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China, the US and the Future of Democracy with Christopher Walker · China Considered

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>> Elizabeth Economy: Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh
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insights and informed discussion to one of the most consequential issues of our time,
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how China is changing and changing the world.
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I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove, senior fellow and co-director of the US, China and
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the World Program at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
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Today I'm delighted to welcome Chris Walker.
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He's the Vice President for Studies and
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Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy.
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He's also well known for having coined the term China sharp power.
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He's written extensively on authoritarianism and democracy, and
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his most recent book is Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power,
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which he co edited with Will Dobson and Tarek Massoud.
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Welcome, Chris.
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>> Christopher Walker: Thanks so much, Liz.
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It's great to be with you.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me start off with, I think,
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just the foundational question,
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which is why do we care whether another state is authoritarian or democratic?
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How does it actually affect US Economic interests or national security?
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>> Christopher Walker: So thanks very much for that fundamental question.
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There are three things I would cite.
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The first is that democracies tend to be more secure.
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As a practical matter, the evidence tells us they don't fight wars with each other.
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They also have the mechanisms internally to channel
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discontent through institutions in ways that temper wild
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swings that you might find in non democratic settings.
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Democracies also tend to be safer.
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We can think of Amarche Sen's observation that there aren't famines in democracies.
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And then critically, democracies tend to be more prosperous and
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free and open societies with rule of law,
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the evidence tells us, deliver more prosperity.
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And I think it's fair to say just on the other side of the ledger,
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repressive regimes tend to perform more poorly on human development indicators.
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And all of these things were down to the benefit of,
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of democracies in the United States in terms of who their partners are and
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how we can advance our own prosperity.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: So you're sort of arguing that US Business benefits from
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this, our security benefits from this.
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But what about China?
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I mean, it's a, it's a country that you've written a lot about.
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And one could argue that China has been, you know, stable for the past, you know,
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several decades, that it certainly has had an incredible economic rise and,
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you know, at least 600 million people might be considered prosperous out
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of 1.2 billion people.
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Does China defy your, your case, your argument?
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>> Christopher Walker: Well, China, of course, is in a way a sui generis case.
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There are very few examples of societies that have operated
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without political rights, that have generated economic growth.
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Of course, some Observers have asked how much more prosperous China might have
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been had the system been open with the rule of law rather than the path it took.
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It's a counterfactual.
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We won't know.
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I think it's also fair to say that the price of that economic
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growth has also been enormous in terms of the brutality
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leveled against minorities in the country,
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not least the Uyghur community, the sacrificing of rights that so
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many have had to make a part of the bargain.
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And I think we're also seeing now some real question marks about whether this
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bargain of sacrificing or ceding political rights and freedom of expression and
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the like for economic growth is starting to hit some real bumps.
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The levers at the disposal of the leadership to pivot are pretty limited,
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and we're seeing, among other things, deep problems in the financial sector,
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the real estate sector, extraordinarily high levels of youth unemployment,
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by some measures upwards of 30%.
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And I think all of this speaks to what are, in a way,
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the limitations of systems that don't permit meaningful competition and
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freedom of expression and other basic values that you would find in democracies.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, I mean that's a fair point.
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I suppose a lot of people make the case that, you know, China's fastest, you know,
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period of fastest economic growth certainly happened when it was more open,
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you know, during the period of Deng Xiaoping and
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Jiang Zemin up through Hu Jintao.
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And, you know, we've seen a partly natural slowdown of growth,
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but also, I think, to your point, probably much of many of
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the repressive measures that Xi Jinping has taken have, in fact,
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constrained some important sectors of the Chinese economy.
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And so that's, I think, a reasonable argument to make.
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But I guess time will only tell whether.
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Whether the Chinese leadership is able to pivot and, you know, revitalize
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the Chinese economy for yet another round of impressive economic growth.
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Go ahead. Sorry.
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>> Christopher Walker: I was going to say, in a sense,
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one of the things to keep an eye on, not only in China, but
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other systems where the leadership has offered this bargain,
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such as it is, is to the extent the economy slows and
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performance legitimacy is challenged, you invariably see more repression.
