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The yellow rotor blade flew four hundred meters - could they stop the crash? · Aviation Survival Stories

• 0:03
  Speaker 1: One rotor blade landed 400 meters from everything else. The
• 0:08
  Speaker 1: fuselage came down in Looters Park, Compton, on the morning
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: of August 14th, 1968. The engines came down with it.
• 0:15
  Speaker 1: The tail section came down with it. 21 people came
• 0:18
  Speaker 1: down with it, and not one of them survived. But
• 0:21
  Speaker 1: one yellow blade kept traveling, 400 meters in the opposite direction, alone,
• 0:26
  Speaker 1: before it touched ground.
• 0:28
  Speaker 2: That distance is not scatter. It is not wind.
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: It is a clue, and the question it asks is
• 0:33
  Speaker 1: not the question you expect, not what happened to Los
• 0:36
  Speaker 1: Angeles Airways Flight 417, but why the test built to
• 0:39
  Speaker 1: catch what killed it looked directly at the failure and
• 0:41
  Speaker 1: found nothing at all. Eighteen passengers and three crew members
• 0:45
  Speaker 1: were aboard. Ninety-one people stood on the ground and watched
• 0:49
  Speaker 1: it happen in real time, and none of them could
• 0:51
  Speaker 1: stop it, and none of them yet understood what they
• 0:53
  Speaker 1: were seeing.
• 0:55
  Speaker 2: It was not a storm. It was not pilot error.
• 0:58
  Speaker 2: It was not a collision.
• 1:00
  Speaker 1: What destroyed Flight 417 was a crack, invisible, patient, growing
• 1:05
  Speaker 1: quietly inside a metal part the size of a large bolt.
• 1:08
  Speaker 1: That crack had been there long enough to be inspected.
• 1:11
  Speaker 1: It had passed, and no one in the maintenance chain,
• 1:13
  Speaker 1: no one at the inspection station, has ever been able
• 1:16
  Speaker 1: to explain why the process built to find exactly this
• 1:18
  Speaker 1: kind of flaw found nothing. That unanswered question is where
• 1:23
  Speaker 1: this story lives. Hold on to three things as it unfolds.
• 1:27
  Speaker 1: The aircraft itself, Because its registration, N30Y, was not just
• 1:31
  Speaker 1: any helicopter. A manufacturing step called shot peening. So routine,
• 1:36
  Speaker 1: it barely earns a line in a maintenance log. Until
• 1:38
  Speaker 1: the day its absence helps kill 21 people. And a date,
• 1:42
  Speaker 1: August 16th, 1968. Two days after the crash. The day
• 1:46
  Speaker 1: regulators finally moved. And moved only after the bodies had
• 1:49
  Speaker 1: already been counted. In the summer of 1968, Los Angeles
• 1:53
  Speaker 1: was a city that flew to Disneyland. Say that sentence
• 1:56
  Speaker 1: slowly and it still sounds strange, but it was the
• 1:58
  Speaker 1: plain logic of Los Angeles Airways. The company ran scheduled
• 2:02
  Speaker 1: helicopter service across the metropolitan area, and its flagship route
• 2:05
  Speaker 1: connected Los Angeles International Airport to the Disneyland Heliport in Anaheim.
• 2:10
  Speaker 1: People booked seats on it the way they booked a
• 2:11
  Speaker 1: commuter train. Schedules, seat assignments, the quiet, unexamined expectation that
• 2:16
  Speaker 1: the machine would do what machines like it always did.
• 2:19
  Speaker 1: Nobody boarding that morning was taking a risk they could name.
• 2:22
  Speaker 1: They were going to work, or they were going to
• 2:24
  Speaker 1: a theme park. And either way, they were doing the
• 2:26
  Speaker 1: single most ordinary thing a person could do in Los
• 2:29
  Speaker 1: Angeles in the summer of 1968. Trusting a scheduled machine
• 2:32
  Speaker 1: to lift them over the freeways and set them down
• 2:34
  Speaker 1: again 20 minutes later. Exactly where the timetable said it would.
• 2:38
  Speaker 1: They were trusting a stranger they would never meet to
• 2:40
  Speaker 1: have looked at a piece of metal they would never
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: see and pronounced its sound.
