Latest / Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast / US-Italian Intelligence Cooperation and Operation Gladio
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome to Eye Spy: the Intelligence History Podcast.
- 0:08I'm your host, Krystel von Kumberg 3 00:00:12,120 --> 00:00:16,720 Every few weeks, I'm going to be interviewing historians, practitioners and scholars in
- 0:16the field of intelligence to explore some aspect of the past and what it can tell us
- 0:21about the present and future of intelligence studies.
- 0:30Dr Nicolo Petrelli is an assistant professor in the Department of International Studies
- 0:34at the University of Roma 3.
- 0:36He's the author of several books, including Israel's Strategic Culture and the Conflict
- 0:40with the Mass, Adaptation and Military Effectiveness, which came out in 2017, and numerous journal
- 0:46articles on international security, counterinsurgency and war, published in Journal of Security,
- 0:51Strategic Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, and Intelligence and National Security.
- 0:56In 2023, he published an article called La Cooperazione di Intelligenz Italia USA, L'Alleanza
- 1:05Atlantica e l'Evoluzione dell'Operazione Gladio, which offers a novel interpretation
- 1:09of the Italian Stay Behind network, focusing on Gladio's organisational structure, operational
- 1:15concept and the international players involved between 1951 and 1990.
- 1:20Additionally, his 2024 article, Through a Glass Darkly, US-Italian Intelligence Cooperation,
- 1:25COVID Operations and the Gladio Stay Behind Program, published in Diplomacy and Statecraft,
- 1:31explores US-Italian cooperation between 1943 and 1976.
- 1:37Today we'll be speaking to Petrelli about US-Italian intelligence cooperation and the
- 1:45evolution of Gladio.
- 1:48Thank you so much for joining me today on Eye Spy: The Intelligence History Podcast.
- 1:54My first question is about your research and sources that you found in the archives.
- 2:03So what significant and newly declassified files shed light on the extent of US covert
- 2:10operations in Italy during the early Cold War?
- 2:14For instance, the Renzi and Draghi recently declassified materials contribute to our understanding
- 2:20the relationship between these two countries and their intelligence agencies in more detail.
- 2:26Okay, thanks.
- 2:28So declassification started in 2008 and that was the first batch of documents declassified
- 2:35by the Prodi government.
- 2:38Later on we had to measure declassifications with the Renzi government and Draghi government
- 2:43in 2014 and 2021.
- 2:48So the reason for this was the fact that Italian intelligence services during the Cold War
- 2:55were suspected of being involved in so-called strategy of tension.
- 3:00So there was a strong public demand to policymakers for shedding more light on these events.
- 3:09That's why these governments chose to declassify these documents.
- 3:14Most of them, I would say 80 to 90 percent are from the intelligence services.
- 3:20Some others are from the Ministry of Defense, the Prime Minister's Office and other sources
- 3:24which are less relevant to the topic that we are discussing today.
- 3:30But I think that the main reason why these documents are interesting, are relevant for
- 3:36scholarship is that these are not the usual kind of sources that you get ordinarily declassified.
- 3:45Meaning that the public demand for details and information about these events were so
- 3:52specific that the government asked the intelligence service to declassify reports by sources,
- 4:01internal assessments, the kind of documentation that you rarely see declassified from intelligence
- 4:07services.
- 4:09So the level of detail that these provide for a scholar interested in doing academic
- 4:18research is really unparalleled, I think.
- 4:23Moreover, in terms of relations between the US and the Italian intelligence service, a
- 4:29lot of documents concern these relations because the US intelligence services were major sponsors
- 4:39of the reconstruction of the Italian intelligence since 1945.
- 4:46But I mean the links between the two intelligence systems started earlier on in 1943.
- 4:53So there is what you can see between 1943 and the late 70s, early 80s is an ongoing
- 5:02conversation and ongoing interactions between Italian and intelligence services.
- 5:08And they mostly deal, for the most part, they deal with the stay-behind network.
- 5:14This is the backbone of their relation.
- 5:17Other aspects of the interactions between the Italian and the US intelligence services
- 5:21are much less discussed in documents that have been declassified.
- 5:29But some of them allow you to make educated guesses and inferences on how these relations
- 5:37evolved.
