Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / GitHub switched off two poisoned Actions, then switched them back on
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Saturday, the twenty-sixth of September.
- 0:07GitHub switched off two poisoned Actions, then switched them back on.
- 0:13Two GitHub Actions were poisoned in May.
- 0:17GitHub switched them off the next day.
- 0:19On 16 September they quietly came back, and nobody had cleaned them.
- 0:24Until GitHub disabled them again on 25 September, every build that called them was running credential-stealin
- 0:31g code once more. No attacker had to lift a finger.
- 0:35Next.
- 0:48. They're small issue-tracker helpers.
- 0:51Malicious content was introduced on 18 May 2026, as part of the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign.
- 0:58GitHub's security team disabled both repositories on 19 May.
- 1:03Socket's researchers report that on 16 September, both became reachable again.
- 1:09The release tags had never been cleaned, so they still pointed at the malicious code.
- 1:15Socket could not determine why they were re-enabled.
- 1:19Both were disabled again on 25 September, after public disclosure.
- 1:24And also.
- 1:29Think of a tag as the label on a box, rather than the box itself.
- 1:34A workflow says: fetch whatever is labelled v2.
- 1:392.1.
- 1:44Months later it's returned, with the label unchanged and the contents untouched.
- 1:49The pharmacy's standing order still reads "send whatever is labelled v2.
- 1:552.1". So it arrives, and nobody has to attack anything.
- 2:00Socket notes that workflows calling these actions usually run on a schedule, or when someone opens an issue
- 2:08or pull request. So most would have executed the payload within a day of re-enablement.
- 2:13BleepingComputer reports the code targets developers' tokens, credentials and C I and C D secrets.
- 2:22For issues-helper alone, GitHub's dependency graph lists about 15,000 dependent repositories.
- 2:29But Socket says it isn't known how many of those referenced a tag rather than a pinned commit.
- 2:34And also.
- 2:38Very little. The build log shows a familiar action, from a repository you already trusted, doing what it alw
- 2:46ays did. There's no new commit in your code.
- 2:49There's no new dependency to flag.
- 2:51The evidence is retrospective.
- 2:54You're looking for workflow runs between 16 and 25 September that reference either action.
- 3:00Socket's advice is to find those references.
- 3:03Replace them with a verified commit from before 18 May, or remove them.
- 3:08Review run history since 16 September.
- 3:11And rotate every secret those workflows could read.
- 3:14That last step is the expensive one, because a build secret is often the key to production.
- 3:20And finally.
- 3:23Two decisions failed. First, the default.
- 3:28GitHub's own hardening guidance says pinning to a full-length commit S H A is currently the only way to use a
- 3:35n action as an immutable release.
- 3:37It also says a tag can be moved or deleted if someone gains access to the repository.
- 3:43Convenience won, and tags stayed the norm.
- 3:46Second, the takedown. Disabling a repository stopped the download, but left the poison in place.
- 3:53So re-enabling it undid the recall.
- 3:56A recall that leaves the product on the shelf is a suggestion.
- 4:00The cost of the fix is modest.
- 4:02Pin third-party actions to commit SHAs, and accept a routine of reviewing and bumping them.
- 4:09The N C S C's supply chain guidance sets out 12 principles for oversight of suppliers.
- 4:15A build pipeline is a supplier relationship like any other, only faster and less audited.
- 4:21The question for a director is short: which code that we did not write runs with our secrets?
- 4:27If nobody can answer, that is the finding.
- 4:30That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:35Thanks for listening.