have to say once a day when they woke up in the morning,
• 1:11:37
  I believe that the moon is made of cheese. That is how much power it has. There's no
• 1:11:41
  constitutional guardrail on it. And the prime minister goes before a committee yesterday. He's
• 1:11:45
  like, well, there's nothing we can do about immigration issues because every time we do it,
• 1:11:49
  there's a judicial review and there are regulations and there's a report that has to be done and
• 1:11:53
  there's this and there's that and there's this and there's that. And you just go, you have absolute
• 1:11:56
  power. Write a law, enact it, you delegate the power to a state agency, and you can fix any
• 1:12:03
  problem you want. But what they've done is there's so much institutional inertia. They're so used to
• 1:12:08
  doing things in a way where nothing gets done, right? And they have various constituencies within
• 1:12:13
  the state that are highly incentivized to keep it that way, right? Where nothing gets done at speed
• 1:12:17
  and everything requires an enormous amount of bureaucracy. And accordingly, everything requires
• 1:12:21
  an enormous amount of bureaucrats that you can never really short circuit it and adopt a sort of
• 1:12:26
  startup style mentality where you just go, no, what's the real problem here? How do we take a
• 1:12:30
  shortcut? And how do we make sure that this happens at speed? But they have unlimited power,
• 1:12:36
  right, in principle. So there's nothing stopping parliament for doing it except their own
• 1:12:40
  internal preconceptions and preconceived notions and self-imposed barriers. And I think Peter's
• 1:12:49
  probably running into that, a lot of that, dealing with local councils where it's like, hey,
• 1:12:52
  there's a problem downtown. There's a lot of crime. What do you want to do about it?
• 1:12:56
  And they're like, well, sorry, we can't do anything. So Peter goes and hires a private
• 1:13:00
  police force to go and patrol the downtown and the problem goes away because he can see the problem
• 1:13:05
  clearly for what it is, understand what the solution is, deploy that solution at speed,
• 1:13:09
  and then the problem disappears. But the local governments just don't work that way.
• 1:13:14
  So he's learning the map.
• 1:13:17
  He's learning how the enemy is shaped.
• 1:13:19
  And I think that at some point, he's going to learn enough where he says, OK, I know enough now to figure out what needs to be done.
• 1:13:28
  And I think when he does that, he will have his own – my hunch.
• 1:13:31
  He hasn't said anything like that to me or anything like that.
• 1:13:34
  But my hunch is that Peter is eventually going to get sick of it enough that he just decides something needs to be done and he's going to jump into the arena.
• 1:13:39
  and when he does so he will be a very formidable
• 1:13:42
  he'll be a very formidable participant
• 1:13:44
  at Arena
• 1:13:44
  he's got
• 1:13:46
  he's got a campaign right now
• 1:13:52
  to
• 1:13:52
  again it's funny
• 1:13:55
  reading the website was
• 1:13:57
  a hoot because you could tell
• 1:14:00
  he was self-censoring to make sure
• 1:14:01
  he wasn't making
• 1:14:04
  the government mad
• 1:14:04
  everybody over there does
• 1:14:08
  They all do.
• 1:14:09
  And that's, you know, if I were working over there now, I'm an English solicitor, right?
• 1:14:13
  I'm a lawyer over there.
• 1:14:14
  If I were over there now, I would not, I'm not flying over there now for context.
• 1:14:17
  I'm not flying over there because I'm afraid I'll be arrested the second, or not arrested,
• 1:14:20
  but at least searched the second I land.
• 1:14:22
  Because my clients are conceivably criminal targets for the UK's online safety regime,
• 1:14:27
  right?
• 1:14:27
  And my computer, conceivably, it doesn't, but conceivably, it has relevant information.
