Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / California Supreme Court 2025 Year in Review: Key Decisions Every Business Litigator Should Know
Transcript
- 0:02My name is Nada Sagafi. I am vice chair of litigation
- 0:06with the HBA. We're delighted that you are joining
- 0:10us this afternoon and I am pleased to introduce
- 0:14today's speakers. So we have Derek Foren. He
- 0:17is a partner at Steptoe. He represents public
- 0:20and private companies in complex civil litigation
- 0:24in state and federal courts. He is considered
- 0:27a litigation heavyweight and his practice focuses
- 0:30on high stakes trials and commercial litigation.
- 0:34Derek has extensive experience representing clients
- 0:37in complex commercial matters in state and federal
- 0:40trial courts and in private arbitration. And
- 0:44most recently, and very impressively, Derek secured
- 0:47a complete defense verdict on behalf of Lattice
- 0:50Semiconductor in a case seeking over $82 million
- 0:55in compensatory damages. And after an 11 -day
- 0:59trial, The jury returned a verdict for lattice
- 1:02in less than two hours. And Connor Tucker is
- 1:06an associate at Steptoe. He has served clients
- 1:09as lead counsel at all levels of the federal
- 1:12court system, including as counsel of record
- 1:15in the United States Supreme Court. Connor has
- 1:18managed cases through every stage of litigation
- 1:21from pre -complaint investigation through trial
- 1:24and appeal. and argued dispositive motions and
- 1:28appeals in state and federal courts. His written
- 1:31and oral advocacy has led to published precedent
- 1:35-setting opinions, including on issues of first
- 1:37impression. Connor has experience litigating
- 1:40on a wide range of issues, including contract,
- 1:44trademark, trade secret, copyright, patent, constitutional
- 1:47criminal procedure, due process rights, and civil
- 1:51procedure for clients in a wide range of industries.
- 1:54And so now let's get started. Thanks very much,
- 1:59Neda. That's absolutely a lovely warm welcome.
- 2:02I didn't recognize myself in that introduction,
- 2:04but we're very grateful to you for it. Thanks,
- 2:07everybody, for joining us today. I'll turn it
- 2:10over to Connor, the real expert in this presentation,
- 2:14to get us rolling. Thank you very much, Derek,
- 2:16and thank you very much, Neda. Can you guys see,
- 2:19Derek, can you see the screen? Yep. You can see
- 2:22it? Yes. Well, we appreciate you all showing
- 2:26up and being present here for the California
- 2:28Supreme Court recap of 2025. We're going to focus
- 2:33on important business litigation cases here today.
- 2:40There we go. If I, excuse me. Okay. So for today,
- 2:46we're This is the basic agenda. We'll come back
- 2:49to it. I think you have it in your emails, and
- 2:51I'm not going to spend too much time on it. But
- 2:53we're going to cover a wide range of topics,
- 2:56both Derek and I, that range the gambit from
- 3:00arbitration cases to judicial review of the Public
- 3:04Utilities Commission to form selection clauses.
- 3:07So we've got plenty in store today, and we're
- 3:10happy that you can join us. For those of you
- 3:13who are either new to appellate litigation or
- 3:16don't have very much experience in the California
- 3:18Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal is divided
- 3:23into multiple districts, and some are substantially
- 3:26larger than others. Appeals can take a very long
- 3:30time if you're ever interested in seeing the
- 3:32statistics. The judiciary publishes its annual
- 3:37statistics every year, usually starting in January
- 3:39or February. And cases average from between 300
- 3:43to 500 days from notice of appeal to issued decision.
- 3:47And in some districts can be significantly larger
- 3:50than that. And so the work of appeals can take
- 3:55a significant amount of time to get the responses
- 3:58that people usually want. That can be a feature
- 4:01of procedural issues such as extensions, the
- 4:06grace period. or amicus briefs, which permit
- 4:11parties to file responses. Despite that, a lot
- 4:14of things do happen very quickly in appellate
- 4:17litigation. So records must be decided within
- 4:19a few weeks. Petitions for review in the California
- 4:22Supreme Court can be as short as 10 days or as
- 4:25long as 40 days. And although argument is guaranteed,
- 4:29it's not always helpful. And so in appellate
- 4:32litigation in California, it's definitely, the
- 4:35old adage is definitely true. that a argument
- 4:39can help you win more or lose less, even if it's
- 4:43not going to change the result. And so I'll hand
- 4:46it over to Derek now to talk about New England
- 4:50county foods versus van law foods. Thanks, Connor.
- 4:53Before we move on from the appellate stuff, am
- 4:55I correct? I always thought it was pretty interesting.
- 4:57One of the unique aspects of appellate procedure
- 5:00in California was that the justices write the
- 5:02opinions before they hear argument. Is that right?
- 5:05That is usually the case. And that comes from
- 5:08a feature of California. So feature of California
- 5:11law where argument is guaranteed and the justices
- 5:15are under a deadline to get something decided
- 5:18once the case is submitted. So they usually provide,
- 5:22they usually have a written opinion on the bench
- 5:26with them when they're listening to argument.
- 5:28Some districts have actually started providing
- 5:30tentatives, which is a very curious a way to
- 5:34go into an argument. And certain districts actually
- 5:37provide tentatives that don't look anything like
- 5:40their eventual opinion. They just want to focus
- 5:43the argument on one issue or two issues. And
- 5:46so it's a interesting way and kind of unique
- 5:50way to go into appellate argument with a sense
- 5:52of what the panel is already thinking. Okay.
- 5:55Well, thanks for that. And let's talk about the
- 5:58first case. And we're going to talk about today,
- 6:01New England country foods versus van law foods.
- 6:04And you know, I'm primarily a trial lawyer. I've
- 6:07done a fair amount of appellate work over the
- 6:08course of my career, primarily a trial lawyer.
- 6:10So I love to focus on the facts in these cases.
- 6:13And this case is about barbecue sauce. It's not
- 6:16going to be reflected on this slide, but the
- 6:18most interesting thing about this case, it's
- 6:19about Trader Joe's barbecue sauce, which I used
- 6:21to love and which they no longer sell. And the
- 6:28plaintiff in the case was a company that made
- 6:32the barbecue sauce for Trader Joe's. It was a
- 6:34very popular product at the time. They contracted
- 6:37with the defendants and provided them with the
- 6:41secret sauce, so to speak, or the ingredients
- 6:42for the secret sauce to make this barbecue sauce
- 6:45for them on a subcontract basis. The defendants
- 6:51Does the dirty on the plaintiff turns around
- 6:53and starts making the barbecue sauce for Trader
- 6:57Joe's directly. What I found particularly hilarious
- 7:00about this whole case was that the plaintiff
- 7:04found out about the defendant's nefarious tactics
- 7:08in litigation over Sriracha sauce. I'm not sure
- 7:11I'm even pronouncing that correctly, but in one
- 7:13case about sauce, they found out about the theft
- 7:15of their ingredients for the barbecue sauce.
