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Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 31-34) (7/4/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
0:03
In this episode, we're getting right back to the OIG
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report into Jeffrey Epstein's and PA three. The NPA did
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not violate department policy relating to deportation of criminal aliens.
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During the negotiations, the USAO rejected a defense offered provision
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prohibiting the USAO from requesting, initiating, or in any way
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encouraging immigration authorities to institute immigration proceedings against two female assistants. However,
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OPR considered whether the April twenty eighth, nineteen ninety five
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memorandum imposed any obligation on the USAO to prosecute Epstein's
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two female assistants, who were known to be foreign nationals
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as Villa Fauna urged in our prosecution memorandum and thus
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trigger their removal, or conversely, whether it precluded the USAO
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from agreeing not to prosecute them as part of a
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negotiated resolution. OPR found nothing in the policy that created
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a clear and an ambiguous standard in either regard the
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Attorney General's April twenty eighth, nineteen ninety five memorandum regarding
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deportation of criminal aliens directed federal prosecutors to become involved
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actively and directly in the process of removing criminal aliens
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from the United States, and, along with u SAM section
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nine Dash seventy three dot five twenty, provided that all
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the portable criminal aliens should be deported unless extraordinary circumstances exist. However,
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Epstein's to assistance were not deportable unless and until convicted
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of a crime that would have triggered their removal. But
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neither the policy memorandum nor the u SAM imposed an
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obligation on the USAO to prosecute or secure a conviction
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against a foreign national, nor did either provision preclude the
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USAO from declining to prosecute an alien using the same
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broad discretion that otherwise applies to charging decisions. The policy
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guidance also requires prompt and close coordination within a grid
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officials in cases involving alien defendants, and specifies that prosecutors
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must notify immigration authorities before engaging in plea negotiations with
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alien defendants. OPR learned during its investigation that an ICE
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agent participated in the Epstein investigation in its early stages. Moreover,
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because the USAO never engaged in pleaan negotiations, with two
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female assistants who in any event had not been charged
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and were therefore not defendants. No further notification was required.
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Part four. The evidence does not establish that the subjects
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were influenced by improper motives to include in the NPA
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terms favorable to Epstein or to otherwise extend benefits to Epstein.
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OPR investigated whether any of the subjects, Acosta, Sloman, menchel Lori,
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or Villafauna, was influenced by corruption, bias, or any other
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improper motive, such as Epstein's wealth status or political associations,
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to include terms in the ENDAS that were favorable to Epstein,
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or whether such motives otherwise affected the outcome of the
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federal investigation. OPR considered the case specific reasons the subjects
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identified as the motivation for the USAOs July thirty first,
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two thousand and seven term sheet and Acosta's approval of
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the NPA in September two thousand and seven. OPR also
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thoroughly examined various factors forming the basis for allegations that
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the subjects were motivated by improper influences, including the subject's
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pre existing relationships with Defense Council, the subject's numerous meetings
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with Epstein's team of nationally known attorneys, emails between the subjects,
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particularly Villa Fauna and Defense Council that appeared friendly, casual,
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and deferential to Defense Council, And inclusion in the NPA
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of a broad provision declining to prosecute all of Epstein's
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co conspirators. These factors are analyzed in the following discussions
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throughout this section of the report. As a threat vishal matter,
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opr's investigation of the subject's decisions and actions in the
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Epstein matter uncovered no evidence of corruption such as bribery, gratuity,
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or legal, political, or personal consideration. In addition, OPR examined
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the extensive contemporaneous documentary record, interviewed witnesses, and questioned the
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subject attorneys. The evidence shows three sets of issues influenced
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Acosta's decision to resolve the case through the NPA. The
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first of main concern to Acosta involved considerations of federalism
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and the deference to state authority. The second arose from
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an assessment by acosta senior advisors Sloman, Menchel and Lori
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that the case carried substantial litigation risks, including both witness
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issues and what some viewed as a novel application of
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certain federal statutes to the facts of the Epstein case.
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The third was a costa's aim of obtaining a greater
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measure of justice for victims of Epstein's conduct and for
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the community that proposed by the state. Although the NPA
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and the process for reaching it can be criticized, as
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OPR does, OPR did not find evidence supporting a conclusion
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that the subjects were motivated by a desire to benefit
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Epstein for personal gain or because of other improper considerations,
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such as Epstein's wealth, status or associations. That is not
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to say that Epstein received no benefit from his enormous wealth.
