Latest / World Ablaze with George Fontes / Daniel Bookman - Israel, Middle East Conflict, and Geopolitics

Transcript

Daniel Bookman - Israel, Middle East Conflict, and Geopolitics · World Ablaze with George Fontes

• 0:00
  Okay, welcome World of Blazers.
• 0:06
  Today I have a special guest, as you can see on my screen, if you're watching the video.
• 0:09
  If not, I have Daniel Bookman.
• 0:13
  Daniel Bookman is a Scottish-born individual who eventually made his way to Israel, where
• 0:20
  he has lived for the last 40 years.
• 0:22
  You practice law, you're a lawyer.
• 0:25
  And I am very interested in that journey and that relationship, what led you back or to
• 0:29
  Israel in general, as well as the fact that you're an author and you've written two books.
• 0:34
  One book that has been discussed more so than others because it's more recent, I believe,
• 0:39
  is Beyond Power, Israel and the Structure for the Ethical State.
• 0:42
  And the title itself there does raise questions, not necessarily negative questions, by the
• 0:47
  way, just let me say that.
• 0:48
  It's just it does raise questions as to how you came to that title and what is actually
• 0:53
  in your book, how you came to certain conclusions and assessments in terms of Israel fighting
• 0:59
  to be an ethical state, you know?
• 1:01
  Yeah.
• 1:01
  And obviously, aside from that, Daniel,
• 1:04
  we are definitely going to talk about your perspective
• 1:07
  as someone living in Israel for the last 40 years
• 1:09
  and what your view is
• 1:11
  and how Israel has been seen by the world,
• 1:13
  especially now the social media,
• 1:15
  even in podcasting.
• 1:16
  I mean, you've been on a bit of a podcast tour here.
• 1:19
  And it's very interesting to me,
• 1:20
  given that some of the leading podcasters,
• 1:22
  at least by numbers,
• 1:23
  have been doing nothing but bashing Israel
• 1:26
  and painting it as the great evil of the world for whatever reason,
• 1:31
  which wasn't the case before.
• 1:32
  So I'd like to understand where you think that's coming from as well.
• 1:36
  And obviously, we have discussed Iran, the Middle East in general,
• 1:39
  as Israel has been attacked since 1948 pretty consistently.
• 1:43
  So with that being said, let's start with your journey from Scotland to Israel,
• 1:49
  and then let's get a little bit into your book.
• 1:52
  Okay.
• 1:53
  Thank you very much, first of all, George, for having me on.
• 1:55
  this distinguished podcast.
• 1:57
  I don't know if I'm worthy of it.
• 1:59
  I appreciate it.
• 1:59
  I'll try to make it worthwhile,
• 2:02
  at least in some measure.
• 2:03
  I'm sure you will.
• 2:05
  Yeah, I hope so.
• 2:07
  But my journey,
• 2:09
  okay, I'll be happy to share that.
• 2:12
  I don't know if that's the main part of it.
• 2:14
  I'm more interested in ideas than people.
• 2:17
  That's what I think is
• 2:18
  partly can help us with conflict
• 2:20
  is if we focus more on ideas than people
• 2:22
  and we can have a common ground.
• 2:25
  But hopefully.
• 2:27
  But my journey, I was born in Scotland.
• 2:30
  We were religious, slightly more than the average.
• 2:34
  So I was educated from the age of 12 in England, in Manchester.
• 2:38
  My parents sent me to religious school to have a better Jewish religious education.
• 2:43
  From there, I matriculated.
• 2:46
  I got a good secular education.
• 2:49
  After what's called, I think, when I was about 18, finished school, finished A-levels, it's called.
• 2:55
  in England. I came to Israel for a couple of years to study in Jewish rabbinical college,
• 3:00
  just two years of intense Jewish studies. And that's quite common practice in these circles,
• 3:06
  in these religious circles, to take that course. And Israel is largely the center of Jewish studies,
• 3:12
  religious Jewish studies. So it was a fairly natural, I don't know if it was Zionist calling
• 3:16
  or religious calling, that was just the done thing. I studied there for a couple of years
• 3:20
  quite intensely.
• 3:22
  I had actually wanted to pursue it a bit more.
• 3:24
  My father said to me,
• 3:25
  no, you got to come back.
• 3:26
  You got to get your professional qualifications.
• 3:28
  So I came back to England.
• 3:29
  I took a degree in law.
• 3:32
  And then that was three years.
• 3:34
  Then I got married
• 3:35
  and straight away came to Israel.
• 3:36
  I was about 22 then.
• 3:38
  And as soon as I got married,
• 3:39
  the intention was to learn for,
• 3:40
  carry on learning.
• 3:41
  The beginning of marriage,
• 3:43
  Jewish studies,
• 3:44
  as also is common practice
• 3:45
  for two, three, four, five years,
• 3:47
  whatever it would be.
• 3:48
  Then maybe go back to England
• 3:50
  to carry on, to study law, to professionally qualify.
• 3:54
  My father-in-law was quite a successful commercial lawyer.
• 3:57
  So maybe I would have gone into partner or worked with him.
• 4:00
  That what happened was two years in Israel became three years,
• 4:04
  four, five years, six years.
• 4:06
  Naturally sort of evolved that this is the place we're going to be.
• 4:09
  There was no magical decision, despite all the various challenges,
• 4:16
  cultural and, of course, there was never peace.
• 4:19
  There was a few wars, the Gulf War, the time when we were there.
• 4:23
  But I continued that.
• 4:24
  I then transitioned from rabbinical studies to becoming a professional lawyer,
• 4:30
  age of about 30, took the Israeli bar, qualified.
• 4:34
  I then didn't like law.
• 4:36
  I didn't like all the tensions with people and clients and other side.
• 4:43
  I felt it was too much fighting.
• 4:45
  So I tried to do something that avoided people.
• 4:47
  I went into high tech.
• 4:48
  I studied computer programming, worked in it for two, three years.
• 4:53
  I then went back to law for various reasons, circumstances.
• 4:58
  I felt it offered me more time to focus also on Jewish studies learning.
• 5:02
  So since then, for the last approximately 15, 20 years,
• 5:05
  I've been working as a lawyer, freelance lawyer in Jerusalem,
• 5:09
  and studying Jewish studies.
• 5:12
  That's considered a holy privilege and duty.
• 5:15
  and at the same time looking at society,
• 5:18
  trying to use my perspective
• 5:21
  and a lot of the analytical skills,
• 5:25
  not that I personally have,
• 5:26
  but are honed naturally through the Talmudic studies.
• 5:29
  A lot of it is based on logic and philosophy
• 5:32
  and understanding and trying to make sense
• 5:34
  of disparate facts and ideas.
• 5:37
  And that combined with my concern of the world and society
• 5:40
  in Israel and as a whole.
• 5:44
  and the conflict led me to ultimately to author these two books.
• 5:49
  First one, fundamentally rational, is about religion,
• 5:51
  trying to present religion in rational terms.
• 5:55
  And the second, more recently, as a result of the recent events
• 5:59
  since October the 7th, that terrorist attack
• 6:01
  and the strong anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist sentiment
• 6:05
  that has been present in the world as a whole.
• 6:08
  I try to understand it to make sense of it,
• 6:11
  of anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism in the Middle East,
• 6:13
  geopolitics, society, democracy, etc.
• 6:16
  And I came to some conceptual conclusions that I think helped to explain it
• 6:21
  and maybe could help to ameliorate in some measure some of these problems.
• 6:26
  And the result of that was Israel and beyond power,
• 6:30
  Israel and the struggle for the ethical state.
• 6:34
  I think everybody's trying to understand, to be honest, or at least I am,
• 6:38
  what has been the turn against Israel lately in terms of support
• 6:43
  and I would say the right to maintain a sovereignty,
• 6:48
  become an actual nation in perpetuity out in the Middle East.
• 6:54
  And I'm not understanding where it all rose up from.
• 6:56
  I don't know if there's any thoughts you have on that,
• 6:59
  the anti-Israeli or Israel sentiment.
• 7:02
  I do have quite a lot.
• 7:04
  A lot of it is the thesis of the book.
• 7:07
  Why recently there's been an upturn?
• 7:09
  That's the first question you asked.
• 7:10
  I think with all the images, you know, when Israel has been fighting against the Hamas in Gaza,
• 7:18
  and there's been a lot of civilian fatalities, too many from all perspectives.
• 7:24
  That's obviously, and the media likes to sensationalize and is never particularly pro-Israel in Europe, certainly,
• 7:31
  and also in America.
• 7:32
  The media tends to be more left-leaning, which creates a narrative of sympathy with the oppressed,
• 7:39
  with the occupied, the Palestinians,
• 7:41
  and whatever.
• 7:42
  There is justice to it.
• 7:43
  There's merit to that.
• 7:44
  But they sensationalize that.
• 7:46
  And it's not so hard to turn
• 7:48
  a certain amount, percentage of the
• 7:51
  certain segments of the population
• 7:53
  who don't deeply think about them
• 7:55
  but base themselves more on the images
• 7:57
  and voices that are coming out,
• 7:59
  the sensational ones,
• 8:01
  that can turn popular opinion against Israel.
• 8:04
  And I think the podcasters
• 8:05
  and the various media propagandists or whatever,
• 8:10
  or personalities,
• 8:13
  it's fairly easy to make a name for yourself
• 8:17
  and to get a platform with an anti-Israel narrative perspective.
• 8:25
  It's dramatic.
• 8:27
  It's a certain righteousness or self-righteousness, whatever.
• 8:31
  How dare you?
• 8:32
  It becomes very, you can dramatize it quite easily.
• 8:34
  That appeals. So maybe I'm oversimplifying it. There definitely is a case against Israel.
• 8:40
  And it's nuanced. That's really what I'm coming to show, to demonstrate, and needs to be understood.
• 8:47
  So that's just the perspective of the last two years.
• 8:50
  If you want to go a bit deeper into why I think there is so much going on in the Middle East
• 8:54
  and why Israel has been the target in the Middle East and in the West of so much unpopularity.
• 9:01
  and aggression, whatever,
• 9:05
  or in the media and on the ground.
• 9:09
  That's where the book starts to,
• 9:11
  that's where the book discusses.
• 9:12
  Well, no, we're going to discuss that,
• 9:14
  but I'm going to back you up here
• 9:15
  because I agree with some of the stuff you said here.
• 9:18
  Well, not some, I'll say most all of it.
• 9:20
  And I'm not anti-Israel, by the way.
• 9:22
  I want to put that out there.
• 9:23
  So I'm just going to take your opposing viewpoint here.
• 9:27
  And let's talk about Gaza.
• 9:30
  I personally, let's be honest, after October 7th, Israel had a right to respond.
• 9:36
  I mean, any nation would.
• 9:37
  And honestly, if it was the U.S., we would have done way worse.
• 9:40
  I'm going to tell you that right now.
• 9:41
  We have shown that to be true in the past.
• 9:45
  But when you're talking about the imagery, for example, if you do look at the imagery of what happened to Gaza,
• 9:49
  I mean, you can't deny that the imagery itself is very convincing in terms of Israel doing a very bad or evil thing or considered to be.
• 9:59
  and I'm not saying that's what Israel did
• 10:01
  by the way I'm just saying you know the imagery's out
• 10:03
  there it's hard for people to turn their eyes away from
• 10:05
  it and I think you're correct
• 10:07
  in the media especially when you're talking about leftist controlled
• 10:09
  media it is all about the oppressor
• 10:11
  oppressed narrative and everybody wants to support
• 10:13
  the oppressor but in this case
• 10:15
  oppressed in this in this case
• 10:17
  were
• 10:19
  the Palestinians really the
• 10:21
  oppressed in terms of Israel being the
• 10:23
  oppressor you know and I think
• 10:25
  from my understanding and
• 10:27
  you can correct me.
• 10:28
  You know, you got someone like Hamas has been there ingrained in the population, you know,
• 10:33
  who has set themselves up militarily to have weapon stashes, you know, operational centers,
• 10:40
  et cetera, entwined in the population, underneath buildings, within buildings, et cetera.