- 7:19So they bring Sue. The only damages that they
- 7:23saw were lost profits, and I'm sure as folks
- 7:26are familiar with the kind of clauses that were
- 7:29at issue here, we had a really, really broad
- 7:31limitation of liability and damages provision
- 7:34in the contract that essentially precluded seeking
- 7:38lost profits on any basis. David Carter, the
- 7:43famous judge down in the central district, and
- 7:45it's pretty interesting. A lot of cases out of
- 7:47the California Supreme Court this year. Came
- 7:49about as a result of questions being certified
- 7:52to them by the ninth circus is ongoing dialogue
- 7:55between the ninth circuit and California Supreme
- 7:56Court. As to California state law procedure David
- 8:01Carter granted a motion to dismiss the case.
- 8:05I found that section 1668 in the California code.
- 8:15Didn't matter that it was a complete bar. on
- 8:18the types of damages that were being sought.
- 8:21That was basically the holding. So this goes
- 8:24up to the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
- 8:26then asks the question of the California Supreme
- 8:30Court, are these damages barred? And the answer
- 8:33was yes. It was a pretty categorical holding.
- 8:39Parties cannot limit their liability for claims
- 8:42asserting willful injury of any kind. There were
- 8:44three intentional tort claims in addition to
- 8:46a contract claim in the case. You cannot limit
- 8:50your liability for claims asserting willful injury,
- 8:52period, end of story. And it was categorical.
- 8:54They were asked to do a case by case analysis
- 8:57that would have been fact specific. They decided
- 8:59not to do that. It constitutes a complete bar
- 9:02on any kind of damages for willful injury. So
- 9:08it's a pretty important case and it's a very
- 9:10important case to have in mind when you're litigating
- 9:13cases like this or indeed when you're drafting
- 9:15commercial contracts that can contain limitations,
- 9:17provisions. You know, what are the takeaways?
- 9:23Well, first off, as I said, it's categorical
- 9:26in nature. I mean, they just decided not to get
- 9:28into any kind of a case by case analysis. They
- 9:33were also clear, however, that 1668 does not
- 9:37operate to prevent limitations of liabilities,
- 9:40damages for breach of contract claims. Sophisticated
- 9:44priorities are permitted to contract as they
- 9:48see fit and it's subject to the usual types of
- 9:51doctrines that you would see when it comes to
- 9:53contract claims like this, for example, unconscionability.
- 9:59Notwithstanding the categorical nature of the
- 10:00Supreme Court's decision in this case, I still
- 10:02think it's a bit messy and at least open a lot
- 10:04of open questions. Negligence claims. Can you
- 10:10limit liability for negligence claims? The answer
- 10:12is yes in theory, but it has to meet a six factor
- 10:15test, which is difficult to understand. Gross
- 10:17negligence is exempt as well. You can't limit
- 10:20liability for gross negligence, but what constitutes
- 10:22gross negligence as opposed to ordinary negligence?
- 10:25These are all pretty. thorny questions in my
- 10:27mind factually and legally that are difficult
- 10:30to answer. The odd thing about the case was they
- 10:35assumed without deciding that the three intentional
- 10:37torts, one was intentional interference with
- 10:40prospect of economic advantage, one was intentional
- 10:43interference with contract and one was a breach
- 10:45of fiduciary duty claim, they assumed without
- 10:48deciding that those claims constituted claims
- 10:52for willful injury. uh which begs the question
- 10:55is there some delta between intentional torts
- 10:59uh on the one hand and claims are willful injury
- 11:03on the other it doesn't seem to me that there
- 11:05is but if there isn't why didn't the supreme
- 11:07court simply answer that question so with all
- 11:10due deference and respect to the california supreme
- 11:12court as per usual all of these issues are going
- 11:14to be left to be worked out by the lower courts
- 11:17um that's uh that's that's that case in a nutshell
- 11:22what do you think connor Well, so you and I wrote
- 11:24an article about this and I agree with you that
- 11:26one of the most striking features of this case
- 11:29is that they assumed the basis for their decision
- 11:34here that willful injury cannot be contractually
- 11:37limited prior to incurring the injury. It's going
- 11:43to be a theme, I think, of this year in the California
- 11:46Supreme Court and certainly in this presentation,
- 11:49there are quite a few decisions that the Supreme
- 11:51Court has made that don't actually resolve the
- 11:55dispute in front of them. This particular case,
- 12:00I don't think the Supreme Court could have resolved
- 12:02it. It was there on certified question from the
- 12:05Ninth Circuit. So the Ninth Circuit gets the
- 12:09final word on it. But there's a few cases, I
- 12:14actually think more than one case today where
- 12:17we're going to talk about the California Supreme
- 12:19Court basically punting and giving a rule to
- 12:22the uh to the courts below and without any need
- 12:28for further segue we'll start we'll jump into
- 12:30epicentrics yeah let me let me just make one
- 12:33final point first off wouldn't it be great to
- 12:35be california supreme court justice you just
- 12:37get to say what the law is and other folks get
- 12:39to figure out exactly how it applies on a case
- 12:42by case basis but one of the things i thought
- 12:45was interesting about the case is this dialogue
- 12:47you know the boundary between contract law and
- 12:51tort law and the grayness of that boundary and
- 12:54the, you know, I like to think of it and we're
- 12:57going to see this in other cases that we talk
- 12:58about today is like what are the, what is the
- 13:00line? between contract law and what it protects
- 13:03on the one hand and tort law and what it protects
- 13:06on the other. The more I read the Supreme Court's
- 13:08decisions in this area, it seems to me that it's
- 13:10an ongoing dialogue between the two bodies of
- 13:13law in order to figure out where that line is.
- 13:15So this was just one example and we're going
- 13:17to see other examples later on in the discussion.
- 13:23I completely agree with that. EpiCentRx or EpiCentrix,
- 13:28as I have been calling it. Apologies if you represent
- 13:31them. I don't know how to pronounce it. But EpiCentrix
- 13:34is a case that arose on a writ. And this case
- 13:40comes from a sadly, I think, more common than
- 13:44I would have initially expected set of facts.
- 13:48So there's a company, EpiCentrix, and it has
- 13:52a minority stockholder, EpiRx. and they raised
- 13:57$5 million from this minority stockholder. And
- 14:00lo and behold, they don't get any of their shares.
- 14:03They never get put into, they're put on the board,
- 14:06but they never get put into the cap table. And
- 14:09the allegations are that what has occurred is
- 14:14all of that $5 million just went into the pockets
- 14:16of the owners of the main company of EpiCentrics.
- 14:22So the plaintiff alleged misconduct by insiders,
- 14:25diverting funds, misleading about an IPO, the
- 14:28failed IPO, then caused issues with valuations,
- 14:32and they kicked the plaintiff's board representative
- 14:36off of the suit. Sorry, off of the case. Now
- 14:41once the suit was filed, or shortly before the
- 14:43suit was filed, when the dispute was going on,
- 14:46the company modified its certificate of infliporation
- 14:50and its bylaws. in order to insert a forum selection
- 14:54clause that required any cases against it to
- 14:57be litigated in the Delaware Chancery Court.