• 2:44
  Speaker 2: That is not naivety. It is the only way anyone
• 2:46
  Speaker 2: has ever flown.
• 2:48
  Speaker 1: Every passenger who has ever boarded any aircraft has made
• 2:50
  Speaker 1: that same unspoken agreement. And almost every single time, it holds.
• 2:55
  Speaker 1: The aircraft assigned to the route that day was a
• 2:57
  Speaker 1: Sikorsky S-61L, registration N30Y, serial number 61031. That serial number
• 3:04
  Speaker 1: is worth remembering, because this was not simply one helicopter
• 3:07
  Speaker 1: among many in a fleet. It was the prototype, the
• 3:10
  Speaker 1: very first S-61L ever built. The airframe used to prove
• 3:13
  Speaker 1: the entire model could fly paying passengers safely. By the
• 3:17
  Speaker 1: morning of August 14th, that prototype had logged 11,863.64 hours
• 3:20
  Speaker 1: in the air, 11,000 hours of blades biting into air,
• 3:27
  Speaker 1: of metal loading and unloading, stress and release, stress and release,
• 3:31
  Speaker 1: tens of millions of times over. It had already flown
• 3:34
  Speaker 1: three round trips before Flight 417 even boarded. The first
• 3:37
  Speaker 1: departure that day left at 6.07 in the morning. By
• 3:40
  Speaker 1: the time the fourth crew took the controls, the aircraft
• 3:43
  Speaker 1: had already put in a full shift. The man in
• 3:46
  Speaker 1: the left seat was Captain Kenneth Lee Wagoner. He had
• 3:49
  Speaker 1: learned to fly helicopters in the United States Marine Corps,
• 3:51
  Speaker 1: where the job was never a desk assignment.
• 3:53
  Speaker 2: Where hours in the air meant something closer to survival
• 3:56
  Speaker 2: than to routine.
• 3:57
  Speaker 1: By 1968, he had carried that discipline into a civilian cockpit,
• 4:00
  Speaker 1: flying the same short hop over and over, professional enough
• 4:03
  Speaker 1: that a fourth trip on a full day never felt
• 4:05
  Speaker 1: like anything but Tuesday. Before every departure, the crew ran
• 4:09
  Speaker 1: the numbers. A pilot runs without thinking twice. Fuel at 1,000
• 4:13
  Speaker 1: pounds of JP4, gross weight 7,795 kilograms against a certified
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: limit of 8,600, center of gravity inside its bounds. Every
• 4:23
  Speaker 1: figure came back clean. Nothing on the paperwork, and nothing
• 4:27
  Speaker 1: in 11,000 hours of history, gave anyone a reason to hesitate.
• 4:31
  Speaker 1: At 10.26, Flight 417 lifted off and turned east under
• 4:34
  Speaker 1: a clear sky, on a routing the crew had flown before.
• 4:38
  Speaker 1: Two minutes and 15 seconds later, air traffic control cleared
• 4:40
  Speaker 1: them onward. At 10.29 and 30 seconds, Wagoner reported his
• 4:44
  Speaker 1: position to Hawthorne Tower, eastbound on Imperial Highway, 1,200 feet.
• 4:49
  Speaker 1: Three minutes and 25 seconds after that, the controller's voice
• 4:51
  Speaker 1: came through one final time.
• 4:54
  Speaker 2: Seven miles to the east. Radar service terminated.
• 4:58
  Speaker 1: Waggoner answered the way he had answered a thousand routine
• 5:00
  Speaker 1: handoffs before it.
• 5:02
  Speaker 2: 417, thank you. Those were the last words anyone heard
• 5:06
  Speaker 2: from the aircraft. Not a warning. Not a hesitation.
• 5:10
  Speaker 1: The ordinary, unhurried cadence of a professional finishing a job
• 5:13
  Speaker 1: he had done more times than he could count. What
• 5:15
  Speaker 1: happened next was witnessed by 91 people standing in yards,
• 5:19
  Speaker 1: on sidewalks, outside storefronts along Rosecrans Avenue near Looters Park.
• 5:23
  Speaker 1: First a sound that was wrong. A note that did
• 5:26
  Speaker 1: not belong in the ordinary rhythm of rotor noise. Then
• 5:28
  Speaker 1: something separated from the helicopter in the open air above them.
