Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / Who Takes Power After Khamenei in Iran? Alex Vatanka on Iran’s Next Battle
Transcript
- Amir Golshani: Alex Vatanka, welcome to Beyond the Summit. Alex Vatanka: Thank you for having me. It's great to be with you. Amir Golshani: Thank you so much. You are one of the most respected analysts on Iran's politics and foreign policy, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and author of The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran. For years, you have studied the power struggles inside the Islamic Republic, the regional chessboard around Iran, and the forces shaping the future of a country that sits at the center of one of the most consequential geopolitical questions of our time. the regional chessboard around Iran, and the forces shaping the future of a country that sits at the center of one of the most consequential geopolitical questions of our time. Alex, before we get into geopolitics and strategy, I always like to begin with the human story. You were born in Iran, grew up partly in Europe, and built your career studying Iran from the outside. What early experiences shaped your curiosity about politics and the Middle East? Alex Vatanka: So Amir, thank you for having me. a great pleasure to be with you. I was born a few years before the 1979 revolution. So I was not part that generation of Iranians that spend so much time trying to figure out what kind of a political world they wanted to live in. My parents' generation, they ⁓ spent 60s and 70s trying to break down the old order. I mean, that was the context of the Cold War. ⁓ Iranian students at the time, whether they were leftist, Islamists, nationalists, ethnic groups, you name it, politics was such a big part of their growing up. That was not my experience because I was too young. I barely remember 1979 revolution. I do remember the protesters, the chants, whether were support of the Shah, you will ⁓ hold image up, or if you're support of Ayatollah Khomeini. ⁓ remember that, but what I can tell you for sure is that that revolution and that of that revolution greatly shaped my life because not just me, ⁓ Iranians, millions of us who left, we up being impacted ⁓ on personal level. So for us, it wasn't just political theories, what kind of a political world we wanted in Iran. We paid with our lives and essentially the impact on our lives to consequences. So ⁓ I ended leaving Iran. going, as you said, grew up in Europe and then 20 years in the United States. So leaving Iran the way ⁓ had to do with so many others, that is essentially the impact, the main impact of the ⁓ on life. And you're I've been mostly an outsider looking in, because I haven't lived in Iran for 40 years. ⁓ But because speak the language, I can read between the lines, I get the cultural context. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Right. Alex Vatanka: And I've done this professionally now for 25 years. It just gives you a little bit of edge compared to folks who might not speak Persian or might never, never been there, which is often the times the cases of Americans who watch Iran because of the bad blood between the two countries for about half a century. So that's my, that's how I kind of became involved on not just being of Iranian extraction, but also professionally devoting my career to trying to figure out to the extent I can, what's going on in that country. Amir Golshani: Yeah, I really appreciate that. So you've spent decades analyzing Iran's leadership, ideology and power structure. What is something about Iran that outsiders, even policymakers, consistently misunderstand? Alex Vatanka: One of the things that I mean, I want to sort of make it most relevant because you can go in different directions with question like that. are a lot of things people misunderstand about countries that are on the other side of the planet. It's not just true for Iran, it's true for many. But here in Washington, D.C., where I've lived and worked for 20 years, one of the ⁓ you often hear, or at least did until recently, this recent war, is that the Islamists... ruling elite in Iran are all the same. They're all the same. There's no difference between them. They're all messianic, Shia Islamists. They have one worldview. They hate the outside world. They hate anybody inside who doesn't like them. there's no compromise to be had with them. that kind a black and white worldview, I kind of sometimes I'm envious because it makes life easier to understand what's going on. Well, this is how they are. But the reality obviously is not that. There are so many different layers what's going on inside the Iranian regime. And if people have the patience for it, because I understand you get bored, know, comparing kind of Ayatollah with another kind of Ayatollah, one kind of beard with another beard. ⁓ But me when I tell you those differences actually matter. And the idea that all of them are hardliners or extremists and middle of the road extremists just doesn't capture the differences. And I say that because those difference are actually something that those people and there are plenty, ⁓ want to see an entered Islamic ⁓ can tap into. So the idea that, you know, the ultra right today in Iran, and I don't want to give... people too many names because that can be confusing unless you're Iran watchers. But the idea that Said Jalili, extreme right winger in Iran, is the same as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a typical middle of the road populist, is the same as a Hassan Khomeini or a Mohammad Khatami. The idea that they're all the same is just intellectually irresponsible. It's beyond lazy. It's not trying to get your head around it. There are no political parties in Islamic Republic for deliberate reasons that from get-go, they made sure there were no political parties. And by the way, that was something also the Shah did. This is oftentimes what you find in authoritarian systems. No political parties. So what you need to look for instead are personalities and the networks around those personalities. We talk about Khamenei's network. Well, that's very formalized in the Supreme Leader's office. It's kind of obvious. But there are other networks that aren't so obvious. Raf Sanjani, who died in 2017. very powerful network that's still almost 10 years after his death, still there. It's a network. It's not a party political system. doesn't have an agenda, but it's got interests. And I can go on. There are lots of different networks. I wouldn't exaggerate it, but there are at least a dozen or so networks that you can point to and say, well, this one is strong, this one is not so strong, this one is strong in this area, this one is strong in this region. And that I think is, when you're covering the same country, as long as I have and those of us who are around watchers. What is exciting for us is exactly those minor details that might not make much difference to somebody who just picks up a newspaper reads, but my job then is to make sure in an accessible way, I say and convince them that little minor detail here actually matters. I can go on and give you examples, but let ⁓ just pause a mirror and get your reaction. Amir Golshani: Now that was a very interesting point you mentioned. Your book, The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran, explores internal power struggles within the regime. Many people imagine the Iranian system ⁓ a monolith, but ⁓ argue it's far more complicated. What are the real factions inside the Islamic Republic? Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran, explores internal power struggles within the regime. Many people imagine the Iranian system ⁓ as a monolith, but ⁓ you argue it's far more complicated. Alex Vatanka: These factions exist, they're real, to my earlier comment, they're part of networks. And when you're in a network, it's not so much that the network has an ideological core that you subscribe to. It might not. Oftentimes it doesn't. You go with it because it's your network. It's where your ⁓ it's where your personal interests are also vested. Let me give you a very clear-cut example. The political left in the Islamic Republic in the 1980s, the likes of Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Musavi, the Green opposition leader, they were the traditional hard left, very famous for their belief in centralized economic planning, anti-American, very ideological. That same group by the 1990s is what we call today the reformists, what's left of them. kind of almost all collectively moved from one set of interests to another set of interests. But the point they're making is they went more or less as a network. They all went together. Even though they started off being to the right of someone like Ali Khamenei, the late supreme leader, they decided that they felt the country's interests were better served in a different direction. And I would say they learned from their lessons. because during the Iran-Iraq war, they famously were very in their ways. By the end of that war, they were open enough to admit that the way they've handled the war effort, the economy, Iran's foreign policy, came a bitter cost for the country of Iran. So they were willing to change course. ⁓ Let give you another example, Amir. Ali Khamenei, who became the ultra hardliner, was opponent of these very same people, the reformists in the 80s. He was calling them names. He was the pragmatic one. He was the one who was like, yeah, some of your policies are too excessive. For example, when the United States sold Iran those F-14s in the 70s, was Khamenei who insisted that they shouldn't return it to the United States because a lot of the revolutionists after the Shah fled wanted to actually give these planes back. Said, we don't need these expensive planes. We want money for the poor. And Khamenei was one of the key voices that said, no, we need these place at some point in the future. turned out he was right. June Iran, Iraq war, those F-14s did provide a service. So I would say, you know, these networks, they're there, they have been there all along. Other networks have been added over the years. So the first generation revolutionaries, they would be men in their 70s and 80s and older. Most of them are gone. So now we have to sort of... put together a picture of the younger generation revolutionaries who came after the fact. They weren't there in 79, but they are still interested in access to money and power. And that's why we've seen a number of new groups emerge to the right, to the left. But overall, I would say politics in Iran is... Perhaps not as exciting as in the United States, but actually if you pay attention to the detail, those details matter. Amir Golshani: Right. So when people hear the regime, they think of a single unified power structure, quote unquote, you know, so more or less similar network. But in reality, there are clerics, the IRGC technocrats, ideological hardliners, as you mentioned, which group actually holds the most power today? in reality, there are clerics, the IRGC technocrats, ideological hardliners, as you mentioned, which group actually holds the most power today? Alex Vatanka: ⁓ No, Khamenei is obviously now gone. So it's a question mark whether the supreme leader role and that office that he built can continue to function the way he has functioned while Khamenei was in charge. Khamenei took 37 years almost to build up that empire. So it's gonna be very difficult for whoever comes after to do the same. It will at least take time. Khamenei is obviously now gone. So it's a question mark whether the supreme leader ⁓ role that office that he built can continue to function And obviously Iran is in a very different place than in 1989 when Khamenei took over. So I have lots of question marks about the future of the office of the Supreme Leader. And by the way, I think that's an opportunity for those in the opposition or foreign powers who looking for ways to shape Iran's trajectory going forward. But the one group that has been very powerful, and largely thanks to Khamenei, who I think will in the short term remain powerful, are the Revolutionary Guards or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, or IRGC. is the state within the state, has its own interests, has political power, has economic power, has an intelligence branch, is involved in foreign policy like any other interest group. And as of right now, although they've been losing a lot of men to the Israeli-American bombing, IRGC is the state within the state, has its own interests, has political power, has economic power, has an intelligence branch, is involved in foreign policy like any other interest group. They're still in this game, they're still fighting on. If the regime survives, Revolutionary Guards are probably, at least in the short term, by far the most capable, organized entity from what I would describe the hardliners in the regime. I would put Khamenei and Revolutionary Guards as hardliners, not ultra hardliners like Pahidari and Sayyid Jalili faction. If the regime survives, Revolutionary Guards are probably, at least in the short term, by far the most capable, organized entity ⁓ But definitely hardliners and then within the regime you also have people like Masoud Pesachki under president the so-called technocratic class Yeah, so watch out for IRGC Amir Golshani: Thank you. mentioned current events, specifically the current war. Seeing the escalation between Iran and Israel and the United States that has reached a level we haven't seen before, from your perspective, what is actually happening right now behind the headlines? Alex Vatanka: To be honest, and this is an unusual thing for me to say, I think the headlines are capturing pretty much what's happening. US has been engaging