Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 022 - End of The Advisory Phase
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- 0:01Speaker 1: Chapter twenty one, Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty
- 0:06Speaker 1: five by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a
- 0:10Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
- 0:15Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
- 0:20Speaker 1: Recording by Betty B. Chapter twenty one, End of the
- 0:25Speaker 1: Advisory phase. Vietcong night outposts and hamlet attacks doubled in
- 0:31Speaker 1: intensity during the last half of nineteen sixty four. They
- 0:35Speaker 1: were especially severe in the Third and Fourth Corps tactical zones.
- 0:40Speaker 1: In October, the enemy scored marked successes in the two corps,
- 0:44Speaker 1: which had been almost pacified a few months earlier. General
- 0:48Speaker 1: Moore thought it just a matter of time before the
- 0:51Speaker 1: Vietcong tried to spring a psychologically damaging surprise raid or
- 0:56Speaker 1: a mortar bombardment on a major air Baseough Soough. The
- 1:00Speaker 1: Vietnamese were responsible for interior security and perimeter defense. The
- 1:05Speaker 1: second Air Division had its own force of one officer
- 1:09Speaker 1: and two hundred eighty airmen as additional guards. Proper aircraft
- 1:14Speaker 1: dispersal was virtually impossible at the overloaded airfields, thus inviting
- 1:19Speaker 1: sabotage or attack. This prompted pack F to ask Sink
- 1:25Speaker 1: Pack in August nineteen sixty four to allow one of
- 1:28Speaker 1: the two B fifty seven squadrons to move from Bienhoi
- 1:32Speaker 1: to tac Lee. Action was put off until October, when
- 1:36Speaker 1: General Harris spoke personally with Admiral Sharp. The latter then
- 1:41Speaker 1: permitted half of each squadron to return to Clark Air
- 1:44Speaker 1: Base for training. This trim the number of B fifty
- 1:47Speaker 1: sevens on alert at Bienhoi to eighteen, but the field
- 1:52Speaker 1: remained overcrowded and poorly defended. How insecure Bienhoi was became
- 1:58Speaker 1: clear on the night of Nolak November one, when a
- 2:01Speaker 1: Yet Kong mortar squadron penetrated the Vietnamese perimeter defenses. The
- 2:06Speaker 1: ensuing thirty minute barrage killed four and wounded seventy two,
- 2:11Speaker 1: destroyed five B fifty sevens and one H forty three helicopter,
- 2:16Speaker 1: and damaged thirteen B fifty sevens and three H forty
- 2:20Speaker 1: three s. Vietnamese losses totaled two killed, five wounded, three
- 2:26Speaker 1: A one h is destroyed, and three A one h's
- 2:29Speaker 1: and two C forty sevens damaged. Some houses, a mess
- 2:33Speaker 1: hall vehicles and fuel tanks were also destroyed or damaged.
- 2:38Speaker 1: The attack provoked discussions on countermeasures at the highest levels
- 2:43Speaker 1: of government in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had
- 2:46Speaker 1: previously agreed on positive action against North Vietnam, but differed
- 2:51Speaker 1: on the severity, timing, and location of that action. The
- 2:55Speaker 1: major point of indecision stemmed from the stand of Ambassador Tiler.
- 3:00Speaker 1: He held that the United States could start no strong
- 3:04Speaker 1: move against North Vietnam until a stable government existed in Saigon. Consequently,
- 3:10Speaker 1: planning for an air campaign had continued on a contingency basis.
- 3:15Speaker 1: At the end of his first year in office, President
- 3:18Speaker 1: Johnson remarked that his principal advisers had made no unanimous
- 3:22Speaker 1: recommendation for air activity against North Vietnam. As noted earlier,
- 3:28Speaker 1: Secretary of Defense McNamara put hard questions to the Joint
- 3:32Speaker 1: Chiefs regarding the effects of bombing the ninety four strategic
- 3:37Speaker 1: air targets identified in North Vietnam. In their reply, the
- 3:42Speaker 1: chiefs accepted sink Pack assurances the targets could be attacked
- 3:46Speaker 1: without depleting fuel and ordinance needed to meet a Chinese intervention.
- 3:51Speaker 1: Sink Pack had already prepared a plan to attack all
- 3:55Speaker 1: the targets in twenty days. Since there was no doubt
- 3:58Speaker 1: that Hanoi was administered and sustaining the war, General le
- 4:02Speaker 1: May pushed for Air Force and Navy air strikes on
- 4:05Speaker 1: North Vietnam's source of supply. He felt that interdiction would
- 4:10Speaker 1: be far more expensive and much less efficient than closing
- 4:14Speaker 1: North Vietnam's ports and destroying the supplies by strategic bombing.
- 4:18Speaker 1: Before they started. South, General Greene, the Marine Corps commandant,
- 4:24Speaker 1: had backed le May, but the other chiefs supported Ambassador
- 4:28Speaker 1: Taylor's view. Le Maay countered that there could be no
- 4:31Speaker 1: sound Sichon government without morale building offensive operations. The Vietnamese
- 4:37Speaker 1: military establishment was the sole stabilizing force. If that collapsed,
- 4:43Speaker 1: the United States might well have to fight to get
- 4:45Speaker 1: its military advisers and their dependents out of the country. Now.
- 4:50Speaker 1: The Bienois attacks spurred the Joint Chiefs toward a strong reprisal.
- 4:55Speaker 1: On November one, they verbally recommended to Secretary macnamara immediate
- 5:00Speaker 1: US air strikes against infiltration targets in the Laosian Panhandle,
- 5:06Speaker 1: airlifting U S Army and Marine Corps units to defend
- 5:09Speaker 1: De Nang Tan San Nut and Bien Hi, and assembling
- 5:14Speaker 1: US Air Force units within sixty to seventy two hours
- 5:18Speaker 1: for air operations against North Vietnam. The air campaign would
- 5:22Speaker 1: consist of an initial B fifty two night strike flown
- 5:26Speaker 1: from Guam against Fukien Airfield, first light naval air strikes
- 5:30Speaker 1: on other airfields and the Hanoi Hiphong oil storage areas,
- 5:35Speaker 1: and rapidly progressing attacks against the entire ninety four targets
- 5:39Speaker 1: listed angered by the Bien Hua affair. Ambassador Taylor favored
- 5:45Speaker 1: limited retaliation against selected North Vietnamese targets by American and
- 5:51Speaker 1: Vietnamese aircraft, coupled with a policy statement warning of a
- 5:55Speaker 1: similar U S response to future incidents. President Johnson's billion advisors,
- 6:01Speaker 1: chiefly Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, counseled patients. The President listened.
- 6:07Speaker 1: He was concerned about the upcoming election and about possible
- 6:10Speaker 1: Vietcong action against American dependence in Saigon. Ruling out an
- 6:16Speaker 1: instant response, the President ordered quick replacement of the destroyed
- 6:20Speaker 1: and seriously damaged B fifty sevens at Bienvois. He further
- 6:25Speaker 1: directed a National Security Council working group chaired by William P.
- 6:30Speaker 1: Bundy to outline political and military options available against North Vietnam.
- 6:36Speaker 1: In its early deliberations, the Bundy Group leaned toward restrained action.
- 6:41Speaker 1: In contrast, the Joint Chiefs on December eighteenth recommended first
- 6:46Speaker 1: a hard hitting, fast, full squeeze air campaign against North Vietnam,
- 6:51Speaker 1: completed in twenty days. Secondly, as a fallback position, they
- 6:56Speaker 1: proposed tightly controlled and gradually increasing air pressure over a
- 7:01Speaker 1: two month period. Meanwhile, on the night of November sixth,
- 7:05Speaker 1: Air Vice Marshall Nu Yen Kao Ki led thirty two
- 7:09Speaker 1: Vietnamese A one hs against a Viet Kong camp in
- 7:13Speaker 1: Zone D. The mission was a widely announced reprisal for
- 7:17Speaker 1: the Vien Hui incident. According to South Vietnamese intelligence reports,
- 7:22Speaker 1: the attack caused five hundred enemy casualties. On the sixteenth,
- 7:27Speaker 1: the Viet Kong troops in Zone D four eight out
- 7:31Speaker 1: and battled Vietnamese forces for six hours near Ben Khat.
