Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / Hostages, Secret Deals & Covert Wars 1980s | Part 3/5 | Epic Fury Series
Transcript
- 0:16On the 4th of November 1979, a group of Iranian students scaled
- 0:21the walls of the United States Embassy compound in Tehran and
- 0:24seized it. They took 66 American diplomats
- 0:28and staff hostage. They call the building the Den
- 0:31of spies. They said they would hold the
- 0:33hostages until the United States returned to Shah, who had been
- 0:36admitted to an American Hospital for cancer treatment, to face
- 0:40revolutionary justice in Iran. The hostages would not be
- 0:43released for 444 days. That crisis and everything that
- 0:48followed from it marked the beginning of a covert war
- 0:50between Washington and Tehran that would run through the 1980s
- 0:54in ways that were sometimes barely visible to the American
- 0:56public and sometimes spectacularly, embarrassingly
- 1:00exposed. It produced one of the most
- 1:02daring and disastrous military operations in American history.
- 1:06It produced a secret arms deal that nearly brought down a
- 1:09presidency. It produced intelligence sharing
- 1:12that helped Iraq deploy chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers
- 1:16by the 10s of thousands. And it established a pattern of
- 1:19covert engagement with Iran, secret channels, backroom deals,
- 1:23and off the books operations that would define the
- 1:25relationship between the two countries for decades.
- 1:28This is episode 3 of the CIA and Iran bonus series, Hostages,
- 1:33secret deals, and the Covert Wars of the 1980s.
- 1:37To understand the hostage crisis fully, you have to understand
- 1:40the sequence of events that led to it.
- 1:42Because the students climbing the embassy walls were not the
- 1:45beginning, they were a consequence.
- 1:48The beginning was the revolution itself and the question it posed
- 1:51for both Washington and Tehran about what came next.
- 1:55When Khomeini returned to Iran in February 1979 and Islamic
- 1:59Republic was proclaimed, the Carter administration faced a
- 2:02foreign policy problem of enormous complexity.
- 2:06The government of a country that had been one of America's
- 2:08closest regional partners for 26 years have been swept away by a
- 2:12popular revolution whose leadership was vehemently anti
- 2:15American. The new government was
- 2:17internally fractured. There were nationalists,
- 2:20Marxists, religious liberals and hardline Islamists all competing
- 2:23for power under the broad umbrella of the revolutionary
- 2:26coalition. Some American officials believe
- 2:29the working relationship might still be possible.
- 2:32Others were more pessimistic. The debate within the
- 2:35administration about how to approach the Islamic Republic
- 2:39was unresolved when the crisis that settled and erupted.
- 2:42The Shah, Mohammad Rezapalavi, had left Iran in January 1979
- 2:46and spent the following months traveling between countries,
- 2:49Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas, Mexico, searching for somewhere
- 2:54that would receive him permanently.
- 2:56By October 1979, he was seriously ill.
- 3:00He had cancer that required treatment, and his doctors
- 3:03believed only American Medical facilities could provide the
- 3:06care he needed. Henry Kissinger and David
- 3:09Rockefeller, among others, lobbied the Carter
- 3:11administration directly and persistently to admit the Shah
- 3:15to the United States on humanitarian grounds.
- 3:18Carter was deeply reluctant. He understood clearly what
- 3:21admitting the Shah would mean. In Tehran, he reportedly asked
- 3:25his advisors more than once what they plan to say.
- 3:28When the Iranian seized the American Embassy in response, he
- 3:31was told that would not happen. He admitted the Shah in October
- 3:361979. Three weeks later, the students
- 3:40were over the wall. The Carter administration moved
- 3:42through several distinct phases in its response to the hostage
- 3:45crisis. The first was diplomatic
- 3:48freezing several billion dollars of Iranian assets held in
- 3:51American banks, imposing sanctions, working through
- 3:54international channels including the United Nations, and
- 3:57attempting to reach a negotiated settlement through
- 3:59intermediaries. These efforts made very limited
- 4:02progress. The hostage crisis was
- 4:05enormously popular with the Iranian public.
- 4:08Khomeini used it to consolidate the Islamic Republic's political
- 4:11identity around confrontation with America.
- 4:14The Iranian government's internal divisions actually made
- 4:17resolution harder rather than easier, because any faction that
- 4:21moved toward compromise risk being outflanked politically by
- 4:24others who accused them of weakness.
