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Unmasking the War in Ukraine (Part 1) | UK Column Interviews · UK Column Radio

• 0:08
  Speaker 1: So this is the quality of the list, and we
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: call it their list because it is their list. It's unique.
• 0:15
  Speaker 1: It made me laugh when it came through the email
• 0:18
  Speaker 1: I wrote them. I wrote back to them saying.
• 0:21
  Speaker 2: Is it a joke? Is it a joke?
• 0:24
  Speaker 1: Because seriously it sounded like a joke, and they responded saying, no,
• 0:28
  Speaker 1: it's not a joke.
• 0:30
  Speaker 3: When you were picked up and taken in for questioning,
• 0:34
  Speaker 3: what was that experience? Like hello and welcome. I've got
• 0:39
  Speaker 3: a very interesting guest with me today, deep T. Deep
• 0:44
  Speaker 3: T is a lady who's actually been on the UK
• 0:48
  Speaker 3: Column before. We've spoken about matters to do with Ukraine,
• 0:54
  Speaker 3: but today we've got a particularly important interview and I
• 0:58
  Speaker 3: think that certainly the UK column viewers are going to
• 1:03
  Speaker 3: be quite astonished at some of the things we are
• 1:05
  Speaker 3: going to be talking about because of the very very
• 1:08
  Speaker 3: serious implications for democracy in the United Kingdom. That is
• 1:15
  Speaker 3: one factor, and the other factories very serious events about
• 1:20
  Speaker 3: of course, what's happening with regard to the war in Ukraine,
• 1:24
  Speaker 3: the Ukraine Russian War. Deep Tea, thank you very much
• 1:28
  Speaker 3: for joining me today.
• 1:30
  Speaker 2: Thank you Brian for giving me the opportunity.
• 1:32
  Speaker 3: Thank you so much it's pleasure. Now you can remind
• 1:37
  Speaker 3: me a little bit. But if my memory serves me correctly,
• 1:40
  Speaker 3: you the last time that we were interviewing you, you well,
• 1:44
  Speaker 3: there are two main factors that you'd been looking at.
• 1:48
  Speaker 3: You had been working with a team of people who
• 1:52
  Speaker 3: were expressing concerns about spread of depleted uranium from weapons
• 1:59
  Speaker 3: systems result of weather conditions from the from eastern Europe.
• 2:05
  Speaker 3: That was one factor. And the other key piece of
• 2:09
  Speaker 3: work that you and your team had been interested in
• 2:13
  Speaker 3: was effectively pollution of the soil as a result of
• 2:18
  Speaker 3: not only the decaying weapons, but of course as a
• 2:22
  Speaker 3: result of munitions which were increasingly being dispersed over farmland
• 2:29
  Speaker 3: in Ukraine. So just a little bit of a prompt
• 2:33
  Speaker 3: for you to tell us a little bit about that, sure.
• 2:39
  Speaker 2: My pleasure.
• 2:40
  Speaker 1: So yes, if I remember correctly, I think I was
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: on Yukikom News. I think it was May twenty twenty three,
• 2:48
  Speaker 1: and that was just after Russia had actually targeted a
• 2:55
  Speaker 1: munition STEPO in Kliminitsky in Ukraine, which was you're being
• 3:00
  Speaker 1: used as a storage facility for storm for depleted uranium
• 3:05
  Speaker 1: ammunition and we'd used open source data set from Gamma
• 3:11
  Speaker 1: Ray sensors across Europe to identify the you know, the
• 3:15
  Speaker 1: movement of your front with the gamma rays as were
• 3:19
  Speaker 1: picked up by the SENSUS within Europe and so so
• 3:24
  Speaker 1: that was quite interesting actually because what we saw was
• 3:27
  Speaker 1: a very you know, it was an extremely sharp, stark signal. Now,
• 3:34
  Speaker 1: the next question was that if you can see that
• 3:36
  Speaker 1: in the atmosphere, can you actually see that on the ground,
• 3:39
  Speaker 1: you know, on the on the surface, on the soil. Fortunately,
• 3:43
  Speaker 1: at that time, just when I did this work, somebody
• 3:48
  Speaker 1: from Ukraine, from within SUMI had been interviewed here on
• 3:53
  Speaker 1: the BBC and we got in touch. We were like, okay, look,
• 3:58
  Speaker 1: this is very serious, is quite important. Politically, we were
• 4:02
  Speaker 1: completely we are completely diametrically opposite.
• 4:05
  Speaker 2: So the person.
• 4:06
  Speaker 1: I'm talking of, unfortunately I can't use a person's name,
• 4:11
  Speaker 1: that person is has a very different view of the scenario.
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: And you know, for me personally and for unit, we
• 4:20
  Speaker 1: are completely apolitical. So we got up together, we met
• 4:24
  Speaker 1: up in Cambridge, we talked around. You know, it's like okay, wow,
• 4:27
  Speaker 1: this is great, you know, you guys we both have
• 4:30
  Speaker 1: the same concerns on the environmental aspect. And then obviously
• 4:36
  Speaker 1: the next step was to go to Ukraine and to
• 4:38
  Speaker 1: Russia to find out what the signatures were. So so
• 4:43
  Speaker 1: you know, theoretically, what should happen is that when you
• 4:46
  Speaker 1: were seeing such a such a very you know, really
• 4:49
  Speaker 1: literally sharp signal in the atmosphere, you should be able
• 4:52
  Speaker 1: to pick up some words, some sort of signal on
• 4:55
  Speaker 1: on the ground. So that was a theoretical background of
• 5:01
  Speaker 1: my work and I arrived.
• 5:03
  Speaker 2: So I went to Ukraine.
• 5:04
  Speaker 1: I worked in the University of Sumi, and at that
• 5:08
  Speaker 1: time I was working with various companies. One of them
• 5:13
  Speaker 1: was the Halo Trust and the whole idea.
• 5:17
  Speaker 2: So I was the specialist essentially.
• 5:19
  Speaker 3: So to just clarify that for people, the Halo Trust
• 5:23
  Speaker 3: is dealing with mind clearance. So if I remember correctly, yes.
• 5:28
  Speaker 1: And papers, yes, but this is remember this is in
• 5:33
  Speaker 1: twenty twenty four. So I went to Ukraine in twenty
• 5:36
  Speaker 1: twenty four, but it wasn't just the Halo Trust. So
• 5:41
  Speaker 1: the thing is, you see, which is what is very
• 5:44
  Speaker 1: very important and something that concerns very many of us
• 5:48
  Speaker 1: within academia, research and all sorts of you know, scientific
• 5:53
  Speaker 1: background organizations, is the fact that a scientist say something.
• 5:59
  Speaker 1: Scientists and well recognized scientists to say something, and that
• 6:03
  Speaker 1: person is from probably the United States or United Kingdom
• 6:06
  Speaker 1: or Native nations, and then you've got a whole follow up,
• 6:10
  Speaker 1: you know, like the it's literally like you've got a
• 6:14
  Speaker 1: pop band someone singing one tune, and you've got the
• 6:17
  Speaker 1: entire stadium or grounds which are just literally following what
• 6:22
  Speaker 1: that person is saying without actually critical thinking, you know,
• 6:25
  Speaker 1: as to what those words mean essentially. So anyhow, coming
• 6:29
  Speaker 1: back to my story, I ended up in Ukraine and
• 6:33
  Speaker 1: my job was essentially to identify heavy metals, heavy metal
• 6:39
  Speaker 1: pollutions of the soil, and that was that was like
• 6:45
  Speaker 1: of mutual interest, but for me personally, my work was
• 6:49
  Speaker 1: more on to do with nuclear side of story. So
• 6:53
  Speaker 1: any form form of radioactive contamination, any form of heavy
• 6:59
  Speaker 1: metal sal brisally heavy mets of pollution that is indicative
• 7:03
  Speaker 1: of of of a catastrophe or a civilian hazard essentially
• 7:10
  Speaker 1: was my work. So the idea was, and this is
• 7:13
  Speaker 1: where perhaps I was at odds with with what was
• 7:16
  Speaker 1: going on, was theoretically what they were believing in was
• 7:21
  Speaker 1: that if let's say a minimet twenty five millimeter missile
• 7:25
  Speaker 1: or ballistic pause onto a field, then essentially there should
• 7:31
  Speaker 1: be some signature, right, and this is this was their
• 7:36
  Speaker 1: theoretical background which through which they would justifying sampling of
• 7:41
  Speaker 1: creators across the border or sorry near the border. That
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: was the Halo Trust and other organizations. And I was
• 7:51
  Speaker 1: working with the I believe correctly with two two major organizations.
• 7:58
  Speaker 2: And so I was the lead scientist.
• 7:59
  Speaker 1: My job meant that ID to go to the front areas,
• 8:02
  Speaker 1: so right up to the front and where there has
• 8:05
  Speaker 1: been a fresh ballistic impact. And now these could be glbonbs,
• 8:10
  Speaker 1: these could be as small as minimum twenty five millimeters
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: or whatnot, but essentially sample across the massive creatus and
• 8:19
  Speaker 1: find the and then use a technique which is called
• 8:23
  Speaker 1: p XRF because they didn't have XRF. Just I don't
• 8:27
  Speaker 1: know if you. I mean, it's beneficial for the viewers
• 8:30
  Speaker 1: to understand. Sum is right at the front. So and
• 8:34
  Speaker 1: it's a wonderful laboratory, wonderful university. I actually am very
• 8:39
  Speaker 1: much in love with that place. My WhatsApp name is Summi.
• 8:43
  Speaker 1: So it's a wonderful place. But because I think that
• 8:48
  Speaker 1: they do lack in logistics essentially, so when we were
• 8:53
  Speaker 1: sampling these facility that we that me and my colleagues
• 8:57
  Speaker 1: had is something called p XRF. So it's basically you
• 9:01
  Speaker 1: collect a sample, you grind it, you put it into
• 9:05
  Speaker 1: small vials, and you shoot x RF essentially X rays,
• 9:09
  Speaker 1: and that X ray signal is then you know, you've
• 9:12
  Speaker 1: got to control sample and then you actually match that
• 9:15
  Speaker 1: to see what the excess is in terms of the
• 9:19
  Speaker 1: signatures for particular metals, metals or elements and so on
• 9:23
  Speaker 1: and so forth.