- 15:01So when plaintiffs sued and the lawsuit was filed
- 15:04in California, where it and most of the defendants
- 15:07reside, and where the alleged misconduct occurred,
- 15:12the company moved to dismiss for forum nonconvenes
- 15:15and for the forum selection clause. So the trial
- 15:18court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based
- 15:23on the forum selection clause. And so it was
- 15:29going to proceed in California, but the court
- 15:31of appeal affirmed in a writ holding that enforcing
- 15:35the clause would, sorry, the California court
- 15:39of appeal affirmed holding that enforcing the
- 15:42clause would violate California's public policy
- 15:45favoring jury trials because the Delaware Chancery
- 15:49Court does not offer jury trials. It's a court
- 15:53of equity. It sits as equity. The California
- 15:57Supreme Court then reversed. And it decided that
- 16:04a forum selection clause is not unenforceable
- 16:07merely because the selected forum, the Delaware
- 16:10Chancery Court, does not provide a jury trial.
- 16:14So the California public policy favoring jury
- 16:17trials really is only applicable within the confines
- 16:20of California itself and does not extend to foreign
- 16:24or out -of -state forums. The way that the court
- 16:30addressed the issue, because the defendant here,
- 16:37or the plaintiff here who was seeking review,
- 16:42the court addressed this by by rejecting defendant's
- 16:47argument that this was a case similar to jury
- 16:52trial, pre -dispute jury trial waivers, where
- 16:55in California, you cannot, prior to a dispute,
- 16:59waive your jury right. And the court says, well,
- 17:04no. There's instances where we have, we being
- 17:09the California Supreme Court, have permitted
- 17:12forum selection clauses to be ignored or not
- 17:16enforced on public policy grounds have really
- 17:21been pursuant to statutory purposes. There's
- 17:26a California statute that requires that franchise
- 17:31agreements be litigated in California if the
- 17:33franchise E is in California. The consumer leases
- 17:37must be litigated in the county where the leasy
- 17:40signed concerning construction contracts. And
- 17:44those statutory public policies can be implemented.
- 17:47But the jury trial right is a procedural right.
- 17:52It's not substantive. And it would stay within
- 17:56the forum. That sounds very strange to my trial
- 17:59lawyer ears. Really? The jury trial right is
- 18:01procedural? It does. It sounds very strange.
- 18:04And I think that they're I get the argument that
- 18:10it's specific to California, but framing it as
- 18:13procedural just sounds strange to me. Rather
- 18:16than substantive. And I think this is going to
- 18:20be something that is going to come back to, I
- 18:26don't want to say haunt the Supreme Court, but
- 18:28it's going to come back and it's going to be
- 18:30a matter of litigation again in the future. Because
- 18:33while they say that, for instance, I guess in
- 18:36theory, you could modify a bylaw in order to
- 18:41require suits to proceed in Delaware Chancery
- 18:45Court, it's not very clear exactly what that
- 18:52dividing line is going to be. So just because
- 18:54the Forum Selection Clause is not a pre -dispute
- 18:56waiver, it's not clear exactly how you're going
- 19:01to determine whether or not the California preference
- 19:07for jury trials will invalidate a form selection
- 19:10clause because the Supreme Court also says the
- 19:13jury trial right can continue to be part of the
- 19:16analysis. It can be part of how you discuss it.
- 19:22So at the end of the day, what we have here is
- 19:28form selection clauses are going to be generally
- 19:32upheld. The California Supreme Court made very
- 19:34clear that the right to contract is itself a
- 19:38public policy aim and enforcement of contracts,
- 19:41a public policy aim that encourages the enforcement
- 19:46of foreign selection clauses. The jury trial
- 19:49rights are not going to override form agreements.
- 19:52And so for the transactional lawyers out there
- 19:57among us, this is a situation where you're going
- 20:00to want to make sure that you are paying attention
- 20:03to how certificates of incorporation or how bylaws
- 20:08or how these agreements are being put together,
- 20:13because you might have the option to choose a
- 20:17different forum. But at the end of the day, what's
- 20:20really challenging here is that the California
- 20:22Supreme Court also said, well, we're not actually
- 20:25going to address whether this particular forum
- 20:28selection clause, which recall was put together
- 20:32after the dispute arose and was implemented in
- 20:36order to shunt a disagreement into Delaware Chancery
- 20:42Court. This California Supreme Court has no opinion
- 20:46on that issue. They just say, well, alone, the
- 20:50jury trial right is not enough to invalidate
- 20:53a form selection clause. So this is one, I think,
- 20:55to watch because while that line seems really
- 21:00clear, I think it's going to get very murky.
- 21:02in practice as we move forward. Derek, do you
- 21:05have any other takeaway? No, not really. I mean,
- 21:09it seems to me that it does give, you know, for
- 21:11in -house lawyers, business lawyers dealing with
- 21:13companies, bylaws, contracts, it gives you A,
- 21:21more flexibility in deciding where you want your
- 21:24disputes to be resolved and B, Well, I guess
- 21:28it's just more flexibility. Well, B is more certainty.
- 21:32It's more certainty because this area was a bit
- 21:34unclear before. And I think the other piece of
- 21:38certainty is the reasoning of the California
- 21:41Supreme Court is that where there's a statutory
- 21:45preference for California litigation, that is
- 21:49likely going to be a pretty big hurdle to a forum
- 21:53selection clause. but free -floating policy or
- 21:58even constitutional policy here, the jury crowd,
- 22:01is not necessarily going to be the same problem.
- 22:08There's also some solidity in that. The next
- 22:14case is a watershed case that's also not really
- 22:19a watershed case, the Center for Biological Diversity.
- 22:22versus the Public Utilities Commission. So many
- 22:27of you, if you are a California resident, if
- 22:29you live in California, or if you own property
- 22:31in California, you'll know that the utilities
- 22:35will pay to have customers who generate solar
- 22:40electricity. Anything you put back into the grid,
- 22:44the utilities will pay for that. And that's required
- 22:47by law. The rates are set by the Public Utilities
- 22:51Commission. And in 2022, the Public Utilities
- 22:55Commission reduced the prices the utilities had
- 22:58to pay for customer generated power, what's called
- 23:01the tariff. So they reduced the tariff that customer
- 23:06generated power business with solar panels on
- 23:10top or your house with a solar roof, the amount
- 23:14that you'd get paid back is gonna be less. So
- 23:19the plaintiffs here sued saying that that did
- 23:26not actually implement the 2013 law that the
- 23:30legislature had passed that permitted the PUC
- 23:34to do this type of rate adjustment, tariff adjustment.
- 23:40The first thing to note is that the PUC is an
- 23:45independent constitutional entity in California.
