Latest / kill switch / who is profiting from scam texts – and can we stop them?
Transcript
- 0:10Speaker 1: Let me read you the last text that guy, great
- 0:12Speaker 1: opportunity up ahead. A stock is about to go up
- 0:15Speaker 1: sixty percent. Would you like a trading signal? Here's another
- 0:18Speaker 1: one that I got earlier. Hi, Jennifer, what's the news?
- 0:22Speaker 1: That's all it says. I get these all the time.
- 0:25Speaker 1: You probably do too, maybe even call you Jennifer. And
- 0:27Speaker 1: it seems no matter what I do, these things keep
- 0:30Speaker 1: coming in. So scams themselves aren't new, but technology is
- 0:35Speaker 1: definitely adding to it.
- 0:37Speaker 2: What's changed is that now people are using computers to
- 0:41Speaker 2: do the communications, to create the communications, where previously they
- 0:47Speaker 2: would have literally had to press buttons on the phone.
- 0:52Speaker 2: It opens up the floodgates in terms of the volume
- 0:57Speaker 2: of messages that you can create, on the numbers of
- 1:00Speaker 2: people that you can hurt around the world.
- 1:03Speaker 1: Eric Prescons has been in a telecommunications business for a
- 1:06Speaker 1: long time. He's worked at T Mobile, at Sky, at WorldCom,
- 1:10Speaker 1: and that's just some of the places. In two thousand
- 1:12Speaker 1: and six, you founded a site called Comm's Risk, and
- 1:14Speaker 1: he left the Corporate World. Comm's Risk reports on the
- 1:17Speaker 1: telecom industry and specifically the crimes that are associated with it,
- 1:22Speaker 1: including the influx of scam texts, He says it. Scams
- 1:25Speaker 1: via text have risen over the last decade as technology
- 1:28Speaker 1: has made them easier to send on mass, and.
- 1:31Speaker 2: Then you had the pandemic and criminalists couldn't commit some
- 1:34Speaker 2: of the crimes that pretty musly committed before, So that
- 1:36Speaker 2: became an accelerant for those changes.
- 1:40Speaker 1: If it feels like you're getting more scam text these days,
- 1:42Speaker 1: it's not just your imagination. According to consumer reports, scam
- 1:46Speaker 1: texts have increased by fifty percent in the last year alone,
- 1:50Speaker 1: and they're not just increasing in number, they're getting a
- 1:53Speaker 1: lot more convincing.
- 1:54Speaker 2: The sophistication of now the criminal patents we're seeing is
- 1:58Speaker 2: a lot more elaborate than they were in the past.
- 2:01Speaker 2: This is a very rapid evolution we're seeing now where
- 2:04Speaker 2: we've gone from machines that make very very simple, repetitive
- 2:08Speaker 2: scam communications so now far more subtle patterns that may
- 2:13Speaker 2: not be so easy to identify.
- 2:16Speaker 1: Talking to Eric was an opportunity to get into the
- 2:18Speaker 1: world of text scams, how they're being sent, who's behind them,
- 2:22Speaker 1: and if there's anything you can do to stab them.
- 2:24Speaker 1: Just as a short answer to that last one, yes,
- 2:27Speaker 1: we probably could start scam text but it's a lot
- 2:31Speaker 1: more complicated than it sounds.
- 2:33Speaker 2: Sometimes our use on the triviality of scam an organized crime.
- 2:38Speaker 2: Oh you've got an annoying message. Oh I got a
- 2:41Speaker 2: phone call. I didn't like the phone call. We're not
- 2:43Speaker 2: seeing the bigger picture of how this is having an
- 2:46Speaker 2: impact on people's lives. That's become almost unimaginable.
- 2:54Speaker 1: From Kaleidoscope and iHeart podcasts, this is kill switch. I'm
- 3:05Speaker 1: Dexter Thomas.
- 3:09Speaker 3: I'm sharing. I'm sharing Goodbye.
- 3:50Speaker 1: When I say scam text, you probably know exactly what
- 3:53Speaker 1: I'm talking about. These are things like fake recruiter messages,
- 3:56Speaker 1: fake delivery messages, wrong number texts. Some of these are
- 4:00Speaker 1: obviously scams because they come from weird email addresses or
- 4:03Speaker 1: use weird characters and place of letters. These are all
- 4:05Speaker 1: workarounds that scammers are found to bypass some of the
- 4:08Speaker 1: security measures that telephone companies are put in place, but
- 4:11Speaker 1: some of the newer methods that scammers are using or
- 4:13Speaker 1: getting harder and harder to detect by the telephone networks
- 4:17Speaker 1: and by us. One that's getting really popular around the
- 4:20Speaker 1: world is called a simbox.
- 4:22Speaker 2: Think of them as phones, but with one hundred sim
- 4:26Speaker 2: cards or two hundred SIM cards in them, so instead
- 4:29Speaker 2: of like a phone making one call or sending out
- 4:32Speaker 2: one message at a time, it can do two hundred
- 4:34Speaker 2: things at once.
- 4:36Speaker 1: There's nothing nefarious about the basic technology behind these symboxes.
- 4:39Speaker 1: I mean, think of a phone with a dual SIM feature.
- 4:42Speaker 1: If you're in the middle of nowhere and the first
- 4:43Speaker 1: phone network dies, you can just switch over to the
- 4:46Speaker 1: other network. It's not that easy to do normally, but
- 4:48Speaker 1: if you have two simcards, one from your primary network
- 4:51Speaker 1: and one for your backup network, it's really easy to do.
- 4:54Speaker 1: So just imagine that would say dozens of SIM cards
- 4:57Speaker 1: or hundreds, and now you have the basic idea for
- 5:00Speaker 1: a symbox. From here, you can combine multiple symboxes to
- 5:03Speaker 1: make what people call a SIM fharm and that can
- 5:06Speaker 1: send out millions of messages per minute.