• 9:24
  Speaker 3: So did that did that research show damage to the
• 9:29
  Speaker 3: soil as a result of the conflict?
• 9:33
  Speaker 1: You think?
• 9:35
  Speaker 2: What do you think?
• 9:37
  Speaker 3: I believe it was less much less than expected, is
• 9:42
  Speaker 3: what I believe.
• 9:43
  Speaker 1: Absolutely correct, Yes, yes, so it was literally so basically
• 9:48
  Speaker 1: Ukraine is known for well known for very fertile soil. Yeah,
• 9:55
  Speaker 1: and whereas you would be surprised that the soil are
• 10:00
  Speaker 1: from fertile, it's actually so below the nutrient level. And
• 10:06
  Speaker 1: the reasoning was given to me. I don't I'm not
• 10:09
  Speaker 1: a you know, I'm seriously not a farmer farming background person,
• 10:13
  Speaker 1: so I don't know this, so please, I know definitely
• 10:16
  Speaker 1: about what work I've done, so I can.
• 10:19
  Speaker 2: Talk hundred percent about it.
• 10:21
  Speaker 1: But I was curious, actually, you know, why is the
• 10:23
  Speaker 1: level of copper, for instance, or lead or arsenic way
• 10:28
  Speaker 1: below than the threshold, and because you know, you do
• 10:32
  Speaker 1: need these elements in for nutrition purposes, so of course
• 10:37
  Speaker 1: the excess is dangerous, but you do need that land.
• 10:41
  Speaker 1: Now it was still well, it's meant it's because of
• 10:43
  Speaker 1: the overuse of the land essentially, so the land is
• 10:48
  Speaker 1: literally fatigued because it's been you know, fertilized, over fertilized
• 10:53
  Speaker 1: in some sense. So anyhow, that work was interesting because
• 10:59
  Speaker 1: it showed obviously as it expected that no, you wouldn't
• 11:03
  Speaker 1: find any any signatures, and why not?
• 11:07
  Speaker 2: Why not is the reason? You know?
• 11:08
  Speaker 1: Like for instance, if you take us paid and iron's paid, yes,
• 11:12
  Speaker 1: and you stick it in your garden, and then you
• 11:15
  Speaker 1: go around sampling that's paid, would you find elevated iron immediately?
• 11:21
  Speaker 1: Obviously not. It takes time for elements to lead into
• 11:25
  Speaker 1: the soil and arrive at at some level where when
• 11:31
  Speaker 1: you happen to sample then it shows up in your
• 11:34
  Speaker 1: in your results. Whereas what these people here, the Trust
• 11:38
  Speaker 1: and that others were doing were literally going up to
• 11:42
  Speaker 1: the front and here's a here's an impact sample, and
• 11:47
  Speaker 1: then that So that that was the first bit that
• 11:50
  Speaker 1: I was involved with. Of course, the craters that were formed.
• 11:53
  Speaker 1: We did sample all the creators, but the story was
• 11:56
  Speaker 1: the same across so so the sampling went right from.
• 11:59
  Speaker 2: North to the out.
• 12:00
  Speaker 1: And this was my work in Sumi in Ukraine. And
• 12:05
  Speaker 1: related to that was also of course we found no uranium,
• 12:09
  Speaker 1: so no no signature of any depleted uranium. And interestingly
• 12:16
  Speaker 1: this is very important actually, So I've got.
• 12:19
  Speaker 2: A very good friend. I met him in Ukraine.
• 12:23
  Speaker 1: He's British, and I asked him, hey, you know what
• 12:26
  Speaker 1: about this du Why do we not see the signature
• 12:29
  Speaker 1: when the signature in the atmosphere is so you know,
• 12:34
  Speaker 1: so distinct and that you just can't mistake it. So
• 12:37
  Speaker 1: he was like, we do that the ballistics in Salisbury plane,
• 12:41
  Speaker 1: but we've never found any any signature, so no, you
• 12:45
  Speaker 1: wouldn't find it. Didn't give them any explanation, but it's
• 12:49
  Speaker 1: quite puzzling really, but hey you go. And then so
• 12:53
  Speaker 1: this was this was really an extremely important part of
• 12:56
  Speaker 1: my work. And if you look onto Ukrainian funding which
• 13:01
  Speaker 1: is based on damage to the soil and agricultural land
• 13:05
  Speaker 1: because of the war, it's based initially on my work,
• 13:11
  Speaker 1: but it's certainly not what's being put out at present,
• 13:15
  Speaker 1: So certainly not now I'm not disputing the fact. I
• 13:20
  Speaker 1: mean this has to be distinguished between what's happening near
• 13:24
  Speaker 1: the nuclear power plants, because that's that was our interest,
• 13:28
  Speaker 1: was the Zaparizia nucleopar plant and the and the Khlimnitsky
• 13:34
  Speaker 1: power plant essentially. But at the end my work was
• 13:38
  Speaker 1: focused only around Zaparizia, which meant that I had to
• 13:43
  Speaker 1: travel not only to Ukraine but also to Russia to
• 13:45
  Speaker 1: obtain samples from Russia Russian side, essentially to compare the two. Now,
• 13:52
  Speaker 1: the findings of those so yeah, okay, we've got the samples.
• 13:56
  Speaker 1: We compared the two, but probably it's best not to
• 13:59
  Speaker 1: go in to detail on that because it's kind of
• 14:02
  Speaker 1: a close close to report. Essentially, what it shows is
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: that there is a concern which the I a e
• 14:11
  Speaker 1: A Has already demonstrated in its reports repeated times, as
• 14:16
  Speaker 1: to how the continuing continued shalling of Zaporizia does pose
• 14:22
  Speaker 1: a threat to the civilians around and certainly at this
• 14:26
  Speaker 1: point in time when Zaporizia is under Russian control. But
• 14:31
  Speaker 1: the shelling is still ongoing, and we've recently seen what
• 14:36
  Speaker 1: has happened in the filiminit Ski and also in Chernobyl,
• 14:42
  Speaker 1: actually in Chernobyl, it's quite serious. So you know, war aside.
• 14:49
  Speaker 1: I think people who are who are engaged in this
• 14:53
  Speaker 1: either side, they are clearly very dangerous entities and whether
• 15:00
  Speaker 1: it's ago or the other side. Now that then comes
• 15:04
  Speaker 1: of course to the beginning of my work, which is
• 15:08
  Speaker 1: meaning to ask you, you know, how, what were the
• 15:11
  Speaker 1: efforts that we put in in place so that we
• 15:14
  Speaker 1: didn't derive at the same this stage obviously we have failed.
• 15:18
  Speaker 1: But that's not to say that me myself personally and
• 15:22
  Speaker 1: my organization has been in words so deeply to try
• 15:29
  Speaker 1: it and mitigate these these circumstances.
• 15:32
  Speaker 2: But obviously we have built.
• 15:35
  Speaker 3: Deeply. Thank you for that. That's a very nice little
• 15:40
  Speaker 3: segment on your background, for that work for the audience.
• 15:45
  Speaker 3: If you will just share us a little bit more
• 15:47
  Speaker 3: about about yourself. You come from an academic background. Geology
• 15:54
  Speaker 3: geotechnical consultancy is your main work, which really you've been describing,
• 16:01
  Speaker 3: and you've also described how that led you to Ukraine.
• 16:09
  Speaker 3: So you've been out in Ukraine as a professional doing
• 16:13
  Speaker 3: professional work, but you've also come to learn a great
• 16:16
  Speaker 3: deal about the politics and the war actually going on.
• 16:25
  Speaker 3: Just if you will explain a little bit about how
• 16:28
  Speaker 3: you have gone from being an academic interested in that
• 16:35
  Speaker 3: geotechnical field. How did you get into Ukraine and how
• 16:42
  Speaker 3: was your interest in Ukraine built up? Is that through
• 16:46
  Speaker 3: people you met? Is it from the experience of going
• 16:48
  Speaker 3: to Ukraine?
• 16:51
  Speaker 1: Thank you, Rian, Now Ukraine was a second chapter in
• 16:56
  Speaker 1: our lives. Yes, I'm a geologist by training via academic qualifications,
• 17:02
  Speaker 1: and certainly that's the first love of my life. Essentially,
• 17:07
  Speaker 1: I love being in the field. I'm thirty years more
• 17:11
  Speaker 1: than that, I would say. However, so well, I come
• 17:17
  Speaker 1: from India, so I did the foundation of everything or
• 17:20
  Speaker 1: who I am today is with the blessings of all
• 17:24
  Speaker 1: my professors and people in India, and they gave a
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: very solid foundation, not only in academia but as a person.
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: I think, you know, I thank them for my ability
• 17:38
  Speaker 1: to be able to say forthright, you know what I think.
• 17:43
  Speaker 1: And so anyhow, I came to Britain in two thousand
• 17:47
  Speaker 1: and two. I went to the University of Cambridge. A
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: complex background there because and I think it's worth sharing this.