Iran militarily with Israel, engaging meaning they're dropping bombs on them. The Iranians are returning the favor, if you will, by pretty much hitting anyone that they can reach. Not everyone, but pretty much anyone they can reach. I feel sorry for the Gulf countries, because Iran, those are the easiest targets for the Iranians, and now they're paying the brunt of the price. There is no political agenda in Washington that is convincing to me other than the one regime change, ⁓ state collapse. I that's not the US policy is state collapse in Iran. I know a lot of people say that's what the Israelis want because ⁓ I was just on a panel a couple hours ago and one of the speakers on the panel reminded audience that Israelis tried to be friends with Iran in the 70s and they were good friends. But then Iran after the revolution of 79 turned on Israel. So Israel learned a lesson that doesn't matter who runs Tehran. We just make sure that Iran is weak. And if that becomes the policy, then I think what happens, ⁓ one, think it's a mistake in policy. Two, you demoralize the opposition to the Islamist rule. Because I think that's one of the things Iranians who are in opposition by and large, and most are, what they want ⁓ is end of the Islamic Republic, but they're... Amir Golshani: Okay. Alex Vatanka: more or less hoping for a secular democratic system. And I know it sounds like a tall order. How do you get there? But that's what they want. That's the vague notion most people have. A secular democratic system, maybe a republic, maybe constitutional monarchy. And yeah, that part of it is missing when you look at what the US is saying and doing. So just a few hours ago, Donald Trump now wants to choose the next Iranian Supreme Leader. I don't know what to make of that statement, but what I can get out of it is there is no serious thinking going on. And I don't want to just say that about Donald Trump because everybody else is saying that about Trump that he has no game plan. Because I don't think that will be unfair. But in this case, he really doesn't seem to have a game plan other than he's going for fragmentation of Iran, which is not his agenda, but could be easy said to be Bibi Netanyahu's agenda. And he has brought him along on this journey. you It's a policy mission. If you're US, you're Israel, you can maybe justify it. But in the process, you can no longer really depend on the Iranian public's support for you because support for dismantling Iran doesn't exist as the ⁓ inside the country. By and large, ⁓ Amir Golshani: So that's the key point. So there is no obvious planning for day after and no one's seeing that exist. Do you think that secular government, democratic secular government ambition is achievable based on what we are seeing today? ⁓ there is no obvious planning day after and no one's seeing that ⁓ exist. Do you think that secular democratic secular government ambition is achievable based on what we are seeing today? Alex Vatanka: If you give it a chance, it would be something you could do. mean, one of the greatest crimes of Ali Khamenei, other than ordering the killing of his own people every so, I mean, he killed so many people that he will go down in history as killer of his own people more than anything else. One of the things he could have done, he had ample of opportunity, was to sort of be a bit humble when he came to ⁓ one of the greatest crimes of Ali Khamenei, other than ordering the killing of own people every so, I mean, he killed so many people that he will go down in history as a killer of his own people more than anything else. respecting and listening to his own people. Humble in the sense of when you look at 70 % of Iranian society being born in after 1979, any memory of the Shah and only having a memory of ⁓ and being angered Khamenei's policies, Khamenei has had plenty of warnings that this society is upset with you. This society doesn't believe in your worldview. This society wants different things than what you're offering them. They want comfort here, some comfort at least, and not the sanctions and the wars and the belligerence that you stand for. Khamenei never went there. Khamenei, since 97 with the election of Mahomet Khatami, knew 70-80 % of Iranian society leans towards major reform. Instead of trying to adapt to that, he did everything he could at every turn to stop it. to stifle it, to sabotage it. Whether it was Muhammad Khatami, whether it was even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Rouhani. The only president he got, I shouldn't say he got, he the to on a civil platter was Ibrahim Raisi, who was of his mind. And then ended up the way he left this world. ⁓ Amir Golshani: Was not lucky enough. Yeah. Alex Vatanka: I think it's tragic even for the Islamists when you think about it. mean, if they were just a bit more capable of introspection and of accepting that they are in a very different place than the average Iranians and made the necessary adjustments, then a lot of these people could be alive today and could be religious, pious, whatever you want to call it. get on with their lives instead of forcing their militant Islamist worldview down the throats of people, which basically didn't just upset Iranians, but created this foreign opposition and anger and fear that resulted in the US and Israeli attack on Iran on the 28th of February, 2026. Amir Golshani: So that's the irony if there was a little bit, a tiny bit of rational and logic behind their decisions. So it wouldn't be the situation that we are dealing with right now. So Alex, analysts argue that Iran is escalating gradually to test limits, almost like probing a defense system. Do you see a deliberative strategy behind the pace of escalation ⁓ just it's another headline? Alex Vatanka: I, yeah. Amir Golshani: some analysts argue that Iran is escalating gradually to test limits, almost like probing a system. Do you see a strategy behind the pace of escalation ⁓ or just it's another headline? Alex Vatanka: Look, there's been so many of senior leaders that there's a genuine question to be asked. What is left of the command and control? Now Iranian officials will tell you they had prepared for this day. They got what they call the mosaic defense strategy that everybody's got a manual. They know exactly what to do even if they can't talk to the mothership back in Tehran. They know what to do, ⁓ fire, what to fire, who fire. ⁓ I... there's been so many killings senior leaders that there's a genuine question to be asked. What is left of the command and control? I think the sequential escalation is something that should not be discounted. We're not there at a point where they are, you know, going suicidal. Obviously some of the things they've done hitting hotels and so forth in the Gulf of like Dubai and Doha. This is a sign of desperation. My point is it could get worse, probably at least in the short term, but