- 23:49even though as an independent constitutional
- 23:51entity, the legislature has plenary authority
- 23:54to determine how the courts get to review it.
- 23:58And so there is a uniquely deferential test which
- 24:05had developed because in 1911, over 100 years
- 24:10ago, a little history lesson here, during the
- 24:11progressive era, the then railroad commission
- 24:16was thought to be captured. And so politicians
- 24:21here in California passed a variety of rules
- 24:25and variety of statutes, including what is now
- 24:29public utilities code and what now regulates
- 24:33the public utilities commission. And they wanted
- 24:37to make sure it was independent and insulated
- 24:39from any other entity, whether that's the courts
- 24:45or the legislature. And so they inserted into
- 24:47this legislation a requirement that limited court
- 24:52review of public utilities, then railroad commission,
- 24:56actions to no further than to determine whether
- 25:00the commission, quote, has regularly pursued
- 25:03its authority. So 50 years later, when the California
- 25:07Supreme Court addressed the question, they decided
- 25:10that what it means to regularly pursue authority
- 25:16was just that the review should not be disturbed
- 25:19unless it fails to bear a reasonable relation
- 25:22to statutory purposes and language. And so it's
- 25:25a bare minimum review. And that's how it had
- 25:29persisted for decades, almost the entirety of
- 25:32the 20th century. In the 1990s, the legislature
- 25:37deregulated the utility market and they changed
- 25:40the language of the statute. But the courts,
- 25:43did not catch on. They continued to apply Greyhound's
- 25:47uniquely deferential test to uphold the PUC's
- 25:50rulings. And they, even though they regularly
- 25:56pursued its authority language, only applied
- 25:59now to water corporations. So the court of appeal
- 26:03applied the uniquely deferential test, holding
- 26:07that you have to approve the PUC's actions, whether
- 26:12if it bears any reasonable relation to the statutory
- 26:15purpose and language. So the plaintiffs took
- 26:20this to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
- 26:23reversed, based mainly on statutory language,
- 26:26saying that Greyhound, its 1968 decision, it
- 26:31was based upon statutory language that no longer
- 26:34existed, and without the basis for the statutory
- 26:36language, the general standard, Yamaha, governs.
- 26:41which permits courts to independently review.
- 26:46And even though they can give respect to the
- 26:50interpretations of the PUC, they are not bound
- 26:53by the PUC. And it's a really straightforward
- 26:58opinion. It's a little bit surprising to me that
- 27:00it took 20 years, well, 95, 2030 years for the
- 27:07Supreme Court to address this Greyhound issue.
- 27:10given the statutory language change in the 1990s.
- 27:13So now it's clear the more rigorous judicial
- 27:17review is available for all of the utilities,
- 27:21telecom, energy, everything except for water.
- 27:26So this uniquely deferential standard is only
- 27:29still existing for water. And of course, a theme
- 27:33of the day today, the merits remain unresolved.
- 27:36So the Supreme Court took no position on whether
- 27:38or not the tariffs which had been put into place
- 27:43by the PUC in 2022 were in fact appropriately
- 27:48put into place. This is a watershed, if you forgive
- 27:54the pun, opinion, but in many ways, it really
- 27:59doesn't change very much because the language
- 28:06has been that way for 30 years. So I think it's
- 28:09just a little bit of cleanup here. Right. But
- 28:12the courts of appeal were not applying more rigorous
- 28:15judicial review based upon that language until
- 28:17this decision instructed them to. Is that right,
- 28:20Connor? That's true. There's some curious Supreme
- 28:24Court decisions that have also applied, Greyhound.
- 28:28So strikes me as quite important, actually. One
- 28:31of the things, as I was listening to your description
- 28:33of the case, pretty interesting that this came
- 28:36out. quite soon after the U .S. Supreme Court
- 28:39said there was no more Chevron deference for
- 28:41agency interpretation of statutes at the federal
- 28:43level. Did the California Supreme Court cite
- 28:47to that? Do you think that was in their mind
- 28:49when they rendered this decision? No, but I also
- 28:52think that general agency review in California
- 28:55has always been a little bit more involved than
- 29:00at least from the statutory construction perspective
- 29:02than in the federal courts. What's unique about
- 29:06California agency law is that many of the agencies
- 29:09have constitutional dimensions. So they have
- 29:11their own legislative functions, which adds a
- 29:16layer of review onto them. And Yamaha describes
- 29:19the case from the Supreme Court describes these
- 29:22as quasi -legislative enactments. And there,
- 29:28there's still a significant amount of deference
- 29:29which has to be given to the agencies. But when
- 29:33they're interpreting statutes, when they're interpreting
- 29:36what the legislature has done, They haven't had
- 29:40a lot of deference since Yamaha. It's really
- 29:44just in this small area with the Public Utilities
- 29:46Commission where they've had a significant amount
- 29:49of deference. Got it. Let me pass it back to
- 29:55you for the magical. Okay. Magical versus Hyundai
- 30:00Motor America Corporation. When I saw this case,
- 30:04I got the willies because it's a bit of a trap
- 30:07for the unwary. Again, it's one of those cases
- 30:12that's hard to figure out. Is it really significant?
- 30:14Because most people are going to take care of
- 30:16this issue themselves, as I'll explain soon.
- 30:19This has to do with 998 offers. I'm sure any
- 30:25litigators on this call certainly know. prevailing
- 30:28parties are entitled to their costs under California
- 30:30law. You can often get into the spats about who's
- 30:33the prevailing party, but put that to one side,
- 30:35you're entitled to your costs. And those costs
- 30:36can include attorney's fees when there is a statutory
- 30:41basis for those fees. So costs can include attorney's
- 30:45fees. Again, as long as you've got a statutory
- 30:47basis, this is a case about a bum car that somebody
- 30:51bought. It was now good they turn around and
- 30:56sue a Hyundai motor America corporation that
- 30:59looks like a small lawsuit over about thirty
- 31:01to forty thousand dollars got out of hand. I
- 31:04was overly litigated at the bottom line is Hyundai
- 31:08smartly very smartly made a series of nine nine
- 31:12eight offers. One of which they made set a few
- 31:17weeks before trial and I think again as most
- 31:20folks now nine nine eight. Code of Civil Procedure
- 31:23998, if you make an offer under that statute
- 31:27and it's either rejected or not responded to
- 31:30within 30 days, then it's A, and the plaintiff
- 31:34does not recover more than the offer, A, it cuts
- 31:38off the plaintiff's right to get their own costs
- 31:40post the time the offer was made, and B, the
- 31:44defendant gets their costs post the time the
- 31:46offer was made. So it can be significant in certain
- 31:48cases, especially in ones that involved claims
- 31:51for attorney's fees under a statute. In that
- 31:53event, a 998 offer was made several weeks before
- 31:56trial. It wasn't responded to, so it lapsed.
