Latest / Eight Pillars of Prosperity / Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution - Noah Webster

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Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution - Noah Webster · Eight Pillars of Prosperity

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  Speaker 1: Section one of an Examination into the Leading Principles of
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  Speaker 1: the Federal Constitution. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox
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  Speaker 1: recordings are in the public domain. For more information or
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  Speaker 1: to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Read by Janet Wedge.
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  Speaker 1: An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution
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  Speaker 1: by Noah Webster. An Examination into the Leading Principles of
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  Speaker 1: the Federal Constitution, et cetera. Of all the memorable eras
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  Speaker 1: that have marked the progress of men from the savage
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  Speaker 1: state to the refinements of luxury, that which has combined
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  Speaker 1: them into society under a wise system of government, and
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  Speaker 1: given form to a nation, has ever been recorded and
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  Speaker 1: celebrated as the most important, have ever been deemed the
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  Speaker 1: greatest benefactors of mankind, respected when living, and often deified
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  Speaker 1: after their death. Hence the fame of Foe and Confucius,
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  Speaker 1: of Moses, Solon and Lycurgus, of Robulus and Numa, of
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  Speaker 1: Alfred Peter the Great, and Mango Kapak, whose names will
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  Speaker 1: be celebrated through all ages, for framing and improving constitutions
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  Speaker 1: of government, which introduced order into society and secured the
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  Speaker 1: benefits of law to millions of the human race. The
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  Speaker 1: Western world now beholds an era important beyond conception, and
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  Speaker 1: which posterity will number with the age of Czar of
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  Speaker 1: Muscovie and with the promulgation of the Jewish laws at
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  Speaker 1: Mount Sinai. The names of those men who have digested
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  Speaker 1: a system of constitutions for the American Empire will be
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  Speaker 1: enrolled with those of Zamosis and Odin, and celebrated by
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  Speaker 1: posterity with the honors which less enlightened nations have paid
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  Speaker 1: to the fable demigods of antiquity. But the origin of
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  Speaker 1: the American Republic is distinguished by particular circumstances. Other nations
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  Speaker 1: have been driven together by fear and necessity. Their governments
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  Speaker 1: have generally been the result of a single man's observations
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  Speaker 1: or the offspring of particular interests. In the formation of
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  Speaker 1: our constitution, the wisdom of all ages is collected. The
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  Speaker 1: legislators of antiquity are consulted, as well as the opinions
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  Speaker 1: and interests of the millions who are concerned. In short,
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  Speaker 1: it is an empire of reason. In the formation of
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  Speaker 1: such a government, it is not only the right, but
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  Speaker 1: the indispensable duty of every citizen to examine the principles
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  Speaker 1: of it, to compare them with the principles of other
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  Speaker 1: governments with a constant eye to our particular situation and circumstances,
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  Speaker 1: and thus endeavor to foresee the future operations of our
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  Speaker 1: own system and its effects upon human happiness. Convinced of
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  Speaker 1: this truth, I have no apology to offer for the
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  Speaker 1: following remarks, but an earnest desire to be useful to
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  Speaker 1: my country. In attending to the proposed Federal Constitution, the
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  Speaker 1: first thing that presents itself to our consideration is the
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  Speaker 1: division of the legislative into two branches. This article has
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  Speaker 1: so many advocates in America that it needs none any
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  Speaker 1: vindication footnote. A division of the legislature has been adopted
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  Speaker 1: in the new Constitution of every state except Pennsylvania and Georgia.
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  Speaker 1: But it has its opposers, among whom are some respectable characters,
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  Speaker 1: especially in Pennsylvania. For which reason I will state some
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  Speaker 1: of the arguments and facts which incline me to favor
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  Speaker 1: the proposed division. On the first view of men in society,
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  Speaker 1: we should suppose that no man would be bound by
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  Speaker 1: a law to which he had not given his consent.
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  Speaker 1: Such would be our first idea of political obligation. But
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  Speaker 1: experience from time immemorial has proved it to be impossible
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  Speaker 1: to unite the opinions of all the members of a
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  Speaker 1: community in every case, and hence the doctrine that thes
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  Speaker 1: of a majority must give law to the whole state,
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  Speaker 1: a doctrine as universally received as any intuitive truth. Another
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  Speaker 1: idea that naturally presents itself to our minds on a
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  Speaker 1: slight consideration of the subject, is that in a perfect government,
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  Speaker 1: all the members of a society should be present, and
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  Speaker 1: each give his suffrage in acts of legislation by which
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  Speaker 1: he is to be found. This is impracticable in all
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  Speaker 1: large states, and even were it not, it is very
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  Speaker 1: questionable whether it would be the best mode of legislation.
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  Speaker 1: It was, however, practiced in the free states of antiquity,
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  Speaker 1: and was the cause of innumerable evils. To avoid these evils,
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  Speaker 1: the moderns have invented the doctrine of representation, which seems
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  Speaker 1: to be the perfection of human gods government. Another idea,
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  Speaker 1: which is very natural is that to complete the mode
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  Speaker 1: of legislation, all the representatives should be collected into one
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  Speaker 1: body for the purpose of debating questions and enacting laws.
