Latest / Conspiracy! The Show / The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (Pt. 1)
Transcript
- 0:10Speaker 1: Winter insurance the troth I'm a check both insurance is
- 0:17Speaker 1: the adult. Hey, everybody, welcome to Conspiracy The Show. I'm
- 0:35Speaker 1: your host Adam Todd Brown joining me as co host today. Ooh,
- 0:40Speaker 1: my favorite co host of all No co host. I
- 0:43Speaker 1: don't even have any guests. The reason for that being
- 0:46Speaker 1: this is another of those band media report episodes where
- 0:51Speaker 1: I talk about a book or a movie or documentary
- 0:55Speaker 1: that for whatever reason, has been sort of wiped from existence.
- 0:59Speaker 2: And you know, asking.
- 1:01Speaker 1: A co host to track down an out of print
- 1:05Speaker 1: book and read all three hundred plus pages of absurdly
- 1:10Speaker 1: tiny print is a little more than I'm willing to
- 1:12Speaker 1: do while also just paying out co host money for it.
- 1:16Speaker 1: So I do these episodes on my own. The book
- 1:19Speaker 1: we're talking about this time around is called The CIA
- 1:23Speaker 1: and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D.
- 1:27Speaker 2: Marx.
- 1:28Speaker 1: This is a hugely important moment in American history that
- 1:33Speaker 1: has mostly been lost to history. Important why because it's
- 1:37Speaker 1: the first book the American government ever sued to have
- 1:41Speaker 1: censored before it was published. Absolutely a landmark moment in
- 1:46Speaker 1: terms of First Amendment protections. Despite all that, this book
- 1:50Speaker 1: is very hard to find now it's currently out of print.
- 1:53Speaker 1: If you rely on sites like Amazon, you're going to
- 1:56Speaker 1: pay five hundred dollars or more for a shitty use
- 2:00Speaker 1: to paperback copy. But I think that's just an algorithm thing.
- 2:03Speaker 1: Once there's not that many available, there's pricing software that
- 2:07Speaker 1: goes in and basically glitches out and prices stuff according
- 2:12Speaker 1: to scarcity. So books like this end up looking like
- 2:16Speaker 1: they are less attainable than they are. I got my
- 2:18Speaker 1: shitty used paperback copy on eBay for pretty cheap. It
- 2:23Speaker 1: also appears to be available in some libraries, so you
- 2:26Speaker 1: can find it. You're just not going to be able
- 2:28Speaker 1: to download it to your kindle or anything of the like.
- 2:31Speaker 1: As mentioned earlier, the book was written by Victor Marchetti
- 2:35Speaker 1: and John D. Marx. Victor Marchetti served in the US
- 2:39Speaker 1: Army during the early years of the Cold War. In
- 2:42Speaker 1: nineteen fifty five, he was recruited by and joined the CIA.
- 2:47Speaker 1: During his time with the agency, he became the government's
- 2:50Speaker 1: leading expert on Soviet military aid to Third world countries,
- 2:55Speaker 1: which back then was probably a way more exciting assignment
- 2:59Speaker 1: than it sounds like it would be. Also, that's an
- 3:01Speaker 1: important detail when it comes to this book because a
- 3:05Speaker 1: lot of it deals with US intervention and interference in
- 3:09Speaker 1: the affairs of third world countries. I think we call
- 3:12Speaker 1: him under developed Nations. Now, this book is from the
- 3:15Speaker 1: nineteen seventies. If that's as culturally insensitive as it gets,
- 3:19Speaker 1: I'll be relieved anyway. Marchetti's research work as a CIA analyst,
- 3:25Speaker 1: among other things, led to our uncovering of the Soviet
- 3:28Speaker 1: highjinks that culminated in the Cuban missile Crisis. From there,
- 3:32Speaker 1: he moved on to serve in a few different important
- 3:35Speaker 1: and high level offices within the CIA, including Special Assistant
- 3:39Speaker 1: to the Chief of Planning, Programming and Budgeting, Special Assistant
- 3:43Speaker 1: to the Executive Director, and executive Assistant to the Deputy Director,
- 3:48Speaker 1: and he credits working in these roles with giving him
- 3:51Speaker 1: a better understanding of how the CIA actually worked. At
- 3:55Speaker 1: the time, it was still claiming to just be a
- 3:58Speaker 1: central clearing house and producer of intelligence reports. What he
- 4:04Speaker 1: found during his employment was that the CIA didn't do
- 4:07Speaker 1: any of those things. Rather, to quote Marchetti, its basic
- 4:11Speaker 1: mission was that of clandestine operations, particularly covert action, the
- 4:16Speaker 1: secret intervention in the internal affairs of other nations.
- 4:20Speaker 2: End quote.
- 4:21Speaker 1: He resigned from the CIA in nineteen sixty nine, Nice
- 4:26Speaker 1: and immediately got to work on the book that he
- 4:29Speaker 1: hoped would lay bare the CIA's inner workings and true motivations.
- 4:35Speaker 1: And that book is not the one we're talking about today. Instead,
- 4:39Speaker 1: it was a fictional novel called The Rope Dancer. The
- 4:43Speaker 1: book didn't do much damage, though, so he moved on
- 4:46Speaker 1: to trying to get a review. An investigation of CIA
- 4:50Speaker 1: operations started in Congress. Surprise, surprise, most of them didn't
- 4:54Speaker 1: care either. So with that he decided to write this book,
- 4:58Speaker 1: The CIA and the Cultivan Intelligence. However, on account of
- 5:02Speaker 1: a whole bunch of legal intervention by the US government,
- 5:05Speaker 1: which we'll talk about in more detail, shortly, he had
- 5:08Speaker 1: to bring on a co author. That co author was
- 5:10Speaker 1: John Marx, and he was not in the CIA. He
- 5:13Speaker 1: joined the Foreign Service, which is a wing of the
- 5:16Speaker 1: State Department, fresh out of college, and his feelings toward
- 5:20Speaker 1: the US government changed when he went to Vietnam to
- 5:24Speaker 1: work as a civilian advisor in something called the Pacification Program.
- 5:29Speaker 1: Just for the record, there are two definitions of the
- 5:32Speaker 1: word pacification. The first is the state of being pacified,
- 5:37Speaker 1: the second the act of suppressing or eliminating a population
- 5:41Speaker 1: considered to be hostile. So I'm guessing it was the
- 5:44Speaker 1: second one we were dealing with in Vietnam as far
- 5:47Speaker 1: as those definitions go. Anyway, while in that role, he
- 5:50Speaker 1: came to view US policy in Vietnam as not only ineffective,
- 5:54Speaker 1: but just straight up wrong. That's something I feel like
- 5:57Speaker 1: he could have determined just from the fact that he
- 6:01Speaker 1: was joining a pacification program there.
- 6:03Speaker 2: But I digress.
- 6:04Speaker 1: He was introduced to the US intelligence community after being
- 6:08Speaker 1: assigned to work as staff assistant to the State Department's
- 6:12Speaker 1: Intelligence Director, whose job was to act as a liaison
- 6:16Speaker 1: between the intelligence community and the State Department.