- 5:09Speaker 2: In New York, three hundred of these things were found
- 5:12Speaker 2: by the US Secret Service recently.
- 5:16Speaker 1: This was back in September, and we still don't know
- 5:18Speaker 1: a whole lot about this operation. What we do know
- 5:21Speaker 1: is what the Secret Service has told us, and they
- 5:24Speaker 1: reported that they uncovered a massive symbox operation in New York.
- 5:28Speaker 1: Three hundred symboxes containing a total of one hundred thousand
- 5:32Speaker 1: SIM cards spread across multiple abandoned apartment buildings within a
- 5:36Speaker 1: thirty five mile radius.
- 5:38Speaker 2: They could as send an AEMS message to every American
- 5:42Speaker 2: within twelve minutes. That's the level of capacity we're talking
- 5:46Speaker 2: about here.
- 5:47Speaker 1: That's not to say that they did that. We actually
- 5:50Speaker 1: don't know what these scammers were doing. One of the
- 5:52Speaker 1: agents on the investigation said that this operation could have
- 5:55Speaker 1: quote disabled cell phone towers and essentially shut down the
- 5:59Speaker 1: cell phone network in New York City. So it goes
- 6:02Speaker 1: beyond just sending some annoying texts. And again, the Secret
- 6:06Speaker 1: Service isn't really telling us what these scammers are doing.
- 6:08Speaker 1: But if we look at some other cases, we might
- 6:11Speaker 1: find some hits.
- 6:13Speaker 2: In Latvia, two hundred of these things were found, and
- 6:19Speaker 2: it's almost certainly the case that what happened in New
- 6:21Speaker 2: York was the same as what happened in Latvia. What
- 6:23Speaker 2: were they used for distributing child pornography extortion? But one
- 6:28Speaker 2: of the big things that they were being used for
- 6:31Speaker 2: was to receive one SMS message. Why would you want
- 6:37Speaker 2: to receive one SMS message? Well, if you're setting up
- 6:40Speaker 2: a WhatsApp account. It gets tied to a phone number.
- 6:44Speaker 2: So if you're creating all other spam scam accounts on WhatsApp,
- 6:48Speaker 2: you need somebody to provide the phone numbers to create
- 6:52Speaker 2: the accounts. They're using the SIM maybe only once then
- 6:56Speaker 2: throwing it away because they have the phone number. The
- 6:59Speaker 2: WhatsApp account gets validated because it received the one time
- 7:03Speaker 2: password by SMS to create the account, right, and then
- 7:08Speaker 2: it doesn't matter if even the telco blocks that SIM
- 7:11Speaker 2: card because the WhatsApp account exists. So you can create
- 7:15Speaker 2: hundreds of thousands of online accounts, and in the Latvia
- 7:20Speaker 2: they estimated that forty nine million online accounts had been
- 7:24Speaker 2: created by that particular criminal outfit.
- 7:28Speaker 1: Eric points out that scam messages are coming to us
- 7:30Speaker 1: in all different ways, not just through SMS messages, but
- 7:34Speaker 1: through WhatsApp, through Signal, and all kinds of different messaging apps.
- 7:37Speaker 1: Telecom companies can try to detect suspicious activity and block
- 7:41Speaker 1: certain numbers, but scammers are usually a step ahead, and
- 7:45Speaker 1: the latest technique bypasses the telephone companies completely. It's called
- 7:49Speaker 1: an SMS blaster.
- 7:51Speaker 2: That's a device that essentially does the same thing that
- 7:56Speaker 2: the radio antenna on a mobile phone network does. When
- 8:01Speaker 2: you connect to your mobile phone to the network. The
- 8:05Speaker 2: difference is it's not a legitimate part of the network,
- 8:08Speaker 2: so that's why they're called sometimes fake based stations, false
- 8:11Speaker 2: space stations, rogue based stations. When you're normally walking around
- 8:15Speaker 2: the city, walking around a town, or driving around, you're
- 8:18Speaker 2: going to be transferred from one base station to another
- 8:21Speaker 2: base station on your same provider's network, whichever is the
- 8:25Speaker 2: strongest signal. These rogue based stations will have the strongest
- 8:29Speaker 2: signal for people in their specific location. It's like being
- 8:33Speaker 2: connected to a network, except of course, now the base
- 8:36Speaker 2: station is a rogue one. It can fire lots of
- 8:39Speaker 2: messages at you, and that's typically how they're used.
- 8:43Speaker 1: These SMS blasters can connect to your phone without you noticing,
- 8:46Speaker 1: and once it's connected, it can send you messages and
- 8:49Speaker 1: because it's directly connected to you, the telecom company has
- 8:52Speaker 1: no ability to black it. An SMS blaster can also
- 8:55Speaker 1: spoof the cinder ID to look like, say, for example,
- 8:58Speaker 1: a legitimate text from your base So what's the stop
- 9:02Speaker 1: in SMS blaster from just spamming everyone in the country. Well,
- 9:06Speaker 1: they don't have very good range, but that doesn't really
- 9:09Speaker 1: matter because they're portable.
- 9:12Speaker 2: Just the other day, somebody had been using one of
- 9:16Speaker 2: these SMS blasters on the London Underground, the capital's subway system,
- 9:22Speaker 2: to fire out lots and lots of scam SMS messages
- 9:26Speaker 2: to people as they're standing on the platform or traveling
- 9:29Speaker 2: through the trains through the underground. Really in Auckland, for example,
- 9:33Speaker 2: there was a student. He was paid four hundred dollars
- 9:36Speaker 2: a day to drive around one of these devices sending
- 9:40Speaker 2: scam SMS messages to whoever was in range. And then
- 9:43Speaker 2: the point of the message is it includes a hyperlink
- 9:47Speaker 2: that points towards a phishing website that impersonates something that
- 9:50Speaker 2: looks like for legitimate business or government function.