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  Speaker 1: Speculation would suggest the idea and the desire of improving
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  Speaker 1: upon the systems of government in the old world would
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  Speaker 1: operate powerfully in its favor. But men are ever running
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  Speaker 1: into extremes. The passions after a violence constraint are apt
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  Speaker 1: to rush into licentiousness, and even the reason of men
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  Speaker 1: who have experienced evils from the defects of a government
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  Speaker 1: will sometimes coolly condemn the whole system. Every person moderately
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  Speaker 1: acquainted with human nature knows that public bodies as well
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  Speaker 1: as individuals, are liable to the influence of sudden and
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  Speaker 1: violent passions, under the operation of which the voice of
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  Speaker 1: reason is silenced. Instances of such influence are not so
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  Speaker 1: frequent as in individuals, but its effects are extensive in
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  Speaker 1: proportion to the numbers that compose the public body. This
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  Speaker 1: fact suggests the expediency of dividing the powers of legislation
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  Speaker 1: between two bodies of men, whose debates shall be separate
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  Speaker 1: and not dependent on each other. That if at any
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  Speaker 1: time one part should appear to be under any undue influence,
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  Speaker 1: either from passion, obstinacy, jealousy of particular men, attachment to
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  Speaker 1: a popular speaker, or other extraordinary causes, there might be
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  Speaker 1: a power in the legislature sufficient to check every pernicious measure,
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  Speaker 1: Even in a small republic composed of men equal improperty
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  Speaker 1: and abilities, and all meeting for the purpose of making laws,
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  Speaker 1: like the old Romans in the field of Mars, a
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  Speaker 1: division of the body into two independent branches would be
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  Speaker 1: a necessary step to prevent the disorders which arise from
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  Speaker 1: the pride, irritability, and stubbornness of mankind. This will ever
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  Speaker 1: be the case while men possess passions easily inflamed, which
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  Speaker 1: may bias their reason and lead them to erroneous conclusions.
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  Speaker 1: Another consideration has weight. A single body of men may
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  Speaker 1: be led astray by one person of abilities and address,
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  Speaker 1: who on the first starting a proposition, may throw a
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  Speaker 1: plausible appearance on one side of the question and give
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  Speaker 1: a lead to the whole debate. To prevent any ill
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  Speaker 1: consequence from such a circumstance, a separate discussion before a
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  Speaker 1: different body of men and taken up on new grounds
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  Speaker 1: is a very eligible expedient. Besides, the design of a
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  Speaker 1: senate is not merely to check the legislative assembly, but
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  Speaker 1: to collect wisdom and experience. In most of our constitutions,
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  Speaker 1: and particularly in the proposed federal system, greater age and
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  Speaker 1: a longer residence are required to qualify for the Senate
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  Speaker 1: than for the House of Representatives. This is a wise provision.
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  Speaker 1: The House of Representatives may be composed of new and
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  Speaker 1: unexperienced members stranger to the forms of proceedings and the
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  Speaker 1: science of legislation, but either positive constitutions or customs which
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  Speaker 1: may supply their place. Fill the Senate with men venerable
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  Speaker 1: for age and respectability, experienced in the ways of men
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  Speaker 1: and in the art of governing, and who are not
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  Speaker 1: liable to the bias of passions that govern the young.
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  Speaker 1: If the Senate of Rhode Island is an exemption to
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  Speaker 1: this observation, it is proof that the massive people are corrupted,
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  Speaker 1: and that the Senate should be elected less frequently than
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  Speaker 1: the other house. Had the old Senate in Rhode Island
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  Speaker 1: held their seats for three years, had they not been
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  Speaker 1: chosen amidst a popular rage for paper money, the honor
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  Speaker 1: of that state would probably have been saved. The old
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  Speaker 1: Senate would have stopped the measure for a year or
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  Speaker 1: two till the people could have had time to deliberate
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  Speaker 1: upon its consequences. I consider it as a capital excellence
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  Speaker 1: of the proposed Constitution that the Senate can be wholly
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  Speaker 1: renew but once in six years. Experience is the best instructor.
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  Speaker 1: It is better than a thousand theories. The history of
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  Speaker 1: every government on earth affords proof of the utility of
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  Speaker 1: different branches in a legislature. But I appeal only to
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  Speaker 1: our own experience in America. To what cause can we
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  Speaker 1: ascribe the absurd measures of Congress in times past, and
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  Speaker 1: the speedy recision of those measures, but to the want
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  Speaker 1: of some check. I feel the most profound deference for
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  Speaker 1: that honorable body, and perfect respect for their opinions. But
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  Speaker 1: some of their steps betray a great want of consideration,
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  Speaker 1: a defect which perhaps nothing can remedy but a division
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  Speaker 1: of their deliberations. I will instance only their resolution to
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  Speaker 1: build a federal town, when we were in involved in
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  Speaker 1: a debt of which we could hardly pay the interest,
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  Speaker 1: and when Congress could not command a shilling. The very
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  Speaker 1: proposition was extremely absurd. Congress themselves became ashamed of the
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  Speaker 1: resolution and rescinded it with as much silence as possible.
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  Speaker 1: Many other acts of that body are equally reprehensible, but
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  Speaker 1: respect forbids me to mention them. Several states since the
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  Speaker 1: war have experienced the necessity of a division of the legislature.
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  Speaker 1: Maryland was saved from a most pernicious measure by her Senate.
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  Speaker 1: A rage for paper money, bordering on madness, prevailed in
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  Speaker 1: their House of Delegates, and emission of five hundred thousand
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  Speaker 1: shillings was proposed, a sum equal to the circulating medium
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  Speaker 1: of the state. Had the sum been emitted every shilling
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  Speaker 1: of speech, she would have been driven from circulation, and
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  Speaker 1: most of it from the state. Such a loss would
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  Speaker 1: not have been repaired in seven years, not to mention
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  Speaker 1: the whole catalog of frauds which would have followed the measure.