• 10:44
  So I can understand the operation being very difficult to target these individuals.
• 10:49
  But the question is, honestly, Daniel, at some point, does it seem to you, your opinion
• 10:55
  only. I'm not holding you responsible for the entire
• 10:57
  state of Israel. But in your opinion, does it
• 10:59
  seem like at some point it was kind
• 11:01
  of a bit too far? Should have Israel
• 11:03
  at some point backed off a little bit?
• 11:05
  Because at one point, Hamas
• 11:07
  was pretty incapable of
• 11:09
  doing any further damage.
• 11:11
  Not until they were probably restocked by Iran.
• 11:13
  We'll get into that. But to be honest,
• 11:15
  did it seem like they may have gone too far at some
• 11:17
  point? Very possibly.
• 11:20
  Very possibly. I don't know where one
• 11:21
  draws the line.
• 11:24
  it was like
• 11:25
  there was certainly an emotional element to it
• 11:27
  and I think there was a political element to it
• 11:29
  that's the structure of democracy
• 11:31
  those who were in power, democratically in power
• 11:33
  at the time this happened
• 11:35
  would be feeling more acutely than anyone else
• 11:37
  a certain sense of responsibility
• 11:39
  that required them to rectify
• 11:41
  and yeah there was
• 11:43
  maybe a certain base appeal that we have to show
• 11:45
  that we're strong, we have the upper hand
• 11:47
  and that could result in taking
• 11:49
  things further
• 11:51
  than the basic strategic
• 11:53
  requirements of deterrence, etc., would necessitate.
• 11:57
  That definitely is possible.
• 11:59
  That, on the other hand, that was almost predictable from the perspective of Hamas.
• 12:06
  Once they perpetrated and decided, definitely premeditated, they're going to undertake this
• 12:12
  horrific attack, it's almost inevitable that Israel is going to respond.
• 12:17
  The issue of proportionality becomes very relevant.
• 12:22
  They're going to respond proportionally
• 12:24
  or maybe what's perceived as unproportionally.
• 12:28
  I have a section on that, what counts as proportionality.
• 12:31
  It's not just measured in numbers.
• 12:33
  If I could maybe briefly just try and correct
• 12:38
  or clarify what I think the appropriate understanding.
• 12:41
  You can discuss whatever you want.
• 12:43
  Go ahead.
• 12:43
  Okay, I'll just mention that point.
• 12:45
  It's not the fundamental concept.
• 12:49
  But proportionality tends to be measured in terms of numbers.
• 12:54
  There were 1 to 2 Israelis who were slaughtered sadistically no question And there are many thousands probably tens of thousands of Palestinians that have lost their lives Like you say there was no possible way of going after the leadership
• 13:09
  the Hamas leadership or the Hamas rank and file
• 13:12
  without incurring significant civilian casualties.
• 13:16
  Nevertheless, does that justify it?
• 13:19
  And on the note, on the point of proportionality,
• 13:24
  The point I made was that proportionality was the act itself.
• 13:29
  There was a certain level of, not peace,
• 13:31
  but there was, before the October 7th attack,
• 13:35
  both sides had, there was a certain tacit agreement
• 13:39
  of how things work.
• 13:41
  You know, you fire a few missiles, Hamas into Israel,
• 13:43
  Israel responds with a few attacks against leadership,
• 13:46
  they try to, and sort of that's what was going on
• 13:49
  for 10 or 20 years.
• 13:51
  There was suddenly a huge escalation
• 13:52
  What I call from containment to absolute terror, absolute, you know, the worst possible type of terrorist attack to genocide, absolute genocide, genocidal attack.
• 14:06
  So the proportionality in order to restore the balance, there has to be a proportional response, which means taking now the level of tension between the sides and responding with that level, that rising of level, that increase of tension between or fighting between the sides.
• 14:30
  there was a huge increase
• 14:34
  on the side of the Hamas
• 14:35
  of the huge change of the balance.
• 14:38
  So Israel, a proportional response
• 14:40
  required a correspondingly increase,
• 14:45
  a corresponding increase
• 14:46
  in the level of aggression
• 14:47
  in order just to balance.
• 14:49
  That would be the counterbalance.
• 14:50
  It was taking something from
• 14:52
  containment, peace or coexistence,
• 14:54
  Hamas did,
• 14:55
  to like premeditated genocide.
• 14:57
  So Israel to respond had to take
• 14:59
  a state of sort of now a genocidal attack
• 15:03
  and respond with something that would parallel that
• 15:07
  in terms of the increase of aggression,
• 15:12
  which is while still maintaining proportionality.
• 15:16
  And therefore the numbers would not necessarily be proportionate,
• 15:21
  would not necessarily be the same, parallel.
• 15:24
  Having said that, yeah, how does one know?
• 15:26
  Is that justified or not?
• 15:27
  I'm not going to be the one.
• 15:28
  No one can really say objectively,
• 15:30
  this is just, this is wrong, this is right.
• 15:33
  It depends ultimately on the narrative you have
• 15:35
  of the whole Palestinian-Israel conflict.
• 15:38
  Who's in the right, who's in the wrong.
• 15:39
  If you were to take the perspective that
• 15:42
  Israel somehow brought this attack on itself
• 15:45
  through its actions relating to Gaza,
• 15:47
  through its alleged blockade or whatever of Gaza,
• 15:52
  which was wrong.
• 15:53
  And according to various commentators,
• 15:54
  notably Norman Finkelstein,
• 15:56
  He's the one that said Israel was maintaining
• 15:58
  a concentration camp conditions in Gaza,
• 16:01
  which I think is very far from the truth.
• 16:03
  And it was also imposed on Israel.
• 16:05
  But if you take that attitude,
• 16:06
  then Israel sort of could expect this attack.
• 16:09
  And therefore, their right to respond is limited.
• 16:11
  On the other end, if you take the other narrative,
• 16:13
  that Israel was doing everything it can
• 16:14
  to limit Palestinian suffering.
• 16:16
  And they were trying to maximize
• 16:17
  the potential of a normal life in Gaza,
• 16:22
  despite the conditions.
• 16:23
  And then the Gazans come along with this,
• 16:25
  unprovoked
• 16:27
  increase, sudden increase
• 16:29
  in the aggression level,
• 16:31
  then Israel seems to be forced
• 16:33
  to respond. I
• 16:35
  said it's an existential attack
• 16:37
  on the Israeli society,
• 16:39
  which leads to
• 16:41
  my conceptual view on
• 16:43
  things. It's the state against the Israeli
• 16:45
  state, the ethical state against
• 16:47
  another entity. That's where
• 16:49
  the
• 16:51
  numbers become less relevant.
• 16:53
  But it's a concept that
• 16:55
  it's easy to
• 16:57
  respond to it on an emotional level.
• 17:02
  To say, yes, there was only 1,500 people
• 17:03
  killed on the Israeli side and you've killed
• 17:05
  tens of thousands of Palestinians.
• 17:07
  That's always going to be a challenge to respond to that.
• 17:12
  Well, okay.
• 17:13
  I understand that. I'm not trying to put you on the spot.
• 17:15
  I just wanted to get your opinion on it.
• 17:17
  No, no, no.
• 17:19
  There is a true answer.
• 17:21
  Okay. There's a few things.
• 17:23
  and I don't want to get stuck on this conversation with Gaza
• 17:26
  because, look, it happened, right?
• 17:28
  We can't write it.
• 17:29
  We can't go back and fix it.
• 17:30
  For whatever the flaws may or may not be there,
• 17:34
  there's also a lot of holes in the argument
• 17:37
  on the pro-Palestinian side, for example,
• 17:40
  or the pro-Gazan side,
• 17:41
  because the narrative has been, as you said,
• 17:45
  people look at Israel controlling Gaza
• 17:47
  as if it was an open-air prison.
• 17:49
  But yet Egypt is closed its southern border
• 17:51
  and not has allowed any Palestinians to leave either.
• 17:56
  So they've been blockaded to a degree by Egypt as well.
• 17:59
  Also, Palestine itself, or I'm sorry, Jordan,
• 18:03
  refuses to take any of them in either.
• 18:05
  And at one point in history, they did,
• 18:07
  and the Palestinians rose up against their ruler.
• 18:09
  So we want to sympathize for the people caught in the middle.
• 18:13
  And I think that's why people view this whole thing
• 18:17
  as a horrible response,
• 18:18
  because there are people who are born into whatever they're born into.
• 18:21
  they don't choose it. And maybe they don't take the side of Hamas. But we also call into question,
• 18:27
  in your mind, because you live in Israel, why haven't the Palestinian people had a chance to
• 18:34
  stand up to Hamas? Is it really just because they don't have the access to weapons? Is that
• 18:40
  what it is? Because I don't think Hamas itself is as big of a force in terms of actual people
• 18:45
  versus the civilians that live there. Do you have any thoughts on that?
• 18:50
  Yeah, I do have a lot of thoughts
• 18:51
  because that brings me to some central key concepts.
• 18:54
  And let me take your question.
• 18:55
  You've asked why do the Palestinians,
• 18:57
  not the Palestinian population itself
• 19:00
  at the street level,
• 19:01
  why do they not assert their authority
• 19:03
  against the Hamas leadership,
• 19:05
  which you're saying perhaps has limited powers
• 19:08
  to quell dissent?
• 19:09
  And the same question you could ask,
• 19:11
  why do the people in China
• 19:12
  not more assert themselves against the regime in China
• 19:15
  or those in Russia or those in North Korea
• 19:18
  or those in Iran or those in Jordan or notably in Lebanon?
• 19:25
  Why in none of these cases do we see the population able to assert itself,
• 19:32
  to create a self-determination regime?
• 19:36
  And that's very central to the ideas I discuss, that question.
• 19:40
  That's a very pertinent question.
• 19:44
  I don't know if you want me to take that a little bit further.
• 19:48
  Well, look, I know where you're going to go with this.
• 19:51
  And of course, we're going to say, well, you know, the regime in power will always have absolute power because they have the weapons and they control the food and they control the resources, they control the infrastructure, the electricity, etc.
• 20:02
  But it's deeper than that.
• 20:02
  But yes, it's deeper than that.
• 20:03
  People don't have access to that, and that's understandable.
• 20:06
  But we also can't deny that we haven't heard any reports of actual Palestinians ever expressing a negative sentiment towards Hamas where they actually condemn Hamas for their actions either.
• 20:16
  and they can do so maybe because they're in fear of Hamas,
• 20:19
  just like in Iran, we may be able to say that,
• 20:21
  but even the Iranian people were able to protest
• 20:23
  and they lost their lives for it.
• 20:26
  Chinese people have protested against their government
• 20:28
  and had lost their lives for it,
• 20:29
  but we're not seeing that in Gaza.
• 20:32
  So that does call into question, you know,
• 20:34
  the delicate balance between what's going on
• 20:36
  with the Palestinian people there and Hamas
• 20:38
  and if they're actually really aligned,
• 20:39
  but acting like they're not as a way of subverting
• 20:41
  what's really going on there
• 20:42
  and their sentiment towards Israel itself.
• 20:45
  So that's why I asked the question.
• 20:47
  I know it's deeper.
• 20:48
  I know we can go forever on this,
• 20:50
  but if you can just give me maybe a few quick points
• 20:53
  or maybe guide us to where you…
• 20:55
  It's a good question.
• 20:56
  Why do we not hear more from the Palestinian people themselves?
• 21:01
  Why do we not hear more voices for coexistence, etc.?
• 21:05
  So first of all, there are certain…
• 21:09
  And I think the common feeling is that when they're off camera,
• 21:13
  when they know that they're not being in any way taped or filmed
• 21:18
  or whatever, recorded, that they do express sentiments
• 21:22
  in terms of wishing for coexistence
• 21:25
  and they're not really interested in these wars.
• 21:27
  There is also part of having a regime that has a large degree of control.
