Latest / The Manufacturing Podcast with Fexingo: Factories, Supply Chains, and Industrial Business / How Boeing's Factory Workers Build the 737 Max
Transcript
- Lucas: So there's this number that I keep coming back to when I think about Boeing's 737 Max production — one point eight inches per minute. That's how fast the final assembly line moves in Renton. Luna: Wait, the whole line? Like the planes move along a conveyor? Lucas: Not exactly. The planes are on a moving line, but they're pulled by a tug system. Each station gets about 50 minutes of work, and then the line advances 18 feet. The speed is calibrated so that every 50 minutes, a new position opens up. It's a classic lean manufacturing idea — takt time. Luna: And the target is something like 60 planes a month now, right? That's what Boeing has been aiming for in 2026. Lucas: Yeah, 60 per month is the target. They hit 38 in early 2024 after the Alaska Airlines door plug blowout, and they've been ramping slowly. But the thing is, Renton is a huge plant — it's over a million square feet — and it's been producing 737s since the 1960s. The workforce there is deeply experienced. But the pressure to hit rate targets has caused real problems. Luna: And I think the Alaska incident really brought that into focus. The door plug was a Spirit AeroSystems fuselage, but Boeing's own inspectors missed it. So it's not just a supplier issue. Lucas: Right. It's a systems issue. And I want to talk about the workers themselves. Boeing's Renton plant employs about 12,000 people, most of them unionized under the International Association of Machinists. The average mechanic there makes about $40 an hour. That's a solid middle-class wage, but the work is incredibly demanding. Luna: What does a typical day look like for someone on the line? Lucas: So imagine you're a mechanic on the final assembly line. You're assigned to a specific station — say, installing the flight deck or connecting the hydraulic systems. You have about 50 minutes to complete your tasks before the line moves. If you're late, the whole line slows down. And Boeing tracks every minute of delay. There's a metric called 'out-of-station work' — work that wasn't finished in its assigned position. That number went way up during the Max crisis. Luna: So speed creates a culture where people skip steps or rush inspections. Lucas: Exactly. And there's a famous example from the 2019 whistleblower reports: mechanics said they were pressured to sign off on work that hadn't been done. That's the kind of thing that happens when the line is moving and you can't stop it. Boeing has since tried to change the incentive structure. They've moved away from purely production-based bonuses and added quality metrics. Luna: But how do you actually change behavior on a line that's been running the same way for 50 years? Lucas: It's hard. One thing Boeing did was introduce 'quality stand-downs' — they'd stop the entire line for a day and have teams review procedures. They also increased the number of inspectors. But here's the thing: the 737 has 367,000 parts. You can't inspect every one. You have to rely on the culture. Luna: And that culture was shaped by the merger with McDonnell Douglas in the 1990s. There's a lot of analysis that says McDonnell Douglas brought a cost-cutting mentality that eroded Boeing's engineering-first ethos. Lucas: Yeah, that's a well-known argument. And it's not just the factory floor — it's the design decisions. The 737 Max was originally supposed to be a clean-sheet design, but Boeing wanted to keep the common type rating with older 737s so airlines wouldn't have to retrain pilots. That led to the MCAS system being a patch on an old airframe. Luna: So the factory is bearing the consequences of design compromises made years earlier. Lucas: Exactly. And now, in 2026, Boeing is trying to rebuild trust. The FAA has capped production at 38 per month for a while, and Boeing has to prove it can run a clean line. There are FAA inspectors stationed at Renton full-time. So every time a mechanic does a torque check, there's oversight. Luna: That has to slow things down. What's the mood like among the workers? Lucas: Mixed. Some appreciate the focus on quality. Others feel like they're being micromanaged after years of being pushed to go faster. And there's a generational divide, too. The older workers remember when Boeing was the gold standard. Younger workers came in during a period of crisis. So there's a cultural tension. Luna: Is there any data on turnover? Are they losing experienced people? Lucas: Boeing doesn't publish breakdowns for Renton specifically, but I've seen reports that after the Alaska incident, retirements spiked. Some of the most experienced mechanics took buyouts. That's a real problem because the tribal knowledge of how to fit a fuselage section or align a wing is incredibly hard to document. Luna: And Spirit AeroSystems is building the fuselages in Wichita. Boeing recently announced plans to reacquire Spirit. That's a huge shift — they outsourced that work decades ago. Lucas: Yeah, that's a big deal. The logic was that outsourcing would save money. But it created a handoff problem. The fuselages arrive by rail from Wichita, and if there's a defect, Boeing discovers it on the line. That's late in the process. Bringing Spirit back in-house is going to take years, and it'll require a massive facility expansion at Renton or elsewhere. Luna: So part of the solution is vertical integration. Lucas: Exactly. And it's not just Boeing. Airbus also faced quality issues on the A220 because of supplier parts. But Boeing's case is more extreme because the 737 Max is such a high-volume program. They can't afford to stop. Luna: I want to ask about the financial side. Boeing has been burning cash for years. How does the factory fit into that? Lucas: Renton is a profit center in theory, but the cost of rework and delays has been enormous. Every time Boeing has to rework a plane after it leaves the line, that's thousands of hours of labor. Some analysts estimate that the Alaska incident alone cost Boeing over a billion dollars in lost production and compensation. Luna: And the share price has been under pressure. But if they can get the line running smoothly, the margins on each 737 are supposed to be healthy — list price around $100 million, though airlines never pay that. Lucas: Right, the actual transaction price is lower, but still profitable per plane. The key is volume. Boeing needs to deliver 50-plus planes per month to cover its fixed costs. At 38, they're basically treading water. Luna: So there's this tension between the financial need for speed and the operational need for quality. And the workers are caught in the middle. Lucas: Exactly. And I think that's the story that doesn't get told enough. The 737 Max is a marvel of industrial engineering — the line itself is incredibly sophisticated. But it's run by humans who face real trade-offs every day. And the decisions made in boardrooms directly affect what happens on the factory floor. Luna: Speaking of decisions that affect the show — we've been doing these episodes for a while now, and they're ad-free. A couple of dollars a month is genuinely what keeps these going — buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo, if you've gotten something out of them. Lucas: Yeah, it's a small thing that makes a real difference. And it helps us keep doing deep dives like this. Luna: Alright, back to Renton. So what's the single most important thing Boeing could do to improve quality on the line? Lucas: I think it's giving workers more authority to stop the line without penalty. Toyota does this with the 'andon cord' — any worker can pull it and halt production if they see a problem. Boeing has a version of that, but in practice, workers have been afraid to use it because of pressure from managers. If they really empower the workforce, that would signal a genuine culture change. Luna: Has there been any move toward that in the last year? Lucas: Some. Boeing has added more quality inspectors and they've done training on 'speak up' culture. But it's still early. The real test will be when the FAA lifts the production cap and Boeing starts ramping again. If they can maintain quality at 50 or 60 planes a month, that's the proof. Luna: And what about the union? The machinists' contract expires in 2028. That could be another flashpoint. Lucas: Absolutely. The union has been vocal about safety and workload. In the 2024 negotiations, they got some quality of life improvements, but the base wage was still below inflation for many. If Boeing pushes for higher production without addressing worker concerns, they could see strikes or higher turnover. Luna: So it's not just a manufacturing problem — it's a human resources problem. Lucas: Exactly. And that's the lesson from Renton: the factory is a system of people, machines, and processes. If any one part breaks, the whole thing fails. And right now, they're still recovering from a major break. Luna: What's the one number that captures that recovery? Lucas: I'd say the defect rate per plane. Before 2019, it was around 0.8 defects per plane at delivery. After the Max grounding, it spiked. In 2025, Boeing reported it was down to 0.5. If they can get below 0.3, that's world-class. That's the metric I'd watch. Luna: And that's the kind of thing investors should look for, not just delivery numbers. Lucas: Yeah, because if defects are low, the line can run smoothly. If they're high, you get delays and rework, which eats into margins. It's a leading indicator. Luna: So next time someone asks you about Boeing, ask how many defects per plane they're seeing. Lucas: That's the takeaway. A simple number that tells you more than any press release.