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067 - Lxvii That God Knows Future Contingent Singulars · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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  Speaker 1: Chapter sixty seven of Summa Contragentilees, First Book on God,
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  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
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  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
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  Speaker 1: Chapter sixty seven that God knows future contingent singulars from
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  Speaker 1: the foregoing. It is already somewhat evident that from eternity
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  Speaker 1: God has had unerring knowledge of singular contingencies, and that
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  Speaker 1: nevertheless they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is
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  Speaker 1: not incompatible with certainty of knowledge, except in so far
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  Speaker 1: as it is future, and not as it is present.
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  Speaker 1: Because a contingency, while future, may not be, so that
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  Speaker 1: the knowledge of one who thinks it will be may
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  Speaker 1: be wrong, and it will be wrong if what he
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  Speaker 1: thinks will be will not be from in a moment, however,
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  Speaker 1: that it is for the time being, it cannot not be,
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  Speaker 1: although it may not be in the future. But this
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  Speaker 1: affects the contingency not as present but as future, hence
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  Speaker 1: since loses nothing of its certainty when it sees that
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  Speaker 1: a man is running. Although this statement is contingent, accordingly,
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  Speaker 1: all knowledge that bears on a contingency as present can
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  Speaker 1: be certain. Now, the vision of the divine intellect from
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  Speaker 1: eternity sees each thing that happens in time as though
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  Speaker 1: it were present, as we have shown above. Therefore, it
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  Speaker 1: follows that nothing prevents God having unerring knowledge of contingencies
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  Speaker 1: from eternity. Again, the contingent differs from the necessary according
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  Speaker 1: as each is in its cause. For the contingent is
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  Speaker 1: in its cause in such a way that it may
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  Speaker 1: not result, or may result therefrom whereas the necessary cannot
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  Speaker 1: but result from its cause. But according as each of
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  Speaker 1: them is in itself, they differ not as to being
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  Speaker 1: on which the true is founded, because there is not
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  Speaker 1: in the contingent considered as it is in itself, being
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  Speaker 1: and not being, but only being, although it is possible
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  Speaker 1: for the contingent not to be in the future. Now,
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  Speaker 1: the divine intellect knows things from eternity not only as
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  Speaker 1: to the being which they have in their causes, but
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  Speaker 1: also as to the being which they have in themselves.
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  Speaker 1: Therefore nothing prevents it having eternal and unerring knowledge of contingencies. Moreover,
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  Speaker 1: even as the effect follows certainly from a necessary cause,
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  Speaker 1: so does it from a complete contingent cause. Unless it
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  Speaker 1: be hindered. Now, since God knows all things, as was
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  Speaker 1: proved above, he knows not only the causes of contingencies,
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  Speaker 1: but also that which may possibly hinder them. Therefore, he
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  Speaker 1: knows certainly whether contingencies be or not. Again, an effect
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  Speaker 1: does not happen to exceed its cause, but sometimes it
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  Speaker 1: falls short of it. Hence, since in us knowledge is
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  Speaker 1: caused from things, it happens at times that we know
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  Speaker 1: necessary things by way not of necessity but of probability. Now,
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  Speaker 1: just as with us, things are the cause of knowledge,
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  Speaker 1: so the divine knowledge is the cause of the things known.
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  Speaker 1: Nothing therefore prevents things whereof God has necessary knowledge, being
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  Speaker 1: contingent in themselves. Further, an effect cannot be as necessary
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  Speaker 1: if its cause be contingent, for it would follow that
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  Speaker 1: an effect exists after its cause has been removed. Now,
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  Speaker 1: the ultimate effect has both approximate and a remote cause. Hence,
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  Speaker 1: if the proximate cause be contingent, its effect must needs
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  Speaker 1: be contingent, even though the remote cause be necessary. Thus,
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  Speaker 1: plants do not necessarily bear fruit, although the motion of
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  Speaker 1: the sun is necessary on account of the contingent intermediate causes.
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  Speaker 1: But God's knowledge, although it is the cause of the
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  Speaker 1: things it knows is nevertheless the remote cause. Wherefore the
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  Speaker 1: contingency of the things it knows does not militate with
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  Speaker 1: its necessity, since it happens that the intermediate causes are contingent. Again,
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  Speaker 1: God's knowledge would not be true and perfect if things
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  Speaker 1: happened not in the same way as God knows them
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  Speaker 1: to happen. Now, God, since he is cognizant of all
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  Speaker 1: being whereof he is the source, knows each effect not
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  Speaker 1: only in itself, but also in its relation to every
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  Speaker 1: one of its causes. But the relation of the contingencies
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  Speaker 1: to their proximate causes is that they result from them contingently. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: God knows that certain things happen, and that they happen contingently.
