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054 - Liv How The Divine Essence Though One And Simple Is A Proper Likeness Of All Things Intelligible · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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  Speaker 1: Chapter fifty four of Summa Contragentilees, First Book on God,
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  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
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  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
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  Speaker 1: Chapter fifty four. How the Divine Essence, though one and simple,
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  Speaker 1: is a proper likeness of all things intelligible. And yet
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  Speaker 1: it may seem to someone difficult or impossible that the
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  Speaker 1: one and same simple thing, such as God's essence, be
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  Speaker 1: the proper type or likeness of diverse things. For since
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  Speaker 1: the distinction of diverse things arises from their proper forms,
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  Speaker 1: that which, by reason of its proper form, is like
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  Speaker 1: one of them, must needs be unlike another. Whereas, so
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  Speaker 1: far as diverse things have something in common, nothing hinders
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  Speaker 1: them from having one likeness. For in an instance, a
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  Speaker 1: man and an ass inasmuch as they are animals. Hence,
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  Speaker 1: it would follow that God has not proper but common
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  Speaker 1: knowledge of things, because the operation of knowledge follows according
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  Speaker 1: to the mode by which the thing known is in
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  Speaker 1: the knower, even as heating follows the mode of heat.
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  Speaker 1: For the likeness of the thing known in the knower
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  Speaker 1: is as the form by which a thing acts Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: if God has proper knowledge of many things, it follows
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  Speaker 1: that He is himself the proper type of each. How
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  Speaker 1: this may be we must investigate. As the philosopher says
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  Speaker 1: in the Eighth Book of Metaphysics, forms of things and
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  Speaker 1: their definitions which signify them are like numbers. For in numbers,
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  Speaker 1: if one unit be added or subtracted, the species of
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  Speaker 1: the number is changed, as appears in the numbers three
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  Speaker 1: and four. Now it is the same with definitions, for
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  Speaker 1: the addition or subtraction of one difference changes the species.
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  Speaker 1: Thus a sensible substance minus rational and plus rational differs
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  Speaker 1: specifically now in things which include many. It is not
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  Speaker 1: the same with the intellect as with nature, For the
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  Speaker 1: nature of a thing does not allow of the separation
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  Speaker 1: of those things that are required essentially for that thing. Thus,
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  Speaker 1: the nature of an animal will not remain if the
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  Speaker 1: soul be taken away from the body. On the other hand,
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  Speaker 1: the intellect is sometimes able to take separately those things
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  Speaker 1: which are essentially united when one is not included in
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  Speaker 1: the notion of the other. Wherefore, in the number three
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  Speaker 1: it can consider the number two alone, and in irrational
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  Speaker 1: animal it can consider that which is only sensible. Hence,
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  Speaker 1: the intellect is able to consider that which includes several
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  Speaker 1: things as the proper notion of several by apprehending one
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  Speaker 1: of them without the others. For it can consider ten
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  Speaker 1: as the proper notion of nine by subtracting one unit,
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  Speaker 1: and in like manner as the proper notion of each
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  Speaker 1: lesser number included therein. Again, in man it can consider
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  Speaker 1: the proper type of an irrational animal as such, and
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  Speaker 1: of each of its species, unless they imply the addition
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  Speaker 1: of a positive difference. For this reason, a certain philosopher,
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  Speaker 1: Clement by name, said that the things of higher rank
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  Speaker 1: are the types of those of lesser rank. Now, the
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  Speaker 1: divine essence contains the excellences of all beings, not indeed
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  Speaker 1: by way of composition, but by way of perfection, as
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  Speaker 1: we have shown above, And every form, whether proper or common,
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  Speaker 1: so far as it is something positive, is a perfection,
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  Speaker 1: nor does it include imperfection, except in so far as
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  Speaker 1: it falls short of true being. Wherefore God's intellect can
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  Speaker 1: include within his essence that which is proper to each thing,
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  Speaker 1: by understanding wherein each thing imitates his essence, and wherein
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  Speaker 1: it falls short of his essence, for instance, by understanding
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  Speaker 1: his essence as imitable in respect of life and not
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  Speaker 1: of knowledge, it understands the proper form of a plant,
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  Speaker 1: or again as imitable in respect of knowledge, but not
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  Speaker 1: of intellect, it understands the proper form of an animal,
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  Speaker 1: and so on. Hence, it is clear that the Divine essence,
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  Speaker 1: inasmuch as it is absolutely perfect, may be taken as
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  Speaker 1: the proper type of such thing. Wherefore God can have
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  Speaker 1: proper knowledge of all things. Thereby, Since, however, the proper
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  Speaker 1: notion of one thing is distinct from the proper notion
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  Speaker 1: of another, and since distinction is the principle of plurality,
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  Speaker 1: we must consider a certain distinction and plurality of understood
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  Speaker 1: notions in the Divine intellect, in so far as that
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  Speaker 1: which is in the Divine intellect is the proper notion
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  Speaker 1: of diverse things. Wherefore, since this is according as God
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  Speaker 1: understands the proper relation of similarity which each creature bears
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  Speaker 1: to him, it follows that the types of things in
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  Speaker 1: the Divine Intellect are not many nor different, except in
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  Speaker 1: so far as God knows that things can be like
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  Speaker 1: Him in many and diverse ways. In this sense, Sugustine
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  Speaker 1: says that God makes man after one type, and a
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  Speaker 1: horse after another, and that the types of things are
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  Speaker 1: manifold in the Divine mind. Wherein also the opinion of
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  Speaker 1: Plato holds good, in that he held the existence of
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  Speaker 1: ideas according to which all that exists in material things
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  Speaker 1: would be formed. End of Chapter fifty four read by
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  Speaker 1: Michael Shane, Craig, Lambert Elsie