Latest / Bloomberg Law / Can President Trump Demote or Fire Fed Chair Powell?
Transcript
- 0:03Speaker 1: Welcome to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. I'm June Grosso. Every
- 0:07Speaker 1: day we bring you insight and analysis into the most
- 0:10Speaker 1: important legal news of the day. You can find more
- 0:13Speaker 1: episodes of the Bloomberg Law Podcast on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud,
- 0:18Speaker 1: and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcasts. The White House
- 0:22Speaker 1: explored the legality of demoting Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell
- 0:26Speaker 1: in February, soon after President Trump talked about firing him.
- 0:30Speaker 1: According to Bloomberg sources in a Bloomberg exclusive, joining me
- 0:35Speaker 1: is Robert Hocket, a professor at Cornell Law School. So, Bob,
- 0:39Speaker 1: can he legally demote the Fed chair? No, he cannot. June,
- 0:45Speaker 1: Great to be with you again. Um, we talked about
- 0:48Speaker 1: this question a little bit before in connection with just
- 0:50Speaker 1: outright firing him or removing him. Uh. The demotion question
- 0:55Speaker 1: is a little bit different than the removable question, but
- 0:58Speaker 1: but hardly different at all. And there's a very straightforward
- 1:01Speaker 1: reason for this. Um. Would you like me to give
- 1:04Speaker 1: it to you? Yes? I would. Let's start with the
- 1:06Speaker 1: start with the firing first. Sure. Yeah. The Federal Reserve
- 1:11Speaker 1: Act itself is very clear that Federal Reserve board members
- 1:16Speaker 1: can only be removed for cause. So they're appointed to
- 1:19Speaker 1: fourteen year terms with the advice and consent to the Senate.
- 1:22Speaker 1: They're removable only for cause, and cause is widely understood
- 1:26Speaker 1: not to include mere disagreements over policy. And of course,
- 1:31Speaker 1: it would be very it would be almost impossible for
- 1:33Speaker 1: things to be otherwise, right, because the whole point of
- 1:36Speaker 1: having the FED UH sort of instituted as an administrative agency,
- 1:41Speaker 1: the whole point of treating the Central Bank is something
- 1:43Speaker 1: that ought to be independent, is precisely in order to
- 1:47Speaker 1: allow for independence UH. And if a president could simply
- 1:51Speaker 1: remove fedboard members just because the destiguts with policy, there
- 1:54Speaker 1: would be no independence at all on the part of
- 1:56Speaker 1: the FED. So that's the story when it comes to
- 1:59Speaker 1: just removal of a board member altogether. Now, the demotion
- 2:03Speaker 1: question amounts to almost the same thing for the following reason.
- 2:07Speaker 1: Up until the late nineteen seventies, the president could simply
- 2:11Speaker 1: choose any given board member and just designate that board
- 2:14Speaker 1: member as the chair. And in so far as the
- 2:17Speaker 1: president could do that, you might it sort of might
- 2:20Speaker 1: be thought to sort of stand to reason as a
- 2:21Speaker 1: matter of symmetry that you know, if the president can
- 2:24Speaker 1: arbitrarily choose the chair from among the board members. Then
- 2:27Speaker 1: perhaps the President can also arbitrarily dedesignate a particular board
- 2:31Speaker 1: member as chair and replace that person by another FED
- 2:34Speaker 1: board member. One might have thought something like that, But
- 2:37Speaker 1: in the late nineteen seventies, Congress introduced additional legislation amending
- 2:41Speaker 1: the Federal Wizer Act requiring that the Senate have the
- 2:44Speaker 1: advice and consent role with respect to the naming of
- 2:48Speaker 1: the chair to a four year term and the vice
- 2:51Speaker 1: chair to a four year term as well. And we
- 2:54Speaker 1: generally understand a position that requires the advice and consent
- 2:58Speaker 1: of the Senate to fill as carrying with it and
- 3:01Speaker 1: implied for cause only restriction when it comes to to
- 3:07Speaker 1: sort of demoting or removing the person from that particular role.
- 3:11Speaker 1: So in that sense, you know, sort of demoting pale
- 3:14Speaker 1: to a mere board member from being the chair looks
- 3:18Speaker 1: almost to be the same kind of thing as a
- 3:20Speaker 1: removal would be, which is to say that it's subject
- 3:23Speaker 1: to a for cause restriction, which again would not be
- 3:26Speaker 1: understood by the courts to include disagreements over policy, Bob.
- 3:29Speaker 1: Have the courts actually ruled on this? Have there been
- 3:33Speaker 1: occasions to rule on this? There have been no occasions
- 3:36Speaker 1: to rule on this in connection with the Fed, and
- 3:39Speaker 1: that I think is because every president before the current
- 3:41Speaker 1: president had sufficient respect for our institutions, uh, and sufficient
- 3:47Speaker 1: respect for the Central Bank and the imperative of central
- 3:49Speaker 1: bank independence as never even to muck around with things
- 3:53Speaker 1: like this. The most most notorious case of a kind
- 3:56Speaker 1: of partial exception was that of President Lyndon Johnson, who
- 4:00Speaker 1: notoriously trying to prevail on then FED Chair Bill Martin
- 4:05Speaker 1: not to raise rates when the Vietnam War expenditures in
- 4:07Speaker 1: Great Society Program expenditures seemed to be generating inflationary pressure.