• 17:56
  Speaker 1: Actually it's essentially that you set in your foot in
• 18:00
  Speaker 1: Cambridge and you don't want to be there. You want
• 18:02
  Speaker 1: to go back, but somehow I ended up staying here
• 18:06
  Speaker 1: for quite some time and now I'm I'm here being
• 18:09
  Speaker 1: here for twenty five years almost. But the story began
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: with COVID actually, and a little bit that the people
• 18:18
  Speaker 1: need to understand is that my background is not just geology,
• 18:22
  Speaker 1: it's also from defense side and more onto. It's complex there,
• 18:27
  Speaker 1: but yes, defense and intelligence site essentially and not professionally
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: so not from for the Indian Army or something. But
• 18:37
  Speaker 1: when COVID started in twenty nineteen, there was some intelligence
• 18:42
  Speaker 1: that landed on my desk. Don't ask me how because
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: I don't know how, essentially myself. And we had forward
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: intelligence in October twenty nineteen as far as I can remember,
• 18:57
  Speaker 1: and that there's going to be this is a military event,
• 19:00
  Speaker 1: that it's been planned, it has been planned by certain entities,
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: and I shouldn't be involved in any international travel. I
• 19:11
  Speaker 1: fed that to the NSA in India saying that, look,
• 19:15
  Speaker 1: you know, there is some global event which has been planned,
• 19:19
  Speaker 1: looks like by the United States, and this is in
• 19:23
  Speaker 1: January twenty twenty, yeah, twenty twenty. And I was laughed
• 19:29
  Speaker 1: at at that point, but we had all the information
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: that you were actually seeing at the moment in the
• 19:35
  Speaker 1: in the news, in the alternate media. But as because
• 19:39
  Speaker 1: of my background, I could see that this was a
• 19:42
  Speaker 1: military event and it was a precursor to a major
• 19:45
  Speaker 1: military conflict. And that point, I must confess, I had
• 19:49
  Speaker 1: no clue it's going to be Russia in Ukraine. I
• 19:52
  Speaker 1: just knew that the good this is the foreground, preparation
• 19:54
  Speaker 1: of foreground for the military conflict that is going to
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: be perhaps year, two year or three years, say, you know, incoming.
• 20:03
  Speaker 1: And so the idea for me was to start making
• 20:08
  Speaker 1: sure that the people within the lead countries, and for
• 20:12
  Speaker 1: me that was the United States, obviously, India and Britain
• 20:16
  Speaker 1: brands essentially that we need to me myself, I need
• 20:21
  Speaker 1: to be able to advise the people.
• 20:24
  Speaker 2: Who are leading these countries.
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: So I put together an organization which was purely defensive
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: intelligence organization. And I use the word intelligence very knowingly
• 20:35
  Speaker 1: because and just to be clear, we never work with professionals,
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: so people who are in service, so we only work
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: with veterans. And the idea was that you know, these
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: people have a background already in nuclear nuclear risks and
• 20:51
  Speaker 1: bio weapons related risk and that we'd be able to then,
• 20:55
  Speaker 1: you know, share intelligence across the world and warn the
• 20:59
  Speaker 1: leaderships of the especially the sea sector, which is the
• 21:03
  Speaker 1: Southeast Asian sector, which our data showed.
• 21:07
  Speaker 2: Was the propeller of what was to come.
• 21:11
  Speaker 1: So thankfully, at that time there was you know, there
• 21:14
  Speaker 1: was a very very wonderful, great group here in Britain.
• 21:17
  Speaker 1: They tasked me to perform the first COVID.
• 21:22
  Speaker 2: Study on the vaccine.
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: So again my geological and geochemical whatever geoscientific skills were
• 21:30
  Speaker 1: very useful. So I did the COVID vaccine study for Britain.
• 21:35
  Speaker 1: So my report was then used for legal cases across
• 21:38
  Speaker 1: the world. At that time, it was very clear what
• 21:42
  Speaker 1: we were facing. We were facing a bio weapon, but
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: not just in terms of the presence or absence of
• 21:48
  Speaker 1: graphene and mRNA and so on and so forth. This
• 21:52
  Speaker 1: is far more complex and I would urge the people
• 21:54
  Speaker 1: if when they're who were listening, to look into something
• 21:58
  Speaker 1: called DNA body or RNA bots. So anyhow, I briefed
• 22:05
  Speaker 1: the officer here in Britain who had asked me with this,
• 22:08
  Speaker 1: I personally briefed him. I said, look, this is far
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: more than graphy. There is far more than mRNA and
• 22:14
  Speaker 1: so once for it's a bio weapon in all aspects,
• 22:18
  Speaker 1: and then onward at that point, this was sometime in
• 22:22
  Speaker 1: twenty twenty two, when the SMO had already started.
• 22:26
  Speaker 3: Just to clarify that for people, the Special Military Operation
• 22:30
  Speaker 3: the Russian term for the conflict in Ukraine. And I'd
• 22:35
  Speaker 3: also like just to mention units because you did use
• 22:40
  Speaker 3: that name earlier on as you started to tell us
• 22:44
  Speaker 3: about your work, and just say a little bit about
• 22:49
  Speaker 3: about unit itself.
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: Thank yes, Brian, thank you for the point here. So yes,
• 22:54
  Speaker 1: unit is essentially exclusively a DII entity, which means defense
• 22:58
  Speaker 1: and intelligence. We people without any consideration to their background,
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: meaning any country, any race, any color, but they need
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: to show certain skills of having been in the service
• 23:14
  Speaker 1: to the people, not to the establishment. So that is
• 23:17
  Speaker 1: the only criteria for selection. And we have selection in
• 23:21
  Speaker 1: terms of internal procedures for selection, so it's through references.
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: None of us are from are within active military, so
• 23:31
  Speaker 1: don't we don't do that. There's a reason because if
• 23:34
  Speaker 1: you're serving for a state you already have, you are
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: basically breaching your contract with the countries. So whereas if
• 23:42
  Speaker 1: you're a veteran, you have more latitude within which you
• 23:47
  Speaker 1: can operate in tern and also you bring in with
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: you so much experience with the with the organization and
• 23:54
  Speaker 1: the firm or the agency whatever.
• 23:57
  Speaker 3: I'd just like to add a little bit here which
• 24:02
  Speaker 3: I feel some sort of questions from the audience, because
• 24:05
  Speaker 3: as we get deeper into this subject, I know that
• 24:07
  Speaker 3: their minds are going to be asking more and more questions.
• 24:11
  Speaker 1: For me.
• 24:12
  Speaker 3: I've known you for some time now, and of course
• 24:16
  Speaker 3: your academic background in Cambridge has meant that you've been
• 24:20
  Speaker 3: very well connected with both professionals and academics, and ultimately,
• 24:28
  Speaker 3: as your work has expanded, so has the network of
• 24:33
  Speaker 3: people from all sorts of different positions within the university world,
• 24:40
  Speaker 3: but also within the political world and some connections with
• 24:44
  Speaker 3: ex military people. So you've been able to build up
• 24:48
  Speaker 3: a circle of some very interesting people with all sorts
• 24:53
  Speaker 3: of professional backgrounds and skills. But it's also been a
• 24:59
  Speaker 3: collect of people who've also been concerned at what they've
• 25:04
  Speaker 3: seen going on in the world, and they have felt
• 25:07
  Speaker 3: the need to come together and ask questions which they
• 25:13
  Speaker 3: feel need to be asked, and many other people are
• 25:16
  Speaker 3: not asking. So I'm just trying to give a little
• 25:19
  Speaker 3: bit more description on your circle of contacts, and then
• 25:25
  Speaker 3: within that a particular group has come together in UNIT,
• 25:31
  Speaker 3: and that group is the same style of people. They're
• 25:35
  Speaker 3: individuals who have been happy to work together in order
• 25:42
  Speaker 3: to challenge what they see as some disastrous wars and
• 25:51
  Speaker 3: of course the damage to humanity coming out of those wars.
• 25:56
  Speaker 3: Is that a reasonable summation of where you are?
• 26:00
  Speaker 1: Yes, you're right, Brian. Yes, The only thing I would
• 26:03
  Speaker 1: like to add on it. Within the unit, we do
• 26:06
  Speaker 1: not so people within who are actually within the unit.
• 26:10
  Speaker 1: We're not public people. So the people you would see
• 26:12
  Speaker 1: is myself, so I'm their face. It's because there are
• 26:17
  Speaker 1: lots of foreign instance, there are lots of Ukrainians, not
• 26:19
  Speaker 1: lots of There are a few Ukrainians in UNIT now
• 26:23
  Speaker 1: under the current circumstances, it's impossible for us to disclose
• 26:28
  Speaker 1: who they are, for them to come out, just because
• 26:31
  Speaker 1: it's going to be quite dangerous for them. Similarly, if
• 26:33
  Speaker 1: there are some Russians, same thing. Whereas more so, essentially
• 26:39
  Speaker 1: the idea of UNIT is that we do we collect
• 26:42
  Speaker 1: the data, we analyze it, and when there is a
• 26:45
  Speaker 1: risk to the public of substantial nature, then we would
• 26:50
  Speaker 1: submit that inform of an early warning report. Or an
• 26:55
  Speaker 1: early early warning to the heads of the of the countries.
• 26:59
  Speaker 1: So we wouldn't do a public announcement unless there is.
• 27:02
  Speaker 2: No other way.
• 27:04
  Speaker 1: However, we would submit any findings to the legitimate public leader,
• 27:11
  Speaker 1: so prime minister or a president directly, so we won't
• 27:14
  Speaker 1: engage in the intermediaries because the intermediaries the reports get lost,
• 27:20
  Speaker 1: and so we.
• 27:21
  Speaker 2: Just directly go.
• 27:22
  Speaker 1: We say, hey, you go, that's your that that's what
• 27:25
  Speaker 1: we found out, and it's now your duty to act
• 27:29
  Speaker 1: upon it.
• 27:31
  Speaker 3: Okay, thank you for that, and I'll add a little
• 27:34
  Speaker 3: bit more. You correct me if I haven't got it right.
• 27:36
  Speaker 3: So when information is collected, it's shared within the group itself.
• 27:44
  Speaker 3: It's shared within unit, and the individuals who are volunteering
• 27:50
  Speaker 3: for this work are then able to bring their particular
• 27:55
  Speaker 3: professional analysis to it, all their professional or personal opinion,
• 28:01
  Speaker 3: and then at that point you're able to build up
• 28:04
  Speaker 3: a statement or a view of what's happening which everybody's
• 28:10
  Speaker 3: agreed on, and that's being shared by the individuals you're
• 28:19
  Speaker 3: working with in other countries, particularly shared amongst people who
• 28:25
  Speaker 3: might not be aware that whatever you've discovered is happening,
• 28:30
  Speaker 3: and you're sharing information, particularly where there's a need to
• 28:34
  Speaker 3: challenge what an individual state is doing when that action
• 28:40
  Speaker 3: is perhaps harmful, either knowingly or unknowingly, or indeed that
• 28:48
  Speaker 3: action is against the law. So it's feeding information back
• 28:53
  Speaker 3: into nation states in order to help them understand that.