- 5:39And focusing on a specific individual who's pretty famous, James Jesus Angleton, who was
- 5:46working in counterintelligence in Italy to begin with in OSS, what were his primary concerns
- 5:53regarding Soviet intelligence activities?
- 5:56And how did his perception of this hall of mirrors, as you emphasize in your work, manifest
- 6:03in Italo-American relations?
- 6:05And how did Angleton's leadership specifically shape US intelligence operations in Italy?
- 6:11Yes, so Angleton is very well known for his obsession with counterintelligence and how
- 6:18this impacted on the CIA during the Cold War.
- 6:22Angleton is a bit less known, except for us Italians, who are very familiar with his character,
- 6:32because basically from 1944 he was, we might call him the godfather of the US-Italian intelligence
- 6:42relations, meaning that he was the guy who developed a very close liaison with the Italian
- 6:48intelligence, and he continued to supervise and to control this relation, at least up
- 6:57until the end of the 50s.
- 7:00Some scholars, John Prados has mentioned, for example, 1960, 1961, is the moment when
- 7:07Angleton influence on the US-Italian intelligence liaison starts to decline.
- 7:13So let me start from the beginning.
- 7:15Angleton, there is very solid scholarship.
- 7:22There is an important study, a PhD dissertation, Harvard PhD dissertation, has demonstrated
- 7:29how Angleton developed, starting from counterintelligence, counterespionage, managed to develop a much
- 7:36broader relation with the Italian intelligence.
- 7:40And besides establishing liaison with the Italian intelligence, conducted a series of
- 7:46penetrations.
- 7:47So Angleton reports in 1945, 1946 to his superiors saying, I'm the guy running the Italian intelligence.
- 7:55And his superiors agree with him, he has very solid empirical evidence for this claim.
- 8:01So basically he had managed to penetrate all the branches of the Italian intelligence service,
- 8:06the civil intelligence service, the one that will become later on the Ufficio Affari Riservati
- 8:13or Divisione Affari Riservati, Office of Classified Affairs, we might call him.
- 8:19And basically he knows everything that's going on in the Italian intelligence service.
- 8:25But more interestingly, Angleton's idea is, okay, we need to counter communism in Italy
- 8:33because communism is on the rise, the Italian communist party is very strong, it has very
- 8:38close links to the Soviet Union.
- 8:41And we have to use, given that we cannot spend too many resources on the intelligence collection,
- 8:50we have to use the Italian intelligence as a force multiplier.
- 8:54And that's the kind of relationship that he sets in place.
- 8:59Basically he uses the Italian intelligence to outsource a series of intelligence collection
- 9:07activities.
- 9:08In the first years up until the mid 50s, the CIA is involved mainly in operational activities
- 9:17in Italy, covered political action mostly.
- 9:20And all the intelligence collection is, except for a few high profile sources, is outsourced
- 9:26to the Italian intelligence.
- 9:29So this is one of the main, this works for a number of years.
- 9:37And then the moment that this system gets into some sort of crisis is when Bill Colby
- 9:44gets to Rome.
- 9:45Colby is an operational officer at the CIA Rome station under the leadership of Jerry
- 9:51Miller.
- 9:52And he becomes across the fact that Angleton still handles information on intelligence
- 9:59networks in Italy personally.
- 10:02There are sources that report to him, but don't report to the reporter at Langley.
- 10:08So what it does is basically it starts questioning the system saying, look guys, it says to his
- 10:14boss, Jerry Miller, look guys, we don't have a full intelligence picture here because Angleton
- 10:19is still retaining control of his intelligence network in Italy.
- 10:24And this is the beginning of Angleton's decline in Italy.
- 10:29I would say 1957 to 1960.
- 10:33So this internal infighting between Colby and Angleton, which will have long lasting
- 10:42consequences, it's the beginning of the, we can say of the decline of the influence of
- 10:51the CIA on the Italian military intelligence.
- 10:55How does your book frame this relationship between Italy and the US during these formative
- 11:01years of the Cold War in particular?
- 11:05Often in the literature, the Italian intelligence services are depicted as very weak.
- 11:11But I think in your work, you really reflect a more complex version of events in which
- 11:16it was not solely the Americans who were dictating events, but really the Italians as well.
- 11:22So perhaps manipulating at times the Americans.