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  Speaker 1: The Senate, like honest, judicious men and the protectors of
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  Speaker 1: the interests of the state, firmly resisted the rage and
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  Speaker 1: gave the people time to cool and to think their
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  Speaker 1: resistance was effectual. The people acquiesced, and the honor and
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  Speaker 1: interest of the state were secured. The House of Representatives
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  Speaker 1: in Connecticut, soon after the war had taken offense at
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  Speaker 1: a certain act of Congress. The upper House, who understood
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  Speaker 1: the necessity and expediency of the measure better than the
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  Speaker 1: people refused to concur in a remonstrance to Congress. Several
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  Speaker 1: other circumstances gave umbrage to the lower House, and to
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  Speaker 1: weaken or destroy the influence of the Senate. The representatives,
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  Speaker 1: among other violent proceedings, resolved not merely to remove the
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  Speaker 1: seat of government, but to make every county town in
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  Speaker 1: the state the seat of government by rotation. This foolish
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  Speaker 1: resolution would have disgraced schoolboys. The Senate saved the honor
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  Speaker 1: of the state by rejecting it with disdain, and within
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  Speaker 1: two months every representative was ashamed of the conduct of
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  Speaker 1: the House. All public bodies have these fits of passion
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  Speaker 1: when their conduct seems to be perfectly boyish, and in
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  Speaker 1: these paroxysms, a check is highly necessary and of Section.
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  Speaker 2: One, Section two Examination into the Leading Principles of the
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  Speaker 2: Federal Constitution. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings
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  Speaker 2: are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer,
• 15:10
  Speaker 2: please visit LibriVox dot org. Read by Claire An Examination
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  Speaker 2: into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution by Noah Webster.
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  Speaker 2: Section two Pennsylvania exhibits many instances of this hasty conduct.
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  Speaker 2: At one session of the legislature, and armed force is
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  Speaker 2: ordered by a precipitate resolution to expel the settlers at
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  Speaker 2: Wyoming from their possessions. At a succeeding session, the same
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  Speaker 2: people are confirmed in their possessions. At one session, a
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  Speaker 2: charter is wrested from a corporation, at another restored. The
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  Speaker 2: whole state is split into parties. Everything is decided by party.
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  Speaker 2: Any proposition from one side of the House is sure
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  Speaker 2: to be damned by the other. And when one party
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  Speaker 2: perceives the other has the advantage, they played truant, and
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  Speaker 2: an officer or a mob hunt the absconding members in
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  Speaker 2: all the streets and alleys and towns. Such farces have
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  Speaker 2: been repeated in Philadelphia, and there alone. Had the legislature
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  Speaker 2: been framed with some check upon rash proceedings, the honor
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  Speaker 2: of the state would have been saved. The party spirit
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  Speaker 2: would have died with the measures proposed in the legislature.
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  Speaker 2: But now any measure may be carried by party in
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  Speaker 2: the House. It then becomes a law and sows the
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  Speaker 2: seeds of dissension throughout the state. Footnote I cannot help
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  Speaker 2: remarking the singular jealousy of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, which
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  Speaker 2: requires that a bill shall be published for the consideration
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  Speaker 2: of the people before it is enacted into a law,
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  Speaker 2: except in extraordinary cases. This annihilates the legislature and reduces
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  Speaker 2: it to an advisory body. It almost wholly supersedes the
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  Speaker 2: uses of representation, the most excellent improvement in modern governments.
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  Speaker 2: Besides the absurdity of constituting a legislature without supreme power,
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  Speaker 2: such a system will keep the state perpetually in boroyaled.
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  Speaker 2: It carries the spirit of discussion into all quarters without
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  Speaker 2: the means of reconciling the opinions of men, who are
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  Speaker 2: not assembled to hear each other's arguments. They debate with themselves,
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  Speaker 2: form their own opinions, without the reasons which influence others,
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  Speaker 2: and without the means of information. Thus, the warmth of
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  Speaker 2: different opinions, which in other states dies in the legislature,
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  Speaker 2: is diffused through the State of Pennsylvania and becomes personal
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  Speaker 2: and permanent. The seeds of dissension are sown in the Constitution,
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  Speaker 2: and no state except Rhode Island, is so distracted by
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  Speaker 2: factions and footnote A thousand examples similar to the foregoing
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  Speaker 2: may be produced both in ancient and modern history. Many
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  Speaker 2: plausible things may be said in favor of pure democracy,
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  Speaker 2: many in favor of uniting the representatives of the people
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  Speaker 2: in a single house, but uniform experience proves both to
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  Speaker 2: be inc consistent with the peace of society and the
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  Speaker 2: rights of freemen. The State of Georgia has already discovered
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  Speaker 2: such inconveniences in its constitution that a proposition has been
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  Speaker 2: made for altering it, and there is a prospect that
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  Speaker 2: a revisal will take place. People who have heard and
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  Speaker 2: read of the European governments founded on the different ranks
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  Speaker 2: of monarch nobility, and people seem to view the Senate
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  Speaker 2: in America, where there is no difference of ranks and titles,
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  Speaker 2: as a useless branch or as a servile imitation of
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  Speaker 2: foreign constitutions of governments without the same reasons. This is
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  Speaker 2: a capital mistake. Our senates, it is true, are not
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  Speaker 2: composed of a different order of men, but the same reasons.