• 21:35
  In my theory, in my conceptualization of this,
• 21:40
  is they have a very strong motivation to perpetuate the conflict.
• 21:45
  And that has led to a radicalization over generations.
• 21:51
  It's already 70, 80 years that the population,
• 21:54
  the Palestinian population has been subject to the propaganda
• 21:57
  of the Hamas and of the Arab nations in general,
• 22:02
  which is extremely anti-Israel propaganda.
• 22:05
  We saw in Germany that one person, Goebbels, was able to conduct a propaganda campaign
• 22:11
  and turn a whole nation of Germany, of 50 million, whatever it is, people, intelligent people,
• 22:17
  rapidly into rabid anti-Semites over the course of 1933 to 1939 to facilitate the Holocaust.
• 22:25
  So the power of propaganda, it cannot be underestimated.
• 22:30
  And here it's particularly focused in Gaza.
• 22:33
  It's a small area.
• 22:34
  It's very intense control.
• 22:36
  And there are definitely injustices that the Palestinians are suffering.
• 22:43
  The question always is who's the actual cause?
• 22:46
  Who's the moral cause of this?
• 22:48
  But there's plenty bitter sentiment upon which the propaganda can focus.
• 22:52
  Therefore, it's not too surprising that we don't hear these voices of
• 22:57
  it's the fault of the Palestinians.
• 23:00
  It's the Hamas leadership that's caused all these problems.
• 23:03
  I do believe there would be a genuine democracy.
• 23:05
  You would hear these voices
• 23:06
  and there would be a huge potential for coexistence.
• 23:09
  I strongly believe that.
• 23:11
  But I can't prove it.
• 23:12
  I agree with you.
• 23:13
  There are facts on the ground
• 23:14
  that call that into question.
• 23:16
  Yeah, do you feel Hamas has been so weakened that,
• 23:21
  because we haven't really heard much of a peep from them lately.
• 23:24
  Are they really weakened?
• 23:26
  They're weakened in terms of,
• 23:29
  there's two fronts they're always conducting.
• 23:30
  The one is the fight against Israel.
• 23:33
  Yeah, I don't think they're in a position to colonize or attack or really create an existential threat to Israel,
• 23:39
  discounting the fact that they would ever attain weapons of mass destruction.
• 23:44
  But based on normal military conditions, they're not really a genuine threat to Israel.
• 23:49
  Militarily, they could take it over.
• 23:51
  However they can present, they can make a lot of problems for Israel.
• 23:53
  Just cheap rockets that fired into Israeli population centers already is hugely disruptive on Israeli society.
• 23:59
  so they are semi-weakened
• 24:04
  but in terms of them
• 24:07
  against their own population
• 24:08
  they're not weakened at all
• 24:09
  I think they maintain strong control
• 24:11
  because of the intense
• 24:13
  focus they have on maintaining control
• 24:16
  and the extreme lengths
• 24:19
  that they will go to
• 24:20
  to maintain control
• 24:21
  not bound by rules of law
• 24:23
  or institutions etc
• 24:25
  therefore and there are
• 24:26
  executions for any
• 24:28
  collaborators or alleged collaborators
• 24:31
  or potential collaborators or sympathizers
• 24:33
  with Israel. Therefore, they have,
• 24:35
  they do rule with an iron hand
• 24:37
  and I think they're still able to maintain that. They don't need so
• 24:39
  much weaponry. They need control of the
• 24:41
  basics in which they have still,
• 24:43
  of the necessities, the amenities,
• 24:46
  and whatever
• 24:47
  weapons they need in order to enforce
• 24:49
  that.
• 24:51
  Is it not coincidental that
• 24:53
  the
• 24:55
  weakness of
• 24:57
  Hamas correlates really with Iran right now being in a conflict in which they themselves are pretty much being decimated, even though people don't want to admit that.
• 25:09
  I mean, let's be honest.
• 25:10
  We're never going to stamp out an ideological authoritarian force.
• 25:15
  It's always going to be something there.
• 25:17
  But militarily, they're pretty much done.
• 25:20
  Their infrastructure is hanging on by a thread.
• 25:22
  And ever since all this happened, the ability for like Hamas, for example, to do anything significant has been very, very much weakened or stifled.
• 25:32
  And that even extends to, you know, like Hezbollah and all of these other proxies.
• 25:37
  I mean, they still are, they're still firing rockets.
• 25:40
  They're still trying to be a nuisance, but it's not to the level that it used to be.
• 25:43
  So this really points to, as it's been said, you know, the head of the snake, Iran really was always the one to control them behind most of all of this.
• 25:51
  whether it was funding, which it really was funding.
• 25:54
  It was arms armaments There was training And I got a question I don know this and has never been confirmed But do you think that these proxies were actually taking instruction from the Islamic regime itself out of Iran
• 26:08
  I think, yes.
• 26:10
  I think, I don't know the degree of coordination that existed.
• 26:15
  But I think most people accept that they were.
• 26:18
  Because, I mean, the Hezbollah was essentially funded and created by Iran.
• 26:23
  I think they very much act on the basis of whatever instructions they receive from Tehran.
• 26:29
  Similarly with Hamas, the circle of fire that Iran engineered around Israel,
• 26:36
  which the intention was to use that to wage a destructive war against Israel and ultimately prevail.
• 26:44
  So I think they very much do take their cue from Iran.
• 26:50
  They take their inspiration.
• 26:53
  The question will become, which maybe we'll discuss,
• 26:55
  you know, what is it?
• 26:55
  Is it ideological? Is it religious?
• 26:57
  What is it? Is it territorial?
• 26:58
  What it's about?
• 26:59
  But yeah, I think, and they all have in common
• 27:01
  that they're not democratic regimes.
• 27:08
  And I think Israel for a long time,
• 27:12
  the dynamic was that Israel tried to assert
• 27:17
  its defense
• 27:20
  through directly engaging
• 27:22
  with the proxies,
• 27:23
  with the Hamas
• 27:24
  and with the Hezbollah
• 27:26
  in the north.
• 27:27
  Until it became,
• 27:28
  like after October the 7th,
• 27:30
  became more evident
• 27:31
  that it's really,
• 27:32
  it is Iran
• 27:33
  and Iran can no longer
• 27:34
  be ignored.
• 27:35
  And the conditions were
• 27:36
  such that the conditions
• 27:38
  of political conditions
• 27:39
  in America facilitated
• 27:41
  and enabled that
• 27:41
  with the Republican government.
• 27:43
  But also was the ongoing,
• 27:45
  you said Iran has been
• 27:46
  decimated militarily. I don't know how much of a difference that actually makes, because for Iran,
• 27:51
  there are essentially two goals. We can maybe discuss which is the primary one, which is the
• 27:56
  secondary one. I have my opinion on that. But essentially two goals for Iran. One is to maintain
• 28:01
  absolute power within Iran over the Iranian population. And despite, therefore, the military
• 28:06
  degrading that it suffered through American and Israeli assaults, I think it still retains that
• 28:12
  control in full measure. And also the second military ability Iran wishes, is important
• 28:18
  strategically for Iran, is ability to threaten Israel and its neighbors. And even though it
• 28:22
  doesn't have a strong military, it doesn't have tanks, etc., a ground military, and doesn't have
• 28:28
  strong air force, but it has these missiles that have developed, thousands of missiles,
• 28:33
  which seem to be fairly accurate and devastating. And that maintains their ability to threaten,
• 28:41
  their deterrent and their ability to threaten neighbors and Israel.
• 28:45
  Therefore, they're still in a very powerful place to cause a lot of problems.
• 28:50
  And with the background the whole time is the development of their nuclear capabilities.
• 28:55
  Also chemical and biological, which have not really been discussed.
• 28:58
  I don't want to give any clues to anyone what they should be doing,
• 29:01
  but that also is something that is a potential.
• 29:05
  Even if they don't have nuclear capabilities,
• 29:07
  non-conventional, there are other non-conventional
• 29:08
  strategic military assets that can be used.
• 29:11
  And I'm sure Iran is considering, you know,
• 29:13
  whether they should be developed or not.
• 29:15
  I'm not sure whether they're even alluding to that
• 29:16
  in recent statements that they've made
• 29:18
  in the context of the negotiations,
• 29:21
  whether, you know, they would consider that.
• 29:23
  So Iran still, I think, is almost as dangerous as it was.
• 29:27
  I don't know if things have really changed.
• 29:28
  It's like the beginning of the end.
• 29:30
  Beginning of the end, I think, is only when the regime itself
• 29:32
  is in danger of collapse.
• 29:35
  I don't know if we're there.
• 29:37
  right but their military capabilities have have been reducing capability i would and i would still
• 29:43
  argue almost decimated um honestly i mean sure they had a lot of missiles but you know their
• 29:47
  stockpile is definitely getting low um the shaheads drones that they were that were manufacturing
• 29:52
  they're basically running out of now after the decimation of most of their facilities they can't
• 29:56
  keep up with production um so now they're gonna have to rely on russia to provide that which now
• 30:00
  is not buying those from iran anymore they're producing them themselves so they lost that
• 30:03
  revenue. So this all comes down to money. As much as we want to talk about the fundamentalism of the
• 30:08
  Islamic regime and how radicalized they can make people to be able to pick up the torch and fight
• 30:15
  against anybody who opposes them, the reality is without the money, they can't exist. And right now,
• 30:20
  that's being choked off by closing the Strait of Hormuz right now. So the reality is, it's a couple
• 30:26
  of factors here. Iran needs money. The Islamic regime needs money. 45% of their government budget
• 30:31
  It comes from their oil sales alone.
• 30:32
  Their biggest customer is China, who buys up to 90% of their oil.
• 30:36
  China cannot do that currently at this state.
• 30:39
  Iran is losing about $13 billion a month.
• 30:43
  And China themselves, as much as they are claiming or are an ally of Iran,
• 30:48
  can't really get them the supplies or resupply them with the armaments they need.
• 30:52
  Russia's too busy with Ukraine.
• 30:54
  And they themselves can't take their attention away from that at the moment either.
• 30:58
  So Iran is kind of on an island at this moment.
• 31:00
  even with the allies they have.
• 31:03
  So this may be what you said.
• 31:06
  It could be the beginning of the end.
• 31:09
  And I'm not, I mean, you may be correct in the fact that,
• 31:12
  sure, they have bodies, right?
• 31:14
  The IRGC is still substantial with about,
• 31:16
  I think it was 350,000 troops or whatever it is.
• 31:19
  And then they still have the Iranian army.
• 31:21
  But the problem is, at this moment,
• 31:25
  is who is leading Iran?
• 31:27
  Now, there is a power struggle between the IRGC
• 31:29
  and the Islamic regime, by the way.
• 31:32
  The IRGC has absolutely done things
• 31:34
  that were against the wishes of the Islamic regime
• 31:36
  because they don't know who's in charge.
• 31:39
  You know, the Moshe Khomeini, we haven't seen him.
• 31:44
  We've seen people reading speeches he's written,
• 31:46
  but where is he, right?
• 31:48
  So that calls into question
• 31:49
  who's really leading the Islamic regime, right?
• 31:50
  But the IRGC has been very prevalent and present,
• 31:53
  and it seems like they're making more of the decisions.
• 31:55
  And then we don't even know
• 31:56
  what's going on with the Iranian army.
• 31:58
  So it seems like there's a lot of conflict within the control of Iran itself.
• 32:03
  There's definitely a power struggle.
• 32:06
  The question I've always had, and just as rhetorical,
• 32:10
  is when maybe the Western nations will stop being so empathetic
• 32:13
  and do what they need to do to wipe out the regime.
• 32:15
  And I know that sounds really evil and mean,
• 32:17
  but the reality is they've been a threat to the world for over 50 years,
• 32:20
  47 years since they came into power in 1978.
• 32:24
  And they have been, in my opinion,
• 32:26
  and you can very much correct me
• 32:27
  because you actually live in the Middle East.
• 32:29
  But in my opinion, from the outside looking in,
• 32:30
  they seem to be behind most of the conflict
• 32:32
  and struggle that is actually in the Middle East.