- 7:36Speaker 1: General Khan personally directed a massive operation in response. One
- 7:41Speaker 1: hundred fifteen US Army and Vietnamese helicopters lifted twelve battalions
- 7:46Speaker 1: of ground troops to the fringe of Zone D near
- 7:50Speaker 1: Ben Suk. They killed one hundred sixty three guerrillas, eighty
- 7:54Speaker 1: three by air and captured sixty eight. These another sizeable
- 7:59Speaker 1: Vietnamese assaults did not deter the insurgents surrounding Saigon. Severe
- 8:04Speaker 1: floods from typhoons in November, together with resurgent communist activity,
- 8:10Speaker 1: virtually collapsed governmental authority in the ten central provinces. As
- 8:15Speaker 1: the floods receded, the Viet Kong moved in to take
- 8:19Speaker 1: almost complete control of the countryside. In the populous Kwangai
- 8:24Speaker 1: in Bin Din provinces, the enemy confined the government's presence
- 8:29Speaker 1: to district towns and provincial capital cities. Vietnamese ground forces
- 8:34Speaker 1: could open a road briefly by committing four to six
- 8:37Speaker 1: battalions of troops, but as soon as they withdrew the
- 8:41Speaker 1: guerrillas moved in. Constant Viet Kong actions kept the army
- 8:45Speaker 1: units off balance and cost them dearly in men, equipment,
- 8:50Speaker 1: and morale. The enemy seemed to easily recruit replacements for
- 8:54Speaker 1: his losses, and the National Liberation Front stood ready as
- 8:58Speaker 1: a shadow government to set power when the Saigon regime crumbled.
- 9:03Speaker 1: During a press interview in Saigon on November twenty one,
- 9:07Speaker 1: Ambassador Taylor depicted the principal problem in Vietnam as the
- 9:12Speaker 1: dual inability to form a solid national government and to
- 9:16Speaker 1: stop Vietcong reinforcement. The ambassador realized the military value of
- 9:22Speaker 1: air strikes against Laosian infiltration routes and North Vietnamese infiltrator
- 9:27Speaker 1: training areas. He suggested a few selective bombings, but clung
- 9:32Speaker 1: to the belief that a sound government in Saigon was
- 9:36Speaker 1: the first priority. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs
- 9:39Speaker 1: more and more accepted the US Air force position stopping
- 9:43Speaker 1: Hanoi's support of the insurgency was a prerequisite for a
- 9:47Speaker 1: stable Saigon regime. William Bundy's National Security Council Working Group
- 9:54Speaker 1: outlined three possible courses of action for the United States.
- 9:58Speaker 1: One envisioned kreisal attacks, intensified covert operations, resumption of offshore
- 10:05Speaker 1: naval patrols, and stepped up Laosian T twenty eight attacks.
- 10:10Speaker 1: Another called for the fast, full squeeze bombing of North Vietnam,
- 10:15Speaker 1: favored by the Joint Chiefs, which Bundy termed almost reckless
- 10:19Speaker 1: an invitation to Chinese intervention. The last specified a slow
- 10:24Speaker 1: squeeze of air attacks on infiltration targets in North Vietnam.
- 10:29Speaker 1: All three would give an impression of steady and deliberate
- 10:33Speaker 1: pressure building while permitting the United States to halt at
- 10:36Speaker 1: any time. Bundy, an Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton,
- 10:42Speaker 1: liked the last option. Ambassador Taylor arrived in Washington on
- 10:47Speaker 1: November twenty sixth to join conferences on strategy. He advocated
- 10:52Speaker 1: US actions to restore adequate government in Pichon, refine the
- 10:56Speaker 1: counterinsurgency campaign, and convince or compel Hanoi to cease helping
- 11:02Speaker 1: the Viet Cong. Taylor set out a three phase program.
- 11:06Speaker 1: The first phase was to consist of heightened covert actions,
- 11:10Speaker 1: anti infiltration attacks in Laos and reprisal bombing, all to
- 11:16Speaker 1: stiffen South Vietnamese morale. The second would afford more air
- 11:20Speaker 1: attacks on infiltration objectives in North Vietnam. The third was
- 11:25Speaker 1: to ultimately destroy all important fixed targets in North Vietnam.
- 11:30Speaker 1: He thought, much like Bundy, that the first phase should
- 11:34Speaker 1: start at once. The ambassador believed that US aircraft ought
- 11:38Speaker 1: to take part in the air operations over Laos the
- 11:42Speaker 1: initial phase of the stepped up action. This would demonstrate
- 11:45Speaker 1: American willingness to share in the risks of acting against
- 11:49Speaker 1: North Vietnam. Armed reconnaissance strikes on infiltration routes in the
- 11:55Speaker 1: Laosian Panhandle would signal a deeper US involvement in the
- 11:59Speaker 1: conflict and a resolve to back the governments of both
- 12:02Speaker 1: South Vietnam and laos Briefed on December first, President Johnson
- 12:08Speaker 1: accepted the premise that a stable South Vietnamese government was
- 12:12Speaker 1: the first essential to end the insurgency. On the second,
- 12:16Speaker 1: he approved the first phase military actions. He said that
- 12:20Speaker 1: subsequent ones would project progressive air bombardment to the north
- 12:25Speaker 1: rather than by functional target systems. At first, the heavier
- 12:29Speaker 1: Laosian T twenty eight and U S Air Force strikes
- 12:33Speaker 1: along Laosian infiltration routes, as well as special covert maritime operations,
- 12:39Speaker 1: would be psychological warnings to Hanoi. After an unspecified transitional period,
- 12:45Speaker 1: air attacks on North Vietnam would begin against infiltration objectives
- 12:51Speaker 1: just beyond the demilitarized Zone, then moving northward to the
- 12:55Speaker 1: nineteenth Parallel. The strikes were to eventually hit the Hanoi
- 12:59Speaker 1: Airfield and Paul Storage while naval forces mined and blockaded
- 13:05Speaker 1: North Vietnam's ports. Upon his return to Saigon, on December seventh,
- 13:10Speaker 1: Ambassador Taylor stressed to Vietnamese leaders that Washington wanted political
- 13:15Speaker 1: stability above all. In line with the President's decision, a
- 13:20Speaker 1: Joint State Defense message on December eighth instructed the US
- 13:25Speaker 1: ambassador in Vienion to seek approval for American air strikes
- 13:30Speaker 1: on hostile communications in Laos. The go ahead was given
- 13:34Speaker 1: on the tenth, and Secretary of Defense McNamara authorized two
- 13:38Speaker 1: missions a week, each consisting of four aircraft. This very
- 13:43Speaker 1: restricted bombing was nicknamed barrel Roll weekly. A National Security
- 13:49Speaker 1: Council committee was to designate two segments of the line
- 13:53Speaker 1: of communications for armed reconnaissance, as well as a fixed
- 13:57Speaker 1: target for ordinance remaining at the end of the root sweep.