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  Speaker 2: The same necessity for distinct branches of the legislature exists
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  Speaker 2: in all governments, but in most of our American constitutions
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  Speaker 2: we have all the advantages of checks and balance without
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  Speaker 2: the danger which may arise from a superior and independent
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  Speaker 2: order of men. It is worth our while to institute
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  Speaker 2: a brief comparison between our American forms of government and
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  Speaker 2: the two best constitutions that ever existed in Europe, the
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  Speaker 2: Roman and the British. In England, the king or supreme
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  Speaker 2: executive officer is hereditary. In America, the President of the
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  Speaker 2: United States is elective. That this is an advantage will
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  Speaker 2: hardly be disputed. In ancient Rome, the king was elective,
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  Speaker 2: and so were the consuls, who were the executive officers
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  Speaker 2: in the republic. But they were elected by the body
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  Speaker 2: of the people in their public assemblies, and this circumstance
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  Speaker 2: paved the way for such excessive bribery and corruption as
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  Speaker 2: are wholly unknown in modern times. The President of the
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  Speaker 2: United States is also elective, but by a few men
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  Speaker 2: chosen by the several legislatures under their inspection, separated at
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  Speaker 2: a vast distance, and holding no office under the United States.
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  Speaker 2: Such a mode of election almost precludes the possibility of corruption. Besides,
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  Speaker 2: no state, however large, has the power of choosing a
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  Speaker 2: president in that state, For each elector must choose at
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  Speaker 2: least one man who was not an inhabitant of that
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  Speaker 2: state to which he belongs. The crown of England is hereditary.
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  Speaker 2: The consuls in Rome were chosen annually. Both of these
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  Speaker 2: extremes are guarded against an r proposed constitution. The president
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  Speaker 2: is not dismissed from his office as soon as he
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  Speaker 2: is acquainted with business. He continues four years and is
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  Speaker 2: re eligible if the people approve his conduct. Nor can
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  Speaker 2: he canvass for his office by reason of the distance
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  Speaker 2: of the electors, and the pride and jealousy of the
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  Speaker 2: states will prevent his continuing too long in office. The
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  Speaker 2: age requisite to qualify for this office is thirty five
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  Speaker 2: years footnote. In the Decline of the Republic, bribery or
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  Speaker 2: military force obtained this office for persons who had not
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  Speaker 2: attained this age. Augustus was chosen at the age of twenty,
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  Speaker 2: or rather obtained it with his sword end footnote. The
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  Speaker 2: age requisite for admittance to the Roman consulship was forty
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  Speaker 2: three years. For this difference, good reasons may be assigned.
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  Speaker 2: The improvedments and science, and particularly in government, render it
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  Speaker 2: practicable for a man to qualify himself for an important
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  Speaker 2: office much earlier in life than he could among the Romans,
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  Speaker 2: especially in the early part of their commonwealth, when the
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  Speaker 2: office was instituted. Besides, it is very questionable whether any
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  Speaker 2: inconvenience would have attended an admission to the consulship at
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  Speaker 2: an earlier age. The powers vested in the president resemble
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  Speaker 2: the powers of the supreme magistrates in Rome. They are
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  Speaker 2: not so extensive as those of the British king. But
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  Speaker 2: in one instance the President, with concurrence of the Senate,
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  Speaker 2: has powers exceeding those of the Roman consuls. I mean
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  Speaker 2: in the appointment of judges and other subordinate executive officers.
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  Speaker 2: The prayers or judges in Rome were chosen annually by
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  Speaker 2: the people. This was a defect in the Roman government.
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  Speaker 2: One half the evils in a state arise from a
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  Speaker 2: lax execution of the laws, and it is impossible that
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  Speaker 2: an executive officer can act with vigor and impartiality when
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  Speaker 2: his office depends on the popular voice. An annual popular
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  Speaker 2: election of executive officers the sure source of a negligent,
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  Speaker 2: partial and corrupt administration. The independence of the judges in
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  Speaker 2: England has produced a course of the most just, impartial,
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  Speaker 2: and energetic judicial decisions for many centuries that can be
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  Speaker 2: exhibited in any nation on Earth. In this point, therefore,
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  Speaker 2: I conceive the plan proposed in America to be an
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  Speaker 2: improvement on the Roman constitution. In all free governments, that is,
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  Speaker 2: in all countries where laws govern and not men, the
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  Speaker 2: supreme magistrate should have it in its power to execute
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  Speaker 2: any law, however unpopular, without hazarding his person or office.
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  Speaker 2: The laws are the sole guardians of right, and when
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  Speaker 2: the magistrate dares not act, every person is insecure. Let
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  Speaker 2: us now attend to the constitution and powers of the Senate.
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  Speaker 2: The House of Lords in England is wholly independent on
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  Speaker 2: the people. The lords spiritual hold their seats by office,
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  Speaker 2: and the people at large have no voice in disposing
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  Speaker 2: of the ecclesiastical dignities. The temporal lord hold their seats
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  Speaker 2: by hereditary right or by grant from the King, and
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  Speaker 2: it is a branch of the King's prerogative to make
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  Speaker 2: what peers he pleases. The Senate in Rome was elective,
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  Speaker 2: but a senator held his seat for life. Footnote. I
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  Speaker 2: say the Senate was elective, but this must be understood
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  Speaker 2: with some exceptions, or rather qualifications. The constitution of the
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  Speaker 2: Roman Senate has been a subject of inquiry with the
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  Speaker 2: first men in modern ages. Lord Chesterfield requested the opinion
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  Speaker 2: of the learned of ver Taught upon the manner of
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  Speaker 2: choosing senators in Rome, and it was a subject of
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  Speaker 2: discussion between Lord Harvey and Doctor Middleton. The most probable
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  Speaker 2: account of the manner of forming the Senate and filling
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  Speaker 2: up vacancies, which I have collected from the best writers
• 23:45
  Speaker 2: on the subject, is here abridged for the consideration of
• 23:48
  Speaker 2: the reader. Romulus chose one hundred persons from the principal
• 23:52
  Speaker 2: families in Rome to form a council or Senate, and
• 23:55
  Speaker 2: reserved to himself the right of nominating their successors, that is,
• 23:59
  Speaker 2: of filling vacancies. Mass Calme Romulus a voit Louis meme
• 24:06
  Speaker 2: choice led premiers senators il fay Referva, LeDroit de Nomer,
• 24:13
  Speaker 2: Avon Graylure's successors madly for less Romaines. Other well informed
• 24:22
  Speaker 2: historians intimate that Romulus retained the right of nominating the
• 24:26
  Speaker 2: president only after the union of the Sabines with the Romans.