- 11:25So in what ways did this relationship play out?
- 11:32Okay, that is a very, very, very interesting question.
- 11:37So I would say it was definitely an asymmetric intelligence relation, but the CIA comes across
- 11:49problems similar to other kinds of political diplomatic relations that the US entertained
- 11:55with other partners during the Cold War.
- 12:00We can think of Vietnam, we can think of partners in Latin America.
- 12:04This fact that you have an asymmetric relation, you have a patron client relationship with
- 12:12an ally.
- 12:13But at the same time, that ally is to a certain extent able to manipulate you.
- 12:20So the purpose of the CIA was to, as I mentioned, to use the Italian intelligence services as
- 12:27a force multiplier.
- 12:30And one of Engelton's goals was basically to make sure that to orient the collection
- 12:41and analysis priorities of the Italian intelligence.
- 12:44So everything they do, all the way they set in place the relationship with the Italian
- 12:52military intelligence and the Italian civilian intelligence is geared towards these two goals.
- 12:59The problem is that the Italians agree with this to a certain extent, meaning that what
- 13:06you see on the part of the Italian intelligence is that they accept the US intelligence hegemony
- 13:13as a fact of life, meaning they know that they have to cooperate with the US, they know
- 13:19that they have to comply with their requests because in exchange for that, they get money,
- 13:25they get equipment, they get training, and they get US support for activities that they
- 13:32want to conduct.
- 13:34So the externality that takes place in this, that emerges from this interaction is the
- 13:46fact that the Italians basically sometimes try to not only to manipulate the US intelligence,
- 13:54meaning to take advantage of their funding, of their training, the kind of information
- 14:02that they provide to conduct their own activities to counter communism.
- 14:07But that sometimes they push this to the extreme.
- 14:11This is a recurring pattern.
- 14:13I mean, and it's linked, it's very closely linked with the strategy of tension, meaning
- 14:18that sometimes what you see in documents is that both the Italian intelligence agencies
- 14:24proposing very extreme measures against the communists.
- 14:29But one of the main, obviously these guys are generally on the right, they are vehemently
- 14:36anti-communist and I mean, this is their point of view.
- 14:40This is what they want to do.
- 14:41They want to counter by any means the strength of the communist party.
- 14:46But at the same time, they want to retain control because they know that the relationship
- 14:51with US intelligence is asymmetric and that the US intelligence agencies have the resources
- 14:57and the will to do whatever they want.
- 14:59And they are concerned about this.
- 15:01So what they want to do and what they actually do and sometimes proposing these more extreme
- 15:07measures like the outlawing of the communist party in 1954, or for example, the cooperation
- 15:14with right wing groups in the late sixties is to try to get back control and to respond
- 15:22to activities that both the US intelligence agencies, the CIA, the country intelligence
- 15:27corps are conducting in Italy.
- 15:30So at first sight, it might look very contradictory and the Italian intelligence services might
- 15:38look very weak, meaning that they basically bow to the US hegemony.
- 15:43But this is not really the case because on the one hand, they accept it.
- 15:47On the other, they try to counteract it as far as they can.
- 15:55And how did the competition between different US intelligence agencies such as the ISS,
- 16:01X2, impact this relationship with Italian intelligence agencies in the immediate post
- 16:08war years?
- 16:09This is another great topic.
- 16:11So there are three batch of sources on this.
- 16:13So you have sources from the CIA, the Nazi Disclosure Act that provides a lot of sources
- 16:22about the activities of the country intelligence corps, especially in the immediate aftermath
- 16:27of World War II.
- 16:28You have some documents that are classified by the CIA and the Italian intelligence.
- 16:33There is a lot that classified by the Italian intelligence about the second half of the
- 16:38fifties and the sixties.
- 16:42And there is an internal history of the CIA under Holland Dallas that provides a lot of
- 16:49context and details.
- 16:52What I mean is that the relationship between the CIA and the country intelligence corps
- 16:56was never an easy one.
- 16:59So the country intelligence corps is very active, especially in the aftermath of World
- 17:03War II.
- 17:04However, there are, I mean, at least this is what is claimed in the CIA internal history
- 17:12apparently their operation are very amateurish.
- 17:15They develop huge networks that is very insecure by design and they basically try to get in
- 17:25touch with as many resources and assets as they can.