• 29:00
  Speaker 3: Let's be a little bit challenging here that what the
• 29:03
  Speaker 3: international media says is happening on the ground in Ukraine,
• 29:08
  Speaker 3: for example, is not necessarily the complete truth.
• 29:15
  Speaker 1: Yes, you're right, well, okay, I would like to find
• 29:21
  Speaker 1: tune that slightly, just because we've got our own limits
• 29:26
  Speaker 1: to which, you know, up to which we can engage really,
• 29:30
  Speaker 1: so essentially what it is, Brian is like, I'll begin
• 29:34
  Speaker 1: with COVID. So COVID was it's the best starting point.
• 29:37
  Speaker 1: So we all knew what was going on in COVID
• 29:39
  Speaker 1: in general terms. However that if you think about it,
• 29:45
  Speaker 1: you see the prime ministers and presidents of certain nations,
• 29:48
  Speaker 1: especially in the Eastern sector, they weren't aware of what
• 29:53
  Speaker 1: the reality of COVID was. So again it became it
• 29:57
  Speaker 1: fell on unit to engage into a one to one
• 30:01
  Speaker 1: program to go and inform either the president and prime
• 30:04
  Speaker 1: minis or you know, the head of intelligence or the
• 30:07
  Speaker 1: head of defense as to look, we've done this work.
• 30:11
  Speaker 1: It's supported by by SO and so, our own analysis,
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: our own data. Yes, it's not open source, it's ground
• 30:20
  Speaker 1: based information and based on that we are advising you
• 30:25
  Speaker 1: on certain things, especially on the vaccines, and then it's
• 30:30
  Speaker 1: up to them what they do, because then, you know,
• 30:33
  Speaker 1: we wouldn't want to interfere in their state what what
• 30:36
  Speaker 1: what's really state craft? Because the decisions that the primenises
• 30:41
  Speaker 1: and president presidents of any country make are far more
• 30:45
  Speaker 1: complex and they you know, they don't they're not they're
• 30:48
  Speaker 1: not there as a person. Those decisions they are made
• 30:52
  Speaker 1: on behalf of a post of entities behind them, and
• 30:58
  Speaker 1: then they've got their complex equations which I may not
• 31:01
  Speaker 1: understand what's going on. However, in the case of a
• 31:04
  Speaker 1: bioweapon or a nuclear weapon, it's very simple. The algorithm
• 31:07
  Speaker 1: is very very simple. That you know, if you are
• 31:10
  Speaker 1: administering a vaccine which is obviously going to change your
• 31:15
  Speaker 1: genetic composition, and this is in twenty twenty. We're saying
• 31:19
  Speaker 1: that with confidence. Yeah, and then it's our duty to
• 31:25
  Speaker 1: inform you, and that it's your duty then to inform
• 31:28
  Speaker 1: the public, because if you don't do that, then there
• 31:31
  Speaker 1: is a big room for legal action essentially, so we
• 31:35
  Speaker 1: don't say anything. We say, okay, so here is the report.
• 31:39
  Speaker 1: We advise you strongly to act on this so and so. However,
• 31:43
  Speaker 1: if you don't do that, then there might be consequences.
• 31:47
  Speaker 1: Public might want to know the answers later on. Now,
• 31:50
  Speaker 1: in case of Russia and Ukraine, it's very different. We
• 31:54
  Speaker 1: had grown enormously by the time the SMO started, by
• 32:00
  Speaker 1: the time I went to Ukraine, by the time I
• 32:02
  Speaker 1: came back from Ukraine, so unit was constantly growing because
• 32:07
  Speaker 1: we were recruiting and we're still recruiting quite frantically essentially,
• 32:11
  Speaker 1: So more people you have, the better the organization, but
• 32:14
  Speaker 1: the better the resolution of the data. So in case
• 32:17
  Speaker 1: of Ukraine, our concern was mostly with the United Kingdom
• 32:22
  Speaker 1: because quite early on we understood that the driving force
• 32:26
  Speaker 1: is not the United States, it's the United Kingdom, and
• 32:30
  Speaker 1: we went, are you okay for me to talk about this.
• 32:34
  Speaker 3: Our engagement because you've asked me the question, I'm going
• 32:38
  Speaker 3: to gently say, just pause there, because I want to
• 32:42
  Speaker 3: come in on a specific thing and we will then
• 32:46
  Speaker 3: get back onto Ukraine. So I'll just come in it'll
• 32:50
  Speaker 3: makes sense.
• 32:51
  Speaker 2: Well, I would like to close on the COVID matter.
• 32:54
  Speaker 3: Yes, okay.
• 32:57
  Speaker 1: So one of the most important things that we found
• 33:00
  Speaker 1: about COVID, and credit goes to my Ukrainian colleagues in
• 33:03
  Speaker 1: this is a presence of bioweapons laboratories and in Ukraine,
• 33:09
  Speaker 1: and they're not the only ones that's been released by
• 33:13
  Speaker 1: miss Gabbart or the hats off to her, she's done that.
• 33:17
  Speaker 1: But and again I don't want to shine light on
• 33:21
  Speaker 1: our contribution, but it was me and Unit who shared
• 33:27
  Speaker 1: the information between Ukraine directly into the United States. So
• 33:33
  Speaker 1: because at that time we already had a very robust
• 33:36
  Speaker 1: United States.
• 33:38
  Speaker 2: Contingent within Unit.
• 33:40
  Speaker 1: And these were not people who were involved in the
• 33:44
  Speaker 1: intelligence site, but these were people which we call diplomatic
• 33:47
  Speaker 1: unit essentially. So these are people who are public figures
• 33:51
  Speaker 1: and who are able to inform the public in the
• 33:54
  Speaker 1: best interest of the public. So two of the people,
• 33:57
  Speaker 1: and I would like to certainly name them Dr mcculliffe,
• 34:00
  Speaker 1: whom we worked very you know, whom we were giving
• 34:03
  Speaker 1: all the information that we had, and the second one
• 34:06
  Speaker 1: who was very important is mister Kennedy. So it was
• 34:11
  Speaker 1: it was very important that mister Kennedy and doctor McCullough
• 34:14
  Speaker 1: were able to receive that information in twenty twenty that sorry,
• 34:18
  Speaker 1: twenty twenty two. And at first there was obviously a
• 34:22
  Speaker 1: lot of doubt. Remember this is not you know, Trump
• 34:26
  Speaker 1: is not in power. We've got President Biden at that time.
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: But slowly, of course, when mister Kennedy began to see
• 34:34
  Speaker 1: the data, that was quite important. And then I also
• 34:37
  Speaker 1: informed him that look, sir, this is not at all
• 34:41
  Speaker 1: only to do with the general you know, bioweapons story.
• 34:44
  Speaker 1: It's a targeted ratio matter, and it is targeted to
• 34:48
  Speaker 1: guess who. Guess who which race was it targeting.
• 34:53
  Speaker 3: It was the Russians. And I'd let you answer that bit.
• 35:01
  Speaker 1: Yeah, ethnically Caucasian white races, So Russians and Caucasian whites.
• 35:09
  Speaker 1: So so this was obviously a bioweapon aimed at being
• 35:14
  Speaker 1: used against the Russians, and the laboratories that were being
• 35:17
  Speaker 1: experimented this was being experimented on were in those border areas.
• 35:22
  Speaker 1: So again that there's a slight overlap with the COVID
• 35:25
  Speaker 1: story and the and and and the bio sorry, and.
• 35:29
  Speaker 2: The Russia Russia story.
• 35:31
  Speaker 1: And this was the conflict that COVID was preparing the
• 35:35
  Speaker 1: world for. So so the COVID camps are meant to
• 35:40
  Speaker 1: be concentration camps for the Russians. And this is now
• 35:44
  Speaker 1: gradually coming out in in in the media, because last
• 35:48
  Speaker 1: I think it was last week they actually published this
• 35:52
  Speaker 1: that the COVID camps would now be used to hold
• 35:55
  Speaker 1: Russian prisoners. So so you know, COVID was a military exercise.
• 36:00
  Speaker 3: Like if I just come back in then when you
• 36:02
  Speaker 3: were talking about the camps, you're talking about camps in Ukraine.
• 36:08
  Speaker 1: No, No, the COVID camps that were being built in
• 36:11
  Speaker 1: the United States, in Europe, in Australia and New Zealand,
• 36:15
  Speaker 1: these were meant for with the planning that they would
• 36:20
  Speaker 1: be holding prisoners towards So, as I said to you
• 36:23
  Speaker 1: in twenty nineteen, we knew there was a conflict, a
• 36:27
  Speaker 1: global conflict, a kinetic conflict that was being planned, and
• 36:31
  Speaker 1: COVID was a measure to bring in certain control measures
• 36:36
  Speaker 1: because again, as you go into a you know, if
• 36:39
  Speaker 1: you if you conduct an operation in an area, you
• 36:43
  Speaker 1: first obviously collect intelligence and you sow certain things in
• 36:47
  Speaker 1: that area so that when we eventually attacked that area,
• 36:52
  Speaker 1: then you have obviously got the infrastructure and everything ready.
• 36:56
  Speaker 1: So COVID was preparation in one you know, in one word,
• 37:01
  Speaker 1: it was the preparation to the kinetic war that was
• 37:04
  Speaker 1: to follow at that time. Obviously I didn't know it
• 37:06
  Speaker 1: was Russian in Ukraine, but it became very quickly apparent
• 37:10
  Speaker 1: at that time.
• 37:13
  Speaker 3: Thank you for that. I'm just going to stay on
• 37:16
  Speaker 3: this line that the audience, I am sure is not
• 37:23
  Speaker 3: only fascinated by you, and they are certainly fascinated by
• 37:29
  Speaker 3: what you're talking about, because in a very calm and
• 37:33
  Speaker 3: quiet manner, you're talking about some very very serious events
• 37:37
  Speaker 3: in the world. As I've already said, I've known you
• 37:41
  Speaker 3: for a few years now, and not only have I
• 37:45
  Speaker 3: been able to attend the conferences that you've set up
• 37:50
  Speaker 3: where you've brought together a number of of highly qualified
• 37:54
  Speaker 3: people to speak about what's been happening in the Ukraine
• 37:59
  Speaker 3: Russian War example, but you've been successful in bringing a
• 38:05
  Speaker 3: number of people together to speak openly about what they
• 38:10
  Speaker 3: understand and what they're seeing. So I can imagine that
• 38:15
  Speaker 3: we have people paying attention to this interview now and
• 38:19
  Speaker 3: they're saying this, Lady deep Tea is who is she?