• 24:29
  Speaker 2: Romulus added another hundred members to the Senate, but by
• 24:33
  Speaker 2: consent of the people, Tarquin the ancient added another hundred.
• 24:37
  Speaker 2: But historians are silent as to the manner. On the
• 24:41
  Speaker 2: destruction of Alba by Hostilius, some of the principal alban
• 24:44
  Speaker 2: families were added to the Senate by consent of the
• 24:47
  Speaker 2: Senate and people. After the demolition of the monarchy, Appius
• 24:52
  Speaker 2: Claudius was admitted into the Senate by order of the people.
• 24:56
  Speaker 2: Cicero testifies that from the extinction of the monarchy, all
• 24:59
  Speaker 2: the man members of the Senate were admitted by command
• 25:02
  Speaker 2: of the people. It is observable that the first creation
• 25:06
  Speaker 2: of the senators was the act of monarch and the
• 25:09
  Speaker 2: first patrician families claimed the sole right of admission into
• 25:13
  Speaker 2: the Senate. Les Femille's k defendioce de diu scent senators
• 25:20
  Speaker 2: k Romulus, Avoit crees Sey, Crusint Soules Androit deentre dons
• 25:27
  Speaker 2: leiftenat mably. This right, however, was not granted in its
• 25:32
  Speaker 2: utmost extent, for many of the senators in the Roman
• 25:36
  Speaker 2: Commonwealth were taken from plebeian families for sixty years before
• 25:40
  Speaker 2: the institution of the censorship, which was a UC three eleven.
• 25:45
  Speaker 2: We are not informed how vacancies in the Senate were supplied.
• 25:49
  Speaker 2: The most probable method was this to enroll in the
• 25:52
  Speaker 2: list of senators the different magistrates viz. The Consul's praders,
• 25:57
  Speaker 2: the two questors of Patrician family, the five tribunes afterwards
• 26:02
  Speaker 2: ten and the two idols of Pleban families. The office
• 26:07
  Speaker 2: of Questor gave an immediate admission into the Senate. The
• 26:11
  Speaker 2: tribunes were admitted two years after their creation. This enrollment
• 26:15
  Speaker 2: seems to have been a matter of course, and likewise
• 26:18
  Speaker 2: their confirmation by the people in their comita or assemblies.
• 26:23
  Speaker 2: On extraordinary occasions, when the vacancies of the Senate were numerous,
• 26:26
  Speaker 2: the consuls used to nominate some of the most respectable
• 26:29
  Speaker 2: of the equestrian order, to be chosen by the people.
• 26:34
  Speaker 2: On the institution of the Censorship, the censors were invested
• 26:37
  Speaker 2: with full powers to inspect the manners of the citizens,
• 26:41
  Speaker 2: enroll them in their proper ranks according to their property,
• 26:44
  Speaker 2: make out lists of the senators, and leave out the
• 26:47
  Speaker 2: names of such as had rendered themselves unworthy of their
• 26:50
  Speaker 2: dignity by any scandalous vices. This power they several times exercised,
• 26:57
  Speaker 2: but the disgraced senators had an appeal to the people.
• 27:00
  Speaker 2: After the Senate had lost half its members in the
• 27:03
  Speaker 2: war with Hannibal. The dictator m Fabius Bhutto filled up
• 27:07
  Speaker 2: the number with the magistrates, with those who had been
• 27:11
  Speaker 2: honored with a civic crown, or others who were respectable
• 27:14
  Speaker 2: for age and character. One hundred seventy new members were
• 27:18
  Speaker 2: added at once with the approbation of the people. The
• 27:21
  Speaker 2: vacancies occasioned by Scylla's prescriptions amounted to three hundred, which
• 27:26
  Speaker 2: were supplied by persons nominated by Scylla and chosen by
• 27:29
  Speaker 2: the people. Before the time of the Gracchi, the number
• 27:34
  Speaker 2: of senators did not exceed three hundred, but in Scylla's time,
• 27:37
  Speaker 2: so far as we can collect from indirect testimonies, it
• 27:41
  Speaker 2: amounted to about five hundred. The age necessary to qualify
• 27:44
  Speaker 2: for a seat in the Senate is not exactly ascertained,
• 27:47
  Speaker 2: but several circumstances prove it to have been about thirty years.
• 27:51
  Speaker 2: Si Ver taught Mably and Middleton on this subject in
• 27:55
  Speaker 2: the last ages of Roman splendor. The property requisite to
• 27:58
  Speaker 2: qualify a person for a senator was settled by Augustus
• 28:02
  Speaker 2: at eight hundred Sisterstia more than six thousand pounds Sterling
• 28:08
  Speaker 2: end footnote. The proposed senate in America is constituted on
• 28:12
  Speaker 2: principles more favorable to liberty. The members are elective, and
• 28:16
  Speaker 2: by the separate legislatures, they hold their seats for six years.
