Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / Iran Has Reached a Point of No Return | Professor Ali Ansari Explains

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Iran Has Reached a Point of No Return | Professor Ali Ansari Explains · Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani

• Amir Golshani: are moments in history that feels like a fog where the sheer weight of the present makes it impossible to see the path ahead. are moments in history that feels like a fog where the sheer weight of the present makes it impossible to see the path ahead. To navigate that fog, you don't need a politician or a pondit. You need a historian who understands that the seeds of today's crisis were sown decades, if not centuries ago. Today's guest is Professor Ali Ansari, one of the most respected historians of modern Iran. Ali Ansari: you you Amir Golshani: He is Professor of Iranian History at the University of St. Andrews, founding director of the Institute for Iranian Studies, and president of the British Institute of Persian Studies. Professor Ansari, it's an honor to have you here. Ali Ansari: Thank you very much for inviting me, Amir. It's good to be with you. Amir Golshani: Fantastic. Before we dive into the complexities of Iran, I want to start with you. What was the first spark that pulled you toward history and specifically modern Iran? Ali Ansari: So that's a really interesting question. always had an interest in history. mean, ⁓ not necessarily Iranian history or Middle Eastern history. I mean, I've always had an interest in history. ⁓ always read a lot ⁓ I was young. I always much more interested in reading ⁓ history than fiction. ⁓ And I was very interested in writing. So I did well at school in history. Originally, I have to tell you, I wanted to become a marine biologist. I did so badly. I did so badly at chemistry. just, I think my teacher said, this is not a good path for you. And I, I always he switched. realized I was quite good at history. So, moved in that direction. ⁓ then as I started to think about my professional choices going forward, you know, my, my interest actually, interestingly enough, are probably more medieval than. Amir Golshani: Wow. Ali Ansari: Late antique history, would love in some ways to maybe work on Sasanian history in some ways. It fascinates me. In the days when I was studying, of course, Sasanian history was still a little bit of a backwater in terms of what was going on elsewhere. And even for my degree, I did a lot of medieval history. My degree I did on European and Middle Eastern history. And basically a lot of my stuff was medieval. I didn't do modern history at all. ⁓ because I just thought, you know, while I'm at university, let's take advantage of the fact that you can do all sorts of interesting and strange things. And I have to say, I think when you're looking at the history of modern Iran, studying the medieval period and the early medieval period is actually very important. It's, ⁓ I always tell people that, you know, you have to have a different frame of reference because of course, when you study modern Iran, you're essentially studying a country in decline. So it's, it's a bit depressing, but when you're studying earlier periods, you see a country often in full flow. Amir Golshani: All Ali Ansari: But then I decided to go into the modern era because I thought if I want to get a job, I need to do something that is going to be relevant. I mean, I do wonder sometimes whether I should have just stuck to my guns and stuck to medieval history. I, yeah, that was really the, ⁓ was fascinated, I suppose. It's partly a personal connection as well. But, you know, you live through these periods. I think all of us have a certain age anyway. We live under the shadow of the Islamic Revolution and you want to understand a little bit more about how we got here, why we got here. But I think ultimately there was also a very sort of hard-headed thinking it, which is I thought that there will be no jobs for medievalists. I was very wrong, I have to say, but that was the reason. Amir Golshani: Yeah, thank you so much for sharing that. One of the things that makes you different from other historians who write about Iran is that you started, you know, earlier in time, you know, to be specific from 1797, 18th century, know, that that. Wow. So you often emphasize that the most important lesson history teaches us is context for those watching or listening who feel overwhelmed by the daily news cycle. Ali Ansari: That's right. Yeah, that's right. Amir Golshani: How has that focus on context shaped the way you stay grounded while the world around you feels like it's in constant state of crisis? Ali Ansari: think one of the advantages of looking at things historically is precisely that, that you can take the longer picture and you could look at things over the long view and you're not constantly being overwhelmed by the immediacy of events. I mean, think the short term of time span that we all live in under the moment means that we're constantly seeing things really the immediacy ⁓ without longer term. perspective. And I always say, it's context and perspective, actually, really, it's this idea that not only do we have depth to what we're looking at, but we also have a broader canvas on which we try to situate things. ⁓ often when you look at things in too much detail, too particular, too close in time, it's very difficult to make ⁓ sober judgment about what's going on. I mean, I think it's difficult for all of us, know, as Iranians, you know, if you look at what's going on in Iran, it's very tragic, and it's very heartbreaking to see it. And it can be You know, I think your emotions start to take over. I, you know, I'm one of these historians who thinks that we should always write with a degree of passion and a degree of emotion. But at the same time, we mustn't let that overwhelm us. You know, we've got to be able to sort of like have a degree of detachment really to be able to try and see in the longer view. So I think, I think that's, you know, that's really what I've tried to argue with people is that you have to look at things in, that broader context. There's lots of things now, for instance, that people are making assumptions. I've written a few things about this and I'm currently writing a piece now also about how some people rushed a judgment about certain developments in the Islamic Republic, which actually if you pull back a little bit more, you can see it in a much longer lens and see that actually there's been planning or there's been a project being worked on for some time. But the other side of it, which I've always tried to work on is basically when you look at US-Iran relations, for instance, which I find... Quite interesting. you look at it from an Iranian, a particular Iranian perspective, they will start in 1953. If you look at it from a particular American perspective, they always seem to start in 1979. And obviously if you frame it in those ways, you know, know who the villain is. As you start, you