- 6:19Speaker 2: I bet that's fun.
- 6:20Speaker 1: There he saw the exact same inefficiency and poor decision
- 6:25Speaker 1: making that led us into the disaster that was the
- 6:28Speaker 1: war in Vietnam. Here's a quote from Marx. In the
- 6:31Speaker 1: high councils of the intelligence community, there was no sense
- 6:35Speaker 1: that intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was
- 6:38Speaker 1: not the inherent right of the United States end quote.
- 6:43Speaker 2: He says the.
- 6:43Speaker 1: Last straw for him was the US invasion of Cambodia
- 6:47Speaker 1: in nineteen seventy. Not long after that, he met Victor
- 6:51Speaker 1: Marchetti and the idea for this book was born. So
- 6:54Speaker 1: the authors of this book clearly have some in depth
- 6:57Speaker 1: understanding of the topic. When you combine that with the
- 7:01Speaker 1: fact that the government fought tooth and nail to have
- 7:04Speaker 1: this book censored, it makes for the rare conspiracy related
- 7:08Speaker 1: book that has none of that. Is this all a
- 7:11Speaker 1: lie stink to it? What's in this book is real
- 7:15Speaker 1: and it's fascinating. Granted, some of the information might be
- 7:18Speaker 1: a little outdated. I'm sure the CIA is getting up
- 7:21Speaker 1: to much wilder stuff now, but it was also pretty
- 7:24Speaker 1: crazy in the nineteen seventies. And that's what kind of
- 7:27Speaker 1: stuff is in this book. It's about what the CIA
- 7:31Speaker 1: was getting up to in the sixties and seventies, beyond
- 7:34Speaker 1: the things we already know about like Watergate and mk
- 7:38Speaker 1: Ultra and you know, Jonestown. So if you've ever been
- 7:41Speaker 1: curious about that, this is the book for you, provided
- 7:45Speaker 1: you can still find it. It really gets into the
- 7:47Speaker 1: nuts and bolts of the agency's operations and budgets and
- 7:52Speaker 1: even the organizational structure. I can't imagine there's a better
- 7:56Speaker 1: resource out there for information about what I would consider
- 8:00Speaker 1: the glory.
- 8:00Speaker 2: Years of the CIA.
- 8:02Speaker 1: That point in history when they were doing whatever they
- 8:05Speaker 1: wanted and nobody knew anything about any of it. I mean,
- 8:08Speaker 1: we're still kind at that point now. But this book
- 8:11Speaker 1: came out right as we as a country were on
- 8:14Speaker 1: the verge of really calling the CIA out on their
- 8:17Speaker 1: shit by way of the Pike Committee and the Church Committee.
- 8:21Speaker 1: This book also came out hot on the heels of
- 8:24Speaker 1: another historic attempt at censorship on the part of the
- 8:27Speaker 1: US government, that being the nineteen seventy one New York
- 8:31Speaker 1: Times Pentagon Papers scandal. Have you seen the Post the
- 8:34Speaker 1: movie with Tom Hanks and Meryl Street that's about the
- 8:37Speaker 1: Pentagon Papers. Go watch it if you haven't. But also
- 8:40Speaker 1: I'll give you the Cliff's Notes version, and yes it
- 8:43Speaker 1: is Cliff's Notes, not cliff Notes. In June nineteen sixty seven,
- 8:48Speaker 1: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara created something called the Vietnam
- 8:52Speaker 1: Study Task Force, and his motivation, he claimed, was to
- 8:58Speaker 1: put together quote an encyclopedic history of the Vietnam War.
- 9:03Speaker 1: And again that's what he claimed. His motivation was why
- 9:06Speaker 1: someone would want to document the history of the Vietnam War,
- 9:09Speaker 1: and that much detail from within the US government is
- 9:12Speaker 1: beyond me unless you were trying to sugarcoat all of
- 9:15Speaker 1: the things that went wrong there, but he was not.
- 9:18Speaker 1: There were some reports that he planned to share the
- 9:21Speaker 1: findings with his friend Robert F. Kennedy, who was seeking
- 9:25Speaker 1: the Democratic presidential nomination.
- 9:27Speaker 2: In nineteen sixty eight.
- 9:29Speaker 1: Either way, he never informed President Lyndon Johnson or Secretary
- 9:34Speaker 1: of State Dean Rusk about the study. Thirty six analysts
- 9:37Speaker 1: worked on it. Half were active duty military officers, the
- 9:41Speaker 1: other half were academics and civilian federal employees. The study
- 9:45Speaker 1: they produced consisted of three thousand pages of analysis and
- 9:50Speaker 1: four thousand pages of documents, spread out across forty seven volumes.
- 9:56Speaker 1: But please tell me more about how much praise you
- 9:59Speaker 1: deserve for reading the Muller Report. It's four hundred pages anyway,
- 10:03Speaker 1: So with it being that big, clearly I cannot tell
- 10:06Speaker 1: you everything that was in there, but I can assure
- 10:09Speaker 1: you it was highly controversial and not a good look
- 10:12Speaker 1: for the US government. Among other things, the study revealed
- 10:16Speaker 1: that the US had secretly increased the scope of its
- 10:19Speaker 1: actions in Vietnam, and even worse, the Johnson administration had
- 10:24Speaker 1: quote systematically lied not only to the public but also
- 10:28Speaker 1: to Congress. End quote about the country's involvement in Vietnam.
- 10:32Speaker 1: One of the people who worked on that study was
- 10:34Speaker 1: Daniel Ellsberg. By the time he was granted security clearance
- 10:38Speaker 1: to access the full report, he had become vehemently opposed
- 10:42Speaker 1: to the war in Vietnam, and as such, he and
- 10:45Speaker 1: a friend named Anthony Russo decided to photocopy the entire report,
- 10:50Speaker 1: which reminder, consisted of about seven thousand pages, with the
- 10:55Speaker 1: intent of releasing it publicly at some point. That detail
- 10:58Speaker 1: is just one of the many reasons why I know
- 11:00Speaker 1: I will never even come close to toppling a government. Yes,
- 11:04Speaker 1: what we did in Vietnam was terrible, but having to
- 11:07Speaker 1: photo copy seven thousand pages sounds like torture. I'm not
- 11:11Speaker 1: willing to endure for any cause. If you told me
- 11:14Speaker 1: I had to photocopy seven thousand pages, I'd tell you
- 11:18Speaker 1: to expect them sometime in the early twenty thirties. Who
- 11:21Speaker 1: even has that much paper laying around anyway? In Ellsburg's opinion,
- 11:25Speaker 1: the documents quote demonstrated unconstitutional behavior by a succession of presidents,
- 11:31Speaker 1: the violation of their oath and the violation of the
- 11:35Speaker 1: oath of every one of their subordinates. End quote. He
- 11:38Speaker 1: also said the leak was intended to end what he
- 11:41Speaker 1: considered a wrongful war. Ellsberg talked to a New York
- 11:44Speaker 1: Times reporter named Neil Shehan about the study in nineteen
- 11:47Speaker 1: seventy one and provided him with forty three of the
- 11:50Speaker 1: forty seven volumes. The New York Times went back and
- 11:53Speaker 1: forth over whether or not to publish it, but finally
- 11:56Speaker 1: they decided they should on the grounds that the press
- 11:59Speaker 1: had as a First Amendment right to publish information significant
- 12:03Speaker 1: to the people's understanding of how their government works. They
- 12:07Speaker 1: began publishing excerpts on June thirteenth, nineteen seventy one, and
- 12:11Speaker 1: a wave of protests and lawsuits from the American people
- 12:16Speaker 1: followed pretty much immediately thereafter. Shortly after publication, the study
- 12:21Speaker 1: came to be known as the Pentagon Papers in the press.
