Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 011 - Tactical Air Control Mule Train and Ranch Hand
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- 0:01Speaker 1: Section ten Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:05Speaker 1: by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:08Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:11Speaker 1: information or a volunteer pleases, visit LibriVox dot org. Recording
- 0:15Speaker 1: by Graham McMillan, San Diego, California. Chapter ten Tactical Air Control,
- 0:20Speaker 1: mule train and ranch hand. The viet Cong thought in
- 0:24Speaker 1: November nineteen sixty one that victory was virtually in their grasp.
- 0:28Speaker 1: Completing the first phase of insurgency, they had surrounded Saigon
- 0:31Speaker 1: and other urban centers and blocked many highways. For the
- 0:34Speaker 1: second phase, they set up subversive apparatus and were mounting
- 0:38Speaker 1: overt attacks by guerrillas, many of whom had been trained
- 0:41Speaker 1: in the North. During each of the first four months
- 0:43Speaker 1: of nineteen sixty two, and estimated one thousand communists entered
- 0:48Speaker 1: South Vietnam, Soviet aircraft stood ready to support two North
- 0:51Speaker 1: Vietnamese regiments poised in the Laotian Panhandle for a possible
- 0:55Speaker 1: thrust across the border. Either the North Vietnamese meant to
- 0:58Speaker 1: move through the Central Highlands to cut South Vietnam in half,
- 1:02Speaker 1: or they were forging an infantry division for a tax
- 1:05Speaker 1: on Saigon. Both seemed likely alternatives to hide its control
- 1:10Speaker 1: over the insurgency. Hanoi in late nineteen sixty one renamed
- 1:13Speaker 1: the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party the People's
- 1:16Speaker 1: Revolutionary Party. On December seventh, the Provincial Committee of the
- 1:20Speaker 1: Laodong Party in South Vietnam's Bowin Province declared, the People's
- 1:25Speaker 1: Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually,
- 1:29Speaker 1: our party is nothing but the Laodong Party of Vietnam,
- 1:33Speaker 1: unified from north to south under the direction of the
- 1:36Speaker 1: Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which
- 1:39Speaker 1: is President Ho. Securing a copy of this statement, President
- 1:43Speaker 1: d M sent it to President Kennedy with the comment, here,
- 1:47Speaker 1: at last is a public admission of what has always
- 1:49Speaker 1: been clear. The Vietcong campaign against my people is led
- 1:53Speaker 1: by communists. There was nothing new in this. The point
- 1:58Speaker 1: was how to combat it. The actions of President d
- 2:01Speaker 1: M's government in November and December nineteen sixty one did
- 2:04Speaker 1: nothing to reassure American observers. The apparent response to American
- 2:09Speaker 1: demands for reforms appeared in a series of newspaper articles,
- 2:13Speaker 1: presumably prepared in the presidential palace. These pieces denounced the
- 2:17Speaker 1: United States for imperialism. Still fearing a coup, d M
- 2:21Speaker 1: resisted forming an unbroken military command chain and giving confidence
- 2:25Speaker 1: and authority to the chief of the Field Command. DM
- 2:29Speaker 1: was not alone in feeling that the United States was
- 2:31Speaker 1: pushing too hard. At times, several Vietnamese officers referred to
- 2:34Speaker 1: counterinsurgency measures as the American plan. They were far from
- 2:39Speaker 1: convinced that U S ideas and methods would work in
- 2:41Speaker 1: their country. In consequence, d M continued to approve every
- 2:45Speaker 1: U S military adviser, explaining that he quote didn't want
- 2:50Speaker 1: to give the monopoly on nationalism to Ho Chi Minho.
- 2:55Speaker 1: Having commenced resettlement projects, President d M was drawn to
- 2:59Speaker 1: the idea of Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, former Secretary
- 3:03Speaker 1: of Defense of the Federation of Malaya. Sir Robert arrived
- 3:07Speaker 1: in Saigon during September nineteen sixty one as head of
- 3:10Speaker 1: a British advisory mission. He suggested a programme of strategic
- 3:14Speaker 1: and defended hamlets to clear communists from the Mekong Delta.
- 3:18Speaker 1: That same month, DM started the strategic hamlet program under
- 3:22Speaker 1: the sponsorship of his brother No Denu, it would take
- 3:26Speaker 1: more than military activity to subdue the guerrillas, DM judged,
- 3:29Speaker 1: and permanent victory rested on restoring the faith of the
- 3:32Speaker 1: people in the government resettlement he felt would help. In contrast,
- 3:37Speaker 1: American officials pinned their hopes on a centralized nationwide counterinsurgency
- 3:42Speaker 1: strategy to secure Saigon, other major centers and lines of communication.
- 3:48Speaker 1: It would also keep the Viet Cong off balance with
- 3:51Speaker 1: search and destroy operations to clear, seize, and hold what
- 3:55Speaker 1: were becoming sizeable Viet Cong base areas known as zones.
- 3:59Speaker 1: The strategy she further sought to seal off the border
- 4:01Speaker 1: against infiltrators. In January and February nineteen sixty two, d
- 4:06Speaker 1: M gradually conceded the plan for a national concept of action,
- 4:09Speaker 1: and he seemed to tilt toward a master plan by
- 4:12Speaker 1: approving a series of separate projects in various places. The
- 4:15Speaker 1: Vietnamese president desired that his and Farmgate's aircraft attacked Vietcong
- 4:20Speaker 1: supply routes. He appeared willing to authorize saturation air attacks
- 4:24Speaker 1: against Communist zones without exact targeting because his troops could
- 4:29Speaker 1: not enter these areas. He deemed them solidly hostile. In comparison.
- 4:34Speaker 1: Generals O'Donnell and Magarr believed indiscriminate bombing might well disturb
- 4:39Speaker 1: pacification efforts. Sir Robert Thompson also thought that innocent casualties
- 4:44Speaker 1: would alienate potentially friendly people. At least two influential men
- 4:48Speaker 1: in the State Department, w Averell Harriman and Roger Hillsman,
- 4:53Speaker 1: shared Thompson's view. American officials devised strategic guidelines for a
- 4:58Speaker 1: massive counterinsurgency up Due to internal political reasons, DM refused
- 5:03Speaker 1: to accept an overall Vietnamese military commander. He opted for
- 5:08Speaker 1: each Corps tactical zone commanders having a forward command post.