- 14:01Speaker 1: Both US Air Force and US Navy planes were to
- 14:04Speaker 1: play a part, with mac Vee acting as the local
- 14:08Speaker 1: coordinating authority. Publicity was forbidden, as were attacks on the
- 14:12Speaker 1: Laosian people. Targets of opportunity had to be unmistakingly military
- 14:18Speaker 1: activity of a transient or mobile nature. Fixed installations could
- 14:23Speaker 1: be hit only during attacks on clearly identified military convoys
- 14:28Speaker 1: and personnel, or as secondary targets. No mission could be
- 14:33Speaker 1: launched from tie bases or Carrie Napalm. Secretary McNamara's explicit
- 14:38Speaker 1: and detailed orders left little room for combat commanders to
- 14:42Speaker 1: specify tactics, ordinance, routing, and like matters. Admiral Sharp sink
- 14:49Speaker 1: Pack was impressed with a high level national interest in
- 14:52Speaker 1: the armed reconnaissance program. He gave the maiden mission to
- 14:57Speaker 1: the F one O five thunder chiefs of pack Aff's
- 15:00Speaker 1: eightieth Tactical Squadron at Korat, Thailand. Sharp selected a section
- 15:06Speaker 1: of Root eight for the armed sweep and the Nape
- 15:09Speaker 1: Road Bridge as the target for unused ordinance. The fifteen
- 15:13Speaker 1: plane force took off from Denang on December fourteenth. Three
- 15:17Speaker 1: r F one o ones served as pathfinders in damage
- 15:21Speaker 1: assessment craft. Eight F one hundreds flew combat air patrol
- 15:26Speaker 1: to guard against MiG interference. Four F one O fives
- 15:30Speaker 1: carried seven hundred fifty pound bombs, two point seventy five
- 15:34Speaker 1: inch rockets, and twenty millimeters ammunition. The mission achieved slim
- 15:38Speaker 1: results because the heavy ordnance load led to miscalculation of
- 15:43Speaker 1: time and distance. Short of fuel, the F one o
- 15:46Speaker 1: fives made a hurried attack on the bridge and missed it.
- 15:50Speaker 1: Navy planes flew on December seventeenth, four A one hs
- 15:55Speaker 1: escorted by eight F four b's, conducted armed reconnaissance of
- 15:59Speaker 1: us ITS one twenty one and twelve, with the Ban
- 16:03Speaker 1: Wong Bao road bridge as the fixed alternative. The aircraft
- 16:07Speaker 1: failed to damage the bridge, but destroyed eight buildings at
- 16:10Speaker 1: one end. The next mission sent four F one hundreds
- 16:14Speaker 1: of the four hundred twenty eighth Tactical Fighter Squadron along
- 16:18Speaker 1: Route eight on December twenty first. Lightly armed with CBU
- 16:22Speaker 1: two a's and two point seven five inch rockets, the
- 16:26Speaker 1: fighters became disoriented after receiving heavy flak, ran low on fuel,
- 16:31Speaker 1: and found no secondary target. Reports on the first two
- 16:36Speaker 1: US Air Force missions disturbed General le May. He sent
- 16:40Speaker 1: word to General Moore that he expected higher professionalism, even
- 16:44Speaker 1: though he recognized that the tight curbs complicated air operations.
- 16:49Speaker 1: To prepare for the fourth mission, packaff's forty fourth Technical
- 16:54Speaker 1: Fighter Squadron deployed six F one O fives from Okinawa
- 16:59Speaker 1: to Dunang. Four of them reconnoitered Route twenty three on
- 17:03Speaker 1: December twenty fifth with a strike against the military barracks
- 17:07Speaker 1: at chipone. The operation went well, though the dive bombing
- 17:12Speaker 1: at chipone was inaccurate. During the fifth mission on December thirtieth, four,
- 17:17Speaker 1: Navy A one HS struck The military camp planners for
- 17:22Speaker 1: a mission on January thirteenth chose the ban Ken Bridge
- 17:26Speaker 1: the most important potential checkpoint on route seven. Aerial photos
- 17:30Speaker 1: showed thirty four anti aircraft guns thirty seven millimeter and
- 17:35Speaker 1: fifty seven millimeters in place, with up to seventy more
- 17:38Speaker 1: firing positions built but not occupied. The planners scheduled an
- 17:43Speaker 1: R F one O one as pathfinder and another for
- 17:47Speaker 1: bomb damage assessment, eight F one hundreds carrying CBU two
- 17:51Speaker 1: a's for flax suppression, and sixteen F one O fives
- 17:55Speaker 1: from the forty fourth and sixty seventh Tactical Fighter Squadron
- 18:00Speaker 1: as strike aircraft. The two flights of F one hundreds
- 18:04Speaker 1: were to fly low level and a breast across the
- 18:07Speaker 1: gun sights to knock them out with cluster bombs. Immediately thereafter,
- 18:11Speaker 1: the F one O fives would attack the bridge. Each
- 18:14Speaker 1: of the first eight F one oh fives were to
- 18:17Speaker 1: drop eight seven hundred fifty pound bombs. This would be
- 18:21Speaker 1: followed by eight F one oh fives loaded with six
- 18:24Speaker 1: bombs and two a GM twelve b bullpup air to
- 18:29Speaker 1: ground missiles. An Air America C one three was to
- 18:33Speaker 1: serve as airborne control for rescue helicopters. The F one
- 18:38Speaker 1: hundreds pummeled the gun positions, but some firing continued. The
- 18:43Speaker 1: first wave of F one oh fives cut the bridge
- 18:46Speaker 1: with their sixty four bombs. The F one hundreds and
- 18:49Speaker 1: the second wave of F one oh fives made multiple
- 18:52Speaker 1: runs on the gun sites, the mixed ordinance of the
- 18:56Speaker 1: F one o fives requiring at least three passes to expend. Moreover,
- 19:01Speaker 1: the thunder Chiefs had to descend into flat range to
- 19:05Speaker 1: control their missiles, and one plane was downed. An F
- 19:08Speaker 1: one hundred on its fifth pass was also shot down.
- 19:12Speaker 1: Four other aircraft were damaged. General Moore said that poor
- 19:16Speaker 1: judgment was displayed in the attack. To escape the losses,
- 19:20Speaker 1: the planes should have broken off the engagement after knocking
- 19:24Speaker 1: out the bridge. While it seemed impossible for ground transportation
- 19:28Speaker 1: to bypass the ban Can Bridge, the communists within three
- 19:32Speaker 1: days converted the top of a dam just up river
- 19:36Speaker 1: into a traffic route. Press reports of the two lost
- 19:40Speaker 1: aircraft prompted Senator Wayne L. Morse to charge that the
- 19:44Speaker 1: air operation violated the nineteen sixty two Geneva agreements on Laos.
- 19:51Speaker 1: Armed reconnaissance sweeps by seventh Fleet aircraft on January second
- 19:56Speaker 1: and tenth, nineteen sixty five detected no enemy. On the fifteenth,
- 20:01Speaker 1: as six A one HS reconnoitered Route twenty three at night,
- 20:06Speaker 1: the flight leader became separated from the flair plane and
- 20:10Speaker 1: wandered west of the road. He sighted and attacked moving
- 20:13Speaker 1: trucks and also adjacent buildings that turned out to be
- 20:17Speaker 1: the friendly village of Ban Tang Bay. No further secondary
- 20:22Speaker 1: targets were assigned for night missions. Admiral Sharp near the
- 20:26Speaker 1: end of January took a close look at this relatively
- 20:30Speaker 1: small interdiction campaign conducted at least risk and under tight
- 20:35Speaker 1: control from Washington. He concluded that the program could be
- 20:39Speaker 1: better managed from Laos. He insisted that militarily effective interdiction
- 20:44Speaker 1: had to be constantly and completely responsive to the tactical situation.
- 20:50Speaker 1: General Harris, the pack a F commander, agreed that the
- 20:53Speaker 1: missions were too few to sway Hanoi. Still, they may
- 20:57Speaker 1: have imparted political strength to the Laosian government at a
- 21:01Speaker 1: critical juncture in late January and early February, an armed
- 21:06Speaker 1: coup was defeated. Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, General Khan and
- 21:11Speaker 1: several associates had seized power from the provisional civil government
- 21:16Speaker 1: on December twentieth, nineteen sixty four. Ambassador Taylor strongly protested,
- 21:22Speaker 1: and after that the relations between him and Khan were strained.