- 4:26By early 1980, with the diplomatic route clearly
- 4:29stalled, the Carter administration made the decision
- 4:32to attempt a military rescue. The operation that was planned
- 4:35and launched in April 1980 was called Operation Eagle Claw and
- 4:39it is studied in military academies around the world to
- 4:42this day. Not as a model of success, but
- 4:45is a comprehensive case study in the dangers of operational
- 4:48complexity, inter service coordination failures and the
- 4:51catastrophic consequences when multiple redundant systems are
- 4:54all required to function perfectly simultaneously.
- 4:58The plan called for 8RH53DC Stallion helicopters to fly from
- 5:03the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the Gulf of Oman across the
- 5:07Iranian desert to a staging area designated Desert One.
- 5:10At Desert 1, the helicopters would refuel from C130 transport
- 5:15aircraft that have flown in from outside Iran.
- 5:17From Desert 1, the helicopters would carry Delta Force
- 5:20commandos and Army Rangers to a second staging area closer to
- 5:24Tehran. The commandos would hide during
- 5:26the following day, move into Tehran at night using cover
- 5:29vehicles, assault the embassy compound, overpower the guards,
- 5:33extract the hostages and bring them to 1/3 location where
- 5:37helicopters would extract them to a waiting aircraft carrier.
- 5:40The entire chain of events depended on a minimum of 6
- 5:43operational helicopters reaching desert. 1/3 of the 8 helicopters
- 5:48experienced mechanical failures before reaching the staging
- 5:51area. 1 turned back due to instrument warnings. 1 landed in
- 5:56the desert with a cracked rotor blade and was abandoned. 1/3
- 6:00developed a hydraulic failure. The mission commanders on the
- 6:03ground at Desert One now had five operational helicopters, 1
- 6:07fewer than the established minimum threshold for
- 6:09proceeding. After consultation with
- 6:12commanders in Washington, the decision was made to abort.
- 6:16Then, during the withdrawal from Desert One, in darkness and
- 6:18dust, one of the helicopters maneuvered into the wing of
- 6:22AC130 transport aircraft parked on the ground.
- 6:25Both aircraft caught fire immediately. 8 American
- 6:29servicemen were killed in the explosion and fire that followed
- 6:33their remains and classified documents from the operation
- 6:36were left behind in the Iranian desert.
- 6:38When the surviving aircraft departed, Iran recovered the
- 6:41wreckage, the documents and the bodies and made full use of the
- 6:45propaganda gift the failure had delivered.
- 6:47For President Carter, it was a political blow from which his re
- 6:51election campaign never fully recovered.
- 6:53For the hostages, it made their situation substantially more
- 6:57precarious. The Iranians dispersed them to
- 6:59multiple locations across the country, making any future
- 7:02rescue attempt essentially impossible.
- 7:05For the American military, it triggered A sweeping examination
- 7:09of special operations capabilities and inter service
- 7:12coordination that eventually produced the restructuring of
- 7:14American special forces that would define their operations in
- 7:17the decades ahead. The specific failure modes of
- 7:20Eagle Claw, the mechanical problems, the command confusion,
- 7:24the absence of a unified special operations structure capable of
- 7:27synchronizing multiple service branches fed directly into the
- 7:31Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 and the creation of United
- 7:34States Special Operations Command in 1987.
- 7:38A failed operation against Iran produced the institutional
- 7:41architecture that American special forces have operated
- 7:44within ever since, including in the operations carried out
- 7:47against Iranian backed groups across the Middle East in the
- 7:50decades that followed. That irony sits quietly in the
- 7:53footnotes of the Eagle Claw story, rarely remarked upon.
- 7:56The hostages were finally released on January 20th, 1981,
- 8:01simultaneously with Ronald Reagan's inauguration as the
- 8:0440th President of the United States.
- 8:06The timing was a political humiliation for Carter that was
- 8:09total and deliberate. Whether it was also the product
- 8:12of a secret deal between the Reagan campaign and the Iranian
- 8:16government is one of the most enduring and contested questions
- 8:19in recent American political history.
- 8:21The allegation, known as the October Surprise, holds that
- 8:24representatives of the Reagan campaign made contact with
- 8:27Iranian officials before the November 1980 election and reach
- 8:31a private understanding. Iran would hold the hostages
- 8:34through Election Day, denying Carter the political benefit of
- 8:37a pre election release, and in return the Reagan administration
- 8:40would facilitate arms transfers to Iran after taking office.
- 8:45The allegation was made by multiple individuals with claim
- 8:47direct knowledge of the negotiations, including former
- 8:50Iranian President Abel Hassan Bonnie Sadr, who stated publicly
- 8:54that he knew the contact had occurred.