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And this is happening across a host of authoritarian regimes.
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And then related to this, and
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coming back to your original question about the advantages of democracies,
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I think you can also see people voting with their feet.
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And in so many of these cases, if we step back away from China for
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a moment and look at settings like Venezuela or Russia,
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people are not beating a path to these countries?
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On the contrary.
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And the numbers suggest in China's case as well,
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that the outflow of people looking for opportunity in other parts of the world,
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often in democracies, is outstripping anyone,
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the numbers of people looking to find their way to the prc.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, I think that is a good point.
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So let's focus on China a little bit more because it's the country that certainly
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the first Trump administration and the Biden administration both identified
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as posing sort of the greatest long term strategic threat to the United States.
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Do you agree with that?
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What do you see as sorta the elements of China's policy that are most
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challenging for the United States?
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What do you see as China's objectives really with regard to the US Policy?
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>> Christopher Walker: So I think the objective at a basic level is China
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seeking to displace the US as the world's most influential country.
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And part of this, as China has methodically asserted itself globally,
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is to pull countries into its orbit and through that process gain privileged
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access to markets, ports, natural resources and the like from governments
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that then are technologically and economically dependent on Beijing.
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We've done a good deal of work on the technological aspirations of
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the Chinese leadership and how this plays out across the globe.
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And of course, to the extent that ambition is successful.
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This will play to the disadvantage of the US And
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I think at least over the last decade or so, the United States
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has taken a more clear eyed look at the China challenge.
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But the scope and comprehensiveness, the domains in which China is operating,
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I think calls for even greater attention the US and
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its partners, to make sure that we don't slip behind.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: When you talk about the technological aspect, you're talking
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about the digital Silk Road, China's efforts to sort of deploy everything
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from subsea cables all the way to satellite systems throughout emerging and
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middle income economies, >> Christopher Walker: for sure.
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I think part of what we've seen, just to allude to a couple
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of things we've done in the recent past, is a very coherent playbook for
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spreading technology of Chinese origin around the world.
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And that includes providing incentives,
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having know how accompany the hardware that China makes available,
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particularly so in the developing world in Africa, and
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a lot of state subsidies that undergird that to provide an advantage.
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Now, what also accompanies this technology, and
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this is something for the US and other free societies to keep in mind,
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is capabilities and affordances for censorship and
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surveillance that's typically baked into these systems.
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And on that count, there often is an inadequate understanding of exactly
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what's coming along with these tech packages in the settings they're arriving.
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And this cries out for greater information and
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discussion of both the way in which deals around tech are consummated,
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but at the same time understanding the tech itself.
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Just last week we sounded the alarm with a report titled
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Data Centric Authoritarianism that focused on the next
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generation of technologies that China's prioritizing that
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could really give the PRC a leg up in areas including, but
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not limited to AI surveillance tech, different sorts of applications,
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neuro and immersive technologies, quantum tech and digital currencies.
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And Valentin Weber, who authored this report for us, really stressed the need
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for the free world to pay more attention to China's ambitions in this regard.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, I want to come back to, you know, what you think the U.S.
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and its, you know, partners and its allies should be doing.
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But I do want to ask then, you know, the Trump administration started with,
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you know, the first Trump administration, you know, had its clean network effort.
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The Biden administration, I think was called Trusted Network.
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So there has been some effort on the U.S. side to compete, I think with Huawei,
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with ZTE, with other Chinese providers of digital infrastructure.
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Have you seen any that the US has made any headway in this competition?
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>> Christopher Walker: So I think both the US and
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Europe alike have made efforts in this sphere.
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There's Still a lot more to do, I think,
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both in terms of the scope of the challenge,
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the efforts to have clean networks essentially to afford opportunities for
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use of technology that doesn't have the affordances.
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And in a sense, the baggage that comes along with technology of
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Chinese origin is going to shape the future of freedom and
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democratic governance around the world.
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So I think, if anything, we need to step up those efforts in
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ways that are commensurate with the challenge.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, and I wanna come and have you talk a little bit about
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what the National Endowment for Democracy is doing in this space and in others.
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But first, let me just pop in a question about sharp power,
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because I think you were the first to use this.