- 21:26Speaker 1: Taylor was apparently concerned that the feeble Saigon government might
- 21:30Speaker 1: yield to elements clamoring for a ceasefire and coalition with
- 21:34Speaker 1: the National Liberation Front. He may therefore have hinted that
- 21:38Speaker 1: US advisors were about to take command of the Vietnamese
- 21:42Speaker 1: armed forces. In any event, the unstable conditions in the
- 21:47Speaker 1: country encouraged the Viet Kong. They increasingly turned from hit
- 21:51Speaker 1: and run guerrilla tactics to more conventional mobile warfare by
- 21:56Speaker 1: regular units. This pushed the United States into strong support
- 22:01Speaker 1: of the counter insurgency. Secretary of Defense Macnamara had already
- 22:06Speaker 1: made clear that the conflict was chiefly a ground war
- 22:10Speaker 1: in which aviation could make only secondary contributions. While this
- 22:15Speaker 1: strategy precluded the full use of tactical air power, the
- 22:19Speaker 1: rather small Vietnamese and U. S air operations were central
- 22:24Speaker 1: to saving the Vietnamese ground forces from piecemeal defeat. On
- 22:28Speaker 1: December ninth, for example, A one h IS from the
- 22:32Speaker 1: Vietnamese five hundred sixteenth Fighter Squadron struck a Viet Kong
- 22:37Speaker 1: force and left thirty three enemy dead. The force on
- 22:40Speaker 1: December seventh had attacked the Alaud District headquarters in Bindin
- 22:46Speaker 1: Province and ambushed government relief troops in the three day battle.
- 22:51Speaker 1: The foe inflicted battle losses of twenty eight killed, fifty wounded,
- 22:55Speaker 1: and twenty two missing. Also on December ninth, a Viet
- 22:59Speaker 1: Kong battalion assaulted and overran a government battalion command post
- 23:05Speaker 1: and one hundred five millimeter howitzer platoon near tam Qui
- 23:09Speaker 1: in quang Tin Province. A US Air Force captain joined
- 23:13Speaker 1: the eighteen strike sortees flown by the five hundred sixteenth
- 23:18Speaker 1: Fighter Squadron against the hill position. All the strikes were
- 23:22Speaker 1: directed by an one A pilot and Vietnamese observer who
- 23:26Speaker 1: were in the air for ten hours. Direct hits on
- 23:29Speaker 1: the artillery site exploded ammunition and killed enemy gunners. The
- 23:34Speaker 1: last flight of four A one hs landed at Dinang
- 23:39Speaker 1: after sunset, when the ceiling was under five hundred feet
- 23:42Speaker 1: and visibility less than a mile. Government troops retook the
- 23:46Speaker 1: ground and confirmed one hundred sixty two Vietcong killed eighty
- 23:51Speaker 1: five by air. Friendly losses totaled twenty six killed and
- 23:55Speaker 1: thirty three wounded. During the night of December tenth to
- 23:59Speaker 1: Via Kong battalions struck outposts at Long Me in Chuang
- 24:04Speaker 1: Tien Province and ambushed relief forces. A US Army L
- 24:09Speaker 1: nineteen and a US Air Force one F located the
- 24:13Speaker 1: ambush and put four covering A one e's on the
- 24:17Speaker 1: camouflage foxholes. US Army helicopters from Suptrang held the enemy
- 24:22Speaker 1: until Vietnamese and A one hs arrived and delivered ordinance.
- 24:26Speaker 1: In the face of intense ground fire, one A one
- 24:30Speaker 1: h was downed, three A one hs, and five helicopters damaged.
- 24:35Speaker 1: By fine teamwork, the A one hs and armed helicopters
- 24:39Speaker 1: killed about four hundred of the fifteen hundred enemy troops
- 24:43Speaker 1: and probably saved a government battalion and a Regional Force
- 24:47Speaker 1: company from being overwhelmed. Yet Kong night attacks on hamlets
- 24:52Speaker 1: and outposts soared to a new high. A total of
- 24:56Speaker 1: ninety six incidents took place over the last ten days.
- 24:59Speaker 1: Of descent, drawing flare and strike aircraft. The planes forced
- 25:04Speaker 1: the foe to break off the assault. In ninety four
- 25:07Speaker 1: of the cases still under test, AC forty seven gunships
- 25:12Speaker 1: joined the air alerts and performed well. On the night
- 25:15Speaker 1: of December twenty fourth, for example, and AC forty seven
- 25:19Speaker 1: used its miniguns to blast gorillas off the wall of
- 25:22Speaker 1: a fort under siege. At night on December twenty seventh,
- 25:27Speaker 1: two North Vietnamese regiments raided the hamlet of Bingjia. The
- 25:32Speaker 1: next morning, a reinforced Ranger battalion, aided by three armed helicopters,
- 25:38Speaker 1: tried without success to relieve the hamlet. That evening, the
- 25:42Speaker 1: Viet Kong hit the Rangers at the nearby town of
- 25:46Speaker 1: Ungei Joao, but were driven off. On the twenty ninth,
- 25:50Speaker 1: twenty four U S Army UH one BS, protected by
- 25:54Speaker 1: fifteen armed UH one bees, lifted two other ranger companies
- 25:59Speaker 1: to a landing air near Bingia. Small arms and machine
- 26:03Speaker 1: gun fire claimed three of the helicopters. One ranger company
- 26:07Speaker 1: fought its way out, the second was overrun. The defeat
- 26:11Speaker 1: seemed to have stemmed from the absence of pre planned
- 26:14Speaker 1: coordination of tactical air support for the helleborne operation. Another
- 26:20Speaker 1: factor was the late request for fighters, made only after
- 26:24Speaker 1: the loss of the three helicopters. Eight A one e
- 26:28Speaker 1: sorties covered the downed UH one bees. Four Vietnamese H
- 26:33Speaker 1: thirty four helicopters carried ammunition into the area and evacuated wounded.
- 26:39Speaker 1: A C forty seven flare ship lighted the scene through
- 26:43Speaker 1: the night, escorted by fifteen armed UH one bees. Twenty
- 26:48Speaker 1: six UH one bees lifted the second and fourth Marine
- 26:51Speaker 1: Battalions into the zone. Eight helicopters were hit and one exploded,
- 26:56Speaker 1: killing the crew. Finally, on the afternoon of December thirtieth,
- 27:00Speaker 1: four A one e's and five A one hs responded
- 27:04Speaker 1: to requests. The strike aircraft blasted two spots in the
- 27:09Speaker 1: rubber forests around Binjia that reportedly sheltered two Viet Kong battalions.
- 27:14Speaker 1: At the same time, H thirty fours evacuated and forty
- 27:19Speaker 1: nine wounded men. A C forty seven, four A one
- 27:23Speaker 1: e's and one AC forty seven furnished night illumination and
- 27:28Speaker 1: fire support. The fourth Marine Battalion battled its way into
- 27:33Speaker 1: the rubber forest on December thirty first, and was soon
- 27:36Speaker 1: surrounded by the enemy identified from captured documents as the
- 27:41Speaker 1: forty eighth Main Force Viat Kong Regiment. The marine commander
- 27:45Speaker 1: radioed the U. S Air Force Forward Air controller overhead
- 27:49Speaker 1: for air support. Four A one e's responded and hit
- 27:53Speaker 1: enemy positions with napalm and general purpose bombs. In the afternoon.
- 27:59Speaker 1: Eight A one e's were scrambled and sent to the scene,
- 28:03Speaker 1: but the senior ground commander ordered them returned to Biennoi
- 28:07Speaker 1: because air support had not been requested through Vietnamese army channels.