• 32:35
  They've proven that they don't even respect
• 32:36
  their Muslim neighbors,
• 32:37
  even though they're a different Muslim, I get it.
• 32:40
  But at the same time,
• 32:42
  there's still some brotherly connection there, right?
• 32:44
  There should be within the religious faith.
• 32:47
  And so they went ahead.
• 32:48
  Between who and who?
• 32:48
  So I didn't get that point.
• 32:50
  Connection between who and who?
• 32:51
  Their Muslim neighbors.
• 32:53
  Their other Arab nations.
• 32:55
  Right.
• 32:55
  But there should be some.
• 32:56
  I understand they're different,
• 32:58
  you know, have different views.
• 32:59
  But at the same time,
• 33:00
  there is that...
• 33:00
  Some people are in Shiites.
• 33:01
  Yeah, there should still be
• 33:02
  that basic connection
• 33:03
  in terms of the religion itself.
• 33:05
  And they've proven that
• 33:06
  they do not respect that, right?
• 33:08
  As soon as they were attacked,
• 33:10
  they viewed anybody
• 33:11
  who didn't jump in the fight
• 33:12
  as an enemy
• 33:12
  and started firing at the Gulf states.
• 33:14
  And then to this day,
• 33:15
  the Gulf states really haven't done
• 33:16
  anything in retaliation either
• 33:17
  outside of trying to protect themselves
• 33:19
  as missiles are volleyed at them.
• 33:21
  So what is the next step here
• 33:25
  in your mind
• 33:26
  in this conflict?
• 33:28
  I mean,
• 33:28
  should the absolute nail
• 33:32
  on the coffin,
• 33:32
  so to speak,
• 33:33
  be taken right now?
• 33:34
  Should we pound that nail
• 33:35
  on the coffin
• 33:36
  on the Islamic regime
• 33:37
  and really decimate them
• 33:38
  and get rid of them?
• 33:39
  Or are we all holding back
• 33:42
  because of,
• 33:43
  I don't know,
• 33:44
  pressures,
• 33:46
  political factors,
• 33:47
  et cetera?
• 33:48
  What do you think?
• 33:49
  Yeah,
• 33:49
  you mentioned a lot of points.
• 33:52
  I'm going to try
• 33:52
  and remember them
• 33:53
  and respond to them.
• 33:54
  No, no,
• 33:54
  it's good because you're obviously very well informed
• 33:57
  and you have a lot of developed opinions on this.
• 33:59
  I hope I'm able to respond
• 34:00
  meaningfully to
• 34:02
  at least some of these points. First of all,
• 34:05
  talking about the finance,
• 34:08
  you said that
• 34:09
  they've been deprived a lot
• 34:11
  of their
• 34:12
  income as a result of
• 34:15
  closing the straits, as a result of limiting
• 34:17
  their ability to
• 34:18
  provide to Russia, etc.
• 34:22
  Yeah, so
• 34:22
  that's a question of a weighting gain. The question is
• 34:24
  How long do they have?
• 34:25
  How long can they keep going?
• 34:27
  And that's really the huge,
• 34:28
  the central geopolitical tension.
• 34:29
  How long can Trump keep going?
• 34:31
  And how long can Iran keep going?
• 34:32
  To one of them is forced to give in.
• 34:38
  It's, I don't know who has longer,
• 34:41
  who can hold their breath longer.
• 34:42
  I think the Iranians are more motivated
• 34:44
  because they have full control.
• 34:45
  The Iranians being the Iranian regime.
• 34:47
  They will do everything they can.
• 34:49
  And if they're not receiving
• 34:50
  the sufficient funding
• 34:51
  for running the country as it should be,
• 34:53
  So they'll cut down, in my opinion, they'll cut down what the country needs and ensure that their own strategic needs are met.
• 35:00
  Their military needs, whatever is needed to maintain the regime, that will always have absolute first priority.
• 35:05
  Therefore, finances short term are not that critical for them.
• 35:08
  They could probably hold out for months, maybe even years.
• 35:10
  And they would just ensure, unfortunately, harsh suffering to the general population.
• 35:15
  If there would be a lot of discomfort and disquiet and dis-ease amongst the population, which would threaten them,
• 35:20
  then they would just have to tighten down the regime, etc.
• 35:23
  if there's less resources available to provide for the population.
• 35:27
  That's, in my understanding, that's really what their primary goal is,
• 35:33
  is to maintain power.
• 35:34
  That's why my book is Beyond Power, alluding to that.
• 35:37
  Therefore, it's going to be hard to bring them down financially.
• 35:40
  You can put pressure on them.
• 35:42
  You spoke about the divided regime in Iran.
• 35:44
  I think it is, I'm skeptical about how divided it is.
• 35:48
  To a certain extent, yes, there are nuances,
• 35:50
  And there's always been this tension between those who want to be more,
• 35:55
  who are more in favor of a slightly more pro-Western approach
• 36:01
  towards dealing with the West, pragmatic in terms of helping the economy of Iran
• 36:10
  and bettering for the betterment of the Iranian population
• 36:13
  against those, the hardliners, who wish to maintain control in Iran.
• 36:18
  That's always been an internal conflict, and it remains that.
• 36:22
  But I don't think it's a fundamental conflict.
• 36:25
  I think because all the elements of those who are in this conflict
• 36:28
  are all part of the ruling regime.
• 36:30
  And for them, again, the primary need and the primary motivation,
• 36:36
  agenda is to maintain power for themselves, ultimately.
• 36:39
  Therefore, I'm skeptical as to what these divisions.
• 36:43
  Trump is trying, that's his strategy, to try and sow division.
• 36:46
  I don't know how successful he can be in that.
• 36:49
  Okay, but you don't see that there's a struggle between the IRGC and the Islamic regime itself?
• 36:54
  Yes, it's a struggle for power, but I don't think it's a major struggle.
• 36:59
  I think because they're all in the same position that they want to maintain power for themselves, for the regime.
• 37:05
  There are elements of the regime.
• 37:06
  So one hand wants this approach.
• 37:08
  Our GC is slightly more strict and more limited in their wish for accommodation with the West.
• 37:18
  And there are other more pragmatic elements of the regime that do wish accommodation.
• 37:22
  But I think these are just nuances within the regime.
• 37:26
  And you spoke about the Russia provision of military equipment, etc. from Russia.
• 37:33
  you have Russia, China
• 37:36
  and also North Korea
• 37:37
  is quite strongly involved.
• 37:39
  It seems to be all these regimes
• 37:40
  do help one another.
• 37:42
  Ultimately, I think they will be
• 37:44
  very keen to avoid
• 37:47
  the Iranian regime falling.
• 37:50
  Russia and China and North Korea
• 37:52
  will ultimately, when it comes to it,
• 37:54
  I think will do everything they can
• 37:55
  to ensure the regime does not fall.
• 37:58
  There's even a danger of them,
• 37:59
  even if the military capability of Iran
• 38:02
  has been severely degraded,
• 38:03
  Russia or China or North Korea could, within a short span of time, redress that balance.
• 38:12
  They could make intense shipments of armaments, especially when you're talking about missiles and capable of inflicting non-conventional missiles.
• 38:22
  You can redress the balance very quickly, and that's a danger that exists.
• 38:26
  And therefore, when you're saying where is this, your following question was where is this going to lead? I think the only thing that the West, Israel and American can really do to threaten Iran is like Trump has been saying, to actually bomb all their petroleum producing assets or to take hold of, what's it called, the island where 90% of the Iranian exports and oil.
• 38:56
  processing exists takes place if you take that if you take a stronghold a stranglehold on the Iranian oil production capability
• 39:07
  that would be an extreme threat.
• 39:08
  Because then they really would
• 39:09
  be undercutting their ability
• 39:11
  to finance, to bankroll,
• 39:13
  their control of the state.
• 39:16
  The problem is Iran,
• 39:18
  the one strategic asset Iran does have
• 39:20
  is they have no rules.
• 39:22
  They're the fanatical.
• 39:23
  In order to maintain their power,
• 39:25
  they'll do anything.
• 39:26
  They'll attack anyone.
• 39:27
  Therefore, every move that you take,
• 39:30
  which is more aggressive,
• 39:31
  in game theory,
• 39:33
  you're going to invite another more aggressive move
• 39:35
  on the other side.
• 39:36
  Therefore, it's a deathly game.
• 39:38
  As to the other Arab nations,
• 39:40
  which you said,
• 39:40
  why do they seem to be on opposing sides?
• 39:45
  I think it's been a transition over 70 or 80 years
• 39:48
  as a result of Israel and the Middle East,
• 39:50
  that they have come to a pragmatic realization
• 39:53
  that a more accommodation, again,
• 39:57
  greater accommodation with Israel and the West
• 39:59
  seems to be better.
• 40:00
  They have the needs of their population
• 40:02
  more at heart than their own needs
• 40:05
  as a ruling regime, authoritarian regime.
• 40:09
  They are keen to actually benefit
• 40:12
  the welfare of their populations.
• 40:14
  And therefore, they have taken this stand,
• 40:17
  which has taken them against Iran.
• 40:19
  Despite, I think, in principle,
• 40:20
  their affiliation probably would be more with Iran.
• 40:23
  Iran would be slightly less fanatical.
• 40:26
  But I think time has brought them
• 40:28
  to this pragmatic position of,
• 40:31
  and they do feel threatened to a certain extent
• 40:32
  because Iran will do anything to preserve its regime.
• 40:37
  It will even threaten these semi-friendly Arab neighbors.
• 40:43
  And that's the dynamic, I think.
• 40:46
  I don't know, one is enemy or friend.
• 40:47
  It's just part of the dynamic of the conflict.
• 40:49
  All right.
• 40:50
  Well, you said a couple of things there that surprisingly,
• 40:53
  I have said myself and not many people have said.
• 40:57
  I'll be honest.
• 40:57
  If I was in control of this, we'd probably all be in trouble
• 40:59
  because I would have absolutely bombed and decimated
• 41:02
  Karg Island a long time ago.
• 41:04
  Honestly, I wouldn't care about the environmental implications
• 41:07
  because we can go back and clean it up.
• 41:08
  We always have done that before on oil spills.
• 41:10
  It's not environmental strategic is the problem.
• 41:13
  Right.
• 41:13
  But if we got rid of that, there's no oil stored.
• 41:17
  It stores about 90% of the oil.
• 41:18
  And then if we went ahead and got rid of their oil fields and controlled those, there's nothing they can do.
• 41:25
  Now, the retaliation you speak of is exactly, I think, what's keeping people at bay.
• 41:29
  And it's not so much the response they would have militarily.
• 41:31
  I think it's in their proxies that are dug into these areas and the terrorist attacks that they can launch from within these areas.
• 41:38
  You know, also in the United States, as well as in these other Arab states.
• 41:42
  Because it's very unclear, you know, if these terrorist cells are active or not, where they're at.
• 41:48
  we know they're around. It's like the statistic I've always used on my program here when I've
• 41:53
  talked about this. So United States 2025, for example, these are people we caught, known.
• 42:02
  We have caught and apprehended enough terrorists trying to get through our border that would put
• 42:07
  actually 15 terrorists in every state of the United States, literally. And we're still
• 42:12
  encountering that influx now in 2026. And so that is the reality. And I think you're correct. I think
• 42:19
  that is what's been holding a lot of people from doing what really needs to happen. And that might
• 42:25
  be why Trump is trying to come to the table and come to an agreement. But on the flip side of that,
• 42:30
  I also have to ask this question, especially of the Western nations. Why would we tolerate such
• 42:35
  an evil regime that is intent on literally conquering the West, destroying Israel, all for
• 42:41
  the sake of oil. Literally.
• 42:43
  I mean, there are other places you can get the oil.
• 42:45
  I understand it's geographical
• 42:46
  location. Sure, it's cheaper
• 42:48
  to purchase and transport
• 42:51
  because it's right there. I understand that.