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It's become part of every China Watcher, China App analyst,
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government official, of the lexicon that we use when we talk about sort of the,
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the range of Chinese power from soft to sharp to hard.
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What is actually sharp power and how does China exercise it and
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what should the US Be doing to counter it?
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>> Christopher Walker: So fundamentally, the effects of sharp power limit free
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expression, curb pluralism, and distort the political environment.
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And just to talk about how we got to that point and made the case for
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something different than either soft or hard power,
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this really came about from things we were seeing out in the field.
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Many of the groups we work with and
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support were referencing engagement first and foremost from China,
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but it's also true with Russia, which has pretty sweeping
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investments in non kinetic forms of influence around the world.
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But China certainly was at the top of the pyramid in terms when
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coming to the scope and depth of engagement around the world.
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And contrary to this idea that engagement in media or
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education or culture was simply resulting in greater
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mutual understanding or helping to persuade or attract,
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we often found that the features of this engagement had significant
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elements of political censorship, of monopolizing.
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The partner organizations that were engaging with
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PRC actors were their surrogates.
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And it, it simply wasn't fitting cleanly or
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coherently in any sort of rubric that was out there.
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And it was slowly being brought to scale.
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And so the more we thought about it and
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the more we looked at what we were coming across,
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we were finding far too many instances of where there were efforts to
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sideline discussion, intimidate partners, coerce partners.
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And it led us to, I feel pretty strongly that it would be useful
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to have a different way of thinking about this,
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at a minimum to stimulate more concerted discussion on these issues.
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And I have to say the Australians were really at the front of the line on this.
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And we had some terrific contributors to our work,
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including the scholar John Fitzgerald,
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who contributed to our Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power.
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I might just mention one of the things he cites in the chapter.
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Chapter in the book is going back now, two decades ago
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when he was testifying before the Australian Senate and
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he alluded to the case of Chen Yong Lin in 2005.
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And this was a junior PRC diplomat who had sought
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asylum in the PRCs in Sydney at the time, and
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through those conversations had outlined the extensive network of CCD.
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The efforts and agents in Australia that were monitoring Chinese Australian
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activists and religious believers through the PRC's Sydney consulate.
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And it was among the first instances where there
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was a public airing of the sort of manipulative and
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coercive efforts that fall under the sharp power rubric.
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I would argue.
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And Fitzgerald made the case ultimately that through the really good
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work of investigative journalists and academics in Australia,
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they in essence unearthed what was a, what he called an integrative
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network of control that was being operated by China within Australia, a democracy.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: But so just to put maybe get a little bit more granular.
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So China uses basically the strength of its market,
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of its economy to do what it buys meat into media, into local media.
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And shapes the narrative.
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What kind of pressure would it bring on, you know,
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Chinese citizens that it's spying on?
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So it's more than just the spying on them.
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Right. It's trying to shape their behavior in
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some way.
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>> Christopher Walker: So that's true, I think, maybe just sticking with
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the political censorship angle and the free expression angle.
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Another incredible case in the Australian context,
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which squares with other things we've seen subsequently.
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It was about a decade ago that the Australian Broadcasting Company
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engaged in what seemed to be pretty straightforward
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partnership with Chinese state media,
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essentially to share content in both directions.
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But one of the secret components of the deal they agreed to
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at the time was to suppress the Mandarin service of the abc.
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And that only came out after the fact.
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It was a scandal.
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It was unearthed by journalists in Australia.
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And I think the notion that decision makers at an independent
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media institution operating within a democracy would
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concede that sort of thing was also an indication a,
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of the ambition of the Chinese side essentially to limit speech or
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the capability of covering issues that the Chinese
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authorities feel should be off limits and to seek to induce
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partners in open societies to take that kind of action.
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So that's one part of it, of course.
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Similarly pernicious.
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Even more pernicious are the examples in any number of settings.
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We've seen this in Canada, Australia,
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the US of intimidation of people within free societies.
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What is effectively transnational repression to
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either do the bidding of the Chinese party state or.
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Or to hold their tongues on certain issues.
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And I think this has similarly been a part of the star power pattern.
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Absolutely.