- 8:56A House of Representatives task force investigated the
- 8:59allegation in 1992 and concluded there was no credible evidence
- 9:03that such a deal had been made. Investigative journalists Gary
- 9:06Sick and Robert Perry spent years examining the same
- 9:09evidence and reached different conclusions, arguing that the
- 9:12documentary and testimonial record pointed strongly toward a
- 9:15covert arrangement. A 2023 investigation by The New
- 9:19York Times, drawing on newly available documents and
- 9:22testimony, concluded that the evidence was more substantial
- 9:25than the 1992 congressional investigation had acknowledged.
- 9:29The question has never been definitively resolved.
- 9:32That unresolved status, after more than 40 years of
- 9:35investigation is itself part of the historical record.
- 9:39What gives The October Surprise allegation its enduring
- 9:42significance is not only what it would mean, if true, but what it
- 9:45reveals about the structural environment in which it could
- 9:48plausibly have occurred at all. By 1980, covert back channels
- 9:52between American political figures and Iranian officials
- 9:56had already been operating through intermediaries for
- 9:58years. The apparatus for secret
- 10:01communication existed. The incentives on both sides
- 10:04were real. The Iranians had reasons to
- 10:06prefer a Reagan presidency that might deliver arms, and the
- 10:10Reagan campaign had obvious reasons to want the hostage
- 10:12crisis unresolved through Election Day.
- 10:15None of that constitutes proof. But it does explain why the
- 10:19allegation has never been fully laid to rest despite decades of
- 10:22investigation, and why serious historians continue to treat it
- 10:25as an open question rather than a settled one.
- 10:28What is documented beyond dispute is the pattern of covert
- 10:31engagement with Iran that developed under the Reagan
- 10:34administration after the hostages came home.
- 10:36The most consequential and explosive element of that
- 10:39engagement was what became known as the Iran Contra.
- 10:42Fair, but to understand it, you first need to understand the
- 10:45broader strategic context in which it developed.
- 10:48The Iran Iraq War had begun in September 1980 when Saddam
- 10:51Hussein ordered his forces to invade Iran, expecting a quick
- 10:55victory over a country whose military had been thrown into
- 10:58revolutionary chaos. The war lasted 8 years and
- 11:01killed somewhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people.
- 11:05The Reagan administration's strategic assessment was that an
- 11:08Iranian victory would be far more dangerous to American
- 11:12regional interests than an Iraqi 1A triumphant Islamic Republic.
- 11:16Dominating the Persian Gulf was a prospect that generated
- 11:19serious alarm in Washington and among America's Gulf Arab
- 11:22partners. The administration therefore
- 11:25adopted a formal tilt toward Iraq.
- 11:28The United States restored full diplomatic relations with
- 11:31Baghdad in 1984, having severed them 17 years earlier.
- 11:35American agricultural credits provided Iraq with financing
- 11:39that freed up resources for its military effort.
- 11:42Diplomatic cover was provided at the United Nations when Iraqi
- 11:45conduct invited criticism and the CIA began sharing military
- 11:49intelligence with Iraqi commanders.
- 11:51Satellite imagery, signals, intercepts, assessments of
- 11:55Iranian order of battle that helped them plan and execute
- 11:58their military operations. The problem embedded in that
- 12:01intelligence sharing was what some of those operations
- 12:04involved. Iraq used chemical weapons
- 12:07against Iranian forces on multiple occasions during the
- 12:10war. Mustard gas was used
- 12:12extensively. Nerve agents, including dubun
- 12:15and sarin, were deployed in at least some engagements.
- 12:18American intelligence knew this was happening.
- 12:21The State Department cable from 1983 declassified and reported
- 12:25on decades later documents that American officials were aware of
- 12:29Iraqi chemical weapons use and made a deliberate policy
- 12:32decision to continue the intelligence sharing
- 12:34relationship. Regardless, the rationale was
- 12:37strategic. Iran must not be allowed to win.
- 12:40Iranian casualties from Iraqi chemical attacks during the war
- 12:44are estimated in the 10s of thousands of dead in a far
- 12:46larger number of injured, many of whom suffered chronic health
- 12:50effects for the rest of their lives.
- 12:51The survivors and the families of those who did not survive
- 12:54carried a specific and documented grievance. the United
- 12:57States had known and had continued to help Iraq anyway.
- 13:01When American officials in later decades invoked chemical weapons
- 13:04as a moral justification for policy, Iranian leaders had a
- 13:08ready and factually grounded response.
- 13:11The selectivity of American concern about chemical weapons
- 13:14was not a conspiracy theory. It was a matter of the
- 13:17declassified record. Simultaneously with this public
- 13:21tilt toward Iraq, the Reagan administration was pursuing a
- 13:24secret relationship with Iran that would eventually become the
- 13:28Iran Contra affair. By 1985, several American and
- 13:32other Western citizens were being held hostage in Lebanon by
- 13:35Hezbollah, the Iranian backed Shia militia.