they're not throwing everything they have ⁓ at the sequential escalation is something that should not be discounted. We're not there at a point where they are, you know, going suicidal. everyone for now. They're still in the hope that they can survive this. Their fundamental point is that Trump is going to get cold feet. They could easily be wrong on that. And Trump has surprised them repeatedly. they're still believing that if the region doesn't pressure Trump to walk away, like the Gulf countries, the public opinion or the party itself could ⁓ They're still in the hope that they can survive this. force him to stand down and then the regime survives. And then they have to go and figure out what comes next because as I said, Khamenei was there for 37 years, big shoes to fill, but they have to make a fundamental decision which direction they want to go. Doubling down on the legacy of Khamenei will only get them so much time. They will still be on borrowed time. They could decide to go in a different direction and do what I just suggested they could have done for many years ago, except that the society they are in charge of is not Islamist by nature, is not looking for foreign wars by nature, doesn't really have this obsession with Israel or United States. By and large, it doesn't. Cares about things like everybody else pretty much around the world cares about. When I get up in the morning, something to eat, work to get to, house to have, of my family and so forth. that's way where they could go. Putting nation-building, development at home first. and not this, which I think is essentially Khamenei's legacy of his Cold War mentality of fighting what he would, when he was alive, call estekbar or imperialism. let's which way this, if this regime survives. I mean, if it survives, because as we speak here today on early March, are US officials who talking about American boots on the ground in Iran. you know, that takes us in a whole different direction. Amir Golshani: That's exactly so. I believe that would be the worst case scenario if they're survived because they're planning for survival and then the narrative would be success. We succeeded, you know, against all coalition forces and US and Israel and all their allies, you know, so we succeeded. We know that this has been played before. But right now, the intensity of the strikes in the last few days has I believe that would be the worst case scenario if they're survived because they're planning for survival and then the narrative would be success. clearly increased. When conflicts suddenly accelerate like this, what usually drives that shift? Political signaling, military opportunity, or domestic pressure? Alex Vatanka: So intensification is being concentrated on the regime forces. We see a lot of effort to sort of clear the way, create a corridor of sorts in the West. If the Kurds do end up coming in from Iraq to take part of Iranian Kurdistan, control it, declare autonomy or independence, who knows, which would be in itself pretty messy. But it's ⁓ real of that. But yeah, the US campaign right now, I at some point they're gonna either run low targets to hit or ammunition to hit. There might be political pressure here that makes it harder for ⁓ Trump administration to stay in this war at this intensity. The Israelis will stop, I think, the Americans stop, unless Israel keeps being hammered by Iranian ballistic missiles, which could happen, but maybe they also decide that. If they had hoped the Iranian people will rise up and take their country, as Trump and Netanyahu have been asking for it, if that doesn't happen, then how long are they going to stay in this fight? The Iranians will stop firing back if US and Israel start firing at them, because that takes us to your point. The regime will survive, which would be ultimately a pretty damn embarrassing strategic defeat for both US and Israel, because they could have done this differently, a much smarter way than Amir Golshani: Right. Alex Vatanka: damaging so much in the process and you know fundamentally Well, forget this the US and Israel are not the ones paying the biggest price here. It's the Gulf countries They were paying hundreds of billions probably trillions of dollars in terms of all sorts of damages that they could incur Not least is image damage. I mean It it you're not supposed to be fearing flying into Gulf airports. They're supposed to be safe and luxurious forget this the US and Israel are not the ones paying the biggest price here. It's the Gulf countries ⁓ They were paying hundreds of billions probably trillions of dollars terms of all sorts of damages that they could incur Not least is image damage. So they must be fuming. They must be fuming and I think I have every right to be fuming because they didn't ask for this war because they said from get-go, if you start this war with Iran, Iran cannot reach the United States. It can reach Israel, but it can for sure reach us. And that's exactly what Iran is doing. Amir Golshani: Right this Right, you know, so this is where we can say history repeats itself, you know, considering the scenario of Islamic regime survival, exactly what happened after 91 when you know, was in ⁓ you know, and then when he survived, we what happened after that. ⁓ So ⁓ from Iranian leadership's perspective, what is the end game in your opinion? Is this about deterrent survival or something bigger? Alex Vatanka: Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think right now, obviously survivalism gets them up in the morning. But if they survive and they can go back to selling oil and getting whatever money they can get. If it's a decision to double down on Khomeini's legacy and continue going in that direction of rebuilding the missile program, the nuclear program, staying in the same, on the same course of fighting, you know, U.S. and Israel, then again, I think there will be a borrowed time because we've seen people in Iran keep rising up more frequently than before. Amir Golshani: I don't think it would be sustainable, you know, so considering the economy, which is a big deal right now. That was the main cause that this last, you know, uprising started at least. Alex Vatanka: Yeah. Yeah, no, exactly. I agree. I agree. It cannot be sustainable. And not how many is dead. There's an opportunity, even if the regime survives, whoever is in charge of the regime, one in man or a group of men, uh, interim council or something else, they really have an opportunity to, to reinvent themselves. They don't have to do what Trump is saying, come out and wave the white flag and, and capitulate openly. They don't have to do that really in practice. But they need to course. They need to have different policies, both because that's what the people of Iran want and obviously that's what US, Israel and Europeans and many others want from this regime. Amir Golshani: You mentioned about the