- 31:59And after the judge made a series of adverse
- 32:03rulings against the plaintiff on the first day
- 32:05of trial on motions and limine, they followed
- 32:07it and entered a settlement on the record, walked
- 32:12back into court and entered a settlement. But
- 32:14they did not account for costs. This settlement
- 32:18that was described to the court did not account
- 32:20for costs. In fact, one of the provisions that
- 32:23the parties agreed to was that they could make
- 32:24a cost application. So the plaintiff had racked
- 32:29up over $200 ,000 in attorney's fees. And again,
- 32:32those qualify as costs under the California statutes
- 32:36because they were statutory attorney's fees.
- 32:40Saw over $200 ,000 in attorney's fees and costs.
- 32:45I'm forgetting now which way the trial judge
- 32:47went on this. I think he said that they were
- 32:50entitled to it, notwithstanding 998. It rolls
- 32:53up to the California Supreme Court and the Supreme
- 32:55Court says, no, no, they're not entitled to them
- 32:58because they entered into a settlement after
- 33:03a 998 offer was made. The plaintiffs, I mean,
- 33:06when I say they, and that settlement was less
- 33:09than the amount of the 998 offer. Therefore,
- 33:12all of your costs post the time that that offer
- 33:15was made, are not recoverable and B, the defendant
- 33:19gets their costs. So it cut out from under them
- 33:22a significant right to attorney's fees because
- 33:25they didn't account for costs themselves. So
- 33:30it's a real trap for the unwary and you know,
- 33:32sometimes I'm not mindful of 998 offers and the
- 33:35potential strategic uses of them in California
- 33:39state court practice, but it's actually a very,
- 33:42very significant Statute and certainly more significant
- 33:45than the bigger the case that you have customer
- 33:47cost will be involved so people will be thinking
- 33:49about making 998 offers. In terms of in terms
- 33:52of just showing this up the obvious thing to
- 33:55do if you settle the case. Let me go back I should
- 33:58have explained. Basically it's a very parsimonious
- 34:01statutory piece of statutory inter interpretation
- 34:04right the trial court said well no there was
- 34:06no trial. So there's no judgment within the meaning
- 34:08of 998 to which to attach. The California Supreme
- 34:11Court said that was wrong. You can get judgments
- 34:13all different ways. It doesn't need to be a trial.
- 34:15Just because you settle your case doesn't mean
- 34:17998 isn't implicated. Well, thankfully it is
- 34:21a horrible trap for the unwary, but thankfully
- 34:22there's a very simple solution, and that is make
- 34:25sure that you account for costs and attorney's
- 34:27fees in your settlements. That's the bottom line.
- 34:30And the judge, the justice, excuse me, that wrote
- 34:34the decision. Justice Corrigan, and we're going
- 34:36to hear from Justice Corrigan later in the proceeding,
- 34:40made that point exactly. Just account for these
- 34:42in your settlements. What do you think, Carl?
- 34:47I do think, and we have a question that just
- 34:50popped up, which one of our viewers asked, is
- 34:53Madrigal really about bad drafting of settlement
- 34:56agreements? Yes. In some ways, I really think
- 35:00that's true. I don't know about in your practice,
- 35:06Derek, but I have never in my practice seen a
- 35:08settlement agreement that does not in some way
- 35:10allocate costs and fees, and usually everyone
- 35:13will bear their own. So I think that this is
- 35:16a little bit of an issue. And if I remember the...
- 35:20Well, actually, let me push back on that a little
- 35:22bit. That was my initial reaction as well. This
- 35:24is just bad drafting, right? But if i'm the defendant
- 35:28in that case is no way i'm agreeing to pay the
- 35:30attorney's fees in order to settle it right if
- 35:32you recall where the parties were at the time.
- 35:35The trial judge just granted a series of motions
- 35:37eliminate in favor of the defendant so everything
- 35:40was going their way. So i'm not sure that even
- 35:44the plaintiff slurs had raised this or thought
- 35:47about it that certainly isn't defendant. You
- 35:51know, we've racked up all these costs already.
- 35:52They've got all these fees on the other side.
- 35:54We're going to win this trial. It's going to
- 35:55be a one -day trial. I'm not sure that I would
- 35:57have agreed. So I don't know that it was about
- 35:59bad drafting, actually. It might have been just
- 36:02one of those cases where the folks found themselves
- 36:03in this particular posture. They couldn't deal
- 36:06with it, so they punted. Well, and there's often,
- 36:08because there's the press of trial, right? And
- 36:10if I remember correctly from this one, the motions
- 36:14eliminated were decided very close to. the trial
- 36:17date and - Or same day, you show up, state court,
- 36:21classic state court, you show up and the judge
- 36:22just guts your case. If they were putting a settlement
- 36:27on the record under the Code of Civil Procedure,
- 36:31that can be enforced and they might just have
- 36:34been in a hurry to put the settlement on the
- 36:36record and get done with it rather than move
- 36:39on. But I do think this should just sit, this
- 36:42case should - Because of this case, you should
- 36:45make sure that on your checklist for every settlement
- 36:47is allocate costs and fees because the California
- 36:52Supreme Court has said, listen, buyer beware
- 36:55on this one. You really need to deal with it.
- 36:59It could be one of those things where it's a
- 37:01bigger issue maybe in a smaller case, right?
- 37:04In a large piece of litigation which sophisticated...
- 37:09parties a significant dispute, is it that big
- 37:12a deal? But in cases where there's statutory
- 37:14rights to attorney's fees, you really want to
- 37:16be having eyes on this. You want to be very careful
- 37:18about your paper, your anti -settlement. I certainly
- 37:22agree. That's magical. That's magical. So I'll
- 37:25move on to the four voter warranty cases. This
- 37:29case, also written by Justice Corrigan, as Derek
- 37:33said, we're going to see quite a bit from that
- 37:36justice. The facts of this case are relatively
- 37:40common, I would say, in the automotive industry.
- 37:45The plaintiffs had purchased a vehicle. They
- 37:47didn't purchase it from the manufacturer. They
- 37:50didn't purchase it from Ford. They purchased
- 37:52it from a dealer. And with that dealer, there
- 37:55was an arbitration agreement. And the arbitration
- 37:57agreement did not include Ford as a party in
- 38:01the sales. contract. It included only the plaintiffs
- 38:04and the dealers, and the dealers were defined
- 38:06by us and our agents in all the good language
- 38:09that you have in those waivers. So when the plaintiffs
- 38:13had transmission issues, they sued Ford Motor
- 38:18Company under the Beverly Consumer Warranty Act
- 38:21and the Magnuson -Moss Warranty Act, which is
- 38:24a federal violation, a federal statute. And Ford
- 38:28sought to compel arbitration. based upon the
- 38:31arbitration agreements that existed in the agreements
- 38:36with the dealers. Of course, Ford was not a party.