- 9:53Speaker 1: The technology behind SMS blasters, again was not developed specifically
- 9:57Speaker 1: for scamming. It's just been co opted by the scammers.
- 10:00Speaker 1: It's actually similar to the technology behind what's known as stingrays.
- 10:04Speaker 1: You might have heard about stingrays recently. Those are the
- 10:06Speaker 1: devices that police sometimes use to capture data from people
- 10:10Speaker 1: at protests. But instead of taking data off your phone
- 10:13Speaker 1: for surveillance, the SMS blasters push data on your phone
- 10:17Speaker 1: in the form of very convincing scam texts.
- 10:20Speaker 2: We're not talking about a completely new, separate technology that
- 10:24Speaker 2: was the only creates for criminals. We're talking about radio
- 10:26Speaker 2: technology for communications networks, and it's just being adapted slightly
- 10:31Speaker 2: tweaked for a different kind of view.
- 10:33Speaker 1: So in a way, these almost sound kind of primitive.
- 10:36Speaker 1: I mean, it's really just like brute forcing its way
- 10:39Speaker 1: into your phones. But you got to drive up pretty close.
- 10:43Speaker 1: What is the range of these things is like a
- 10:44Speaker 1: couple of miles or something like that.
- 10:46Speaker 2: It varies. Some of them are less, so you could
- 10:48Speaker 2: have a handheld device that has only a few hundred yards.
- 10:52Speaker 2: The advantage of that, of course, much more discrete, much
- 10:54Speaker 2: easier to carry around. There's been cases where people have
- 10:58Speaker 2: carried them around in backpacks through show malls, for example.
- 11:01Speaker 2: Or you might have a larger device with a larger
- 11:04Speaker 2: range than heavier, so you'll have to put it in
- 11:06Speaker 2: the back of the car or somewhere like that. In
- 11:08Speaker 2: one case in Bangkok, there was said to be a
- 11:11Speaker 2: particularly powerful device that had a range of three kilometers
- 11:15Speaker 2: and was able to send something in the order of
- 11:17Speaker 2: one hundred thousand SMS messages per hour. Wow, but that's
- 11:22Speaker 2: not necessarily a good thing. In terms of being a criminal,
- 11:24Speaker 2: because you don't want to be caught. And that's why
- 11:26Speaker 2: I would argue the London underground example I talked about,
- 11:29Speaker 2: that's like almost the perfect example because it's about how
- 11:32Speaker 2: many people you have passing by. You don't necessarily need
- 11:36Speaker 2: to have.
- 11:36Speaker 1: A huge range. So that's in background on how you're
- 11:39Speaker 1: getting these texts. It's kind of wild to think that
- 11:42Speaker 1: when you get one of these, it could just be
- 11:44Speaker 1: some random person with a backpack across the street. So
- 11:48Speaker 1: who are these people and what do they actually want?
- 11:52Speaker 1: That's where it starts to get heavy, and that's after
- 11:55Speaker 1: the break. I want to walk through a sample scam
- 12:06Speaker 1: text and if you could tell me what's going on here?
- 12:08Speaker 1: What are they trying to do? So I'm just going
- 12:09Speaker 1: to read you one here. Hi. I'm Caroline from the
- 12:12Speaker 1: We Work Remotely human resources team. We recently saw your
- 12:16Speaker 1: excellent background would like to introduce you to a remote,
- 12:19Speaker 1: high paying job opportunity. The work is so easy you
- 12:22Speaker 1: can do it from home. You'll work about sixty minutes
- 12:24Speaker 1: a day and will provide you with free training. Daily
- 12:26Speaker 1: pay ranges from three hundred to seven hundred. If you're interested,
- 12:29Speaker 1: please contact us via WhatsApp or telegram. What's the endgame here?
- 12:35Speaker 2: There's a couple of things going on. The always bear
- 12:38Speaker 2: in mind that criminal is just looking for potential victims.
- 12:42Speaker 2: Some people are more suggestible, some people are more open
- 12:45Speaker 2: to suggestion, and so just the very fact that you
- 12:48Speaker 2: respond means that you now a better target for all
- 12:52Speaker 2: sorts of scams. So there doesn't have to necessarily be
- 12:56Speaker 2: a linear relationship between the content of the message and
- 12:59Speaker 2: the scam. But in that case, the linear scam would
- 13:02Speaker 2: typically be they've got you on the hook. They're gonna
- 13:06Speaker 2: convince you that you're gonna make a lot of money
- 13:08Speaker 2: down the line, and maybe you have to pay a
- 13:10Speaker 2: fee in order to have your application processed or something
- 13:14Speaker 2: like that. So they're going to hook you in for
- 13:16Speaker 2: spending some money in order to then get the money
- 13:19Speaker 2: that's going to be promised to you later on.
- 13:22Speaker 1: And maybe if.
- 13:23Speaker 2: You pay once, then they're gonna make you pay a
- 13:25Speaker 2: second time, because once you've paid once, you really don't
- 13:29Speaker 2: want to have that money wasted by not paying a
- 13:31Speaker 2: second fee. So then you can see how a more
- 13:34Speaker 2: susceptible person gets dragged along until eventually they've realized they've
- 13:39Speaker 2: got to stop, So that would be a very typical
- 13:42Speaker 2: way in which that scam would evolve.
- 13:44Speaker 1: It's interesting because these scam texts are so diverse, because
- 13:47Speaker 1: another one that I think a lot of people seen
- 13:50Speaker 1: is just a completely random text out of the blue
- 13:53Speaker 1: saying how do you what's going on? Or hey Jennifer,
- 13:57Speaker 1: how are you? And I'm not Jennifer, O my right
- 14:00Speaker 1: now I can say this isn't Jennifer wrong number.