• 42:53
  But the U.S. is
• 42:55
  honestly, we overproduce.
• 42:57
  And we literally
• 42:58
  probably be
• 43:01
  the number one producer of oil
• 43:03
  at this point, especially with what happened
• 43:05
  with Venezuela. And then not even just the U.S.
• 43:06
  You got Canada. You got Mexico.
• 43:09
  As much as we don't want to give more money to Russia, there's Russia.
• 43:12
  I mean, there's other places that oil can be had on the worst case scenario here.
• 43:18
  And I'm not saying we should cut out the other nation's revenue.
• 43:20
  Don't get me wrong.
• 43:21
  But what I'm saying is there's other inroads that can be taken to alleviate the situation at the moment.
• 43:26
  And then people cry about the fertilizer and everything.
• 43:28
  Well, you know, there's other nations that absolutely produce fertilizer.
• 43:31
  So I think those are just excuses that are being used as to trying to be empathetic or sympathetic only because, and I think the reason here, Daniel, is this, there are innocent civilians in Iran that don't deserve this.
• 43:47
  And as much as we want to see them liberated, we can't force it.
• 43:50
  And if we go in and truly, truly be the military aggressor that we could be, for example, a lot of people are going to die, even more than now.
• 43:58
  And those mistakes have been made.
• 43:59
  I mean, you know, we had a school full of children that were killed.
• 44:02
  And I know that wasn't intentional.
• 44:03
  A lot of people argue it was, but it was not.
• 44:06
  We haven't seen that again or since.
• 44:08
  And then people will cry about war crimes.
• 44:10
  Oh, you can't target civilian infrastructure.
• 44:12
  Really?
• 44:13
  Well, then we can talk about how many times Iran has targeted civilian infrastructure
• 44:16
  and done things that were considered war crimes.
• 44:18
  So I think the West has too much of a big heart to do what needs to be done.
• 44:23
  And I don't believe there's an attack against Islam itself
• 44:26
  because I think the religion and the practice has evolved.
• 44:28
  We have people living in modern societies that don't take it literally.
• 44:31
  Just as a Christian, for example, if we practiced the Old Testament the way it was, we would be stoning people right now.
• 44:38
  But we don't do that.
• 44:39
  So we have evolved.
• 44:41
  And the problem we're seeing with the regime is they're using the Islamic religion in an extreme way to control people, to push their narrative and idea of conquest and subjugation.
• 44:54
  And that's what we're seeing.
• 44:56
  But we're afraid to do what needs to be done
• 44:58
  because, again, there's too many innocent people in Iran.
• 45:01
  We can't go and just decimate those people themselves
• 45:03
  or kill them.
• 45:05
  My opinion.
• 45:07
  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
• 45:07
  There's a lot there.
• 45:09
  Again, there's a lot there.
• 45:11
  First of all, let's talk.
• 45:13
  I'll try to remember.
• 45:14
  You'll remind me the points you made.
• 45:16
  First point, you were saying that
• 45:18
  why does America or Israel not take the ultimate,
• 45:23
  the optimal strategic move of taking out Cargo Island,
• 45:29
  taking out all production facilities of Iran,
• 45:32
  thereby severely degrading any resources
• 45:37
  Iran has at their disposal.
• 45:39
  And you said it's because of the threat of reprisals.
• 45:42
  And I agree with that.
• 45:43
  But you point to reprisals on the level of domestic terrorism.
• 45:50
  I think that's what you're primarily concerned with.
• 45:51
  I don't think that's the main concern.
• 45:54
  I think American very security organizations in the West
• 45:59
  would be able to deal quite effectively with these threats.
• 46:02
  I think the threat is Iran itself has said
• 46:04
  that they have, again, these strategic missiles
• 46:07
  that are fairly powerful and quite accurate.
• 46:09
  And they've threatened to take out the civilian infrastructure
• 46:13
  throughout the Middle East.
• 46:15
  And that's not a threat.
• 46:16
  They take out water production facilities,
• 46:18
  oil production facilities, educational facilities,
• 46:20
  all the fundamental civilian infrastructure
• 46:23
  and all the oil production facilities in the world,
• 46:27
  they could render the world incapable of oil production
• 46:30
  worthy to want to do that.
• 46:31
  Now, I think that's a threat pre the act.
• 46:34
  I think if post the act, if America were actually to do that,
• 46:37
  I don't think Iran would have an interest
• 46:38
  in actually carrying out their alleged response
• 46:42
  because what interest would they have in doing that?
• 46:44
  That would just invite an even greater response for America.
• 46:47
  So therefore, strategically, in terms of game theory
• 46:49
  and threatening,
• 46:51
  it seems to be that would be
• 46:52
  perhaps the right move.
• 46:54
  And I think that is part of the negotiation.
• 46:56
  I think Trump has that threat
• 46:57
  the whole time in the back of his pocket.
• 47:00
  And he also has a threat of,
• 47:01
  so to speak,
• 47:02
  he'll say that I can't contain Israel.
• 47:04
  Israel would like to do this,
• 47:05
  would like to do this.
• 47:06
  I'm holding them back.
• 47:07
  And if negotiations don't progress,
• 47:09
  then I won't be able to hold back Israel
• 47:11
  because that's really what Israel knows
• 47:12
  that should be done
• 47:13
  to seriously weaken the regime
• 47:16
  by taking out all that fundamental infrastructure.
• 47:19
  That's on that point. You say also, why is it being so accommodating of Iran? Why is it not done more to take away this threat, this Islamic fundamentalist threat, this threat to peace in the Middle East and throughout the world and in Western society?
• 47:38
  and strategically you're right.
• 47:41
  If they would get together,
• 47:42
  if all these democratic governments
• 47:43
  would get together
• 47:44
  and craft a strategy for dealing with this,
• 47:49
  they would create the resources
• 47:50
  to deal with the temporary problems
• 47:51
  of supply, et cetera,
• 47:52
  and say, let's take the military moves
• 47:54
  that are necessary.
• 47:54
  They probably would be able to do that.
• 47:56
  But we're in a very imperfect world,
• 47:58
  unfortunately.
• 47:58
  That's what you're lamenting, I think,
• 47:59
  where democracies do not necessarily
• 48:01
  function together.
• 48:02
  And democracies, unfortunately,
• 48:03
  do not make completely rational decisions
• 48:06
  or strategic moves.
• 48:07
  They're petrified of what the media
• 48:08
  will say, they're petrified of a very militant and vocal left progressive movement who are
• 48:16
  very sympathetic.
• 48:17
  And although they might not represent absolute majorities, but they're a very powerful and
• 48:21
  vocal minority backed by the media.
• 48:24
  Therefore, any move that the West takes, which is seen as pro-Israel, anti-Iran, is always
• 48:30
  met by a very loud chorus of opposition.
• 48:35
  And the democratically elected governments,
• 48:37
  which generally only have minor majorities,
• 48:40
  small majorities, slim majorities,
• 48:41
  are incapable.
• 48:43
  They're really frozen from taking major action.
• 48:45
  They're always in a state of containment geopolitically.
• 48:48
  They can't do major things.
• 48:50
  That's partly because of the democratic structure,
• 48:53
  which I also talk about.
• 48:54
  But that's because of this imperfect,
• 48:56
  every man for themselves
• 48:58
  and looking over the back of their shoulder
• 48:59
  just to maintain their own status
• 49:02
  is what's driving things, unfortunately,
• 49:05
  to a large extent.
• 49:07
  That's why we don't get the optimal solutions
• 49:08
  that you would like to see.
• 49:10
  Well, yeah.
• 49:11
  So, all right.
• 49:12
  I'm going to address some of that
• 49:13
  and then I'm going to ask you another question.
• 49:16
  But let's back up.
• 49:18
  I think the domestic terrorist threats are very real.
• 49:22
  Okay.
• 49:22
  And the only reason they haven't been implemented
• 49:24
  to the degree we've seen
• 49:26
  is because I think Iran knows that's a last resort move.
• 49:30
  Okay.
• 49:30
  If they do that now,
• 49:31
  then it does invite the absolute destruction of Iran, period.
• 49:35
  That's just what's going to happen.
• 49:37
  You know, after 9-11, we can agree or disagree with how the U.S. handled that,
• 49:43
  but we've proven that we're not going to take anybody's crap.
• 49:46
  We're going to go and we will respond in kind,
• 49:49
  just as you said Israel would too if that happened.
• 49:53
  So I think that's why.
• 49:55
  I think that's like a death rattle for Iran.
• 49:59
  When they're at the point where there's nothing left,
• 50:00
  then they're going to turn it on.
• 50:03
  They say, you know what?
• 50:04
  Whoever we can bring down with us,
• 50:05
  that's what we're going to do.
• 50:06
  And the reason I say this is we've seen an increase
• 50:08
  in terrorist activities on U.S. soil.
• 50:11
  We've seen an increase or uptick
• 50:12
  in what might be happening in the U.K. itself.
• 50:15
  We've seen it in Australia.
• 50:17
  It seems like around the world
• 50:18
  that we've seen an increase in activities, okay?
• 50:21
  There's been terrorist activities that have,
• 50:23
  as you said, because there are intelligence agencies
• 50:26
  and law enforcement that can deal with this.
• 50:28
  So there has been a lot that has also been stopped.
• 50:30
  but they were in process.
• 50:32
  Okay.
• 50:33
  So I believe that's still a big factor
• 50:35
  of what keeps a lot of people at bay.
• 50:37
  And as far as the Western nations
• 50:38
  not coming together, as you said,
• 50:40
  and saying, look, we need to do what we got to do.
• 50:42
  I think the real reality there
• 50:44
  is that our economy is too intertwined
• 50:47
  and it's too globalized
• 50:48
  to the point where all people care about
• 50:51
  is the damn money.
• 50:52
  They just care about how their wallet feels.
• 50:54
  And politicians will always be pressured
• 50:56
  by those who feel that gas prices are too expensive
• 50:58
  or food's too expensive, whatever.
• 50:59
  But these are, to me, these are minor pains that can be weighted out, so to speak, right?
• 51:05
  Especially if we offer alternative solutions and sourcing.
• 51:09
  In an ideal world.
• 51:11
  Yes, ideal.
• 51:12
  Of course, ideal.
• 51:13
  Yeah, I'm not disagreeing with that point.
• 51:15
  But I'm going to say this, and it may not be comparable in some people's minds, but to me it is.
• 51:20
  The world came together to hunt the Nazis and made sure that they would never, ever reign again or come together.
• 51:24
  It's even taboo for you even to speak about trying to be a Nazi or support Nazism.
• 51:29
  but yet we will not do that with the regime,
• 51:32
  the Islamic regime.
• 51:33
  Not Islam itself, but the Islamic regime,
• 51:35
  who is very fundamentally extreme.
• 51:39
  We won't do that.
• 51:40
  And yet we can argue they've probably killed
• 51:42
  just as many or more people throughout their time
• 51:44
  and existence than maybe the Nazis did.
• 51:47
  And I know, so just hear me out.
• 51:49
  So it may not be directly comparable,
• 51:51
  but that is one thing we can do.
• 51:52
  That's one thing that the world is not doing.
• 51:54
  We're allowing them to exist again, in my opinion,
• 51:57
  because of oil, period.
• 52:00
  Their reaction,
• 52:01
  of the Strait of Hormuz
• 52:02
  isn't the first time.
• 52:03
  They did this in the 80s
• 52:04
  when Reagan was in charge.
• 52:05
  Okay?
• 52:05
  They did the same thing.
• 52:07
  So,
• 52:08
  Iran is the thorn
• 52:09
  of the side
• 52:09
  of the Middle East,
• 52:10
  in my opinion.
• 52:11
  And in my opinion,
• 52:12
  they're hell-bent
• 52:14
  on taking over the world.
• 52:15
  Okay?
• 52:15
  There's two strategies
• 52:16
  they're using.
• 52:17
  We can use a kinetic strategy
• 52:18
  of what they haven't been doing.
