Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / The Fall of the Islamic Regime? Eli Lake on the "End of the Failed Experiment"

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The Fall of the Islamic Regime? Eli Lake on the "End of the Failed Experiment" · Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani

• Amir Golshani: Eli Lake, welcome to Beyond the Summit. Eli Lake: Great to be here. Thanks for having me. Amir Golshani: You're one of the rare journalists who manages to connect breaking news with deep historical context. Through your reporting and your podcast Breaking History, you've shown that today's geopolitical crisis don't just appear overnight. They grow out of decades, sometimes centuries of political decisions, ideological struggles, and human ambition. Your work on Iran in particular stands out because you treat it not just as a policy problem or a headline. but as a nation with a long and complicated history. Thank you for being here. Eli Lake: ⁓ well, it's great. That's what I aspire to do. So thank you very much. Amir Golshani: Fantastic. Eli, before we dive into I want people to know the person behind the analysis. What pulled you toward foreign policy and national security reporting? Eli Lake: ⁓ I was fairly early in my career. I had been covering Washington and the Environmental Protection Agency, ⁓ in the Education Department for newsletters, which meant that I had to make sources ⁓ Washington and give me a sense of how Washington worked. And then I kind of got my first big break. It was with a newspaper that's still around called The Forward, which is the oldest and largest Jewish newspaper in the country. and I was there kind of hired as their Washington correspondent this was at the very end ⁓ the Oslo process and I had an opportunity to kind of cover I guess you could say the collapse of that process and then very shortly less than a year after getting that job I was hired by UPI to be their State Department correspondent which threw me into the center of the fire to cover international diplomacy and It was a, you I was a young man. So in that process of having to kind of cover, you know, the end of the Clinton administration and the beginning of the Bush administration, I was also of learning as much as I could, reading a lot of books on the regions that I had to cover. It was a kind of, ⁓ like to think of it as almost like a graduate school without being in the school. So that was helpful. And I've always been very curious. like to history. that's kind of, so for me, there's an element of fun, you when I get an opportunity to dive into a new issue. But yeah, so that's basically how it was. I cover a lot things now. I cover ⁓ politics and... written about culture and stuff. I think foreign policy, national security, statecraft, the intelligence world, those are the things that I really love to write about. And here we are ⁓ a middle-aged man. ⁓ Yeah. Amir Golshani: Yeah, I love So everyone who ends up covering these topics usually has some moment that shapes how they see the board. Was there a turning point in your life or career that pushed you toward this path? Eli Lake: Well, before the run up to the Iraq war after 9-11, like way before that, I was covering the Iraqi democratic opposition in Akhmet Shalabi. But not just Akhmet Shalabi, I was covering the Kurdish opposition in Iraq and other elements of the opposition, the sort of Shia opposition in Iraq. And to me, getting to know some of the exiles, getting to know some of the people, who were trying to take their country back, just felt that it was a natural partnership that America as an ideal is that we're this great experiment as a democratic republic and represent certain universal values. if you those universal values, it's just not true that if you look at a country that is living under a tyranny like Iran is today, that especially not true in Iran, but I'm saying it's just not true that everybody is just used to it. that in fact, you know, the there is ⁓ sort of universality of a demand for a certain kind of dignity, respect, security and freedom. And so that really in the run up to the Iraq war, that's really what motivated me. I was not an opinion writer. was again, UPI is a wire service. It's like the AP, ⁓ although it's it's diminished quite a bit. since I was there and it was already somewhat diminished then. But the point is that I wasn't writing op-eds. I started in this period in the run-up, guess, I did write for National Review, the Weekly Standard, and the New Republic. But they were reported pieces, really. I didn't have the stature that I have today, so I wasn't as influential. But I supported the idea of the Iraq War. because I felt that there were millions of Iraqis who deserved to live in a better world. And that combined with the fact that Saddam Hussein, even though this sort of, this history is forgotten and airbrushed aside today by most people, he was a threat to his neighbors. He was a threat to US national security interests. So when you have a kind of confluence of interests, much like we have right now in Iran, my was that it know, why not see how we can marry power to democratic opposition Now, ⁓ yeah, but would say that I've also learned a lot since then, which is that one of the lessons that I take away from the Iraq war is that we're very good at toppling regimes. I believe that Iraq is better off than it was under Saddam Hussein or would have been under one of his. Amir Golshani: Fantastic. So yeah, please. Eli Lake: loathsome, monstrous sons. However, we as a nation state, as Americans, ⁓ kind of our institutions are really not capable of the kind of nation building that we thought we might be. And so that's another element of it where I think this happening ⁓ after Cold War victory. So we had a kind of hubris that we could do anything, but it's not really, I don't think our military is designed to have, you know, 22 year old, you know, Marines manning checkpoints and training local police and you know, trying to settle disputes about in local tribal councils and things like that. We were asking our military to do. We don't really have the infrastructure to do that. We don't have the, I think, patience as a nation to do that. So I would not have supported the idea of like an invasion of Iraq where we were going to be the de facto. a you know, running country for a while. And the way, we didn't end up, we supported a new constitution and elections. It's a little bit more complicated than the story that the left tells today and many elements of the right. But I think that you have to be chastened and sort of learn those lessons as well. So I'm still much a person who believes that we should use American power, that I don't think that... the tyrants of the world, whether it's Vladimir Putin or Kim Jong-un or for that matter, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may he burn in hell. I think those people should be part of representing like the community. I think that they destroy the international community. They undermine it. But at the time, I also, you you have to recognize the sort of limits of American power and, you know, ⁓ realistic is it? So we are in new territory here. The president has authorized effectively a regime change war with no boots on the ground. Amir Golshani: So you mentioned some great points. I will get back to them, you know, so before this, I'd like to know about you because you mentioned ⁓ have learned ⁓ the way. When people read your work today, they seek confidence and clarity, but every thinker evolves. What is something you believed early in your career that you later change your mind about? Eli Lake: Yeah. Mm. Hmm, that's a great question. Well, one thing what did I believe early on? I I think now that our capabilities to find sleeper cells ⁓ and to actually root out networks as opposed to sort of lone wolves who are inspired by radical, radicalism. I thought that we were gonna be living with