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What happens when a former German intelligence boss is accused of spying on his own side · DEEP INSIGHT

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  Speaker 1: German prosecutors say the country's former foreign intelligence chief has
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  Speaker 1: been arrested on suspicion of attempted treason. They allege that
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  Speaker 1: August Hanning paid to access secret documents and used them
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  Speaker 1: to prepare an analysis for an unspecified foreign spy service.
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  Speaker 1: Mr Hanning headed Germany's BND intelligence service from 1998 to 2005.
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  Speaker 1: It's alleged that he later obtained hundreds of classified documents
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  Speaker 1: from a senior official in exchange for payment. That official
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  Speaker 1: has also been arrested.
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  Speaker 2: Mr.
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  Speaker 1: Hanning faces other charges, including alleged espionage, disclosure of state
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  Speaker 1: secrets and working as a secret service agent. Let's get
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  Speaker 1: more from our political correspondent, Simon Young. Welcome, Simon. How
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  Speaker 1: did they catch him?
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  Speaker 3: Yeah, well, that's one of the side curiosities of this case.
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  Speaker 3: The allegations against August Hanning... actually came up as a
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  Speaker 3: result of investigations on a totally different case, which concerns
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  Speaker 3: a child of abduction in part of a custody dispute
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  Speaker 3: in a prominent German business family. Searches were done as
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  Speaker 3: part of that because one of August Hanning's businesses was
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  Speaker 3: suspected of involvement in that case. And so Hanning's premises
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  Speaker 3: were searched and police found material there that then led
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  Speaker 3: them to look more closely at his other activities.
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  Speaker 1: And he used to lead the BND, Germany's Foreign Intelligence Service.
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  Speaker 1: So is that like Britain's MI6 or America's CIA?
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  Speaker 3: Well, it's the main foreign intelligence service in Germany. The difference,
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  Speaker 3: the big difference perhaps with some of those allied services
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  Speaker 3: is that the BND primarily is involved in collection and
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  Speaker 3: analysis of information. It doesn't hasn't in the past, by
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  Speaker 3: and large, gone in for active covert operations, if you like,
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  Speaker 3: James Bond style stuff. It's been very much a kind
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  Speaker 3: of administration that is providing information to central government, to
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  Speaker 3: the chancellor's office and allowing them to make assessments about
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  Speaker 3: their foreign relationships.
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  Speaker 1: And so who is he thought to have been spying for?
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  Speaker 3: Well, that indeed remains a mystery at this point. The
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  Speaker 3: federal prosecutor's office has not stated which foreign service they
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  Speaker 3: are alleging that he might have provided this information to.
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  Speaker 3: What they have said is that on one occasion, August
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  Speaker 3: Hanning used classified information that he got from his former
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  Speaker 3: chief of staff to draft an analysis that he then
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  Speaker 3: provided to a foreign intelligence service. And they also added
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  Speaker 3: the sort of rider that's yet to be determined whether
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  Speaker 3: that analysis actually got through to its intended recipient. They
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  Speaker 3: also say that Hanning passed on political information, as they
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  Speaker 3: described it, based on some of this classified material to
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  Speaker 3: a representative of another foreign intelligence service over several years.
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  Speaker 3: So serious allegations for context. I think it's worth mentioning
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  Speaker 3: that all this just has come out just a day
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  Speaker 3: after the current head of the BND, Germany's Foreign Intelligence Service,
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  Speaker 3: warned that Russia was conducting a shadow war against Germany,
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  Speaker 3: that the quality of that confrontation with Russia had reached
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  Speaker 3: a new and dangerous level. And he also named China
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  Speaker 3: as one of Germany's key adversaries. So there are many
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  Speaker 3: countries that might have been interested in getting hold of
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  Speaker 3: this type of classified analysis that was being provided ultimately
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  Speaker 3: to Chancellor Merz.