- 5:12Speaker 1: More to DM's liking was his decree of February third
- 5:16Speaker 1: that designated an inter ministry Committee for Strategic Hamlets to
- 5:19Speaker 1: draw up a national plan. Besides the seven hundred and
- 5:23Speaker 1: eighty four defended hamlets completed and the four hundred and
- 5:26Speaker 1: fifty three being built, he planned six thousand and sixty
- 5:29Speaker 1: six more. In nineteen sixty two, failing to convince the
- 5:33Speaker 1: Vietnamese to accept all out military counterinsurgency, Defense Secretary McNamara
- 5:38Speaker 1: acceded to a concept of smaller clear and hold operations.
- 5:42Speaker 1: Sink Pack wished them to begin in Binduang Province, where
- 5:46Speaker 1: large communist groups threatened Saigon and Biennois, but Thompson pointed
- 5:50Speaker 1: out that a cleared Bin Duang would be hard to
- 5:53Speaker 1: hold without pouring in thousands of troops. Dm okayed the
- 5:57Speaker 1: Bin Dwang mission, which got under way in March as
- 5:59Speaker 1: the publicized beginning of the countrywide Strategic Hamlet program. As
- 6:04Speaker 1: he told Thompson, it makes the Americans happy, and it
- 6:07Speaker 1: does not worry me or the Viet Cong. Decentralized clear
- 6:11Speaker 1: and hold operations and the Strategic Hamlet Program comprised the
- 6:15Speaker 1: major ventures against the Viet Cong. Having repeatedly ordered the U. S.
- 6:20Speaker 1: Military services to come up with special measures for countering
- 6:23Speaker 1: the insurgency, President Kennedy remained dissatisfied with results. Urged by
- 6:28Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs and CIA to create a single authority
- 6:31Speaker 1: in Washington to fuse all efforts, he formed on January eighteen,
- 6:35Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, chaired by General Taylor.
- 6:41Speaker 1: The group worked on the premise that subversive insurgency was
- 6:44Speaker 1: a valid form of politico military conflict equal in status
- 6:48Speaker 1: to conventional warfare. That perception was to be properly reflected
- 6:52Speaker 1: in the organization and doctrine of all American programs. The
- 6:57Speaker 1: group was to judge how well U S resources and
- 6:59Speaker 1: action dealt with subversion in South Vietnam, Lao, and Thailand.
- 7:04Speaker 1: To coordinate with the group, the Joint Staff of the
- 7:07Speaker 1: JCS gained a new office, the Special Assistant to the
- 7:10Speaker 1: Director for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities Indecision, in autumn nineteen
- 7:16Speaker 1: sixty one. Over American advisers engaging in combat now vanished,
- 7:20Speaker 1: the Special Group pinpointed the particular character of counterinsurgency subtly,
- 7:25Speaker 1: but perhaps not always clearly. The group pushed for less
- 7:28Speaker 1: American and more Vietnamese involvement in the war. This point
- 7:31Speaker 1: of view clashed with President Kennedy's intent to have US
- 7:34Speaker 1: Armed services used Vietnam as a laboratory for studying and
- 7:38Speaker 1: testing counterinsurgency techniques and equipment. The President encouraged civil and
- 7:43Speaker 1: military agencies to send senior officials on temporary duty to
- 7:47Speaker 1: Vietnam for orientation and learning. By November nineteen sixty two,
- 7:52Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs of Staff mirrored the new outlook. The
- 7:56Speaker 1: scale of United States involvement, and the level of force,
- 7:58Speaker 1: they said should be limited and merely supplement that of
- 8:02Speaker 1: indigenous forces. Where guerrilla warfare flared, American military men were
- 8:07Speaker 1: to give operational assistance to show US resolve. They were
- 8:11Speaker 1: to extend material aid and planning guidance, and to furnish intelligence, operational,
- 8:16Speaker 1: and communications facilities that could be further expanded should the
- 8:20Speaker 1: United States enter the war. American representatives were to bring
- 8:24Speaker 1: the combat conditions under control and re established stability by
- 8:28Speaker 1: using Vietnamese forces in well coordinated, integrated, and adequately supported operations.
- 8:34Speaker 1: Yet the United States might have to act outside the
- 8:37Speaker 1: host country to deny safe havens to its surgeons, spilling
- 8:40Speaker 1: across country borders. Somewhat contrary to the prevailing emphasis on
- 8:45Speaker 1: training Vietnamese armed forces, the US military services were expressly
- 8:50Speaker 1: directed to refine their own doctrine, tactics, procedures, organization, and equipment.
- 8:57Speaker 1: A wide assortment of schemes was tried amid a lingering
- 9:01Speaker 1: uncertainty about the thrust of American policy and strategy. Nevertheless,
- 9:06Speaker 1: President Kennedy's and Secretary McNamara's program of expanded American assistance
- 9:11Speaker 1: sparked some noteworthy achievements for the United States Air Force
- 9:15Speaker 1: in Vietnam, the most pressing requirement was a strong countrywide
- 9:19Speaker 1: tactical air control system. The system would enable effective and
- 9:23Speaker 1: response of Vietnamese Air Force tactical operations and squeezed the
- 9:28Speaker 1: most from scarce Vietnamese and American air power. If President
- 9:32Speaker 1: dam saw how well central control worked, he might scrap
- 9:35Speaker 1: the divided control of military and provincial chiefs. Since the
- 9:38Speaker 1: Vietnamese could not run a control system, it would be
- 9:41Speaker 1: US manned and oriented. A tactical air control system had
- 9:46Speaker 1: proved its worth in World War II and the Korean War,
- 9:49Speaker 1: both for air defense and close support. An air operations
- 9:52Speaker 1: center afforded centralized planning, direction, and control of air operations
- 9:57Speaker 1: in a combat theater. Supporting it was reporting center for
- 10:01Speaker 1: radar and other warning services. In each major ground command
- 10:04Speaker 1: area were subordinate air support, operation centers and warning posts.