- 17:30So the CIA is constantly concerned by this kind of approach because they think, okay,
- 17:35these guys might mess up with our operation.
- 17:39They may jeopardize the way the relationship that we set in place with the Italian intelligence.
- 17:47So the relationship is never an easy one between the two and it's very difficult to reach an
- 17:53agreement.
- 17:54There are various attempts up until 1957.
- 17:58In 1957, there is some kind of gentleman's agreements for coordinated activities in basing
- 18:06on which, at least in theory, the country intelligence corps must refer to the director
- 18:11of the CIA who has to approve their activities and to make sure that they do not jeopardize
- 18:18CIA operations all over the world, but in this case in Italy.
- 18:24The problem is that the country intelligence corps in Italy, I mean, fails to respect this
- 18:29agreement and they continue to go on with their activities, which leads us to the issue
- 18:35of Los Angeles.
- 18:37What kind of activities was the country intelligence corps conducting in Italy?
- 18:41So the crown jewel of their operation is an informational network called Los Angeles,
- 18:48which is set up in 1945.
- 18:50And this is a very serious informational network, meaning that it gets together some penetration
- 18:58from the Italian military intelligence, exponents of the official Faro Riservati, and some former
- 19:05counterintelligence officers from the Nazi security service.
- 19:09So all the three intelligence services, the country intelligence corps, the official Faro
- 19:15Riservati, and the Italian military intelligence, they're all aware of the fact that Nazis are
- 19:20part of the network and they all agree that these former Nazis are very precious assets.
- 19:28So there's no ethical concern whatsoever.
- 19:30There's a new enemy and this enemy must be fought.
- 19:35Who has the expertise to fight against the communists?
- 19:37The Nazis.
- 19:39So this is the beginning.
- 19:41Starting from this early incarnation of Los Angeles in the following years under the leadership
- 19:46of this kind of obscure and fascinating feature figure, Major Joseph Luongo, the counterintelligence
- 19:57corps start to develop other networks and they get on board, I mean, many other Italian
- 20:08agents, not from the intelligence services, but most importantly, at least according to
- 20:14internal documents by the Italian counterintelligence, what they do is they set up these new networks
- 20:21made up by US citizens of Italian ascent that basically purchase and or set in place commercial
- 20:33activities.
- 20:34But according to the Italian intelligence, they conduct secret intelligence gathering
- 20:40and some unspecified operational activities from Italian territory into neighboring Yugoslavia
- 20:47and apparently even in Bulgaria.
- 20:50So this is obviously an element of serious concern from the Italian intelligence, especially
- 20:55because Yugoslavia is a communist country.
- 20:58I mean, it's out of the, as we all know, it's out of the, I mean, the relationship is out
- 21:02of the Warsaw Pact.
- 21:04But still, I mean, the point is that, and here you can see the asymmetry is that there
- 21:10are huge operational activities by the counterintelligence corps of which the Italian intelligence knows
- 21:16nothing.
- 21:17And the Italian intelligence even asked for help to the CIA.
- 21:21The CIA basically say, oh, we really don't know that much about these activities, which
- 21:26is partly true.
- 21:28To a certain extent, they didn't want to disclose the operation of their sister agency.
- 21:34And to a certain extent, obviously they were a little bit embarrassed because they consider
- 21:38these activities unprofessional.
- 21:40So in the end, the CIA is not able and not willing to help the Italian intelligence.
- 21:49That's why, at least this is, I mean, my understanding of my interpretation from the sources, this
- 21:57is why the Italian intelligence first get in touch with neo-fascist groups.
- 22:03In order to regain control and to basically contain the counterintelligence corps activity,
- 22:13especially the northeastern area of Italy.
- 22:17With figures such as Valerio Borghese as well, does he come into that?
- 22:23No, no, actually Valerio Borghese is a very, I mean, would be a very interesting topic
- 22:31in and of himself because of the fact that, I mean, he looks for support by the US intelligence
- 22:38for his attempted coup d'etat.
- 22:41But the US are very cautious.
- 22:43I mean, we, certain number of documents have been declassified and basically the assessment
- 22:50of the US embassy is that, okay, this guy is not going to make it.