• 52:19
  They've been doing that
• 52:20
  in the Middle East
• 52:20
  through proxies.
• 52:21
  But as far as Western nations,
• 52:23
  they've been using
• 52:23
  a soft invasion tactic.
• 52:24
  And we can talk about
• 52:25
  the migration issues
• 52:27
  that are going on
• 52:28
  with all Western nations.
• 52:29
  Right?
• 52:30
  And that's a very complex
• 52:31
  topic. We can probably talk about that another time. We can have you back and we can discuss
• 52:35
  that, but that is a reality that a lot of people are choosing to ignore or not really talk about.
• 52:40
  So that's my opinion. And it's not necessarily opposing what you just said because I think we do
• 52:45
  align on our points, but I think there's a lot of, like you said, there's a lot of nuance. There is,
• 52:50
  there's a lot of nuance there. So that's going to lead me to the next question here.
• 52:56
  Okay.
• 52:58
  Let's talk about the perception of U.S.-Israeli relationships.
• 53:04
  A lot of people are trying to push a narrative that Israel controls the U.S., for example.
• 53:09
  They're also asking, is Israel really an ally to the U.S.?
• 53:13
  But in turn, I also have to ask this, does Israel see the U.S. as an actual strategic ally, right?
• 53:20
  What are your thoughts on that question?
• 53:21
  Okay. My thoughts are very, I mean, there's a few points you made, but can I just respond to what you said about the threat of domestic terrorism?
• 53:33
  Absolutely.
• 53:34
  I don't know if it comes directly from Iran. I think maybe Iran does have the power.
• 53:40
  They do have certain units or whatever that are sleeping units that are ready for when it comes to the day of reckoning.
• 53:48
  But I think there's a lot of ground sympathy within Western regimes amongst progressive, ultra-progressive movements who are sympathetic to Iran for reasons that I would be happy to discuss.
• 54:00
  That's really the essence of my conceptualization of this.
• 54:04
  Real quick though, before you move on.
• 54:06
  But let me get back to…
• 54:07
  Hold on.
• 54:08
  The people who've been caught, who have been carrying out these terrorist acts as recent, actually were Middle Easterns.
• 54:14
  They weren't necessarily…
• 54:16
  Yeah, agreed.
• 54:17
  Yeah, they're more susceptible to,
• 54:19
  yeah, they abide less by the rules.
• 54:21
  It's easier to radicalize them
• 54:22
  and to get them to perpetrate
• 54:24
  these type of actions.
• 54:25
  But there's a lot of sympathy
• 54:27
  in the background for that
• 54:28
  from nationals,
• 54:31
  Western nationals.
• 54:32
  But let me connect this up
• 54:34
  with what you're saying
• 54:36
  about the strategic alliance
• 54:37
  between Israel and America,
• 54:39
  who, in my opinion,
• 54:40
  both see each other
• 54:41
  as strategic allies
• 54:43
  of the first order.
• 54:44
  And for reasons I'll maybe
• 54:45
  try and explain in a brief time,
• 54:47
  I don't want to be long, but this is really the essence of everything.
• 54:50
  And I'll try and tie up quite a few points with this.
• 54:53
  What's really behind all of this, in my humble opinion,
• 54:57
  and I just have to zoom out for two minutes because you're very on the ball.
• 55:02
  So you'll get this in one minute.
• 55:04
  But if I look at China and Taiwan, and I look at Ukraine and Russia,
• 55:09
  and I ask you the question, why did, and I ask this to every podcast I've been on,
• 55:13
  Why is Putin waging an existential war against Ukraine?
• 55:18
  Why?
• 55:19
  Why has he gone to such a length?
• 55:20
  What has Ukraine done to deserve almost like World War III on its doorstep?
• 55:25
  Yeah, but that's the basic question that forms the theory.
• 55:28
  Right, but that's a multi-part question with multiple answers because, you know…
• 55:31
  I'm looking for the simple answer.
• 55:33
  Why?
• 55:33
  It's not a simple answer because one answer is…
• 55:37
  Okay, there's more than one answer because I know the answer you're looking for is defiance of democracy.
• 55:41
  It's defiance of authoritarianism, right?
• 55:42
  You know, becoming more of a democratic society.
• 55:45
  So Putin may view that as an affront to Russia, for example, Russian rule, authoritarian rule.
• 55:50
  But we also have to look at the fact that Putin himself, being part of the old USSR when he was a KGB agent, has always longed to reunite the old USSR.
• 56:00
  And he said that himself multiple times, which is what led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
• 56:08
  Okay, that was an unprovoked attack in where he was trying to regain territory.
• 56:12
  And a lot of people forget about that as well.
• 56:15
  We got 15 territories that were part of the old USSR, right?
• 56:18
  Georgia.
• 56:19
  And now we have multiple nations that were part of those territories
• 56:22
  that are now either NATO members or recognized by NATO.
• 56:25
  Ukraine now being one of those, not a member, but recognized, right?
• 56:29
  And so that's why I said there's multiple answers here.
• 56:32
  You know, there's the affront to authoritarianism, obviously,
• 56:35
  to where, like, look, this is a direct stand against what, you know,
• 56:40
  Russian control stands for in and of itself, right, against Moscow.
• 56:44
  But we also have to see that being a previous territory,
• 56:46
  that there is a lot of sympathizers to Russia as well.
• 56:49
  There's parts of Ukraine where they're more Russian, I guess,
• 56:52
  aligned in terms of culture and whatnot to this day.
• 56:55
  But at the same time, Putin really has always wanted to reunite the old USSR,
• 57:02
  you know, the great Russia, the great imperial Russia.
• 57:05
  And that has always been a goal of his.
• 57:06
  He's getting older and older.
• 57:07
  So I think that's part of his legacy statement, for example.
• 57:10
  And then there's the other argument, which I kind of agree with and don't.
• 57:14
  There's the encroachment of NATO territories, for example.
• 57:17
  Well, kind of yes and no.
• 57:18
  And there have been some of the previous territories that have become NATO members.
• 57:23
  So you can look at that as encroachment on his borders.
• 57:26
  But that was happening in the late 90s and through 2000, I think up to 2014 or so.
• 57:31
  We really haven't had another NATO member, you know, accepted, for example.
• 57:37
  We've had Ukraine recognized.
• 57:38
  but there's a hesitancy there too
• 57:40
  because even though while they are appearing
• 57:42
  to move towards democracy,
• 57:44
  we still can't ignore that they were considered
• 57:47
  one of the most corrupt governments
• 57:48
  on the earth for many, many years.
• 57:51
  And this has been accepted by many.
• 57:53
  Yes, the Ukraine was.
• 57:55
  Ukraine was.
• 57:56
  I'm not saying now,
• 57:57
  and I'm not going to speak to that,
• 57:58
  but they were, right?
• 58:00
  So I think in the back of people's minds
• 58:01
  that's still like,
• 58:03
  have they turned the corner?
• 58:05
  I think Zelensky is wanting to do
• 58:07
  what he has to do to protect his country.
• 58:09
  I mean, nobody wants to be ruled by an opposing force
• 58:12
  or an opposing nation and be absorbed, right?
• 58:14
  But those are some of the answers.
• 58:17
  I know I can keep going,
• 58:18
  but that is some of the answers that I have.
• 58:20
  Okay.
• 58:21
  So I want to respond to that
• 58:22
  because I want to say my,
• 58:24
  I want to try and be a reductionist
• 58:25
  and say that all of these answers are true,
• 58:27
  but they're all part of one sort of meta-narrative,
• 58:30
  I call it.
• 58:31
  That is this authoritarian.
• 58:33
  And maybe I need to just explain it a little bit,
• 58:35
  break it down.
• 58:36
  what this opposing authoritarianism actually means.
• 58:40
  And I think it's quite simple.
• 58:41
  I think that in an authoritarian regime,
• 58:45
  you have those, there are basically two elements to it.
• 58:48
  There are those in the regime, those who enjoy the power,
• 58:50
  and those who are ruled, the ruling and the ruled.
• 58:53
  And the ruling regime in a country of a country
• 58:55
  often enjoy almost absolute power which means absolute entitlement to the full resources of that country which means tremendous power tremendous influence
• 59:06
  tremendous security,
• 59:07
  tremendous privilege, gratification, everything.
• 59:10
  And that, if we take it, reduce it to
• 59:12
  very basic human psychology,
• 59:16
  essentially power corrupts.
• 59:17
  Once you have power,
• 59:18
  once you've attained absolute power
• 59:19
  or any degree of power,
• 59:21
  you'll do anything whatsoever
• 59:22
  to ensure that that's preserved,
• 59:25
  including dealing with any theoretical potential threats,
• 59:28
  however small he might be.
• 59:29
  That is what is in the back of the mind
• 59:31
  or even the front of the mind of the Russian regime,
• 59:34
  Putin himself and everyone.
• 59:35
  And the reason why, as you say,
• 59:37
  you point out, yes, they lost the empire,
• 59:39
  the Russian empire,
• 59:40
  and he's sentimentally trying to restore it.
• 59:42
  It's far more than about sentiment, I think.
• 59:44
  I think because these satellite nations
• 59:46
  themselves have acquired independence,
• 59:48
  that itself is the greatest threat
• 59:49
  to the ruling regime in Russia themselves.
• 59:52
  Because having a democracy,
• 59:53
  even a semi-democracy on your doorstep,
• 59:55
  means that the population in Russia themselves
• 59:57
  are going to start questioning,
• 59:59
  why are we not enjoying the privileges of democracy,
• 1:00:03
  even the partial privileges?
• 1:00:04
  Why are we subject to this ruling regime?
• 1:00:06
  And that for a ruling regime, authoritarian regime,
• 1:00:08
  is the greatest threat ever.
• 1:00:10
  And they will do anything to offset that.
• 1:00:12
  And that is why Putin wants to reunite the Russian regime
• 1:00:16
  to ensure that his power remains unchallenged and is greater.
• 1:00:20
  and he thwarts any thoughts of democracy.
• 1:00:23
  They should all be subject to the Russian regime,
• 1:00:26
  the ruling regime.
• 1:00:27
  The same thing, let me jump quickly across Atlantic
• 1:00:29
  or behind to the North Pacific.
• 1:00:32
  To China, it's exactly the same thing.
• 1:00:34
  Why China is so fixated with Hong Kong and with Taiwan.
• 1:00:38
  For the same reason, China,
• 1:00:39
  the ruling regime of the Chinese empire
• 1:00:41
  has absolute power
• 1:00:42
  and they have entitlement thereby
• 1:00:44
  to the huge massive resources that China offers.
• 1:00:47
  Therefore, the greatest threat to them, I maintain,
• 1:00:49
  is democracy. Democracy has seen them as an aggressive threat because it's a threat not to
• 1:00:53
  the people, but to the ruling regime. Therefore, Taiwan, as a culturally affiliated neighbor
• 1:00:59
  whose population does enjoy affluence, success, and democracy, is a threat because that implants
• 1:01:07
  within the Chinese population the thought, why can't we be like that? And that's why they'll do
• 1:01:11
  anything to undermine Taiwan. Let me come back then to America and Israel very briefly. That,
• 1:01:16
  I think is the fundamental dynamic in forming the Middle East conflict. That is why Iran is so
• 1:01:21
  implacably opposed to Israel, who is 2,000 miles away, essentially. Why do they have such an issue
• 1:01:26
  with Israel? Because Israel is the only, for many years, the only real democracy. And the Iranian
• 1:01:33
  regime is more about power than ideology and religion. I believe that religion and ideology
• 1:01:37
  in these cases is really the vehicle, the means to maintaining absolute power, which corrupts
• 1:01:44
  anyone. And Iran, therefore, the Iranian regime will do anything to ensure that. And Israel in the
• 1:01:49
  Middle East will start giving ideas to the Iranian population. Why can't we have independence? Why
• 1:01:54
  can't we have democracy? It's a threat, the greatest threat to the Iranian regime. That's why they
• 1:01:58
  oppose Israel. Come back to America. Let's say, why is America so strongly aligned with Israel?