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Does not fall in a soft power context.
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And this is, I think, part of what we're grappling with.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, and
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I think it's important to recognize the US has not been immune.
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Has faced its own challenges with this in a number of industries.
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I think in particular, maybe, you know, Hollywood.
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The film industry has often come under pressure from Chinese partners
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to shape the narrative, to make sure that China's not painted as the enemy or
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to ensure that a map reflects Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or
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over Taiwan, or else, you're not gonna get market access for your failure.
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>> Christopher Walker: Exactly.
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And we have a terrific chapter in the book by Aynne Kokas of the University
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of Virginia who looks at the challenge in Hollywood.
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And I think one of the things we have to reckon with at
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this point is to the extent key institutions or
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figures within them internalize the wishes of the party state,
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that is to say, in the entertainment industry.
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And I think this transcends Hollywood.
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I think it's true in other parts of the world that something that is perceived to
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be undesirable or wouldn't be welcomed by Beijing would never even be thought about,
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say, by a screenwriter or scriptwriter in the first instance.
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And so then you've achieved what's in essence,
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the anaconda and the chandelier at scale by having
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the internalization of the wishes of authoritarian powers.
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And I think this is something we see even in the very difficult
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decisions that authors make when their books are published and
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then translated to reach markets within the prc.
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I think more often than not these days, for certain issues,
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they will accede to the preferences of the editors in Beijing.
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And there, too, just as a theoretical exercise, over time, if we keep
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widening the circle of topics or issues that are understood to the off limits
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from the perspective of the leadership in China, where will that lead us?
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15 years ago, it might have simply been Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen Square.
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Today, it surely includes, in many instances,
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issues relating to the corruption of the party leadership in China.
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In instances in other parts of the world where China's engagement
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may be running afoul of local norms, those things might not be
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covered by local news outlets who perceive it to be out of bounds.
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And I think from a freedom of expression and censorship point of view,
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there's a lot of space from the perspective of free societies to
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really think about where to draw their own bottom line and to refresh.
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Defense of freedom of expression.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: Yep.
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So, that, I think, raises an important point about.
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I think in a bigger picture, we are in the midst of a big debate in the US
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over to what extent we should support people globally who are fighting for
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their own freedom and democratic institutions.
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How do you think about this issue?
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I mean, what do you think is at stake?
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And I think you talked a bit about this right up front in
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our discussion about the value for the United States of
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having a majority of the world's countries be democracies.
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But.
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But what do you think fundamentally is at risk here?
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>> Christopher Walker: Well,
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I think there is what one could consider the noble side of the work,
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which is to support people who themselves are struggling for their own freedom.
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And this is very much in the American tradition,
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people who are looking to enjoy the rights that we're all blessed with,
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living in open and free societies.
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Why shouldn't.
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They be able to enjoy themselves.
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And if they're willing to fight for it,
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there's a very strong argument to support them in that noble endeavor.
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At the same time, there's a very practical argument for
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this, which is to say we're in a tough period right now where
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certainly the leadership in capitals like Beijing and Moscow.
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And Tehran, they're feeling their oats,
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they feel like the wind in some respects is at their back.
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And supporting people who believe in freedom helps to shine
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a light on the activities and
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the ambitions of the leadership in those countries as they do this.
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And so if we want to have a world where there's more transparency,
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where there's more freedom, there's more opportunity for innovation.
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We need more countries that are more free and enjoying liberty and
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are more prosperous, and
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we need to support natural allies who themselves are working towards that end.
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And I think the work that my colleagues and
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I have done at the National Endowment for Democracy at a top order level.
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Helps to counter threats from regimes like those in Iran and Russia,
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North Korea, Cuba and China.
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This is something we've done for years and years.
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And just talking about the challenge posed by China, as we discussed earlier.
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I would contend that the leadership in China has made pretty considerable headway
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in spreading their vision of freedom of expression and censorship globally.
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They have a very clear vision domestically.
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That's reflected in the way they brutalize independent media,
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don't permit meaningful alternative voices,
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really put the screws to any sort of independent civil society.
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In a sense, it's a regime of censorship.