• 1:14:32
  And so they could use counterterrorism laws, for example, to stop me when I enter the border,
• 1:14:36
  search my devices, detain me for 12 hours, and then put me on a plane and fly me straight back
• 1:14:40
  to New York. So from my point of view, the UK is not a safe place to be if you are active in
• 1:14:46
  free speech at all, right? And if they're willing to do that to Graham Linehan when he flies over
• 1:14:51
  there because he posted one offensive tweet once, you know, the chief architect of the American
• 1:14:57
  legal resistance, right? Who's taking them on head on in every forum available. I just don't trust
• 1:15:04
  that the UK wouldn't take advantage of that. So it's not a pleasant place to be a speaker,
• 1:15:11
  and it's certainly not a pleasant place to be a free speech activist. And yeah, everyone I know
• 1:15:15
  over there is very guarded with what they say, because they know that if they cross the line,
• 1:15:20
  they're not... And that's the whole point, right, about why the First Amendment exists. The realm
• 1:15:24
  of public discourse has been severely constrained in the UK, which prevents people from actually
• 1:15:29
  participating in it and pushing back on state excess because effectively if you criticize
• 1:15:34
  something it loudly enough if you criticize a government policy loudly enough you'll be
• 1:15:39
  arrested for it um and that's why that's why we're doing what we're doing here because we we know that
• 1:15:44
  we can't allow that to spread into the states yeah it's um that's what i wear because i would
• 1:15:50
  like to actually go over to peter's uh conference next year but he wrote this i no longer consent
• 1:15:55
  the moral case for a peaceful revolution.
• 1:16:00
  He's got a whole website.
• 1:16:01
  Yeah, I think he's trying to make a movement out of it.
• 1:16:04
  So it's interesting.
• 1:16:06
  It's funny.
• 1:16:07
  Not funny.
• 1:16:08
  It's just crazy.
• 1:16:10
  It's sad.
• 1:16:11
  It's crazy how Peter ended up in this position, too.
• 1:16:14
  He's going from a...
• 1:16:16
  I mean, he's a smart guy who cares.
• 1:16:18
  And eventually what happens is if you care about the world,
• 1:16:23
  you get involved, right? And you get involved sometimes. Peter doesn't need to do this,
• 1:16:29
  right? He could keep running the podcast business, not have opinions, and probably make a lot more
• 1:16:35
  money than the trajectory that he seems to be hinting he might go down. But that's what happens
• 1:16:42
  if you care, right? You eventually start making decisions that affect your ability to make money,
• 1:16:47
  right? But you're not optimizing for money at that point, you're optimizing for outcomes.
• 1:16:51
  and I strongly suspect that Peter will wind up optimizing for outcomes rather than money.
• 1:16:58
  Just knowing, given the aggregate sum of every interaction I've had with him over 10 years,
• 1:17:04
  it seems logical and almost inevitable that he will do that. But we'll see.
• 1:17:09
  Well, as some people say, real recognize real. It seems like you're real in this sense, too,
• 1:17:13
  where you've dedicated a lot of your life to pro bono work and the defense of free speech,
• 1:17:18
  particularly here in america and hopefully outside of our border so again um that blend
• 1:17:23
  smoke up your ass thank you for all the work you've been doing on that front it's extremely
• 1:17:27
  important these are existential anytime you know they're i'm not i'm nothing special though you
• 1:17:33
  know they're i know at least three other lawyers if they'd caught this case who they would have
• 1:17:39
  done thank you um but there are like three people who i know who would have done this um but but
• 1:17:44
  any one of them would have done exactly the same thing um it's just less than a handful of us
• 1:17:50
  there's less than a handful of us yeah it's it's ron coleman amy pike off um maybe mark randaza
• 1:17:56
  and um trying to think and i think that's it i think that's those i think those are the three
• 1:18:02
  others who would have who would and mark randaza ron coleman is involved right because he's co-counsel
• 1:18:08
  on the 4chan case uh amy pike off is currently working with pacific legal and she's doing fourth
• 1:18:14
  Amendment work at the border, which is a big problem here in the US. And Mark Randazza is one
• 1:18:18
  of the most storied First Amendment litigators in the United States. So those three people I know
• 1:18:25
  would have done exactly the same thing. And one of them, in fact, is involved in this fight. So
• 1:18:30
  I'm not alone. There aren't many of us, but there are a lot of people in the federal government now
• 1:18:35
  who care and they can't be named for obvious reasons, but they're pushing the ball forward
• 1:18:41
  too. And I'd say probably another 10 lawyers in the government in various places are looking at
• 1:18:47
  this very seriously and moving the ball forward. So every issue has its specialists. My issue,
• 1:18:54
  I languished in comparative obscurity, just focusing on this one problem nobody cared about
• 1:18:59
  for a long time until suddenly everybody did. And so it was just a weird set of circumstances where
• 1:19:07
  the UK if Bulgaria had done this right If Bulgaria had decided that they were going to have an internet censorship law and they were going to enter the US I would not have been the right lawyer for that You would have needed a Bulgarian dual qualified lawyer But it just happened to be
• 1:19:19
  coincidence timing and, yeah, coincidence, pure coincidence that it happened to be the UK that
• 1:19:25
  did it first. But yeah, it's been a crazy ride. It's not over yet. I'm not doing any victory laps
• 1:19:32
  yet. But I think once we're done reinforcing the American perimeter, I think a lot of the UK's
• 1:19:40
  assumptions around controlling domestic speech are predicated on the additional assumption that
• 1:19:49
  they would be able to control American speech and the environment here through their extraterritorial
• 1:19:54
  rules. And I think the same is true in the EU and Australia. And if we can negate that assumption
• 1:20:00
  by nullifying the effect of these extraterritorial laws here in the United States,
• 1:20:05
  that will do two things.