- 28:13Speaker 1: Armed helicopters tried to launch strikes later that day. However,
- 28:17Speaker 1: they learned from US Marine Corps advisors with the surrounded
- 28:21Speaker 1: battalion that the thick branches of the rubber trees absorbed
- 28:25Speaker 1: the rockets and machine gun fire from the air. Attacking
- 28:28Speaker 1: at dusk and using massed automatic weapons, the Viet Cong
- 28:33Speaker 1: overpowered the fourth Marine Battalion all through the night of
- 28:36Speaker 1: the thirty first. Three C forty SEVENS, two C one
- 28:41Speaker 1: twenty threes, one AC forty seven, and four A one
- 28:45Speaker 1: hs supplied flare fire support. Even so, just two hundred
- 28:50Speaker 1: thirty two of the five hundred thirty two men of
- 28:53Speaker 1: the fourth Marine Battalion managed to straggle back to Bingjia.
- 28:58Speaker 1: General Khan took personal charge of a large operation set
- 29:02Speaker 1: afoot in Fuaktui Province. On January first, nineteen sixty five,
- 29:07Speaker 1: C one twenty three's flew the first and third Airborne
- 29:11Speaker 1: Battalions from Tonsanut to Vung Tau, then helicopters whisked them
- 29:17Speaker 1: to the battle area. On January second, helicopters transported the
- 29:22Speaker 1: seventh Airborne Battalion directly from Bien Huac. Tactical fighters supported
- 29:27Speaker 1: continuing operations with cover and escort, landing zone preparations and
- 29:33Speaker 1: strikes on enemy positions. On the fifth of January, eight
- 29:38Speaker 1: A one e's were each loaded with one Lazy Dog
- 29:41Speaker 1: XM for four canister and normal high explosive ordinance. The
- 29:46Speaker 1: aircraft employed the Lazy Dog missiles against Vietcong troops, firing
- 29:51Speaker 1: at US Army helicopter observers. Government troops kept clear of
- 29:56Speaker 1: the Lazy Dog zones, but US Army air observers reported
- 30:00Speaker 1: that after the drops they no longer received ground fire.
- 30:04Speaker 1: An intelligence report stated that the Viat Kong carried away
- 30:08Speaker 1: from the strike areas fifteen ox cart loads of dead
- 30:12Speaker 1: and wounded. At General Khan's order. Government battalions with tanks
- 30:17Speaker 1: and armored vehicles continued to swing through the safer areas
- 30:22Speaker 1: of Waktui Province from January tenth through February fifteenth. A
- 30:27Speaker 1: small air support operations center managed the flights, aiding the
- 30:31Speaker 1: massive sweeps. The operations achieved little for the Viat Kong
- 30:35Speaker 1: evaded ground contact. Analysis of the Bingjia defeat revealed a
- 30:41Speaker 1: failure to use available fixed wing air support properly. Armed
- 30:46Speaker 1: helicopters were unable to provide the needed firepower. As the
- 30:51Speaker 1: MACVJ three reported, the armed UH one B did not
- 30:55Speaker 1: possess heavy enough ordinance to destroy the VC in prepared
- 30:59Speaker 1: position or deter their assault since they were concealed under
- 31:04Speaker 1: a dense canopy of trees. Meanwhile, an incident in downtown
- 31:08Speaker 1: Sigon brought the United States to the verge of direct
- 31:12Speaker 1: all out action. On Christmas Eve nineteen sixty four, a
- 31:16Speaker 1: three hundred pound charge exploded in the Brink Hotel Bachelor
- 31:21Speaker 1: officers quarters for US advisors, killing two Americans while injuring
- 31:26Speaker 1: sixty four Americans and forty three Vietnamese. Admiral Sharf and
- 31:31Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs recommended an immediate reprisal. On December twenty ninth,
- 31:36Speaker 1: President Johnson ruled against it. The Brink Hotel explosion, a
- 31:41Speaker 1: direct attack against and an open challenge to the United States,
- 31:46Speaker 1: was ominous, but the battle at Binjiab was potentially disastrous.
- 31:51Speaker 1: To US officials in Saigon. It was a highly visible
- 31:55Speaker 1: defeat of serious proportions. On December thirty, First Ambassador to
- 31:59Speaker 1: Time Taylor reversed his thinking. Bolstered by Deputy Ambassador You
- 32:04Speaker 1: Alexis Johnson and General Westmoreland, he sent a joint message
- 32:08Speaker 1: to Washington. It advocated American air action against North Vietnam
- 32:14Speaker 1: despite the persistent weakness of the Saigone government. Attention then
- 32:19Speaker 1: turned to the airstrike aircraft on hand. Attacked planes in
- 32:24Speaker 1: Vietnam numbered forty eight US Air Force A one e's
- 32:28Speaker 1: and ninety two A one hs of the Vietnamese Air Force.
- 32:33Speaker 1: This combined force could fly about sixty combat and thirty
- 32:36Speaker 1: training sorties a day. Air Vice Marshall Keys need to
- 32:41Speaker 1: have an elite palace guard flight of standby A one
- 32:45Speaker 1: hs at tomsonnut constrained Vietnamese combat sorties. These planes were
- 32:50Speaker 1: piloted by highly trained, screened, and politically dependable personnel who
- 32:55Speaker 1: routinely flew strike missions in the third and fourth core
- 32:59Speaker 1: air aasas. However, assignments to thwart coups and to control
- 33:04Speaker 1: dissidents often diverted them from action against the viet Cong.
- 33:09Speaker 1: Although individual Vietnamese strike crews performed valiantly, the growing independence
- 33:15Speaker 1: of unit commanders diluted the control of the air operations centers. Typically,
- 33:21Speaker 1: fifty percent of the aircraft were held on five hour
- 33:25Speaker 1: ground alert. A squadron deciding to fly would call for
- 33:29Speaker 1: target about an hour before the end of its ground
- 33:32Speaker 1: alert and receive a set of coordinates for attack, usually
- 33:36Speaker 1: in a free strike zone. Hence, it was difficult to
- 33:39Speaker 1: scramble or to redirect aircraft to meet emergencies. Early in
- 33:44Speaker 1: January nineteen sixty five, the Vietnamese sixty second Tactical Wing
- 33:50Speaker 1: and a detachment of the five hundred and sixteenth Fighter
- 33:53Speaker 1: Squadrons A one HS deployed from Plai Coup to Natreng,
- 33:58Speaker 1: where work was to start on a new rou February.
- 34:01Speaker 1: The move station the strike aircraft too far away to
- 34:05Speaker 1: properly support the critical highland provinces, including Pleai Coup and Kantom.
- 34:12Speaker 1: Ambassador Taylor now wanted to use the US Air Force
- 34:15Speaker 1: B fifty sevens at Bienhoi in combat. He also wished
- 34:19Speaker 1: to put off indefinitely the plan to form a fifth
- 34:22Speaker 1: and six Vietnamese fighter squadron so that the Vietnamese could
- 34:27Speaker 1: focus on operations in lieu of training. Pack f on
- 34:32Speaker 1: January twelfth, nineteen sixty five, suggested that heavier air demands
- 34:37Speaker 1: argued for greater air assets. It as for thirteen tactical
- 34:42Speaker 1: strike squadrons in Vietnam, seven to be US Air Force
- 34:46Speaker 1: jet units, extra US Air Force air liaison officers and
- 34:51Speaker 1: tactical air control parties to extend direct air support nets
- 34:56Speaker 1: to province and sector levels, and at least one hundred
- 35:00Speaker 1: seventy five US Air Force and Vietnamese O ones more
- 35:05Speaker 1: if continuous air reconnaissance was authorized. Defending the role of
- 35:10Speaker 1: US Army helicopter gunships, General Westmoreland said that they had
- 35:15Speaker 1: performed magnificently at Bien Jump. At a briefing on January thirteenth,
- 35:21Speaker 1: he asked if stepping up air firepower made sense in Vietnam.