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He was able to hire nationally known attorneys who had
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prestige skill and extensive experience in federal and state criminal
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law and in conducting negotiations. He had the resources to
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finance an aggressive approach to the case that included the
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preparation of multiple written submissions reflecting extensive research and analysis,
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as well as multiple in person meetings involving several of
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his attorneys and USAO personnel. He assembled a defense team
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well versed in the USAO and the Department, with the
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knowledge to maneuver through the department's various levels and offices,
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a process unknown to many criminal defense attorneys and infrequently
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used by those familiar with the department's hierarchy. Access to
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highly skilled and prominent attorneys is not unusual in criminal
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cases involving corporations and their officers or certain other white
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collar defendants, but it is not so typical for defendants
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charged with sex crimes or violent offenses. Nonetheless, while recognizing
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that Epstein's wealth played a role in the outcome because
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he was able to hire skilled and assertive attorneys, OPR
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concludes that the subjects were not motivated to resolve the
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federal investigation to Epstein's benefit by improper factors. A OPR
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found no evidence of criminal corruption, such as bribery, gratuity,
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or legal, political, or personal consideration. Some public criticism of
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the usao's handling of the Epstein matter implied that the
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subject's decisions or actions may have been motivated by criminal corruption,
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although no specific information substantiating such implications was identified. Throughout
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its investigation, OPR was attentive to any evidence that any
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of the subjects was motivated by bribes, gratuities, or other legal,
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political or personal considerations, and found no such indication. Witnesses,
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including law enforcement officials, were specifically asked whether they had
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any information indicating such corruption, and law notwithstanding the harsh
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criticism by some of those same witnesses of the Epstein
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matter's outcome, stated that they did not. Specifically, the FBI
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case agent told OPR that she did not believe there
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had been any illegal influence, and that if she had
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perceived any, she would have gone screaming to the FBI's
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Public Corruption Unit. The co case agent and the FBI
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supervisors up through the Special Agent in charge likewise told
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OPR that they were unaware of any indication that a
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prosecutor acted in the matter because of illegal factors such
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as gratuity or bribe or other corrupt influence, and that
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any such indication would immediately have been referred to criminal
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investigation by the FBI. B contemporaneous written records and witness
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and subject interviews did not reveal evidence establishing that the
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subjects were improperly influenced by Epstein's status, wealth, or associations.
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Although Epstein's name is now nationally recognized in two thousand
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and six, in two thousand and seven, he was not
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a familiar national figure or even particularly well known in Florida.
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All five subjects told OPR that when they first learned
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of the investigation, they had not heard of Epstein. Similarly,
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the FBI case agent told OPR that when the investigation began,
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no one in the FBI appeared to have heard of Epstein,
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and other witnesses also told OPR that they were initially
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unfamiliar with Epstein. However, news reports about Epstein and his
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July two thousand and six arrest on the state indictment,
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which were contemporaneous with the beginning of the federal investigation,
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identified him as a wealthy Palm Beach resident with influential
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contacts including William Clinton, Donald Trump, Kevin Spacey, and Alan Dershowitz,
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and other prominent business, academic and scientists. Villa Fauna, Lorie Sloman,
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and Acosta learned of his press coverage early in the
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investigation and thus understood that Epstein was wealthy and associated
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with notable public figures. The FBI case agent also told
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OPR that we knew who had been on his plane,
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we knew some of his connections, and just to interject
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real quick, that's a straight up lie. They knew about
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Epstein way back in the day, and that's because he
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was reported to them by Maria Farmer. One contemporaneous records
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did not reveal evidence establishing that the NPA resulted from
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improper factors. OPR found no evidence in the extensive contemporaneous
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documentary record that the terms of the NPA resulted from
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improper factors, such as Epstein's wealth or influential connections. Epstein's
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legal team overtly raised Epstein's financial status in arguing for
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a sentence that did not include a term of imprisonment
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on the grounds that Epstein would be extor in prison,
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but the USAO insisted that Epstein serve a term of incarceration.
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Defense council mentioned former Clinton in one pre NPA letter,
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but that reference was made in context of a narrative
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of Epstein's philanthropic activities, rather than presented as a suggestion
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that Epstein's association to the former president warranted leniency, and
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in any case, the USAO rejected the defense argument that
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the matter should be left entirely to the state's discretion.
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The defense submission to the Deputy Attorney General contained a
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direct reference to Epstein's connection the former President Clinton, but
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the submission was made well after the NPA was negotiated
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and signed, and in it, Council contended that the USAO
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had treated Epstein too harshly because of his association with
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the former president. Two the subjects asserted that they were
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motivated by reasonable strategic and policy considerations, not in proper influences.