- 10:09Speaker 1: PACAF and Thirteenth Air Force planned such a system for
- 10:13Speaker 1: Vietnam in December nineteen sixty one, tied in with a
- 10:16Speaker 1: combat Operations Center manned by US and Vietnamese personnel for
- 10:20Speaker 1: the Joint General Staff, an Air Operations Center for the
- 10:23Speaker 1: overall control at Tansan nut would also support the third
- 10:27Speaker 1: Core Tactical Zone headquarters. Two subordinate Air Support Operations centers
- 10:31Speaker 1: at Danang and Plai Coup would serve the first and
- 10:34Speaker 1: second core headquarters. Secretary McNamara rejected the idea of phasing
- 10:38Speaker 1: in this system. He directed General O'Donnell to set it
- 10:42Speaker 1: up at once. From PACAF assets, Transports from the three
- 10:47Speaker 1: hundred and fifteenth Air Division airlifted men and equipment into
- 10:50Speaker 1: South Vietnam from January Tewod to fourteenth, nineteen sixty two.
- 10:56Speaker 1: The USAF Fifth Tactical Control Group worked at Tansan Nut
- 11:00Speaker 1: and Danang, while Vietnamese operated at Placu. The Air Force
- 11:04Speaker 1: ran a communications center at Tanson Knut and sent high
- 11:07Speaker 1: frequency radio teletype circuits to d Nang, Biennoi, Blecoux, and Netrange.
- 11:13Speaker 1: The initial system began operating on January thirteenth, nineteen sixty two.
- 11:17Speaker 1: To avoid innocent targets, air strikes needed President d M's
- 11:21Speaker 1: prior personal approval, General Anthus brief DM and stressed how
- 11:25Speaker 1: the system's instant information on enemy and friendly air activities
- 11:29Speaker 1: led to quick response. Persuaded, he permitted the Joint Operations
- 11:34Speaker 1: Center to authorize air strikes this austereo system brimmed with problems.
- 11:39Speaker 1: Corps commanders reserved specific strike and transport aircraft for their
- 11:43Speaker 1: own purposes, thereby taking them out of central control. Additional
- 11:47Speaker 1: duties of officers at the center consumed part of their time.
- 11:51Speaker 1: Vietnamese personnel were accustomed to afternoon siestas precisely during the
- 11:55Speaker 1: hours when plans were readied and warning orders issued for
- 11:58Speaker 1: the next day. Several Americans had no background for their jobs.
- 12:03Speaker 1: Many grew impatient because work took longer when Vietnamese were involved.
- 12:07Speaker 1: Quite a few of them were highly competent, but the
- 12:09Speaker 1: Air Operations Center was certainly not a Vietnamese directed and
- 12:13Speaker 1: operated facility as eventually intended. It was rather a USAF
- 12:17Speaker 1: facility with some Vietnamese Air Force participation. Still, the workers
- 12:23Speaker 1: at d Nang and Pleiqou skipped siestas and performed well
- 12:26Speaker 1: due to insistence by their USAF counterparts that the Vietnamese
- 12:30Speaker 1: themselves plan and monitor missions. A number of junior Vietnamese
- 12:36Speaker 1: officers acted as forward air controllers and as air liaisons
- 12:39Speaker 1: officers with the ground forces. They were as hesitant to
- 12:43Speaker 1: control strikes or to give advice as the ground commanders
- 12:46Speaker 1: were to accept their services. Lacking authority and seemingly uninformed,
- 12:51Speaker 1: these young officers appeared merely to transmit requests for information
- 12:54Speaker 1: to their headquarters over communications nets not always secure. Five
- 12:59Speaker 1: USAF forward air controllers came to the country on February fifteenth,
- 13:02Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two. They were pilots who were highly qualified
- 13:06Speaker 1: to direct strike aircraft to targets by talking with them
- 13:09Speaker 1: from observation planes in the area. The initial Air Force
- 13:12Speaker 1: liaison officers to advise and assist Vietnamese ground commanders got
- 13:16Speaker 1: to Vietnam in April. At first, the USAF controllers were
- 13:20Speaker 1: attached to Vietnamese ground forces likely to clash with the enemy.
- 13:24Speaker 1: President dm wished only rated Vietnamese observers to control strikes,
- 13:29Speaker 1: so the Americans worked mainly as assistant air liaison officers.
- 13:33Speaker 1: They also flew the L nineteen for the Vietnamese observer
- 13:36Speaker 1: forward air controller and would help him, and they served
- 13:39Speaker 1: as duty officers in the Air Operations Center. Crippling the
- 13:43Speaker 1: tactical air control system with the limited and failure prone
- 13:47Speaker 1: communications between the centers and the air fields. Through the
- 13:50Speaker 1: early break in period, numerous communication equipment failures took place.
- 13:55Speaker 1: PACAF had obtained newly developed ANTSC fifteen high frequency single
- 14:01Speaker 1: side band radios for long distance voice and teletype channels.
- 14:05Speaker 1: The sets reached Clark on December thirtieth, nineteen sixty one
- 14:08Speaker 1: for field installation by the First Mobile Communications Group. Problems
- 14:13Speaker 1: arose at once. Operators in the small mobile vans sweltered
- 14:17Speaker 1: as temperatures often soared to one hundred thirty degrees fahrenheit.
- 14:21Speaker 1: Atmospheric conditions caused poor transmission and extensive use jammed the vands.
- 14:26Speaker 1: Mister McNamara on January nineteen sixty two approved a JCS
- 14:30Speaker 1: request for a civilian contractor to install an MRC eighty
- 14:34Speaker 1: five tropospheric scatter communications system. Page Communications Engineers Inc. Set
- 14:40Speaker 1: about supplying many main link channels that joined Saigon Nitrang
- 14:45Speaker 1: PLAIKU and Danang One Channel Link PLAIQU with Uban Thailand.
- 14:49Speaker 1: Not until Page wound up its work in September nineteen
- 14:52Speaker 1: sixty two. Were their rapid, positive and dependable communications for
- 14:56Speaker 1: central control over air operations. The Air Control SYSTM DAMAN
- 15:00Speaker 1: being sufficed for a few forces, but an entirely integrated
- 15:03Speaker 1: countrywide structure would enhance air power and train Vietnamese It
- 15:07Speaker 1: would in addition, be a framework under American Command and
- 15:11Speaker 1: Control for directing farm Gate and USAF operational units later
- 15:16Speaker 1: deployed to Vietnam. Yet General Magar, the mag Chief, undermined
- 15:21Speaker 1: the concept of a centralized tactical air control system by
- 15:23Speaker 1: his handling of the two Army H twenty one helicopter
- 15:26Speaker 1: transport companies deployed to Vietnam in November nineteen sixty one.