- 38:42So the trial court denied Ford's motion to compel
- 38:44arbitration, and the Court of Appeal affirmed,
- 38:47holding that Ford could not invoke the arbitration
- 38:50clause in the dealership contracts. The Supreme
- 38:54Court affirmed again. Ford's main theory was
- 38:59one of estoppel, that because the plaintiffs,
- 39:05in this case, the consumers had already agreed
- 39:08to litigate, sorry, to litigate their claims
- 39:11through arbitration and not through the Superior
- 39:14Court, that that was a estoppel towards litigating
- 39:21against Ford in the Superior Court. And the California
- 39:24Supreme Court was not really having track with
- 39:27that. Ford was not a party. There was no express
- 39:31obligation to arbitrate against Ford. And critical
- 39:34to the court, the plaintiff's claims were not
- 39:37related to the contract. There was no intertwining
- 39:41of the claims and the contract. So even though
- 39:43Ford itself might be intimately related with
- 39:46the contract, it's a Ford vehicle that was manufactured
- 39:50by Ford at a Ford dealership, sold to customers
- 39:54who were trying to purchase Ford vehicles. even
- 39:58though Ford was very involved and intricately
- 40:00involved in the relationship, the claims of the
- 40:04plaintiffs were not. The claims of the plaintiffs
- 40:07were statutory in nature. The California Supreme
- 40:12Court describes its prior case, Metaclad, as
- 40:21not going so far as to permit Ford to do that.
- 40:26So if plaintiffs have agreed to arbitrate claims
- 40:28arising out of a contract dispute, they may not
- 40:31pursue a lawsuit to vindicate contractual provisions
- 40:33beneficial to them, yet avoid an agreement to
- 40:36arbitrate either by couching their claims as
- 40:38actions unrelated to a contract or by suing a
- 40:41non -signatory. But it still has to be claims
- 40:45arising out of that contract. The estoppel is
- 40:48not going to permit you to catch... statutory
- 40:55claims of this nature. And then I think there's
- 40:58an interesting soliloquy at the end where the
- 41:04Supreme Court says that there's not evidence
- 41:06in this record that the dealers were agents of
- 41:08Ford. And so they avoided addressing the question
- 41:11of whether or not Ford could invoke the provisions
- 41:17that permit a principle to enforce the arbitration
- 41:21agreements entered into by its agents. So they
- 41:25really sidestep that issue. And I didn't check
- 41:27the briefs, I should have perhaps, to see how
- 41:30big of an issue that was to Ford, but it certainly
- 41:32is another angle to take in these types of situations.
- 41:40So the takeaways here, manufacturers should not
- 41:43rely upon dealerships or more broadly, perhaps
- 41:46retailers to compel arbitration. and that warranty
- 41:51and fraud claims are not automatically arbitrable,
- 41:54and the contract language is going to matter.
- 41:56Make sure that you're defining the scope and
- 41:58the parties. If there's a third party who needs
- 42:01arbitration rights, make sure that they are put
- 42:03in there to preserve as many of their arbitration
- 42:06rights as you can. You should be paying attention,
- 42:10especially if you are either a reseller or you're
- 42:13in the position of the dealerships, or you are
- 42:16the manufacturer, you should be paying significant
- 42:20attention to how those arbitration clauses are
- 42:22drafted so that you can address them. And if
- 42:26you want arbitration, take advantage of it. Derek,
- 42:29I don't know if you have any thoughts on this
- 42:32one. Well, what's to stop car manufacturers and
- 42:38their relationships with dealers? What's to stop
- 42:39the car manufacturers from just making sure that
- 42:43they're covered by an arbitration provision in
- 42:46the sales agreement? What's wrong with that?
- 42:51We, Ford, are a third party beneficiary or something.
- 42:56You agree to litigate your claims against Ford
- 42:58or us, right? You define Ford in the agreements.
- 43:02That could be one way. I think that that runs
- 43:04a little bit contrary to the logic that the Supreme
- 43:07Court is using in these cases because I think
- 43:11the Supreme Court is concerned about making sure
- 43:14that the the claims that you are stopped from
- 43:19litigating, that you must arbitrate, must arise
- 43:23from whatever is providing the arbitration right.
- 43:29And so, I think it would be a different case
- 43:32and a more difficult case for this theory if,
- 43:36for instance, the arbitration contract language
- 43:38had set forward. But I do think that's an open
- 43:42question because there's nothing that I read
- 43:45in this opinion that suggests that's foreclosed.
- 43:49At the same time, the logic would suggest that
- 43:52if you're trying to use a contractual arbitration
- 43:55agreement to force the arbitration of statutory
- 43:59claims, you're going to run into a hard time,
- 44:03I think. All right. This is pretty thorny. We
- 44:06could talk a lot about this, but we got two or
- 44:08three more cases to get through. So let's push
- 44:10on. How do you pronounce this one, Connor? I'm
- 44:15not certain. I'm saying Hohenschelt. The petitioner's
- 44:20first name was Dana, so I'm going to go with
- 44:22Dana. Dana versus Superior Courts. This is a
- 44:25pretty interesting one. I actually enjoyed reading
- 44:28this one. It has to do with a statute that was
- 44:32enacted a few years ago to try to put a stop
- 44:35to employers in arbitration proceedings from
- 44:42jamming up the works by failing to pay fees.
- 44:45And there was apparently some relatively nefarious
- 44:47conduct going on. The decision that we're going
- 44:50to talk about, Houghton -Sheldt, I'm going to
- 44:52go with Houghton -Sheldt versus Superior Court,
- 44:54has to do with interpreting that provision. Basically,
- 45:01and it went through in some detail, the reasons
- 45:04behind the statute, and I'll explain why in a
- 45:05second, I have to do this analysis, but Apparently
- 45:08for example Chipotle was facing a class action
- 45:12they successfully got the class action dismissed
- 45:14and then they had 2800 arbitration demands made
- 45:18against them by I believe it was employees. And
- 45:23Chipotle simply didn't pay the arbitration fees.
- 45:27So six years after all of these arbitration demands
- 45:30were filed, literally not a single one of them
- 45:33had yet been adjudicated. That's obviously not
- 45:35OK. No disrespect to Chipotle. I like their burritos.
- 45:39It certainly wasn't OK from the standpoint of
- 45:41the California legislature. So they enacted a
- 45:42statute. It's CCP 1281 .98, excuse me for all
- 45:47those numbers. That basically said in employment
- 45:51or consumer arbitration, if the fees aren't paid,
- 45:55if the employer is responsible for the fees and
- 45:59they're not paid within 30 days after the due
- 46:01date, the drafting party is quote in material
- 46:04breach of the arbitration agreement is in default
- 46:08of the arbitration and waives its right to compel
- 46:12the employee or consumer to proceed with that
- 46:15arbitration as a result of that material breach.
