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2. Into Battle (2001–2002) · The Long War: Canada in Afghanistan

• ANNA MARIA TREMONTI: [Music begins]. I’m Anna Maria Tremonti and this is The Long War: Canada in Afghanistan. As we heard in the last episode, by December 2001, the Taliban regime had collapsed. Al-Qaeda was scattered and on the run. And in Bonn, Germany, Afghan leaders gathered with international diplomats to map out the country’s democratic future. It looked like victory, like the mission was almost complete. But there was a piece of unfinished business: Osama bin Laden was still alive, and U.S. intelligence thought it knew where he was hiding: in the mountains of Tora Bora where a battle was about to take place. [Music ends]. ANDREW BURTCH: The Battle of Tora Bora, taking place at the end of 2001, was an effort to capture or kill bin Laden and his top lieutenants, who were reported to have been sheltering in the mountains of Tora Bora and defensive complexes or in caves in and around that area. And they were subject to a great deal of artillery and airstrikes in order to isolate and put them to ground with the objective of trying to go in and capture or kill Osama bin Laden. TREMONTI: Andrew Burtch, the Post-1945 Historian at the Canadian War Museum, is our guide this season. [Music begins]. At first it seemed like the architect of 9/11 was finally within grasp. For two weeks, American special forces and Afghan militias pounded them with airstrikes and artillery. Ultimately, to no avail. BURTCH: The bombing campaign and the various sorties in order to capture him were in the end unsuccessful. Bin Laden and his retinue were able to escape from Tora Bora and slip into Pakistan where he would subsequently be able to evade capture for many years. TREMONTI: Now the mission was becoming more complex. There would be victories but also surprises, setbacks, and the slow pace of diplomacy. The quick war was becoming a long one. [Music ends]. Canadian warships and aircraft had deployed to support coalition operations in October and November of 2001. And Canadian special forces were on the ground during fighting in December. Then in February 2002, the main Canadian battle group finally arrived: 750 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, the PPCLI. A number that would eventually increase to 850. Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran commanded the group. PAT STOGRAN: We were just sitting on our rucksacks waiting to go, and it wasn’t until sometime during Christmas leave that we actually got the warning order that we would be leaving in the new year. TREMONTI: A career Infantry Officer, Stogran served in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia. Now he was heading to Afghanistan, as part of Operation Apollo. The mission: Secure the Kandahar airfield and support American-led coalition operations against remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Canadian troops would operate under an American-led task force in preparation for further combat. What the soldiers also found when they arrived in Kandahar was a landscape unlike anything they’d experienced before. The scrub desert heat was relentless, and dust was so fine it got into everything — their equipment, their clothing, and their lungs. STOGRAN: Oh, it was insidious. It was everywhere. You know, if you blew your nose, it was like mud. You just started to live like a local, you knew when to cover your face, and yeah, you just made do. TREMONTI: Then there was the camouflage pattern on their uniforms. It was designed for temperate woodlands like the ones found in Bosnia. But they made it work. STOGRAN: After a couple of weeks in the sun and the dirt, the green tone was a little more muted. And I have to say, I don’t think the troops ever felt that the green was an impediment. You know like I said, we had other means of camouflaging our uniforms with scrim and those sorts of things. TREMONTI: The Canadians were under the command of U.S. Colonel Frank Wiercinski. He led the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division, known as the Rakkasans, an air assault unit. Stogran says Colonel Wiercinski had been forced to leave one of his own maneuver units behind to make room for the Canadians. So the reception at first was cool. But that changed quickly. STOGRAN: You know to his credit, as soon as we took over the airfield from the Marines who’d captured the airfield, I think we impressed them with our professionalism, and the way the troops defended the airfield, and we had contingency plans for all sorts of attacks and all that. And I think he recognized, I think he was a little more receptive to our contribution and he understood the politics of it all. TREMONTI: The question now hanging over the mission was how long would they be there? The planned Afghan constitutional processes would take months. Plus, a presidential election was on the horizon. STOGRAN: I told the troops right from the get go, “Don‘t consider this a six-month tour. We could be here a year or, you know, who knows, but just get used to the lifestyle.” So, it was open-ended, and it was open-ended for the longest time. BURTCH: There is already a time scale ahead that is longer than just the next six months. And the needs of Afghanistan are profound. So, I think that there’s a sense that there’s a longer haul ahead, but the precise shape that takes is still being discussed and being refined by the time that Canadians