- 14:02Speaker 2: We tend to call them now in the industry, the
- 14:05Speaker 2: high dad, the hey mom scam, because it's quite often
- 14:09Speaker 2: a term like that, right, so it seems like it's
- 14:12Speaker 2: somebody familiar. You associate it in your mind with somebody
- 14:16Speaker 2: that you know, and that's the start of the process.
- 14:18Speaker 2: But again it's the same sequence there where they're just
- 14:21Speaker 2: looking to see who's going to reply. They just want
- 14:24Speaker 2: to get you into a conversation. And then maybe you
- 14:26Speaker 2: do reply back and you go I'm not your mom,
- 14:29Speaker 2: I'm a man, and they go, well, I'm very sorry, right,
- 14:34Speaker 2: I have the wrong number. But you see, the point
- 14:36Speaker 2: is you've already replied back, You've already engaged with them
- 14:40Speaker 2: on some level, and so can they turn the conversation
- 14:43Speaker 2: around to selling cryptocurrency or something like that. It's all
- 14:46Speaker 2: about that initial engagement. It's also about trying to get
- 14:49Speaker 2: you off maybe the channel of communication that was used
- 14:52Speaker 2: in the beginning, which could be an SMS message, towards
- 14:55Speaker 2: something encrypted, because if it's encrypted, it's much harder for
- 14:59Speaker 2: any technology to be used to monitor the behavior, to
- 15:03Speaker 2: intervene to protect you. So that's another thing that they're
- 15:07Speaker 2: looking do to is just to try and get you
- 15:09Speaker 2: somewhere else. So some scams are very simple, They stop
- 15:12Speaker 2: very quickly and the goal is very clear very early on.
- 15:15Speaker 2: Some is a long game. They just want to hug
- 15:18Speaker 2: you in and they will take you as far as
- 15:21Speaker 2: they possibly can. They're running a lot of scams, these
- 15:24Speaker 2: organized criminals. They'll just find the one that will be
- 15:27Speaker 2: the one that you are most susceptible to.
- 15:32Speaker 1: So who exactly are these criminals with the time and
- 15:35Speaker 1: patience to play out a long game of this scale.
- 15:38Speaker 1: The world behind this is a lot bigger than whoever
- 15:41Speaker 1: sent you that annoying text.
- 15:44Speaker 2: When we talk about some of the cyber crimes that
- 15:47Speaker 2: go on in the world today, there's this pattern where
- 15:50Speaker 2: we talk about kids, maybe teenagers, maybe early twenties. They're
- 15:55Speaker 2: learning from each other on discord. They're going to certain
- 15:59Speaker 2: forums and they're showing advice on how to commit crime,
- 16:02Speaker 2: and that's definitely a way in which crime gets propagated.
- 16:05Speaker 2: But to some extent those people are amateurs. Not everybody's
- 16:09Speaker 2: an amateur. So what I think you're seeing is a
- 16:12Speaker 2: degree to which the professionals are teaching each other how
- 16:15Speaker 2: to commit crime. And also they're franchising crime, so they
- 16:21Speaker 2: may provide a criminal service, and the point of the
- 16:25Speaker 2: criminal service is that somebody else will come along and
- 16:28Speaker 2: use the service to commit a more specific crime on
- 16:32Speaker 2: top of it, and that then has a multiplier effect.
- 16:35Speaker 2: Not every criminal needs to understand how a phone network works.
- 16:40Speaker 2: It's capitalism. But in the criminal world, why try to
- 16:44Speaker 2: do everything yourself when you can get very very good
- 16:47Speaker 2: at a layer of crime and then sell your services
- 16:51Speaker 2: to somebody at a different layer.
- 16:54Speaker 1: This is when you know crime is getting sophisticated when
- 16:57Speaker 1: people specialize in one area to reduce their liability. So
- 17:02Speaker 1: that text about a great crypto deal or even the
- 17:04Speaker 1: random high Jennifer text likely has a lot of people
- 17:07Speaker 1: working on different layers behind it, and it gets pretty
- 17:11Speaker 1: dark pretty quick.
- 17:13Speaker 2: In Mi and Mah in Cambodia and in Laos, which
- 17:18Speaker 2: are the three countries that have taken a lot of
- 17:21Speaker 2: the scam compounds that used to be based in China
- 17:24Speaker 2: and have become the new homes for scam compounds. It's
- 17:27Speaker 2: estimated that there's about one hundred thousand people working in
- 17:30Speaker 2: scam compounds, and there's a lot of tragic stories about
- 17:33Speaker 2: people being murdered, tortured, hichacked. It's effectively modern day slavery.
- 17:38Speaker 2: We're talking about huge numbers of people being persuaded to
- 17:43Speaker 2: move to a foreign country to work in these ones
- 17:46Speaker 2: with offers of jobs or well paid jobs, well paid
- 17:48Speaker 2: it job. Some people move just because they know they're
- 17:51Speaker 2: going to work for a criminal enterprise and they don't
- 17:53Speaker 2: care other people Hi chacked. I mean, there was a
- 17:56Speaker 2: terrible case that I was reading the other day. Nineteen
- 17:59Speaker 2: year old old Chinese boy was sold into slavery by
- 18:05Speaker 2: a seventeen year old Chinese girl. You know, she had
- 18:09Speaker 2: befriended him, she had become his girlfriend. She had told
- 18:13Speaker 2: him that she had family running businesses in me and Mark.