• 1:02:04
  Does Israel control America? And I say, no. I say the American people fundamentally realize that
• 1:02:09
  Israel is a strategic asset within this geopolitical dynamic that I've just described.
• 1:02:14
  Because let's take very briefly, what would happen if Israel would disappear?
• 1:02:18
  If Israel were to disappear off the map, what would happen in the Middle East?
• 1:02:21
  And I argue that in the Middle East, it would revert.
• 1:02:24
  Whatever progress is made towards democracy would very possibly, very likely, turn backwards.
• 1:02:30
  The club would turn back.
• 1:02:31
  And all the Middle Eastern regimes would revert to authoritarian dictatorships,
• 1:02:35
  in which the primary focus of the regime is maintaining their own power.
• 1:02:40
  In that constellation, so you have basically five geopolitical extremist regimes.
• 1:02:46
  You have North Korea, you have Russia, you have China, you have the Middle East, sorry, four.
• 1:02:50
  All of whom have a common interest in maintaining the regimes, not the people.
• 1:02:54
  The regimes are maintaining their own power.
• 1:02:56
  And therefore, they will always side one with another against a democracy, because democracy is their strategic enemy.
• 1:03:03
  Because democracy implants within the population thoughts of, let's get rid of this regime.
• 1:03:07
  That's why America understands that without Israel,
• 1:03:11
  they will be the next in line.
• 1:03:13
  The great Satan with or without Israel will be America.
• 1:03:15
  And therefore, America will acquire a very powerful strategic enemy
• 1:03:18
  if Israel is not there to some way placate,
• 1:03:21
  to ameliorate the threat from the Middle East.
• 1:03:23
  And that's why America understands.
• 1:03:25
  It's not that Israel is able to manipulate through Bibi Netanyahu's charm
• 1:03:28
  or whatever, Trump, or because of some files or somewhere.
• 1:03:32
  It's far deeper than that.
• 1:03:33
  It reflects the sentiment of the American people.
• 1:03:35
  I think they fundamentally understand this dynamic, that why they need Israel to protect democracy itself, which is the greatest, which is, without that, America is severely threatened.
• 1:03:47
  That is why Israel fundamentally understands it needs America.
• 1:03:50
  And America understands that Israel is its greatest ally.
• 1:03:53
  In a nutshell, that's the thesis.
• 1:03:56
  Yeah, I'm not going to disagree with why we have the relationship with Israel or the U.S. has a relationship with Israel.
• 1:04:04
  Okay. And I'll touch on that and I'm going to go back to Ukraine for a little, just a little bit.
• 1:04:09
  I'm not going to dwell on it though. But I said a lot to this. No, no, no, no, no, no. You didn't,
• 1:04:14
  you didn't say too much. To be honest, I agree that if Israel wasn't there,
• 1:04:21
  I'm going to, I think that there may be peace for a moment, but if we're going to be honest
• 1:04:26
  with ourselves, the Middle East is going to go back to fighting with each other because now we're
• 1:04:30
  going to get into old tribal disputes coming back up again.
• 1:04:35
  Okay.
• 1:04:35
  Because the Middle East is very tribal.
• 1:04:37
  It really is.
• 1:04:37
  And they have a long memory and they don't forget and evil begets evil and
• 1:04:42
  violence because violence.
• 1:04:43
  And that,
• 1:04:44
  that is very true.
• 1:04:45
  That is very true.
• 1:04:46
  And we've seen it.
• 1:04:47
  And it's,
• 1:04:47
  and it's a reason for a lot of conflict.
• 1:04:49
  You know,
• 1:04:49
  you,
• 1:04:50
  you killed my uncle a thousand years ago.
• 1:04:51
  And then,
• 1:04:52
  so I'm going to kill yours and kill yours and keeps going.
• 1:04:54
  And,
• 1:04:54
  and so most Middle Eastern people or Arabs specifically from what I,
• 1:04:58
  from what I recall and people have talked to,
• 1:05:00
  they have a long memory.
• 1:05:01
  They don't forget.
• 1:05:02
  They really don't.
• 1:05:03
  They don't forget.
• 1:05:04
  And so I think if Israel falls,
• 1:05:07
  it'll look peaceful for a moment,
• 1:05:08
  but it's going to go back to being a very conflicted area
• 1:05:10
  because they can't come to terms with each other.
• 1:05:14
  They can't.
• 1:05:16
  If Iran falls-
• 1:05:16
  It'll go back to authoritarianism.
• 1:05:17
  You think, will it go back to authoritarianism?
• 1:05:19
  Well, there's always going to be authoritarianism
• 1:05:22
  because there hasn't ever been a real example of democracy
• 1:05:25
  in the Middle East aside from Israel, for example.
• 1:05:28
  And so what you said is correct.
• 1:05:29
  anybody in power, absolute power,
• 1:05:32
  as far as we see with the government, that is authoritarian.
• 1:05:35
  They're not going to give it up.
• 1:05:37
  Same thing with the communist government.
• 1:05:38
  It's all the same.
• 1:05:40
  It's all authoritarian in nature.
• 1:05:42
  And their control
• 1:05:44
  extends to the
• 1:05:46
  extent that they can control their people.
• 1:05:48
  Because if there is no people to control,
• 1:05:50
  then what's the point?
• 1:05:51
  That's exactly what's been happening in North Korea.
• 1:05:53
  You can leave North Korea If you don like the government they will not allow you to leave They will punish you for trying to leave In the end they got to capture their people The same thing been going on in Iran
• 1:06:05
  Captured people because they look at people
• 1:06:06
  as resources. That's all they are.
• 1:06:09
  They're assets and resources to be used to their
• 1:06:10
  benefit. But
• 1:06:12
  let me go back to Russia
• 1:06:14
  just for a minute. I don't disagree
• 1:06:16
  with anything you said, and
• 1:06:18
  I agree with that. I don't
• 1:06:20
  believe it's just sentimental for Putin.
• 1:06:22
  I do believe it is part of that.
• 1:06:25
  But if we look at the 15 territories, if we look at Ukraine, I think that Putin miscalculated.
• 1:06:31
  I think that he thought that there was more support for Russia than there was in Ukraine
• 1:06:35
  because there were large parts of Ukraine that were very, again, culturally Russian.
• 1:06:43
  And very much they themselves thought they aligned more with Russian culture than, let's
• 1:06:47
  say, Ukraine.
• 1:06:48
  Because it was part of Russia for so long until the, what was it, 99, I believe.
• 1:06:52
  And so I think that Putin saw that.
• 1:06:57
  They weren't necessarily backed by any Western nation until this attack, to be honest.
• 1:07:01
  The U.S. was supposed to.
• 1:07:03
  We're supposed to, but have we, right?
• 1:07:05
  That's why they gave up their nuclear weapons from the old USSR, the old Russian Empire.
• 1:07:08
  We were supposed to look out for them, but we really haven't done that outside of money and armament.
• 1:07:15
  And so I think if Putin was successful in taking Ukraine, that is a signal to the world, right?
• 1:07:20
  then he would probably try to move on to the next territory the non-nato territories right now
• 1:07:25
  or recognized and so he would continue to do that and the other reason that he would do that is
• 1:07:29
  because it's a signal to the world that look how great we are and look what we can achieve we are
• 1:07:33
  once again more powerful than you thought we were but at the same time it puts his borders if he
• 1:07:37
  gains all the territory back right back up to iran and afghanistan which we know through history
• 1:07:42
  they have always wanted to control and throughout history even if we're talking about iran in the
• 1:07:48
  1940s, you know, and even before that, they were trying to assert their control of Iran
• 1:07:54
  by infiltrating them with their communist ideals, by making inroads with the government
• 1:08:00
  of Iran to try to spread their influence.
• 1:08:03
  They did the same thing in Afghanistan.
• 1:08:05
  And so this is a bigger picture thing.
• 1:08:08
  And, you know, you and I are just, look, in the end, we're all guessing.
• 1:08:11
  We don't know what Putin's actually really thinking.
• 1:08:13
  I'm not talking to him.
• 1:08:14
  You're not.
• 1:08:14
  But at the same time, if we could read the tea leaves and look at the patterns of his behavior, to me, that kind of seems where he's trying to go.
• 1:08:23
  And I'm also going to stick to my guns here.
• 1:08:25
  Hey, I really believe that this is his legacy.
• 1:08:29
  Aside from everything we just discussed, he's going to prove that in his time, he was able to bring Russia back to the great empire it was, really.
• 1:08:37
  And who's he leaving it for?
• 1:08:38
  I mean, and that's the big question.
• 1:08:40
  Who's after Putin?
• 1:08:41
  We don't know what we're going to face after Putin.
• 1:08:42
  And for as crazy as Putin is, we don't know who we're going to face next, right?
• 1:08:47
  So, but getting back to the Middle East, and I can't argue against you because you live
• 1:08:51
  there.
• 1:08:52
  Like, you have the lived experience.
• 1:08:53
  I don't.
• 1:08:54
  But just from the reports and everything that I've said, I've done and who I've talked to,
• 1:08:59
  it's just outside knowledge coming to me.
• 1:09:01
  So, I'm just trying to give you my assessment based on what I know and what people are telling
• 1:09:06
  me.
• 1:09:06
  And also reading history and looking into history.
• 1:09:08
  But I think if Iran falls, I think it's better for them, at least personally.
• 1:09:13
  I think you're correct.
• 1:09:14
  I think the Gulf states, the other Arab nations have realized, look, we can live together.
• 1:09:19
  We can be amicable towards each other, and we don't have to fight each other.
• 1:09:23
  And realistically, we haven't seen other Arab nations necessarily do that.
• 1:09:27
  It's been Iranian proxies that have been attacking Israel, not Saudi Arabia or Qatar or anybody, right?
• 1:09:34
  So I think I agree with you.
• 1:09:37
  I do.
• 1:09:38
  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
• 1:09:38
  Yeah, no, I think they've become pragmatic.
• 1:09:41
  I think people like a nation like Saudi Arabia would gladly make peace,
• 1:09:47
  would be far more inclined to resolve the conflict with Israel
• 1:09:51
  and come to a peace accommodation.
• 1:09:53
  They're only afraid of essentially the media and the more extremist
• 1:09:56
  anti-Israel elements that exist within Saudi Arabia.
• 1:10:00
  These regimes have become more pragmatic.
• 1:10:03
  They've become more concerned with the welfare of their own populations
• 1:10:06
  than with their own power.
• 1:10:08
  I oversimplify it maybe,
• 1:10:10
  but the lens I see everything through
• 1:10:11
  is through the people
• 1:10:14
  and through the power regime.
• 1:10:16
  And what's the power dynamic?
• 1:10:17
  And everything flows
• 1:10:18
  from the regime
• 1:10:20
  trying to extend its power.
• 1:10:21
  Like you said,
• 1:10:22
  communists wanted more influence
• 1:10:25
  in Iran, the Middle East,
• 1:10:26
  in Afghanistan, etc.
• 1:10:27
  It's all a means
• 1:10:28
  because communism
• 1:10:29
  was just a means to power
• 1:10:30
  for the ruling regime.
• 1:10:31
  They offered extreme power.
• 1:10:33
  Socialism and then communism
• 1:10:34
  is really an excuse, I think,
• 1:10:36
  for power,
• 1:10:36
  for maintaining power.
• 1:10:37
  It's like Islamic ideology, religion,
• 1:10:40
  but in terms of a secular ideology,
• 1:10:42
  which confers extreme power on the regime.
• 1:10:45
  And therefore the regime will do everything it can
• 1:10:46
  to perpetuate and increase the influence
• 1:10:50
  of that ideology because it benefits them.
• 1:10:53
  I boil it down ultimately to personal gratification
• 1:10:57
  and benefit.
• 1:10:58
  It's really what drives all of that.
• 1:11:00
  And that's how to view it.
• 1:11:02
  Right.
• 1:11:03
  Right.
• 1:11:04
  I think that all we can do at this point is see how it plays out.