are deploying. TREMONTI: In early February, Afghan militia reconnaissance teams reported a concentration of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the Shah-i-Kot Valley. It’s a remote mountainous region northeast of Kandahar. This was corroborated by American intelligence. In March 2002, Operation Anaconda began — a massive effort to clear the area. STOGRAN: Anaconda was meant to break the back of the bad guys, and they were well prepared and dug in for a big fight with the Americans. We had been tasked to take over the perimeter. BURTCH: Operation Anaconda was between the al-Qaeda fighters, Taliban remnants, and members of the American forces primarily, with some Canadian presence. But essentially, pushing through the Shah-i-Kot Valley, to close with and destroy the al-Qaeda fighters that were in there, that was fought with an assemblage of American forces, but also with the support that was provided by Canadian sniper detachments. TREMONTI: The Canadian snipers used specialized rifles and operated independently, finding high ground and waiting to take the perfect shot. It required a particular kind of soldier. STOGRAN: I think a combination of patience and being tough. You know, to be able to stay in a position for a long period of time, to stay, to stalk an enemy, those kinds of things. So they’re patient. I think that’s, it’s the tenacity of them, their ability to go off on their own and make their own way. But what they did was they broke out from the Americans and went up into a piece of high ground and just started picking off commanders on the other side to the point where the American troops were kind of watching the Canadians, you know, whittle down, and letting out a cheer every now and then when they’d take somebody out. TREMONTI: One of those snipers was Corporal Rob Furlong. In March 2002, Furlong was observing an al-Qaeda position when he spotted three armed fighters. He fired. The first and second shot missed. But the third bullet traveled 2,430 metres — nearly two-and-a-half kilometres — taking roughly four seconds to reach its target, killing one of the fighters. It was the longest confirmed sniper kill in military history at the time, a record that stood for seven years. His McMillan TAC-50 sniper rifle is on display at the Canadian War Museum. The accomplishment of Canada’s snipers was an early sign of success as members of the international coalition learned to work together. BURTCH: I say that wasn’t the thing that moved the needle or was necessarily the most memorable thing from that deployment. But it was something that was reported home and was noteworthy in large part because the Americans and the Canadians on the ground, you know, wanted it known. So it was viewed as kind of an example of the cooperation, why Canadians were there, what they were doing there. And I think it was held up as an example of that in the media. TREMONTI: But Operation Anaconda was just beginning. Days later, Canadian commanders received orders for a follow-up mission — the first major combat mission since the Korean War 50 years earlier. They called it Operation Harpoon. The target was a jagged ridgeline in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, nicknamed The Whale’s Back. BURTCH: It’s called The Whale’s Back because, as a feature I guess viewed from the air, it kind of looks like the spine of a whale cresting up from the landscape. Because Afghanistan, although in some places it’s quite flat, is also very mountainous. And this gets more pronounced as you go north. TREMONTI: Journalist and filmmaker Garth Pritchard was in Afghanistan in 2002. Here he is talking to Colonel Pat Stogran back then. [CLIP – GARTH PRITCHARD] Tell me about The Whale. [CLIP – PAT STOGRAN] Tell you about The Whale. Uh, that was really where we cut our teeth. The whale was the culmination of Operation Anaconda, where Task Force Rakkansan fought tenaciously for about two weeks. And this was planned to be, I think, the final blow in the operation where onto a land feature that dominated the Shah-i-Kot Valley and Task Force Rakkansan had taken a lot of fire from that particular feature. And it was our job to, to clear the feature of any al-Qaeda and set conditions for us to do sensitive site exploitation and gather whatever evidence we could on the al-Qaeda network that was left in the area. We were expecting, or intelligence had suggested to us, that there’d be 60 to 100 al-Qaeda still holding the feature. TREMONTI: On the morning of March 13, 2002, helicopters lifted off from Bagram Airfield and flew over rugged landscape. Aboard were members of 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and an American infantry company. This would be a fast, overwhelming show of force against what they thought would be Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters scattered in the hills. STOGRAN: So I was expecting, you know, very hardened guys who’d been fighting wars for a long time. Evil people. I thought they were real bad guys and, you know, I’d heard of some of the executions that they’d done. So, I remember my final briefing to my commanders, and I said, “If anybody gets taken, it’s attack. You know, guys, don’t let anybody get taken and there’s no turning back. You know, I want ‘em to think, we’re in a gun fight now.” BURTCH: And of course, against the heavy downwash of the Chinooks loaded up with all sorts of gear because they don’t know how long they’re going to be out there. They may be