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In addition to reviewing the documentary evidence, OPR questioned the
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five side object attorneys, all of whom denied being personally
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influenced by Epstein's wealth or status, in making decisions regarding
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the investigation, in the decision to resolve the case through
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the NPA, or in negotiating the NPA. Villa Fauna in particular,
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was concerned from the outset of the federal investigation that
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Epstein might try to employ against the USAO. The same
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pressure that she understood had been used with the State
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Attorney's office, and she proactively took steps to counter Epstein's
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possible influence by meeting with Acosta and Sloman to sensitize
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them to Epstein's tactics. Both Acosta and Sloman told OPR
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that the USAO had handled cases involving wealthy high profile
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defendants before, including the abram Off case. A Costa told OPR,
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we tried to treat this case fairly, not looking at
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how wealthy he is, but also not saying we need
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to do this because he is so wealthy. Menchell expressed
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a similar review, telling OPR that he did not believe
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it's appropriate to go after somebody because of their status
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one way or the other. Lori told OPR that Epstein's
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status may have generated more front office involvement in the case,
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but it did not affect the outcome, and Slowman emphatically
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disagreed with the suggestion that the usao's handling of the
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case had been affected by Epstein's wealth or influential connections.
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Other witnesses corroborated the subject's testimony on this point, including
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the FBI case agents, who told OPR that no one
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ever communicated to them that they should treat Epstein differently
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because of his wealth. The CEO's chief told OPR that
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he did not recall anyone at the USAO expressing either
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qualms or enthusiasm about proceeding against Epstein because of his
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wealth or influence. OPR takes note of, but does not
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consider dispositive the absence of any affirmative evidence that the
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subjects were acting from improper motivations or their denial of
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such motivations. Of more significance, and has discussed more fully below,
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was the fact that temporaneous records support the subject's assertions
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that the decision to pursue a pre charge resolution was
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based on various case specific, legal and factual considerations. OPR
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also considered that the usao's most pivotal decisions to resolve
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the case through an NPA requiring Epstein to serve time
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in jail, register as a sexual offender, and provide monetary
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damages to victims had been made by July thirty first,
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two thousand and seven, when the USAO presented its term
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sheet to the Defense. This was before Acosta had ever
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met with Defense Council and when he had been indicated
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and he plans to do so. It's also well before
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Acosta's October twelfth, two thousand and seven, breakfast meeting with
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Defense Council left Kowitz, which received strong public and media criticism.
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OPR also considered significant the fact that, although the USAO
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made numerous concessions in the course of negotiating the final NPA.
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The USAO did not accede to the defense request that
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the USAO and federal involvement altogether and return the matter
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to the state authorities to handle as they saw fit,
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and the USAO refused to eliminate its requirement that Epstein
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register as a sexual offender, despite a strong push by
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the defense that it does. So, all right, that's going
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to do it for this one. And in the next episode,
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we're going to pick up with Part three, Subject and
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witness interviews and contemporaneous records, identified case specific considerations relating
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to evidence, legal theories, litigation risk, and a trial's potential
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impact on the victims. All of the information that goes
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with this episode can be found in the description box.
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What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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This episode, we're getting right back to the OIG report
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into the non prosecution Agreement three, Subject and witness interviews
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and contemporaneous records, identified case specific considerations relating to evidence,
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legal theories, litigation risk, and a trial's potential impact on victims. Acosta, Sloman, Menchel,
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and Lauri told OPR that they did not recall the
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specific content of discussions about the challenges presented by a
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potential federal prosecution, or reasons for Acosta's decision to resolve
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the federal investigation through the NPA. But they and Vilafauna
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identified for OPR several case specific factors unrelated to Abstein's
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wealth or associations that either did or likely would have
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been included in those discussions and that OPR concludes likely
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influenced Acosta's decision making. These considerations include assessment of the
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evidentiary risks and the potential impact of a trial on
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the victims. For the most part, however, these factors appear
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more aptly to pertain to the decision to resolve the
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case through a precharge disposition, but do not directly explain
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why a Costa chose to resolve the federal investigation through
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a guilty plea in state court. That decision appears to
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have stemmed from Acosta's concerns about intruding into an area
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he believed was traditionally handled by state law enforcement authorities.