• 38:25
  Speaker 3: And I'm going to smile and say, well, my first
• 38:28
  Speaker 3: reaction to this is to say that I put you
• 38:31
  Speaker 3: under the I'll put you in the carricter in the
• 38:34
  Speaker 3: category of my gutsy women. People who have followed the
• 38:39
  Speaker 3: UK column for a while will know that I have
• 38:43
  Speaker 3: done quite a few interviews with ladies that I believe
• 38:46
  Speaker 3: are doing some really difficult, serious and very difficult work,
• 38:52
  Speaker 3: and they've certainly got guts, hence the gutsy women. So TVT,
• 38:56
  Speaker 3: I'd certainly place you in the category of a gutsy woman.
• 39:02
  Speaker 3: And that's at two levels, because it's not only the
• 39:06
  Speaker 3: fact that you have looked at what's happening in the
• 39:10
  Speaker 3: world and you've said, as an individual, what's happening is wrong.
• 39:17
  Speaker 3: We've got the fermenting of wars, we've got the fermenting
• 39:20
  Speaker 3: of the means of killing and disabling people. And I
• 39:24
  Speaker 3: know from a personal point of view you've said, I
• 39:28
  Speaker 3: can't allow that to happen. So you've stood up to
• 39:33
  Speaker 3: not only speak out and warn about it, but you've
• 39:36
  Speaker 3: used your considerable people skills to network with some really
• 39:44
  Speaker 3: amazing people in a number of different countries. So your
• 39:49
  Speaker 3: approach to the problem that something nasty is going on
• 39:52
  Speaker 3: in the world has been to reach out to individuals
• 39:56
  Speaker 3: not only in the United Kingdom but in other countries
• 40:00
  Speaker 3: in order to bring them together, to look at the
• 40:04
  Speaker 3: body of evidence as to what's happening, and then to
• 40:07
  Speaker 3: share their analysis and warnings. So I think it's been
• 40:13
  Speaker 3: very impressive what you've been doing. Now I'm very keen
• 40:18
  Speaker 3: that we will talk in more detail about the Ukraine War,
• 40:25
  Speaker 3: in particular the special military Operation, but I think this
• 40:29
  Speaker 3: is at the point where we really need to get
• 40:32
  Speaker 3: the audience to understand that we're into some serious things here,
• 40:36
  Speaker 3: because deep Tea, you have done what you've done in
• 40:43
  Speaker 3: an open manner. You haven't made any secret about what
• 40:47
  Speaker 3: you've been doing, or the fact that you've been liaising
• 40:51
  Speaker 3: with people not only in the UK but overseas in
• 40:54
  Speaker 3: order to get information about these very serious matters, and
• 41:00
  Speaker 3: in doing that that has brought you to the notice
• 41:04
  Speaker 3: of the security services in UK and the net result
• 41:09
  Speaker 3: of that has been that you have been arrested, you've
• 41:15
  Speaker 3: been interrogated, and you've actually been forced to endure I've
• 41:21
  Speaker 3: lost track of how long it is, but it's certainly
• 41:24
  Speaker 3: over a year of not being able to sleep anywhere
• 41:28
  Speaker 3: but your own house. So as a result of working
• 41:33
  Speaker 3: with other people to ensure the peace and safety of mankind.
• 41:40
  Speaker 3: You are now under the microscope of the intelligence and
• 41:45
  Speaker 3: security services in the UK. You are restricted to sleeping
• 41:51
  Speaker 3: at your house, and you are in the iniquitous position
• 41:57
  Speaker 3: that I'm going to choose my words carefully. It's suggested
• 42:01
  Speaker 3: you may be brought into court in order to be
• 42:06
  Speaker 3: charged with crimes as yet undefined because of the work
• 42:12
  Speaker 3: that you've been doing. What are you able to tell
• 42:15
  Speaker 3: us about this pretty unique and unpleasant experience.
• 42:24
  Speaker 2: Thank you.
• 42:26
  Speaker 1: It's natural that when you are when you're doing something
• 42:29
  Speaker 1: of the sort that I knew I would be doing,
• 42:32
  Speaker 1: then these are expected consequences and I'm not you know,
• 42:39
  Speaker 1: our strategy with a unit is to request assistance from
• 42:43
  Speaker 1: the country that is actually involved in the actions. You know,
• 42:49
  Speaker 1: when I started unit, obviously it's a defense intelligence organization.
• 42:54
  Speaker 1: It's not a defense and journalistic organization. There's a reason
• 42:58
  Speaker 1: for that, because we understood I understood, my colleagues understood.
• 43:02
  Speaker 1: Now this is a very different ballgame. We are actually
• 43:07
  Speaker 1: dealing with entities within nations in the West who are
• 43:12
  Speaker 1: held bent on a catastrophic end result of something. So
• 43:20
  Speaker 1: when you're investigating those people or those entities who are
• 43:24
  Speaker 1: meant to be protecting you, then you obviously are aware
• 43:28
  Speaker 1: of the consequences that would arrive with that. So the
• 43:32
  Speaker 1: restrictions started in October twenty twenty four, and they said
• 43:40
  Speaker 1: they would like to investigate.
• 43:41
  Speaker 2: You know, obviously you know what I'm doing.
• 43:44
  Speaker 1: So having the background as well that I do, I
• 43:48
  Speaker 1: understand that all this will think.
• 43:51
  Speaker 2: You know, if you.
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: Tell somebody that hey, I went to Russia, I went
• 43:54
  Speaker 1: to Ukraine, it's going to and these are two nations
• 43:58
  Speaker 1: at war, is going to obviously start.
• 44:03
  Speaker 2: Some sort of investigation.
• 44:05
  Speaker 1: So I'd been absolutely open with the with the services here,
• 44:09
  Speaker 1: not only that, we'd actually requested assistance from them because
• 44:14
  Speaker 1: of the amount of data we have, amount of concerns
• 44:18
  Speaker 1: we have that if we cannot release those concerns to
• 44:21
  Speaker 1: the public, with the public or the panic, So what
• 44:23
  Speaker 1: is your gain plan? You know, we want to understand
• 44:26
  Speaker 1: what you are chasing in this whole thing, So can
• 44:29
  Speaker 1: you please come and have a word with us on
• 44:32
  Speaker 1: the nuclear front. It was the concerns are so serious
• 44:36
  Speaker 1: that you know, if we share the data that we've
• 44:39
  Speaker 1: got with you know, with the actual normal.
• 44:42
  Speaker 2: Public, they won't believe it.
• 44:45
  Speaker 1: Essentially, And and this is what we're seeing from our
• 44:49
  Speaker 1: end that entities within Britain are actually engaging in acts.
• 44:54
  Speaker 2: That are purely terroristic acts essentially. And I live in
• 45:00
  Speaker 2: this country. I've been in this country so many years.
• 45:05
  Speaker 1: I've got two children and they are British. After someone
• 45:10
  Speaker 1: has lived in a country for twenty years plus, you know,
• 45:14
  Speaker 1: you it's my country almost. Yeah, I don't have a
• 45:18
  Speaker 1: British passport, but my family, my friends are here, this
• 45:24
  Speaker 1: is my place, this is my home, and I have
• 45:27
  Speaker 1: concerns for the security of my family and my home
• 45:31
  Speaker 1: and the land where we live. And this is a
• 45:34
  Speaker 1: very basic concern. And so when you have such concerns,
• 45:39
  Speaker 1: whom do you go to. You don't dial up Vladimir
• 45:42
  Speaker 1: Putin and say hey, hang on, No, you go first
• 45:46
  Speaker 1: to your people, which we did.
• 45:50
  Speaker 2: Zero response.
• 45:51
  Speaker 1: We had zero response from the United Kingdom Security Services.
• 45:56
  Speaker 2: And there are a lists of.
• 45:57
  Speaker 1: People we approached with our concerns and we had none, no,
• 46:02
  Speaker 1: no response. We I mean there are people who were
• 46:06
  Speaker 1: there are people who are speaking online you know, about things,
• 46:10
  Speaker 1: but they want to consent to coming to one to
• 46:12
  Speaker 1: one meeting and trying to to actually resolve the situation.
• 46:18
  Speaker 1: So there is obviously an issue here. Hence, when I
• 46:21
  Speaker 1: was when when you know, restrictions began on me, I
• 46:25
  Speaker 1: was actually, you know, in a small part of me
• 46:29
  Speaker 1: was hoping that I might be able to speak to
• 46:33
  Speaker 1: these people and see what's what's in their brain, you know,
• 46:37
  Speaker 1: because maybe maybe maybe they they're not aware of what's
• 46:42
  Speaker 1: going on essentially. But now it's been what twenty four months,
• 46:47
  Speaker 1: twenty two years, more than that, almost three years actually,
• 46:52
  Speaker 1: and their response is to restrict me completely in terms
• 46:58
  Speaker 1: of movement or Hey, you know, I don't anyway have
• 47:01
  Speaker 1: to have much to do here and there.
• 47:04
  Speaker 2: I work from home.
• 47:05
  Speaker 1: That's fine, But essentially the latest part of restrictions have
• 47:09
  Speaker 1: been completely unbelievable. So they've produced a list of almost
• 47:18
  Speaker 1: forty individuals and entities that.
• 47:21
  Speaker 2: I can't talk to.