• 1:20:06
  The first one is, one, it will communicate to those places
• 1:20:08
  that they are not able to pull us down to the lowest common denominator
• 1:20:14
  and hobble us competitively.
• 1:20:16
  So this is not a viable economic strategy for their countries.
• 1:20:19
  And the second thing is it will tell them,
• 1:20:21
  you are not able to control the political environment here
• 1:20:24
  through extraterritorial coercion.
• 1:20:26
  And as a consequence of that, you will have to learn to live with America and American free speech online, and you will have to make the decision whether you want to really own the censorship, like Stasi-style, Soviet-style, controlling what information enters the information economy.
• 1:20:43
  And my dog is now making more noise.
• 1:20:47
  He's digging on the carpet under the chair, presumably to go take a nap.
• 1:20:52
  That's my life now.
• 1:20:54
  I sit here, I fight foreign governments, and I have a small poodle who makes noises inside.
• 1:21:00
  But yeah, so they'll have to make the decision whether they want to take those politically damaging actions in their countries or whether they want to chart a different course and try something else.
• 1:21:09
  I think it'll take a little time, but I suspect over the next five to 10 years, the alternative course of action.
• 1:21:15
  I think we've reached a high watermark of this nonsense and that the pushback, once we're done, once we've completed it here in the U.S., that's going to communicate to a lot of people in Europe that their current course was not sustainable.
• 1:21:27
  It does not have a future.
• 1:21:29
  And accordingly, they need to alter course as well.
• 1:21:33
  With that note, any calls to action to the audience?
• 1:21:35
  Anybody who's listening to this is inspired.
• 1:21:38
  What can they do to get involved?
• 1:21:39
  Um, if you're a lawyer, uh, there's a lot that you can do. Uh, chiefly you can pick up a, you know,
• 1:21:47
  pick up a pro bono case now here and there, um, and get involved, reach out to me. You know,
• 1:21:52
  if there's anything you want to do, let's, let's be friends. And, um, you know, I can try to send
• 1:21:56
  some work your way because if we don't succeed at, you know, holding the line with federal action,
• 1:22:02
  but I think we will, but if we don't, uh, there are certainly going to be more clients and I'm
• 1:22:07
  certainly not able to take them all myself. If you're not an attorney, you can retweet,
• 1:22:13
  engage with content and call your representatives, that sort of thing. I know that your audience may
• 1:22:19
  not actually know this because Taylor Lorenz, who's a journalist over on the political left,
• 1:22:25
  who is very much not aligned with the ideals of most Bitcoiners, is actually one of the most
• 1:22:31
  outspoken pro-free speech activists for internet speech in the United States. And I frequently find
• 1:22:38
  that when she expresses an opinion on any one of the many child safety or online safety or age
• 1:22:46
  verification laws here in the United States, even I learned something and I find myself adopting her
• 1:22:51
  positions. And we are not predisposed to agree with each other by any stretch of the imagination.
• 1:22:56
  So definitely follow Taylor, follow people she engages with, follow groups like FIRE and Net
• 1:23:00
  choice, retweet their content. If we get federal legislation in the new year, please call your
• 1:23:07
  representative and say that you support that legislation and that you'd like to see it enacted.