- 46:18Non -payment by definition is a material breach
- 46:20and the consumer or employee can withdraw from
- 46:25the arbitration and go back to state court. What
- 46:30happened in this case was Golden State Foods
- 46:33Corporation was the entity that was sued by a
- 46:37former employee. They moved to compel arbitration
- 46:39successfully. They went into arbitration. They
- 46:42got a bill to pay some initial fees which they
- 46:44paid. They later got a bill from an arbitrator
- 46:47that apparently was inadvertently, it was an
- 46:50oversight at the offices of the lawyers handling
- 46:52the case, they didn't pay the arbitrators fees
- 46:56on time. The employee withdraws from the arbitration
- 47:02and reinitiates state court proceedings. This
- 47:06rolls up to the California Supreme Court. Does
- 47:08this statute say, you know, is it going to be
- 47:11construed strictly or is it not? And it involved
- 47:15like all these issues around FAA preemption and
- 47:18whether or not the FAA preempts a California
- 47:20statute because California statutes that interfere
- 47:22with arbitration are preempted by the FAA. But
- 47:26the California Supreme Court went in a slightly
- 47:28different direction. It basically said the statute
- 47:31didn't say this. But they might as well have.
- 47:34The statute doesn't say what it says because
- 47:38there's all sorts of ways in which contractual
- 47:43obligations, even if they are not met, don't
- 47:46necessarily constitute a waiver. That's basically
- 47:50what they said. And there's a key quote in the
- 47:54opinion itself. No other contracts are voided
- 47:56on a hair trigger basis due to tardy performance
- 47:58alone. Now I want to emphasize the failure to
- 48:03pay the arbitration fees in this case was inadvertent
- 48:07and immediately corrected. There was an oversight,
- 48:10right? So there was a strong record that was
- 48:12an oversight. California Supreme Court went and
- 48:15looked at the legislative history of this new
- 48:18statute, said this is all about stopping shenanigans.
- 48:21This is all about stopping bad behavior. We are
- 48:23not going to construe an inadvertent oversight
- 48:27to pay fees. as a waiver of your right to compel
- 48:32arbitration. That's the essence of the opinion.
- 48:35So if anybody's out there and they inadvertently
- 48:38fail to pay their arbitration fees, you're going
- 48:41to be OK. Just fix it really quickly. This is
- 48:44one of the few decisions that I've read this
- 48:46year that gave rise to multiple opinions. There
- 48:48was a concurrence that talked a lot about FAA
- 48:50preemption. We've already spoken about Justice
- 48:55Carol Corrigan. She dissented. She dissented
- 48:59and she said even as construed by the California
- 49:02Supreme Court. Meaning inadvertent failure to
- 49:05pay fees doesn't constitute a violation of this
- 49:08statute this statute still interferes with arbitration
- 49:10and therefore it's preempted by the FAA she would
- 49:13have addressed the preemption issue directly.
- 49:16So it remains to be seen, but you know it's good
- 49:18news obviously if you're representing businesses
- 49:20and consumer employment arbitration, I always
- 49:24get really concerned as a settlement trial mostly
- 49:27about the payment of jury fees. Those dates always
- 49:31scare me because again they're a trap for the
- 49:34unwary but at least the California, look at the
- 49:37bottom line I think this is good policy. I'm
- 49:39not necessarily certain that this is a all that
- 49:43consistent with straight constructions of statutes
- 49:45because the statute says any failure to pay is
- 49:48a material breach. The California Supreme Court
- 49:50basically said no. I do think that's an interesting
- 49:54point because there are many other times just
- 49:57today we've talked about how the California...
- 50:01I think we lost you, Connor. It appears we're
- 50:18having some sort of technical difficulties. Okay,
- 50:21let's give them five seconds to unstick here.
- 50:43Sorry about this, folks. We'll try to fix this
- 50:44as fast as we can. Looks like he's signing out
- 50:54to come back in. Yes, he is. Thanks very much
- 50:57folks for bearing with us. We apologize. Apologies
- 51:27for that, folks. No worries. We're all used to
- 51:31it at this stage, Connor. Let me get back up
- 51:35here. So we were just turning to Ratigan. OK.
- 51:43Another case with pretty interesting facts. This
- 51:47has to do with an Argentinian lawyer. And we
- 51:50talked earlier about this constant dialogue between
- 51:54tort law and contract law. and California Supreme
- 52:00Court's interest in that issue. And this is another
- 52:02case that sort of gets into that issue in some
- 52:06detail, but factually, this concerns a lawyer
- 52:09in Buenos Aires that represented Uber. Apparently
- 52:14under Argentinian law, you have to designate
- 52:16somebody and file a certificate with somebody
- 52:19saying you're their representative in that jurisdiction.
- 52:22And it has to be a lawyer. And this person did
- 52:24that and was advising Uber and Uber related entities
- 52:27in connection with their plans to open in Buenos
- 52:30Aires. According to the lawyer, Uber hatched
- 52:34a plan behind his back and did not tell him that
- 52:37they were just going to they were just going
- 52:38to launch at midnight on a certain date. And
- 52:40they did that. And that led to riots and protests
- 52:43of all kinds in Buenos Aires. People were open
- 52:46arms. It was public knowledge that this lawyer
- 52:49in Argentina was their designated representative
- 52:51in the area and so he was subject to, he contends
- 52:56at least, he was subject to all sorts of harassment
- 53:00and intimidation and abuse in the press and otherwise.
- 53:06He sues Uber in the Northern District of California.
- 53:11and he had a bunch of different claims, but the
- 53:14bottom line is that the case came down to a claim
- 53:18for fraudulent concealment during the performance
- 53:23of the contract. You fraudulently concealed,
- 53:26the contract of course being his agreement with
- 53:29Uber to represent them, you Uber fraudulently
- 53:32concealed from me that you were going to launch
- 53:34behind my back and that gave rise to all sorts
- 53:36of terrible things that happened to me, I've
- 53:38got a fraud claim against you. And the question
- 53:41was related to the economic loss doctrine and
- 53:47whether or not this guy, excuse me, this plaintiff
- 53:50could pursue claims for money damages in light
- 53:57of what's called the economic loss doctrine is
- 54:00very briefly. The economic loss doctrine is one
- 54:02of these doctrines of the California Supreme
- 54:03Court has articulated over several decades to
- 54:09try to try to police the boundary between contract
- 54:13law on the one hand and tort law on the other.
- 54:16You can sue in contract, but you can't recover
- 54:19for losses that are negligently inflicted on
- 54:23you, absent as some claims for personal injury
- 54:27or property damage, right? If all you're doing
- 54:29is suing for purely economic losses, you don't
- 54:32get those in negligence. Another decision Conner
- 54:39you and i spoken about this previously where
- 54:41the california supreme court party loves explaining
- 54:43every decision that is ever written. In a particular
- 54:46area right so this one of those is kinda like
- 54:48a bible on the economic loss doctrine justice
- 54:50corrigan again very interesting she was active
- 54:52this year. What a very expensive decision folks
- 54:56that know this area the big case in this area
- 54:58is case called robertson helicopter and robertson
- 55:01helicopter recognize that you can still recover.