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  Speaker 1: Wherefore the certainty and truth of the divine knowledge do
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  Speaker 1: not take away the contingency of things. It is therefore
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  Speaker 1: clear from what has been said how we are to
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  Speaker 1: refute the objection gain saying, God's knowledge of contingencies for
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  Speaker 1: change in that which is subsequent, does not argue changeableness
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  Speaker 1: in that which precedes, since it happens that contingent ultimate
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  Speaker 1: effects result from necessary first causes. Now, the things known
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  Speaker 1: to God, do not proceed his knowledge, as is the
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  Speaker 1: case with us, but are subsequent there too. Therefore, it
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  Speaker 1: does not follow that if what is known to God
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  Speaker 1: to be changeable, his knowledge can err or in any
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  Speaker 1: way be changeable. It will therefore be a fallacy of
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  Speaker 1: consequence if, because our knowledge of changeable things is changeable,
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  Speaker 1: we think that this happens in all knowledge. Again, when
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  Speaker 1: we say God knows or knew this future thing, we
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  Speaker 1: imply a kind of middle term between the divine knowledge
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  Speaker 1: and the thing known, namely, the time at which the
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  Speaker 1: statement is made, in relation to which that which God
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  Speaker 1: is said to know its future. But it is not
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  Speaker 1: future in relation to the divine knowledge, which, existing in
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  Speaker 1: the moment of eternity, is related to all things as
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  Speaker 1: though they were present in relation to that knowledge. If
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  Speaker 1: we set aside the time at which the statement is made,
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  Speaker 1: there is no saying that the thing is known as
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  Speaker 1: non existent, so as to allow of the question being
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  Speaker 1: raised as to whether it is possible for the thing
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  Speaker 1: not to be, but it will be said to be
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  Speaker 1: known by God as already seen in its existence. This
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  Speaker 1: being supposed, there is no room for the aforesaid question,
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  Speaker 1: since what is already cannot as regards that instant not be.
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  Speaker 1: The fallacy arises then from the fact that the time
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  Speaker 1: at which we speak is coexistent with eternity, as also
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  Speaker 1: does pastime, which is designated when we say God knew. Wherefore,
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  Speaker 1: the relation of past or present to future time is
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  Speaker 1: ascribed to eternity, which is altogether inapplicable there too. The
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  Speaker 1: result is a fallacy of accident. Further, if every single
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  Speaker 1: thing is known to God as seen present to him,
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  Speaker 1: that which God knows will be so far necessary as
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  Speaker 1: it is necessary that Socrates is sitting from the fact
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  Speaker 1: that he is seen to be sitting. Now this is
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  Speaker 1: necessary not absolutely, or as some say, by necessity of consequence,
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  Speaker 1: but conditionally or by necessity of consequence. For this conditional
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  Speaker 1: statement is necessary. If he is seen to sit, he sits. Wherefore,
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  Speaker 1: if the conditional be rendered categorically so as to run,
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  Speaker 1: that which is seen to sit necessarily sits. It is
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  Speaker 1: clear that if it be referred to the statement and
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  Speaker 1: in a composite sense, it is true, and if referred
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  Speaker 1: to the thing and in a divided sense, it is false.
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  Speaker 1: And so in these and in all like arguments employed
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  Speaker 1: by those who gainsay God's knowledge of contingencies there is
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  Speaker 1: a fallacy of composition and division. That God knows future
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  Speaker 1: contingencies is also proved by the authority of Holy writ
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  Speaker 1: for it is said in Wisdom chapter eight, verse eight,
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  Speaker 1: about the divine wisdom she knoweth signs and wonders before
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  Speaker 1: they be done, and the events of time and ages,
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  Speaker 1: And in Ecclesiasticus thirty nine, verses twenty four and twenty
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  Speaker 1: five there is nothing hid from his eyes. He seeth
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  Speaker 1: from eternity to eternity. And in Isaias forty eight five,
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  Speaker 1: I foretold thee of old before they came to pass.
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  Speaker 1: I told thee end of chapter six seven, read by
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  Speaker 1: Michael Shane Craig Lambert l C.