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In a declaration submitted to the District Court in two
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thousand and seven in connection with the CVRA litigation, Villafauna
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explained to the usao's rationale for terminating the federal investigation
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through the NPA. Prior to the office making its decision
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to direct me to engage in negotiations with Epstein's council,
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I discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the case with
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members of the office management and inform them that most
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of the victims had expressed significant concerns about having their
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identities disclosed. It is my understanding from these and other
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discussions that these factors, that is, the various strengths and
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weaknesses of the case, and the various competing interests of
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the many different victims, including the privacy concerns expressed by many,
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together with the office's desire to obtain a guaranteed sentence
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of incarceration for Epstein, the equivalent of uncontested restitution for
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the victims and guaranteed sexual offender registration by Epstein, were
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among the factors that led to the NPA. During her
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OPR interview, Villa Fauna similarly described the victim's general reluctance
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to go forward with a trial. When we would meet
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with the victims, we would ask them how they wanted
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the case to be resolved, and most of them wanted
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the case to be resolved via a plea. Some of
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them wanted him not to be prosecuted at all. Most
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of them did not want to have to come to
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court to testify, and they were very worried about their
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privacy rights. In his written response to OPR, Lurie stated
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that although he did not specifically recall the issues Villa
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Fauna set forth in her declaration, he believed they would
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have been important to the USAO. In two thousand and seven,
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Laurie told OPR that he generally recalled concerns within the
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USAO about the charges and a potential trial. My vague
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recollection is that I and others had concerns that there
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was a substantial chance we would not prevail at both
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trial and on appeal after a conviction, resulting in no
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jail time, no criminal record, no restitution, no sex offender status,
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publication at a trial, of the names of certain victims
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that didn't want their names revealed, and the general difficulties
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of a trial for the families and the victims. Although
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his email showed that at the time he advocated for
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prosecution of Epstein, Lori told OPR it was also his
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general recollection that everybody at the USAO working on the
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matter had expressed concerns at various times about the long
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term viability of a federal prosecution of Epstein due to
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certain factual and legal hurdles, as well as issues with
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the cooperation and the desires of the victims. Similarly, Menchell,
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who had experienced prosecuting sexual assault crimes, recalled understanding that
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many of the victims were unwilling to go forward and
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would have experienced additional trauma as a result of a trial,
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and some had made statements exonerating Epstein. Menchell told OPR
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he believed that if the USAO had filed the proposed
18:56
charges against Epstein, Epstein would have elected to go to trial.
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In Menchell's view, the USAO therefore had to weigh the
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risk of losing at trial and thereby retraumatizing the victims
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against the benefits gained through the negotiated result, which ensured
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that Epstein served time in jail, registered as a sexual offender,
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and made restitution to his victims. Slowman also recalled witness
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challenges and concerns about the viability of the government's legal theories.
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He told OPR, it seemed to me you had a
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trench of witnesses who were not going to be reliable.
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You had a tranch of witnesses who were going to
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be severely impeached, people who loved Jeffrey Epstein, who thought
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he was a Svungali, who were going to say I
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told him I was eighteen years old. You had witnesses
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who were scared to death of the public light being
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shown on them because their parents didn't even know, had
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very vulnerable victims. You had all of these concerns. Acosta
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told OPR that he recalled discussions with senior managers about
19:53
the victim's general credibility and reluctance to testify, and the
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evidentiary strength of the case, all of which factored into
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the resolution. He acknowledged that his understanding of the facts
20:05
was not granular and did not encompass a detailed understanding
20:08
of each victim's expected testimony, but he trusted that his
20:12
team had already done the diligence necessary to make recommendations
20:16
about the evidentary strength of the case. Acosta recalled discussing
20:19
the facts with Slowman and Menchel and possibly Lori, none
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of whom had a detailed and understanding of the facts
20:25
as Villafauna. Nevertheless, OPR credits a costas statement that he
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reasonably believed based on his conversations with others who expressed
20:34
this view, that a trial would pose significant evidentiary challenges.
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Other witnesses corroborated the subject's testimony regarding witness challenges, including
20:44
the FBI co case agent, who recalled during his OPR
20:47
interview that some of the victims had expressed concerns for
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their safety and a lot of them didn't want to
20:52
take the stand and didn't want to have to relive
20:55
what happened to them. The co case agent told OPR
20:58
that one of the strategies for dealing with victims fear
21:01
was to keep them off the stand, and he generally
21:03
remembered discussions about resolving the Epstein case in a way
21:06
that protected victim's identities. In addition, the CEO's trial attorney,
21:11
who briefly worked with Villa Fauna on the case after
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the NPA was signed, told OPR that in her meetings
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with some of the victims, she formed the impression that
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there were not interested in the prosecution going forward. The
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CEO's trial attorney told ODPR that the victims would have testified,
21:27
but would have required an extensive amount of victim management
21:30
because they were deeply embarrassed about potentially being labeled as prostitutes.