out there longer. They brought enough supplies to last for a much longer period of time. They brought mortars and ammunition and all that sort of stuff because they’re going to push out and perhaps need to get into defensive positions and have firefights. They’re not just there for a sightseeing trip. They’re landing with all the intention and capability that the Battalion could offer at that time. TREMONTI: And then . . . nothing. By the time the Canadians landed, al-Qaeda had largely abandoned the area, except for a few holdouts. BURTCH: Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on your perspective I suppose, the enemy has largely vacated the feature. So it was, I think, job well done in terms of exercising the capability, showing that they were up to the task of a helicopter-borne assault, but weren’t able to fully test the extent of their capabilities, owing to the fact that the enemy declined to give them a fight. TREMONTI: The mission was completed without loss of life. The Canadians had proven they could execute a complex air assault and work with U.S. forces. Weeks of building capability and learning to work together seemed to be paying off. [Music begins] And then, in an instant, that coordination failed, with deadly consequences. On the night of April 17, 2002, 100 or so Canadian soldiers from Alpha Company 3 PPCLI were participating in live-fire exercises at a place called Tarnak Farms. [Music ends]. Tarnak Farms was once an agricultural site that used to be an al-Qaeda training facility. After the Taliban fell, it became a training range where all coalition troops would practice. STOGRAN: This was a well-known area that was being used, heavily used, by rangers and Delta Force. TREMONTI: The Canadians began their exercises after dark, firing machine guns and anti-tank weapons at ground targets, including an old tank. Above them, two American F-16 fighter jets were passing through the area after a patrol mission. Their call signs: Coffee 5-1 and Coffee 5-2. [CLIP – PILOTS] Okay boss man, this is Coffee 5-2. I’ve got a tally on the vicinity. Request permission to lay down some 20 mike mike. Standby. Let’s just make sure that it’s not friendly. TREMONTI: One of the pilots saw gunfire. To him, the flashing lights below looked like anti-aircraft fire. [CLIP – PILOT] Okay, I’ve got a, I’ve got some men on a road and it looks like a piece of artillery firing at us. I am rolling in, in self-defence. Bombs away. Cranking left. TREMONTI: He released a 500-pound laser-guided bomb on the Canadians. STANLEY CLARK: All I recall was, it felt like I got hit in the chest, right square in my chest and, thrown back about, 20 feet, down the hill and landing on my back. TREMONTI: Master Corporal Stanley Clark, after the attack. CLARK: I didn’t know what the hell it was, it was just something seemed like a big, big orange flash and I landed on my back, realized I was okay, after a few seconds, and then got up to see what the, what the hell was going on. TREMONTI: Four Canadian soldiers were killed: Sergeant Marc Léger, Corporal Ainsworth Dyer, Private Richard Green, and Private Nathan Smith. There were also eight injured. One of them, Sergeant Lorne Ford, suffered catastrophic wounds. [CLIP – LORNE FORD] And I looked up, and I’m just standing there and I’m like, “What the fuck?” And then I heard like, three seconds later, it was like [makes airplane noise]. Then it was like, then it was just all hell. And then, you know, I was on my right side and I could move my arms, you know, and I put my hand down to my leg and, there was no pain at that time. There was nothing, because, it was just total shock and everything. So I put my hand down to my leg, and I brought it up, and it was just covered. And I was like, “Fuck, I’m hurt.” Like that’s what I said. I was like “I’m hurt.” Cause there was just blood everywhere. TREMONTI: The shrapnel nearly severed Sergeant Ford’s left leg. He lost his right eye to the blast. As the wounded arrived at the American field hospital, every bit of help was needed. Canadian dental officer Captain Deidra McLean scrubbed in to help. [CLIP – DEIDRA MCLEAN] And so when the American orthopedic surgeon asked me if I’d like to scrub in and assist with the surgery, of course I wanted to do whatever I could. I mean, that’s the first time that I’ve ever been exposed to anything like that, and all I can say is, it was just shocking. Shocking. Awful. It’s just, this sort of thing doesn’t happen to Canadian soldiers. TREMONTI: She was joined that night by dental technician Sergeant Kim Haley. [CLIP – KIM HALEY] It was different. These were our guys. They were Canadians, and whatever we could do, we were going to do. Whether it was just to talk to them, just to touch their arm, just to say, you know, “Is there anything I can do? Everything’s all right, we’ll find out how your buddy is.” BURTCH: So medical aid is scrambled on the ground to stabilize people and then they’re evacuated out. And then the following day, that’s when the quite grisly work of kind of retrieving remains and documenting where what had taken place begins. [CLIP – ANDREW MACLEAN] We were picking up what was left of their protective gear, their helmets, their flack jackets. TREMONTI: Master Corporal Andrew MacLean talked to Garth Pritchard shortly after he visited the bomb site to gather the belongings of the wounded and the dead. [CLIP – ANDREW MACLEAN] It’s a rather humbling experience as far as being able, you know, to see