that, you know, for the rest of our lives. I think what's happened is that we've gotten very good part of its modern surveillance technology, but a lot of it is just we've learned how to track and disrupt terrorist networks. So that's one thing. I thought after 9-11 that we were going to be living with that for generations. And we've gotten very good at that. So that's one thing I've learned about. The other is that I believed or I wanted to believe because I lived in Egypt when the former president, late Hosni Mubarak, under pressure from the George W. Bush administration allowed for Muslim Brotherhood parties to participate in legislative elections. And they did very well, and I covered those elections. And I that there was an opportunity with Islamist groups, political Islam, that if you invite, if you let them participate politically in a system, that they would maybe potentially be tamed and that their actual ambitions were, you know, ⁓ could be more modest if they had to participate in the give and take of a democratic process. Amir Golshani: But it's proof they can't. Eli Lake: Well, don't. Yes, I think after Hamas won the legislative elections in 2005, there haven't been any elections since. I'm of the view that political Islam is incompatible with democratic. So I would not be in favor of Islamist being invited into the democratic process, whereas I would say maybe, I don't know, 20 years ago, I probably would have said, sure, let's give it a shot because the people that I interviewed in Egypt when I was living in Cairo, who were representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, presented a very moderate face, but those were not the people who ended up few years later after Tahrir Square being the who, you know, in the brief interregnum of the Morsi presidency were the people who were running They were instead purging all potential political rivals. And then, of course, we know what happened. Sisi conducted a military coup and put an end to that. And in my view, the old me would have said, it's really important that we kind of do these transitions to democracy and respect these groups and so forth and so on. And now I think I would have a more flexible perspective on that, which is that, of course, I would like there to be elections. I would hope for there to be liberalism. But I also don't think that you can just invite everyone in, especially if there are dangerous and parties or movements like political Islam. So I don't think that the Muslim Brotherhood should be allowed to participate in political elections. I think that the Erdogan experiment in Turkey is an example of a country that it was quasi-democratic before, but I think it's less democratic now that Erdogan is in power. Amir Golshani: I sing. Eli Lake: Even though he he did win legitimate elections Amir Golshani: What a great example. So, you've spent years covering intelligence agency diplomacy and wars. What habits or principles help you stay intellectually honest, when politics becomes very polarized. Eli Lake: Yeah. Mm. Well, it helps to read history to understand intelligence and to understand really all of those things. So it helps to sort of understand that. I feel like I understand US intelligence much better than I did when I first started covering because I hadn't read as much history, hadn't lived through enough of it. I ⁓ it's important to not get into the trap of assuming that intelligence services have a kind of omnipotence because we assume because they have access to secret information, secret knowledge, they must know things more than us. So we spend an enormous amount of time in the American media, or we used to, like, you know, reporting on alleged secret intelligence assessments of things and giving it more weight because they would have a basis on some states' secrets. intelligence community is perfectly capable of getting things entirely wrong, even if they have access to sources of information that the rest of us in the public do not. And so it's important to understand that these are human bureaucracies. And what I mean by that is that human beings are flawed. They make mistakes. Groups of human beings make mistakes. can be group think, there can be blind spots. So that's important thing, but it cuts both ways, which is to say, it means do not treat the intelligence services as if they're 10 feet tall and that they are superhuman and they have a godlike understanding of things. So that's the one side. But the other side is that a lot of people ⁓ ⁓ susceptible or prone to believing conspiracy theories want to also believe kind of an inversion of that, which is not that the intelligence agencies are gods, that they are devils. But it's the same concept that they have special knowledge and special powers and therefore are secretly controlling events in the world. Usually, it's not like that. might, ⁓ though, an exception. in just that it seems that Israel's penetration of Iran is so overwhelming and complete that it is almost as if it's not adequate to simply say that they have very good intelligence on Iran. ⁓ I think they have established almost, I don't know if they don't control the Iranian regime, I'm not saying that, but they have something more than just very good intelligence. have a kind of. Amir Golshani: Right. Eli Lake: real, unprecedented level of penetration, which I think is, yeah. Amir Golshani: Definitely, definitely many insiders, know, so they're doing the job. Yeah. Eli Lake: Yeah, well, human but also technical. And they have developed certain capabilities from just the intelligence side. So they know when the top leadership went and where they're meeting and they're able to get them from the sky. I don't think we've seen a kind of sustained capability like that. They did the same thing with Hassan Nasrallah, the same thing with the Yemeni leadership. So these are capabilities I think that have been developed over 20, 25 years. We've sort of seen them demonstrated in the battlefield, so to speak, since the war that I believe began after October 7th against Iran and its proxies. That to me is, it's quite impressive for Israel. And I think it's one of the reasons maybe why Trump was willing to go along with the second Iran of his presidency. Amir Golshani: Where there are mixed messages coming out of intelligence services that threat is imminent and then later, so a couple of days right now what's happening? They say it wasn't imminent, it was looming. So do you interpret that kind of mixed messages? So it's politicized kind of intelligence service, what they're doing. Eli Lake: Right. The question about the imminence of the threat, think, is a phony conversation. was a threat. It was a sworn enemy of the United States and Israel. It calls for death to Israel, death to America. But it's not just their slogans. They were persistent. They wanted to build a nuclear weapon. And to me, that is such an obvious. ⁓ world cannot allow that. are fanatics. And so it wasn't, and it's not just an, it's like everything, they were, mean, let's leave aside the tragedy of the 90 million Iranians who have to live under this death call, where their leadership would to have their people starved and ⁓ living in deprivation. tragedy the 90 million Iranians who have to live under this death call, where their leadership would prefer to have their starved and living in deprivation. So they can continue to try to kill Americans and Israelis and others in the Middle East through their terror networks or whatever. So they can continue to try to kill Americans and Israelis and others in the Middle East through their terror networks or whatever. Yeah. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Let me give you a better example. So when They killed 30 to 40,000 Iranian citizens in two days. So I cannot imagine that kind of, those kinds of people, you know, have got access to nuclear weapons. So I cannot imagine that, you know, no way. when They killed 30 to 40,000 Iranian citizens in two days. So I cannot imagine that kind of, those kinds of people, you know, have got access to nuclear weapons. So I cannot imagine that, Eli Lake: Yes. Yes. Right. Right. Of Of course. So we're in agreement here. mean, so my view is like, well, OK, was it five years away? Was it five months away? It probably wasn't five months away because of Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Rising Lion from ⁓ 12 Day War. But, know, ⁓ the why Iran now is because they were penetrated by Israel and so weak. It probably five months away because of Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Rising Lion from ⁓ the 12 Day War. But, you know, ⁓ the reason why Iran now is because they were penetrated by Israel and so weak. that this was maybe the best opportunity to end the regime. that this was maybe the best opportunity to end the regime. Now that is a risky gamble because we don't know what's going to come next. And we are potentially opening up a series of things that I hope it isn't, but we have to keep open the possibility that things may be worse. There might be chaos and anarchy. And what was once that is a risky gamble because we don't know what's going to come next. And we are potentially opening up a series of things that I hope it isn't, but we have to keep open the possibility that things may be worse. There might be chaos and anarchy. regime that had a monopoly of force and monopoly of violence over Iran Repressive monopoly of violence, but nonetheless, you know was you know control control the guns ⁓ Then becomes an insurgency and a faction that terrorizes Iranians and Iran's neighbors So that would be bad. ⁓ ⁓ view is kids always kind of compared to what? Amir Golshani: Right. Eli Lake: And so, you know, I think the critics of the war make a dishonest argument if they presume that what we saw, let's say, on February 28th, 2026 in Iran represented stability or represented something that was good. I think that was also a threat because you had at the top of the regime in Ayatollah Khamenei, and everybody else, by this point, by the way, none of the people who might've wanted to reform or moderate the regime, they were all purged from power. They were under house arrest, some were killed, some were exiled. So you were dealing with what was like a fanatic core. ⁓ say that you have to really convince me that, you know, if we have this conversation in a year, you really have to show me how that, whatever is in Iran in a year is worse than what I think was an unsustainable situation now. Amir Golshani: Now it's definitely very complicated right now, but at the same time, I believe, know, so you cannot wait until it's too late, you know, at this war was inevitable, you know, so they found the right timing, as you mentioned Islamic Republic at its weakest point, because people with bare hands couldn't even resist, you know, against these people, let alone to overcome and take over. So one thing I really appreciate about your work is that you zoom out. Eli Lake: Right. Amir Golshani: and look at history before analyzing the present. So let's start there. If you had to explain modern Iran in a few key chapters, would the essential ⁓ look like? Eli Lake: Yeah. Well, would start the timeline in the late 19th century under the Qajar dynasty with the initial revolts over the tobacco tax and the riots in Tehran. That is the precursor to what becomes what some call the Constitutional Revolution, which begins in 1905 and kind of ends in 1911. So that to me shows that since the late 19th century, there has been an organic desire of Iranians to have representative government and to hold their leaders to account. On the other hand, and this is what I find so fascinating about the kind of the Persian riddle or the Iranian riddle, is that Iran has for 2,500 years ⁓ One could argue until 1979 with the Islamic Revolution, but also maybe you could argue after 1979 it was similar, the supreme leader is very similar to a Shah, but you've had a history kings. There's an expectation. So Iranians also respond to a strong leader and You know, we in America have an aversion to monarchy. We have a kind of like we're no kings. We had our revolution against a monarchy and we believe we are a country founded on these kind of universal ideals. I think Iranians have a more subtle view. I think that they distinguish between what they would consider to be good kings ⁓ evil kings. So it's hard to say how that would kind of work out because in the 20th century you have different versions of this and there is this tension between the Majlis, the parliament, the Shah at points. But what I find interesting is that at key hinge moments like 1925, the Majlis amends constitution ⁓ to give powers to the first Pahlavi dynast, ⁓ Mohammed Reza. or sorry, Reza-Polik. And then, right, and then after Iran is invaded in World War II by British ⁓ and Soviets, the remaining kind Iranian elites convinced them not to end the Pahlavi dynasty. exile, you know, ⁓ they exile the first But then, you know, Shah, Mohammed Shah, the son, who was a very young man, is then made the new Shah because they would assume he would be more pliant. in that instance, after being invaded during World War II, ⁓ on to the Pahlavi dynasty was an act of self-determination in many ways. It was kind of an act of Iranian national pride. And then the other thing is then you see, you know, you know, the current Reza father, he ⁓ is very of reformer in some ways like his father, the first Shah, in that he introduces women's rights, he introduces land reform, which is a very big deal. And he uses the kind of autocratic power, the power of a royal edict to accomplish many of these substantial reforms that people like Mohammed Mosaddegh and the original generation of the constitutionalists wanted to accomplish in their own democratic revolution. sort of an irony. I'm not saying, by the way, I don't think that, I think that Mohammed Shah is a complicated figure in Iranian history because I have many criticisms. towards the end of his reign, he became very insulated. lived very, he and his court lived very lavishly as there was a huge wealth gap in the country. And he to sort of be unaware of the aspirations ⁓ of the class that his reforms in many ways had largely created. Like they wanted more, they wanted a more political buy-in. And he was unable to really respond to that until it was too late. 1978 at one point, he says he's joining the revolution, which is insane. So again, I have kind of mixed views on that. And then it's my, this is the Eli Lake theory of Iranian history. Not everyone necessarily agrees. But then I think what happened was is that there really was a widespread movement that wanted a democratic revolution in 1978. That included lots of people, including Iranian liberals, Iranian socialists, all kinds of various political factions. And it was Ruhollah Khomeini who represented a version of political Islam in the Shia religion that stole the revolution and purged out other competition. And that became apparent as soon as he to from Paris. And he fooled the whole world. He fooled many Iranians, sadly, who it was Ruhollah Khomeini who represented a version of political Islam in the Shia religion that stole the revolution and purged out other competition. We're happy to let him lead the revolution unaware that he was going to drive the country into a ditch. my hope is that what we are seeing now is the beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic and this experiment. ⁓ And Iranians begin to take their country back. That is my hope. ⁓ Yeah. my hope is that what we are seeing now is the beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic and failed experiment. ⁓ And Iranians will begin to take their country back. Amir Golshani: So we have 100 % agreement on the fact that Khomeini fooled people. This is the result of... Eli Lake: Right, but I think it's important to say he stole the revolution. was