know, the villain is either the United States or Iran. And I've always said to people that you need to actually frame it further back. You need to go back to the 1850s and have a look at things. You know, what was going on before and what was the relationship between America and Iran. Amir Golshani: Right. Ali Ansari: before the politics in a sense got in the way in a very explicit way. And you'll find that I think with a lot of these relationships, and I said this ⁓ a book I wrote a while back, that if there's a sense of betrayal, it's because there's something to betray. And, you know, it's normally a friendship that has been betrayed. It's normally a very intimate relationship that has been betrayed. So I'm more interested in some ways in that intimate relationship. I mean, I want to know what is the relationship that has been undermined, that has caused so much anguish and so much pain among if there's a sense of betrayal, it's because there's something to betray. It's normally a very intimate relationship that has betrayed. I want to know what is the relationship that has been that has caused so much anguish and so much pain among know, both the Iranians and Americans. know, both the Iranians and Americans. Amir Golshani: Very well said. I love that, that the keyword is, something to betray. So ⁓ it's the deeper understanding the Iranian mind that I want to bring into the present because your work can consistently challenges people to stop treating Iran as a cliche. By cliche, I mean Iran is just a security threat or religious monolith. Can you elaborate on that? Ali Ansari: Well, I like you, I've always become very, you know, I've always been very irritated by the fact that we tend to reduce our analysis of events and people into very simple narratives. But, know, this is not unique to Iran. mean, the Iranians do exactly the same to the other side. You when you talk about the great Satan, you know, it's a wonderful way of summarizing your view of the United States in two words, you know, but of course that's, you know, that's also a mythologizing a rather complex relationship and a rather complex people. But I think, know, in Iran, it is true, you know, I find that Iran has often been seen as a an appendix to a wider problem. you know, for instance, when you look at the I was talking to this with students today, you know, when you look at the whole nuclear negotiations, actually, you know, the nuclear negotiations which have been going on since about 2002 2003, mean, obviously, now it's an end, unless they decide to restart them in some way or form. frustration about all this really has been that for 20 years, when you're looking at Iran from a, policy ⁓ ⁓ diplomatic perspective, it's almost been exclusively focused on the security issue around the nuclear program, which is fine. I have no problem with people doing that. But it's been at the expense of anyone looking at the wider subject of Iran itself. What are the people one, you know, is going on in terms of political dynamics? How diverse is it? What do you know? And instead, because that has all been neglected, you know, I can tell you number of people who can recite at great, with great depth, the number of centrifuges that you need to enrich uranium to a particular purity. But there are very few people these days who can tell you anything about political dynamics in Iran, because nobody's bothered to look at it. I mean, nobody's bothered to look at it because they've tended to view Iran through the cipher of the nuclear program. I can tell you number of people can recite at great, with great depth, the number of centrifuges that you need to enrich uranium to a particular purity. But there are very few people these days who can tell you anything about political dynamics in Iran, because nobody's bothered to look at it. which for good or ill has basically marginalized the wider dynamics of the issue. So for instance, know, suddenly last the Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic suddenly came out with Sharpoor the first, and you know, the Sasanian King and had this sort and everyone sort of suddenly got very excited and they said, ⁓ my God, look at all this nationalism. It's fantastic. And you know, said, this has been going on for some time. I ⁓ mean, not actually new. And it's something that the Islamic Republic always does when it's trying to consolidate a certain amount of national solidarity behind it. It doesn't mean that it believes it. It means that it's ideologically very useful to it. But if you think this is new, you haven't been paying attention. mean, that's all I would say. And I think these are the issues. Because we focus so much on particular aspects or particular things, we fail to see the wood for the trees. Amir Golshani: I love that. So talking about nationalism, you have written a lot about nationalism and political memory. Ali Ansari: Yeah, any effect at all, have to say. mean, not that anyone pays any attention to it, but I'm happy to try again. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Right. If you had to explain it simply, how do stories shape power in Iran? Ali Ansari: So I, know, I, again, I have written about this and it's really about these sort of competing narratives, mythologies as we talk about it. And, you know, Iran comes from a culture which is very deeply, you know, in which mythology and narratives and storytelling are very embedded. So we don't have in a sense in Iran, a tradition of history writing in the way that you might have it in the West. I don't want to say that it's massively different, but certainly in Iran, the tradition of the sort of the ⁓ of narrative storytelling, myth making as a form of history has a much longer pedigree. It goes back further in time. It comes forward further in time than say you have in Europe. So obviously this is encapsulated in the great book of Kings, the Shahnawmeh, which actually devises this sort of narrative mythic sort of culture and framework in which Iranians draw upon and they draw upon very, very extensively. ⁓ I think, you know, what you see, in Iran is even when it comes to sort of the development of modern history, modern historical events, it could be the first world war, could be, you know, the coup in 1953, it could be the revolution in 1979. The tendency for these events to become heavily mythologized and narrativized into sort of quite simplistic narratives with villains and good guys and bad guys, you know, very clear storylines and whatever. The propensity for that grows I think, I think there's a sort of a mentality and approach which has less of a sort of a tendency to critically engage with history. You know, I always say to people that Iran and the Iranians I should say are one of the peoples that have so much history. We have so much history, but we know so little about it because nobody really bothers. know, we tend to die. We're so spoiled in a sense with the amount of history we have. We have never taken time to appreciate it. If I can put it that way. We've tended just to