latest development at Trump, know, new opinion about Supreme Leader. So he was keeping distance when he was asked repeatedly about, would you support Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and says, OK, so this is not something that we need to talk about or it's not my place or position to support him or do not. It's Iranian people. What has changed that suddenly says I need to play my role in selecting Supreme Leader of Iran? It's very interesting. Alex Vatanka: It's really difficult. I mean, it could just be something as simple as Donald Trump not understanding the Iranian political setup, not understanding what a supreme leader means, what the job requires, what the process looks like. I mean, Donald Trump right now could declare victory and say, I killed Ali Khamenei, victory declared, I move. But what he's trying to do is regime change, he's saying, but he's actually doing something harder than regime change. Regime change is relatively straightforward because you just have to find opposition defectors and sort of push that agenda for regime change. He's doing something even harder. He wants to be converting the loyalists of Ali Khamenei to MAGA supporters so he can have a say in the selection of the supreme leader. He wants these Shia militants to have him with the veto power. It just, you can't make this stuff up. You really can't make this stuff up. so that takes me to, I don't think the man knows what he's talking about ⁓ it comes to wanting to have a say. I guess, I mean, I give this much to Donald Trump. He's not talking about ⁓ grand Ayatollah that constitution has to be someone who takes over. He's talking about, he has to have a say. We're a top leader in Iran. And if you look at it that way, it's much more understandable what he's coming from. But if you knew what the Supreme Leader means in terms of the religious qualifications, you have to go through the assembly of experts, they have to vote for you, then you have somebody at least should tell them how the Catholic Church chooses its popes because that gives them an idea what the Iranians do when they choose this Supreme Leader. If they end up choosing the Supreme Leader, who knows what they do. Amir Golshani: Right, you mentioned, you know, so one of the main victims, is these Gulf countries. How worried should be about this becoming a truly regional war? Because I do not believe it's truly a regional war at this How worried should we be? Alex Vatanka: So don't know what the definition of a regional war is, but Iran is... Amir Golshani: that they actively get involved, to take part in attacking Iran. Alex Vatanka: Well, they are not involved in the sense that they're getting drones and missiles thrown at them. So in that sense, they're involved. But you're right that they're not responding in kind yet. suspect that is a tough decision for them to make. How much could they actually damage Iran? It's a question mark. What difference would it make when US and Israel already in the fight? What could the Bahraini Air Force do that would be so, or the UAE, that would be so game changing. Probably not. And if they do attack Iran, ⁓ ⁓ using offensive tools as opposed to just using interceptors to stop these missiles and drones, then the Iranians will have an excuse to hit them even harder. And they're the closest thing to Iran, right? They're the closest thing to Iran. Anybody who's been to the Gulf knows that Iran is not far away. ⁓ I why the Gulf countries are playing this very safe. That makes total sense to me. They're obviously hoping that Iran will come to its senses and keep the war between itself US and Israel, but I doubt Iran will do that because Iran is fundamentally very weak and its best bet in many ways is this internationalization the conflict. So I would not be surprised if more energy was hit to the south trying to ⁓ create a for international economy. Maritime, energy trade. You name it. I hate to think of strategic assets on the other side of the Gulf becoming targets, but that's another thing. If US and Israel tomorrow hit, I don't know, Hark Island in Iran, expect the Iranians to find something equally important on the other side to hit. So this could get out of hand very quickly, and in that sense, it's already a regional. Amir Golshani: Right. So fact that Gulf countries playing safe bet, you know, makes sense in a way that they know ⁓ vulnerable, you so and absolutely. And can get out of hand, so quickly. The strategy of Iran they're following to drag out this war in a way to raise ⁓ Alex Vatanka: Right. Amir Golshani: the political cost for the United States, specifically for Donald Trump? How long do you think they can follow this strategy? Alex Vatanka: I agree with you, that's what Iran wants to do. US is paying about a billion dollars a day on this war. God knows what the costs are for Americans if you wanna measure this based on the price of gas going up and all sorts of goods going up in price. That's, as you know, what happens when oil goes up, everything goes up. So you can measure that, it runs in many, many billions. But fundamentally Trump has to balance this, paying a big political price at home potentially, under pressure for sure already, but has maybe has to pay bigger political price versus this notion that he seems to subscribe to him as the savior of the Iranian people and at least of Israel, that he frees the region of the Islamic Republic. as let me quote Senator Graham of South Carolina, he becomes the the Ronald Reagan of his time. I don't know Donald Trump in his second term not worried about reelection anymore, how that sort versus the risks would have to take to stay in this fight for the long term, but maybe the appeal ⁓ of being the president who basically topples the Islamic Republic since since Jimmy Carter might just be more captivating in his mind for him as his legacy is concerned and a lot of people think is the case. Amir Golshani: Right. ⁓ There is a point that I really cannot find an easy answer for that because such an answer doesn't exist in my opinion. While ⁓ all this is happening externally, Iran itself faces enormous internal pressure, know, economic hardship, sanctions, protests, and generational change. How stable is the regime internally right now in a sense that after these, you know, bombing campaign is kind of over, I really cannot find an easy answer for that because ⁓ such an answer doesn't exist in opinion. and Americans are signaling Iranian people who protested, you know, in January, it's time for you to get back to your streets, you know, and get institutions, you know. How possible plausible do you think this strategy is? Alex Vatanka: So Amir, I will tell you my estimation on that is that's actually not improbable. That is possible. I don't think that call should come from United States or Israel. Last time they called Trump and Netanyahu, it didn't really make