- 12:25Speaker 1: Concern over the scandal crossed administrations, which, as I've mentioned before,
- 12:30Speaker 1: is usually a sign of trouble. The story broke when
- 12:33Speaker 1: Nixon was in office, but Nixon being Nixon, he didn't
- 12:37Speaker 1: want to respond to it at all because it only
- 12:39Speaker 1: impacted his enemies on the other side of the aisle,
- 12:43Speaker 1: So why not just let them look bad in the
- 12:45Speaker 1: eyes of the public, but the notoriously cool and good
- 12:50Speaker 1: for the world. Henry Kissinger thought not saying anything would
- 12:54Speaker 1: set a bad precedent for hiding secrets in the future,
- 12:58Speaker 1: so he pushed Nixon to act. I told you that
- 13:01Speaker 1: cross administration thing is bad, and Nixon did act. His
- 13:05Speaker 1: administration argued that Elsberg and Russo were guilty of a
- 13:09Speaker 1: felony under the Espionage Act of nineteen seventeen. That's treason,
- 13:14Speaker 1: baby yikes. Nixon and his people followed that up by
- 13:18Speaker 1: trying to coerce The New York Times into voluntarily ceasing
- 13:22Speaker 1: publication of the Pentagon Papers. When that failed, they obtained
- 13:25Speaker 1: a court injunction that forced the Times to stop publishing
- 13:29Speaker 1: after three articles. They appealed that ruling, and, in response
- 13:33Speaker 1: to the government's crackdown on the New York Times, the
- 13:36Speaker 1: Washington Post also started publishing the Pentagon Papers. That prompted
- 13:40Speaker 1: the government to seek a similar injunction against them, except
- 13:43Speaker 1: this time the judge disagreed. In response to all of that,
- 13:47Speaker 1: the Supreme Court agreed to hear the New York Times
- 13:50Speaker 1: in Washington Post cases jointly, at which point fifteen other
- 13:54Speaker 1: publications started running the Pentagon Papers. And with that the
- 13:58Speaker 1: Supreme Court sided with the people and allowed further publication.
- 14:02Speaker 2: But that wasn't the end of it.
- 14:03Speaker 1: Reminder, the government also charged Ellsberg and Russo with espionage,
- 14:08Speaker 1: and that still had to be dealt with. Unfortunately for
- 14:11Speaker 1: the government and fortunately for Ellsberg and Russo, a mistrial
- 14:16Speaker 1: was declared after it was revealed that Nixon's goon squad
- 14:20Speaker 1: called the Plumbers, same people who carried out the Watergate
- 14:23Speaker 1: break ins, had also broken into the office of Daniel
- 14:26Speaker 1: Ellsberg's psychiatrist in an effort to find information they could
- 14:31Speaker 1: use to discredit him. Representatives of the Nixon administration also
- 14:34Speaker 1: approached the trial judge and offered him an FBI director job.
- 14:38Speaker 1: So that's pretty shady. And a mistrial was declared and
- 14:42Speaker 1: Ellsberg and Russo were released, and eventually the Pentagon papers
- 14:46Speaker 1: were published in their entirety, and by eventually, I mean
- 14:50Speaker 1: twenty eleven, that's when they were finally released in their entirety.
- 14:54Speaker 1: But even back in the seventies, enough of them were
- 14:57Speaker 1: released to the public to make it a huge problem
- 14:59Speaker 1: for the government. So cut to ten months later. History
- 15:04Speaker 1: doesn't mention it nearly as much, but right after the
- 15:08Speaker 1: government tried to shut down the news media. They tried
- 15:11Speaker 1: the same thing with this book. On April eighteenth, nineteen
- 15:14Speaker 1: seventy two, Victor Marchetti became the first American writer to
- 15:18Speaker 1: be served with an official censorship order issued by a
- 15:22Speaker 1: court of the United States. That order prohibited him from
- 15:26Speaker 1: quote disclosing in any manner any information relating to intelligence activities,
- 15:33Speaker 1: any information regarding intelligence sources or methods, or any intelligence information.
- 15:39Speaker 1: The government's argument was that in his role with the CIA,
- 15:43Speaker 1: Marchette signed several secrecy agreements that precluded him from revealing
- 15:48Speaker 1: any information learned during his employment, and by writing that book,
- 15:51Speaker 1: they claimed he was violating these secrecy agreements and that
- 15:55Speaker 1: publication of the book would quote result in grave and
- 15:58Speaker 1: irreparable injury to the interests of the United States, And
- 16:03Speaker 1: as a result of these claims, Judge Albert Bryan, Junior
- 16:07Speaker 1: of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
- 16:11Speaker 1: of Virginia in Alexandria signed a temporary restraining order forbidding
- 16:17Speaker 1: Marchetti from disclosing any information about the CIA, and requiring
- 16:22Speaker 1: him to submit any manuscript, article, or essay, or other writing,
- 16:27Speaker 1: factual or otherwise to the Cia before releasing it to
- 16:31Speaker 1: any person or corporation. At that point, the ACLU got involved.
- 16:36Speaker 1: The first court date happened a few days later, and
- 16:39Speaker 1: Judge Brian not only refused to lift the order, he
- 16:43Speaker 1: also refused to let Marchetti's lawyers read the affidavit filed
- 16:47Speaker 1: by the government on account of how they had labeled
- 16:50Speaker 1: it secret. That meant none of Marchetti's legal team had
- 16:53Speaker 1: the proper security clearance to read it in order to
- 16:55Speaker 1: freely discuss the affidavit. Not only did the lawyers have
- 16:59Speaker 1: to be granted security clearance, so did any witnesses they
- 17:03Speaker 1: intended to call. In other words, they couldn't even talk
- 17:06Speaker 1: to witnesses if the government didn't approve of those witnesses,
- 17:09Speaker 1: which is insane. The ensuing appeals were unsuccessful, and in
- 17:14Speaker 1: December nineteen seventy two, the litigation came to an end
- 17:18Speaker 1: when the Supreme Court refused to hear the case again.