- 18:17Speaker 2: They flew to Thailand. They traveled overland to the border,
- 18:21Speaker 2: and when they arrived at the border, there's a bunch
- 18:23Speaker 2: of goons to grab a hold of him. She went
- 18:25Speaker 2: and had a ten day holiday in Thailand, and she
- 18:28Speaker 2: had pocketed her I think it was something in the
- 18:30Speaker 2: order of fifteen thousand dollars she'd got paid for selling him,
- 18:35Speaker 2: selling him to slavery. And to be fair to the
- 18:39Speaker 2: Chinese government, who are alive to this problem, they are
- 18:42Speaker 2: now prosecuting her. She returned to China and they're going
- 18:46Speaker 2: to do something about her. But that poor boy was
- 18:49Speaker 2: working sixteen twenty hour shifts in the scam compound in
- 18:53Speaker 2: Myanmark for four months until his friends and family were
- 18:57Speaker 2: able to pull together a ransom of five thousand dollars
- 19:01Speaker 2: to get him out. In the meantime, the poor lad
- 19:03Speaker 2: was beaten, beaten because he's not meeting his targets. That
- 19:07Speaker 2: poor Ladders lost some of his hearing as a result
- 19:10Speaker 2: of the beating. And that's not even by far the
- 19:13Speaker 2: worst case that I could recount to you. I mean,
- 19:15Speaker 2: there are some absolutely appalling stories. The only good thing
- 19:20Speaker 2: you can say about AI is that if AI gets
- 19:22Speaker 2: so good that you don't need to make a human
- 19:24Speaker 2: being a slave to do it anymore, at least we
- 19:26Speaker 2: won't have the problem with the human trafficking In a way,
- 19:28Speaker 2: I look forward to that because the level of human
- 19:31Speaker 2: misery that's occurring in some places is it's quite upsetting.
- 19:36Speaker 2: It's quite upsetting when you.
- 19:37Speaker 1: Read the stories. A lot of the scam text that
- 19:43Speaker 1: you get about stocks or selling crypto, or job recruiting
- 19:46Speaker 1: or the random high mom oops, wrong number, those kind
- 19:50Speaker 1: of texts, the ones that are after the long game,
- 19:52Speaker 1: these likely originate from these scam compounds. This kind of
- 19:57Speaker 1: scam has exploded since twenty twenty. Why well, there is
- 20:01Speaker 1: a pretty simple theory behind it. Chinese organized criminals had
- 20:04Speaker 1: built casinos that were sitting empty during the pandemic, and
- 20:07Speaker 1: they needed something to do with the empty buildings, so
- 20:10Speaker 1: they converted them into scam compounds. So if you engage
- 20:13Speaker 1: with one of those scam texts, there's a good chance
- 20:16Speaker 1: of the person you'll end up talking to is in
- 20:18Speaker 1: one of those buildings being watched by guards in case
- 20:21Speaker 1: they try to escape.
- 20:25Speaker 2: I'm the criminal. I will hook you into talking to
- 20:28Speaker 2: somebody who's gonna appear like a beautiful woman. I'm will
- 20:31Speaker 2: to talking to somebody who's gonna try and sell your cryptocouncy.
- 20:34Speaker 2: So what do I do, I send you a message
- 20:36Speaker 2: and then oh, whoops, it was the wrong number. I'm sorry,
- 20:40Speaker 2: I didn't mean to message you right. That message was
- 20:43Speaker 2: an automated message. The follow up message was an automated message.
- 20:47Speaker 2: They're sat in the scam compound waiting to see if
- 20:50Speaker 2: you're the kind of person who's gonna respond, who's gonna
- 20:54Speaker 2: get into a conversation. And that's why they employ all
- 20:57Speaker 2: these people in these scam compounds, just to haveversations with people,
- 21:01Speaker 2: weeding through the population to find who are the ones
- 21:05Speaker 2: who can be exploited, who will be open to this idea,
- 21:10Speaker 2: that idea. Maybe your weakness is a pretty girl. You
- 21:14Speaker 2: don't know that you're messaging some guy from Manila, but
- 21:18Speaker 2: you're going to be seeing a picture of a beautiful woman.
- 21:21Speaker 2: They'll have a beautiful woman in the compound who will
- 21:24Speaker 2: be brought out to do the live video conversation when
- 21:28Speaker 2: it's needed. The rest of the time, they're just working,
- 21:31Speaker 2: you working, you working.
- 21:32Speaker 1: This is the background of all this stuff. On the
- 21:35Speaker 1: receiving end, we just see an annoying text, but the
- 21:38Speaker 1: operation behind each message can be massive. There's a technology
- 21:42Speaker 1: on the ground, and then there's the buildings full of
- 21:44Speaker 1: forced laborers. This hurts a lot of people, but it
- 21:48Speaker 1: continues because it's a viable business. How many people have
- 21:52Speaker 1: to actually answer and get hooked into this thing for
- 21:55Speaker 1: it to make money for you?
- 21:56Speaker 2: It will depend on the scam. If I'm running a
- 22:00Speaker 2: scam compound and i have somebody who's my prisoner who
- 22:03Speaker 2: has to sit at like a screen and then cheat
- 22:06Speaker 2: you over the course of six months, well I'm going
- 22:09Speaker 2: to need a much bigger amount of money from you
- 22:11Speaker 2: to make it worthwhile to do it. So it does
- 22:13Speaker 2: very a lot depending upon the scam. But what I
- 22:16Speaker 2: would say is all the evidence shows that these scams
- 22:21Speaker 2: are so incredibly lucrative, whether at the low end or
- 22:24Speaker 2: at the high end. This thing is just ramping up
- 22:27Speaker 2: and up and up. They're just taking the accumulated profits
- 22:30Speaker 2: that they're generating from crime reinvesting it in more crime.
- 22:34Speaker 2: And the things that we're doing to chip away to
- 22:37Speaker 2: we're not keeping pace. We're falling further and further behind.
- 22:40Speaker 2: So their margins, their profits are getting higher and higher
- 22:43Speaker 2: and higher, and we are not at all sophisticated and
- 22:46Speaker 2: doing anything about tackling it.