- 35:26Speaker 1: In other words, were there significant and vulnerable targets in
- 35:30Speaker 1: viet Cong's sanctuary areas and how could they be brought
- 35:33Speaker 1: under attack. General de Puy the MACV J three addressed
- 35:39Speaker 1: the question in a paper that was largely the work
- 35:42Speaker 1: of US Air Force Colonel Allan C. Edmonds, Deputy Assistant
- 35:46Speaker 1: Chief of Staff J three. For air targets were available,
- 35:50Speaker 1: the study said, and lifting the curbs on using US
- 35:54Speaker 1: Air Force aircraft in the country would expand air power.
- 35:58Speaker 1: This could best be done by by drawing on Guam
- 36:01Speaker 1: based B fifty two bombers, as well as US Navy
- 36:04Speaker 1: carrier aircraft on South Vietnamese offshore stations for air facilities
- 36:10Speaker 1: in Vietnam were scarce and overcrowded. The Vietnamese ground forces
- 36:15Speaker 1: were apparently unable to give a high degree of security
- 36:18Speaker 1: against Vietcong attack of air bases, and it was hard
- 36:22Speaker 1: to haul ordnance and aviation fuel to Vietnamese airfields. Air
- 36:28Speaker 1: staff analysts agreed with part of the study calling on
- 36:32Speaker 1: aircraft outside the country would indeed alleviate the airfield security problem.
- 36:38Speaker 1: As early as December ninth, nineteen sixty four, General le
- 36:42Speaker 1: May had suggested sending US ground combat units into Vietnam
- 36:46Speaker 1: for air base defense. The Navy and Marine Corps had demurred,
- 36:51Speaker 1: saying that it was contrary to national policy. The Army
- 36:54Speaker 1: had objected on the ground that four divisions would be
- 36:58Speaker 1: needed to defend eighteen operating sites. As for the supply system,
- 37:03Speaker 1: there was no doubt that conveying pol And ordinance was cumbersome, slow,
- 37:08Speaker 1: and risky. This was especially true when done by barges, lighters,
- 37:13Speaker 1: and trucks, requiring security guards on the other side of
- 37:18Speaker 1: the coin. Using aircraft located outside the country could hamper
- 37:22Speaker 1: attempts to improve air based security and Vietnamese air facilities.
- 37:27Speaker 1: Both were long overdue. Although the B fifty two bombers
- 37:31Speaker 1: were unmatched in all weather heavy saturation attacks, the long
- 37:35Speaker 1: flights from Guam would be expensive. Furthermore, using these strategic
- 37:40Speaker 1: bombers would reduce SACKS worldwide deterrent posture. While the interest
- 37:45Speaker 1: of General Westmoreland in tactical air was encouraging, he failed
- 37:50Speaker 1: to understand second Air Division and pack aff hopes for
- 37:54Speaker 1: building a well rounded air command, coordination and control structure
- 37:59Speaker 1: in Vietnam. On January twenty fourth, nineteen sixty five, General
- 38:05Speaker 1: Moore advised General Westmoreland that the fastest way to bolster
- 38:09Speaker 1: air power was to make full use of the US
- 38:12Speaker 1: Air Force resources now in the country. More believed that
- 38:16Speaker 1: the most compelling needs were to let US Air Force
- 38:19Speaker 1: jets fly missions in South Vietnam, do away with the
- 38:23Speaker 1: requirement to carry a Vietnamese observer or trainee on operational missions,
- 38:29Speaker 1: and remove helicopters from air bases to allow an expansion
- 38:33Speaker 1: of facilities. Some optimistic signs emerged from the lingering debate
- 38:38Speaker 1: on air demands. A measure of political stability in Saigon
- 38:43Speaker 1: seemed to give the Vietnamese Armed Forces confidence and initiative.
- 38:48Speaker 1: A MACV press release told of air attacks killing about
- 38:51Speaker 1: twenty five hundred Vietkong in November and December nineteen sixty four.
- 38:57Speaker 1: Given these indications were more strikeplanes really required, Vietnamese and
- 39:03Speaker 1: US Air Force A ones flew two thousand, three hundred
- 39:06Speaker 1: thirty nine combat sorties in January nineteen sixty five, filling
- 39:12Speaker 1: every request for close air support. The combined air forces
- 39:16Speaker 1: flew a total of four thousand, five hundred fifty sorties,
- 39:21Speaker 1: yet could not meet fifty percent of the requests for
- 39:24Speaker 1: all types of air activity. Estimates showed that all of
- 39:27Speaker 1: them could have been met had there been no operational restrictions.
- 39:32Speaker 1: In a saturation test during January nineteenth to the twenty first,
- 39:37Speaker 1: Vietnamese and US Air Force A one's dropped eight hundred
- 39:40Speaker 1: tons of bombs on pre planned targets in the Bois
- 39:44Speaker 1: Lois Woods of Zone d Ranch hand C one twenty
- 39:48Speaker 1: three's then began a massive defoliation program in Boilois to
- 39:54Speaker 1: cover forty eight square miles of dense forest hiding a
- 39:57Speaker 1: key Vietcong base. Operation tied up many of the combined
- 40:02Speaker 1: strike aircraft. On January twenty six, in a separate action,
- 40:07Speaker 1: two government battalions surrounded an enemy battalion near ap Buck.
- 40:12Speaker 1: Helicopter gunship and A one strikes accounted for half of
- 40:16Speaker 1: the estimated four hundred and fifty insurgents billed that day.
- 40:21Speaker 1: Late in January, the Joint Chief secured approval for using
- 40:25Speaker 1: US Air Force jet aircraft in a strike role within
- 40:29Speaker 1: South Vietnam if Ambassador Taylor agreed in advance to each
- 40:34Speaker 1: mission and if these strikes could not be carried out
- 40:37Speaker 1: by Vietnamese A one's. According to this formula, Taylor could
- 40:42Speaker 1: authorize jet air strikes solely to save American lives or
- 40:46Speaker 1: to spoil huge Vietcong attacks like the one at Binja.
- 40:50Speaker 1: You could do this only if the Air Support Operations
- 40:53Speaker 1: Center certified that conventional aircraft were unavailable, and if a
- 40:58Speaker 1: core Tactical Zone commander, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and
- 41:03Speaker 1: mac Vee all thought the action necessary. As for air
- 41:06Speaker 1: strikes on North Vietnam, President Johnson rejected them in January
- 41:11Speaker 1: nineteen sixty five, despite his growing conviction that the feeble
- 41:15Speaker 1: Saigon government needed help of some sort to survive. Trials
- 41:20Speaker 1: and tribulations, including militant Buddhist opposition, prompted CIA Director Macone
- 41:26Speaker 1: to expect Kahn to fall from power and a serious
- 41:29Speaker 1: political crisis to follow. On January twenty third, in a
- 41:34Speaker 1: speech interpreted by some observers as a bid for negotiations,
- 41:39Speaker 1: William P. Bundy suggested a diplomatic meeting similar to the
- 41:43Speaker 1: nineteen fifty four Geneva Accords as the answer for a
- 41:48Speaker 1: secure and independent South Vietnam. Five days later, Presidential assistant
- 41:53Speaker 1: McGeorge Bundy informed Preston Johnson that he and Secretary McNamara
- 41:59Speaker 1: were pretty well convinced that our current policy can lead
- 42:03Speaker 1: only to disastrous defeat. The preferred alternatives were to use
- 42:07Speaker 1: our military power in the Far East and to force
- 42:11Speaker 1: a change of communist policy, or to deploy all our
- 42:14Speaker 1: resources along a track of negotiation aimed at salvaging what
- 42:19Speaker 1: little can be preserved, with no major addition to our
- 42:23Speaker 1: present military risks. Secretary of State Rusk opposed both options.
- 42:28Speaker 1: The consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad.
- 42:32Speaker 1: He said that we simply must find a way of
- 42:36Speaker 1: making our present policy work. Not sure whether to support
- 42:40Speaker 1: Saigon more vigorously or to disengage from a losing proposition,
- 42:45Speaker 1: the President on February fourth sent a fact finding party
- 42:49Speaker 1: headed by McGeorge Bundy to Saigon. The party's arrival coincided
- 42:54Speaker 1: with a visit to Hanoi by Soviet Premier Alexei and Kosegin.