- 17:21Speaker 1: Wildly important moment in US history. Up to this point,
- 17:25Speaker 1: prior restraints aka injunctions against publication were considered a threat
- 17:31Speaker 1: to the very core of democracy. Before they tried to
- 17:34Speaker 1: stop the Pentagon Papers from being published, the US government
- 17:37Speaker 1: had never even considered anything of the sort. A few
- 17:41Speaker 1: states had tried it before, but they were always shot
- 17:44Speaker 1: down by the Supreme Court.
- 17:45Speaker 2: But now the.
- 17:46Speaker 1: Federal government was trying it for the second time in
- 17:49Speaker 1: less than a year, and this time around they were winning.
- 17:51Speaker 1: Even the Pentagon Papers effort wasn't a total loss. They
- 17:55Speaker 1: did prevent a US publication from running a story for
- 18:00Speaker 1: around fifteen days, after all. But even worse, when the
- 18:04Speaker 1: Supreme Court decision came down, only two justices agreed that
- 18:09Speaker 1: injunctions against publication were constitutionally forbidden under any circumstances. It
- 18:15Speaker 1: was just that the majority believed it wasn't warranted in
- 18:18Speaker 1: that particular case, and it was at quirk in the
- 18:21Speaker 1: Supreme Court ruling that gave the government the confidence to
- 18:25Speaker 1: try this again. In all of the justice opinions in
- 18:28Speaker 1: the Pentagon Papers case, there was one thing they all
- 18:31Speaker 1: agreed on. Information could be suppressed only if the disclosure
- 18:35Speaker 1: would result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to the
- 18:40Speaker 1: nation or its people. And the author's legal team wasn't
- 18:43Speaker 1: concerned about that standard because they didn't think anything they
- 18:47Speaker 1: planned to reveal would cause any damage, just like the
- 18:50Speaker 1: Pentagon Papers didn't.
- 18:51Speaker 2: The only damage or fallout from.
- 18:53Speaker 1: That was to the reputation and careers of the government
- 18:59Speaker 1: actors involved. It didn't do anything to hurt the country.
- 19:02Speaker 1: None of us suffered for it, and Marchetti and Marx
- 19:05Speaker 1: and their legal team were thinking same thing here, This
- 19:07Speaker 1: should be a cakewalk. The problem was the government wasn't
- 19:11Speaker 1: using that argument this time around. Instead, they argued that
- 19:15Speaker 1: they were merely attempting to enforce a contract Marchetti signed
- 19:19Speaker 1: with the CIA, so it's not a First Amendment case.
- 19:22Speaker 1: It's just a contract action. But again, there wasn't a
- 19:25Speaker 1: whole lot of precedent for the stipulations of the secrecy
- 19:28Speaker 1: agreements like the one Marchetti signed actually being enforced.
- 19:31Speaker 2: Either.
- 19:32Speaker 1: Disclosing classified information, at least at the time, probably still
- 19:36Speaker 1: wasn't a crime unless it was done in an espionage
- 19:40Speaker 1: kind of way with the intent to harm the country.
- 19:43Speaker 1: The government tried prosecuting Daniel Ellsberg for espionage in the
- 19:47Speaker 1: Pentagon Paper's case. They failed only because a mistrial was declared,
- 19:52Speaker 1: but there's a good chance they were going to fail anyway.
- 19:55Speaker 1: They were making a pretty extreme argument. The difference here
- 19:58Speaker 1: is that Marchetti was disc closing classified information and signed
- 20:03Speaker 1: a contract with the CIA that said he wouldn't. They
- 20:06Speaker 1: felt that gave them the proper legal footing to stop
- 20:09Speaker 1: this book from being published, if nothing else, And unfortunately,
- 20:13Speaker 1: the courts mostly agreed. And that might sound reasonable at
- 20:16Speaker 1: first until you take into account that literally every government
- 20:20Speaker 1: official who's ever written a memoir signed those same agreements
- 20:24Speaker 1: and technically violated that agreement by writing said memoir. Still,
- 20:29Speaker 1: this decision didn't mean the book couldn't be published at all.
- 20:32Speaker 1: It just meant the CIA was allowed to read it
- 20:35Speaker 1: first and censor any sections they didn't like. At first,
- 20:39Speaker 1: they demanded that three hundred and thirty nine sections be removed,
- 20:43Speaker 1: which amounted to around fifteen to twenty percent of the book.
- 20:47Speaker 1: By the time the authors appealed that the FEDS had
- 20:49Speaker 1: reduced the number of sections they wanted deleted to one
- 20:52Speaker 1: hundred and sixty eight, and this part of the legal
- 20:55Speaker 1: wrangling over this book went a little better for Marchetti
- 20:58Speaker 1: and Marx. The government or ment's position was a pretty
- 21:02Speaker 1: audacious one. In their opinion, material was classified if they
- 21:07Speaker 1: said it should be classified, no other justification required in
- 21:11Speaker 1: the government's opinion, and as if by magic. Judge Bryan
- 21:15Speaker 1: disagreed with that and ruled that justification for why each
- 21:19Speaker 1: section should be classified was required, and in most cases
- 21:23Speaker 1: the government wasn't able to prove that point, so in
- 21:26Speaker 1: the end, only twenty seven of those sections were considered
- 21:30Speaker 1: classified and removed from the book. So that brings us
- 21:33Speaker 1: to the obvious question, what kind of information is in
- 21:37Speaker 1: the CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. The short answer
- 21:40Speaker 1: is that, just like the CIA was probably afraid of,
- 21:44Speaker 1: it's a very detailed account of how the agency worked
- 21:47Speaker 1: at the time, what kind of shenanigans they were getting
- 21:50Speaker 1: up to overseas and at home, and it even names
- 21:53Speaker 1: names when it gets into describing the organizational structure. The
- 21:57Speaker 1: book is divided into three parts. We're going to talk
- 22:00Speaker 1: about part one today and then parts two and three
- 22:03Speaker 1: on the next episode. Part one is further divided into
- 22:06Speaker 1: three chapters. Chapter one is called the Cult of Intelligence.
- 22:10Speaker 1: Chapter two it's called The Clandestine Theory. Chapter three the
- 22:14Speaker 1: CIA and the Intelligence Community. Gonna be honest. That third
- 22:18Speaker 1: chapter is mostly organizational hierarchy stuff, and as such it's
- 22:25Speaker 1: kind of boring, so we'll mostly focus on those first
- 22:28Speaker 1: two chapters for the rest of this episode. I doubt
- 22:31Speaker 1: most of the people named in chapter three are even
- 22:34Speaker 1: alive anymore. This was a long time ago, and you
- 22:37Speaker 1: know they were all like fifty year old white men
- 22:40Speaker 1: even by that point. So up first chapter one, the
- 22:43Speaker 1: Cult of Intelligence. The first page of this chapter really
- 22:47Speaker 1: sets the tone for the rest of the book, as
- 22:49Speaker 1: I suppose any good first page should do. So if
- 22:53Speaker 1: you will please bear with me, I'm just gonna read
- 22:55Speaker 1: that first page for batim.
- 22:57Speaker 2: Just a heads up.
- 22:58Speaker 1: The print in this book very so this could take
- 23:01Speaker 1: a bit. Sorry, here goes. There exists in our nation
- 23:05Speaker 1: today a powerful and dangerous secret cult, the Cult of Intelligence.