- 15:31Speaker 1: He assigned them to senior Army advisers of Corps, then
- 15:35Speaker 1: urged the Joint General Staff to reorganize the three Vietnamese
- 15:38Speaker 1: L nineteen Liaison Squadrons and the one thirty four helicopter
- 15:42Speaker 1: Squadron into four composite groups. He wanted three of the
- 15:46Speaker 1: groups located at the three corps air headquarters and the
- 15:50Speaker 1: fourth held in general support. That would give each Vietnamese
- 15:53Speaker 1: Army Corps the helicopters and planes to conduct reconnaissance, move
- 15:57Speaker 1: platoon or company sized combat patrol, transport critical supplies, evacuate casualties,
- 16:04Speaker 1: and perform staff and command liaison. When General Magar asked
- 16:08Speaker 1: for Army CV two Caribou light Transports L twenty and
- 16:12Speaker 1: L eighteen Liaison aircraft and UH one formerly HU one
- 16:17Speaker 1: Iroquois helicopters. For better support of the mag Army Field advisors.
- 16:21Speaker 1: He planned to place this air fleet under local, rather
- 16:24Speaker 1: than central control. Some Vietnamese questioned this parceling out of
- 16:28Speaker 1: pilots and technicians of the Vietnamese Air Force, for it
- 16:31Speaker 1: seemed to point to an army air force. The main
- 16:35Speaker 1: hope for expanding tactical fighter strength lay in upgrading L
- 16:39Speaker 1: nineteen and C forty seven pilots. This would be impossible
- 16:43Speaker 1: if the liaison squadrons passed to Army control. Beyond that,
- 16:47Speaker 1: maintenance and repair facilities at the Corps headquarter for helicopters
- 16:51Speaker 1: and liaison craft were few. Impetus for centralized airlift control
- 16:57Speaker 1: came from the arrival in January nineteen sixty two of Muletrain,
- 17:01Speaker 1: a temporary duty detachment designed to give logistics support to
- 17:05Speaker 1: Vietnamese and American forces. Muletrain drew its aircraft and personnel
- 17:10Speaker 1: from tactical air commands. Three hundred forty six troop carrier
- 17:13Speaker 1: Squadron Assault at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, sixteen
- 17:19Speaker 1: C one. Twenty three providers arrived overseas in January, the
- 17:23Speaker 1: first four touching down at Tansun nut On. The second
- 17:26Speaker 1: mule Train sixteen C one twenty three providers arrived overseas
- 17:31Speaker 1: in January, the first four touching down at Tan San
- 17:34Speaker 1: nut On. The second Muletrain had two hundred forty three
- 17:38Speaker 1: officers and airmen and was complete with its own maintenance,
- 17:42Speaker 1: air base personnel, medical detachments, and load masters. The commander
- 17:47Speaker 1: was Lieutenant Colonel Floyd D. Schaffner. In March, permanent duty
- 17:52Speaker 1: personnel from the seven hundred seventy six Troop Carrier Squadron
- 17:56Speaker 1: started to replace the original mule train. The transfer was
- 17:59Speaker 1: finished in June. Of the sixteen Muletrain C one twenty
- 18:04Speaker 1: three's four were at Clark in the Philippines, ten at
- 18:07Speaker 1: Tan San Nut and two at Tenang. Operational control rested
- 18:12Speaker 1: with sync PACK through PACAF thirteenth Air Force and second
- 18:16Speaker 1: a d v o N, a Joint Aircraft Allocation Board.
- 18:21Speaker 1: In the mag j four logistics represented interested agencies and commands,
- 18:26Speaker 1: set movement priorities and designated space requirements. The Airlift branch
- 18:31Speaker 1: of the Joint Operations Center, part of the Tactical Air
- 18:34Speaker 1: Control System, directed flights specialists on temporary duty from PACAF's
- 18:40Speaker 1: three hundred and fifteenth Air Division Combat Cargo joined Vietnamese
- 18:44Speaker 1: Air Force officers in the Airlift Branch to control Mule Train,
- 18:48Speaker 1: and they often helped the Vietnamese work the first transport group.
- 18:52Speaker 1: In the initial seven weeks, Mule Train flew more than
- 18:55Speaker 1: five hundred sorties of one thousand, six hundred ninety three
- 18:58Speaker 1: flying hours, moved six hundred ninety five tons of cargo
- 19:02Speaker 1: and over thirty six hundred passengers, and kept an operational
- 19:05Speaker 1: readiness rate of eighty five percent. Every CEA one twenty
- 19:09Speaker 1: three was scheduled for fifty flying hours monthly, leaving time
- 19:13Speaker 1: for training, testing, and flight to Clark for maintenance. The
- 19:16Speaker 1: number of sorties rose steadily, from two hundred ninety six
- 19:19Speaker 1: in January to one thousand, one hundred two in June.
- 19:24Speaker 1: In February alone, Meal Train conveyed one thousand and thirty
- 19:27Speaker 1: five passengers and four hundred and forty nine tons of cargo,
- 19:31Speaker 1: dropped one hundred and seventy four point five tons of
- 19:33Speaker 1: resupply to outposts, and transported nine hundred ninety six troops
- 19:38Speaker 1: for airborne training. Frequently employed in long halls with light loads,
- 19:43Speaker 1: the Sea one twenty threes operated at about ninety per
- 19:45Speaker 1: cent of capacity. They were supposed to support tactical operations,
- 19:50Speaker 1: but made mostly routine cargo and passenger flights. Through nineteen
- 19:54Speaker 1: sixty two, the airlift system was not very efficient. Management
- 19:59Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese C forty seven's was worse. The airlift
- 20:03Speaker 1: branch could not consistently obtain firm priorities, and sudden shifts
- 20:07Speaker 1: in daily orders stirred confusion at the operating and air
- 20:10Speaker 1: terminal levels. Many times USAF personnel scheduling C one twenty
- 20:15Speaker 1: three's accepted Vietnamese requests based on sketchy C forty seven
- 20:20Speaker 1: mission reports, while C forty seven crew shortages prevented peak operations.