- 43:00Speaker 1: Since Khrushchev's departure from power in October nineteen sixty four,
- 43:04Speaker 1: Kosegin had tried to restore closer Russian ties with Hanoi.
- 43:09Speaker 1: He in a sizeable Moscow delegation that included top Soviet
- 43:13Speaker 1: Air Force officials, reached Hanoi on February sixth. According to
- 43:19Speaker 1: the Chinese, Kosegin hoped to persuade Hanoi to halt military
- 43:23Speaker 1: aid to the Viet Kong as a precondition to negotiation,
- 43:28Speaker 1: as William Bundy seemed to have suggested, but in Maccohone's opinion,
- 43:32Speaker 1: Kosegin sens an imminent Vietcong victory and wanted the Soviet
- 43:37Speaker 1: Union to share in it. Kosegin would probably offer more
- 43:40Speaker 1: economic and military aid and encourage stepped up warfare in
- 43:45Speaker 1: South Vietnam. Consequently, mccohn proposed that the United States starred
- 43:51Speaker 1: air attacks on targets at North Vietnam. These would commence
- 43:54Speaker 1: at the seventeenth Parallel and work progressively northward, selecting signals stopped.
- 44:01Speaker 1: On Sunday morning, February seventh, nineteen sixty five, Vietcong mortar
- 44:06Speaker 1: squads and demolition teams attacked the small US Advisory detachment
- 44:11Speaker 1: in two Corps four and one half miles north of
- 44:14Speaker 1: play Coup. In addition, they struck Camp Holloway, headquarters of
- 44:19Speaker 1: the U. S. Army fifty second Aviation Battalion, also near
- 44:23Speaker 1: play Coup. The joint assaults killed eight Americans and wounded
- 44:27Speaker 1: one hundred four, destroyed five Army UH one B helicopters
- 44:32Speaker 1: and two CV two transports, three U. S. Air Force
- 44:37Speaker 1: O one FS, and one Vietnamese O one F. Moreover,
- 44:41Speaker 1: the teams damaged the main building of the Advisory Detachment. Bundy, Westmoreland,
- 44:48Speaker 1: and Taylor jointly sent from Saigon their recommendation for a
- 44:52Speaker 1: reprisal strike, and President Johnson ordered an instant air response
- 44:57Speaker 1: that afternoon. U. S. Navy aircraft. On the eighth, Vietnamese
- 45:02Speaker 1: and US Air Force planes hid enemy military barracks near
- 45:06Speaker 1: Dong Hua in an operation called Flaming Dart. At the
- 45:11Speaker 1: same time, pac AF Air Transports commenced to lift U. S.
- 45:15Speaker 1: Marine Corps light anti aircraft missile units from Okinawa to
- 45:20Speaker 1: Dinang and to evacuate US dependence from South Vietnam. The
- 45:25Speaker 1: viet Cong struck on the tenth near Quinan, taking twenty
- 45:29Speaker 1: three American and seven South Vietnamese lives. On the following day,
- 45:34Speaker 1: US Air Force, US Navy, and Vietnamese Air Force aircraft
- 45:39Speaker 1: in Flaming Dart I pounded troop barracks in the North
- 45:42Speaker 1: Vietnamese Panhandle. The joint chiefs quickly ordered the deployment to
- 45:47Speaker 1: South Vietnam and Thailand of four and one half US
- 45:51Speaker 1: Air Force tactical squadrons from bases in Japan, Okinawa and
- 45:56Speaker 1: the Philippines, and the movement of thirty B fifty twos
- 46:00Speaker 1: to Guam. South Vietnamese control deteriorated in all of the
- 46:04Speaker 1: corps tactical zones as Vietcong action exploded. On February eighth,
- 46:10Speaker 1: a major enemy force crossed Route nineteen between Plai Coup
- 46:14Speaker 1: and Kinon. The crossing occurred even though four A one
- 46:18Speaker 1: e's dropped lazy dogs and killed about one hundred of
- 46:22Speaker 1: the enemy. The attackers then enveloped and damaged two battalions
- 46:27Speaker 1: of the fortieth Regiment and a troop of M one
- 46:30Speaker 1: fifteen armored personnel characters in vin Bin Province. That night,
- 46:35Speaker 1: in AC forty seven poured twenty thousand, five hundred seven
- 46:40Speaker 1: point star rounds into the area, killing around two hundred
- 46:44Speaker 1: and fifty enemy soldiers. To shore up the two corps,
- 46:48Speaker 1: defense General Moore ordered eight A one e's to Quinon,
- 46:52Speaker 1: where conditions were unsafe in every respect. Staying close to
- 46:57Speaker 1: the scene of action, Each pilot flew at least three
- 47:00Speaker 1: strikes sorties a day and significantly helped to blunt the
- 47:04Speaker 1: enemy offensive. On February thirteenth, President Johnson gave the green
- 47:09Speaker 1: light to measured and limited air attacks on North Vietnam
- 47:14Speaker 1: called Rolling Thunder, and planned for swift execution. The strikes
- 47:18Speaker 1: were delayed for two weeks by political and military turmoil
- 47:22Speaker 1: in Saigon and by bad weather. The capital was directly
- 47:27Speaker 1: and immediately threatened by the viet Cong ninth Division, which
- 47:31Speaker 1: had no less than two well armed regiments under forest
- 47:35Speaker 1: cover in Fwoktui Province. The mystery of how these troops
- 47:39Speaker 1: were getting modern weapons was solved. On February sixteenth, a U. S.
- 47:44Speaker 1: Army helicopter pilot discovered and Vietnamese a one h S
- 47:49Speaker 1: sank a steel hauled vessel at Vunroe Bay. An investigation
- 47:54Speaker 1: turned up one hundred tons of arms and ammunitions at
- 47:59Speaker 1: a nearby cove at cap Rilla. The U. S. Seventh
- 48:03Speaker 1: Fleet at once started naval patrols to stop these deliveries.