• 28:21
  Speaker 2: They are thus rendered sufficiently dependent on their constituents, and
• 28:25
  Speaker 2: yet are not dismissed from their office as soon as
• 28:27
  Speaker 2: they become acquainted with the forms of proceeding. It may
• 28:31
  Speaker 2: be objected by the larger states that the representation in
• 28:34
  Speaker 2: the Senate is not equal, the small estates having the
• 28:37
  Speaker 2: privilege of sending the same number of senators as the largest.
• 28:42
  Speaker 2: To obviate this objection, I would suggest but two or
• 28:45
  Speaker 2: three ideas. One, If each state had a representation and
• 28:49
  Speaker 2: a right in deciding questions proportional to its property, three
• 28:53
  Speaker 2: states would almost command the whole. Such a constitution would
• 28:57
  Speaker 2: gradually annihilate the small states and finally melt down the
• 29:00
  Speaker 2: whole United States into one undivided sovereignty. The Free States
• 29:04
  Speaker 2: of Spain and the Heptarchy in England afford striking examples
• 29:08
  Speaker 2: of this. Should it be said that such an event
• 29:11
  Speaker 2: is desirable? I answer, the states are all entitled to
• 29:14
  Speaker 2: their respective sovereignties, and while they claim independence in internal jurisdiction,
• 29:19
  Speaker 2: the federal constitution ought to guarantee their sovereignty. Two. Another
• 29:25
  Speaker 2: consideration has weight. There is in all nations a tendency
• 29:28
  Speaker 2: towards an accumulation of power in some point. It is
• 29:32
  Speaker 2: the business of the legislator to establish some barriers to
• 29:36
  Speaker 2: check that tendency. In small societies, a man worth one
• 29:40
  Speaker 2: hundred thousand pounds sterling has but one vote, when his neighbors,
• 29:44
  Speaker 2: who are worth but fifty pounds have each one vote. Likewise,
• 29:48
  Speaker 2: to make property the sole basis of authority would expose
• 29:51
  Speaker 2: many of the best citizens to violence and oppression. To
• 29:54
  Speaker 2: make the number of inhabitants in a state, the rule
• 29:57
  Speaker 2: of apportioning power is more putable, and where the United States,
• 30:02
  Speaker 2: one indivisible interest would be a perfect role for representation.
• 30:06
  Speaker 2: But the detached situation of the states has created some
• 30:09
  Speaker 2: separate interests some local institutions, which they will not resign
• 30:14
  Speaker 2: nor throw into the hands of other states. For these
• 30:17
  Speaker 2: peculiar interests, the states have an equal attachment for the
• 30:20
  Speaker 2: preservation and enjoyment of these in equal sovereignties necessary, and
• 30:25
  Speaker 2: the sovereignty of each state would not be secure had
• 30:29
  Speaker 2: each state in both branches of the legislature an authority
• 30:32
  Speaker 2: in passing laws proportioned to its inhabitants. Three, But the
• 30:38
  Speaker 2: Senate should be considered as representing the Confederacy in a body.
• 30:42
  Speaker 2: It is a false principle in the vulgar ideas of
• 30:45
  Speaker 2: representation that a man delegated by a particular district in
• 30:48
  Speaker 2: a state is the representative of that district only, whereas
• 30:52
  Speaker 2: in truth, a member of the legislature from any town
• 30:55
  Speaker 2: or county is the representative of the whole state. In
• 30:58
  Speaker 2: passing laws. He is to view the whole collective interest
• 31:01
  Speaker 2: of the state and act from that view, not from
• 31:05
  Speaker 2: a partial regard to the interests of the town or
• 31:07
  Speaker 2: county where he is chosen. End of section two.
• 31:18
  Speaker 1: Section three of an Examination into the Leading Principles of
• 31:24
  Speaker 1: the Federal Constitution. This is a LibriVox recording. All librivos
• 31:30
  Speaker 1: recordings are in the public domain. For more information or
• 31:35
  Speaker 1: to volunteer, please visit librivos dot org. Read by Janet Wedge.
• 31:42
  Speaker 1: An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution
• 31:48
  Speaker 1: by Noah Webster. The same principle extends to the Congress
• 31:53
  Speaker 1: of the United States. A delegate is bound to represent
• 31:57
  Speaker 1: the true local interest of constituents to state it in
• 32:02
  Speaker 1: its true light to the whole body. But when each
• 32:06
  Speaker 1: provincial interest is thus stated, every member should act for
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: the aggregate interest of the whole confederacy. The design of
• 32:15
  Speaker 1: representation is to bring this collective interest into view. A
• 32:20
  Speaker 1: delegate is not the legislator of a single state. He
• 32:24
  Speaker 1: is as much the legislator of the whole Confederacy as
• 32:28
  Speaker 1: of the particular state where he is chosen. And if
• 32:32
  Speaker 1: he gives his vote for a law which he believes
• 32:35
  Speaker 1: to be beneficial to his own state only and pernicious
• 32:40
  Speaker 1: to the rest, he betrays his trust and violates his oath.