- 20:26Speaker 1: The First Transportation Group devoted about twenty five percent of
- 20:29Speaker 1: its efforts to transporting very important persons or VIPs, upgrading
- 20:35Speaker 1: Vietnamese SEA forty seven pilots to fill T twenty eight
- 20:38Speaker 1: cockpits strip The Transport Group and Secretary McNamara authorized thirty
- 20:43Speaker 1: USAF pilots to augment the unit. The pilots reached Tansan
- 20:47Speaker 1: nut in March and April at once. The relations with
- 20:50Speaker 1: the Vietnamese pilots became prickly. Tension built until August, when
- 20:55Speaker 1: the commander Lieutenant Colonel winkowed Kai assembled them all and
- 20:59Speaker 1: asked them they worked together. The meeting cleared the air
- 21:02Speaker 1: cemented close coordial relations, and boosted the sortie rate to
- 21:07Speaker 1: meet army needs. The Air Force had developed the C
- 21:09Speaker 1: one twenty three as an assault transport capable of carrying
- 21:13Speaker 1: eight tons in the late nineteen fifties. However, the Army
- 21:17Speaker 1: procured the CV two Cariboo transport, featuring a two and
- 21:21Speaker 1: a half ton capacity and good short takeoff and landing characteristics.
- 21:27Speaker 1: By March nineteen sixty two, Army leaders were pressuring Admiral
- 21:30Speaker 1: Felt sink Pack to approve a Caribou company for Vietnam.
- 21:35Speaker 1: Late that month, General Harkins put in for a Cariboo
- 21:38Speaker 1: company and one squadron of C one twenty threes. He
- 21:42Speaker 1: intended that the Cariboos concentrate on delivering supplies, chiefly food,
- 21:46Speaker 1: to American advisors and isolated troops at remote spots of
- 21:51Speaker 1: the one hundred eighty two airfields in Vietnam. Harkins pointed
- 21:54Speaker 1: out that one hundred sixty two could accommodate CEAV twos,
- 21:58Speaker 1: while only one hundred and fifteen could handle C one
- 22:00Speaker 1: twenty threes. To avoid additional overcrowding at ten s on Nut.
- 22:05Speaker 1: He planned to base the Cariboos at the unoccupied air
- 22:08Speaker 1: field of Fung Tois to check General Harkins's evaluation of
- 22:12Speaker 1: air fields. The second Advon surveyed operating conditions. Aerial photographs
- 22:18Speaker 1: disclosed fewer fields than listed, for some had been duplicated
- 22:21Speaker 1: under French and Vietnamese names. Many small ones were unfit
- 22:25Speaker 1: for either C one twenty threes or CV twos due
- 22:29Speaker 1: to low load bearing capacity, vegetation, or danger from the
- 22:33Speaker 1: viet coom. At first, eighty three airfields seemed possible for
- 22:37Speaker 1: C one twenty threes, but another survey showed that one
- 22:40Speaker 1: hundred and forty five of the current one hundred fifty
- 22:43Speaker 1: three fields were suitable in dry weather. Admiral Felt was
- 22:48Speaker 1: out of sympathy with General Harkins's desire for extra airlift.
- 22:51Speaker 1: The Army's eighteenth Fixed Wing Aviation Company at Dnang already
- 22:56Speaker 1: owned sixteen U one otters for core support. A light
- 23:00Speaker 1: utility plane, the otter could haul one ton of small
- 23:03Speaker 1: bulk cargo or seven to eight passengers. Additional aircraft Felt
- 23:08Speaker 1: believed would overload the few facilities in South Vietnam he
- 23:12Speaker 1: favored better use of the C one twenty threes and
- 23:14Speaker 1: C forty seven's on hand. Like Feldt, General LeMay and
- 23:19Speaker 1: his party visiting Vietnam in April nineteen sixty two thought
- 23:22Speaker 1: more transports, whether C one twenty three s or CV twos,
- 23:26Speaker 1: to be unnecessary to attain better airlift. They suggested assigning
- 23:30Speaker 1: an experienced officer to establish tighter control. Colonel George M. Foster,
- 23:35Speaker 1: formerly PACAF Director of Transportation, reported to General Anthus for
- 23:40Speaker 1: duty on May first. Later in the month, Tactical Air
- 23:43Speaker 1: Force Transport Squadron Provisional I was formed a tents on
- 23:47Speaker 1: NOOT to bring the management of mule train and other
- 23:49Speaker 1: C one twenty threes under a single commander. General Harkin
- 23:53Speaker 1: was still bent on securing CV two cariboos. He suggested
- 23:58Speaker 1: using C one twenty three providers to handle the main
- 24:01Speaker 1: line long haul airlift to thirty nine airheads. At the
- 24:05Speaker 1: same time, cariboos would take care of short haul feeder
- 24:08Speaker 1: air transport to fifty four locations. The CV two could
- 24:12Speaker 1: manage items two bulky and heavy for the U one
- 24:15Speaker 1: otters and UH one helicopters. Once More, the MACV commander
- 24:20Speaker 1: requested an additional C one twenty three Squadron and an
- 24:24Speaker 1: Army CV two company. Five of the C one twenty
- 24:28Speaker 1: three's were earmarked for mule train, five for airstrip alert,
- 24:31Speaker 1: two for training, and four for maintenance and reserve. Two
- 24:35Speaker 1: of the CV twos were tagged for each Corps to
- 24:37Speaker 1: directly support advisors, four for the air transport system, two
- 24:42Speaker 1: for MACV staff support, and four for maintenance and reserve.
- 24:46Speaker 1: Admiral felt exceeded, but told General Harkins that daily air
- 24:50Speaker 1: supply to fifty four points through thirty nine airheads meant
- 24:54Speaker 1: many of your customers are eating too high on the hog.
- 24:57Speaker 1: The Army's first aviation company of xia VV two cariboos
- 25:01Speaker 1: went to Thailand with Joint Task Force one sixteen, mainly
- 25:05Speaker 1: for testing under field conditions. From Thailand, the Army sent
- 25:09Speaker 1: six CV twos to Vietnam for dispersal in pairs to
- 25:12Speaker 1: the Corps advisers. American activities in Thailand tapered off during December,
- 25:17Speaker 1: and General Harkins reassembled the whole Caribou company in Vietnam.