• 47:24
  Speaker 1: And and you would be surprised the names, some of
• 47:29
  Speaker 1: the names in there. And this is all entirely focused
• 47:34
  Speaker 1: to shut me and my organization down. The names in there,
• 47:39
  Speaker 1: and I'll start with the most important ones. I'm President
• 47:43
  Speaker 1: Donald Trump. It's mister Kennedy, it's it's a Scott Writter,
• 47:51
  Speaker 1: it's it's mister Michael Muloof, who is a senior analyst
• 47:55
  Speaker 1: s Pentagon analyst, security analyst, President Vladimir Putin, mister Medwdeve,
• 48:03
  Speaker 1: and there are many others Andrew Bridgin and my colleagues
• 48:08
  Speaker 1: here in Britain, Britain who are basically fundamentally an inorganic
• 48:16
  Speaker 1: part of UNIT. So the aim is for them to
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: completely dismantle Units. So they've arrived at the conclusion that
• 48:26
  Speaker 1: Unit is not a fantasy. It exists, and it has
• 48:32
  Speaker 1: the reach into the White House and into the Kremlin.
• 48:37
  Speaker 1: And I would like to bring here something very very important.
• 48:41
  Speaker 1: So I was actually arrested twice. The first time was
• 48:47
  Speaker 1: probably just to stop me from going somewhere else, right,
• 48:51
  Speaker 1: But the second time was timed a week after I
• 48:57
  Speaker 1: was on a phone call with an individual within the
• 49:00
  Speaker 1: you know, within the White House, or a tentative peace
• 49:04
  Speaker 1: talk with Kremlin. Now, what does that tell you that
• 49:10
  Speaker 1: they do not want anyone to patch up at that
• 49:15
  Speaker 1: time in twenty twenty four, you know, I'm not talking
• 49:18
  Speaker 1: today today. The geometry is very different. B At that time,
• 49:23
  Speaker 1: our efforts, Unit's efforts were the nuclear war can only
• 49:28
  Speaker 1: be a versus if there is dialogue between.
• 49:30
  Speaker 2: The two ends.
• 49:33
  Speaker 1: So my involvement with the Kremlin, side with the White
• 49:36
  Speaker 1: House side has been initially in twenty twenty three, was
• 49:42
  Speaker 1: to bring together Russians and the Ukrainians together.
• 49:46
  Speaker 2: So my job was and they've.
• 49:48
  Speaker 1: Got all these documents in writing, So the security services
• 49:52
  Speaker 1: people have here in Britain in writing all the communication
• 49:56
  Speaker 1: that we're actually talking about patching up the stuff between
• 50:00
  Speaker 1: Russia and Ukraine.
• 50:02
  Speaker 2: That's not a terrorist act, is it.
• 50:04
  Speaker 1: It's not. So they've got that entire email link with them,
• 50:11
  Speaker 1: and they also have the emails and the WhatsApp calls
• 50:15
  Speaker 1: and every communication between me about Russian Kremlin presidential office
• 50:20
  Speaker 1: and the White House trying to bring them together. So
• 50:26
  Speaker 1: there is no sense in the middle to stop me
• 50:29
  Speaker 1: from talking to both sides. Now, further, why did they
• 50:32
  Speaker 1: put Donald Trump on the no contact list? President Donald
• 50:37
  Speaker 1: Trump was when he was elected, he was carrying on
• 50:41
  Speaker 1: himself the hopes not just of the United States, but
• 50:46
  Speaker 1: of the entire world. And at that point in time
• 50:50
  Speaker 1: I'm talking this is sometime in April of twenty twenty four,
• 50:54
  Speaker 1: our body, our intelligence body, came across evidence that there
• 51:00
  Speaker 1: were British sas entities planning to assassinate orchestrate the assassination
• 51:06
  Speaker 1: of President Donald Trump. What is the duty of somebody,
• 51:11
  Speaker 1: and this is now, this is what we're why we're
• 51:14
  Speaker 1: going now completely because of miss Gabbard, because she's now
• 51:18
  Speaker 1: released these bio weapons data and and mister Kennedy has
• 51:23
  Speaker 1: also released the Russian targeting of the of the COVID
• 51:27
  Speaker 1: and bio weapons laboratories in Ukraine. It's now time for
• 51:33
  Speaker 1: the world to understand that there were entities and these
• 51:36
  Speaker 1: are still under active unit investigation. These entities still very
• 51:42
  Speaker 1: active in the same process, and they were working in
• 51:46
  Speaker 1: collaboration extended collaboration with certain entities in Europe. Okay, so
• 51:54
  Speaker 1: in Europe, and I will not specify where, but in
• 51:57
  Speaker 1: the continent of Europe. I'm not talking about Europe, in Union,
• 52:01
  Speaker 1: in the continents of Europe. So we've got specific names
• 52:05
  Speaker 1: of three individuals who are actually literally orchestrying to or
• 52:10
  Speaker 1: they've been tasked to or whatever whatnot at that day,
• 52:13
  Speaker 1: at that time, and I.
• 52:15
  Speaker 2: Meant to go to Ukraine.
• 52:16
  Speaker 1: So I dished those names out to be sent asap
• 52:22
  Speaker 1: to the FBI, and I'd send that or whomsoever in
• 52:27
  Speaker 1: the United States who was close to President Trump. And
• 52:31
  Speaker 1: does it sound familiar to you the Russia Gates thing?
• 52:34
  Speaker 2: You know?
• 52:35
  Speaker 1: Anyhow, people can join the dots later on, But and
• 52:40
  Speaker 1: then I went off to Ukraine and then they had
• 52:45
  Speaker 1: the assassination attempt whilst I was there in Ukraine on
• 52:48
  Speaker 1: President Trump. At that time, the person whom I had
• 52:52
  Speaker 1: sent that information to was frantically, frantically coiling me and saying,
• 52:57
  Speaker 1: can you speak to the FBI and Ukraine. I said,
• 53:01
  Speaker 1: You'm nuts. Probably the MBI themselves are involved in it, don't.
• 53:06
  Speaker 1: We just have names of three individuals from who are
• 53:08
  Speaker 1: British and have sas links and this is not something
• 53:14
  Speaker 1: you you you this is a massive operation if it is.
• 53:17
  Speaker 1: And I didn't know what the background was to that
• 53:20
  Speaker 1: assassination attempt at that time anyway, so I refused. And
• 53:24
  Speaker 1: then later on when I came to Britain and restrictions
• 53:29
  Speaker 1: were put on the same scenario remerged again. I think
• 53:34
  Speaker 1: it was in January or some some months later. Again,
• 53:38
  Speaker 1: so these guys are still working on that. And why Trump,
• 53:41
  Speaker 1: Because Trump was the person who was slightly sympathetic towards
• 53:46
  Speaker 1: Russia and with the President sorry, with the presence and
• 53:49
  Speaker 1: the and the alliance with mister Kennedy. This was a
• 53:54
  Speaker 1: mixture that Britain doesn't want because this is the mixture
• 53:58
  Speaker 1: that can solve the problem, whereas the British want the
• 54:01
  Speaker 1: problem to exacerbate. So my response to the security services
• 54:07
  Speaker 1: was this that if the missiles fall, they're not falling
• 54:11
  Speaker 1: on the United States. They'll fall here, they'll fall in Europe.
• 54:17
  Speaker 1: US would be nowhere near. So hence it is a
• 54:22
  Speaker 1: security concern not just for me but every individual that
• 54:28
  Speaker 1: they become aware of the games of sabotage by the British,
• 54:34
  Speaker 1: of any attempts towards the resolution of this scenario and
• 54:40
  Speaker 1: what do we see at the moment is completely the opposite.
• 54:45
  Speaker 3: And to put this in very simple terms, you and
• 54:48
  Speaker 3: your team become dangerous to United Kingdom security because you're
• 54:58
  Speaker 3: working very hard to try and remove conflict and to
• 55:02
  Speaker 3: bring people together. And that is so telling because if
• 55:07
  Speaker 3: you're a threat to the system doing that, it says
• 55:10
  Speaker 3: absolutely that the system itself is held bent on making
• 55:16
  Speaker 3: sure that the conflict not only continues, but it seems
• 55:19
  Speaker 3: from present day reporting they're doing everything they can to
• 55:23
  Speaker 3: expand the conflict in Ukraine and in Europe. So you
• 55:30
  Speaker 3: do your work over quite a protracted bit of time.
• 55:34
  Speaker 3: You're doing it openly, but okay, there's always the need
• 55:39
  Speaker 3: to deal with certain individuals in a confidential way, because
• 55:44
  Speaker 3: everybody needs some level of confidentiality in the work they do.
• 55:49
  Speaker 3: But you do all that, you're really open that you're
• 55:51
  Speaker 3: making trips to Ukraine, You've really open in the types
• 55:56
  Speaker 3: of communications you're making with people at quite high left
• 56:00
  Speaker 3: in a number of countries. So it's not as if
• 56:03
  Speaker 3: you're doing something which is sort of hidden. And what
• 56:06
  Speaker 3: you're doing has the objective of trying to stop war
• 56:10
  Speaker 3: and conflict.
• 56:15
  Speaker 1: Now when you were when when we were trying to
• 56:18
  Speaker 1: do this, of course you wouln't want to expose what
• 56:20
  Speaker 1: we're doing to the British or to even to be
• 56:24
  Speaker 1: entities within NATO, which includes Europe and the United States,
• 56:28
  Speaker 1: because it's not just let's be very clear, it's not
• 56:30
  Speaker 1: just the United Kingdom entities that are against resolution. There's
• 56:34
  Speaker 1: a huge amount of money change, great bravy change. You
• 56:38
  Speaker 1: know that that's involved, and the key players are United
• 56:42
  Speaker 1: Kingdom and United States, and then it's France and Germany.
• 56:47
  Speaker 1: Also in France and Poland and so so yes, when
• 56:51
  Speaker 1: you are attempting to resolve the matter which the heads
• 56:54
  Speaker 1: of the states of the of NATO are are keen
• 56:58
  Speaker 1: On or on Stoke. Then you do it with great secrecy.
• 57:02
  Speaker 1: You don't go around telling what you're doing. And that's
• 57:05
  Speaker 1: so that part of our operation was highly secretive. But
• 57:10
  Speaker 1: of course because they raided our offices and my house,
• 57:14
  Speaker 1: I'm basically my house, they have all the evidence of
• 57:18
  Speaker 1: what we were doing. So hence it makes it really,
• 57:20
  Speaker 1: you know, hilarious that they do know. I said to them,
• 57:25
  Speaker 1: I'm Indian, I'm not British, and I do not support
• 57:28
  Speaker 1: this war. So anything that is going to do anything
• 57:33
  Speaker 1: that you guys are doing, you know, to to ensure
• 57:36
  Speaker 1: that the Ukraine is and the Russians don't talk.