much of a difference. Fundamentally, it didn't make much of a difference. Of course, some people were encouraged by that, but it didn't really change. the trajectory of where we're going. What could make a difference is, and remember fundamentally I believe that the future of the place in the short term, long term, in the hands of people who live in Iran. So if there is a split inside what's left of the regime, then I can see that partition, that split in the regime. and calls that might come from one faction saying, let's mobilize against the hardliners who've brought us to this point of disaster, that could be a real mobilizing element. We saw that in 2009. In 2009, it wasn't people in the streets. It was one faction within the system that fell out with another faction, it was a hugely important mobilizing element. So that I think is important because it also gives you an address that you can go to when you are subscribing to this notion that people power the street can result in change. If you're just doing it because some American president or Israeli prime minister told you go to the street, but you don't have an organized agenda, a network plan underground in Iran, what are you doing? You're going on the streets, you're shouting, chanting, the security forces will come and shoot you dead. That is not smart politics. I mean, you could say about the security forces by then have been entirely eliminated. That's different if we get to that, but they're not eliminated as of this conversation right now. And they're very worried about it. And in Iranian state TV, they're saying, if anybody wants to come out and protest against the regime, kill them. Basically, that's pretty much explicitly said, kill them, because they're traitors. They're foreign agents. But no, that, think, my line is this. Amir Golshani: Right. Alex Vatanka: The regime is hated by the Iranian people for good reasons, for very good reasons. So that anger is there. Are they willing to risk it for nothing? No. Are they going to be willing to risk it when they see, there is a clear way we can organize. We come out in the street. have already prepared ground for defections from the regular armed forces, the artesh Maybe even members of the Revolutionary Guards have decided they're going to join. This starts to look much more like 1979. This starts to look much more like 1979. You chip away at the old guard, the old regime, and you create an alternative in waiting. But it's really important it's on the ground in Iran. It can't happen in Toronto or Washington, D.C. You can't have it done here and then put it on a plane and take it to... It has to happen there. I'm not saying the opposition outside don't have a role to play. They do. They really do. Amir Golshani: All Alex Vatanka: But it's extremely important that those in Iran are in the driver's seat. Amir Golshani: Yeah, absolutely. there is a point that I really like to know your opinion about. So someone like Hassan Rouhani has been silenced recently after the war, specifically. There was some noise about him and his competition with the Supreme Leader, you know, for the succession. But right now, quiet. Does it mean anything? Alex Vatanka: Look, it could mean a lot of things or could mean nothing. Hassan Rouhani, we know, is a target inside the country. Inside the Islamic Republic, there are a lot of people who would like to see Hassan Rouhani dead. So he's not necessarily just hiding from American bombs and missiles. He's hiding from people within the regime who openly on TV are calling him a foreign agent. That's not just Hassan Rouhani, Javad Zarif, Muhammad Ali Larijani. The L'Orijone brothers today under massive attack by certain circles being called, know, hidden Jews as they call them. They are basically a part of a Jewish conspiracy. I can go on. I can go on and give you lots of lists. This is where we are politically. So people have good reasons to fear internal enemies, even within the regime, and foreign enemies, you know, the Israelis, the Americans. They have shown that they have infiltrated Iranian society. So they might have targets and they have an agenda. Certain people would be better not to be there when they try to implement their project. Should be eliminated, gone, out of the way. So the silence, obviously, you mentioned Rouhani specifically, totally understandable. It be he's already in touch with the Americans. It could be he's already using intelligence services from, know, Turkey or somewhere else and he's already passing messages. Help me come to power and make me supreme leader and I will take Iran in a very different direction. It could be he's already using intelligence services from, know, Turkey or somewhere else and he's already passing messages. Help me come to power and make me supreme leader and I will take Iran in a very different direction. I mean, I could give you scenarios, but clearly, I mean, these are all scenarios and speculation on my part. But I would just say one thing. If you look at the 1971, 1981 period, when it was almost Iran was a state of civil war, how bloody the political factional fighting. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. Alex Vatanka: became, I don't expect it's going to be that different. So I expect some, if the regime collapses and there's a vacuum, there'll be a lot of killing. There'll be a lot of revenge seeking. ⁓ it's going to be very slippery, very scary. And understand people want revenge for the crimes of the Islamic Republic, but we need to be careful about is you don't jeopardize the state. country. because that has to be preserved. That doesn't mean you don't go back and revisit the issue of what kind of political system you want. think if you're an ethnic minority in Iran, if you're a Sunni or you're a Baluch or a Kurd, you have good reason to want a different political system, including the idea of a federal system. But there's a time and a place for that. And if you try to sort of get that done now, at a moment of chaos and instability, I'm not sure if that's the best way for themselves. These groups, they have that interest like that. And certainly not for the country as a whole, because it risks that fear that so many Iranians have, the prospect of civil conflict. Amir Golshani: Thank you for sharing your opinion. As you mentioned, there are tons of scenarios, but we need to be patient and wait to see which one of those scenarios will come into light. if were shift suddenly in Iran, what would look like? Alex Vatanka: Yeah. ⁓ I really don't know. I the best case scenario, I average Iranians, a secular democratic system, again, either Republican model, constitutional monarchy. Right now, I don't think Reza Pahlavi has an organized game plan inside of Iran. It's a sad thing for me to say because I would have thought he has the name recognition, the pedigree, and the fact that he has to knock on the White