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  Speaker 1: And the allegation is that he was doing this for
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  Speaker 1: money rather than ideological purposes.
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  Speaker 3: Well, I'm not sure that the allegations that have been
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  Speaker 3: made public today contain a suggestion of motive. What is
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  Speaker 3: in the public domain is that August Hanning did have
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  Speaker 3: some financial problems, but not such that one would necessarily
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  Speaker 3: say that they should have caused this. This is a
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  Speaker 3: massive scandal, clearly going right to the heart of Germany's
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  Speaker 3: intelligence community and raising all sorts of questions, for instance,
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  Speaker 3: about the rights and wrongs of former public officials, particularly
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  Speaker 3: in the intelligence and security sector. Where are the lines
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  Speaker 3: between those people and private commercial interests when they leave office?
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  Speaker 3: That is a question that we've discussed many times before.
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  Speaker 3: But I think, of course, this case raises it again,
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  Speaker 3: because it's a small group of people with a lot
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  Speaker 3: of specialist knowledge, and what degree of role in the
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  Speaker 3: private sector can such people be allowed to have.
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  Speaker 1: August Hanning hasn't been head of Germany's foreign intelligence service
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  Speaker 1: for more than 20 years. So do these allegations have
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  Speaker 1: implications for the country's security now?
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  Speaker 3: Well, I think they certainly would do. For one thing,
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  Speaker 3: foreign intelligence services could get very nervous if they think
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  Speaker 3: that information that they share with Germany might be passed
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  Speaker 3: on in this kind of way. You know, will they
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  Speaker 3: be less willing to share that information? Certainly seems possible.
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  Speaker 3: And another thing, I think it raises questions around the
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  Speaker 3: government's planned reform of the German intelligence services, in particular,
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  Speaker 3: The idea is that they should be given more powers,
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  Speaker 3: allowing them to do more of those kind of active
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  Speaker 3: things that the CIA or the British Intelligence Service can do.
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  Speaker 3: But this scandal. will surely cause opponents of that idea,
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  Speaker 3: people who say that the services have already got too
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  Speaker 3: much power and shouldn't get any more, they'll see themselves
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  Speaker 3: confirmed in this story. It's a huge scandal. Is it
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  Speaker 3: a total disaster? Well, that partly depends on how much
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  Speaker 3: information ultimately is shown to have got through into the
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  Speaker 3: wrong hands. We may find that out as this case unfolds.
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  Speaker 1: Thanks, Simon. DW political correspondent Simon Young.
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  Speaker 4: The arrest of the former head of Germany's foreign intelligence
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  Speaker 4: service is causing shock waves. To discuss the case that
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  Speaker 4: has rocked the BND, I'm now joined by Omid Nouripour.
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  Speaker 4: You're the vice president of the German Bundestag and a
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  Speaker 4: politician from the Green Party.
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  Speaker 1: Hello.
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  Speaker 4: Former BND President August Hanning has been arrested. What is
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  Speaker 4: your reaction?
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  Speaker 2: I was shocked. Everybody's shocked in the bubble here, in
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  Speaker 2: the political bubble of Berlin. But second, I discovered that
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  Speaker 2: it's a huge success, of course, to to detect him
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  Speaker 2: and that he's been arrested. Of course, we have to
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  Speaker 2: wait for the trial, but we definitely have to bring
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  Speaker 2: him to justice and we definitely have to understand what
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  Speaker 2: the mechanisms are. Who was he working for? Which kind
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  Speaker 2: of information were leaving this country? And of course, what
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  Speaker 2: was the mechanism of recruitment? We have to learn from
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  Speaker 2: that immediately and rapidly. We have to see the conclusions
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  Speaker 2: and try to keep our defense better than we did
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  Speaker 2: in the past.
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  Speaker 4: The case comes to light at a time of heightened
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  Speaker 4: security concerns. The current head of Germany's foreign intelligence service
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  Speaker 4: has just warned of the risk of a violent conflict
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  Speaker 4: with Russia. Against that backdrop, how damaging is this case
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  Speaker 4: for the BND?