- 22:55He's not going to make it because he doesn't, he's not, he's too old, he's too compromised
- 23:01with the fascist regime and has no following, I mean, among right wing groups in Italy.
- 23:10So basically, the assessment is that even if this coup succeed, I mean, there will be
- 23:17a civil war and therefore it is not in our best interest to support it.
- 23:22That's the assessment of the embassy.
- 23:24But the neo-fascist groups which I'm referring to is Ordine Nuovo, New Order, and a minor
- 23:32one, National Alliance, which was not involved in too many violent activities.
- 23:38The most important groups that the counterintelligence corps and Italian military intelligence fight
- 23:44for controlling is this group, which is very violent, Ordine Nuovo, New Order, very active
- 23:50in Northeast Italy, which is an offshoot of a previous group, which was called Fasci Armati
- 23:58di Combattimento, whose members were for a short time included in the early incarnation
- 24:06of the Los Angeles network.
- 24:08It's a very necessary.
- 24:10What differentiated the CIA's stay behind operation in Italy to other NATO countries?
- 24:18Operation Gladio is really very much more well known, I guess, in the literature.
- 24:23And why was this relationship between CIA and, I guess, CIFAR for one point unique?
- 24:31Okay.
- 24:32Yes.
- 24:33So the relationship between the two was different because the Gladio agreement, which was informally
- 24:43signed in 1951 and then formalized in 1956, was a bilateral agreement.
- 24:51And this is the byproduct of an understanding of a professional understanding, we might
- 24:57say, of stay behind operation that the US and Italian intelligence shared, meaning that
- 25:02the US preferred bilateral stay behind agreements.
- 25:08And the Italian intelligence wanted to set up a bilateral agreement with the US because
- 25:14the relationship was already quite close and because they wanted to extract more aid and
- 25:20resources from the CIA.
- 25:23The point is that the CIA is for some time dragged into this multilateral framework by
- 25:32the MI6.
- 25:33The MI6 wants to get the CIA on board with its multilateral framework and the NATO framework,
- 25:39which is the standard one that got together all the other stay behind systems in Europe.
- 25:46Italy becomes part of the NATO network only in 1964.
- 25:51So very late.
- 25:53Why is that?
- 25:54Why were the United States more interested in bilateral relations?
- 25:58First of all, because they could control them more easily.
- 26:03Secondly, and this we know for sure because there's a lot of documents on this, the stay
- 26:09behind agreements, stay behind programs were a fixation of the US Armed Forces.
- 26:16So the CIA is not really happy in the first years of the fact that so much time, so much
- 26:22resources, so a lot of training and personnel is devoted to these activities.
- 26:30So and both Dallas as the Deputy Director of CIA, then as director and the Deputy Director
- 26:39for Plans, Frank Wisner, they are against multilateral agreements and they prefer bilateral
- 26:46agreements.
- 26:47In the case of Italy, they managed to get that because Italy was very eager to get one.
- 26:52But in order to understand the need, why Gladio is so important, is central to the US-Italy-Intelligence
- 26:58relations is the fact that it was not purely bilateral, a pure stay behind agreement.
- 27:07It was something more.
- 27:09So what you get is from the, what you see is from the Italians, continuous requests
- 27:16for equipment, help, training, funding, and anything they can think of.
- 27:21So basically Gladio was the vector that Italy used to get as much support as they could
- 27:32from the US-Intelligence service.
- 27:35What you see from the CIA to the Italian intelligence is an attempt, which is not really consistent,
- 27:42it's rather occasional, but I mean several times to have Gladio employed for intelligence
- 27:52collections and operation against the Communist Party.
- 27:56And why is that?
- 27:57It's because the CIA understanding of Gladio was okay, Gladio will be of no use if war
- 28:03breaks out.
- 28:05The CIA view, especially up until the late 50s, early 60s, is that these stay behind
- 28:11systems are not really useful because once war breaks out, they will probably be messed
- 28:17up, they won't work.
- 28:19So the idea is to use Gladio in the same way that they, in a way consistent with the nature
- 28:26of the intelligence relations with the Italian intelligence service as a force multiplier
- 28:30for intelligence collection.
- 28:32So that's why they keep asking to have Gladio employed for these purposes, informational,
- 28:39sometimes operational.