House door to get them to elevate him. It's sad. Reza Pahlavi has... Lots of things to offer and I know people don't like him or they love him But I look at him in terms of practicality. I want to go back to where he's about It was a couple of years ago and i'm just citing what he says He he said the other day on a tv interview. think was 60 minutes. I'm 65 years old. I'm too old I don't think he's too old and he can go back to his Original promise of being the transition leader the manager that helps bring all the different opposition opposition groups on the one roof and They go and keep the place together as one for now, get rid of the Islamic Republic look for the day after where again, secular democratic system could be maybe achieved. And people sometimes laugh when they hear you say, ⁓ secular democracy in Iran, give me a break. ⁓ you have to remind them, this year is 120 years ago since Iran had a constitutional revolution. So they've actually achieved it, 120 years ago. They got a ⁓ They forced the king at the time, a weak king at the time, but nonetheless a king who gave him a constitution, gave him a parliament. So no, nothing is out of the possible here, but you need to organize. You need to organize. And a lot of Iranian diaspora oppositions are walking around, protest movements, waving a flag, which I totally understand. But you ask them, how are you going to go from this? ⁓ to being in charge of Iran. What's the plan? What's the pathway to you taking over when you're dealing with people inside of Iran who feel they have to fight to death because they've got no alternative. They're either going to survive or they're going to die. How are you, how are we in the outside world going to go and take over unless there's a plan? And that part, unfortunately, is missing pretty much across the board. Well, there are exceptions. MEK is very organized, but frankly, don't think MEK has much support at all. yeah, organization really does matter. Amir Golshani: So that absolutely the point that you mentioned, I cannot put enough emphasis on that. Up to a certain point, it's understandable that Prince Reza Pahlavi doesn't want to be seen as someone who's appointed by Americans. Makes sense. Then things are normal. But right now when you're witnessing that Iran is being apart, in that case, Alex Vatanka: Yeah. Amir Golshani: things will be different. Okay, as you mentioned, knocking on the White House and say, okay, I'm ready, help me, you so to be a transition leader, to do something, you know, so this is not a normal situation, but I don't know when that point has come up or not yet. Alex Vatanka: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, no, I agree. Amir Golshani: So there are rumors about succession struggle around the Supreme Leader that we know it's not rumor. How real are those tensions? Alex Vatanka: I mean, I don't even know if inside of Iran there's a good sense of what's going on. But there's a succession process likely to happen. They need that for the sake of continuity. They need to give their base hope that not everything's lost. They have to do that while trying not to get assassinated by Israel, who's promised it will kill anyone who wants to take over. So these are extraordinary circumstances. And I'll go back to a point Amir made before. know, and Mojtaba Khamenei becoming supreme leader. What kind of a change is that? That's no change. That actually points to darker future for Iran to come. Even a sort of a reformist cleric would at best be Good for, I don't know, 20, 30 % of Iranian society who might at that point just want to end the war. vast majority of Iranians clearly are over Islamic Republic. And the idea is the supreme leadership, you know, people might put up with it if there's nothing else, but that is not the first choice on any. But in terms of names, you know, we could go down the list of Hassan Khomeini's of this world, Saudeghe Larijani's of this world, you know. I told him Mir Bagheri from the Pahidari faction. Rouhani is a candidate himself. Why not? He could do that. Muhammad Khatami. So yeah, there are a number of people that we... But fundamentally, who gets the job is not because of religious qualifications. It's because of politics. And who has the political upper hand the day they announce it? It's exactly what happened in 1989. Khamenei became supreme leader because of political expediency. not because he was a religious figure that anybody had any great respect for, because he was seen as the consensus candidate for vast majority of people who at the time had the power. And by the way, Rafsanjani really pushed his candidacy through. He got it wrong, Rafsanjani, history turned out to got that decision badly wrong, but his gamble was he was gonna get a weak Supreme Leader in Khamenei so he could run the place as president. And for a while he did, but then Khamenei decided, yeah, he wasn't gonna let Ras and Joani have everything. So he pushed back. Amir Golshani: I exactly got the same same analysis from Afshan Ustavar. You know, I was talking to him the other day. He mentioned Rafsanjani Meesma. Alex Vatanka: A great, great, ⁓ yeah, Afshan is a great author on Vanguard, his book, and a good friend, by the way. I'm glad you spoke to Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. Amir Golshani: Shout out to him, know, fantastic gentleman like yourself. Yeah, and Rafsanjani miscalculated in that regard, thought that supreme leader position would be a ceremonial one, you know, and then presidency would be the main one, but it turned out to be the opposite. Alex Vatanka: Yeah. Biggest mistake of his political career, biggest mistake. Khamenei turned out to be power hungry in ways that, I mean, most of us would have a hard time thinking, how do you get up every morning just wanting to be micromanaging so much? do you care? But he did. And for 36 ⁓ plus, ⁓ did. The problem is he got almost everything wrong. All his big gambles went wrong. ⁓ home, Amir Golshani: Cost is life. Alex Vatanka: He got it wrong. Abroad, he got it wrong. He was focused on turning a few West Africans from being Sunni Muslims to Shia Muslims. And when they had a couple of converse, they would celebrate. They would announce it loudly on Iranian media. We have converted somebody from Sunni Islam to Shia Islam in Nigeria. And then while they were doing that, millions of existing Shia Muslims in Iran left the faith. you know, his policies just... did not make sense when you think about it. And I know people who love him and called him Imam think he was the best because he was such a strong character, tell you. He stood up to the Americans, did Israeli bullies. Yeah, I he did stand up, but there are other ways, smarter ways to stand up. The way he did it, I don't think was smart. don't think he was, as a resistance leader, he just gambled too much and he burned too many bridges and he... He