absorb it as a kind of stories. I always say to people that Iran and the Iranians I should say are one of the peoples that have so much history. We have so much history, but we know so little about it Amir Golshani: Right. Ali Ansari: and not a means of sort of critically analyzing our past and, you know, what it means to be Iranian, for instance, and, you how the whole notion of a national identity has emerged. And what you have in a lot of Iranian historical perspectives, particularly people who don't do history, is that they tend to project back into history, back into the 19th or 18th century, that shape themselves today, particularly like nationalism. I mean, all countries do it, by the way. mean, Iran is not the uniqueness, but... Amir Golshani: Right. Ali Ansari: What they tend to do is they tend to sort of take the perspective of what we understand to be Iran today and to be Iranian today and put it back in the mind of Nader Shah or put it back in the mind of Agha Mohhamadkhan But this is not the way people think in those days. You know, they think in different ways. That doesn't mean that they don't have some idea of Iran, as I say to some people, but it means that their idea of Iran is different to our idea of Iran. That's what I said. You you have to understand that ⁓ progress, that Amir Golshani: Absolutely. It's another reminder the importance of reading history. you written, you mentioned perfectly, ⁓ about myth and that are used as instruments of power. For someone listening or watching who is not academic, how do these historical mythology actually show up in the real political life and suffering of Iranians today? Ali Ansari: So let me give you two myths that are very powerful in political narratives today. And you know, one is an Islamic myth and the other one is an Iranian myth. Okay. And the Islamic myth tends to follow a certain pattern and it's not really a sort of a necessarily a Shia myth. It's more a tradition that comes from the Abrahamic tradition. And it's very common in both Judaic and Christian sources because it's actually what people call the Mosaic myth. And the Mosaic myth is this notion of the leader coming to liberate his people, often coming from the Amir Golshani: All right. Ali Ansari: you if you follow the mosaic myth of Moses and others much more to the letter, often coming from within often the court or something of the oppressive nation, but it just has to be a leader. And the key thing about the leader and the struggle with the Pharaoh, for instance, the evil sort of autocrat is that it's this notion of wandering in the desert for 40 years before you head to the promised land. And if you look at the narratives that in the Islamic Republic, they tell people, they say, you know, things are tough. Things are going to get tougher. But don't worry, the promised land is just across the next step or whatever. And this is sort of a revolutionary myth in some ways that is very common to many cultures, but you can see this very clearly in Iran. for instance, in the current conflict, one of the videos, the AI videos, which seem to populate everywhere these days, that have been issued is some sort of idea of almost like Khamenei parting the Persian Gulf and swallowing up the ⁓ Navy in the water. I mean, that's very vulgar depiction of it. The more important thing really is this idea and used to get this a lot, even when I used to go to Iran, people would say that, you know, we have to, know, the Imam Mahdi, the hidden Imam will only return, ⁓ promised land will only come when things have gotten really bad. And everyone used to say to me, I don't know how bad it has to get, but it's getting really bad now. And I wish the hidden Imam would come. Imam Mahdi, the hidden Imam will only return, the promised land will only come when things have gotten really bad. And everyone used to say to me, I don't know how bad it has to get, but it's getting really now. And I wish the hidden Imam would come. Amir Golshani: Right. Ali Ansari: So, I mean, this sort of thing. And I think you can see this narrative absolutely right now. So if you look at the devotees who are fighting so hard for Khamenei and Mojtaba and others, you know, their argument will be that this is a struggle and it's a struggle that has to be fought because once we win this struggle, we will then enter the promised land. I mean, that's the idea. The vast majority of people don't pay any attention to this, by the way, and don't buy into it at all. They have no stake in it. The vast majority of people, interestingly enough, have gone to a different mythology, a different narrative myth, and that's the myth of Kavit. And the myth of Kaveh is a very particular narrative of emancipation that is particular to the Iranians. And of course, it's been very, very popular in Iran over the last 100, 150 years. mean, if you think of the major nationalist newspaper that was edited by Hassan Tghizadeh, this was named Kaveh. And on the front piece, was this engraving of Kaveh, the blacksmith leading the people from darkness into light, with his Derafshe Kavyani Onye and all this sort of. You know, for a period in the Islamic Republic, of course, you didn't get it much about Kaveh. There was a period in the early part of the 2000s where in Isfahan they put a statue up to Kaveh. know, lot of the mullahs were very unhappy about it ⁓ they didn't like it because of course, ⁓ know, Kaveh is responsible for overthrowing the Arab tyrant of Iran, know, Zahak. So people didn't want that analogy to be drawn, you know, between, you Kaveh and what the current regime is about. But if you look now, it's very interesting that you know, the last 10 years, the notion of Khamenei senior, I'm talking about now Khamenei, Ayatollah Khamenei as the Zahhak of the age is one that has gained a wide traction among people. I mean, it's been quite extraordinary how it's come back in, if you will. And I think that's, know, these are the two rival sort of mythologies at work. And the important thing with the Iranian one, I have to say, is that the uprising is led by basically the common man. mean, it's not like, unlike the mosaic myth, it's not a prince in the household, you know, comes in. It, Kaveh is the representative and emblematic, he's a blacksmith. He's the emblematic of the common man. And in that way, that's why, of course, the whole narrative of Kaveh was very popular with the left in Iran in the 20th century. I mean, a lot of children were Kaveh precisely because of this, because they had two day leanings and all sort of. Amir Golshani: All right. Ali Ansari: And, but for me, it's a very interesting and mythology. And it's quite different from the ones that are familiar to the Judeo-Christian world and Muslim world, where you have a great leader who comes in and leads his people across the desert to the promised land. Although the leader himself never sees the promised land, of course. mean, that's the thing, Moses dies before he gets to Israel, right? So, ⁓ in the Iranian mythology, it's different. In Iranian