- 23:10Speaker 1: Its holy men are the clandestine professionals of the Central
- 23:14Speaker 1: Intelligence Agency. Its patrons and protectors are the highest officials
- 23:19Speaker 1: of the federal government. Its membership, extending far beyond governmental circles,
- 23:25Speaker 1: reaches into the power centers of industry, commerce, finance, and labor.
- 23:29Speaker 1: Its friends are many in the areas of important public influence,
- 23:33Speaker 1: the academic world and the communications media. The Cult of
- 23:37Speaker 1: Intelligence is a secret fraternity of the American political aristocracy.
- 23:42Speaker 1: The purpose of the cult is to further the foreign
- 23:44Speaker 1: policies of the US government by covert and usually illegal means,
- 23:50Speaker 1: while at the same time containing the spread of its
- 23:52Speaker 1: avowed enemy, Communism. Traditionally, the cult's hope has been to
- 23:57Speaker 1: foster a world order in which America would reign supreme,
- 24:00Speaker 1: the unchallenged international leader. Today, however, that dream stands tarnished
- 24:06Speaker 1: by time and frequent failures. Thus the cult subjectives are
- 24:10Speaker 1: now less grandiose, but no less disturbing. It seeks largely
- 24:14Speaker 1: to advance America's self appointed role as the dominant arbiter
- 24:19Speaker 1: of social, economic, and political change in the awakening regions
- 24:24Speaker 1: of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and its worldwide war
- 24:28Speaker 1: against communism has to some extent been reduced to a
- 24:32Speaker 1: covert struggle to maintain a self serving stability in the
- 24:36Speaker 1: Third World, using whatever clandestine methods are available for the
- 24:40Speaker 1: Cult of Intelligence. Fostering stability may in one country mean
- 24:44Speaker 1: reluctant and passive acquiescence to evolutionary change, in another country,
- 24:49Speaker 1: the active maintenance of the status quo, and yet another
- 24:52Speaker 1: a determined effort to reverse popular trends toward independence and democracy.
- 24:58Speaker 1: The cult attempts that which which it believes it can accomplish,
- 25:01Speaker 1: and which, in the event of failure or exposure, the
- 25:05Speaker 1: US government can plausibly deny the end of page one,
- 25:10Speaker 1: I mean not the book. From there, the book gets
- 25:13Speaker 1: into the wall of secrecy the CIA had built around itself.
- 25:18Speaker 1: By this point, they describe it as the clandestine mentality,
- 25:22Speaker 1: a mindset that thrives on secrecy and deception. To quote
- 25:26Speaker 1: the book, you can tell Marchetti wrote a novel before this.
- 25:29Speaker 1: He's good with words. The book still kind of reads
- 25:33Speaker 1: like a novel. The clandestine mentality is also described as
- 25:37Speaker 1: being one that encourages professional immorality, in this case, the
- 25:41Speaker 1: belief that our country's righteous goals can only be achieved
- 25:46Speaker 1: through normally unacceptable means. One of the really interesting things
- 25:50Speaker 1: they touch on in this first chapter is the relationship
- 25:54Speaker 1: between the CIA and the president. Their assertion is that
- 25:58Speaker 1: the president and the CIA generally agree on things, and
- 26:02Speaker 1: that the president usually knows what kind of stuff the
- 26:05Speaker 1: agency is getting up to. It's just that it doesn't
- 26:08Speaker 1: always seem that way. JFK is a good example. He
- 26:11Speaker 1: said a lot of not nice things about the CIA,
- 26:15Speaker 1: especially the part where he vowed to break them into
- 26:18Speaker 1: a million pieces. But it was more because the Bay
- 26:20Speaker 1: of Pigs invasion was a pr disaster, not because it
- 26:24Speaker 1: was something he didn't know about, and as discussed on
- 26:27Speaker 1: the Jonestown episodes, he was all for the CIA toppling
- 26:31Speaker 1: the government of Guyana. Before him, the Eisenhower administration actively
- 26:35Speaker 1: lied about CIA actions in Guatemala. Lyndon Johnson lied about
- 26:40Speaker 1: pretty much everything involving the Vietnam War, including what the
- 26:44Speaker 1: CIA was doing there After Kennedy, the Nixon administration covered
- 26:49Speaker 1: for the CIA toppling the government of Chile. Jimmy Carter
- 26:54Speaker 1: was the last president to really confront the CIA publicly.
- 26:58Speaker 1: He came into office promise saying a whole bunch of
- 27:01Speaker 1: reforms as a result of the Church and Pike Committee hearings,
- 27:06Speaker 1: but behind the scenes, when the CIA got wrapped up
- 27:10Speaker 1: in a scandal over millions of dollars of secret and
- 27:14Speaker 1: unexplained payments they made to Jordan's King Hussein, it was
- 27:19Speaker 1: Jimmy Carter who lobbied the hardest for the agency's right
- 27:23Speaker 1: to lie in the name of national security. And from
- 27:26Speaker 1: there we move on to the Reagan years, which is
- 27:29Speaker 1: a whole other story we'll get to in a future episode.
- 27:32Speaker 1: Another interesting detail from the first chapter is what the
- 27:36Speaker 1: CIA was supposed to be when it started, and how
- 27:39Speaker 1: quickly it became something else entirely how it started versus
- 27:43Speaker 1: how it's going. As the memes say, the CIA sprung
- 27:46Speaker 1: to life by way of the nineteen forty seven National
- 27:50Speaker 1: Security Act, which was signed into law by Harry Truman,
- 27:54Speaker 1: a man history, it seems like, still kind of views
- 27:57Speaker 1: as a whimp, even though he's the only world world
- 28:00Speaker 1: leader to ever drop a nuclear weapon during war. Anyway,
- 28:04Speaker 1: this whimp's vision for the CIA, as touched on earlier,
- 28:08Speaker 1: was that it would just be a sort of clearing
- 28:10Speaker 1: house for all of the intelligence gathered by the various
- 28:14Speaker 1: other government agencies, and it would produce reports about things
- 28:18Speaker 1: happening overseas so as to better inform our foreign policy.
- 28:23Speaker 1: But Alan Dulles, the CIA's first director and a veteran
- 28:27Speaker 1: of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, saw things a
- 28:31Speaker 1: little differently. He envisioned the CIA more as a secret
- 28:35Speaker 1: spy army that could help the US achieve its foreign
- 28:38Speaker 1: policy goals when diplomacy failed, and obviously Alan Dulles won
- 28:43Speaker 1: that argument. He did that by way of a seemingly
- 28:47Speaker 1: unimportant passage in that nineteen forty seven National Security Act.