- 25:21Speaker 1: He gave as his reasons the increased need for airlift
- 25:24Speaker 1: and the desire for further field tests. When the JCS
- 25:29Speaker 1: ordered Tactical Air Command to deploy a second C one
- 25:31Speaker 1: twenty three unit to Vietnam. The seven hundred seventy seventh
- 25:35Speaker 1: Troop Carrier Squadron at Pope furnished sixteen aircraft. These C
- 25:40Speaker 1: one twenty threes staged through Clark, four of them flying
- 25:44Speaker 1: on to Thailand. The other twelve arrived at Dnang on
- 25:47Speaker 1: June fifteenth, nineteen sixty two, going under the Tactical Air
- 25:50Speaker 1: Force Transport Squadron Provisional two. General Moorman, PACAF Vice Commander
- 25:57Speaker 1: in Chief had proposed that the three hundred fifty fteenth
- 26:00Speaker 1: Air Division Combat Cargo form a lower headquarters in Vietnam
- 26:04Speaker 1: to control the C one twenty three's. General Milton, thirteenth
- 26:08Speaker 1: Air Force Commander, protested the proposal. He said it would
- 26:12Speaker 1: add another air headquarters in Vietnam independent of Second adv On,
- 26:17Speaker 1: thereby tangling relations with MACVE. Moorman next asked Milton to
- 26:22Speaker 1: set up a combat Cargo Group in Vietnam under the
- 26:24Speaker 1: operational control of General Anthis the MACV Air Component Commander,
- 26:29Speaker 1: in addition to the airlift units assigned or attached to
- 26:32Speaker 1: the Second advon anthus would control all USAF air terminal
- 26:37Speaker 1: facilities in Southeast Asia. Merman thought a Southeast Asia airlift
- 26:41Speaker 1: system complete with a combat cargo group to be the
- 26:44Speaker 1: damnedest exercise in overstaffing, a proposal that I have ever
- 26:47Speaker 1: heard of. Milton accepted the idea because it achieved professional
- 26:51Speaker 1: supervision quote without creating another little empire. General Moorman asked
- 26:57Speaker 1: Admiral Felt to approve the plan for centralized control of
- 27:00Speaker 1: regional airlift, and he requested General Harkins to establish an
- 27:04Speaker 1: Airlift Allocation Board. The board would require fifty more people
- 27:09Speaker 1: in Thailand and Vietnam, along with small movement control sections
- 27:12Speaker 1: at Tanson Nut and Danang and in Thailand. Morman also
- 27:17Speaker 1: wanted an aerial port squadron in Vietnam. The overall concept
- 27:21Speaker 1: appealed to Harkins, but he thought that the MACV J
- 27:24Speaker 1: four could discharge the duties of the Airlift Allocation Board.
- 27:27Speaker 1: He agreed to let the system take in an all Army, Navy,
- 27:31Speaker 1: Marine and Air Force airlift say helicopters. Felt then directed
- 27:35Speaker 1: the MACV commander to form a Joint Airlift Allocation Board
- 27:39Speaker 1: within his J four and told Morman to create a
- 27:42Speaker 1: combat cargo group as planned at Tanson Nut PACAF organized
- 27:47Speaker 1: the six thousan four hundred and ninety second Combat Cargo
- 27:51Speaker 1: Group Troop Carrier and as six thousand, four hundred ninety
- 27:54Speaker 1: third Aerial Port Squadron. Both provisional units were replaced in
- 27:59Speaker 1: December nineteen sixty two by the three hundred and fifteen
- 28:02Speaker 1: Troop Carrier Group Assault and the eighth Aerial Port Squadron.
- 28:07Speaker 1: General Harkins directed the Joint Airlift Allocations Board in j
- 28:11Speaker 1: four to approve all C one twenty three missions in
- 28:14Speaker 1: Southeast Asia, but as Chief of Staff, General Weed deviated
- 28:18Speaker 1: from SINC pack guidance. Weed neither defined General anthuss responsibilities
- 28:23Speaker 1: in the airlift system as the air component commander, nor
- 28:27Speaker 1: made clear of the Combat Cargo Group's functions in running
- 28:29Speaker 1: the air terminals. Nevertheless, the Southeast Asia airlift system was
- 28:35Speaker 1: broad enough to encompass Army Cariboos, Marine R four d's,
- 28:39Speaker 1: Vietnamese and Air Force C forty sevens, and the USAF
- 28:43Speaker 1: C one two threes. Airlift specialists were interested in a
- 28:48Speaker 1: clean and straight line organization at the same time. General
- 28:52Speaker 1: anthus expected the C one twenty three s also to
- 28:55Speaker 1: fly tactical airlift generated through the Air Operations Center of
- 28:58Speaker 1: the Tactical air Control CIS. The arrival of the additional
- 29:02Speaker 1: C one twenty threes in June nineteen sixty two allowed
- 29:05Speaker 1: the creation of a Fire Brigade Quick Reaction Force placed
- 29:09Speaker 1: on a thirty minute alert for emergency employment twenty four
- 29:12Speaker 1: hours a day. This composite force consisted of five SEA
- 29:16Speaker 1: one twenty threes, five later six C forty sevens, one
- 29:20Speaker 1: L nineteen and five hundred Vietnamese airborne troops. The planes
- 29:26Speaker 1: dropped all the paratroopers during a demonstration on June fifth.
- 29:30Speaker 1: Impressed the Joint General Staff, and the second Air Division
- 29:33Speaker 1: planned to locate paratroop battalions and transport aircraft together at
- 29:38Speaker 1: eight dispersed locations. The concept was never completely carried out,
- 29:42Speaker 1: and despite its intrinsic merit, the Fire Brigade idea fell
- 29:46Speaker 1: into disuse. Tying down C forty sevens and C one
- 29:50Speaker 1: twenty threes to alert status turned out to be a
- 29:53Speaker 1: waste of airlift. Between June and December nineteen sixty two,
- 29:58Speaker 1: the SEA one twenty threes, for the most part, flew
- 30:01Speaker 1: cargo and passenger missions instead of the tactical airlift for
- 30:04Speaker 1: which they had been intended. This was due chiefly to
- 30:07Speaker 1: the country's surface transportation, being vulnerable to Viat Kong ambush.