mythology, yes, Fereydun is waiting in the wings, so to speak, but the person who leads the revolt is the blacksmith. Amir Golshani: I really love that talking about that that kind of difference. We often hear people compare the situation in Iran to Iraq, Syria or Libya. As someone who knows Iran's unique DNA, what what do those comparisons ⁓ and why is that misunderstanding so dangerous for our future? We often hear people compare the situation in Iran to Iraq, Syria or Libya. As someone who knows Iran's unique DNA, what what do those comparisons ⁓ miss Ali Ansari: So there's a couple of things there. I mean, I'm not one of these people who wants to talk about like the uniqueness or the exceptionality of any particular country. But I do argue, as you point out, about distinctive characteristics. And I think that the problem we have is not in making Iran exceptional. The problem we have is in people translating the experience of completely different countries, Iraq, Syria, Libya, wherever else you want to talk about it, and sort of transplanting them onto Iran. And of course, Iraq and Syria and a lot of the... These are countries that are relatively new in terms of their composition and Iran, on the other hand, in terms of the plateau and in terms of the ⁓ culture that has occupied that plateau, ⁓ at least been there for 500 years. And lots of people will say much longer, and of course they were introduced, but as a political culture, it has a much, much longer pedigree. And obviously the name Iran itself goes back to the Sasanian period. The border, as I always point out, the border between Iran and the West, what used to be the Ottoman Empire and now obviously Iraq and Turkey, is one of the longest standing land borders anywhere in the world. I mean, that border has basically remained the same since 1639. So this is not some sort of thing that people have made up in post-World War I, you know, things. So there's a lot of cultural cohesion there, I think. And I think if you look at the history of Iran, even at the periods when the political system has been a mess, which is very often, I have to tell you. You know, the social and cultural unity and cohesion of that plateaus remained fairly static. I, you know, I always say to people, you think in 1919, 1919 to say 1923 was a peak period. The Ottoman Empire was collapsing. The Russian Empire had been taken apart. The maps of everywhere were being redrawn. But somehow, interestingly, you know, took good statesmanship as well as a bit of luck, but also because of the realities on the ground. always say to people, you think 1919, 1919 to ⁓ say 1923 was a peak period. The Ottoman Empire was collapsing. The Russian Empire had been taken apart. The of everywhere were being redrawn. But somehow, interestingly, you know, took good statesmanship as well as a bit of luck, but also because of the realities on the ground. that cultural cohesion on the Iranian plateau remained fixed. that cultural cohesion on the Iranian plateau remained fixed. ⁓ the idea, for instance, that people say that if the Islamic Republic falls, a political system falls, that you will get the Balkanization, as they call it, of Iran. To my mind, this is complete nonsense. I mean, it has no historical justification for this argument at all, other than a sort of a weird and wonderful notion that all political cultures are retained together, or all countries are retained together by force. Clearly that's not true. mean, and if you look historically, what has been the one really stable aspect of Iran? It's society and culture. It's society and culture, which has been the strongest thing. And like I say in a recent piece, if you want to look for resilience, look to the people, don't look to the state. systems come and go. We know that. Iranians are long enough in the tooth to know that political systems like dynasties, they come and go. if you look historically, what has been the ⁓ one ⁓ really stable aspect Iran? society and culture. Political systems come and go. We know that. Amir Golshani: Alright. Ali Ansari: real stability, if you want to find it, is with that of political culture, that social culture, political society, if you will. That's what's important. Amir Golshani: I love that. You mentioned reality on the ground. ⁓ We are in a moment where people are desperate for answers, but also very vulnerable to hope and to fear. If you had to describe Iran today in one sentence, what would you say? Ali Ansari: Hmm. Amir Golshani: We are in a moment where people are desperate for answers, but also very vulnerable to hope and to fear. If you had to describe Iran today in one sentence, what would you say? Ali Ansari: In one sense of that, I'd it's tragic. I to be honest, I mean, think what's happening today is tragic. It shouldn't have happened. I think there are many ways in which down the line it could have been avoided, certainly. I think that there have been, you know, I think it's a situation which, you know, for most Iranians is, well, would say probably all Iranians actually one way or another. I mean, I think unless you're completely heartless, you feel very heartbroken over But I think also at the end of the day, they're torn and very conflicted by this, that they also don't think the Islamic Republic as a political system has a legitimate right to continue. I mean, that's the thing. Many Iranians that I certainly talk to are determined to get rid of the Islamic Republic in one way or another. And I think they're aware that the cost of this will be high in some way. they also don't think the Islamic Republic as a political system has a legitimate right to continue. I mean, that's the thing. Many Iranians that I certainly talk to are determined to get rid of the Islamic Republic in one way or another. And I think they're aware that the cost of this will be high in some way. I think in a word, if you wanted a sentence, I just think it's tragic that we have to do this. You I said to someone, I said the easiest solution for all this is just to agree to have a referendum. I mean, if you had a referendum, you could decide then, you know, what the people want and it would be relatively bloodless. But as we know, the leadership of the Islamic Republic is diminished as they are, are quite determined to hold on, you know, whatever happens, because I don't think they see themselves having a future without the political system they have And I have to say they're probably right on that, but ⁓ you know, it's a tragedy that Iranians as a whole have to to live through this. Amir Golshani: Right, absolutely. So you recently described a war of the words. Why does the regime put so much energy into controlling the narrative abroad while they're losing control of the hearts and minds at home? These white sim, so-called white SIM cards, know, the seizure of Starlink, you know, the internet blackout and all these things ⁓ have their own narratives. Why does the regime put so much energy into controlling the narrative abroad while they're losing control of the hearts and