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The CEO's trial attorney also told OPR that there were
21:39
obvious weaknesses in the case from an evidentiary perspective. The
21:44
contemporaneous records also reflect discussions of or references to, various
21:49
legal and factual issues or other concerns about the case.
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For example, in an early email to Menchell, Lori noted
21:56
that two key issues raised by Villa fauna proposed charges
22:00
were whether the USAO could prove that Epstein traveled for
22:03
the purpose of engaging in sex acts and the fact
22:06
that some minor victims had told Epstein they were eighteen.
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He later opined to a Costa and Menchel that there
22:12
is some risk on some of the statutes proposed in
22:14
Villa Fauna's prosecution memorandum, as this is uncharted territory to
22:19
some degree. In his July fifth, two thousand and seven
22:22
email to Vilafauna, Menchel cited Acosta and Sloman's concerns about
22:27
taking this case because of the petit policy and a
22:30
number of legal issues, and Acosta's concerns about hurting projects
22:33
save childhood. Defense counsel raised a myriad legal and factual
22:37
challenges to their letters to the USAO. Defense submissions attack
22:42
the legal theories for a federal prosecution and detail factors
22:46
that could have undermined victim's credibility, including victim's statements favorable
22:50
to Epstein and evidence of victim drug and alcohol use,
22:54
as well as the fact that some victims recruited other
22:56
victims and purportedly lied to Epstein about their ages. Acosta
23:01
also recalled that although his team had expressed concern about
23:04
the trial issues, his own focus had been on the
23:07
legal side of things. Notably, during his prior tenure as
23:10
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the department's Civil
23:13
Rights Division, Acosta had been involved in efforts to address
23:17
sex trafficking. He told OPR that one of the background
23:20
issues that the Civil Rights Division addressed under his leadership,
23:24
and which influenced his view of the Epstein case, was
23:27
a distinction between sex trafficking and solicitation of prostitution. Specifically,
23:32
he was concerned about avoiding the creation of a potentially
23:35
unfavorable federal precedent between prostitution, which was traditionally a matter
23:40
of state concern, and sex trafficking. Which remained a developing
23:44
area of federal interest in two thousand and seven. The
23:47
USAO might not have been able to surmount the evidentiary,
23:50
legal and policy issues presented by a federal prosecution of Epstein.
23:54
Villafauna in particular, believed she could have prevailed had she
23:58
taken the case to trial and EVA, and after the
24:00
NPA was negotiated, she repeatedly recommended declaring Epstein in breach
24:05
and proceeding with an indictment because she continued to have
24:08
confidence in the case. Osterbond and others also believed that
24:12
the government would succeed at trial. Furthermore, the victims were
24:15
not a uniform group. Some of them were afraid of
24:18
testifying or having their identities made public. Others wanted Epstein prosecuted.
24:23
But even among those, it's not clear how many expressed
24:25
a willingness to testify at a trial, and still others
24:28
provided information favorable to Epstein. In the end, the cost
24:32
to assume responsibility for deciding how to resolve the Epstein
24:35
investigation and weighing the risks and benefit of a trial
24:39
versus those of a precharge disposition, his determination that a
24:43
precharge disposition was appropriate was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
24:48
Although the evidentiary and witness issues explained the subject supervisor's
24:52
concerns about a winning a potential trial and why the
24:55
USAO would have sought some sort of pre charge disposition,
24:58
they do not fully explain and why Acosta decided to
25:01
pursue a state based resolution as opposed to a traditional
25:05
federal plea agreement. OPR did not find in the contemporaneous
25:09
records a memorandum or other memorialization of the reasoning underlying
25:14
Acosta's decision to offer a state based resolution or the
25:17
terms offered to the defense on July thirty first, two
25:20
thousand and seven. According to Acosta in two thousand and six,
25:24
it would have been extremely unusual for any United States
25:27
Attorney's office to become involved in a state solicitation case,
25:31
even when involving underage teens, because solicitation was a province
25:36
of state prosecutors. Acosta told OPR that he developed a
25:40
preference for deferring to the state to make it clear
25:43
that the USAO was not stepping on something that is
25:46
purely a local matter, because we didn't want bad precedent
25:49
for the sake of the larger human trafficking issue. Acosta
25:53
also told OPR that it was his understanding that the
25:57
PbD would not have brought the case to federal investigators
26:01
if the State Attorney's office had pursued a sanction against
26:03
Epstein that had included jail time and the sexual offender registration.
