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Governor John de Jongh's Motion To Dismiss The Epstein Survivors Lawsuit (Part 2) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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  In this episode, we're going to pick up where we
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  left off with a memorandum of law and support of
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  John Dejeong's motion to dismiss the lawsuit brought against him
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  by the survivors of Jeffrey Epstein. No long armed jurisdiction.
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  CPLR Section three oh two A is New York's long
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  arm statute for non domicillaries. None of the bases for
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  personal jurisdiction appear in the fac There are no allegations
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  that mister Dejeong Junior himself transacted any business within New York,
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  contracted anywhere to supply goods or services in New York,
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  committed a tortious act within New York, or owned or
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  used or possessed any real property situated within New York
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  CPLR three oh two A one and two and four.
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  Nor have plaintiffs alleged facts supporting personal jurisdiction under CPLR
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  three two A three, which requires first, mister DeJong committed
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  a tortious act outside of New York. Second, the cause
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  of action arose from that act. Third, the act caused
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  injury to plaintiffs in New York. And fourth mister DeJong
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  expected or should reasonably have expected the out of state
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  act to have consequences in New York. And fifth mister
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  DeJong derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. The
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  first and second requirements are not met. The fac does
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  not allege the out of state tortious act is the
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  approximate cause of injury in New York. I e. The
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  act must be so close to the injury that reasonable
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  people would regard it as a cause of the injury.
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  Energy Brands five seventy one ft. Supp. Two d At
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  four to sixty seven. Plaintiff is not alleged any specific
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  out of state tortious acts by mister DeJong, let alone
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  one that is so close to the injury as required
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  by the Southern District. The third element is not met.
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  The only specific allegations of sexual assault occurred in the
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  USVII in Gilbert. The tortious act of rape occurred in Etiquette,
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  and the first effects of that rape were felt in Connecticut,
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  not New York as in Gilbert, although plaintiffs undoubtedly continued
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  to experience pain and suffering from the rape upon their
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  return to New York. A litigant may not carry an
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  injury home for purpose of sanction. It is firmly established
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  that the domicile or residence of an injured party within
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  New York is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction. Rather,
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  a more direct injury must have occurred within New York State.
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  Rosenblat versus Coots, twenty seventeen, w L three forty nine
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  thirty two forty five four, SDNY, twenty seventeen. The fac
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  also group pleads nonspecific communications and transactions directed to New
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  York by unnamed co conspirators and the defendants. Generally, the
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  co conspirators are not necessarily the defendants, even if they were.
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  Such nonspecific group allegations are not sufficient, even if group
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  pleading was sufficient. Telephone calls, facts, transmission, and correspondence in
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  connection with negotiations, and conduct that have a center of
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  gravity well outside the state do not create personal jurisdiction.
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  Under CPLR three oh two A one direct TV Latin
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  America versus Park six' ten six ninety one F dot
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  supp TWO d four oh five four twenty SDN y twenty.
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  Ten the fourth element is not. Met foreseeability must be
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  coupled with the evidence of a Purposeful New york, affiliation for,
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  example a discernible effort to direct or indirectly Serve New
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  york Market International biometric Versus intrepid twenty, TWELVE wl two
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  thirty six ninety five oh one three Sdn y twenty.
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  Twelve THE fac does not allege that Mister DeJong purposefully
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  availed himself of the benefits of the laws Of New,
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  york such that Mister DeJong would reasonably anticipate being held
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  Into New York Court kernin Versus Kurz hastings one seventy
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  five F dot THREE d two thirty six to forty,
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  One Second, circuit nineteen ninety. Nine see Also DeJong Affid.
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  David the fifth element is not. Met THE fac fails
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  depleted revenue Mister DeJong derived from interstate. Commerce His affidavid
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  addresses this by denying it even if the nonspecific allegations
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  are construed as governor official conduct any commercial transactions In
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  New york to obtain commercial benefit by acting in a governmental.
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  Capacity Stroman realty Versus warinski five point Thirteen ft THREE
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  d four seventy six four eighty, Four Fifth circuit two
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  thousand and. Eight because no such benefit accrues to The
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  governor from his activities relating To New. York any jurisdiction
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  based upon him having caused an effect In New york
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  is likewise. Misplaced THE fac fails to show Mister DeJong
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  engaged in interstate commerce, activities let alone any revenue he
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  generated by those interstate commerce. Activities due process not. Satisfied
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  THE fac fails to allege either of the tw two
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  necessary elements of the due process. Inquiry THE fac does
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  not establish that Mister DeJong one has sufficient minimum contacts
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  with The forum to justify the court's exercise of personal.
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  Jurisdiction parina versus More Wan, shipping five point twenty one
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  F dot THREE d one twenty two one twenty, Seven Second,
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  circuit two thousand and. Eight, again the FAC's group pleading
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  is fatal because each defendant's contacts With New york must
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  be assessed. Individually calder Versus, jones four to sixty FIVE
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  us seven eighty, three nineteen eighty. Four the five paragraphs
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  mentioning Mister DeJong failed to do. This even if met
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  the first, test THE fac does not satisfy the second
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  test of due process inquiry because the assertion of personal
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  jurisdiction is unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular. Case
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  Mister DeJong has filed an affidavid in which he states
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  that he does not live In New, york does not
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  work In New, york does not own property In New,
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  york does not served with process In New, york and
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  he never entered reacted with any plaintiff. Ever part four
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  FED rcivp twelve b. THREE Us code twenty, Eight section
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  fourteen oh six dismissal for improper wrong venue on a
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  motion to dismiss for in proper. Venue under rule twelve b,
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  three the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to
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  show that venue is. Proper Detroit Coffee company Versus soup
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  FOR U llc twenty, eighteen W l ninety four one
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  seven four seven ONE sdny twenty. Eighteen THE fac must
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  show that the venue is proper for each claim against each,
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  defendant including Mister. DeJong the FAC's, group pleading that all
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  defendants were involved in conduct that affect all, plaintiffs fails
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  to do. This. ONE Us code twenty, Eight section thirteen
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  ninety ONE b. Two venue is wrong and proper in SDN.