minds at home? Ali Ansari: I think that's an excellent question I have to say. it's one of the things that does, you you ponder they spend so much time trying to control and manipulate the narrative abroad. They do spend quite a bit of time, you know, at home, but they've obviously lost the majority of the people. And one of the things I find really quite interesting is the number of people in the West who are still willing to believe the narratives that the Islamic Republic puts out when their own people no longer believe them. I mean, that's really quite striking. And I often find, you know, I remember one of the things I find really quite interesting is the number of people in the West who are still willing to believe the narratives that the Islamic Republic puts out when their own people no longer believe them. during the Women Life Freedom protests, journalists would say to me, you know, I thought that the Iranians like the Iranian women like to wear the hijab. And I said, well, if they like to wear the hijab, they need to beat it into them. I mean, you know, it's a fairly simple, you know, you know, I mean, ⁓ if what they like, then surely, you know, it wouldn't be a question of, of having to force it on them like this. And there was this sort of ⁓ weird and a slightly sort of receptive notion among some people, not everyone in the West, but some people in the West, who sort of tended to believe what came out of the Islamic Republic at face value, largely because they saw the Islamic Republic as a sort of a challenger, a combatant against the United States or against, you know, ⁓ capitalism, whichever you want to look at it. And that was really their focus. If you remember what we were talking about earlier, it's really not understanding Iran on its own merits. It's understanding Iran as an opponent of something that you really want to focus on. It's Iran as a challenger to Western capitalism or as an anti-Israeli state or as an anti-American state. But they're not really looking inside. They're simply looking at the surface to see Republic offers. And of course, think the Islamic Republic has always been, and ⁓ Iran to extent, but the Islamic Republic in particular has always been very good at trying to manipulate and master its narratives, it has certain advantages. Like all authoritarian states do, the way, their own public sphere is closed. fairly tightly controlled. Sometimes they open it, sometimes they close it, but it's always controlled. Whereas the public sphere in the West is generally open. So they can access that and they can engage with that. They can talk to people, you, me, whatever, ⁓ Western Like I say to people, you see ⁓ Iranian on CNN, on BBC, on I say to people, you see ⁓ Iranian voices on CNN, on BBC, you know, all these other channels, they get access to that, they can shape that narrative. We don't have the same access going inside. know, we don't, not only do, not only can we not see what's going on properly, but we cannot engage with it. I mean, this is my point with a lot of people, you know, all these other channels, they get access to that, they can shape that narrative. We don't have the same access going inside. know, we don't, not only do, not only can we not see what's going on properly, but we cannot engage with it. I mean, this is my point with a lot of people, you know, people don't understand it. So for instance, just to give you another historical example, during the hostage crisis in 1979, when the Iranian students took the embassy, you know, America in the end of the 1970s, Amir Golshani: All right. All right. Ali Ansari: I think have the largest number of television sets per capita of any country in the world. It was part of its affluence, right? There more television sets. And so what you find and what you found at that time was the hostage crisis was beamed into everyone's homes, everyone's homes. And basically that message, of, that sort of narrative became embedded within the American psychology. That's not to say in that particular case that, you know, it was a positive thing for the Islamic Republic, but what it does show in a sense is that you know, ability to reach us there and they were able to talk to people in a way that the reverse message could not be passed back really to the Iranians. Like what the hell are you doing? know, this is damaging relations. you know, has, I mean, I should be clear on that. It has, you know, pros and cons. sometimes mismanage their message, but at the same time, I'm sure they were able to get their message out because of that access, because of the connections they have, particularly with Western journalists and others. Amir Golshani: Hmm. Absolutely. Ali Ansari: they can manipulate the narratives well. And of course, the added thing to that, which we have to understand is that the West on the whole has been very poor at managing its narratives, very poor. ⁓ And particularly now, I mean, it's very eclectic, right? Amir Golshani: This was. Yeah, this was fantastic clarification. Many Iranians see the brutal crackdown of January as a point of no return. Do you believe history will look back on this January as the moment that emotional contract between the state and the people was permanently shattered? Many Iranians see the brutal crackdown of January as a point of no return. history will look back on this January as the moment that emotional contract between the state and the people was permanently shattered? Ali Ansari: I think the process has been a longer one, really going back even to 2017, 2019, and then obviously the Masai, many projects. But I would agree with you that the January 8th and 9th was to my mind, you know, what we could term a sort of a paradigm shift. It was a moment when things fundamentally changed and which if you talk to Iranians in Iran, I'm talking about really rather than outside in Iran. I would agree with you that the January 8th and 9th was to my mind, you know, what we could term a sort of a paradigm shift. It was a moment when things fundamentally changed when you reach out, it's for them and also for those outside, but mainly for those inside, because that's the ones that matter really in some ways. a point of no return. mean, they simply will not, you know, it's something that is unforgivable. And I certainly myself found it extremely difficult, ⁓ extremely difficult. you know, when we talk about historical detachment, it was even for me, extremely difficult to deal with that in a detached way. It's a point of no return. Amir Golshani: Yeah, it changed the game, know, absolutely. So there is a critical question. We hear analysts say that for the regime, winning means surviving. But as a historian, at what point does that survival stop being a strategy and become self-destruction, ⁓ leaving a burnt land for future generations? that survival stop being ⁓ strategy ⁓ and become civilizational self-destruction, ⁓ leaving behind a burnt land for future generations? Ali Ansari: Well, I mean, my view is that we're already there, by the way. And I always