- 13:38Reagan was publicly and emphatically committed to a
- 13:41policy of never negotiating with terrorists and never trading
- 13:45arms for hostages, a position he had stated repeatedly and with
- 13:48evident conviction. National Security Council staff
- 13:52LED principally by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North.
- 13:55We're working on a different approach.
- 13:57The idea, as it was presented to Reagan and approved by him, was
- 14:01that there were moderate elements within the Iranian
- 14:03government who genuinely wanted to improve relations with the
- 14:06United States. Selling arms to Iran would
- 14:08signal good faith, strengthen those moderates against hard
- 14:12line rivals, and perhaps encourage them to use their
- 14:14influence over Hezbollah to secure the release of American
- 14:17hostages in Lebanon. The arms were American made TOW
- 14:21anti tank missiles and Hawk surface to air missiles.
- 14:24Initial sales were routed through Israel, which maintained
- 14:27its own covert connections with elements of the Iranian military
- 14:31and had strategic reasons for keeping those channels open.
- 14:34CIA Director William Casey was centrally involved in planning
- 14:38and executing the operation. The Tower Commission documented
- 14:42Casey's role in detail. CIA personnel facilitated
- 14:46logistics. Agency infrastructure was drawn
- 14:49upon to move weapons and money through the web of
- 14:52intermediaries North and his colleagues had constructed.
- 14:55The Iran arms sales were not a rogue White House operation
- 14:59conducted in isolation from the intelligence community.
- 15:02The CIA was a participant. The scheme acquired its Contra
- 15:05dimension through a financial arrangement Oliver North
- 15:08devised. With Casey's knowledge and
- 15:10encouragement. The weapons sold to Iran were
- 15:13marked up above their actual cost.
- 15:15The profits were then diverted to fund the Nicaraguan Contra
- 15:18rebels fighting the Sandinista government.
- 15:21Congress had passed the Boland Amendment explicitly prohibiting
- 15:24the use of American government funds to support the Contras.
- 15:28The diversion was specifically designed to circumvent that
- 15:31prohibition, using money that did not technically originate as
- 15:34congressional appropriations. It was, in the assessment of
- 15:37Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh, a clear violation of the
- 15:41constitutional principle that Congress controls the power of
- 15:44the purse. The operation was exposed in
- 15:47November 1986. Reagan's initial public
- 15:50statements were demonstrably inconsistent with the documented
- 15:54evidence. His approval ratings fell more
- 15:56sharply in a shorter period than those of any president since
- 15:59polling began. Several senior officials were
- 16:02indicted and convicted, though some convictions were
- 16:05subsequently overturned on appeal.
- 16:07Casey died of a brain tumor in May 1987 before he could
- 16:11testify. Reagan survived politically,
- 16:14completed his second term and left office with his historical
- 16:18reputation largely intact. Among his supporters.
- 16:21The affair was serious. It did not end his presidency.
- 16:25What Iran Contra revealed is the depth of the institutional
- 16:28temptation to pursue secret arrangements with Tehran that
- 16:32bypassed official policy, congressional oversight and
- 16:35public accountability. This was not the first time such
- 16:38an arrangement had been attempted, and it would not be
- 16:41the last. The belief that the right back
- 16:44channel, the right covert deal, the right secret contact, could
- 16:47unlock something that overt policy could not.
- 16:49That belief ran through the CIA's Iran Project from 1953
- 16:53forward. There is one more dimension of
- 16:56the 1980s covert war that deserves direct examination.
- 17:00Throughout the decade, the CIA maintained covert relationships
- 17:03with Iranian exile groups, gathering intelligence on the
- 17:07Islamic Republic's internal dynamics and funding activities
- 17:10meant to create friction inside the regime.
- 17:13The results were consistently modest.
- 17:15The Islamic Republic proved far more resilient than American
- 17:19intelligence had predicted. The pattern of underestimating
- 17:22Iranian political durability, which began with a failure to
- 17:26anticipate the revolution, continued through the 1980s and
- 17:29beyond. The bombing of the United States
- 17:31Marine barracks in Beirut on the 23rd of October 1983 belongs in
- 17:36this history as well. 241 American service members were
- 17:40killed in a single truck bomb attack, the deadliest day for
- 17:43the American military since the Second World War.
- 17:46A simultaneous attack killed 58 French paratroopers.
- 17:50The attack was carried out by a Hezbollah operative working
- 17:53under the direction of Iranian intelligence.