- 28:41And what you see is a kind of two deaf men speaking to each other because the CIA asked
- 28:49for, okay, why don't we use Gladio for intelligence collection?
- 28:53And the Italian intelligence says, okay, we might think about it.
- 28:57And then they in exchange, rather they asked for, get us some more money, we can do that,
- 29:04get us that equipment that we can do that.
- 29:07And the Italian intelligence consistently deviate from the CIA requests.
- 29:15So for example, CIA in the second half of the 50s and the early 60s wants the Italian
- 29:21intelligence to start developing the stay behind system with the clandestine informational
- 29:27networks.
- 29:28The Italian intelligence says, no, we're not going to do that.
- 29:31We're first work on the paramilitary units.
- 29:35So the units that are supposed to conduct counterinsurgency activities behind enemy
- 29:39lines.
- 29:40And why is that?
- 29:41Because they have no interest in the informational networks.
- 29:44The equipment that they want, the training that they want is in counterinsurgency and
- 29:49they already have the personnel.
- 29:51So they can spare a little bit of money and extract more from the CIA.
- 29:57So in the end, what you see at work here is basically the Italians managed to outmaneuver
- 30:06the CIA because the Italians get a lot of equipment, a lot of training, a lot of everything
- 30:13from the CIA and the CIA in return doesn't get much because the Italians consistently
- 30:18refuse to apply to employed for countering communism in various ways, collecting information
- 30:26or operational activities.
- 30:28They don't want, we can say to pollute Gladio with this.
- 30:34The rationale is, okay, we are already working with you in intelligence collection with our
- 30:40resources.
- 30:41We want Gladio to be something, our crown jewel, our special operations forces organization,
- 30:49our operational art.
- 30:51So that's the logic of the Italian intelligence.
- 30:55And how do external factors such as the war in Vietnam for the US change the relationship
- 31:05during the 1960s?
- 31:07The 1960s are a period of crisis for two reasons.
- 31:11First of all, as you mentioned, the US is overexposed in Vietnam, meaning that there
- 31:21is a huge scholarship on the amount of intelligence resources that the US committed in Vietnam
- 31:27since 1964, 1965.
- 31:30So the resources for covert operation and intelligence collection in Italy draw down.
- 31:38At the same time, there is, if you take a look at documents from the late Kennedy, the
- 31:46last period of the Kennedy administration, 1963 and the early period of the Johnson administration,
- 31:52you see the committee responsible for covert operations saying, look, the Italians are
- 31:58exploiting us.
- 31:59They're taking advantage of our funding for doing whatever they want.
- 32:03This funding, these covert activities are not working.
- 32:07The idea is, okay, Italy is stable enough.
- 32:10We don't need to commit more resources because the more resources we commit, the more the
- 32:16Italians will ask for.
- 32:19So fundamentally, there is a draw down of intelligence collection and covert operations.
- 32:28At the same time, concurrently, there is some more pressing requests for having Gladio employed
- 32:38for intelligence collection.
- 32:41And this is probably linked to the fact that the CIA didn't have enough resources for conducting,
- 32:46I mean, all the intelligence collection activities that they wanted to conduct in Italy.
- 32:52But basically, the 60s is a kind of standoff period for the US-Italy intelligence relations,
- 33:02at least up until the end of the 60s.
- 33:08And how did the alignment of Italian intelligence agencies with US sort of priorities shape
- 33:15the strategy of tension during the 1970s?
- 33:20To what extent were US intelligence agencies involved in the creation of these groups,
- 33:24as you kind of mentioned earlier?
- 33:27And can you unpack why the phoenix-style approach use of Gladio is declined by the Italians?
- 33:38Okay, so the CIA is not involved at all in the strategy of tension.
- 33:45Their only connection is to a certain extent with Borghese, as we mentioned before.
- 33:56But I mean, there's no US support for Borghese at all.
- 33:59CIA is approached by Borghese people that they want to probe their intention.
- 34:05But the CIA says basically the assessment of the CIA is very similar to the assessment
- 34:12of the ambassador.
- 34:13Basically, these guys, they're not going to make it.
- 34:16No way we will support them.
- 34:18The story is different for the counterintelligence corps.
- 34:21Obviously, it is very, very messy.
- 34:25But what a very well-known Italian policymaker from the Democrazia Cristiana, Minister of
- 34:34Defense in the 50s, several times Minister of Interior during the 60s, has claimed that,
- 34:40for example, for the most, the bloodiest terrorist attack of the strategy of tension, Piazza
- 34:48Pontana in 1969, that the counterintelligence corps provided the explosive to the neo-fascist
- 34:55groups that actually perpetrated the attack.
- 34:58And we have other scattered evidence that the counterintelligence corps networks were
- 35:10involved, meaning that they were in touch, we know for a fact that they were in touch
- 35:17with the groups that actually perpetrated the attack.
- 35:20What we don't know is the extent of their involvement.
- 35:24However, I mean, there is also a similar claim about the explosive and the involvement, even
- 35:30though a kind of a very general and not really specific claim has been made by the head of
- 35:39the Italian counterintelligence at the time, General Maletti.
- 35:43So we don't have any conclusive evidence of the involvement of the US intelligence in
- 35:49the strategy of tension, but there is what we might call a thin black line that connects
- 35:58the counterintelligence corps to the groups most seriously involved in the strategy of
- 36:04tension.
- 36:05So the prevailing interpretation in Italian historiography is basically that the idea
- 36:13behind the strategy of tension is let's destabilize security in the country.
- 36:22With security destabilized, people will ask for a reaction.
- 36:28The government will be ready around the flag effect.
- 36:32The government will be able to set in place more severe measures against the communists.
- 36:41So that was the idea of the strategy of tension.
- 36:44Let's start a bombing campaign.
- 36:46Let's blame the communists.
- 36:47The people will ask for more security.
- 36:49The government will react and crack down on communism.
- 36:56Apparently the role of the US intelligence in this, but it's not, I mean, it's not a
- 37:01role orchestrated with all the other subjects involved in the strategy of tension.
- 37:07Their idea was, okay, let's provide this neo-fascist group with some capability to carry some small
- 37:17attacks, some occasional bombing without killing anybody.
- 37:22But let's try to create a little bit of chaos so that the government will have to, obviously,
- 37:29let's blame the communists and let's have the government reacting.
- 37:34So that is the prevailing interpretation in Italian serography.
- 37:39As I mentioned, there is no solid evidence and probably there will never be.
- 37:45But there is, as I mentioned, really a black trail connecting through the years the counterintelligence
- 37:56corps with these groups.
- 37:58So this sounds plausible at least, even though we will probably never know.
- 38:04Yeah, probably not.
- 38:06What are the main areas you think readers should take away from your work and research
- 38:18as well as your upcoming book on this topic?
- 38:22I think that the most interesting aspect of the book, of the US-Italian intelligence relations
- 38:31during the Cold War, is that they provide a very different angle on the nature of intelligence
- 38:38relations, even between allies, meaning that we have studies on the, for example, intelligence
- 38:52relations between Soviet intelligence and the intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact,
- 38:59which more or less demonstrate that there were patron-client relationships with our
- 39:05asymmetric relationships with an intelligence service that dictated priorities, activities,
- 39:11and so on and so forth.
- 39:13On the other hand, we have a scholarship on the Five Eyes, the US-UK intelligence relations,
- 39:22and for intelligence cooperation in the war on terror.
- 39:28Scholarship on intelligence cooperation mainly focuses on transactional relations or alternatively
- 39:39on politically aligned intelligence relations.
- 39:45The case, the US-Italian intelligence relations case shows that there is a lot of variation
- 39:51between the two.
- 39:53There might be hybrid relations between intelligence services, meaning that the Italian intelligence
- 40:00relation is, during the Cold War, is a cooperative one to a significant extent.
- 40:05But at the same time, there was a lot of cooperation, there was a lot of fighting with both systems
- 40:11trying to take advantage of fractures or disagreements within the other system to advance their goals,
- 40:20to preserve their turf, and so on and so forth.
- 40:28So basically, I think that the main contribution of this study is to provide a more nuanced
- 40:38understanding of intelligence cooperation and how cooperation can go on even for decades
- 40:45with a certain amount of conflict and competition.
- 40:48Great way to sum up everything!
- 40:51Thank you so much for all your insight.
- 40:54Thank you very much.
- 40:55Thank you for the invitation.