genuine ⁓ the Shah in There was a sense that he not only was of touch, but that he was not a to kind of continue to lead the country and address the legitimate grievances of a lot of Iranians. I mean, the example. that I get into in the podcast, but I think it's a good one, is that he holds this lavish kind of party to celebrate the 2,500 year anniversary of Persian kings going back to the Achaemenid Persian Empire. And the main people who are at this banquet are all the kind of foreign guests and other royals from around the world. And there are very little actual Iranians who are there. This is a symbolic thing. I understand that, you know. Governments throw big parties. I'm not against that and what I'm saying is that optics of that would have been infuriating if I was an Iranian who felt like I wasn't making enough money to make ends meet or I was worried about the economy or whatever it was I would be furious about it. But the but what's interesting is that take the contrast in and you know, this you're Iranian yourself People who were not born who were not alive for this period of history are now Now would look at you know Now would look at you know 1970s as a golden age for Iran compared to what they have to live under now, ⁓ which where there's drinking water crisis, the currency is worth nothing. There are all the scandals, I've tried to follow it, of banks collapsing because of the graft of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, pensions being looted. This is no way, ⁓ people despise that. 1970s as a golden age for Iran compared to what they have to live under now, ⁓ which where there's drinking water crisis, the currency is worth nothing. There are all the scandals, I've tried to follow it, of banks collapsing because of the graft of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, pensions being looted. This is no way, ⁓ people despise that. ⁓ do think, I would like to in the power of nonviolent resistance. I think it's a powerful idea. Gandhi was able to liberate and gain Indian independence without an armed insurrection. So it has worked historically. Martin Luther King was able to achieve civil rights without armed resistance. But in the case of Iran, and I've talked to so many Iranians that they said at certain point when the fear is finally lifted. there will be a vengeance against the people who have exploited us for so long and impressed us. I just think there's gonna be kind of inevitability there. And I think people like Ali Larijani and the people who are at the top of the regime who've survived probably understand this as well and they're fight like hell to hold onto power. it'll be a struggle, a real fight. I'm hoping that people win. Amir Golshani: Right. main takeaway for me is that what you just mentioned is a great reminder for all of us to read history from reliable sources. It is very important. So when people outside, Iran talk about 1979, they simplify it. But in reality, as you mentioned, the revolution involved very different political factions. What do you think most people misunderstand about coalition that created the Islamic Republic? Eli Lake: Well, think most, if it goes back a little bit further, I think most Americans and people in the West know a little bit of information about Iranian history, which is they know what the Operation Ajax, the CIA, MI6 coup, that they say unseated, what they say the democratically elected Mohammed Mosaddegh. And they have no appreciation for the fact that Mosaddegh himself Amir Golshani: That's it. Eli Lake: First of all, it was elected by the parliament and technically by the Iranian constitution at that time as amended in 1925, was appointed by the Shah and the Shah had the power to fire him. when they say coup, I think of what a coup is is when the head of the palace guard collusion with ⁓ the generals in of the military go to the leader with a godfather offer and a gun to his head and say you have to resign. That's a coup. And that didn't happen in 1953 in Iran. What the CIA did is really, I see it as two things. They had ineffective black propaganda in newspapers that were already hostile to Mosadegh. And then they helped persuade the Shah. Who we like to think of as who has this reputation as being a ruthless autocrat, but in this period in 1953 he was an unsure unsteady young man who was Very close to leaving the country because most of them wanted to wanted him out So I would say there was a duel and what the CIA? Specifically a man by the name of Kermit Roosevelt who is the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt did was he persuaded him to use his power and to fire Mosaddegh. At first it didn't work. The Shah leaves, he comes back and he does it again. And reason Mosaddegh steps down is because Ayatollah Kashani, ⁓ who is speaker of the Majlis and the most senior cleric in Qom, who was part of his coalition, turns on Mosaddegh and riles up street against him. Now, None of that history makes it into the kind of telling the story. It's the only actors that the CIA meddled and Mosadegh was just doing fine. They don't talk about the fact that Mosadegh had effectively had a vote to dissolve the Majlis, amend the He had fired the Supreme Court. He'd fired many of the generals. He was consolidating power. He was acting autocratically, which is ⁓ a kind of irony because Mosaddegh was the conscience of the Majlis in 1925. He was one of the only votes, the only people to say, wait a second, I don't think we should empower another Shah. We want to be a democratic republic. So there's a lot to admire in the full biography of Mosaddegh. ⁓ even Mosaddegh, when he becomes the prime minister, which is far more powerful than any kind of position today in the Islamic Republic, he can't ⁓ the allure of of autocracy in some ways. So that's the part of it. don't, again, I history because the more you dive into it, it's harder to there are pure villains and pure heroes. I think Mosadegh is neither a villain nor a hero in the same way I think the Shah is neither a villain nor a hero. And then, know, the of Mosadegh in many ways is after that, he's effectively kind of relegated to a, you know, internal exile in his home. He's out of politics. But, you know, he had tried again to, exile Shah. He had tried to, you he shut down newspapers, you know, he arrested editors and things like that. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Where do you put the role of his efforts in nationalizing oil industry in Iran? Eli Lake: Well, another irony is that the Americans were not where the was absolutely right to try to nationalize the oil industry. The he went to the American went to the Truman and Eisenhower administration as to be sort of honest brokers third party mediators in this dispute with the ⁓ British National Petroleum eventually became BP. The British who wanted to hold onto this revenue because it was an unfair contract that was originally signed under the Qajari Shah and was not representative. And I think that Mosaddegh had absolutely the better of that argument, and he was correct. What Mosaddegh didn't understand, and I'm getting a lot of this from Ray Takei's great book on the last Shah, is that the Iranians still didn't have a class of kind of technocrats that could run their oil industry. So if he wanted to have a dramatic scene where all of the Brits were kicked out of the country, which he did, there weren't like Iranians who had the skills to run this complicated industry at the time. They would get that in 15 years, I think, or less. But it wasn't at the time. the Iranian economy suffered. But it wasn't as if the Shah at the time was against nationalizing the oil. This is another. part of the story that's often, by the way, it wasn't even that the Americans were against the Iranians nationalizing their oil. It was really just the British. ⁓ problem was is that Mosaddegh had refused what were considered to be fair by the American side and eventually