• 5:32
  Speaker 1: Then the aircraft began to rotate and destabilize, and fall.
• 5:36
  Speaker 1: The yellow blade came down 400 meters from everything else.
• 5:39
  Speaker 1: It had gone first, before the rest of the machine
• 5:41
  Speaker 1: even finished failing. And bolted to the fragment of blade
• 5:44
  Speaker 1: sleeve still clinging to it was a broken piece of spindle,
• 5:46
  Speaker 1: stamped with an identifier that would end up explaining almost everything. AJ-19.
• 5:52
  Speaker 1: Investigators found the fracture at the neck of that spindle,
• 5:54
  Speaker 1: right where it met the shoulder at its inboard end.
• 5:57
  Speaker 1: Laboratory analysis named the failure precisely, high cycle, low stress fatigue.
• 6:01
  Speaker 2: That phrase is not an afternoon's damage. It is not
• 6:04
  Speaker 2: a week's damage.
• 6:05
  Speaker 1: It is a crack that accumulates across thousands of small,
• 6:07
  Speaker 1: invisible load cycles, each one meaningless on its own. Each
• 6:10
  Speaker 1: one moving the metal one increment closer to a threshold,
• 6:13
  Speaker 1: it will reach exactly once and not survive. How long
• 6:17
  Speaker 1: had it been growing? Long enough, the physical evidence suggests.
• 6:20
  Speaker 1: to have already existed at the time of the aircraft's
• 6:22
  Speaker 1: last scheduled inspection.
• 6:25
  Speaker 2: Picture that inspection.
• 6:26
  Speaker 1: A technician in a maintenance bay runs a process called MagnaGlo,
• 6:30
  Speaker 1: magnetic particle testing, built for precisely this purpose. Dust the
• 6:34
  Speaker 1: component with magnetic particles, induce a field, watch where the
• 6:37
  Speaker 1: particles cluster. They cluster at discontinuities. They cluster at cracks.
• 6:42
  Speaker 1: It is a careful, deliberate, well-designed method, performed by someone
• 6:45
  Speaker 1: doing their job the way it was meant to be done.
• 6:48
  Speaker 1: On a healthy spindle, the particles sit still, and even
• 6:51
  Speaker 1: dusting with nothing underneath to gather them. On a cracked one,
• 6:55
  Speaker 1: they pool along the flaw like iron filings finding a
• 6:57
  Speaker 1: hidden magnet, and a trained eye is supposed to catch
• 7:00
  Speaker 1: that gathering the moment it appears. That is the entire
• 7:03
  Speaker 1: premise of the method. That is why the airline trusted it,
• 7:06
  Speaker 1: and why the passengers who never heard the word MagnaGlo
• 7:08
  Speaker 1: in their lives were trusting it too, without knowing it existed.
• 7:12
  Speaker 1: The particles did not cluster in a way that raised alarm.
• 7:15
  Speaker 2: AJ-19 passed.
• 7:17
  Speaker 1: The crack, investigators later concluded, was already there. The inspection
• 7:21
  Speaker 1: did not find it. No procedure was flagged. No lapse
• 7:24
  Speaker 1: of attention was noted. No equipment fault was ever recorded.
• 7:27
  Speaker 1: The spindle simply went back into the aircraft, and the
• 7:30
  Speaker 1: aircraft went back onto the route and flew three more
• 7:32
  Speaker 1: round trips between Los Angeles International and Anaheim before Flight
• 7:36
  Speaker 1: 417 ever pushed back from the gate. For three flights,
• 7:39
  Speaker 1: 18 strangers at a time sat above a crack that
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: a careful, competent process had already looked at and cleared.
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: The spindle itself had been vulnerable long before any of
• 7:48
  Speaker 1: those flights. Laboratory analysis found the metal at the critical
• 7:52
  Speaker 1: point had hardness just below specification, not dramatically, but enough.
• 7:56
  Speaker 1: Its internal grain structure showed banding, a layered unevenness that
• 8:00
  Speaker 1: spread stress the wrong way through the material instead of
• 8:02
  Speaker 1: absorbing it cleanly. And the surface, which had received shot peening,
• 8:05
  Speaker 1: the process meant to bombard it with tiny pellets and
• 8:07
  Speaker 1: leave behind a protective layer of compressive stress, had not
• 8:10
  Speaker 1: been peened enough. Worse, a plating step applied afterward, may
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: have left the surface carrying residual tensile stress in the
• 8:17
  Speaker 1: opposite direction, quietly encouraging the very crack.
• 8:20
  Speaker 2: It should have resisted. Three separate failures, stacked inside a
• 8:23
  Speaker 2: piece of metal a few inches across. None of them sudden.
• 8:27
  Speaker 1: All of them, in principle, the kind of thing an
• 8:29
  Speaker 1: inspection and certification system exists to catch. Take away any
• 8:32
  Speaker 1: one of the three, and the story likely changes. Proper
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: hardness alone might have resisted the crack's start. Even, well-formed
• 8:39
  Speaker 1: grain alone might have carried the load without bending it
• 8:41
  Speaker 1: unevenly toward failure. A fully compressive, correctly peened surface alone
• 8:44
  Speaker 1: might have held the crack shut before it ever had
• 8:46
  Speaker 1: room to open. It took all three at once, in
• 8:49
  Speaker 1: the same few inches of the same part, to turn 11,000
• 8:52
  Speaker 1: routine hours into a fatal one. This was not a
• 8:55
  Speaker 1: tired old machine patched together after years of neglect. It
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: was a working aircraft inside a scheduled airline, under federal oversight,
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: maintained on manufacturer protocols, inspected on intervals built for exactly this.
• 9:07
  Speaker 1: It happened also to be the prototype, the airframe with
• 9:10
  Speaker 1: more hours than any other of its kind, in continuous
• 9:13
  Speaker 1: revenue service since the.
• 9:14
  Speaker 2: Model was introduced.
• 9:14
  Speaker 1: 11,000 hours of short flights, dozens of takeoffs and landings
• 9:19
  Speaker 1: a week, loading and unloading the rotor system in precisely
• 9:22
  Speaker 1: the rhythm that breeds high cycle fatigue. 91 people on
• 9:25
  Speaker 1: the ground watched what that accumulation finally produced. Their accounts
• 9:29
  Speaker 1: agreed with each other. The wrong sound first, then a
• 9:32
  Speaker 1: blade gone, then the aircraft losing its balance without it,
• 9:35
  Speaker 1: the asymmetric thrust tearing at the airframe until the tail
• 9:37
  Speaker 1: section separated too. would have been a flying machine a
• 9:40
  Speaker 1: moment earlier fell into Looters Park and burned. Here is
• 9:43
  Speaker 1: the number that changes the shape of this story, and
• 9:45
  Speaker 1: it is not 11,863. It is two. Flight 417 was
• 9:51
  Speaker 1: not the first fatal accident. Los Angeles Airways suffered that year.
• 9:55
  Speaker 1: Months earlier, Flight 841 had also gone down. On the
• 9:59
  Speaker 1: same route between the same aircraft, and the same Anaheim heliport,
• 10:02
  Speaker 1: flown by the same company. Two total losses, same operator,
• 10:06
  Speaker 1: same year, same narrow corridor of sky above the same neighborhoods.
• 10:10
  Speaker 1: That fact does not change what the metal in AJ19 was.
• 10:13
  Speaker 1: The spindle failed because of what it was, under hard,
• 10:16
  Speaker 1: under peened, a crack that inspection missed. Those are physical
• 10:20
  Speaker 1: facts and they do not bend. But they sit inside
• 10:22
  Speaker 1: a larger fact that is harder to look away from.
• 10:24
  Speaker 1: A scheduled passenger airline had now lost two aircraft in
• 10:27
  Speaker 1: a single calendar year, and the second loss left 21
• 10:30
  Speaker 1: people dead, with no survivors at all. Two days after
• 10:34
  Speaker 1: the wreckage came out of Looters Park, the Federal Aviation
• 10:36
  Speaker 1: Administration issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive 68-19-07. It did not recommend caution.
• 10:44
  Speaker 1: It did not suggest closer monitoring.
• 10:46
  Speaker 2: It ordered removal.
• 10:48
  Speaker 1: Any S61 series spindle carrying 3,000 or more flight hours
• 10:51
  Speaker 1: was to come out of service immediately, unless it could
• 10:53
  Speaker 1: be separately qualified against the Sikorsky maintenance manual. A list
• 10:57
  Speaker 1: of serial numbers went out with it. Not re-inspected. Not re-evaluated.
• 11:01
  Speaker 2: Removed.
• 11:02
  Speaker 1: Somewhere, on some other S61, on some other route, a
• 11:06
  Speaker 1: spindle just like AJ-19 came out of an aircraft before
• 11:09
  Speaker 1: its own crack ever had the chance to finish growing.
• 11:12
  Speaker 1: That is what the directive bought. Two days too late
• 11:14
  Speaker 1: for the people over Compton and just in time for
• 11:16
  Speaker 1: everyone who flew after them. The directive would be amended
• 11:19
  Speaker 1: twice more as the investigation deepened and the picture of
• 11:22
  Speaker 1: the metal sharpened. And the deeper the investigators went, the
• 11:26
  Speaker 1: harder the easy answer became to hold onto. Consider the
• 11:30
  Speaker 1: innocent version of events first. If the MagnaGlo inspection was correct,
• 11:34
  Speaker 1: if the crack genuinely did not exist yet at the
• 11:36
  Speaker 1: moment the particles were applied, then the entire failure, initiation,
• 11:39
  Speaker 1: and growth both happened inside the gap between that final
• 11:42
  Speaker 1: check and the accident, a flaw moving faster than the
• 11:45
  Speaker 1: inspection schedule could contain it. Under that version, No one failed.
• 11:49
  Speaker 1: The system was not negligent, only outrun. That version is possible.
• 11:54
  Speaker 1: It is not what the evidence points to. The National
• 11:57
  Speaker 1: Transportation Safety Board's findings lean the other way. The crack,
• 12:00
  Speaker 1: the record states, was considered present at the time of
• 12:02
  Speaker 1: the last inspection.
• 12:04
  Speaker 2: Not certain. The word chosen is considered.
• 12:07
  Speaker 1: But the physical evidence on the fracture surface supported a
• 12:09
  Speaker 1: crack old enough to have already existed at that final clearance,
• 12:12
  Speaker 1: which means the inspection had it in front of the
• 12:14
  Speaker 1: equipment and returned AJ-19 to service anyway. Not because a
• 12:18
  Speaker 1: technician was careless. The record names no careless decision. Not
• 12:22
  Speaker 1: because a supervisor overruled a finding. The record names no
• 12:25
  Speaker 1: override and no individual at all. What the record says
• 12:28
  Speaker 1: instead is simpler and harder to sit with. The inspection method,
• 12:32
  Speaker 1: applied exactly as designed by someone doing the job correctly,
• 12:35
  Speaker 1: did not find a crack the physical evidence says was
• 12:37
  Speaker 1: already there. Whether the particles failed to cluster visibly at
• 12:41
  Speaker 1: a defect buried below the surface, whether the cracked shape
• 12:44
  Speaker 1: made it hard to separate from ordinary surface texture, Whether
• 12:48
  Speaker 1: something and how the test was carried out simply fell
• 12:50
  Speaker 1: short on that particular day. None of that has ever
• 12:52
  Speaker 1: been publicly resolved. What the evidence does support is this.
• 12:57
  Speaker 1: A manufacturing floor produced a spindle that did not meet
• 12:59
  Speaker 1: its own hardness specification. A surface treatment meant to guard
• 13:03
  Speaker 1: against exactly this kind of fatigue did not perform as required.
• 13:06
  Speaker 1: An inspection built to be the last line of defense
• 13:09
  Speaker 1: passed the very defect it existed to catch. And an aircraft,
• 13:12
  Speaker 1: the first of its kind, flew 11,000, 863 hours before
• 13:16
  Speaker 1: that chain reached its final link over a residential neighborhood
• 13:19
  Speaker 1: in Compton. No single person decided that 21 people would
• 13:22
  Speaker 1: die on a clear August morning. What the record describes
• 13:26
  Speaker 1: instead is a chain of ordinary, well-intentioned work, each link
• 13:29
  Speaker 1: performed by someone trying to do their job right, that
• 13:32
  Speaker 1: still produced the worst possible outcome when placed end to end.
• 13:36
  Speaker 1: You have flown, or someone you love has flown, on
• 13:38
  Speaker 1: the same truss those 18 passengers extended without a second thought.
• 13:42
  Speaker 2: You do not inspect the spindle yourself. You cannot.
• 13:45
  Speaker 1: You trust a stranger with a jar of magnetic particles
• 13:47
  Speaker 1: and years of training to look at a piece of
• 13:49
  Speaker 1: metal you will never see and tell you, correctly, almost
• 13:52
  Speaker 1: every single.
• 13:53
  Speaker 2: Time, that it is safe.
• 13:54
  Speaker 1: 18 people did exactly that on the morning of August 14th.
• 13:58
  Speaker 1: They were not careless. They did what flying has always
• 14:01
  Speaker 1: required every passenger to do. That is the quiet, uncomfortable
• 14:05
  Speaker 1: center of this story. The system was not staffed by villains.
• 14:09
  Speaker 1: It was staffed by people performing careful, well-designed procedures competently.
• 14:13
  Speaker 1: And the procedure itself, had a blind spot none of
• 14:15
  Speaker 1: them could see from inside it. Captain Wagoner never knew
• 14:19
  Speaker 1: any of this.
• 14:20
  Speaker 2: He flew marine helicopters before he flew passenger routes over
• 14:22
  Speaker 2: the Los Angeles basin, and on the morning of his
• 14:25
  Speaker 2: last flight, nothing in his voice suggested he needed to
• 14:27
  Speaker 2: know it.
• 14:28
  Speaker 1: His last transmission was routine. Seven miles east. Radar service terminated. 417,
• 14:34
  Speaker 1: thank you. The ordinary cadence of a job done a
• 14:37
  Speaker 1: thousand times, offered up one more time to a controller
• 14:40
  Speaker 1: who never heard anything wrong either.
• 14:42
  Speaker 2: That is what fatigue failure does. It does not announce itself.
• 14:45
  Speaker 1: It does not change the pilot's voice or the passenger's
• 14:48
  Speaker 1: schedules or the color of the sky. It grows in
• 14:50
  Speaker 1: the dark interior of a component, underneath the very tools
• 14:53
  Speaker 1: built to find it, across thousands of flight hours, until
• 14:56
  Speaker 1: the one morning it does not stay hidden anymore. Ninety-one
• 14:59
  Speaker 1: people on the ground saw the blades separate. They saw
• 15:02
  Speaker 1: the rotation begin. They saw the tail cone go. Investigators
• 15:06
  Speaker 1: would spend months afterward reconstructing exactly what those seconds meant,
• 15:09
  Speaker 1: cycle by cycle, fracture line by fracture line, But for
• 15:12
  Speaker 1: the people standing on the street near Rosecrans Avenue that morning,
• 15:15
  Speaker 1: there was no reconstruction. There was only the aircraft, and
• 15:19
  Speaker 1: then there was not. The emergency directive came two days later.
• 15:23
  Speaker 1: The serial numbers were pulled.
• 15:24
  Speaker 2: The fleet was modified.
• 15:26
  Speaker 1: The system corrected itself, the way systems tend to, in
• 15:29
  Speaker 1: the aftermath of exactly the failure that correction beforehand might
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: have prevented. A fatigue crack that began on the manufacturing floor,
• 15:36
  Speaker 1: and a hardness reading that fell just short, and a
• 15:38
  Speaker 1: surface treatment that did not do its job, inside the
• 15:40
  Speaker 1: very aircraft that that had once proven the whole design
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: could fly, traveled 11,863 hours before it reached its end.
• 15:48
  Speaker 2: It passed the one inspection built to stop it. It
• 15:50
  Speaker 2: was there. It was not found.
• 15:53
  Speaker 1: The Yellow Blade still landed 400 meters away. That distance
• 15:56
  Speaker 1: has not changed since the first minute of this story.
• 15:59
  Speaker 1: What has changed is what it measures. Not simply how
• 16:02
  Speaker 1: fast a helicopter can come apart once a single piece
• 16:04
  Speaker 1: of metal finally lets go, but how long, unseen, uninspected
• 16:08
  Speaker 1: in any way that mattered, that letting go had already
• 16:10
  Speaker 1: been underway.
• 16:12
  Speaker 2: This show is made by Oboe Media.