• 57:38
  Speaker 2: For instance, come on, seriously, Ukraine is right next to Russia.
• 57:44
  Speaker 2: Britain is nowhere there.
• 57:45
  Speaker 1: But do you know what, they have massive amounts of
• 57:48
  Speaker 1: investments in Ukraine. And I'm not talking about just a
• 57:52
  Speaker 1: few million dollars, No, this is way beyond that. So
• 57:57
  Speaker 1: this is all to do with the interests of the elites,
• 58:01
  Speaker 1: because people need to understand that these people with titles
• 58:06
  Speaker 1: can be such despicable characters. Mister is a part of
• 58:11
  Speaker 1: active investigation relating to child trafficking from Ukraine, and so
• 58:19
  Speaker 1: he is also on that list.
• 58:21
  Speaker 2: I have nothing to talk.
• 58:22
  Speaker 1: To him because we do our investigations without talking to
• 58:25
  Speaker 1: the to those guys. But yes, so this is the
• 58:30
  Speaker 1: quality of the list, and we call it their list
• 58:33
  Speaker 1: because it is their list. It's unique. It made me
• 58:36
  Speaker 1: laugh when it came through the email I wrote them.
• 58:40
  Speaker 1: I wrote back to them saying is.
• 58:42
  Speaker 2: It a joke? Is it a joke?
• 58:44
  Speaker 1: Because seriously it sounded like a joke, And they responded saying, no, it's.
• 58:49
  Speaker 2: Not a joke.
• 58:50
  Speaker 3: Do you when you were picked up and taken in
• 58:53
  Speaker 3: for questioning? What was that experience like just normal in
• 58:59
  Speaker 3: our requestion? Brian, Yes, I have some idea what might
• 59:07
  Speaker 3: have taken place? Members of the public who have no
• 59:11
  Speaker 3: idea what this might entail. What was the experience, like
• 59:15
  Speaker 3: how will you treated by these people when they ask
• 59:19
  Speaker 3: their questions when.
• 59:21
  Speaker 2: They were doing their duty? Brian.
• 59:23
  Speaker 1: I've said to my lawyer also, who was quite upset,
• 59:25
  Speaker 1: and like I said, look, if somebody of my my
• 59:30
  Speaker 1: traits appeared for the first time in India, that person
• 59:35
  Speaker 1: would be treated really badly. Believe me, So I'm not Look,
• 59:41
  Speaker 1: what I want to say to this question is this
• 59:44
  Speaker 1: there's a job that the security services do and they
• 59:49
  Speaker 1: are called the security services for a reason because they
• 59:52
  Speaker 1: are trying.
• 59:53
  Speaker 2: To protect the country.
• 59:55
  Speaker 1: Okay, So at the point when they nawt me, they
• 59:58
  Speaker 1: had zero clue, or at least, you know, they had
• 1:00:00
  Speaker 1: fragments of information about me which looked like I am
• 1:00:03
  Speaker 1: a Russian spy and out to collect information and perhaps
• 1:00:09
  Speaker 1: harm a few people here and there. So just think
• 1:00:12
  Speaker 1: about it from your angle that if you get and
• 1:00:15
  Speaker 1: you are in the security services, and this I'm talking
• 1:00:18
  Speaker 1: in twenty twenty four, my view of them now has
• 1:00:21
  Speaker 1: changed dramatically. In twenty twenty four, I had no issues
• 1:00:25
  Speaker 1: in them coming taking me off for questioning and doing
• 1:00:29
  Speaker 1: what they do, and I so, yeah, what I was
• 1:00:34
  Speaker 1: saying is that if somebody you know, you've got Russian literature,
• 1:00:39
  Speaker 1: you've got Russian contacts, you've got Ukrainian contacts, you've put
• 1:00:42
  Speaker 1: American contracts, contacts, French and so on and so forth,
• 1:00:46
  Speaker 1: and the person would think, hey, this person is a studio, sorry,
• 1:00:50
  Speaker 1: an academic, so what is she doing with all?
• 1:00:53
  Speaker 2: Something's not right?
• 1:00:54
  Speaker 1: Right, So give them a chance to investigate. But that
• 1:00:58
  Speaker 1: should be a fair chance to investigate, meaning they knew
• 1:01:01
  Speaker 1: everything about me before they napped me. From my side,
• 1:01:05
  Speaker 1: so I've been very open to them right from the start,
• 1:01:08
  Speaker 1: from March twenty twenty four. I've informed them A to
• 1:01:11
  Speaker 1: Z everything. So I said, okay, fine, you know, maybe
• 1:01:17
  Speaker 1: you'll run your you run your things. But their interest
• 1:01:21
  Speaker 1: during the second time has only been to restrict anything
• 1:01:27
  Speaker 1: that I'm doing. So that's wrong because now it's been
• 1:01:30
  Speaker 1: nearly three years. So either you charge me and we
• 1:01:34
  Speaker 1: deal with this in the court, or you let me
• 1:01:38
  Speaker 1: go either way. But what's happened for me personally during
• 1:01:44
  Speaker 1: these two years is that I've grown. I've learned a
• 1:01:48
  Speaker 1: lot more about how these people work. So when I
• 1:01:52
  Speaker 1: say security services, what I've learned now is there is
• 1:01:55
  Speaker 1: a special wing and special thought process. Okay, no, let's
• 1:02:02
  Speaker 1: let me let me explain it this way. When they
• 1:02:05
  Speaker 1: were interviewing me, the feeling that what I got was
• 1:02:10
  Speaker 1: this and bear with me, and this that.
• 1:02:13
  Speaker 2: These are fascists.
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 1: The and I said to them that they are fascists
• 1:02:20
  Speaker 1: the second time around, because by that time I had
• 1:02:22
  Speaker 1: confirmed my my feelings that these people said to me,
• 1:02:29
  Speaker 1: we know, we know who your friends are. They're all Russian,
• 1:02:32
  Speaker 1: Russian loving people. What kind of what what kind of
• 1:02:36
  Speaker 1: mentality is that can people not love Russia? Can people
• 1:02:40
  Speaker 1: not love Russians? Can people not have Russian wives, Russian
• 1:02:45
  Speaker 1: girlfriends or Russian husbands? So the first time around, when
• 1:02:49
  Speaker 1: they were interviewing me, there was like a literal war.
• 1:02:54
  Speaker 1: I felt a literal wall that anything to do with Russia,
• 1:02:58
  Speaker 1: anything could be very simple thing. If Russia would be
• 1:03:02
  Speaker 1: saying it's sunny today and very hot, no no, no.
• 1:03:05
  Speaker 1: Bretain would say, it's all Russian propaganda. So that was
• 1:03:08
  Speaker 1: a palpable feeling inside that interrogation room. And when you're
• 1:03:13
  Speaker 1: faced with such people, you know that you can't talk
• 1:03:17
  Speaker 1: to them because they've already been fed some sort of
• 1:03:20
  Speaker 1: a notion. And but then anyway, that was my first time,
• 1:03:25
  Speaker 1: but the second time on it was very different because
• 1:03:27
  Speaker 1: by that time I knew what they were, I knew
• 1:03:30
  Speaker 1: exactly where they were coming from.
• 1:03:32
  Speaker 2: So I just didn't give them any leeway. I explained.
• 1:03:36
  Speaker 2: I asked them that, okay, tell me.
• 1:03:39
  Speaker 1: If I have information that you know some SAS entities
• 1:03:42
  Speaker 1: are planning something of the sort in relation to Donald Trump,
• 1:03:47
  Speaker 1: who am I supposed to say and to go to
• 1:03:50
  Speaker 1: do You guess what the answer was? Guess what the
• 1:03:53
  Speaker 1: answer was? Answer was not Russia when they know at
• 1:03:59
  Speaker 1: that point the reason to feed Russia this information was
• 1:04:02
  Speaker 1: because there was direct contact between Trump and and and Putin.
• 1:04:07
  Speaker 1: So if there is any any danger to one of
• 1:04:09
  Speaker 1: the presidents with whom at that point in time we
• 1:04:12
  Speaker 1: didn't have direct or we couldn't contact at that time,
• 1:04:18
  Speaker 1: the obvious way is that you dial up the number
• 1:04:20
  Speaker 1: of I don't know Macron Macron or or or whom
• 1:04:24
  Speaker 1: whom's or whosoever who has the direct contact. But no,
• 1:04:27
  Speaker 1: the French president would be actually very happy to see
• 1:04:30
  Speaker 1: Donald down.
• 1:04:31
  Speaker 2: So whom do you go to?
• 1:04:32
  Speaker 1: Obviously President Putin? So so that's what that was his answer.
• 1:04:38
  Speaker 1: This was the answer of the of the investigating officer.
• 1:04:42
  Speaker 1: And you know, it's it's really sad, it's really sad.
• 1:04:46
  Speaker 1: So if they've if they've got, if they've got this
• 1:04:51
  Speaker 1: sort of mentality towards security, then that's you know, then
• 1:04:55
  Speaker 1: Breton is in very great danger, and which it is,
• 1:04:59
  Speaker 1: which we are see.
• 1:05:00
  Speaker 3: Britain is in extreme danger and this is becoming ever
• 1:05:05
  Speaker 3: more obvious. It's why the UK colin does what it
• 1:05:08
  Speaker 3: does to warn people about the changes in this society.