• 32:45
  Speaker 1: It is indeed difficult for a man to divest himself
• 32:49
  Speaker 1: of local attachments and act from an impartial regard to
• 32:54
  Speaker 1: the general good. But he who cannot, for the most part,
• 32:58
  Speaker 1: do this is not a good legislator. These considerations suggests
• 33:05
  Speaker 1: the propriety of continuing the senators in office for a
• 33:09
  Speaker 1: longer period than the representatives. They gradually lose their partiality,
• 33:16
  Speaker 1: generalize their views, and consider themselves as acting for the
• 33:21
  Speaker 1: whole confederacy. Hence, in the Senate we may expect union
• 33:26
  Speaker 1: and firmness. Here we may find the general good the
• 33:30
  Speaker 1: object of legislation, and a check upon the more partial
• 33:35
  Speaker 1: and interested acts of the other branch. These considerations obviate
• 33:41
  Speaker 1: the complaint that the representation in the Senate is not equal,
• 33:46
  Speaker 1: for the Senators represent the whole Confederacy, and all that
• 33:50
  Speaker 1: is wanted of the members is information of the true
• 33:54
  Speaker 1: situation and interest of each state as they act under
• 33:59
  Speaker 1: the direction of the several legislatures. Two men may as
• 34:03
  Speaker 1: fully and completely represent a state as twenty, and when
• 34:08
  Speaker 1: the true interest of each state is known, if the
• 34:12
  Speaker 1: Senators perform the part of good legislators and act impartially
• 34:17
  Speaker 1: for the whole collective body of the United States, it
• 34:20
  Speaker 1: is totally immaterial where they are chosen. It is a
• 34:25
  Speaker 1: capital defect of most of the state constitutions that the Senators,
• 34:31
  Speaker 1: like the representatives, are chosen in particular districts. They are
• 34:36
  Speaker 1: thus inspired with local views, and, however wrong it may
• 34:41
  Speaker 1: be to entertain them. Yet such is the constitution of
• 34:44
  Speaker 1: human nature that men are almost involuntarily attached to the
• 34:50
  Speaker 1: interest of the district which has reposed confidence in their
• 34:54
  Speaker 1: abilities and integrity. Some partiality, therefore, for constituents is always
• 35:01
  Speaker 1: expectable to destroy it. As much as possible, a political
• 35:05
  Speaker 1: constitution should remove the grounds of local attachment. Connecticut and
• 35:11
  Speaker 1: Maryland have wisely destroyed this attachment in their Senates by
• 35:16
  Speaker 1: ordaining that the members shall be chosen in the state
• 35:20
  Speaker 1: at large. The senators hold their seats by the suffrages
• 35:24
  Speaker 1: of the state, not of a district. Hence they have
• 35:28
  Speaker 1: no particular number of men to fear or to oblige.
• 35:32
  Speaker 1: They represent the state. Hence that union and firmness which
• 35:37
  Speaker 1: the Senates of those states have manifested on the most
• 35:41
  Speaker 1: trying occasions, and by which they have prevented the most
• 35:46
  Speaker 1: rash and iniquitous measures. It may be objected that when
• 35:51
  Speaker 1: the election of senators is vested in the people, they
• 35:55
  Speaker 1: must choose men in their own neighborhood, or else those
• 36:00
  Speaker 1: with whom they are unacquainted. With respect to representatives, this
• 36:05
  Speaker 1: objection does not lie, for they are chosen in small districts.
• 36:11
  Speaker 1: And as to senators, there is in every state a
• 36:15
  Speaker 1: small number of men whose reputation for abilities, integrity, and
• 36:20
  Speaker 1: good conduct will lead the people to a very just choice.
• 36:25
  Speaker 1: Old experienced statesmen should compose the Senate. And people are generally,
• 36:32
  Speaker 1: in this free country acquainted with their characters. Were it possible,
• 36:37
  Speaker 1: as it is in small states, it would be an
• 36:40
  Speaker 1: improvement in the doctrine of representation to give every freeman
• 36:45
  Speaker 1: the right of voting for every member of the legislature,
• 36:49
  Speaker 1: and the privilege of choosing the men in any part
• 36:53
  Speaker 1: of the state. This would totally exclude bribery and undue influence,
• 36:59
  Speaker 1: for no men can bribe a state, and it would
• 37:03
  Speaker 1: almost annihilate partial views in legislation. But in large states
• 37:09
  Speaker 1: it may be impracticable. The House of Representatives is the
• 37:14
  Speaker 1: more immediate voice of the separate states. Here the states
• 37:19
  Speaker 1: are represented in proportion to their number of inhabitants. Here,
• 37:24
  Speaker 1: the separate interests will operate with their full force, and
• 37:28
  Speaker 1: the violence of parties and the jealousies produced by interfering
• 37:33
  Speaker 1: interests can be restrained and quieted only by a body
• 37:38
  Speaker 1: of men less local and dependent. It may be objected
• 37:43
  Speaker 1: that no separate interests should exist in a state, and
• 37:47
  Speaker 1: a division of the legislature has a tendency to create them.
• 37:51
  Speaker 1: But this objection is founded on mere jealousy or a
• 37:55
  Speaker 1: very imperfect comparison of the Roman and British governments which
• 38:00
  Speaker 1: the proposed federal Constitution. The House of Peers in England
• 38:05
  Speaker 1: is a body originally and totally independent on the people.