used say to people, said, you don't conflate the Islamic Republic with Iran. The Islamic Republic is a political system. Iran is the country. And their principle goal of survival is survival of the regime. It's not survival of the country. They seek when they want to, to identify one with the other. They say, we are not a regime, we are Iran. used say to people, said, you don't conflate the Islamic Republic with Iran. Islamic Republic is a political system. Iran is the country. And their principle goal of survival is survival of the regime. It's not survival of the country. I think that's wrong, actually. I mean, think they've shown themselves over and over over again to be fundamentally an ideological project around a regime. And, the tragedy when we talking about earlier about this is that we have a situation where the Islamic Republic wants to survive even at the cost of the loss of Iran. And I think the point you made there is absolutely right, that for them, it matters little if the country burns as long as they survive. But then the question comes, do they survive? mean, ⁓ do they have? You know, what do they have? Amir Golshani: That's my next question. Yeah, exactly. What happens to a state when it still has the guns, the prisons, but it completely ⁓ lost its authority and the belief of its own people? What phase of a revolution are we actually in? has completely ⁓ lost its moral authority and the belief of its own people? phase of a revolution are we actually in? Ali Ansari: So the interesting thing is, is I think they've already lost the faith of the majority of the population. I mean, they've obviously got a certain constituency, but the majority has obviously gone. They have now relied increasingly on just brute force and violence in order to implement their will. And they will be counting on a certain amount of sort of national blowback on nationalist blowback on the war to be able to sustain a certain amount of sort of a nationalist bounce, if you will. But I don't think it will last very long. And I don't think it's happening. I think they had it very modestly after the 12 day war last summer, but I don't think they'll have it now, principally for the reasons that you said. in the, of January the eighth and ninth, you know, that's really an inflection point. And I, you know, the thing is, is what will be left is interesting. And we don't really have much insight into what's going on at the moment. We know that, you know, lot of the political infrastructure has been shattered. God forbid that they then go after the economic infrastructure, but that's certainly a possibility. I hope not personally, but that's possibility. But the political infrastructure is really quite shattered. I've always said to people also, you know, what happens afterwards? Well, you here we have maybe a repressive apparatus of maybe half a million people. mean, that's, you know, I'm being generous there by the half a million people. They try and ship in some of the Arabs of Iraq and they have the Afghan and some others, you know, who they might want to bring in to do some of the killing. ⁓ But fact is they have a limited resource and they have a vast country, the size of Western Europe, as everyone reminds us, that they need to govern. And my sense is that it will be increasingly difficult for them to do it. have two means by which to establish control, brute force and obviously money. You know, the idea that you disperse salaries and money and patronage and this, that, the other. ⁓ money and patronage and whatever I think will be severely depleted after this. So they will be, they're left to brute force alone. And brute force is a very, very difficult and fragile way and unstable way to try and establish control over a country the size of Iran. with a population that doesn't like you. I mean, this is the thing. It's very difficult to able to do that. And again, you know, my, there was a very interesting, I mean, I don't know whether it's true or not, know, Peshezgian arguing with the IRGC about what happens after the war is over. And clearly, you know, if that's to be believed, they have no plan for when the war is over. They have no idea what they're going to do. And they have no idea, I think, how they will establish control, reestablish control over the vast majority of the population. I think we're in for some, you know, ⁓ say the least, ⁓ very interesting times. As as I can see, the Islamic Republic itself as a political system will have been severely weakened, severely weakened. And if ⁓ they they will certainly not thrive, is what I would say. I mean, it's impossible for them to, and I think the situation there is going to be extremely fluid and a lot will depend on what the people a whole do or do not do in the after. far as I can see, the Islamic Republic itself a political system will been severely weakened, severely And if ⁓ they survive, they will certainly not thrive, Amir Golshani: Right. Absolutely. Professor Ansari, do you actually believe that history repeats itself or it is more that the patterns stay the same while the consequences get much more severe each time the cycle turns? do you actually believe that history repeats itself Ali Ansari: So I'm a strong believer in, there's an Italian historian called Vico who had this idea of recurrence. And I think recurrence is better. So I don't think history repeats itself, but there are certain patterns that you can see that recur and have a certain parallels. think the danger is in saying that history repeats itself because clearly it doesn't. mean, because circumstances are different, as I said, context, contingency, perspective, whatever, but you can see patterns that are familiar. And those patterns, I think, are the things that we need to be aware of. And we can see that in, you know, for instance, a very basic notion is this notion of the repeated pattern of autocracy, for instance, in Iran, or the other countries as well. But I mean, basically, the sort of notion of, ⁓ what you have is a period of strong rule, weak rule, ⁓ a collapse, followed by strong rule, weak rule, another, you know, These are these sort patterns that even people like Ibn Khaldun and others would have talked about in the medieval period. Again, things would be different in the modern age because obviously things have changed in terms of technology, in terms of communication and others that make things slightly different. But that's the way tend to see it. I see that we should look for patterns, not for straight repeats, if I can put it that way. Amir Golshani: So what is uniquely Iranian about how this crisis will unfold? Why won't an outside model like the fall of the Soviet or the Arab Spring, they don't give us the full picture. what is uniquely Iranian about how this crisis will unfold? Ali Ansari: Well, I I think there are several trajectories that Iran can go down. don't, as I said, see the balkanization or the breakup in that sense of the state as one that is likely as some people think. It doesn't make it impossible, by the