- 22:50Speaker 1: So far, authorities haven't been able to stop these scams
- 22:52Speaker 1: from continuing to pop up. But is there anything that
- 22:55Speaker 1: we can do to stop these scam texts? That's after
- 22:59Speaker 1: the break. When it comes to stopping scam text the
- 23:10Speaker 1: advice you usually hear is learning how to spot them,
- 23:13Speaker 1: watch out from misspellings or weird formatting in the text,
- 23:16Speaker 1: don't click links if you don't know the sinder, maybe
- 23:18Speaker 1: don't reply. We also hear that certain demographics are more
- 23:22Speaker 1: vulnerable and that we need to teach them to be
- 23:24Speaker 1: more savvy. But all of this is kind of missing
- 23:27Speaker 1: the bigger picture.
- 23:28Speaker 2: It's been argued that all the people are more vulnerable
- 23:32Speaker 2: to scams, but then there's also some conflicting data that
- 23:35Speaker 2: says actually, young people spend a lot more time on
- 23:38Speaker 2: the phone, they're a lot more casual, shall we say,
- 23:42Speaker 2: about what they do. They think of themselves as savvy,
- 23:45Speaker 2: so they fall for scams. And I think, really what
- 23:48Speaker 2: we should be learning from the criminals is however much
- 23:53Speaker 2: you train people, how much you educate people to be
- 23:56Speaker 2: scam aware to improve the whether it's still be less
- 23:59Speaker 2: likelyful for it. Those criminals, they're gaining a lot of
- 24:03Speaker 2: data about what works in terms of mental tricks, psychological ploys, manipulations,
- 24:09Speaker 2: Their masters are it, and they have an enormous amount
- 24:12Speaker 2: of data about what actually works in practice, so they're
- 24:17Speaker 2: always getting better and better and better. I'm not a psychologist,
- 24:20Speaker 2: but from what I understand about the topic, suggestibility is
- 24:25Speaker 2: not well correlated to intelligence, and that's what the criminals
- 24:29Speaker 2: are looking for. Are you suggestible in some ways? Can
- 24:32Speaker 2: they plant an idea that you will act upon? Can
- 24:36Speaker 2: they hook you with something that tempts you and motivates
- 24:39Speaker 2: you in a certain way? And they're looking for your
- 24:41Speaker 2: weakness and different people will have different weaknesses.
- 24:44Speaker 1: I mean, I think this is the really difficult thing
- 24:46Speaker 1: here is because I think there are probably some people
- 24:48Speaker 1: who started listening to this who are thinking this is
- 24:50Speaker 1: going to be great. Dexter got an expert here who's
- 24:52Speaker 1: going to give me the top three tips for that
- 24:54Speaker 1: far and victim to a scam. And it doesn't sound
- 24:59Speaker 1: like you want to give that to me.
- 25:03Speaker 2: I mean, look, I could do that, and I could
- 25:05Speaker 2: say things like don't let your phone get downgraded to
- 25:08Speaker 2: a two G network because that's typical for the format
- 25:11Speaker 2: for SMS blasters, And I could say look for spelling
- 25:15Speaker 2: errors in the message, and you know, if there's a
- 25:17Speaker 2: high pull link, if it's a link that's been shortened,
- 25:20Speaker 2: be suspicious or stuff like that. You know, if someone
- 25:23Speaker 2: makes a call, don't receive the call, call back to
- 25:26Speaker 2: your bank rather than it's all that's all good stuff,
- 25:29Speaker 2: that's all common sense stuff. I'm not going to argue
- 25:31Speaker 2: that you shouldn't do that, but it's not enough. It's
- 25:34Speaker 2: never going to be enough. The rate of acceleration in
- 25:38Speaker 2: criminal sophistication. To try to solve the problem like that
- 25:42Speaker 2: is fundamentally the wrong method.
- 25:46Speaker 1: So there is one small thing that you may be
- 25:48Speaker 1: able to do. If you have an Android phone, assuming
- 25:51Speaker 1: it's relatively recent, you can block those SMS blasters from
- 25:55Speaker 1: even being able to connect to your phone at all.
- 25:57Speaker 1: It's pretty simple. You just disabled two G switch in
- 26:00Speaker 1: your settings to do it. I put a link in
- 26:02Speaker 1: the show notes to a guide that walks you through it,
- 26:04Speaker 1: and trust me, its very simple. It takes like thirty seconds.
- 26:08Speaker 1: For iPhones. Unfortunately, you're kind of stuck. You can't turn
- 26:12Speaker 1: off two G unless you use lockdown mode, which would
- 26:15Speaker 1: also limit other functions in your phone that you probably
- 26:18Speaker 1: want to keep on other than that. Again, base rule.
- 26:21Speaker 1: If you get a text with a link in it,
- 26:23Speaker 1: don't click it, even if it looks legit, even if
- 26:26Speaker 1: it's a text from your bank or your doctor, call
- 26:28Speaker 1: them and confirm that it is actually from them. I
- 26:32Speaker 1: know it's annoying, but it's better safe than sorry. But again,
- 26:36Speaker 1: all these things, even the features that let you report scams,
- 26:39Speaker 1: that's treating the symptom. If we really want to stop
- 26:42Speaker 1: these scams, the solution probably isn't in your phone settings.
- 26:46Speaker 1: It's in the phone companies.
- 26:49Speaker 2: The correct method is for the businesses to look at
- 26:52Speaker 2: who they do business squit, who's buying the SIM college,
- 26:56Speaker 2: who's making the book communications these criminals. I had one
- 27:00Speaker 2: hundred thousand SIM cards in New York. Now that's a
- 27:06Speaker 2: lot of SIM cards. A phone network should be saying,
- 27:09Speaker 2: where have all our SIM card's gone? Well, all these
- 27:11Speaker 2: strange customers on a network, why are they not behaving
- 27:14Speaker 2: like a normal person. Let me give you an example
- 27:15Speaker 2: about normal and abnormal behavior that a network should pick
- 27:18Speaker 2: up on. When you carry your phone around, When you
- 27:21Speaker 2: go around, you move, you move from place to place.