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And because China now has interests around the world,
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they have clearly taken, to the extent they're able.
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And to the extent local circumstances in other countries permit that vision for
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censorship to other parts of the world.
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And so Ned has really been squarely focused on fighting
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the CCP's censorship and documenting the party states.
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For example, egregious persecution against religious minorities and
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Chinese dissidents abroad in the context of transnational repression.
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And this is as important today, I would contend,
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as it's been since the end of the Cold War.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me just take you a half a step back because you raised
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Russia, Iran, Cuba, obviously there's North Korea and Venezuela.
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To what extent do you see, and I know you testified last month
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actually on what's become considered an axis of Russia,
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Iran, North Korea and China.
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So I testified before the US economic and Security Review Commission.
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What do you see as the relationship among them?
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Are they independent actors who share a vision and
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pursue parallel opportunities and policies or
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are they in some way working together or are they learning from each other?
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How do you think about the relationship among these sort
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of leading authoritarian powers?
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>> Christopher Walker: Thanks for the question.
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I testified before the commission,
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they were grappling with this question of whether there's an axis or not.
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In a sense, I think the question, it may not be essential to answer that
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question definitively because I think what we're seeing is.
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And this is a trajectory over quite a few years,
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is unquestionably more cooperation.
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And I think part of what has emerged over time is that China's
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leadership over the last period, as we've discussed,
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has been committed to projecting more power internationally in its own right.
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But less obvious has been the extent to which China has used,
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we could call it a web of relationships with other autocracies to enhance
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leverage and where possible, to achieve multiplier effects.
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And then I would argue more generally to guide the world in a direction
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that's more friendly to the CCP's interests and preferences.
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And as Beijing over this period, say over the last 5 to 10 years, has deepened
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its strategic coordination with countries that include Russia, Iran, North Korea.
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China's also played a pretty key role in helping make the whole of
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these groupings of countries stronger than any single part.
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One example of this, which is it's such a ghastly case, but
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it's Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine where I think if you and
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I had had this chat several years ago and I had said.
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I can imagine a time where Russia was waging full scale war on Ukraine,
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Belarus was offering itself as the leadership in that country,
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as a staging area for Russia.
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Iran would be producing thousands and thousands of kamikaze drones.
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That North Korea would have thousands of soldiers on
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European soil fighting on Russia's behalf against Ukraine,
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and that China would, would be providing a range of support.
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Diplomatic material as we understand it, and
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very importantly in the information and media domain.
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Where today China's global propaganda apparatus systematically
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helps Russian arguments reverberate about the nature of the war,
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who started the war, who's responsible for it.
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And that's no small thing given the billions of dollars that the PRC
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invests annually in their outward facing communication.
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So that's just one example, but
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I think it's fair to say by just about any measure today.
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There's more of a stitching together of these authoritarian powers in
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ways that gives them more lift together rather than in any individual case.
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>> Elizabeth Economy: What do you think it would take at this point for
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the United States and together, really, with its allies and partners.
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To be able to compete effectively with, I think,
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what you've quite accurately demonstrated to be an extremely significant challenge,
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even threat to democracy and freedom on the global stage.
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>> Christopher Walker: And I really appreciate the question, Liz.
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I think the competition we're in, going back, say,
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a generation ago, has been grossly underestimated.
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And now we find ourselves in what is an intense
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competition with formidable rivals.
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And as we've discussed during the course of our conversation,
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the Chinese party state is investing across a wide range of domains.
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Of course, they're investing in the military sphere, and
31:47
the trajectory of that investment is rising.
31:50
And I think the US and other democracies properly need to
31:54
think about the sort of investments in that sphere that are.
31:59
Suitable for the environment we find ourselves in.
32:02
That's beyond my ken.
32:04
What we focused on is the non military sphere.
32:09
And there too, I think we really underestimated the level
32:14
of commitment and purpose that China.
32:17
And other authoritarian states had in this sphere in
32:21
the information technology, media, cultural education and
32:27
other such domains where they've invested very heavily.
32:32
It is by many measures in the many, many billions of dollars that
32:37
China alone is investing in the outward facing information and
32:42
communications sphere, just to give that example.