- 28:52Speaker 1: The passage in question permitted the CIA to quote perform
- 28:56Speaker 1: such other duties related to intelligence, as the National Security
- 29:00Speaker 1: Council may from time to time direct end quote. And
- 29:04Speaker 1: now here's a quote from the book regarding those words
- 29:07Speaker 1: in the nineteen forty seven National Security Act. Quote from
- 29:11Speaker 1: those few innocuous words, the CIA has been able over
- 29:14Speaker 1: the years to develop a secret charter based on National
- 29:18Speaker 1: Security Council directives and presidential executive orders, a charter almost
- 29:24Speaker 1: completely at variance with the apparent intent of the law
- 29:29Speaker 1: that established the agency.
- 29:31Speaker 2: End quote.
- 29:31Speaker 1: And that right there is the crux of this book,
- 29:34Speaker 1: the disparity between what the CIA was supposed to be
- 29:37Speaker 1: versus what it had become by this point in history.
- 29:40Speaker 1: Chapter ends with a really interesting sentence. Here goes, the
- 29:44Speaker 1: aim of this book is to provide the American people
- 29:48Speaker 1: with the inside information which they need and to which they,
- 29:52Speaker 1: without question have the right to understand the significance of
- 29:56Speaker 1: this issue and the importance of dealing with it. Say
- 30:00Speaker 1: that last sentence is interesting because here's the thing, we
- 30:03Speaker 1: never did deal with it. Seeing as how this book
- 30:05Speaker 1: was published in the early seventies, We've had approximately fifty
- 30:09Speaker 1: years to address the CIA's actions in other countries and
- 30:14Speaker 1: intervening in the affairs of governments that we don't like.
- 30:18Speaker 2: But we didn't.
- 30:19Speaker 1: As worried as the CIA was about its publication, this
- 30:22Speaker 1: book did absolutely nothing to stop them from continuing their
- 30:27Speaker 1: work as a force for international instability on behalf of
- 30:32Speaker 1: us interests. So now let's talk about chapter two, which
- 30:36Speaker 1: is titled The Clandestine Theory. This is where the CIA
- 30:40Speaker 1: censorship starts coming hot and heavy. In fact, the first
- 30:44Speaker 1: line of the chapter just says one and a half
- 30:47Speaker 1: lines deleted. Apparently the part they wanted deleted was a
- 30:51Speaker 1: quote from Henry Kissinger, because the next two actual sentences
- 30:54Speaker 1: are Henry Kissinger made that statement not in public, but
- 30:58Speaker 1: at a secret White House meeting on June twenty seventh,
- 31:00Speaker 1: nineteen seventy. The country he was referring to was Chile.
- 31:04Speaker 1: So Henry Kissinger said something about Chile, and the FEDS
- 31:08Speaker 1: didn't want us to know what it was. I'm sure
- 31:10Speaker 1: it was nothing major, probably just a joke that hasn't
- 31:12Speaker 1: aged well or something.
- 31:14Speaker 2: The first few pages of.
- 31:15Speaker 1: Chapter two are all about that CIA intervention in Chile
- 31:19Speaker 1: back when this book was published. The notion that the
- 31:22Speaker 1: CIA interfered in another country's affairs to get their chosen
- 31:26Speaker 1: candidate elected was mostly just a rumor and still a
- 31:30Speaker 1: thing Nixon was publicly saying didn't happen. But now we
- 31:34Speaker 1: know all about it. Now that is a thing that
- 31:36Speaker 1: history has since confirmed did happen. But this book was
- 31:40Speaker 1: on that train super early. There are still some super
- 31:43Speaker 1: interesting details despite all their redactions, and we'll get to those.
- 31:48Speaker 1: But sometimes the redactions themselves are interesting just because of
- 31:52Speaker 1: the sense of mystery they evoke. Case in point, this
- 31:55Speaker 1: line Henry Kissinger, the single most powerful man at the
- 31:59Speaker 1: forty committee meeting on Chile Comma twenty five and a
- 32:03Speaker 1: half lines deleted, and it would have been more like
- 32:06Speaker 1: thirty three lines if not for one half of a
- 32:08Speaker 1: sentence that was allowed to slip through before another six
- 32:12Speaker 1: and a half lines are deleted that sentence during the
- 32:15Speaker 1: next two months before Allende was officially endorsed as president
- 32:20Speaker 1: by the Chilean Congress comma, and that's it. The sentence
- 32:23Speaker 1: ends at a comma and then six point five more
- 32:26Speaker 1: deleted lines.
- 32:28Speaker 2: Nevertheless, like I said.
- 32:29Speaker 1: There are still a few things of interest to be
- 32:33Speaker 1: found here, like how the CIA met up with executives
- 32:37Speaker 1: from two American corporations that were especially interested in stopping
- 32:42Speaker 1: Allenda from taking power in Chile. Those two corporations were
- 32:45Speaker 1: ITT International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. I'm sure they're still
- 32:50Speaker 1: doing great, and the awesomely named Anaconda Copper. They don't
- 32:54Speaker 1: want none if it ain't copper Son. What the CIA
- 32:58Speaker 1: discussed with them was a four part plan of economic
- 33:02Speaker 1: sabotage meant to destabilize the Aenday regime to the point
- 33:07Speaker 1: that the people would revolt and the military would take over. Now,
- 33:11Speaker 1: officials from ITT would later claim that they dismissed this
- 33:15Speaker 1: plan as unworkable at the time, and that is probably
- 33:19Speaker 1: not true.
- 33:20Speaker 2: What is for sure true.
- 33:22Speaker 1: Is that three years, almost to the day after Allenda
- 33:26Speaker 1: was elected, Chile was mired in financial distress and chaos.
- 33:31Speaker 1: The people revolted, Allende was killed in a coup, and
- 33:34Speaker 1: a military junta took over. The US government tried its
- 33:38Speaker 1: best to deny responsibility for the coup, but even way
- 33:41Speaker 1: back in the seventies, we were already admitting that we
- 33:45Speaker 1: did try to undercut the Allende government, which is a
- 33:49Speaker 1: little bit, not much at all, just a little. All
- 33:52Speaker 1: we did was cut off economic assistance, discourage private lines
- 33:56Speaker 1: of credit, and block loans by international organizations, and we
- 34:01Speaker 1: had a perfectly good reason.
- 34:02Speaker 2: For doing it.
- 34:03Speaker 1: We wanted to bring about the collapse of the Allende
- 34:06Speaker 1: government and discredit socialism, that's all. But in the end
- 34:10Speaker 1: we didn't do any of that. It just happened naturally, Baby,
- 34:13Speaker 1: That is what we actually wanted and expected people to
- 34:17Speaker 1: believe for the longest time. And remember that part at
- 34:21Speaker 1: the end of chapter one about the need to stop
- 34:23Speaker 1: doing things like this. You can find a good example
- 34:26Speaker 1: of how we definitely did not stop doing that in Venezuela.
- 34:30Speaker 1: That country had the gall to elect a non white
- 34:34Speaker 1: socialist president named Hugo Chavez back in the early two thousands,
- 34:38Speaker 1: and despite what the government told John Oliver to tell you,
- 34:42Speaker 1: to the contrary, we've been waging economic war against Venezuela
- 34:47Speaker 1: ever since. We've tried at least three or four times
- 34:51Speaker 1: to topple that government since then, including right after Chavez
- 34:55Speaker 1: got elected. We launched a coup, flew him away in
- 34:58Speaker 1: a helicopter, and the people protested so hard we just
- 35:02Speaker 1: let him go back to being president.