way, but I mean, it's because you can't say things will definitely happen or not happen. All can try and do as historians is try to say, you know, what is the pattern in the past and what does it help us see into the future as far as we can? And I would say that the sort of notion of breakup like the Soviet Union or whatever like that, is probably more far-fetched. But in terms of a political settlement that may come up, could see a of a secular, I think it would certainly be secular by the way, I I think it would be religious. It would be secular in terms of the division between state and religion. I mean, that probably, I think it's fairly clear. Whether we go down a sort of a constitutional monarchy, a secular republic, or even another form of autocracy, even a form of enlightened despotism, if you want to call it that way. These are things that we have to see how things pan out. I mean, the, the, you know, ⁓ are not automatic. I wouldn't say that moving the road of a sort of secular Republic of some sort, be it the constitutional monarchy or say, I wouldn't say that that is more or likely if you will. mean, I think it's, it's one of the options that are available and it depends of course contingency on on what's going on on the ground. of course in Iran, mean, one of the things that are different is that Iran has a very long tradition, least 100 years, of trying to fight for a democratic settlement. So there is the architecture there. There is the baggage there. Do you know what I mean? I mean, there are things there that could be used. That doesn't mean it will happen. I mean, I have to say it could very easily go down the route of a renewed autocracy if you will. it's, but these options are there. Amir Golshani: Yes, you. Absolutely. You've also mentioned that, if I'm right, 1906 Iran, Iranians, they've been looking for the rule of law, khanun. They've been demanding that for this period. You also pushed back against the simplistic collapse theories. Yet you've also said we might be reaching an end game. What are two or three signs that would Ali Ansari: Yeah. Amir Golshani: tell you we are looking at a terminal decline rather than just another cycle of adaptation. Ali Ansari: So my, my, my criticism of the collapse theory is really to do with state, you know, with basically state fragmentation. I don't think I'm one of those people that thinks that state of like the implosion of say the Islamic Republic as a political system is more likely than not. And I simply say that because all political systems have a lifespan in some ways. I mean, it's like I say to people, the French have had five Republics. mean, they've had five French Republics. So Amir Golshani: Right. Ali Ansari: You know, I don't understand why this concept is so alien to people. sort of say, why would things change? Well, I mean, France, as I said, since the French Revolution, I think they've had two empires, five republics, one two monarchies, actually. So, you these political systems can change. It doesn't mean France went anywhere. mean, France didn't go anywhere. France remains, but the political system changes. And I, so in that sense, you know, I think that the, ⁓ if you at the political economy of the Islamic Republic, it's extremely weak. And even before it went into this war, was already very, very weak. was running out of money. mean, ⁓ of the catalysts for the protests in January, December, January, was the collapse of the currency, the collapse of the banks, its to supply basic needs to its own people. And none of these problems are going to be any easier now. Even if the war ends tomorrow, these problems are all going to come back and there's going to be no, you know, unless ⁓ the the Islamic Republic somehow signed some sort of long-term peace with massive compensation or reparations, which I think is very unlike. one of the catalysts for the protests in December, January, was the collapse of the currency, the collapse of the its inability to supply basic needs to its own people. And none of these problems are going to be any easier now. if the war ends tomorrow, these problems are all going to come back It's going to be in a lot of trouble. So that's why, you know, I say that whatever happens out of this, I do not see a situation where the Islamic Republic comes out of this in a stronger position. think this is a, I mean, I saw an article, I think in one of the newspapers today that argued that, you know, Iran could come out stronger. No, the Islamic Republic might survive. I think in whichever way you look at it, Iran, if you look at Iran as the broader people will come out in a very bad shape, actually. I mean, it will not be good for entire, you know, the whole country as a whole. It will need to rebuild, of course, but I think the best way to rebuild is without the Islamic Republic. I I think the Islamic Republic has been a detriment and a hindrance to the progress of the wider country. So, know, this is that I think that if you look at it in the longer term, in the historic term, then, you know, the fall of the Islamic Republic is a matter of time. It's really question of, you know, when, I've said in other articles, death by a thousand cuts. Amir Golshani: Not if. Ali Ansari: I think they've had a lot of cuts recently. ⁓ you know, I think that process has certainly accelerated. Amir Golshani: So that being said, and after years of studying power ideology and tragedy, do you find yourself more hopeful about Iran's future or more cautious? Ali Ansari: I always find, it always depends on perspective. If I take a longer historical view, I'm always quite optimistic. Yeah. And the reason is, is because I look at this in the longer period of history and we look at the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Republic is maybe 40 or 50 years in the life of a political culture that is old. Okay. And, know, will pass through this. There was a very famous quote by Lord Curzon back in the 19th century where he said that Iran's progress precipitate on a period of fanaticism you know he says that that it may be that ⁓ an attempt to progress may regress into fanaticism but they will get through it you know in the sense that it's an important part of the process in getting towards a sort of a modern state and of course you know when you take a historical perspective all these things are quite nice to say it's not great for you and me having to live through it i mean i have say it's quite different ⁓ it's you know ⁓ when take a historical perspective i think it's the prospects I think for Iran as a whole are very bright, actually. And I say that when I look at the people. And again, it's the people that give me hope. But I will caveat and qualify that by saying that in the immediate term, and for those of us at the ground level, shall we say, I think the situation in the immediate future will be tough. I mean, I think are facing some very, very difficult times. But if I was to say in 50 years time, would we feel that Iran looking back on it, that we had traversed through this