it and to do it and, I dunno, it’s just something that I, you know, I don’t care to, repeat again anywhere in the near future or actually ever, ever again. TREMONTI: Warrant Officer Billy Bolen talking to Garth Pritchard after the attack. [CLIP – BILLY BOLEN] I had a concern about friendly fire, but not, not with training. I had like, maybe on The Whale, but not, not, not here. BURTCH: Well, it certainly had an impact on morale. I think that there was an assemblage of members of the Rakkasan team, the Task Force Rakkasan, as it was called, the American-led team, Colonel Wiercinski and others came out and basically said, “This is, you know, not just your loss, it’s our loss.” So they mourned together, they fought together, they mourned together. TREMONTI: U.S. Colonel Frank Wiercinski at Kandahar Airfield, April 18, 2002. [CLIP – FRANK WIERCINSKI] To our Canadian brothers and sisters, on behalf of the coalition forces against this War on Terrorism and Task Force Rakkasan, we offer our sincere condolences, to the families, friends, and especially to the soldiers of the 3rd Princess Patricia, Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group. This loss is shared by our entire task force. Our hearts ache with yours as we continue to stand shoulder to shoulder against terrorism. TREMONTI: But beneath the shared grief there was anger. Especially later, when the pilot involved, Major Harry Schmidt, showed little remorse. Schmidt and his Mission Commander, Major William Umbach, had reportedly been flying for 10 hours that night. They had reportedly taken amphetamines, the so-called “go pills,” standard issue for long missions. Later, in reviewing the incident, a U.S. Air Force general would conclude that Schmidt had, quote “blatantly disobeyed” orders and used self-defence as a pretext. STOGRAN: You know, the guy that called self-defence — and when self-defence happens we had no weapons that could reach up to, to fast air. It was all gonna be tracer on the ground and, and that kind of thing. So, the guy who called self-defence and then later didn’t accept his mistake, that annoyed the hell outta me. And like I say, “Shit happens in war.” I, we wouldn’t have been upset. But I was really upset that he wouldn’t say, “Yeah, we made a mistake.” BURTCH: I think it was an early indication of the fact that this was a mission that was unlike others, that had been pursued in the past where there were always the risk. There are always those risks — mines, errant bullets, firefights — but usually not aerial bombing. And, there would be deadlier days in Afghanistan that would follow, but as the first incident, it wasn’t just a single tragic accident. It was an accident that had an immediate impact on everyone who was there and a lot of families back home. TREMONTI: [Bagpipe music begins, clapping, voices]. In July 2002, after decompressing on the island of Guam, the remaining soldiers of 3 PPCLI came home, landing in Edmonton. Images of the homecoming were broadcast across the country. Soldiers embracing spouses, lifting children into their arms, tears streaming down faces. It looked a lot like a triumphant return. But it wasn’t a victory. [Music ends]. BURTCH: This was the end of that first mission that took place with some tragedy but was not worse and where Canadians could proudly say that they had taken part in that first phase of that mission and what looked to be at that point a successful mission. That the Taliban were on the run or dissipating. There was a government in waiting that was going to be established. There was going to be this infusion of external funds and Canada was going to be there as part of the reconstruction effort and different perspectives. TREMONTI: [Music begins]. While war clouds gathered over Iraq, Canada would return to Afghanistan again — not to Kandahar, but to Kabul. To rebuild, to support elections, and train a new Afghan army. It would be like peacekeeping, they said, nation-building, the kind of work Canada was good at. But waiting in Kabul was a new kind of enemy. [CLIP – SARAH HEER]: Kabul was a pretty intense area. We received daily int. reps on different insurgents and different threats that we had to look out for. So, you know, you always had to be careful, we were always prepared, and you always had to be alert. TREMONTI: The Long War: Canada in Afghanistan was produced by Lisa Gabriele and Neil Morrison. Our associate producer is Hailey Choi. The series was mixed by Cameron McIver. Executive producers from the Canadian War Museum are Jenny Ellison and Steve McCullough. Andrew Burtch is our historian throughout this series. Lorne Ford was told he would never jump out of a plane again. He defied that prediction, making three more jumps over the course of his career. He also returned to Afghanistan for a nine-month deployment spanning 2011 and 2012, and later became the 3rd Battalion’s senior parachute instructor. Filmmaker Garth Pritchard interviewed all of the veterans you heard in this episode on site in Afghanistan in 2002. The Canadian War Museum acquired Pritchard’s remarkable archive — more than 400 hours of raw video footage and 700 photographs documenting Canadian forces in Bosnia, Croatia, Burma, Kuwait, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. Garth Pritchard died in April of 2020. To hear more interviews with the veterans featured in this episode and others, head to our show notes for links. I’m Anna Maria Tremonti. Thanks for listening. [Music ends].