- 30:13Speaker 1: Along with multrain had come six C one twenty three's
- 30:16Speaker 1: equipped for defoliation operations and known as Ranch Hand. These
- 30:21Speaker 1: planes plus sixty nine men selected from the Special Aerial
- 30:25Speaker 1: Spray Flight at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia and the
- 30:28Speaker 1: four hundred and sixty fourth Troop Carrier Wing at Pope
- 30:32Speaker 1: made up the Tactical Air Force Transport Squadron Provisional one,
- 30:35Speaker 1: with Captain Carl W. Marshall as officer in charge. The
- 30:39Speaker 1: unit reached Clark on December sixth, nineteen sixty one, and
- 30:43Speaker 1: there awaited policy decisions. It was assigned to PACAF and
- 30:47Speaker 1: Second ADVON, but MAG handled the planning and coordinating. The
- 30:53Speaker 1: Advanced Research Projects. Agency had been conducting small scale defoliant
- 30:57Speaker 1: tests in South Vietnam since August nineteen sixty one. Pleased
- 31:02Speaker 1: with the results, President DM became an ardent advocate of
- 31:05Speaker 1: the use of herbicides, both to destroy crops and to
- 31:08Speaker 1: strip away foliage concealing enemy activities. The MAG readied a
- 31:13Speaker 1: plan to try defoliant chemicals against border areas, Vietcong crops
- 31:17Speaker 1: and Viacong base areas in Zone D. The JCS endorsed
- 31:22Speaker 1: this plan on November three, and Defense Secretary McNamara on
- 31:25Speaker 1: the seventh ordered the Air Force to send planes, crews,
- 31:28Speaker 1: and chemicals to South Vietnam. On November thirtieth, President Kennedy
- 31:33Speaker 1: approved the defoliation guidelines suggested by the Departments of State
- 31:37Speaker 1: and Defense. The approvals were cautious. They called for carefully
- 31:41Speaker 1: controlled defoliation flights along key roads and railways before undertaking
- 31:46Speaker 1: food denial. There was to be no spraying in Zone
- 31:49Speaker 1: D or along the border quote until there are realistic
- 31:52Speaker 1: possibilities of immediate military exploitation. In other words, spraying for
- 31:58Speaker 1: the sake of spraying was It had to be linked
- 32:01Speaker 1: with ground tactical operations. In theory, the Vietnamese government was
- 32:06Speaker 1: managing the operations and the United States was simply supplying
- 32:09Speaker 1: the means and serving as a consultant. United States planners
- 32:13Speaker 1: saw the technique as an excellent measure to counter ambush
- 32:17Speaker 1: the classic guerrilla tactic mastered by the foe. Killing foliage
- 32:21Speaker 1: would deny him hiding along roads and railways. The outcome
- 32:25Speaker 1: of wiping out his crops was less certain, but into
- 32:28Speaker 1: the summer of nineteen sixty two, General O'Donnell and Ambassador
- 32:31Speaker 1: Nolting continued to harbor reservations on the untried chemicals. The
- 32:36Speaker 1: State Department remained apprehensive that the common non toxic herbicides
- 32:40Speaker 1: would provoke Communist charges of chemical warfare. In the meantime, however,
- 32:45Speaker 1: Secretary McNamara was eager to continue defoliation activities since the
- 32:50Speaker 1: Vietcong had already gathered their seasonal crops when the spray
- 32:53Speaker 1: plans entered the country. The initial plan was to defoliate
- 32:56Speaker 1: along three hundred miles of strategic roads north and northead
- 33:00Speaker 1: east of Saigon. President Kennedy severely paired this proposal. On
- 33:05Speaker 1: January third, nineteen sixty two, he authorized experimental spraying against
- 33:10Speaker 1: separate targets that comprised merely sixteen of the nearly sixty
- 33:14Speaker 1: miles between Binhois and Vung Twao on Route fifteen. The
- 33:18Speaker 1: State Department wanted no advanced notice aside from local and
- 33:21Speaker 1: low key warnings. Still, the Vietnamese government, on January tenth,
- 33:26Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two, quote announced plans to conduct an experiment
- 33:30Speaker 1: to rid certain key communications routes of thick tropical vegetation.
- 33:34Speaker 1: U S assistance has been sought to aid Vietnamese personnel
- 33:37Speaker 1: in the undertaking. Because the SEE one twenty three spray
- 33:42Speaker 1: planes had no armour plating, General O'Donnell voice concerned that
- 33:45Speaker 1: advanced notice of flights would expose them to viet Cong
- 33:48Speaker 1: ground fire. The second Advon consequently scheduled fighter cover from
- 33:52Speaker 1: farm Gate. According to the rules then in force, a
- 33:56Speaker 1: Vietnamese needed to be aboard each spray plane. Lanes were
- 34:00Speaker 1: to stay clear of areas where food crops were growing.
- 34:03Speaker 1: Province chiefs had to be alerted three days in advance
- 34:06Speaker 1: of flights so they could explain the non toxic spray
- 34:09Speaker 1: to their citizens. Three CEA one twenty threes, each fitted
- 34:13Speaker 1: with an internal one thousand gallon chemical tank and removable
- 34:17Speaker 1: spray bars attached under the wings, departed Clark and arrived
- 34:20Speaker 1: at Tansan Noot on January seventh, nineteen sixty two. After
- 34:25Speaker 1: pouring over aerial photos. The crew flew two familiarization sweeps
- 34:29Speaker 1: along Highway fifteen before embarking on their first full scale
- 34:33Speaker 1: mission on the thirteenth. For three days, the plane sprayed
- 34:36Speaker 1: a two hundred meters wide swath on both sides of
- 34:38Speaker 1: selected segments of Rout fifteen. Complete defoliation in ten days
- 34:43Speaker 1: was counted on. However, the leaves turned brown slowly, the
- 34:47Speaker 1: vegetation remained alive, and few immediate military advantages resulted. Several
- 34:53Speaker 1: tries at burning the sprayed area fizzled. The Vietcong turned
- 34:58Speaker 1: the spraying into a propaganda event. They claimed that the
- 35:01Speaker 1: spray was chemical warfare and led the peasants to believe
- 35:04Speaker 1: it was to blame for all dying plants. A Vietnamese
- 35:08Speaker 1: government board established to evaluate claims for accidental destruction angered
- 35:12Speaker 1: those people whose suits were denied. On February seventh, nineteen
- 35:17Speaker 1: sixty two, a C one twenty three on a low
- 35:19Speaker 1: level training mission was lost. The cause of the crash
- 35:23Speaker 1: was not clear. Enemy ground fire or sabotage was suspected,
- 35:27Speaker 1: but the exact reason was never officially proved. The three
- 35:30Speaker 1: crewmen were the first U SAF fatalities in South Vietnam.
- 35:35Speaker 1: By February, several U S officials concluded that the spray
- 35:38Speaker 1: project was badly managed. General O'Donnell termed it a quote
- 35:42Speaker 1: blooper from start to finish un quote. He sought to
- 35:45Speaker 1: discontinue the program, reconvert the Sea one twenty threes to
- 35:48Speaker 1: standard transports and give them to mule team. He told
- 35:52Speaker 1: Secretary macnamara that the spray operations were a waste of aircraft,
- 35:57Speaker 1: and he recommended removal of the tanks and spray plumbing.