- 48:07Speaker 1: General Westmoreland wanted to send B fifty seven light bombers
- 48:12Speaker 1: against the Viet Kong ninth Division base camps in Fwaktui Province,
- 48:17Speaker 1: which had been pinpointed by infrared reconnaissance, securing emergency authority
- 48:23Speaker 1: on February seventeenth. He planned to launch the planes on
- 48:27Speaker 1: the nineteenth. On that day, dissident military leaders revolted against
- 48:32Speaker 1: General Khan their troops seized Saigon and took part of
- 48:36Speaker 1: Tansannut to ground Key's Antai Kup Air Force, but Ki
- 48:40Speaker 1: got his planes in the air as C forty sevens
- 48:43Speaker 1: brought loyal troops from the One Corps to clear Saigon
- 48:47Speaker 1: of the rebels. The Armed Forces Council then removed Khan
- 48:51Speaker 1: and exiled him at the height of the coup crisis
- 48:54Speaker 1: in Saigon. On the afternoon of February nineteenth, four B
- 48:59Speaker 1: fifty sevens from Bienhoi flew the first open US Air
- 49:02Speaker 1: Force mission in South Vietnam as they bombed viet Cong
- 49:06Speaker 1: base camps in Fuap Tui. The aircraft struck again during
- 49:10Speaker 1: February twenty first to twenty fourth. While Key kept most
- 49:14Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese Air Force A one HS on counter
- 49:18Speaker 1: coup alert and out of combat. Judging on February twenty
- 49:22Speaker 1: first that the United States was not fully committed to
- 49:26Speaker 1: winning the war in Vietnam, General Westmoreland was ready to
- 49:29Speaker 1: change the nature of the American involvement. He would make
- 49:33Speaker 1: more use of jet aircraft within South Vietnam, restore US
- 49:38Speaker 1: markings to American manned A one ease, and abolish the
- 49:42Speaker 1: requirement for Vietnamese observers in American planes. Enemy action on
- 49:48Speaker 1: February twenty fourth involved the elite Communist battalion that had
- 49:52Speaker 1: apparently just arrived in the Central Highlands. The battalions surrounded
- 49:57Speaker 1: a ranger company and a civilian Irregular Defense Group company
- 50:01Speaker 1: on Route nineteen in the Aqui Valley near the Mangyang Pass,
- 50:06Speaker 1: where the Vietna min had wiped out a French mobile
- 50:10Speaker 1: group in nineteen fifty four. General Westmoreland used his emergency
- 50:14Speaker 1: authority to commit US Air Force jet aircraft in an
- 50:18Speaker 1: all American relief effort. F one hundreds B fifty sevens
- 50:23Speaker 1: and A one EAS covered and supported US Army UH
- 50:27Speaker 1: one bs that rescued the surrounding men. The covering attacks
- 50:31Speaker 1: by the six hundred thirteenth Tactical Fighter Squadron F one hundreds,
- 50:36Speaker 1: four hundred fifth Tactical Wing B fifty sevens and six
- 50:40Speaker 1: hundred second Fighter Commando Squadron A one e's cost the
- 50:44Speaker 1: enemy one hundred fifty men killed. They also allowed the
- 50:48Speaker 1: helicopters to land three times in the area without a
- 50:51Speaker 1: single casualty. The copters evacuated the two hundred twenty officers
- 50:56Speaker 1: n men, who, according to Colonel Theodore C. Mattacks US
- 51:01Speaker 1: Army two Corps Advisor would otherwise have been lost. The
- 51:05Speaker 1: employment of B fifty seven and F one hundred jets
- 51:09Speaker 1: marked the end of the long US combat advisory phase
- 51:12Speaker 1: and the beginning of direct and open American action in
- 51:16Speaker 1: the Vietnam War. On March first, the new Commander in
- 51:20Speaker 1: chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, Major General Tran Van Minh,
- 51:25Speaker 1: established the Vietnamese Air Force Air Requestnet as the primary
- 51:30Speaker 1: means to obtain immediate air support for all regular and
- 51:34Speaker 1: paramilitary operations. He further removed the restriction that only a
- 51:39Speaker 1: Vietnamese forward air controller could mark targets for air strikes
- 51:44Speaker 1: after approval by higher headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 51:48Speaker 1: on March ninth directed that US aircraft could be used
- 51:52Speaker 1: for combat operations in South Vietnam. No strikes were permitted
- 51:57Speaker 1: from Thai airfields, and American aircraft were not to accept
- 52:00Speaker 1: missions that the Vietnamese Air Force could carry out, but
- 52:04Speaker 1: the planes now boldly displayed US insignia, and the Vietnamese
- 52:09Speaker 1: airman was no longer required to be a board in combat.
- 52:13Speaker 1: The United States Air Force advisory effort spanned the decade
- 52:17Speaker 1: between nineteen fifty five and early nineteen sixty five, from
- 52:21Speaker 1: the time the United States formerly took over the training
- 52:25Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese from the French, until American aircraft first
- 52:30Speaker 1: openly engaged in combat. During this interval, the Vietnamese Air
- 52:34Speaker 1: Force expanded from a few hundred to over ten thousand men.
- 52:39Speaker 1: Its five squadrons of obsolete French and American planes at
- 52:44Speaker 1: two air bases swelled to fourteen squadrons and almost three
- 52:48Speaker 1: hundred more modern aircraft at five major air bases. In addition,
- 52:53Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force forged a chain of command mirroring
- 52:58Speaker 1: that of its American advisors. Most of these changes took
- 53:01Speaker 1: place through the final three years of the period, when
- 53:05Speaker 1: the threat from the North grew ever more serious. The U. S.
- 53:09Speaker 1: Air Force experienced parallel growth in Southeast Asia during the decade.
- 53:14Speaker 1: In the late nineteen fifties, there were sixty eight airmen
- 53:18Speaker 1: stationed in Vietnam and forty four in Thailand. From nineteen
- 53:22Speaker 1: sixty one on, these numbers gradually rose, and on the
- 53:26Speaker 1: eve of americanization of the war, stood at six thousand,
- 53:30Speaker 1: six hundred four and two thousand, nine hundred forty three, respectively.
- 53:35Speaker 1: By February nineteen sixty five, the Air Force had two
- 53:38Speaker 1: hundred twenty two planes in South Vietnam and eighty three
- 53:42Speaker 1: in Thailand. Seventy percent of those in South Vietnam were
- 53:47Speaker 1: clustered around the Saigon area, operating from Tanzanut or Bienhoi
- 53:52Speaker 1: Air Base. The remainder were up north, primarily at Dinang.
- 53:57Speaker 1: One third of all these aircraft were SEI twenty three transports,
- 54:01Speaker 1: operating for the most part out of Toan Sanut. Reconnaissance
- 54:05Speaker 1: missions also originated from Ton Sanut, flown by r F
- 54:09Speaker 1: one oh one's and RB fifty sevens on temporary assignment.
- 54:14Speaker 1: The Saigon base further housed a handful of F one
- 54:17Speaker 1: O twos for air defense. The attack fleet of forty
- 54:21Speaker 1: eight A one e's for in country strikes was positioned
- 54:24Speaker 1: at nearby Bienhoi, also the headquarters for the forward air
- 54:28Speaker 1: control mission, performed by twenty two O one f's from Denang.
- 54:33Speaker 1: The Air Force operated one transport squadron and one temporary
- 54:38Speaker 1: duty squadron of F one hundreds for missions in Laos.
- 54:42Speaker 1: A sprinkling of support aircraft rounded out the total. The
- 54:46Speaker 1: US Air Force presence in Thailand was still small. At
- 54:50Speaker 1: the start of nineteen sixty five. Air defense of the
- 54:53Speaker 1: country was provided by four F one O twos from
- 54:57Speaker 1: Don Wang Airport outside Bangkok. Farther upcountry, a squadron of
- 55:03Speaker 1: F one O fives at Eudorn Royal Thai Air Force
- 55:06Speaker 1: Base RTAFB and another at Takli RTAFB flew against the
- 55:12Speaker 1: infiltration routes in the Laosian Panhandle. At Eudorn RTAFB, just
- 55:18Speaker 1: south of the Laosian capital, twenty to twenty eights worked
- 55:22Speaker 1: to stem the Pathet Lao tide in northern Laos. These
- 55:26Speaker 1: were supported by eight air rescue helicopters from the same base.
- 55:31Speaker 1: None of these aircraft took part in operations in Vietnam.
- 55:36Speaker 1: Despite this sizeable swelling of personnel and aircraft between nineteen
- 55:41Speaker 1: fifty five and nineteen sixty five, the US Advisory Mission
- 55:45Speaker 1: failed to end Hanoi's support of the insurgency in South
- 55:49Speaker 1: Vietnam and Laos. The decision early in nineteen sixty five
- 55:54Speaker 1: to replace advisors with combat troops recognized two facts that
- 55:59Speaker 1: had come clear in late nineteen sixty four. Infiltration from
- 56:03Speaker 1: North into South Vietnam was growing rather than tapering off,
- 56:08Speaker 1: and the government of South Vietnam still unstable since the
- 56:11Speaker 1: assassination of DM, could not cope with the situation. US
- 56:16Speaker 1: policymakers saw the confluence of these two factors spelling defeat
- 56:21Speaker 1: for the South unless a new approach was taken. Thus,
- 56:25Speaker 1: the purely advisory function was abandoned in favor of direct
- 56:29Speaker 1: US air and ground participation in the conflict. The US
- 56:34Speaker 1: Air Force units in place early in nineteen sixty five
- 56:38Speaker 1: would form the nucleus for the coming build up. End
- 56:43Speaker 1: of Section twenty one