26:08
A Costa viewed the usao's role in the case as
26:11
limited to preventing the manifest injustice that, in Acosta's view,
26:15
would have resulted from the state's original plea proposal. A
26:19
Costa acknowledged that if the investigation had begun in the
26:22
federal system, we would not have viewed the term set
26:25
out in the NPA as satisfactory result, but it was
26:28
adequate to serve as a backstop to the state's prosecution,
26:32
which he described as a polite way of saying or
26:34
encouraging the state to do a little bit more in
26:37
some Acosta told OPR that the Epstein case lay in
26:40
unchartered territory. There was no certainty that the USAO would
26:44
prevail if it went to trial, and a potentially unfavorable
26:48
outcome had to be weighed against a certain plea with
26:51
registration that would make sure that the public knew that
26:54
this person was a sex offender. A Costa told OPR
26:58
that he discussed the case primarily with Loman and Menchel,
27:01
and both told OPR that while they did not share
27:03
Acostas federalism concerns, they recalled that Acosta had been concerned
27:08
about policy and federalism issues. Slowman told OPR that although
27:13
he did not remember specific conversations, he generally recalled that
27:17
Acosta had been sensitive to petit policy and federalism concerns,
27:21
which Slowman described as whether the USAO was overstepping our
27:25
bounds by taking what is a traditional state case that
27:29
was in the state attorney's office that was resolved by
27:32
the state attorney's office at some level. During his OPR interview,
27:36
Menchell remembered that Acosta approached the case from a broader
27:39
policy perspective and was worried about the impact that taking
27:43
the case in federally may have on other programs, although
27:47
Menchell did not recall specifically what those programs were. All Right,
27:51
we're going to wrap this one up right here, and
27:53
in the next episode we're going to pick up with
27:55
c Other significant factors are inconsistent with the conclusion that
27:59
the subjects actions were motivated by improper influences. All of
28:03
the information that goes with this episode can be found
28:07
in the description box. What's up everyone, and welcome back
28:10
to the Epstein chronicles. In this episode, we're getting right
28:13
back to the OIG report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA. See
28:19
other significant factors are inconsistent with the conclusion that the
28:22
subject's actions were motivated by improper influences. OPR considered additional
28:28
aspects of the Epstein case that were inconsistent with a
28:31
suggestion that Acosta's decision to offer the July thirty, first,
28:35
two thousand and seven terms was driven by corruption, a
28:38
desire to provide an improper benefit to Epstein, or other
28:41
improper influences. First, OPR considered highly significant the fact that
28:47
if Acosta's primary motivation was to benefit Epstein, he had
28:50
an option even more favorable to Epstein available to him.
28:54
The NPA required Epstein to serve time in jail and
28:58
register as a sexual offender, and provided a mechanism for
29:01
the victims to seek monetary damages, outcomes unlikely if the
29:05
matter had been abandoned and sent back to the state
29:08
for whatever results state authorities deemed appropriate. Epstein's attorneys had
29:12
argued to the USAO that there was no federal interest
29:15
in the investigation and that his conduct was exclusively a
29:19
matter of state concern. If the USAO had declined to
29:22
intervene in the case, as Epstein's counsel repeatedly and strongly
29:27
argued it should, the state would have meted out the
29:29
sole punishment for his behavior. Under the state's original plan,
29:33
Epstein likely would have received a sentence of probation. Menchel
29:38
described such a result as a mere slap on the wrist,
29:41
with no jail time, no felony, no sex offense, no
29:44
sexual offender registration, and no restitution for the victims. Instead
29:49
of acceding to Epstein's proposal, however, the USAO devised a
29:53
resolution of the federal investigation that, although widely criticized as
29:57
inadequate to address the seriousness of evslas Stein's conduct, nevertheless
30:02
penalized Epstein more than a guilty plead to the state's
30:05
original charge standing alone would have done. Acosta's affirmative decision
30:11
to intervene and to compel a more stringent and just
30:14
resolution than the state had proposed. Rather than exercising his
30:17
discretion to quietly decline prosecution is strong circumstantial evidence that
30:22
he was not acting for the purpose of benefiting Epstein. Similarly,
30:26
despite Defense Counsel's repeated requests to eliminate the sexual offender
30:31
registration requirement, Acosta refused to reconsider the provision. Acosta would
30:37
certainly have modified or eliminated the provision entirely if his
30:40
motivation was to benefit Epstein or Epstein's attorneys. Second, Epstein
30:46
himself was not satisfied with the NPA. Immediately after signing
30:50
the agreement, he sought to have the Department nullify it
30:53
by declaring federal involvement in the investigation inappropriate. In addition
30:57
to repeatedly attacking the NPA in his submission of the
31:01
misconduct and improper bias on the part of specific USA personnel,
31:06
Epstein's dissatisfaction with the NPA and his personal attacks on
31:10
individual prosecutors involved in negotiating the agreement appear inconsistent with
31:15
the conclusion that the subjects design the NPA for Epstein's benefit.