particularly tough time and we had moved in a more, yes, I certainly think that when you look at the longer perspective, the prospects are actually quite good. Amir Golshani: What's your perspective about the succession in Iran? So let's say this regime collapses. There is no way. ⁓ cannot be sustained. We all agree it's a matter of when not if. ⁓ what was your take on the succession? Who ⁓ what kind of system would be replaced based on history, based on It cannot be sustained. We all it's a matter of when not if. Ali Ansari: It's really difficult. It's difficult to say. I mean, I've said that there are three, you you could, I mean, you can certainly have a constitutional monarchy, you know, restoration of Pahlavist. ⁓ you know, anything is possible, but I don't think it's probable at the moment, I have to be honest with you. There's another one that sees a sort of route towards a more secular republic. I mean, that's also possible. Depending on the leadership within the country, again, it depends. It's very contingent to what happens within the country. And again, in part, when people talk about the restoration of the pan-land, it really depends on whether people in the country wish them to come back. mean, there has to be a means and a ways of him getting back. And the other side of it, of course, is that you get the political movements within the country itself, new leadership coming up, which also brings in, in my view, again, a... probably another succession, have to say. But very possible that a strong man would come from within the country ⁓ who then try and rebuild the country, Al-Asr or Reza Khan in 1920s and 30s, and then establish their own dynasty. So those are that we can see to go back to Vico. You can see those patterns. And I think it would be naive ⁓ not to at all three of those as a possibility. think where you... where I think we can be more certain of is that it will be secular. It will not be a religious state. It will be a secular state. that it will be irreligious, but it simply won't have religion in politics. And I think the position of the Shia clergy will be much diminished as a result of the experience of the last 47 years. So think those things are much clearer. the precise constitutional setup, I think the thing that we have to be very active in working towards is that whatever the settlement is, it has to be a constitutional settlement of one sort or another with greater or lesser degrees of political participation. mean, in my view, it has to have maximum political participation because as we are discussing, have been fighting for over 100 years for just this sort of democratic settlement with the rule of law. And I think that's important. If the country wants to get back on its feet, that's the important point. wants to get back on his feet, then it has to choose that one of those options. If it goes down the route, if something happens where you have a more autocratic setup, which is also possible, I it will be much more difficult for the country in the long run to recover. So, you know, these are options and these are things that we have to think about. And I hope Iranians themselves will be very actively engaged in ⁓ trying, know, not just being a bystander, but actually actively engaged in making sure that the most productive political solution is implemented for the security and welfare of the country. Amir Golshani: I really loved that. That was really good. Professor, I'm sorry. Is there anything that I haven't asked but you think it is absolutely critical for people to know, Ali Ansari: Yeah. All I'd say is that think you need to pay attention to history, pay attention to context, look at the particularities without making exceptional cases, but look at the particularities and distinctions and try and understand Iran on its own terms and don't forget the people. Please don't forget the people. think greatest criticism I have of everyone who has dealt with Iran politically or otherwise over the last hundred years is that we have tended to ignore the people. And I think that has come back to bite people. know, it has not been to the benefit of the country as a whole, but it has also ensured that any political system has tended to be short-lived. ⁓ political system that is founded without the consent of the people will not last. And I think that needs to be recognized by succeeds next. And I think I would ask that foreigners also pay attention, really pay attention to Iran as a country, not Iran as a problem. know, this is the thing. ⁓ People deal Iran as a problem. As a chat note. political system that is founded without the consent of the people will not last. And I think that needs to be recognized by whoever succeeds next. And I think would only ask that foreigners also pay attention, really pay attention to Iran as a country, not Iran as a problem. Look at Iran just as a people, a complex political system with centuries, millennia of history and culture that is interesting, complicated, problematic, difficult. Yes, but, you know, not much different from most other countries in the world. And one with a lot of potential and a lot of promise, a lot of promise. Look at Iran just as a people, a complex political system with centuries, millennia of history and culture that is interesting, complicated, problematic, difficult. Yes, but, you know, not much different from most other countries in the world. And one with a lot of potential and a lot of promise, a lot of promise. You know, in that sense, I'm very optimistic about the future because I think the people of Iran will be the critical factor that saves the nation, if I can put it that way. Amir Golshani: Yeah, you're absolutely right. Professor Ansari, I want to close on something personal. After everything you have studied, everything you have witnessed and heavy cycles of history you have documented, what does freedom mean to you today? Ali Ansari: Joe. What does freedom mean to me? Freedom to choose, freedom to your life with dignity, the freedom not lie. One ⁓ of the failings of the Iranians is that they force you to lie. mean, everyone has to lie. I mean, in order to get ahead, you have to be dishonest because ⁓ nobody can the truth because they're so worried that they might get shot or something. You want to have the freedom to be able to live your life with dignity. and to be able to live an honest life really. I mean, I think that for me is the important things. I mean, there has to be, you know, political, social, legal freedoms and other things that protect the dignity of the individual. My ideas of freedom, I'm sorry to say, are very founded in sort of enlightenment principles of rights and this sort of thing. It's sort of fairly archaic in some ways, but I still think those old ones in some ways work. I mean, you know, we need basic freedoms, I think, to... allow ourselves as human beings to grow. And I that's important. Amir Golshani: Thank you, Professor Ansari. It has been a true honor to have you here to help us find Ali Ansari: Thank you. Thank you very much.