- 27:25Speaker 2: While simbox doesn't move. When it's in a New York apartment,
- 27:28Speaker 2: it's sat there, not moving at all. That should be
- 27:32Speaker 2: a red flashing warning like, why have I got such
- 27:36Speaker 2: a peculiar customer? Why have I got so many peculiar
- 27:41Speaker 2: customers are in the same place, never moving. Perhaps they
- 27:46Speaker 2: only make outbound communication. That would be weird because of
- 27:49Speaker 2: normal person sends and receives. There should be lots of
- 27:54Speaker 2: flashing warning lights going off in those telcoasts.
- 27:57Speaker 1: I mean, this really reminds me of also of the
- 28:00Speaker 1: conversation about detecting AI right, which is to say, there
- 28:04Speaker 1: was a point at which you could give people tips
- 28:07Speaker 1: and you'd tell them, hey, look for too many fingers
- 28:10Speaker 1: on one hand. And I remember, and I was saying
- 28:12Speaker 1: this back here on the same show back then. You
- 28:14Speaker 1: were fooling yourself if you think that you were gonna
- 28:18Speaker 1: be able to use those same tricks six months from now.
- 28:22Speaker 1: And sure enough, you look at AI generated pictures, AI
- 28:25Speaker 1: generated videos, the hands look perfect. The idea that we
- 28:29Speaker 1: can just educate the public and that will solve everything.
- 28:32Speaker 1: It sounds like bringing a knife to a nuke fight,
- 28:35Speaker 1: you know, pardon the American violent imagery here, but it
- 28:39Speaker 1: just seems like it's not functional.
- 28:41Speaker 2: So true. I mean, for myself personal experience, a few
- 28:46Speaker 2: months ago, I received my first ever spam call from
- 28:51Speaker 2: an AI, and I think I'm a pretty savvy guy
- 28:55Speaker 2: about this kind of stuff. And I listened to the
- 28:58Speaker 2: spam AI talked to me, and I had to ask
- 29:01Speaker 2: the question, are you an AI? Because it was not obvious. Now, thankfully,
- 29:09Speaker 2: that particular spam AI did honestly answer the question. Yes,
- 29:14Speaker 2: I am an artificial intelligence because it had been programmed
- 29:18Speaker 2: that way. But I had to think about it. I
- 29:20Speaker 2: had to ask the question. But what really upset me
- 29:22Speaker 2: about that interaction was I continued my conversation with the AI,
- 29:27Speaker 2: not trying to buy the thing it wanted to sell me,
- 29:29Speaker 2: but actually trying to investigate learn what was happening. It
- 29:33Speaker 2: claimed it received my phone number from one of the
- 29:37Speaker 2: world's biggest telecoms industry associations, a conference that I had
- 29:43Speaker 2: attended shortly beforehand, where I have to hand over my
- 29:47Speaker 2: phone number in order to register and participate. What does
- 29:51Speaker 2: that say about our attitude towards data? That call was illegal.
- 29:57Speaker 2: It was illegal because my number is on the list
- 30:00Speaker 2: in the UK. There's essentially you're not allowed to call
- 30:03Speaker 2: me for marketing purposes. And yet one of the world's
- 30:06Speaker 2: biggest telecoms associations has handed over that data to another company,
- 30:12Speaker 2: doesn't bother to check the laws. Just made the spam
- 30:15Speaker 2: call because they're going to make some money from me today.
- 30:18Speaker 2: And that's where the rotten heart of it lies. In
- 30:23Speaker 2: the end, the problem we're trying to solve this is
- 30:28Speaker 2: that a phone company makes money for carrying calls, for
- 30:32Speaker 2: transmitting messages, for doing the communications. They don't make money
- 30:36Speaker 2: for blocking things. If all those calls got blocked, if
- 30:40Speaker 2: all those messages got blocked, if all those bad actors
- 30:43Speaker 2: were taking out the ecosystem, revenues would go down. Why
- 30:47Speaker 2: would you go out of your way to find crime
- 30:52Speaker 2: if your job is to increase the amount of traffic
- 30:55Speaker 2: on your network, if your job is to increase the
- 30:58Speaker 2: revenues of that network. That's the conflict of interest, that's
- 31:02Speaker 2: the fundamental issue here. They may not be actively choosing
- 31:08Speaker 2: to enable crime, but they'll also not get any reason
- 31:12Speaker 2: to work harder to prevent crime. There's a lot of
- 31:15Speaker 2: money being made off the back of scams. Ultimately, the
- 31:21Speaker 2: result is corrosive for society. You don't trust the call
- 31:24Speaker 2: coming into your phone, you don't trust the messages. I
- 31:27Speaker 2: don't answer phone calls anymore. I use other modes of
- 31:32Speaker 2: communication now, And that's sad that when somebody maybe really
- 31:36Speaker 2: does want to speak to me on the phone, that
- 31:38Speaker 2: I'm rejecting them. But it's also bad for society. The
- 31:42Speaker 2: phone network was a beautiful thing. It was a thing
- 31:45Speaker 2: where you could pick up a phone and with ninety
- 31:48Speaker 2: nine point nine nine percent probability you could dial a
- 31:52Speaker 2: number to anywhere in the world and it would connect.
- 31:56Speaker 2: And now people don't want to pick up the phone
- 31:58Speaker 2: at the other end, what does that say about how
- 32:01Speaker 2: we've gone backwards spending terms of how we communicate with
- 32:03Speaker 2: each other.
- 32:04Speaker 1: I mean, you're not wrong, I'm thinking of Actually, there's
- 32:07Speaker 1: a text thread that I got added to that I
- 32:09Speaker 1: just assumed was spam, and people are making plans for
- 32:14Speaker 1: having dinner here in LA and I'm thinking, man, they're
- 32:17Speaker 1: getting sophisticated. Come to find out these were actually people
- 32:22Speaker 1: A friend had added me into a group. I just
- 32:25Speaker 1: wasn't familiar with everybody. After the event, they sent pictures
- 32:27Speaker 1: in the thread it looked like a good time. I
- 32:30Speaker 1: didn't respond once because I thought it was a scam.