- 36:00Speaker 1: General Moorman joined O'Donnell in calling the project militarily ineffective,
- 36:05Speaker 1: and the State Department labeled it quote too reminiscent of
- 36:09Speaker 1: gas warfare. In the face of this opposition, McNamara went
- 36:14Speaker 1: for continued herbicide experiments. He decided to press ARPA to
- 36:18Speaker 1: make the spray work, sending a scientific team to Vietnam
- 36:21Speaker 1: in April for a technical assessment. Brigadier General Fred J. Delmore,
- 36:26Speaker 1: U SA, commanding General of the Chemical Core, Research and
- 36:29Speaker 1: Development Command, headed the team. General Delmore quickly discovered what
- 36:34Speaker 1: had gone wrong with the ranch hand defoliant missions. Most
- 36:37Speaker 1: of the plants had been dormant and the herbicide was
- 36:39Speaker 1: a growth regulating chemical that worked only on actively growing plants. Furthermore,
- 36:45Speaker 1: the spray system had dispensed two light a dose of chemicals.
- 36:48Speaker 1: The system required readjustment and modifications. These findings reassured President
- 36:54Speaker 1: DM he was willing to begin herbicide operations against viat
- 36:58Speaker 1: com crops in the central Highland, where gorillas were seizing
- 37:01Speaker 1: food from the Montagnard tribal people. Relocating the Montagnards to
- 37:06Speaker 1: strategic hamlets and destroying the crops would cause the viet
- 37:09Speaker 1: Cong to go hungry. Secretary McNamara agreed to seek approval
- 37:14Speaker 1: for the use of herbicides against Vietcong crops. Ambassador Nolting
- 37:18Speaker 1: and General Harkins in July forwarded a specific proposal to
- 37:22Speaker 1: allow the South Vietnamese to spray twenty five hundred acres
- 37:25Speaker 1: in Pu Yen Province. Following the Vietcong's killing of two
- 37:29Speaker 1: Vietnamese perimeter guards near the Bienhoi Airfield, Admiral Feldt suggested
- 37:34Speaker 1: spraying the areas around airstrips. Approval came in late June
- 37:38Speaker 1: from Washington for defoliating the forest area north of the
- 37:41Speaker 1: Bienhoi runway. Vietnamese aged thirty four helicopters made these flights
- 37:46Speaker 1: in July. General Harkins next urged that Ranch hand See
- 37:50Speaker 1: one twenty threes treat some nine thousand acres around fourteen
- 37:54Speaker 1: square miles of mangrove forests bordering the rivers and canals
- 37:57Speaker 1: of the Kamoi Peninsula to deprive the Communists of ambush cover.
- 38:02Speaker 1: After approval, two Sea one twenty threes started the spray
- 38:05Speaker 1: operations on September third. Another spray equipped Sea one twenty
- 38:10Speaker 1: three sent from the United States, joined in later finished
- 38:14Speaker 1: in October eleventh. The flights killed ninety to ninety five
- 38:17Speaker 1: percent of the vegetation along the waterway. It was estimated
- 38:21Speaker 1: that the view from the air was five to seven
- 38:23Speaker 1: times better than before. This success spurred the Vietnamese armed
- 38:28Speaker 1: forces on December third, to seek widespread defoliation of around
- 38:31Speaker 1: ninety thousand acres along Vietnam's main highways. The State and
- 38:35Speaker 1: Defense departments let Harkins and Nolting approve operations to clear roadsides,
- 38:40Speaker 1: power lines, railroads, and areas adjacent to depots, air fields
- 38:44Speaker 1: and other field installations. Other targets took presidential approval. Inasmuch
- 38:49Speaker 1: as the Vietnamese now wanted to spray on their own,
- 38:52Speaker 1: McNamara wondered aloud why DM did not buy weed killing
- 38:55Speaker 1: chemicals on the open market and go ahead via Coong propaganda.
- 38:59Speaker 1: Scoring defas handed DM's government an unforeseen advantage. The Montagnards,
- 39:04Speaker 1: who had been impressed with Ho Chi Men's victory over
- 39:06Speaker 1: the French came to believe that the power to kill
- 39:09Speaker 1: trees would bring victory to the Republic of Vietnam. Many
- 39:13Speaker 1: of them left the highlands for resettlement in strategic hamlets.
- 39:17Speaker 1: The migration reduced the Viet Cong's food supply, and guerrillas
- 39:20Speaker 1: had to switch from fighting to farming. In Washington, on
- 39:23Speaker 1: September twenty fifth, nineteen sixty two, the Vietnamese Deputy Minister
- 39:27Speaker 1: of Defense pressed President Kennedy to authorize the use of
- 39:30Speaker 1: chemicals to destroy crops. Kennedy agreed a few days later,
- 39:34Speaker 1: and the State and Defense departments authorized arkins and nolting
- 39:38Speaker 1: to proceed with limited test crop destruction operations as long
- 39:42Speaker 1: as they took precautions to prevent damage to innocent people
- 39:45Speaker 1: and to feed refugees from sprayed areas. State insisted on
- 39:49Speaker 1: approving every crop destruction target. However, the rice crop in
- 39:54Speaker 1: Puyen Province had matured by this time and appeared to
- 39:57Speaker 1: be no longer a valid target. The State Department of
- 40:00Speaker 1: proved an alternate area in Fuok Long Province, and on
- 40:03Speaker 1: November twenty first and twenty third, five Vietnamese H thirty
- 40:07Speaker 1: four helicopters treated about seven hundred seventy five acres of rice, potatoes,
- 40:13Speaker 1: manioc beans, and peanuts. This operation destroyed food sufficient to
- 40:18Speaker 1: feed one thousand communists for over a year. During February,
- 40:23Speaker 1: May and June nineteen sixty three, Vietnamese ground troops sprayed
- 40:27Speaker 1: portions of Tuatian Province by hand. In general, the Joint
- 40:31Speaker 1: Chiefs of Staff favored further spraying, but President Kennedy withheld
- 40:35Speaker 1: blanket authority. He did not wish it to appear that
- 40:38Speaker 1: Americans were making war upon Vietnamese peasants. End of Chapter ten,
- 40:44Speaker 1: recording by Graham McMillan, San Diego, California,