• 1:05:13
  Speaker 3: It is very clear to me that a dictatorship is
• 1:05:16
  Speaker 3: installing itself very very quickly, and people really need to
• 1:05:23
  Speaker 3: wake up as to what dangers are. I'm not going
• 1:05:27
  Speaker 3: to go off on a tangent, but I will save
• 1:05:31
  Speaker 3: people want one two subjects to pay attention to. One
• 1:05:35
  Speaker 3: is free speech, the suppression of speech, free speech, and
• 1:05:39
  Speaker 3: the other one is definitely the major attack by Lord
• 1:05:43
  Speaker 3: Levison and David Lammy on jury trial. So they are
• 1:05:49
  Speaker 3: very very serious things unfolding in this country. But you
• 1:05:53
  Speaker 3: deep to have hit the nail on the head by saying, well,
• 1:05:55
  Speaker 3: we've got these intelligence services, or use the expression, they
• 1:06:01
  Speaker 3: seem to be completely reframed to have a particular view
• 1:06:06
  Speaker 3: of life, which you could say is itself a fascist view,
• 1:06:12
  Speaker 3: because this is not about preserving a democracy. It's about
• 1:06:17
  Speaker 3: suppressing free speech which could protect people. Those are my words.
• 1:06:22
  Speaker 3: So you might not agree with that, but no.
• 1:06:25
  Speaker 1: No, I no, because you see, no, I agree with that.
• 1:06:28
  Speaker 1: I agree entirely with that. It's just because you know,
• 1:06:31
  Speaker 1: as I said, when I began with twenty twenty two
• 1:06:33
  Speaker 1: SMO matter, I knew nothing at that time. Okay, I've grown.
• 1:06:38
  Speaker 1: So it's like you're given a new project and then
• 1:06:40
  Speaker 1: you start reading, doing the referencing. You know, reading the
• 1:06:44
  Speaker 1: literature and using your brains and evaluating so well from
• 1:06:48
  Speaker 1: twenty to twenty two to twenty twenty six. Today I
• 1:06:52
  Speaker 1: can say definitely what's going on within the British security
• 1:06:55
  Speaker 1: services and the establishment. Essentially it's our understanding and we
• 1:07:02
  Speaker 1: have connecting dots to that that after this all is
• 1:07:06
  Speaker 1: to do since after World War Two, operational thinkingful part
• 1:07:12
  Speaker 1: of it, but essentially the security services were entirely for
• 1:07:18
  Speaker 1: one reason or the other, you know, obsessed with the
• 1:07:22
  Speaker 1: fact that they needed a post war occupation, meaning they
• 1:07:25
  Speaker 1: needed an enemy after the war, and that enemy has
• 1:07:29
  Speaker 1: to be Russia, and that that enemy has to and
• 1:07:34
  Speaker 1: Germany has to be the ally converted slowly.
• 1:07:36
  Speaker 2: Into ally and and.
• 1:07:38
  Speaker 1: There's a whole lot of you know, whitewashing the Nazism
• 1:07:42
  Speaker 1: part in this as well, where basically you are justifying
• 1:07:46
  Speaker 1: the crimes that were committed by ultra you know, nationalists
• 1:07:54
  Speaker 1: in all areas essentially, as you've seen, must have seen
• 1:07:57
  Speaker 1: recently about Poland, what has happened with and Zelensky. So
• 1:08:01
  Speaker 1: Zeennsky is trying to whitewash the crimes done by Melnick
• 1:08:04
  Speaker 1: for instance, or you know, Bandera is a hero, so
• 1:08:08
  Speaker 1: I don't know if you if people here know that
• 1:08:11
  Speaker 1: eight thousand of SS people Ukrainian SS were in the
• 1:08:18
  Speaker 1: United Kingdom having pensions until very recently, and the Met
• 1:08:22
  Speaker 1: Police was investigating that, and that investigation was was what
• 1:08:27
  Speaker 1: was stopped. And these people were absorbed within the in
• 1:08:31
  Speaker 1: the mi I six and these people were absorbed in
• 1:08:35
  Speaker 1: the FCDO and no wonder, we've got the second generation
• 1:08:39
  Speaker 1: of the same Nazis here. So this is not something
• 1:08:43
  Speaker 1: I'm going to. This is a very well established conclusion
• 1:08:48
  Speaker 1: that I've arrived to in terms of joining the dots,
• 1:08:52
  Speaker 1: that this is not that these people don't know know
• 1:08:55
  Speaker 1: these are fascists, These are these are fascist pockets within
• 1:08:59
  Speaker 1: the United Kingdom Security Services that unless we resolve and
• 1:09:04
  Speaker 1: face them front of Come on. There is an article
• 1:09:06
  Speaker 1: yesterday with Sam Kylie. Look at the language the person uses.
• 1:09:13
  Speaker 1: I mean, what kind of an Oxford or Cambridge graduate
• 1:09:17
  Speaker 1: uses that kind of a language. Professor Jade McGlynn, she's
• 1:09:22
  Speaker 1: an Oxford professor. Look at the language they use. Okay,
• 1:09:27
  Speaker 1: So I'm sorry, this is not you know, this is
• 1:09:30
  Speaker 1: not this is inexcusable because they're doing so at the
• 1:09:34
  Speaker 1: expense of the people here, common people who know, you know,
• 1:09:39
  Speaker 1: who don't know the granularity of the scenario, and they
• 1:09:43
  Speaker 1: are literally branding all the entire version, the entire British
• 1:09:48
  Speaker 1: population as as if it's them, And that's not true
• 1:09:54
  Speaker 1: because there are people here who are absolutely who know
• 1:09:58
  Speaker 1: the truth, who are not like that, very polite.
• 1:10:00
  Speaker 2: And they want to preserve their.
• 1:10:03
  Speaker 1: Culture and want to use diplomacy and dialogue and they're
• 1:10:06
  Speaker 1: not these you know, blood thirsty Russian blood sucking people.
• 1:10:13
  Speaker 2: So I'm sorry.
• 1:10:14
  Speaker 1: But the conclusion that the unit has a right to
• 1:10:16
  Speaker 1: do is this that fcdo and MI six and other
• 1:10:20
  Speaker 1: security services have got serious problem with the infestation of
• 1:10:23
  Speaker 1: serious fascist bloods in a sorry fresciest groups in there
• 1:10:27
  Speaker 1: who are completely and utterly against Russians. And there is
• 1:10:33
  Speaker 1: no other conclusion to this.
• 1:10:35
  Speaker 3: This is a very key point that you deeps in.
• 1:10:37
  Speaker 3: It takes us into the the need to look and
• 1:10:44
  Speaker 3: discuss the Ukraine War in war detail, because you spent
• 1:10:49
  Speaker 3: a huge amount of time with your colleagues looking at
• 1:10:52
  Speaker 3: the fermenting of that war, how the war was actually
• 1:10:57
  Speaker 3: brought to fruition. You've looked at the the role of
• 1:11:01
  Speaker 3: the Nazi elements inside Ukraine, and then we've seen the
• 1:11:06
  Speaker 3: massive expansion of the war as a result of the
• 1:11:09
  Speaker 3: West's support in ammunition and munitions in order to make
• 1:11:16
  Speaker 3: sure that the war continues to run. And many people,
• 1:11:21
  Speaker 3: of course have said they've been happy to do that
• 1:11:23
  Speaker 3: until the last Ukrainian so the Russian deaths don't matter
• 1:11:29
  Speaker 3: at all to the West. They will gloat at the
• 1:11:31
  Speaker 3: Russian deaths, but they're also prepared for the Ukrainian, the
• 1:11:38
  Speaker 3: male population of Ukraine to be slaughtered in continuing this
• 1:11:43
  Speaker 3: war against the Russians. I'm going to make a suggestion
• 1:11:47
  Speaker 3: that we do stop fairly shortly, because I'd definitely like
• 1:11:52
  Speaker 3: to be talking to you in a lot more detail
• 1:11:56
  Speaker 3: about the work that you've done, what you've discs gothered
• 1:12:00
  Speaker 3: about Ukraine. I have looked at certain documents of interest
• 1:12:06
  Speaker 3: to refresh my mind, and I think that there's a
• 1:12:08
  Speaker 3: lot of the summaries that you put together would be
• 1:12:11
  Speaker 3: a good place to do that. But I think for
• 1:12:15
  Speaker 3: this opening section we've we've really done it because you've
• 1:12:22
  Speaker 3: given our audience the background of you deep Tea as
• 1:12:26
  Speaker 3: a lady, an academic who stepped forward to say there's
• 1:12:30
  Speaker 3: something going on. You've investigated, and then you find yourself
• 1:12:33
  Speaker 3: working at a pretty serious level, which has now got
• 1:12:37
  Speaker 3: you up against the intelligence services in UK I will
• 1:12:43
  Speaker 3: say that I'm not surprised at the way you've been
• 1:12:47
  Speaker 3: treated because I've felt for a great many years that
• 1:12:53
  Speaker 3: our country is not what we believe it to be,
• 1:12:58
  Speaker 3: and we have a group of individuals who are controlling
• 1:13:02
  Speaker 3: things in this country who should be brought to book.
• 1:13:05
  Speaker 3: But if you shine a spotlight on what they're doing,
• 1:13:08
  Speaker 3: then yes, this means that you are going to come
• 1:13:11
  Speaker 3: under the interest of whatever it is SO fifteen or
• 1:13:17
  Speaker 3: the Intelligence services themselves or the METS police. And I
• 1:13:23
  Speaker 3: can say to the audience that I have had the
• 1:13:26
  Speaker 3: police not only in my house but also at the
• 1:13:29
  Speaker 3: UK Column studios on a number of occasions simply because
• 1:13:34
  Speaker 3: of our reporting or matters we would have thought the
• 1:13:39
  Speaker 3: police would have been desperate to take the information we had.
• 1:13:42
  Speaker 3: And what am I talking about. I'm talking about the
• 1:13:44
  Speaker 3: abuse of children. And indeed you have mentioned that there
• 1:13:51
  Speaker 3: are links to the trafficking and abuse of children with
• 1:13:55
  Speaker 3: what's actually going on in Ukraine. So maybe we're finding
• 1:13:59
  Speaker 3: a bit of common ground and there. But DT can
• 1:14:01
  Speaker 3: I thank you for joining me. It's been a really interesting,
• 1:14:07
  Speaker 3: very serious discussion a very interesting discussion and I look
• 1:14:11
  Speaker 3: forward to getting into more detail about Ukraine and the
• 1:14:16
  Speaker 3: special military operation with you.
• 1:14:19
  Speaker 2: Yeah, thank you Brian for leaving me the opportunity. Thank
• 1:14:21
  Speaker 2: you