had sort of proven himself and then combined with all these other steps he was taking to just sort of be like incapable of kind of making a deal and moving on with things. And that's really when Eisenhower administration said, all right, well, let's see what we can do. But the other part of this is that lots of Iranian politicians, members of Mosadegh's own political coalition, were coming to the American embassy asking for their help to try to foment a coup, say something to the Shah, do something here. So to me is, ⁓ it complicates the story. It's not just about how America is a kind of rapacious Imperial power who wants to steal the oil from the Iranian people because what do we know that happens? After it's not as if the Shah doesn't control the oil revenues From Iran. It's not like he is, you know paying an un you know the the exploitative arrangement ended He didn't reverse the nationalization of the oil that's not what happened So that does not count to me as the sort of motivation. I think it's more that Mosadegh himself was alienating his own coalition. And I actually think he would have been toppled if the Americans had done nothing, if the British had done nothing. It would have just been, I think that there were enough people in his own coalition who said, we don't want you to be the leader anymore, that he would have been forced to resign. Amir Golshani: Right. So ⁓ that's fascinating. So looking back at the late Pahlavi era, debates are still extremely polarized. What do you think both supporters and critics of that period often overlook? Eli Lake: Right. Well, I think that the supporters of the Shah overlooked the fact that there was still a massive wealth gap, that there was still like something like a quarter of the country was living below the poverty line. Now, to the credit, that was a lot better than it was, you know, in 1925 or 1955. You know what saying? was the problem was getting better, but it was still pretty bad. And so that's the first thing. ⁓ I also think that there were very humane, intellectual ⁓ noble SAVAK directors, that's the SAVAK being the intelligence service, the security service, but there were also brutal thugs who abused their power in that job. So there were things, there was repression under the Shah, but this gets us to the other side, it was often overstated by his critics. never account for is the reforms of what is known as the white revolution. I think they also don't account for the fact that when began emerging in the early ⁓ 1960s the primary critic to the legitimacy of the Shah during the white revolution, that Khomeini was ⁓ just nonviolent Like Khomeini belonged to a kind of radical sect of Shia Islam that encouraged, that believed in terrorism and was willing to work with various, was willing to sort of have that as part of his broader kind of campaign. these were, it was not as simple as, I mean, any honest person would say eventually we saw the true colors of Khomeini. But I think sometimes in all of this, we sort of miss key decisions. my view that in hindsight, maybe it's easy to say this, but the SAVAK director, the best SAVAK director there was Hassan Pakravan, who met with when he was ⁓ and played an important in the Shah not to execute him. credit in some ways, but I actually think that he should not have listened to Pakravan He would not have had this problem. Khomeini was a generational leader, and it was probably in his interest in retrospect to have taken the hit killed Khomeini. Because I'm not sure that there would have been a leader as charismatic as Khomeini that would have emerged, and maybe he would have had a more democratic revolution or an opportunity if the revolution would lead the Shah to have real another set of reforms or something like that. It's Khomeini who really poisoned it. And then the other big mistake that the Shah made was requesting in 1978 for Saddam Hussein to exile him to France. ⁓ thinking, I don't want this lethal threat to my regime, to my monarchy, across the border in Najaf, Southern Iraq. But by him to Paris, he he made him an international media figure because face it in 1978 there weren't that many you know international journalists or television networks that were hanging out in Karbala and Najaf they were but it's pretty easy to get a camera crew to Paris and that was how Khomeini was able to you know con the entire world basically was through the series of interviews that he would give where he would say that he of course, believed that only Islam should be guiding from the background of democracy and all this claptrap that he knew he had no intention of doing any of that. But he said it, and lots of people believed him. And the sad truth is that there were a few scholars in the West, like Bernard Lewis, who were familiar with Khomeini's kind of most important work, the Islamic State, where he lays out exactly what he wants to do. He it entirely clear. what he wants to do. You know what saying? He says, this is the kind of system I want to build. But so many of the expert class, of the professors and CIA analysts and people who worked in Congress and European parliaments and so forth, were completely unaware of of the scholarly work that Khomeini did, which would have told us exactly what he was going to do once he got power. Amir Golshani: Exactly, ⁓ So the level of ignorance is unbelievable. Why no one paid enough attention. That's why, you know, children of revolution in Iran, you know, so they blaming their parents for being fooled by a cleric. the level of ignorance is unbelievable. Why no one paid enough attention. That's why, children of revolution in Iran, you know, so they blaming their parents for being fooled by a cleric. Eli Lake: Yeah. I mean, listen, I kind of understand. I can understand that when you are trying to have a revolution, when you've had enough living under the Shah, where you feel that it's not the worst situation in the world. if you're, know, Iran is a an educated population with a long history, a deep and rich and fascinating culture. said I'm not an Iranian, but I kind of fallen in love with Iranian culture. And it's not, I say Iranian and not Persian because it's not just Persians. Iran has always been a cosmopolitan place with lots of different peoples living under this sort of system. I mean, that's an idea that goes back to Cyrus. ⁓ And so, in my view, it's the same, but it reminds me a little bit of how the United States is a melting pot of different cultures and so forth. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. Eli Lake: Similar to Iran is what I would say. So, you know, that I understand a talented population that, you know, many for the first time are, you have families that are sending children to college and university. They're encountering ideas like Shariati, who is, you know, a brilliant socialist and also an Islamist. And he's, you know, very influential in this period. And so I understand that people are sort of young people, especially like looking around and they're saying, What future do I have in a system where the people who are rewarded with the best positions in society there because they have some connection to this corrupt ruling family? I'm very talented. Why can't I compete? Why can't I be the head of a ministry one day or something like that? I totally understand that. They were restless for good reason. I have sympathy. The where think Khomeini would enough for them to believe that he was just this cleric who didn't understand politics and that they would be left alone to then run this new country, which they wanted more freedom. That's the part of it where there were people who warned them, but not enough. And ⁓ That's the part of it where it was real. And I think the first were, there was a great tradition of Iranians feminism, going back to the 19th century in some ways. I mean, you have remarkable poets, women poets, who had a profound effect on the kind of culture and the elites of