- 17:56The CIA had some intelligence in the period before the attack
- 17:59suggesting A Hezbollah was planning a major strike against
- 18:02American forces in Beirut. The precise nature of that
- 18:06intelligence, what was done with it, and whether it could have
- 18:09prevented the attack has been the subject of classified
- 18:11investigations whose full findings have never been made
- 18:14public. Reagan's response to the Beirut
- 18:16bombing was to withdraw American forces from Lebanon two months
- 18:20later. That withdrawal was interpreted
- 18:22across the Middle East and explicitly cited by Iranian
- 18:26backed groups for years afterward as evidence that the
- 18:28United States could be driven from the region by a
- 18:31sufficiently costly attack. It shaped the strategic thinking
- 18:34of Hezbollah and Iranian military planners in ways
- 18:37traceable through subsequent decades of conflict.
- 18:40The decision had strategic consequences that extended far
- 18:44beyond Lebanon. The 1980s closed with two events
- 18:47that burned into the Iranian national consciousness in ways
- 18:50that continue to shape Iranian political culture to this day.
- 18:54In July 1988, the USS Vincennes, an American Aegis guided missile
- 18:59cruiser operating in the Persian Gulf, shot down Iran Air Flight
- 19:03655. All 290 people aboard were
- 19:06killed, men, women, and children, on a routine civilian
- 19:09flight from Bandar Abbas to Dubai.
- 19:12American military statements about the incident were, in
- 19:14several respects, factually incorrect.
- 19:17The aircraft, claimed to be a descending military jet, was
- 19:20actually climbing and squawking the transponder codes of a
- 19:24civilian airliner on a scheduled commercial route.
- 19:26The Reagan administration expressed regret but refused to
- 19:29issue a formal apology. Vice President George HW Bush
- 19:33said publicly he would never apologize for the United States,
- 19:37regardless of the facts. Compensation was eventually paid
- 19:40to victims families without any acknowledgement of legal
- 19:43liability in Iran. The shoot down was not
- 19:46experienced as a tragic accident.
- 19:49It was experienced as mass murder without consequence, The
- 19:52data point that fit perfectly within the established pattern
- 19:55of how Iranians had come to understand American power.
- 19:58Whether that reading is historically fair to the naval
- 20:01crew making decisions under genuine stress in an active war
- 20:05zone is a separate question. What is not separate is what it
- 20:08added to the accumulated grievances structuring Iranian
- 20:11attitudes toward the United States through the decades that
- 20:14followed. The Iran Iraq War ended in a
- 20:16ceasefire in August 1988. Iran had suffered casualties on
- 20:21a scale no Western country had experienced since the Second
- 20:24World War. Khomeini accepted the ceasefire
- 20:27in terms he described publicly as like drinking poison.
- 20:31He died the following year, in June 1989, leaving the Islamic
- 20:35Republic to Ali Khamenei and to a country that had spent a
- 20:38decade of war and was only beginning to count what it had
- 20:41cost. Every covert arrangement that
- 20:43was meant to open a new channel ended up closing it more firmly.
- 20:46Every secret deal that was meant to build leverage produced
- 20:49instead a new layer of betrayal and recrimination.
- 20:53It is worth noting what was lost in the process.
- 20:56At the start of the 1980s, there were still Iranians inside the
- 20:59government, in the clerical establishment, in the business
- 21:02community, who believed some form of functional relationship
- 21:05with the United States was eventually possible and
- 21:08potentially desirable. By the end of the decade, that
- 21:11constituency had been comprehensively marginalized.
- 21:15Every episode of the decade gave the hardliners fresh ammunition.
- 21:19The arm sails to Iraq while American officials quietly sold
- 21:22missiles to Tehran. The shoot down of 290 civilians
- 21:26followed by a refusal to apologize.
- 21:29The exposure of Iran Contra, which humiliated both the
- 21:32moderates who had engaged in the back channel and the Americans
- 21:35who had exploited them. Each event made the case for
- 21:38engagement harder to sustain and the argument for permanent
- 21:41hostility easier to make. The space for pragmatic
- 21:44diplomacy, never large to begin with, have been systematically
- 21:48compressed by a decade of contradictory covert action
- 21:51until it barely existed at all. That is the legacy of the 1980s
- 21:56in the CIA's history with Iran, and it is a legacy whose
- 21:59consequences are still being felt in the conflict being
- 22:02fought today. Next Time Episode 4 covers the
- 22:061990s and 2000s CIA regime change efforts, the Stuxnet
- 22:10cyber attack that sabotage Iran's nuclear program, the
- 22:13systematic assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, and
- 22:17the drone strike that killed IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani.