Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / The Met's unapproved app and the side door in every organisation
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Sunday, the eighteenth of October, twenty twenty-six.
- 0:09This is the evening edition.
- 0:12The Met's unapproved app and the side door in every organisation.
- 0:18For eighteen months, about 500 Metropolitan Police accounts sat on a retail crime platform that the force
- 0:26had never approved. On 14 October, the I C O, the Information Commissioner's Office, the UK's data regulator,
- 0:36published a reprimand and an enforcement notice over it.
- 0:39Nobody was hacked. This is the quieter failure that sits behind many hacks.
- 0:45Nobody knew which outside services staff were using.
- 0:50So, what did the regulator actually find?
- 0:54Between March 2023 and September 2024, officers and staff used Auror, a platform where retailers log shoplif
- 1:04ting and share intelligence.
- 1:06The I C O said the force had not formally approved it.
- 1:10About 500 accounts were created, and 375 were actively used.
- 1:16Between January and September 2024, personal information on 179 people, three of them under 18, was uploaded
- 1:27to help identify suspected shoplifters.
- 1:30The I C O concluded the force processed data unlawfully.
- 1:34It lacked appropriate technical and organisational measures.
- 1:39It completed no data protection impact assessment before high-risk processing.
- 1:44And it still lacked measures to make sure only approved third-party technology was used.
- 1:50The notice was issued on 23 September, before the regulator became the Information Commission on 30 September
- 1:59. How did this slip through?
- 2:03Picture a building with a guarded front door and a visitor book.
- 2:07Then a side door that anyone can prop open with a sign-up form.
- 2:11The Register reported that the Auror accounts were free, so no purchase ever raised an alarm.
- 2:18It also reported that the force leaned on soft controls, such as policy reminders and training, and never tes
- 2:26ted whether its web controls worked.
- 2:28So the use went unflagged for over eighteen months.
- 2:32Staff themselves raised two internal security reports in August and September 2024, and access was blocked on
- 2:4126 September 2024. So what's the Secure by Design lesson here?
- 2:49Strip out the badge and this is every UK organisation's problem.
- 2:54Software arrives through a browser, a free trial or a supplier's invitation, outside procurement.
- 3:01The data was ordinary: names, dates of birth and, in a small number of cases, home addresses.
- 3:10That's what an attacker, or a supplier's breach, would want.
- 3:14The Met accepts the findings.
- 3:17It suspended the platform in September 2024 and brought it back in January 2026 with stronger governance, tra
- 3:26ining, contractual controls and a completed impact assessment.
- 3:30The I C O acted anyway, because the wider approval gap remained.
- 3:36Approval should be a gate, not a request.
- 3:40That means an approved-services list that's enforced, not just published, and a regular test proving the con
- 3:48trol works. The notice asks for much the same: assess and approve third-party services, review controls, test
- 3:58their effectiveness and report progress.
- 4:00I C O head of investigations David Doodson said "organisations cannot allow innovation to outpace their data
- 4:09protection responsibilities.
- 4:11" So here's the question for directors this week.
- 4:14If a team signed up to a new service holding customer or staff data tomorrow, how would you know?
- 4:20If the answer is "someone would tell us", that's a soft control.
- 4:26As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 4:31That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:36Thanks for listening.