• 1:11:11
  And we don't…
• 1:11:13
  I think Trump is like the last stand.
• 1:11:17
  Yeah.
• 1:11:17
  I think the key factors are how far does Trump want to go, number one.
• 1:11:22
  Number two…
• 1:11:22
  He wants to go very far.
• 1:11:23
  Well, he says that.
• 1:11:25
  But I also think he's holding back because I don't think he wants to be held responsible for…
• 1:11:30
  Yeah.
• 1:11:30
  It's a delicate game.
• 1:11:32
  Yeah, what may come if he really did.
• 1:11:34
  And two, it's really going to come down to, as you said before,
• 1:11:37
  how much support China and Russia can provide Iran.
• 1:11:42
  And maybe even North Korea.
• 1:11:44
  I haven't seen their involvement too much.
• 1:11:45
  But you're right.
• 1:11:46
  They are an ally.
• 1:11:47
  They are an ally.
• 1:11:48
  And Kim Jong-un may be crazy enough to do something
• 1:11:51
  just because he's bored.
• 1:11:52
  He does seem like an appellate child at times.
• 1:11:55
  So that's a possibility.
• 1:11:58
  But China has been watching.
• 1:11:59
  They have been supplying arms.
• 1:12:01
  Quite a lot of the missile technology has been coming from North Korea in the last year or two.
• 1:12:06
  Yeah, I'm just saying in this conflict, I haven't heard of the resupplies happening.
• 1:12:11
  I mean, I know they're involved, but maybe I'm wrong.
• 1:12:13
  Maybe I missed it.
• 1:12:14
  I haven't seen any reports of North Korea sending anything to them recently or within this particular conflict.
• 1:12:21
  And China has been using this as a learning experience.
• 1:12:24
  I've got to be honest.
• 1:12:24
  I don't think China thought that the U.S. would respond the way they did.
• 1:12:27
  I think a lot of people view the U.S. as weak because we haven't been in any military engagements for many years.
• 1:12:33
  A lot of people saw us as being our military being in a state of atrophy.
• 1:12:37
  And then after what happened in Venezuela, people were like, wait a minute.
• 1:12:41
  I can't believe they just did that.
• 1:12:43
  And then here's the Iran response.
• 1:12:46
  So it's very interesting.
• 1:12:48
  And in turn, because of all this, people are viewing Israel as the great evil.
• 1:12:53
  They looking at the U as not an ally as we should be to our other allies Everybody wants to pull away from At least they saying this in the media
• 1:13:04
  We don't know what happens behind closed doors.
• 1:13:05
  A lot of this could all just be theater as well.
• 1:13:08
  But this leads me to where I want to ask you,
• 1:13:12
  these are going to be opinions based on the sentiment
• 1:13:14
  that people have against Israel,
• 1:13:16
  mostly by these propagandists in my eyes or these what I call podfluencers.
• 1:13:20
  So your thoughts on that?
• 1:13:21
  And this happens in the podcast space more than I see maybe in legacy media.
• 1:13:26
  But the push for people like, let's just be honest.
• 1:13:28
  We got Tucker Carlson.
• 1:13:30
  We got Dave Smith.
• 1:13:30
  We got all these guys out there.
• 1:13:33
  Candace Owens.
• 1:13:34
  All these people that are considered influential, that have big names, that suddenly, well, Candace has been on a long journey of saying this for a while.
• 1:13:43
  But a lot of them seem to have been turning their back more and more and pushing the narrative that Israel is not a benefit, that America does nothing but die for Israel.
• 1:13:51
  That all we do is provide, provide, and get nothing back.
• 1:13:55
  And the only point I can say is this, and I don't know how you feel as far as the money.
• 1:13:59
  We give Israel over $3 billion a year, guaranteed.
• 1:14:03
  That's not everything we give.
• 1:14:04
  We actually have that agreement.
• 1:14:07
  And people do question, why are we giving Israel so much money?
• 1:14:10
  So with that, first off, tell me your feelings on these podcasters.
• 1:14:15
  These people that seem to be deliberately stirring the pot to get people to hate Israel or the Israeli government anyway.
• 1:14:21
  What are your thoughts on that?
• 1:14:23
  So I think the podcasters, I think they're doing this because they're feeding on the ready audience who is willing to hear this type of rhetoric.
• 1:14:35
  Seems a popular type of rhetoric.
• 1:14:36
  So I think it's symptomatic of the deeper division within society.
• 1:14:41
  I think there's a, we don't have time to get into this, but I view it as anti-establishment really.
• 1:14:48
  it's anti-patriotic
• 1:14:51
  they seem to have something against
• 1:14:53
  because the way I described it
• 1:14:55
  supporting Israel is actually strategically
• 1:14:57
  supporting America itself
• 1:14:59
  American democracy
• 1:15:00
  so I think deeper down there is a problem
• 1:15:02
  with these influencers or more with
• 1:15:04
  the audiences of millions
• 1:15:06
  who have for some reason which
• 1:15:08
  we don't have time to go into
• 1:15:10
  they have a problem with the American democratic
• 1:15:12
  establishment itself as it currently
• 1:15:15
  is conceived
• 1:15:16
  as a semi-religious democratic,
• 1:15:19
  these ideals,
• 1:15:20
  these conservative ideals,
• 1:15:22
  which I think are the basis
• 1:15:23
  of Western democratic society,
• 1:15:26
  are for many people anathema.
• 1:15:29
  And that's why they seem to support
• 1:15:31
  these tyrannical dictatorships,
• 1:15:33
  which seems to be,
• 1:15:35
  if you're somebody on the left
• 1:15:36
  who believes in human rights,
• 1:15:38
  there seems to be a lot of hypocrisy
• 1:15:39
  and self-contradiction here
• 1:15:40
  in being sympathetic to regimes like Iran,
• 1:15:43
  even China and maybe North Korea.
• 1:15:46
  And I think that's because they have a deeper agenda, which is an anti-establishment agenda, anti-democracy as it's currently functioning at the moment.
• 1:15:55
  They want a socialist regime.
• 1:15:57
  And I view that in the book, I get into that, as a power struggle, a deep power struggle.
• 1:16:02
  And I think that's what they're playing to, to the sentiments of those who feel disempowered by the current regime, particularly the Trump regime.
• 1:16:10
  The conservative, Republican, conservative, religious ideology and democratic regime,
• 1:16:18
  I think they feel threatened by it deeply.
• 1:16:21
  Seems like a propaganda campaign for sure.
• 1:16:24
  It's almost causing the question as to whether these people are being paid or coerced to
• 1:16:28
  spread this messaging, probably through monetary gains, I'm sure.
• 1:16:30
  Possibly, but they're amenable to it.
• 1:16:31
  Whether or not they're being paid, they're amenable to it.
• 1:16:34
  I get it.
• 1:16:36
  So there's that.
• 1:16:38
  and I don't know
• 1:16:40
  you know what
• 1:16:40
  we can keep going
• 1:16:41
  but I think we've been
• 1:16:42
  talking a long time already
• 1:16:43
  yeah yeah yeah
• 1:16:44
  maybe we'll do a different
• 1:16:45
  session if you're interested
• 1:16:46
  no no no
• 1:16:46
  we should have you back
• 1:16:48
  because as I said
• 1:16:49
  offline before we recorded
• 1:16:51
  it's like
• 1:16:51
  everything we're talking
• 1:16:53
  about the subject matter
• 1:16:54
  it's
• 1:16:55
  this can go on for
• 1:16:56
  forever probably
• 1:16:58
  it's you know
• 1:16:59
  it changes daily
• 1:17:00
  so yeah I would love
• 1:17:01
  to have you back
• 1:17:02
  we'll definitely discuss
• 1:17:03
  more of this type of
• 1:17:05
  discussion for sure
• 1:17:06
  moving forward
• 1:17:07
  but before we get there
• 1:17:09
  or before we sign off
• 1:17:10
  I mean
• 1:17:10
  why don't you tell people
• 1:17:12
  where they can get your book
• 1:17:13
  your current book
• 1:17:14
  Beyond Power
• 1:17:15
  okay
• 1:17:15
  it's not that complicated
• 1:17:16
  it's on Amazon really
• 1:17:17
  that's the main place
• 1:17:18
  it's called Beyond Power
• 1:17:19
  if you type in
• 1:17:21
  Daniel Bookman
• 1:17:22
  Beyond Power on Amazon
• 1:17:22
  you'll get it
• 1:17:24
  it's only three dollars
• 1:17:25
  two of which I think
• 1:17:27
  go to Amazon
• 1:17:28
  to
• 1:17:28
  Jeff Bezos himself
• 1:17:30
  I think I get one dollar
• 1:17:32
  so
• 1:17:33
  it's not about the money
• 1:17:34
  you're just giving out
• 1:17:34
  the information for free
• 1:17:36
  basically
• 1:17:36
  I'm happy to
• 1:17:38
  because it's more about the ideas
• 1:17:39
  trying to get people to think
• 1:17:41
  understood
• 1:17:41
  more deeply about these things
• 1:17:43
  that's it
• 1:17:45
  I don't really have a presence
• 1:17:47
  and I'm from a religious community
• 1:17:49
  it's not over encouraged exposure
• 1:17:51
  to the general media
• 1:17:52
  understood
• 1:17:53
  I'm partly here to deal with things
• 1:17:55
  like anti-Zionism
• 1:17:56
  anti-Semitism
• 1:17:57
  religion
• 1:17:58
  things like that
• 1:17:58
  that's my justification
• 1:17:59
  for being here
• 1:18:00
  I don't have a fancy homepage
• 1:18:04
  or something like that
• 1:18:05
  no no no
• 1:18:05
  No, but it's still good for you to do what you're doing
• 1:18:08
  because if you're not having these conversations publicly
• 1:18:10
  and using media to do so,
• 1:18:12
  we're not going to hear your perspective, right?
• 1:18:14
  Right.
• 1:18:14
  So I think it's a great justification.
• 1:18:17
  And I understand that maybe you're not on social media
• 1:18:19
  and all that.
• 1:18:19
  It was probably good for you.
• 1:18:21
  Yeah, yeah.
• 1:18:22
  I think so.
• 1:18:22
  My wife says it's not the right place.
• 1:18:24
  And the rabbis say so.
• 1:18:25
  Yeah, we just don't go there.
• 1:18:26
  Okay.
• 1:18:26
  So we can get your book on Amazon.
• 1:18:28
  And then you have…
• 1:18:29
  Send your link if it's relevant.
• 1:18:31
  Yeah, no, I'll make sure everybody has the links.
• 1:18:34
  and we'll have your profile on my website
• 1:18:38
  if you're okay with that
• 1:18:39
  because at least they get a little information on you.
• 1:18:41
  They can click the link from there.
• 1:18:43
  Yeah, right.
• 1:18:44
  Yeah, and then you have your website.
• 1:18:46
  Again, at least it's some information about your book
• 1:18:49
  and maybe a little bit about you.
• 1:18:51
  Right.
• 1:18:51
  But outside of that,
• 1:18:53
  is there anything else you want to say?
• 1:18:56
  No, I want to say thank you
• 1:18:57
  to you, George, for having me on this distinguished podcast.
• 1:19:01
  No, I encourage people.
• 1:19:03
  I think I'm here to encourage people to try and think,
• 1:19:05
  not just accept the media narratives.
• 1:19:07
  I mean, that sounds a bit cliched maybe,
• 1:19:09
  but maybe a good way to think is to read my book.
• 1:19:12
  If not to agree with me,
• 1:19:14
  like you didn't agree with a lot of things
• 1:19:15
  or you challenge it.
• 1:19:16
  Challenge the thing.
• 1:19:17
  Let's start to think more deeply about what's going on
• 1:19:20
  rather than just reacting automatically.
• 1:19:23
  I think that's my agenda.
• 1:19:25
  Right.
• 1:19:25
  Devils hide behind redemption.
• 1:19:28
  Honesty is a one-way gate to hell.
• 1:19:33
  Bye.