• 1:23:12
  And there'll be a time and a place for that. No bills have been published as yet. But yeah,
• 1:23:17
  I think there's going to be an interesting story for internet censorship over the next six,
• 1:23:23
  12 months. And you can get involved. Everything helps, literally. Every retweet, every like,
• 1:23:29
  every reply, every phone call you make to a representative, if enough of us do it,
• 1:23:34
  we make a difference. And it requires everybody, you know, it requires everyone. And everyone,
• 1:23:40
  everyone who is involved does, you know, this effort that we had, you know, nine months ago,
• 1:23:46
  I struggled to get a journalist to cover it. I remember I wrote, I wrote to, we provided some
• 1:23:49
  documents to Politico. And basically the only media coverage this had was a, was one link of
• 1:23:54
  Politico uploading a PDF. And it wasn't a story, right? And it's become a story because so many
• 1:23:59
  people have followed it. So many people have engaged with it. And so I'm the shit poster in
• 1:24:04
  chief, right? But everybody who's helped to disseminate that content, there is a direct
• 1:24:10
  line of causation to every Twitter user, every Facebook user, every internet user who shared
• 1:24:16
  this content, engaged with it, commented on it, even disagreed with it by making this a conversation
• 1:24:21
  that's now being had in Washington. And yeah, I thank everybody for it because without each and
• 1:24:27
  every single person who has retweeted anything, read a post, shared it by email, anything like
• 1:24:32
  that over the course of the last year, every single one of those things you can, and you can
• 1:24:36
  chart it. You can actually plot it on a map or on a chart. You can see the graph going up, up, up,
• 1:24:40
  up, up. And so with engagement and things like that, and it's because of you, right? It's because
• 1:24:45
  of the people who listen to these podcasts, follow us on Twitter, repost these things,
• 1:24:49
  that this has become a national issue. And, you know, I would not, it's, it's, it's one of the,
• 1:24:55
  I wish I could snap my fingers, make a magic list.
• 1:24:59
  And I'm sure there's a way for AI to do that.
• 1:25:01
  But in rank, every contributor to the discourse, but literally every single person who has
• 1:25:07
  contributed to the discussion or participated in the discussion and agreed with us in particular
• 1:25:13
  and said, you guys are doing good stuff.
• 1:25:15
  All of that has been seen.
• 1:25:17
  It's all been ingested.
• 1:25:18
  And now what we're seeing is we're starting to see movement at the federal level to respond
• 1:25:22
  to this.
• 1:25:22
  So yeah, thank you to the entire internet for helping us do this.
• 1:25:28
  You're a formidable shitposter.
• 1:25:29
  Don't sell yourself short.
• 1:25:31
  This was an incredible conversation.
• 1:25:35
  Very important.
• 1:25:36
  And co-sign all that.
• 1:25:37
  Get involved if you're listening to this.
• 1:25:39
  Every little bit helps.
• 1:25:40
  It's a very important, again, existential fight as we continue to transition into the digital age.
• 1:25:47
  We're having the big battles right now.
• 1:25:50
  Speech being one of the biggest.
• 1:25:51
  So Preston, thank you for your time.
• 1:25:54
  Thank you for what you're doing.
• 1:25:55
  It's incredible work, important work.
• 1:25:57
  And I'm excited to see this progress into 2026.
• 1:26:02
  I'll keep you posted.
• 1:26:04
  But what I would say to everyone, the parting message is it may not seem like it, but we are winning and we are going to win.
• 1:26:12
  So watch this space.
• 1:26:14
  All right.
• 1:26:14
  We're going to win, freaks.
• 1:26:15
  Peace and love.
• 1:26:16
  Thank you for listening to this episode of TFTC.
• 1:26:19
  if you've made it this far, I imagine you got some value out of the episode.
• 1:26:24
  If so, please share it far and wide with your friends and family.
• 1:26:28
  We're looking to get the word out there.
• 1:26:30
  Also, wherever you're listening, whether that's YouTube, Apple, Spotify,
• 1:26:34
  make sure you like and subscribe to the show.
• 1:26:37
  And if you can leave a rating on the podcasting platforms, that goes a long way.
• 1:26:42
  Last but not least, if you want to get these episodes a day early and ad-free,
• 1:26:47
  Make sure you download the Fountain podcasting app and go to fountain.fm to find that.
• 1:26:53
  $5 a month gets you every episode a day early, ad-free.
• 1:26:58
  Helps the show, gives you incredible value.
• 1:27:01
  So please consider subscribing via Fountain as well.
• 1:27:05
  Thank you for your time.
• 1:27:07
  And until next time.
• 1:27:08
  Okay.
• 1:27:17
  Thank you.