31:19
D OPR does not find that the subject's pre existing
31:23
relationships with Defense Council, decisions to meet with Defense Counsel,
31:28
and other factors established that the subjects acted from improper
31:31
influences or provided improper benefits to Epstein. In evaluating the
31:37
subject's conduct, OPR considered various other factors featured in media
31:41
accounts to show that the subjects provided improper benefits to
31:44
Epstein or which purportedly suggested that the subjects acted from
31:49
improper influences. OPR examined these factors but did not find
31:54
that they supported of finding that the subjects were influenced
31:57
by favoritism, bias, or other proper motivation. One the evidence
32:02
does not establish that the subjects extended any improper benefit
32:06
to Epstein because of their pre existing relationships with his attorneys.
32:11
Epstein's wealth enabled him to hire multiple attorneys who had
32:14
pre existing personal connections to some of the government attorneys
32:18
involved in his case in the State Attorney's office, in
32:20
the USAO and elsewhere in the department. Based on the
32:24
attorneys Epstein selected to represent him, a reasonable inference can
32:28
be drawn that Epstein believed that hiring attorneys with relationships
32:31
to the prosecutors would be beneficial to him. One of
32:35
the first attorneys who contacted the USAO on Epstein's behalf
32:39
was Guy Lewis, a former AUSA and US attorney for
32:43
the Southern District of Florida. Villafauna and Laurie had worked
32:47
for Lewis, and Laurie was close friends with one of
32:50
Lewis's law partners. Epstein also retained to Lily Anne Sanchez,
32:55
a former AUSA who had been Menchel's deputy and with
32:58
whom he had socialized. Later, when Epstein was seeking Acosta's
33:02
personal involvement in the case, Epstein hired Kenneth Starr and
33:06
Jay Lefkowitz, prominent attorneys from kirk Lan Ellis, with whom
33:10
Acosta was acquainted from his previous employment with that firm.
33:14
Villa Fauna told OPR that she believed Acosta was influenced
33:17
by the stature of Epstein's attorneys. Critically, However, other than
33:21
the information regarding Menchel that is discussed in the following subsection,
33:25
neither Villa Fauna nor any of the other individual OPR
33:29
interviewed identified any specific evidence suggesting that Acosta or any
33:34
of the other subjects extended and in proper favor or
33:37
benefit to Epstein because of a personal relationship with defense counsel,
33:41
or for any other improper reason. Villa Fauna explained how,
33:45
in her view, the legal prowess of Epstein's attorneys had
33:48
an impact on the case. One of the issues in
33:51
the case was the defense ability to describe the case
33:54
or characterize the case as being legally complex. It was
33:57
not as legally complex as they made it out to be,
34:00
but because they were able to convince members of our
34:03
office that it was somehow extremely novel and legally complex,
34:07
the issue became who was likely to succeed in arguing
34:10
these legal issues, and because of that, the legal prowess,
34:14
if you will, of the attorneys is something to consider.
34:17
I think that the ability of Alan Dershowitz and Ken
34:20
Starr nj Lefkowitz to convince alex Acosta that I didn't
34:23
know what I was talking about also came into play.