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  Speaker 2: I'd rather have a spy in prison than having bad news.
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  Speaker 2: So at the end of today, I'm just happy that
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  Speaker 2: this problem has been resolved and we do not have
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  Speaker 2: a source for the enemy in this moment. But of course,
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  Speaker 2: there are times of tension and we are seeing that
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  Speaker 2: the conflict with Russia could escalate. I hope and we
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  Speaker 2: all hope that it will not happen. But we see
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  Speaker 2: that the will to aggression in Moscow is sky high.
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  Speaker 2: So it's good not to have one source of information
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  Speaker 2: for Kremlin more.
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  Speaker 4: Germany relies heavily on intelligence cooperation with partner countries around
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  Speaker 4: the world. To what extent does this case damage the reputation,
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  Speaker 4: credibility of Germany's foreign intelligence service among its international partners?
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  Speaker 2: There are no services without leaks in the past. So
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  Speaker 2: it's not about a blame game. And I would push
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  Speaker 2: that back. It's obvious that other countries rely on us
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  Speaker 2: when they give us information and we have to keep
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  Speaker 2: secrets secret. But it's vice versa. We need each other.
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  Speaker 2: The countries in Europe, democracies need each other. We have
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  Speaker 2: to cooperate also on intelligence to keep our population safe.
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  Speaker 4: Thank you very much. Omid Nouripour.
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  Speaker 2: Thank you.
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  Speaker 1: Anthony Glees is lifetime professor in security and intelligence studies
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  Speaker 1: at the University of Buckingham in the UK. Welcome to DW.
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  Speaker 1: The journalists who wrote this story say they've been told
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  Speaker 1: that the foreign power buying those secrets was not Russia.
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  Speaker 1: So if not Russia, Who would you be looking at?
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  Speaker 5: Well, good evening. We understand that it was a country
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  Speaker 5: in the Caucasus. Now, that can include member states of
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  Speaker 5: the Russian Federation as well as independent states. So the
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  Speaker 5: jury has to be out on that. We don't know.
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  Speaker 5: But the very act of a German intelligence chief giving
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  Speaker 5: information secret intelligence away to anybody is appalling enough. Had
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  Speaker 5: it been Russia, were it to prove to be Russia,
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  Speaker 5: it would be catastrophic, absolutely catastrophic for the German intelligence,
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  Speaker 5: foreign intelligence service, the BND. So we must hope that
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  Speaker 5: it was not Russia. And we must hope that it
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  Speaker 5: was a caucus of state that wasn't part of the
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  Speaker 5: Russian Federation. But Even so, the damage done to the
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  Speaker 5: reputation of the BND and the reputation of Germany cannot
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  Speaker 5: be minimized. You see, secret intelligence work depends totally on trust,
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  Speaker 5: trust between the officer and the actual spy that gets
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  Speaker 5: the information, but also trust between the various agencies involved.
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  Speaker 5: that bind together the intelligence services of NATO or of
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  Speaker 5: the West. So once trust is destroyed, the relationship is destroyed,
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  Speaker 5: and countries begin to ask themselves, if we can't trust
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  Speaker 5: this person now, could we ever trust him? And what
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  Speaker 5: flows from that?
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  Speaker 1: Okay. And before all this blew up, how was Germany's
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  Speaker 1: BND regarded within the intelligence community?