- 55:04Notwithstanding the absence of any personal injury
- 55:06or property damage you can recover on a claim.
- 55:10Affirmative fraud during the course of a contract
- 55:14the affirmative fraud. That took place during
- 55:17the course of the contract in robinson helicopter
- 55:19were some certificates that particular. That
- 55:22particular widget work the way it worked that
- 55:24when in fact that wasn't true and the entity
- 55:27that was certified to that new wasn't true at
- 55:29the time. That's fraud, says the California Supreme
- 55:32Court. You can sue in that and you can recover
- 55:33notwithstanding the economic loss doctrine. So
- 55:36the question that was left open in this one and
- 55:38that was answered by the Supreme Court is OK,
- 55:41that's affirmative fraud. Is the same thing true
- 55:44for fraudulent concealment? The California Supreme
- 55:48Court said yes. Again, on another certified question
- 55:51from the Ninth Circuit, the California Supreme
- 55:53Court said, yes, we don't distinguish. Yes, there
- 55:56are different kinds of fraud, but that's not
- 55:58a material difference or purposes of saying whether
- 56:00or not you can pursue claims for money damages
- 56:05based upon fraud that occurs during the course
- 56:10of performance of a contract. Justice Corrigan
- 56:12went out of her way to say, oh, there's all sorts
- 56:15of boundaries in place to police the distinction
- 56:18between contract law and tort law. I'm honestly
- 56:22not sure that that's true. If I were a plaintiff
- 56:26advising a client or excuse me, advising a client
- 56:29on potential claims to be brought based upon
- 56:32bad behavior that occurs during the performance
- 56:34of a contract, obviously assuming there's a factual
- 56:36basis to do so, I'd be thinking about bringing
- 56:38these to our claims now. I would. So once again,
- 56:43we get a decision from the California Supreme
- 56:44Court that's a really interesting, you know,
- 56:48these opinions are very well written. We've got
- 56:50to, I want to emphasize this. facetious a little
- 56:53bit today. We've got a great Supreme Court here
- 56:56in our state and they do a great job. But it's
- 56:59just a lot of notwithstanding the number of questions
- 57:03that are answered in any given year by the Supreme
- 57:06Court, it seems to me that it just gives rise
- 57:09to more questions. And that's all going to have
- 57:11to get sorted out by, you know, litigants and
- 57:14trial courts and courts of appeal. What do you
- 57:16think, Connor? I agree. I think the theme for
- 57:22today certainly is we have some answers, but
- 57:26we're a long way from having all of the answers.
- 57:29And this is just another one of the cases that
- 57:32makes that theme. So we've got about, I think,
- 57:35four minutes left or three minutes left or so.
- 57:38If you have questions, please do pop them into
- 57:40the Q &A. Forgot to say that earlier. Derek,
- 57:44we do have one question. that came in early on
- 57:50about the NECF case. And the question is whether
- 57:55we think it matters if the intentional tort is
- 57:58related to the object of the contract. Ah. I
- 58:04think we should tee up that for the California
- 58:06Supreme Court maybe. Yeah, if the intentional
- 58:12tort is related to the purpose of the contract.
- 58:15I don't think that's necessarily a 1668 analysis.
- 58:20I think that's an analysis of whether or not
- 58:22you were in fact pleading a tort, as opposed
- 58:25to a contract. I think that's what that would
- 58:28come down to. And they do make that point in
- 58:32the New England Country Foods case. It's like,
- 58:35there's all these guardrails in place. And of
- 58:38course you have to actually have a tort claim
- 58:41separate and apart from your contract claim in
- 58:45order for any of this analysis to apply. So if
- 58:48you're pleading a tort claim, but really it's
- 58:52a guzzi to a contract claim, I think that whole
- 58:54body of law would apply to that question as opposed
- 58:56to whether or not 1668 exemption from where 1668
- 59:05applies at all. I think there's a bunch of threshold
- 59:07issues around that. That's what I would think.
- 59:09Yeah. And I think that my initial reaction, and
- 59:12I agree, I don't know that this is the answer,
- 59:13but my initial reaction to that question is I'm
- 59:17not sure that it does because the willfulness
- 59:20of the injury is what the Supreme Court says
- 59:23is the key point. Now, again, they don't define
- 59:26what willful is. They don't give that to us.
- 59:29But I'm not sure it needs to be tied to the object
- 59:33of the contract. We have another question here,
- 59:38which is about AI, so AI -generated evidence
- 59:41or deepfakes. I have not seen any. It does not
- 59:46mean that they're out there, but I have not seen
- 59:48any come out of the California Supreme Court.
- 59:51I also did not check any of the bar decisions.
- 59:56So if you're interested in that, I imagine that
- 59:59somewhere in this state, there must be some bar
- 1:00:01decisions regarding AI -generated evidence. and
- 1:00:04deep fakes, but I haven't yet seen it out of
- 1:00:06the California Supreme Court. It hasn't rolled
- 1:00:09up to him yet. I think that's probably true.
- 1:00:13I just want to go back to the first question.
- 1:00:15I'm sorry, I was a little bit waffly in my answer.
- 1:00:17I mean, the California Supreme Court did address
- 1:00:20this, right? It's like for any of this analysis
- 1:00:23to apply, as they said at the very end of their
- 1:00:25opinion, a further clarification is warranted.
- 1:00:29Section 1668 does not preclude parties from limiting
- 1:00:33their liability for pure breaches of contract,
- 1:00:37absent a violation of an independent duty that
- 1:00:40falls within the ambit of Section 1668. Where
- 1:00:44the claims asserted are nothing more than a breach
- 1:00:47of contractual obligations, Section 1668 does
- 1:00:51not apply. So I think I'm right in my instinct
- 1:00:55that if you're trying to plead a tort claim and
- 1:00:58it's really just a contract claim gussied up
- 1:01:00as a tort claim, then you're going to have to
- 1:01:03unpack that based upon the law that separates
- 1:01:07out contract claims from tort claims as opposed
- 1:01:10to getting into 1668 right away, right? There's
- 1:01:13a threshold question there that would need to
- 1:01:15be answered. I hope that's more helpful than
- 1:01:17the answer previously provided. I do think that's
- 1:01:20right. But we're a minute over, and I want to
- 1:01:22respect people's time. So I thank you all for
- 1:01:27showing up and joining us for this hour. And
- 1:01:30I'll pass it back over to Suzanne if she has
- 1:01:32anything else. Thanks very much, everybody, for
- 1:01:34joining us. We really appreciate your time. And
- 1:01:37the best news is you don't need to code for CLE
- 1:01:40credit. I'm told that you can just apply for
- 1:01:42your CLE credit right away. This concludes today's
- 1:01:46presentation. Thank you so much Connor and Derek
- 1:01:48for an excellent presentation and thank you so
- 1:01:50much to our audience. Have a great afternoon
- 1:01:52everyone. Thanks everybody.