Iran, going back to the Qajar dynasty. when they wanted to march for women's rights, and then they were intimidated by the guard corps. and they were beaten up and they were pushed aside, that they were the first, they were sort of new, it like, wait a second, this is not what we signed up for. And then the absolutely brutal original trials where there would be like 15 minutes in front of some absolute fanatic lunatic, and then they would be dragged out and shot in the neck, awful. And then corpse would be displayed. the newspapers and everybody would see the, and that there's a reason why they want you to see that in the newspaper, that photograph. ⁓ because it's signal to everybody else, don't cross us, we're now in charge ⁓ we're willing to kill you. And we saw it again last, in January with the absolutely unthinkable, I mean, listen, the stories break my heart, but the idea that you have parents looking for the bodies of their children through unmarked body bags, the idea that they would sell the bodies back. stories break my heart, but the idea that you have parents looking for the bodies of their children through unmarked body bags, the idea that would sell the bodies back. for the price of the bullets. disgusting and it ⁓ infuriates me in a lot of for the price of the bullets. disgusting and it ⁓ infuriates me in a lot of ways. I'm never gonna, I'm gonna, I'm very that Hommany is dead. ⁓ Apparently they've named ⁓ his son I hope they kill him too, the lot of them. at a certain point I think there has to be an understanding that Donald Trump, will, under no circumstances, send the American army into Iran to keep the peace as we saw in Iraq. So he is looking for some kind of figure that will be strong enough to avoid anarchy. then it's going to be up to the Iranian people to demand of that figure and what's left of the regime that time for ⁓ the of radical reforms. can eliminate the position of the supreme leader, return the rights of the Iranian constitution. And I mean, I hope it works. My hope is that there's someone who were, there's some figures who are in the elites who have a little shred of a kind of dignity or connection to the pride of their country and the pain of the Iranian people that they're suffering. And that maybe their conscience or maybe out of fear, they will go along with it. That's my hope. But again, hope is not the same as a plan. So we'll see. Amir Golshani: Right. When you look at the Islamic Republic today, it's both ideological and pragmatic. How do you interpret the regime's real governing strategy, ideology first or survival first? Eli Lake: Yes. I think it's ideology first, and I think that's If they were just interested in survival, there were all kinds of off ramps. The state the, the of Iran's economy could have been ⁓ if the regime simply given up its quest for a nuclear weapon or any number of So. I, my view is that they're all they were ideological. They were always more interested in spreading the Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East, destroying Israel than they were in making Iran great. and that's obvious. Yeah. ⁓ Amir Golshani: There is a quote by Karim Sajjadpour, he got this quote from his university professor, seemingly that at the beginning of Islamic revolution, there were maybe 80 % ideologues, 20 % charlatans, but right now it's reversed. by Karim Sajjadpour, that at the beginning of Islamic revolution, there were maybe 80 % ideologues, 20 % charlatans, but right now it's reversed. Eli Lake: Right. I love that quote too. It's one of my favorites from him. Amir Golshani: Yeah, and right now they are trying to survive for their own benefits because, you know, in sanctions, they're benefiting from sanctions, they're benefiting from these everything, you know, so and there are a group of elite that under any circumstances, they are making money. that's why they want, you know, ⁓ survival. What's take on that? Eli Lake: Well, I hope that's true if 80 % corrupt as opposed to 80 % true believers. And then the main thing is just you have to, and I think this is quite, you can accomplish this, by the way. ⁓ don't think you have to just change the calculus of fear. Right now, ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ senior regime official has more to fear from ⁓ security forces than does from being on a Mossad or CIA kill list. But maybe that is given how successful the Israelis in the US have been so far in taking out top regime officials. And then the other part of that is if you then turn around and say, listen, Your family will live in relative security and safety and you'll You know, it won't be maybe as nice as it was before but you'll have some future Take the money If they are corrupt, that's what they would do. They would look around and say well, there's no future, you know the other way So there's a hope maybe that that's the case But even still if it's 20 % true believers, there's almost 200,000 members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps 20 % would be 40,000 and if there are 40,000 true believers that are willing to you know risk their lives to keep the revolution alive that's an enormous problem since that we don't know of any groups in Iran with the exception maybe of the Kurds maybe the Baluch you know that have anything like you know that many people under arms So that could be a huge problem. the other hand, what you do is you, ⁓ think there's a very good chance that the Iranian National Army, which was started by Reza Pahlavi's grandfather, well, I imagine that they would probably be happy to defect to the transition to the new government. They were displaced by the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And perhaps they will find a kind of courage and steel to take on, you know, whatever that percentage of true believers that will continue to fight one way or the other. But we have to worry about that. Amir Golshani: So we are at a stage right now that we can just be hopeful. Let's be hopeful that that's the case. Eli. Eli Lake: Yes. But let me ask, I would like to ask you a question, Amir, if I could. my question is, first of all, I think America and Canada and European countries have been blessed by talented Iranians coming to our countries and creating businesses and adding to our economy and our culture. I love that as an American. But do you think that you could see a number Iranians who are living in the Iranian diaspora now returning to Iran and joining and offering their specialty, whether they're engineers or people who know how to fix drinking water systems? mean, there's a lot of to be done in Iran. ⁓ And then would some of them, young men, come back who are, ⁓ know, stirred by the of January and everything before and what they did in women, life, freedom, and things like that. Would they want to return perhaps and pick up a gun in order to defend their new country? ⁓ Well, that would be, I would love to write that story for the free press, but I would also love to see it. I mean, that to me is, that's a game changer. Amir Golshani: 100%, 100%. Eli Lake: Do you think that Reza Pahlavi would be the man to sort of be the leading figure to organize such a return? Amir Golshani: So as he mentioned, he's not looking for actually grasping the power. He has mentioned over and over again that I want to be the leader of transition to get people to a point that they are able to attend free election. That's what he's trying to do. And I really admire that. and there are. Eli Lake: Right. Right. Amir Golshani: Thousands and thousands of people, if not millions, that are willing to get back. I'm not sure about, you know, fighting with guns, but I'm 100 % sure I would be one of them to get back and help to rebuild my own country. Thousands and thousands of people, if not millions, that are willing to get back. I'm not sure about, you know, fighting with guns, but I'm 100 % sure I would be one of them to get back and help to rebuild my own country. And