- 32:33Speaker 1: Now I got like ten people I got to apologize
- 32:36Speaker 1: to because they think I'm ignoring them. Because I'm scared
- 32:38Speaker 1: to answer text.
- 32:39Speaker 2: And here's the thing, right, it's about what we comes
- 32:42Speaker 2: to the normal. There was a time your phone you
- 32:46Speaker 2: could trust that people are basically only people. You know,
- 32:50Speaker 2: people want to communicate you. Someone with a genuine reason
- 32:53Speaker 2: to call you would call you. And that was your
- 32:55Speaker 2: attitude towards your phone. Right, what's your attitude towards email.
- 32:59Speaker 2: It's not the same, is it. No, your email is full.
- 33:01Speaker 2: You've got a junk folder. There's lots of crap in
- 33:04Speaker 2: your junk folder. Maybe sometimes a good message gets into
- 33:07Speaker 2: your junk folder. Maybe you send a message and you're
- 33:10Speaker 2: annoyed it didn't get through to someone else because it
- 33:12Speaker 2: ended up in their junk folder.
- 33:13Speaker 1: M hm.
- 33:14Speaker 2: We are transferring from a scenario where essentially your phone
- 33:18Speaker 2: voice communications, message communications, you generally would trust them, to
- 33:23Speaker 2: the scenario like email. It's gonna be like that in future.
- 33:26Speaker 2: And yeah, we're gonna use technology, and yeah we're gonna
- 33:29Speaker 2: weed it out and we're gonna get with some of
- 33:31Speaker 2: the bad stuff. But is that the level that we
- 33:33Speaker 2: now want to be communicating at that level of trust
- 33:36Speaker 2: and confidence. That's a step back.
- 33:38Speaker 1: Yeah, And that's.
- 33:39Speaker 2: Sadly the way we're going about solving problem because a
- 33:42Speaker 2: lot of it is that we're trying to solve the
- 33:43Speaker 2: problem in the way that the problem was solved for email. Email.
- 33:46Speaker 2: This email, it's not something where I am in an
- 33:49Speaker 2: emergency and I want to speak to you, I send.
- 33:51Speaker 1: You an email.
- 33:52Speaker 2: When I'm in an emergency and I want to speak
- 33:54Speaker 2: to you, I want to call you.
- 33:55Speaker 1: Yeah, So to start.
- 33:57Speaker 2: Turning that kind of communication into level of email, we're
- 34:00Speaker 2: losing something in society that makes me shock.
- 34:04Speaker 1: It makes me shock, you know. A little after we
- 34:09Speaker 1: recorded this conversation, a friend of mine sent me a
- 34:12Speaker 1: song that I had not heard in a long time.
- 34:14Speaker 1: It's this really simple and beautiful song by this guy
- 34:17Speaker 1: named labby Siffrey, and apparently it's been going viral recently.
- 34:21Speaker 1: I can't play it here, you know, copyright all that
- 34:23Speaker 1: sort of thing, but I can read you part of
- 34:25Speaker 1: the lyrics. It's strange how a phone call can change
- 34:29Speaker 1: your day and take you away from the feeling of
- 34:32Speaker 1: being alone. Blessed the Telephone, and that's the name of
- 34:36Speaker 1: the song, Blessed the Telephone, which is something I think
- 34:39Speaker 1: you could still say. Sincerely in nineteen seventy one, when
- 34:42Speaker 1: it's recorded, and then I think to twenty years later,
- 34:45Speaker 1: to nineteen ninety one when Tribe call Quest put out
- 34:47Speaker 1: a song called Skypager, which is seriously just a song
- 34:51Speaker 1: about how cool it is to have a device that
- 34:52Speaker 1: lets people contact you when you're outside. At some point,
- 34:57Speaker 1: the ability to contact someone instantly was this future or
- 35:00Speaker 1: even magical thing. I'm not that young, but I guess
- 35:04Speaker 1: I'm not old enough to really remember that time period
- 35:06Speaker 1: because by the time I was really using my own
- 35:09Speaker 1: phone and especially using email, it was already something that
- 35:12Speaker 1: we saw as potentially suspicious. And now forget about it.
- 35:16Speaker 1: When's the last time you heard someone say that they
- 35:18Speaker 1: even like their phone. Anyway, we'll leave the links to
- 35:22Speaker 1: those songs and the show notes if you want to
- 35:24Speaker 1: check that out. Thank you for listening to another episode
- 35:30Speaker 1: kill Switch. If you want to talk to us, you
- 35:32Speaker 1: could email us at kill Switch at Kaleidoscope dot NYC,
- 35:36Speaker 1: or we're also on Instagram at kill Switch Pod, and
- 35:39Speaker 1: you know, please think about leaving us a review. It
- 35:42Speaker 1: helps other people find the show, which in turn helps
- 35:44Speaker 1: us keep doing our thing. And once you've done that,
- 35:47Speaker 1: you know we're also on YouTube, so if you want
- 35:49Speaker 1: to watch this interview rather than just listen to it.
- 35:52Speaker 1: There you go. The link for that and everything else
- 35:54Speaker 1: again is in the show notes. Kill Switch is hosted
- 35:57Speaker 1: by Me Dexter Thomas. It's produce by Sheen Ozaki, darl
- 36:01Speaker 1: Of Potts and Julian Nutter. Our theme song is by
- 36:05Speaker 1: me and Kyle Murdoch and Kyle also mixed the show
- 36:08Speaker 1: from Kaleidoscope. Our executive producers are Oswa Lashin, Mcgueshatikadur and
- 36:12Speaker 1: Kate Osborne. From iHeart, our executive producers are Katrina Norville
- 36:16Speaker 1: and Nikki E. Tor Catch on the next one, Goodbye,