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  Speaker 5: The truth has been that Germany and German intelligence and
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  Speaker 5: German foreign intelligence was always seen as slightly different from
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  Speaker 5: other Western intelligence services in that it was the BND
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  Speaker 5: was the child of the CIA and the NSA because
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  Speaker 5: the BND did both kinds of intelligence activity. And basically,
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  Speaker 5: when the Americans said jump, to the BND, the BND replied, yes,
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  Speaker 5: how high? And one's understanding is that the relationship between
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  Speaker 5: the Americans and the BND is very, very close, almost,
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  Speaker 5: you know, between a master and his servant. However, certainly
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  Speaker 5: before Brexit, the relationship between the BND and Britain's secret
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  Speaker 5: intelligence service, MI6, was extremely strong. The BND was very
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  Speaker 5: highly valued, highly valued for what it could tell us,
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  Speaker 5: in particular about the Islamic and Islamist world, but also
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  Speaker 5: about Russia, going back to the times when there were
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  Speaker 5: two Germanies and links between East and Germany. And the BND...
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  Speaker 5: were altered by unification. So these were big, big factors.
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  Speaker 4: Right.
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  Speaker 5: Now, I'm afraid, all that is called into question.
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  Speaker 1: One of the allegations is that something like 2,000 official
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  Speaker 1: documents left the BND over a decade with nobody noticing.
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  Speaker 1: What can you tell us about the sort of counterintelligence
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  Speaker 1: safeguards security services are supposed to adopt?
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  Speaker 5: Well, obviously, there will be a big investigation if these allegations,
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  Speaker 5: which are extremely serious allegations, should be upheld in a
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  Speaker 5: court of law. The trouble is where you're dealing with
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  Speaker 5: the head of an intelligence service, that head is virtually
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  Speaker 5: impossible to interrogate in a normal way. In the United Kingdom,
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  Speaker 5: we had something rather similar 60, 70 years ago when
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  Speaker 5: he wasn't the head of the Secret Intelligence Service. He
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  Speaker 5: was merely a very senior person in it. Kim Philby
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  Speaker 5: was believed to have been a Russian spy. And trying
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  Speaker 5: to investigate him and trying to see if he was
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  Speaker 5: loyal or not proved very, very difficult in the end.
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  Speaker 5: Philby was able to escape British justice and go to Moscow.
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  Speaker 5: So these are very, very difficult issues precisely because Hanning
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  Speaker 5: was as important as he was. Now, what we can
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  Speaker 5: do is distinguish between two phases of Hanning's career when
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  Speaker 5: he actually was chief. So in a position to influence
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  Speaker 5: the making of German policy, particularly when Gerhard Schröder was
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  Speaker 5: the chancellor, when in 2005, Hanning moved to the German
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  Speaker 5: Ministry of the Interior as the Secretary of State. He
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  Speaker 5: was still in a position to make policy, but no
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  Speaker 5: longer a foreign policy expert. He continued, though, in the
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  Speaker 5: second phase to get secrets right until very recently.
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  Speaker 1: Well, this is the allegation. Away from this case, what
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  Speaker 1: can you tell us about the motivations of traitors? Is
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  Speaker 1: it always about money or sex? Well.
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  Speaker 5: Money is important and sex is important. And both are
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  Speaker 5: used and have always been used by all secret intelligence organizations,
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  Speaker 5: including our own here in the United Kingdom. So in
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  Speaker 5: that sense, anything is OK if you want to recruit somebody. However,
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  Speaker 5: there's no doubt that the best spies for another country
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  Speaker 5: are are those who share an ideological belief in the
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  Speaker 5: values of that other country. And that might not necessarily
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  Speaker 5: mean money in the case of Russia. It might mean
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  Speaker 5: the ability to make money, the potential to make masses,
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  Speaker 5: shed loads of money from Russian natural resources. So there
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  Speaker 5: are many motives, but money and sex and ideological beliefs
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  Speaker 5: attraction will always prove things that need to be looked at.
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  Speaker 5: And precisely because they're vulnerabilities, it means that counterintelligence officers
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  Speaker 5: need to look very carefully indeed if there is evidence
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  Speaker 5: of these things there.
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  Speaker 1: Good talking to you. Thanks for joining us, Professor Anthony
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  Speaker 1: Glees from the University of Buckingham.