I know many of people in Iranian diaspora that they're willing to even take their capital. So there are specialties, there are expertise, you know, and to help to rebuild that country. Eli Lake: Yeah. Well, that is an important message I think Americans need to hear right now, which that this passion from who've been living kind of in exile, that they would be willing to go back and rebuild the country and in some cases fight for their country because there will be a fight, I think. So that's important. Amir Golshani: course. So Eli, let's shift to the present moment. Right now, tensions across the region feel unusually high. From your perspective, what are the most important forces shaping the current escalation? Right now, tensions across the region feel unusually high. From your perspective, what are the most important forces shaping the current escalation? Eli Lake: Yes. Yes. that's a great question. Well, I mean, listen, we have to notice one thing, which is that when the war started, it was Israel and America. And even Saudi Arabia was on the fence, although now we know that the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was privately telling Trump to go for it, even though publicly ⁓ the Saudis saying we're neutral. You know, we, we sew it. So there was a lot of fear and anticipation kind of before the war. And you didn't know where all the Gulf Arab states now they're all looks like they're joining in on the war against Iran because the Iranians I mean, their response has been ⁓ liken it to the great movie Al Scarface, the Brian De Palma film at the end where, you know, he's like, say hello to my little friend and just start spraying a machine gun everywhere. That's the Iranian regime right now. And when they spray a machine gun, they're hitting all these Gulf states who now are like, well, that's an act of war and we're going to join in. The United Kingdom started off not allowing us to use Diego Garcia, which is an important base in the Indian Ocean. now they're on board. There's the socialist government of Spain that has decided that they're not going to participate. But. ⁓ So what started off as it looked like a kind of unilateral US-Israel war, now you have a lot of allies who are supporting it and willing to kind of go the distance. So that's an interesting dynamic. that Iran, one of its strategies is to try to divide America from its allies and divide Israel, from any of its allies, especially America, is now seeing unprecedented military between Israel and America. We've never seen anything quite like this. These two countries fighting a war together where they're really equal partners, that the Gulf are not gonna be neutral, that they've joined in on it. And their friends, their great power allies, China, and Russia are doing nothing of note to help them. they are looking alone. And so they're just, I see their future. the hope is that there will be of those corrupt rational actors inside of Iran who will cry uncle and then sort of move towards a transition. At that point, by the way, if that happens, and I hope it does in some ways, ⁓ because I don't know how politically sustainable a long drawn out war will be for Donald Trump. But if there is that moment where some figure emerges and says, OK, lead the transition to government, similar to what we saw in Venezuela, that ⁓ the moment when the Iranian diaspora and the Iranian people have to be very loud and and say, it's not good enough. ⁓ is the moment when the Iranian diaspora and the Iranian people have to be very loud and noisy and say, it's not good enough. to just return to Islamic Republic light. We want democracy. We want to take our country back. to just return to Islamic Republic light. We want democracy. We want to take our country back. to sort of establish them, they can't do it now. They're dropping bombs. know what I mean? It's perilous for the Iranian people. And I feel horrible. It must be very, it must be terrifying. But there is this light maybe at the end of the tunnel. But I think it's also important that, you know, as much as I, and I totally understand why, you know, Iranians who had to flee, Islamic Republic and in Canada will look at what's going on and they would say Netanyahu and Trump are great heroes. I totally that. They've slain khamenei you know, one the great villains of our era. And that is something Trump and Netanyahu and, you know, the IDF and the Mossad and the CIA should be absolutely proud of. But it's also important to remember that America's interests in this are not aligned entirely with the Iranian people and the Iranian people have to assert themselves and say We are demanding at this moment Not just a cosmetic change We want a real change we and by the way, we all know what they are I mean, this is the other thing What when people say we don't know what the Iranian people want. I'm like, are you kidding? Have you been paying attention? I have been covering this story now for 25 years. I can confidently say that what Iranians want is they want to eliminate the office of the supreme leader. They want to eliminate the council of experts. They want to eliminate the guardian council. They want to empower the majlis And they want to return to a constitution that gives them a kind of representative government. Now, could there be a figure like the Shah or something like that in there? That is up, obviously, to the Iranian people. But generally speaking, we know what they want. They want to be able to print Newspapers and and have websites that criticize the government without fear of being arrested They want to wear with the women want to wear whatever they want in the streets without being arrested by these stupid morality police Which they've stopped doing anyway because the country no longer believes in this you know Barbaric interpretation of Shia Islam I think they want they want prosperity they want they want a government that cares about fixing the infrastructure Amir Golshani: So in a very simple term, people in Iran want a normal life, just a normal life. And they have sacrificed their lives and their families. We do not want anything that has got connection to this Islamic regime. Eli Lake: Right, yeah. Yes, that's exactly, great way to say it. Right. Right. Amir Golshani: political change is something that needs to happen, you know, for Iranian, you know, to get to that prosperity. Eli Lake: Right. I think, by the way, what does Trump want? think what Trump wants is to, in a few months, or ⁓ whenever it is, right? I think he would like to do it before the midterm elections. He would like to take Air Force One, land it in Tehran International Airport, and have a photo opportunity where he's walking down the streets and Iranians are cheering him as a liberator. And then he'll have a meeting with his Board of Peace. and there'll be some representative of the Iranians there. And he will announce that there will be hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions of dollars in contracts to rebuild this great nation of Iran. you know, the friends of Trump will probably get the first dibs on those contracts, because that's how he operates. But that's what I think he wants. He wants the photo op. You know what I'm saying? It's up to the Iranian people to, ⁓ you do the hard work. establishing, one could say, you know, the original promise of the 79 Revolution, or one could even go back and say the original promise of the 1905 Revolution. But it's up to the Iranian people to make that, ⁓ do the hard work there. And my hope is that, you know, we're at a point where I think there's, Iranian Americans, Iranian Canadians that I've met, Amir, are some of the most talented, ambitious people I know. Iranian Americans, Iranian Canadians that I've met, Amir, are some of the most talented, ambitious people I know. in terms of their natural capitalists, their natural entrepreneurs. Like I'm Jewish, my people have an advantage in that we value education, but guess what? I can tell you, I know this, I know so many Iranian Americans, they absolutely value, they want their kids to learn and go to school and succeed. I think that there are gonna be a number of Iranian Americans who are like, I'm an American, especially the kids who were born. in the Gen Z and millennial Iranian Americans who were born here, think they were like, hey, I'm an American. I this country. So they not return. But the point that there are going to be a lot of them who are. And then that kind of infusion of talent hopefully will help steer the country out of the ditch that the mullahs drove them into. Yeah. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. As you mentioned, we are seeing regional tensions expand beyond Iran itself. How do you ⁓ the strategic calculations of Israel right now? Eli Lake: I think what the Israelis, to understand where the Israelis are coming from, there's a couple timelines. Israelis understood 30 years ago that the Islamic Republic was trying to build a nuclear weapon. This is in the late 90s, they understood that. And it forced them to refocus their, the, to refocus the Mossad to focus solely on penetrating the Islamic Republic. And this war, an Operation Midnight Hammer, and you could argue you can go back before when they stole all the archives of the nuclear program from a warehouse in Tehran. These are, that's the fruit of like a generational almost like Manhattan project, just focusing on an intelligence war against Iran. But it became acute after October 7th, because even though may be that Iranian senior IRGC didn't know that it was going to be on October 7th when you saw the horrible pogrom that Hamas launched, that Sinwar kind of But then it became that that was the opening salvo of a war not just against Hamas, but a war against Iran and all of its proxies. And if you look around the region, Israel has prevailed. So that's what this is. This is the final step of that. don't quite understand leftists ⁓ who that as, you know, imperial bellicose warmongering from Israel. They were attacked and The result is that in a place like Lebanon, you saw a remarkable thing. The Lebanese prime minister just absolutely ⁓ that Hezbollah not join this war and fire into Israel. And so for first time, we have a Lebanese government in like 20 years that is willing to actually take on the once mighty Iranian militia that had pretty much kind of taken over their country. It was the Turks who helped push Shah Ra to finally topple Bashar al-Assad, but that wouldn't have happened if it wasn't for the fact that Israel had decimated Hezbollah. So all of Iran's regional proxies and their network have gone down like dominoes. mean, the Houthis are still there, but they're even diminished. Amir Golshani: Right. Eli Lake: There still is the Shia militias in Iraq, but that's a little bit more complicated. there, the dream of Qasem Soleimani is over. The axis of resistance is somewhat finished. And then the piece of the puzzle is the head of the snake. And that's what this war kind of represents. And that's also in America's interest, by the way, because America keeps getting sucked back into the Middle East in large part because the Iranians continue to light it on fire. So if you really succeed in removing the regime or defanging it or having someone to fill in the void that is just demoralized or something for a generation and will just not continue to go back to it, then that's Israel's national security interests are taken care of. But that's not. enough, and as I see it, for the Iranian people. The Iranian people have to see that next part of it. And I hope that and America, and I suspect probably more so Israel, can be an ally in that regard. I I know enough about the Iranian ⁓ democracy to know that it is not artificial, it's not created by Israel, it's something that comes from the Iranians themselves. It reflects a real disgust with the Islamic Republic and the regime. But, you know, during the American Revolution, we had help from France and that, you know what I'm saying, why can't the Israelis or the Americans or other outside forces assist, Iranians in their goal to finally the Islamic Amir Golshani: Yeah, as you mentioned, know, Iranian people an of Israel and Americans, you know, are kind of aligned, not 100%. But you know, so it is. ⁓ Eli Lake: Right. No, it's not. But we should be very aware and not 100%. And Trump, you know, it's interesting to me because on the one hand, I mean, I don't know if you read, I wrote a piece that Reza Pahlavi and his people didn't like where I pointed out that he has not done a good job of bringing together the opposition that it's unclear whether Pahlavi has the grit and mettle necessary to sort of be. you know, the man on the white horse leading the revolution. Although, but at the same time, I would also say he's the only real option. There's no other figure who has that national name recognition and commands the kind of respect that he does. Amir Golshani: Let's talk about question many people are asking right now. Leadership. If political change were to happen in Iran, leadership would become a critical issue very quickly. What qualities would a credible transitional leader actually need in a country like Iran? Eli Lake: Okay. Well, the transitional leader would have to be commanding the respect of various different factions and seen as somebody who would not press the interest of one group over the others. So that would mean like it couldn't be somebody who was a Kurdish nationalist, obviously. But it would also be, I don't think you would succeed if it was somebody who demanded that every Kurdish school in the Kurdish provinces teach in Farsi. So it would have to be somebody who the diverse population of Iran and various interests and was kind of seen as a credible, honest broker. Second, be somebody who I think would be seen as strong, who would be willing to use violence to make sure that violence didn't spread. That's very important. to demonstrate monopoly force. That's very important. And finally, would have to be somebody who I think would show that they would not seek to become an autocrat themselves. And that's the best thing that Pallavi has going for him. He has a track record of more than 30 years of saying he only wishes to be a transitional figure and that after the transition, he would respect results of elections and may not even run himself. me, that is the of humility that we would need in that kind of figure. Those are the qualities that I would. Amir Golshani: Right. So Eli, what would a best case scenario look like for the Iranian people? Eli Lake: Well, the best case scenario would be if Reza Pahlavi could manage to bring and knit together the ethnic groups from the Baluch to the Awazi to the Kurds, but also the women life freedom movement inside the country, the unions inside the country who have demonstrated against the regime and to kind of recognize that he's going to be that transitional figure if he can do that hard political work then also to get the National Army and others in the regime to defect to his side. and create that kind of momentum and then oversee this period of like, you know, one to three years where you're rebuilding the country and preparing it for national elections. That to me would be a best case scenario. if not Pallavi, then somebody like Pallavi in that role. But I kind of think that Pallavi would, in view, probably the best guy for the job. And I want him to succeed in that. Amir Golshani: Eli, thank you for this conversation. Your work reminds us that understanding Thank you. Eli Lake: Thank you, Amir. Great questions. Okay, next year in Isfahan. Okay. Amir Golshani: Yeah, Eli Lake: I want to see, ⁓ I've to Tehran, I want to see Esfahan and I really want to see Tabriz, ⁓ which the cultural wealth you know, for so much of the 17th, 18th, 19th was the place, ⁓ you know, ⁓ those are the I really want to see because it's a wonderful,