- 4:12Speaker 1: But even Johnson, as willful and notoriously sort of uh
- 4:17Speaker 1: self assertive as he was, didn't try anything this whack
- 4:20Speaker 1: a doodle. All he did was invite Bill Martin to
- 4:23Speaker 1: his ranch and in Texas and try to persuade him
- 4:25Speaker 1: in a golf cart, uh not to raise rates. It
- 4:28Speaker 1: didn't work. Trump, of course, um is much more um
- 4:32Speaker 1: I think, contemptuous of the norms of governance than Johnson was,
- 4:36Speaker 1: And so of course he thought about things like this.
- 4:38Speaker 1: But nobody's tried it yet, and so there isn't any
- 4:41Speaker 1: precedent any court precedent when it comes to the FED itself.
- 4:44Speaker 1: There is, however, analogous precedent in connection with other administrative agencies.
- 4:49Speaker 1: Probably the most notorious case, or the best known case,
- 4:52Speaker 1: involved the Federal Trade Commission, back when President Roosevelt not
- 4:55Speaker 1: Teddy in this case, but f d R removed UH
- 4:59Speaker 1: then chair of the Federal Trade Commission. UH. That chair
- 5:02Speaker 1: resisted the attempt to remove a student court. He died
- 5:07Speaker 1: while the case was pending. But ultimately the court found
- 5:10Speaker 1: in favor of that chair, and so all of his
- 5:14Speaker 1: back pay that he would have been entitled to went
- 5:16Speaker 1: to his estate went to his children because it was
- 5:18Speaker 1: found by the court that FDR had exceeded his authority
- 5:21Speaker 1: in removing that FDC chair. UM. So that's probably that's
- 5:25Speaker 1: a fairly well known and relatively close I suppose you
- 5:28Speaker 1: could say, closely analogous precedent. UH. And again it doesn't
- 5:32Speaker 1: look very good for Donald Trump, But Bob don't clients
- 5:36Speaker 1: asked their lawyers to look up all kinds of things
- 5:40Speaker 1: that that seemed ludicrous. And here he has a staff
- 5:43Speaker 1: at his disposal, a llegal staff. So it didn't surprise
- 5:47Speaker 1: me so much that he had asked them to research
- 5:49Speaker 1: or if he did. We don't know whether he directed
- 5:52Speaker 1: it or not, whether there was research done on this issue. Yeah,
- 5:57Speaker 1: so it doesn't It doesn't surprise me either, June. Um,
- 5:59Speaker 1: and they're too since one is, as you say, clients
- 6:01Speaker 1: will often ask their lawyers to explore various possibilities. I
- 6:05Speaker 1: think most clients, however, probably don't ask their lawyers to
- 6:08Speaker 1: explore ludicrous possibilities. So in that sense, this is surprising.
- 6:13Speaker 1: On the other hand, we are talking about Trump, and
- 6:16Speaker 1: the man is a kind of daily producer of ludicrous
- 6:19Speaker 1: actions and words and deeds. Uh. And so in that sense,
- 6:22Speaker 1: it's not surprising that Trump would have tried to do this. Right,
- 6:25Speaker 1: if anybody would, I suppose it would have been him. Um,
- 6:28Speaker 1: you know, so in that sense, Yeah, I'm with you.
- 6:30Speaker 1: I'm not that surprised. I'm nevertheless indignant and disgusted because
- 6:34Speaker 1: the very idea that the President would actually view the
- 6:38Speaker 1: FED as his plaything in this way, given how long
- 6:42Speaker 1: fought the struggle for central bank independence was, is to
- 6:46Speaker 1: me just absolutely horrifying. And I'm far from alone in this.
- 6:49Speaker 1: As you know, Um, all of the talk that Trump
- 6:51Speaker 1: was engaging in last December about possibly firing Trump was
- 6:54Speaker 1: crtuly royaling the financial markets because the finantio people who
- 6:57Speaker 1: are participants in the markets, they understand the importance of
- 7:00Speaker 1: predictability and stability, at least where monetary policy is concerned,
- 7:03Speaker 1: and the thought of this kind of stochastic, you know,
- 7:06Speaker 1: kind of random number generator president tweeting out attacks on
- 7:10Speaker 1: the feed every day didn't tend to sit well with investors. Uh.
- 7:13Speaker 1: And I think these latest revelations, you know, in an
- 7:16Speaker 1: odd paradoxical way, might actually instill a little bit more confidence, because,
- 7:20Speaker 1: um it might tell us. What it seems to tell
- 7:23Speaker 1: us is that Trump was thinking about this stuff back then,
- 7:25Speaker 1: and that his legal counsel presumably persuaded him not to
- 7:29Speaker 1: pursue this any further, because we haven't heard a lot
- 7:32Speaker 1: about it since he complains about Poul a lot still,
- 7:35Speaker 1: but we haven't heard a lot of talk about fire
- 7:36Speaker 1: in your demoting of late No, we haven't. Thank you
- 7:39Speaker 1: so much, Bob for that analysis. That's Robert Hockett. He
- 7:43Speaker 1: is a professor at Cornell Law School. Thanks for listening
- 7:47Speaker 1: to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can subscribe and listen
- 7:51Speaker 1: to the show on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, and on bloomberg
- 7:54Speaker 1: dot Com slash podcast. I'm June Basso. This is Bloomberg
- 8:00Speaker 1: giving the ding, then ended Duck the UE