- 35:03Speaker 2: And all of our.
- 35:04Speaker 1: Subsequent attempts to topple the government since then have mostly
- 35:09Speaker 1: just been efforts that ended up hurting the most poverty
- 35:12Speaker 1: stricken Venezuelan citizens while having no real impact on who
- 35:17Speaker 1: actually runs the country. See that's the thing about economic warfare.
- 35:20Speaker 1: It destabilizes governments by inflicting pain and suffering on the
- 35:24Speaker 1: people of that country, so then they get mad enough
- 35:27Speaker 1: to want the government out. We don't drop bombs, we
- 35:30Speaker 1: don't send in tanks, but people die all the same.
- 35:33Speaker 1: The CIA has a phrase for operations like the one
- 35:36Speaker 1: in Chile, covert action, and according to the book, that
- 35:40Speaker 1: has been the CIA's main business function almost since the
- 35:44Speaker 1: inception of the agency, and the book also provides a
- 35:47Speaker 1: fascinating explanation for why that was the case. Basically, the
- 35:51Speaker 1: CIA was bad at espionage. Turns out, Russia was too
- 35:56Speaker 1: much of a closed society and too good at surveilling
- 36:00Speaker 1: people who entered their borders for any sort of intelligence
- 36:03Speaker 1: gathering operations to have any impact. So the CIA just
- 36:08Speaker 1: shifted focus to stopping less powerful countries from buddying up
- 36:13Speaker 1: with the Ruskies. In other words, this is the point
- 36:16Speaker 1: in history where America decides it's our job to protect
- 36:20Speaker 1: the rest of the world from communism, and if we
- 36:22Speaker 1: have to murder your democratically elected president in a bloody
- 36:27Speaker 1: coup will do it for you. And a lot of
- 36:29Speaker 1: those efforts were focused on Third world nations, and there
- 36:33Speaker 1: is a reason for that focus. Here's what Richard Bissel
- 36:37Speaker 1: of the CIA told the Council on Foreign Relations. Quote
- 36:41Speaker 1: simply because their governments are much less highly organized, there
- 36:45Speaker 1: is less security consciousness, and there is apt to be
- 36:48Speaker 1: more actual or potential diffusion of power among the parties, localities, organizations,
- 36:54Speaker 1: and individuals outside the central government end quote. In other words,
- 36:59Speaker 1: their instability makes them prime candidates for the kind of
- 37:03Speaker 1: instability that makes American corporations rich. And some of the
- 37:07Speaker 1: things they got up to in the name of fomenting
- 37:11Speaker 1: that instability are wild. Take Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale,
- 37:16Speaker 1: for example. He's specifically brought up in this book. He
- 37:19Speaker 1: is so famous for his adventures in psychological warfare mind
- 37:24Speaker 1: fuckery that he's the basis for the main character in
- 37:27Speaker 1: two different novels about that very thing. His most notorious
- 37:31Speaker 1: campaign happened in the Philippines, as the story goes, in
- 37:36Speaker 1: that country, there exists a mythological beast that some portion
- 37:40Speaker 1: of the population lives in fear of. It's called a
- 37:44Speaker 1: swang Asua Ng. Under Lansdale's guidance, a psychological warfare squad
- 37:50Speaker 1: entered an area in the countryside of the Philippines and
- 37:53Speaker 1: planet rumors that an Aswang lived where their communist targets
- 37:59Speaker 1: were based to. Two nights later, after giving the rumors
- 38:02Speaker 1: time to circulate, the psychological warfare squad lays an ambush
- 38:07Speaker 1: for the communist rebels that they're trying to put down,
- 38:09Speaker 1: and when a patrol passed, the squad quietly snatches the
- 38:14Speaker 1: last man in line, drags him into the woods, punctures
- 38:18Speaker 1: his neck vampire style with two holes, hangs his body
- 38:22Speaker 1: until the blood drains out, and then they just tossed
- 38:25Speaker 1: the corpse back onto the trail. In other words, they
- 38:28Speaker 1: made it look like he got killed by that fearsome
- 38:32Speaker 1: mythological beast, and that was all it took to get
- 38:35Speaker 1: those insurgents to flee that area. Another example of his
- 38:38Speaker 1: shenanigans happened in Vietnam, where during the nineteen fifty five
- 38:43Speaker 1: presidential election in South Vietnam, he made sure the presidential
- 38:47Speaker 1: candidate of our choosing had his name listed in red,
- 38:50Speaker 1: which is a color that means good luck in that country. Meanwhile,
- 38:54Speaker 1: his opponent's name was listed in green. In that color
- 38:57Speaker 1: in that country means you're a cuckold.
- 39:00Speaker 2: That's right.
- 39:00Speaker 1: This book uses the phrase cook, except the proper term,
- 39:03Speaker 1: not the truncated Internet version that we know and love today.
- 39:07Speaker 1: If from there, the book gets into kind of the
- 39:09Speaker 1: operational procedures behind these covert actions in third world countries. Basically,
- 39:14Speaker 1: a case officer would go in first. The case officer
- 39:17Speaker 1: was responsible for lining up all of the contacts and
- 39:21Speaker 1: sources and informants that the United States could ever need
- 39:26Speaker 1: to bring down the government of that country. If we
- 39:28Speaker 1: ever decide to the case officers and the agency in
- 39:31Speaker 1: general call these sources and contacts penetrators. Ooh, and the
- 39:37Speaker 1: actions they carried out on behalf of the CIA and
- 39:40Speaker 1: the case officer, well, those are called penetrations. Oh yeah,
- 39:45Speaker 1: look at the CIA being all sexy and stuff. And
- 39:48Speaker 1: all of this has to be done ahead of time,
- 39:50Speaker 1: because if you send the case officer in at the
- 39:53Speaker 1: same time you're hoping to pull the trigger on top
- 39:56Speaker 1: in that government, you're not going to have all the
- 39:57Speaker 1: penetrations in place to be success. It's a long con
- 40:01Speaker 1: The book mentions eight different tactics that the CIA would
- 40:05Speaker 1: use back then during these interventions in the affairs of
- 40:09Speaker 1: other countries. Let's go through them, shall we. Number one
- 40:13Speaker 1: political advice and council. Number two subsidies to an individual.
- 40:17Speaker 1: Number three, financial support and technical assistance to political parties.
- 40:22Speaker 1: Number four support of private organizations including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives,
- 40:28Speaker 1: et cetera. Number five covert propaganda. Number six, private training
- 40:34Speaker 1: of individuals and exchange of persons. Number seven economic operations,
- 40:39Speaker 1: and number eight paramilitary or political action kind of like
- 40:43Speaker 1: the Beyapigs invasion. Those all seem pretty self explanatory, but
- 40:48Speaker 1: after listing all of them, the book then tries to
- 40:51Speaker 1: explain each one in a little more detail.