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  Y THE fac bases venue ON Us code twenty Eight
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  section thirteen ninety ONE b and two because it alleges
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  substantial activity has occurred in this. District for a venue
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  to be proper UNDER Us Code section thirteen ninety ONE b,
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  two significant events or emissions material to the plaintiff's claim
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  must have occurred in the district in, question even if
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  other material events occurred. Elsewhere substantially for venue purposes is
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  more qualitative than quantitative, inquiry determined by assessing the overall
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  nature of the plaintiff's claims and nature of the specific
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  events or emissions in the, forum and not by simply
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  adding up the number of. Contacts The Second circuit cautions
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  that courts are required to construe the venue statutes. Strictly,
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  thus it would be error to treat the venue statutes
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  substantial part test as mirroring the minimum contacts test employed
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  in personal jurisdiction. Inquiries, rather only the events that directly
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  give rise to a claim are. Relevant the substantial events
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  or emissions test limits proper venue in order to protect
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  the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select
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  an unfair or inconvenient place of. Trial from the face
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  of THE, fac the court can determine that the alleged
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  substantial events and emissions occurred in THE. Usvii, parenthetically THE
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  fac does not even adequately allege the defendants. Domiciles the
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  court may dismiss because the FAC's emissions prevents sufficient venue
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  analysis Two section fourteen oh SIX a dismissal warranted rather than.
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  TRANSFER Us code twenty Eight section fourteen oh SIX a
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  provides that if plaintiffs have laid venue in the wrong,
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  district the court shall dismiss, or if it be in
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  the interest of justice. Transfer this court should, dismiss not
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  transfer THE fac because it was filed in an improper.
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  Venue when venue not, pleaded courts in the circuit have
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  dismissed the complaint instead of transferring the. Case if the
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  court does not dismiss, it it should. Transfer then it
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  should transfer it to THE dvii pursuant TO Us code
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  twenty eight section fourteen oh. Six if it does not
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  transfer pursuant to section fourteen oh six wrong, venue it
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  should transfer pursuant TO Us code twenty Eight section fourteen oh.
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  Four convenience THREE. Federcivp TWELVE b THREE Us code twenty,
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  Eight section fourteen oh six transfer for improper. Venue if
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  The court does not, dismiss, then pursuant to section fourteen
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  oh SIX, a the court shell in the interest of
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  justice transfer to another. District in considering whether it is
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  in the interest of justice to transfer pursuant To section
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  fourteen oh SIX, a the court considers factors such as
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  the location of witnesses and, evidence the underlying, events and
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  the location of the Defendants Hermann Verse Cat foura seven
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  thirty F dot THREE d four sixty Fifth circuit twenty.
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  Thirteen from the face of the Fac all of these
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  factors favor A section fourteen oh six transfer to THE
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  usvii FIVE Us code twenty Eight section fourteen oh FOUR
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  a only a venue proper transfer for. Convenience if venue
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  is proper in the southern, district the court may transfer
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  an ap section pursuant TO Us code twenty Eight section
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  fourteen oh. Four in deciding to TRANSFER tvpr cases pursuant
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  to section fourteen oh, four courts consider factors such as
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  access to, proof, witnesses ability to attend, trial enforceability of
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  any judgment, rendered and preventing unnecessary waste of, time, energy and,
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  money and to protect witnesses and public interest against unnecessary
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  inconvenience and expense IN. Ct although venue was proper over
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  defending hotel In, ohio there was a strong interest in
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  litigating the matter In, florida WHERE ct was allegedly, trafficked
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  and evidence and witnesses can be more easily accessed. Here
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  it's clear that the operative facts of the sex trafficking
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  and abuse allegations in THE usvii have a minimal connection
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  to The southern, district particularly because the sexual assaults occurred
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  in THE. Usvii dismissal is still a proper remedy because
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  section fourteen oh, four a transfer is only available when
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  the court initiating the transfer one is a proper and
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  two has personal jurisdiction over the. Defendant Kelly brown Versus
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  winfrey two thirteen W. L sixty five seventy four nine
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  eighteen ONE sdny twenty thirteen plaintiffs have failed to plead
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  jurisdiction or, venue have filed in the wrong, venue and
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  have discussed herein there is no personal jurisdiction over the
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  defendant De. Jong but if the court declines to transfer
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  pursuant to section fourteen oh, six it should transfer pursuant
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  to fourteen oh. Four all, right we're going to wrap
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  up right, here and in the next, episode we're going
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  to pick up With part six FEDER civp TWELVE b
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  six fac fails to state. Acclaim all of the information
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  that goes with this episode can be found in the description.
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  Box