32:46
And I think we have to recognize that if we're going to be successful,
32:51
the United States and other free societies in this competition.
32:55
We also have to have a level of preparation and
32:58
investment that's commensurate to the task so
33:01
that we can compete at a higher level in the battle of ideas.
33:05
The Chinese leadership is making an argument, they're essentially
33:10
making an argument that it isn't necessary to have liberty and
33:15
freedom as an ingredient that's essential to prosperity.
33:19
I think their own experience now is starting to offer some free,
33:23
pretty rough internal contradictions about that.
33:26
But I don't think we should underestimate the sort of traction that those arguments
33:31
are getting in different parts of the world.
33:34
And if we're not in the fight competing, it's going to be very hard for
33:39
other countries to do so themselves.
33:41
And so we have a huge opportunity both to help share information and
33:47
educate the world about the ambitions of the Chinese party state,
33:52
to assert its own vision and its forms of control.
33:56
And on the one hand, and at the same time to offer an affirmative
34:01
alternative that privileges freedom and prosperity.
34:06
And I think that's where the real opportunities are going
34:09
to come in the coming period.
34:13
>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me just ask one last thing.
34:15
And I think, have painted a picture that suggests that we've
34:20
been a little bit slow off the mark, that we haven't really
34:25
appreciated I think the enormity of the challenge that is before us.
34:31
Is there anything else that you think an issue or
34:35
a topic with regard to China in particular,
34:38
tIhat where you think we're missing the reality of the story somehow.
34:43
Some issue about China that we don't really know enough about,
34:47
we need to learn more.
34:50
>> Christopher Walker: I think the issue of how China seeks to shape
34:54
the information and ideas realm is crucial because in
34:59
a sense what we've seen, it's often done subtly, but
35:04
it's become a feature of the external engagement.
35:09
All authoritarian regimes, China in this case in particular,
35:14
is trying to delegitimize the ideas and
35:18
even the political systems of the US and its allies.
35:22
And by doing that, seeking to corrode international confidence in free systems.
35:29
And I think unless we have the sorts of arguments
35:34
that can respond to what is now a systemic
35:39
strategy that Beijing has around the world.
35:44
It's going to be very hard for
35:46
all of us to have a clear eyed view of what we're up against.
35:49
And so among the wide range of issues that we're facing,
35:54
I think the challenge in the idea sphere that's on offer.
35:58
And being put out by the leadership in Beijing really deserves more granular and
36:06
focused and systemic attention from all of us.
36:12
>> Elizabeth Economy: Well, Chris, I want to thank you really on several fronts.
36:16
First, just for reminding us why democracy and freedom matter so
36:22
much and matter not only just for us here in the United States.
36:27
But it matters to us that other countries are able to share the opportunities and
36:34
benefits that derive from free and open societies.
36:38
And thank you too for your sobering analysis of
36:43
the challenge that we face in protecting those values and
36:49
rights that we have had for so long, and for your call to arms.
36:55
And for your articulation of what we need to do now to
37:00
push back against authoritarian countries that
37:05
seek to undermine freedom and democracy.
37:09
And replicate their own societies and their own values and interests globally.
37:14
So thanks for coming on the podcast and for delivering such a powerful message.
37:18
>> Christopher Walker: Thank you so much for this opportunity.
37:20
I'm sorry if it was maybe too sobering, but in a sense,
37:25
if we're not able to frame and see a challenge clearly,
37:29
it's really hard to devise a response that can meet that challenge.
37:35
So I really appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today.
37:38
Liz, >> Elizabeth Economy: thanks again.
37:41
If you enjoyed this podcast and want to hear more reason, discourse and
37:44
debate on China.
37:45
I encourage you to subscribe to China Considered via
37:48
The Hoover Institution YouTube channel or podcast platform of your choice.
37:51
In our next episode, I'll be speaking with Matt Turpin,
37:54
visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and
37:56
former Senior National Security Official in the first Trump Admin.
38:01
>> Presenter: This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
38:05
where we generate and promote ideas advancing freedom.
38:09
For more information about our work, to hear more of our podcasts or
38:13
view our video content, please visit hoover.org.
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