- 40:54Speaker 2: They mentioned that the fifth and.
- 40:55Speaker 1: Eighth categories covert propaganda and paramilitary action are good to
- 41:00Speaker 1: be their own chapters later in the book, But when
- 41:02Speaker 1: they try to get into explaining the other six points,
- 41:05Speaker 1: that's when the CIA redactions come back in full force,
- 41:09Speaker 1: to the point that it's not even worth trying to
- 41:12Speaker 1: go through it. We're talking pages where in between each
- 41:16Speaker 1: paragraph there are fifteen to thirty lines deleted, and honestly,
- 41:20Speaker 1: that's not that surprising because when we're getting into this
- 41:23Speaker 1: section of the book, we're getting into actual tactics. The
- 41:27Speaker 1: CIA uses to do what they perceive to be their
- 41:30Speaker 1: job overseas, or at least that's what they did back
- 41:33Speaker 1: when this book came out. Either way, they didn't want
- 41:36Speaker 1: us to know. It's one of the redactions in this
- 41:38Speaker 1: book that probably makes the most sense to me. And
- 41:41Speaker 1: after all those reactions, the chapter ends by reminding us
- 41:44Speaker 1: of something that was mentioned at the beginning of the
- 41:46Speaker 1: book and at the beginning of this episode, which is that,
- 41:50Speaker 1: for the most part, every president has been mostly fine
- 41:54Speaker 1: with all of the covert operations and actions carried out
- 41:58Speaker 1: by the CIA overseas. Here is another direct quote from
- 42:01Speaker 1: the book. Once again, it's kind of long. Apologies, here
- 42:05Speaker 1: goes in no instance, as a president of the United
- 42:09Speaker 1: States ever made a serious attempt to review or revamp
- 42:13Speaker 1: the covert practices of the CIA. Minor alterations in operational
- 42:17Speaker 1: methods and techniques have been carried out, but no basic
- 42:20Speaker 1: changes in policy or practice have ever been demanded by
- 42:24Speaker 1: the White House. And this is not surprising. Presidents like
- 42:27Speaker 1: the CIA. It does their dirty work, work that might
- 42:30Speaker 1: not otherwise be doable. When the agency fails or blunders,
- 42:34Speaker 1: all the president need do is to deny, scold, or threaten.
- 42:38Speaker 1: For the CIA's part, being the focus of presidential blame
- 42:41Speaker 1: is an occupational hazard, but one hardly worth worrying about.
- 42:45Speaker 1: It is merely an aspect of the cover behind which
- 42:49Speaker 1: the agency operates. Like the other aspects of its cover,
- 42:53Speaker 1: it is part of a deception. The CIA fully realizes
- 42:56Speaker 1: that it is too important to the government and the
- 43:00Speaker 1: American political aristocracy for any president to do more than
- 43:04Speaker 1: tinker with it. The CIA shrugs off all the blunders
- 43:08Speaker 1: and proceeds to devise new operations, secure in the knowledge
- 43:12Speaker 1: that the White House usually cannot resist its offerings, particularly
- 43:17Speaker 1: covert action. Covert action that dominates, that determines, that defines
- 43:22Speaker 1: the shape and purpose of the CIA. America's leaders have
- 43:26Speaker 1: not yet reached the point where they are willing to
- 43:28Speaker 1: forsake intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and
- 43:33Speaker 1: let events naturally run their course. There still is a
- 43:36Speaker 1: widely held belief in this country that America has the
- 43:40Speaker 1: right and responsibility to become involved in the internal political
- 43:45Speaker 1: processes of foreign nations. And while faith in this belief
- 43:49Speaker 1: and that of doctrinaire anti communism may have been somewhat
- 43:53Speaker 1: shaken in the last decade. Six lines deleted. That's how
- 43:58Speaker 1: the passage ends, and that's how this chapter ends, just
- 44:02Speaker 1: like it started. Deleted lines, in this case six lines deleted.
- 44:07Speaker 1: But you get the idea. They're saying. The Presidency has
- 44:10Speaker 1: always been in favor of CIA covert action. They just
- 44:14Speaker 1: prefer that it stays covert so they don't have to
- 44:16Speaker 1: say anything about it now. I mentioned earlier that the
- 44:18Speaker 1: CIA did sort of get taken to task not long
- 44:22Speaker 1: after the publication of this book by way of the
- 44:25Speaker 1: Church Committee and the Pike Committee that said, do you
- 44:28Speaker 1: remember what the resulting action from all that hubbub was?
- 44:32Speaker 1: The CIA was banned from operating on American soil against
- 44:36Speaker 1: American citizens. In other words, they were banned from doing
- 44:39Speaker 1: something they had no interest in doing in the first place.
- 44:43Speaker 1: They just wanted to fuck up Latin America and not
- 44:46Speaker 1: get any guff for it, and no one ever stopped
- 44:48Speaker 1: them from doing that. So, as I mentioned previously, the
- 44:51Speaker 1: third chapter of this book, titled the CIA and the
- 44:54Speaker 1: Intelligence Community, is kind of dull. It mostly deals with
- 44:58Speaker 1: organizational structure and higher so basically the authors doing their
- 45:02Speaker 1: best to estimate how huge the CIA really was at
- 45:06Speaker 1: that time. There were official personnel figures available, but none
- 45:10Speaker 1: of them took into account all of the contractors and
- 45:13Speaker 1: various other intermediaries and penetrators the agency worked with. Their
- 45:18Speaker 1: final estimation was that the CIA was huge, and they
- 45:23Speaker 1: probably haven't gotten any less huge since. And with that,
- 45:27Speaker 1: we've reached the end of part one of The CIA
- 45:30Speaker 1: and the Cult of Intelligence. Will probably drop a bonus
- 45:33Speaker 1: episode in between, but on the next free episode we'll
- 45:37Speaker 1: dive into parts two and three of this book.
- 45:40Speaker 2: Until then, I don't know.
- 45:42Speaker 1: You can follow the show on Twitter or Instagram at
- 45:46Speaker 1: Conspira pops. If you want to hear bonus episodes, you
- 45:49Speaker 1: can subscribe at patreon, dot com, slash and pops or
- 45:52Speaker 1: on popsnetwork, dot Supercast, dot tech. Got a whole bunch
- 45:55Speaker 1: of different options for you to subscribe there. And I'm
- 45:58Speaker 1: launching a substack soon called Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Friends,
- 46:03Speaker 1: where you'll be able to give me money to read
- 46:05Speaker 1: the things I make instead of, uh, listen to them.
- 46:09Speaker 1: It's writing. Substack is for writing. I used to write.
- 46:13Speaker 1: I don't know if people who listen to this podcast
- 46:14Speaker 1: know that, but there'd be different topics it's not You're
- 46:17Speaker 1: not just going to go.
- 46:18Speaker 2: I don't know.
- 46:19Speaker 1: It'll look at it when it launches. Okay, all right,
- 46:22Speaker 1: I think that's it for now. Let's get out of here.
- 46:25Speaker 1: Adam say goodbye. Goodbye everybody, We love you.