forgot his own people fundamentally. He forgot his own people. When they dance the day you get assassinated by foreign bombs and they're dancing, then I don't know. I know I'm not saying everybody danced. There's surely some that mourned too. But those of us who know Iranian society, we know exactly how average Iranians felt. He wasn't going to be missed. Amir Golshani: That's the main thing, yeah. Right, right. what talking about, you know, the outcome of this conflict, it's kind of speculation and prediction, but based on facts and experiences and history that you are an expert. If this conflict continues escalating, what are the more realistic scenarios? Alex Vatanka: I don't, I mean, I, can't, no, no, no, I, I just know it. I've been answering all sorts of questions the last one week. So I, I'm a little bit of my, you know, prepared remarks because this is such a fast moving topic. You know, we were this morning is different than now because this morning ⁓ didn't want to help select the next Supreme leader of Iran. Amir Golshani: I'm sorry to put you in that position, I know. Alex Vatanka: So I don't know what the politics of the United States will be. That's gonna be a great factor in shaping the will of the regime to fight on, the will of people to defect or stay with the regime. So much of that depends on the outside world. But you know, a scenario to keep in mind is. US and Israel basically at some point decide they've damaged it enough that Iran will not attack or be a danger for another 20, 50 years and then just pack up and leave. Which I think would be a strategic defeat for the United States. It's a horrendous scenario for the people of Iran it's not good for the world. So I ⁓ that they will. have now the patience it takes to finish something they started. They shouldn't have started the way they started it. There was no need for this war to happen this way. There would have been smarter ways to bring the Islamic Republic down. But they decided on this. I don't know, maybe they decided to make an example out of Iran. Maybe to sort of dangle Iran from the rest of the world and say never ever stand in our way. I don't know. ⁓ the timing to me was definitely a war of choice. And hope... But now that they've started it, they will go back, think, how do we put this together? And I was hearing, ⁓ ⁓ Lindsey Graham saying, ⁓ doesn't believe in the concept that if you break it, you own it. In other words, yeah, you can break it, but who cares about the future of Iran? That's not what he said, to be fair, but roughly that's where he was going. That's up to the Iranian people, ⁓ is true. The future of the place is in the hands of the Iranian people. My point is... help them organize because they got 47 years of proving they can get along. And it's the time, this is the moment. If you don't get along, like Trump said, well, then that's their loss. And you know, whatever you might think of Trump fundamentally has a point. It's the people of Iran who put this regime in there in 1979. The Americans didn't bring Khomeini to Iran. I mean, I know there are all sorts of conspiracy theories, but frankly, that's nonsense. Iranians chose Khomeini. Then they got Khamenei. Now Khamenei is gone. They have to work harder than ever. Maybe look for friends like US others to help them organize, but take the place in a different direction than a failed state. A failed state where any Air Force from anywhere can just whenever they feel like it go and drop bombs over the heads of Iranians. That to me is a nightmare scenario for the people of Iran. And I frankly think for the rest of the Middle East, Iran is collapsing a black hole. It's in no one's interest because the alternative could be a prosperous Iran, a partner, a country that needs billions and trillions in investment, could support ⁓ it. It could be such ⁓ a positive economic force for ⁓ many countries in that West Asia region. a prosperous Iran, a partner, ⁓ a ⁓ country that needs ⁓ billions and trillions investment, could support investments around it. It could be ⁓ a economic for ⁓ so many countries in that West Asia region. Amir Golshani: Right. No, these are possible scenarios. to your point about, know, Khomeini and conspiracy theories about that, I had a conversation the other day with Eli Lake, a fantastic, you know, journalist, you know, he mentioned, I really like, you know, the way he put it into perspective that Iranians, because of many reasons that we are all aware of, you know, they're ready for a revolution. So in 78, you know, and then of fundamental changes. But Khomeini, you know, was still their revolution by lying and fooling people. That's another way of looking at that. ⁓ You've spent life studying power conflict and political systems after all these years of observing geopolitics and human behavior. What have learned about freedom? Alex Vatanka: that I like freedom, that I like to be able to speak up my mind, travel, not worry about how I dress, or my wife, my daughter. I do remember those dark early days, 1980s in Iran. I mean, they put a very bad taste in our mouths. The Romanists who took over and insisted that we had to dress in a certain way. carry ourselves in a certain way. So no, for me, it's on a very personal level. don't mean I could give you an elaborate political answer about freedom, but it does. But no, I go to very basic understanding that being left to decide basic things for myself in my life, for me and my family, that's to me freedom. ⁓ The regime in Tehran Khomeini and Khamenei never understood that. To this day, they didn't understand it. And that essentially became their undoing. That is one of the reasons that they were They are so much rejected by their own people. This idea of my way or the highway that you know better. I remember, let me leave you with this saying, you've heard it I'm sure, but when, I think it was a senior, I don't remember his name, senior cleric was asked, sir, people are saying that what do you insist on? policies that you say will take us to heaven. They're saying they don't want to go to heaven. They just want to be left alone here on earth. And he was, no, no, no, no, they have to, they have to. That's the mission the regime is on. Another thing where I can quote almost verbatim by Khamenei was, we didn't come here to make life comfortable for you on earth. This is not why Islamic Republic was created. Amir Golshani: Right. Alex Vatanka: not here for economic planning. We're not here to turn Tehran into Dubai. The problem with that is people wanted to turn Tehran into something much better. And if you had listened to them, he might be alive today, but he didn't because he was on his way and he thought he was untouchable till he wasn't. Amir Golshani: Right. Alex, thank you for this thoughtful and powerful conversation. Appreciate it. Alex Vatanka: Thank you, it was good talking to you. ⁓ Thank you so much.