34:26
So I think there were a number of factors and
34:28
it all came together. Although Villafana was critical of Acosta's
34:33
consideration of the defense arguments, she conceded that the defense
34:36
team's tactics demonstrated effective advocacy. Certainly throughout the case, Epstein's
34:41
attorneys prepared lengthy memoranda analyzing the evidence and arguing nuanced
34:46
legal points concerning federalism. The elements of numerous federal criminal
34:51
statutes and the evidence relevant to those statutes. But it's
34:55
not unusual or unreasonable for prosecutors to carefully consider well
34:59
craftedly legal arguments from the Defense Council. There is little
35:03
question that Epstein's extensive team of attorneys was able to
35:06
obtain negotiated benefits for Epstein. Although the USAO never wavered
35:11
from its three core requirements, it did agree to a
35:14
reduction in prison time from its original offer and to
35:17
grant that Epstein's certain other concessions during the negotiations, Epstein's
35:21
wealth provided him with skilled, experienced negotiators who continually sought
35:26
various incremental concessions, and with attorneys who knew how to
35:30
obtain department review of a USAO matter, thereby delaying undesired
35:35
outcomes for as long as possible. Despite Epstein's evident intentions, However,
35:40
OPR did not find evidence warranting a conclusion that the
35:44
NPA or its terms resulted from the subject's relationship with
35:47
the attorneys he had selected to represent them. Two the
35:52
subjects asserted that their relationships with Defense Council did not
35:55
influence their actions. Acosta, mental Slowman, and each asserted that
36:01
Epstein's choice of counsel did not affect his handling of
36:04
the case. Menchell told o PR that once in private practice,
36:08
former colleagues often became adversaries. In Menchell's views, such pre
36:12
existing relationships were useful because they afforded a defense attorney
36:16
initial credibility and an insight into the issues a prosecutor
36:20
would likely view as areas of concern, which enabled the
36:23
defense attorney to tailor arguments in a way that would
36:26
maximize their persuasive impact on the USAO. Menchell told o PR, however,
36:31
that these advantages did not move the needle in any
36:34
major way, and he rejected the notion that anyone in
36:37
the USAO had been swayed because of pre existing friendships
36:41
or associations with any of Epstein's attorneys. In fact, Menchell
36:45
told OPR that he had his USAO colleagues viewed Epstein's
36:49
attempt to exert influence through his choice of counsel as
36:52
ham fisted and clumsy. Sloman told o PR that although
36:57
he became aware that Lori was friends with Guy Lewis
37:00
and Lewis's law partner, he was unaware of personal relationships
37:03
between any of his colleagues and any of Epstein's attorneys,
37:07
but that in any event, his attitude or regarding cases
37:10
involving former colleagues was that we would give them process,
37:14
but we didn't pull any punches with them. And Sloman's view,
37:18
pre existing relationships with defense counsel did not change the
37:21
equation because as Ausa's he and his colleagues were motivated
37:26
by what they perceived to be the best for the case.
37:29
Lourie told OPR that his pre existing associations with Epstein's
37:33
attorneys didn't influence anything. Notably, at the outset of the
37:36
Epstein case, Laurie sought guidance from the usao's Professional Responsibility
37:41
Officer about the propriety of his role as a supervisor
37:44
in the investigation because of his acquaintance with Lewis and
37:48
longtime friendship with Lewis's law partner. OPR considered Laurie's caution
37:53
in seeking and obtaining the Professional Responsibility officer's advice as
37:57
an indication that he was alert to his ethical responsibilities
38:01
regarding relationships with defense counsel, including avoiding the appearance of
38:05
a conflict of interest. Acosta said during his OPR interview
38:09
that he developed the three criteria reflected on the term
38:12
sheet of sentence, incarceration, sexual offender registration, and monetary damages
38:18
for the victims before he engaged directly with any of
38:21
Epstein's attorneys, and before Epstein added Star and left Kowitz
38:25
the Kirkland and Nellis attorneys to his team. Acosta pointed
38:29
out that the USAO continued to insist on a resolution
38:32
that satisfied all three of those criteria even after Kirkland
38:36
and Ellis became involved in the case. Acosta took other
38:40
action that appear inconsistent with an intent to benefit Star
38:44
and left Kowitz. On several occasions when directly appealed to
38:48
Bi Left Kowitzer Star, he directed them to address their
38:51
communications to Villafauna, Sloman, and other subordinates. After his October twelfth,
38:57
two thousand and seven, breakfast meeting with left Kowitz, Acosta
39:00
immediately communicated with Slowman about their conversation. In late two
39:04
thousand and eight, when Acosta anticipated leaving the USAO and
39:08
was considering pursuing employment with Kirkland Danellis, he recognized the
39:12
conflict of interest and instructed Slowman to stop copying him
39:16
on emails relating to the Epstein matter on Acosta's behalf.
39:19
The usao's professional Responsibility Officer sought and obtained formal department
39:24
approval of Acosta's recusal from the case, based on the
39:28
fact that he had begun to discuss possible employment with
39:30
Kirkland Ellis. These actions support Acosta's assertion that he was
39:35
cognizant of his ethical responsibilities concerning relationships with defense counsel.
39:40
All right, we're going to wrap this episode up here,
39:42
and in the next episode, we're going to pick up
39:44
where we left off. All of the information that goes
39:47
with this episode can be found in the description box.