• 38:10
  Speaker 1: The Senate in Rome was mostly composed of patrician or
• 38:15
  Speaker 1: noble families, and after the first election of a senator
• 38:20
  Speaker 1: he was no longer dependent on the people. He held
• 38:24
  Speaker 1: his seat for life. But the Senate of the United
• 38:27
  Speaker 1: States can have no separate interests from the body of
• 38:31
  Speaker 1: the people. For they live among them, they are chosen
• 38:35
  Speaker 1: by them. They must be dismissed from their place once
• 38:39
  Speaker 1: in six years, and may at any time be impeached
• 38:43
  Speaker 1: for malpractices. Their property is situated among the people, and
• 38:49
  Speaker 1: with their persons, subject to the same laws. No title
• 38:53
  Speaker 1: can be granted but the temporary titles of office bestowed
• 38:58
  Speaker 1: by the voluntary election of the people, and no pre
• 39:02
  Speaker 1: eminence can be acquired. But by the same means. The
• 39:07
  Speaker 1: separation of the legislature divides the power, checks, restrains, amends
• 39:14
  Speaker 1: the proceedings. At the same time, it creates no division
• 39:18
  Speaker 1: of interest that contempt either branch to encroach upon the
• 39:23
  Speaker 1: other or upon the people. In turbulent times, such restraint
• 39:28
  Speaker 1: is our greatest safety. In calm times, and in measures
• 39:33
  Speaker 1: obviously calculated for the general good, both branches must always
• 39:39
  Speaker 1: be unanimous. A man must be thirty years of age
• 39:43
  Speaker 1: before he can be admitted into the Senate, which was
• 39:47
  Speaker 1: likewise a requisite in the Roman government. What property was
• 39:51
  Speaker 1: requisite for a senator in the early ages of Rome,
• 39:55
  Speaker 1: I cannot inform myself, but Augustus fixed it at eight
• 40:00
  Speaker 1: hundred cistercia between six and seven thousand pounds stirling. In
• 40:07
  Speaker 1: the Federal Constitution, money is not made irrequisite. The places
• 40:12
  Speaker 1: of senators are wisely left open to all persons of
• 40:17
  Speaker 1: suitable aid and merit, and who have been citizens of
• 40:21
  Speaker 1: the United States for nine years, a term in which
• 40:25
  Speaker 1: foreigners may acquire the feelings and acquaint themselves with the
• 40:30
  Speaker 1: interests of the native Americans. The House of Representatives is
• 40:36
  Speaker 1: formed on very equitable principles, and is calculated to guard
• 40:41
  Speaker 1: the privileges of the people. The English House of Commons
• 40:45
  Speaker 1: is chosen by a small part of the people in
• 40:48
  Speaker 1: England and continues for seven years. The Romans never discovered
• 40:54
  Speaker 1: the secret of representation. The whole body of citizens assembled
• 40:59
  Speaker 1: for the purposes of legislation, a circumstance that exposed their
• 41:04
  Speaker 1: government to frequent convulsions and to capricious measures. The federal
• 41:10
  Speaker 1: House of Representatives is chosen by the people qualified to
• 41:15
  Speaker 1: vote for state representatives, and continues two years. Note it
• 41:21
  Speaker 1: is said by Rome that no property should be required
• 41:25
  Speaker 1: as a qualification for an elector. I shall not enter
• 41:29
  Speaker 1: into a discussion of the subject, but remark that in
• 41:33
  Speaker 1: most free governments some property has been thought requisite to
• 41:37
  Speaker 1: prevent corruption and secure government from the influence of an
• 41:42
  Speaker 1: unprincipled multitude. In ancient Rome, none but the free citizens
• 41:47
  Speaker 1: had the right of suffrage in the Comitia or legislative assemblies.
• 41:52
  Speaker 1: But in Sila's time, the Italian cities demanded the rights
• 41:56
  Speaker 1: of the Roman citizens, alleging that they furnished two thirds
• 42:00
  Speaker 1: of the armies in all their wars, and yet were
• 42:04
  Speaker 1: despised as foreigners Veili Patek lib A Cop. Twenty five.
• 42:11
  Speaker 1: This produced the Marsik Or Social War, which lasted two
• 42:17
  Speaker 1: years and carried off three hundred thousand men one bim.
• 42:22
  Speaker 1: It was conducted and concluded by POMPEII, father of Pompey
• 42:27
  Speaker 1: the Great, with his lieutenants Scilla and Marius. But most
• 42:32
  Speaker 1: of the cities eventually obtained the freedom of Rome, and
• 42:36
  Speaker 1: were of course entitled to the rights of suffrage in
• 42:40
  Speaker 1: the Comitia paulatim de inde recipiendo in city tautem qui
• 42:47
  Speaker 1: arma ot non sepernd out de posso errant maturius virees
• 42:54
  Speaker 1: rescdai sunt vel patec. Two sixteen. But Rome had cause
• 43:02
  Speaker 1: to deplore this event, for however reasonable it might appear
• 43:06
  Speaker 1: to admit the allies to a participation of the rights
• 43:10
  Speaker 1: of citizens, yet the concession destroyed all freedom of election.
• 43:16
  Speaker 1: It enabled an ambitious demagogue to engage and bring into
• 43:21
  Speaker 1: the assemblies whole towns of people, slaves and foreigners, and
• 43:26
  Speaker 1: everything was decided by faction and violence. This Montesquieu numbers
• 43:33
  Speaker 1: among the causes of the decline of the Roman greatness.
• 43:37
  Speaker 1: De la grandeur de homen e d representation would have,
• 43:43
  Speaker 1: in some measure prevented these consequences. But the admission of
• 43:48
  Speaker 1: every man to a suffrage will ever open the door
• 43:52
  Speaker 1: to corruption. In such a state as Connecticut, where there
• 43:56
  Speaker 1: is no confluts of foreigners, no introduction of seamen, servants,
• 44:03
  Speaker 1: and so forth, and scarcely an hundred persons in the
• 44:07
  Speaker 1: state who are not natives, and very few whose education
• 44:12
  Speaker 1: and connections do not attach them to the government. At
• 44:16
  Speaker 1: the same time, few men have property to furnish the
• 44:20
  Speaker 1: means of corruption. Very little danger could spring from admitting
• 44:25
  Speaker 1: every man of age and discretion to the privilege of
• 44:29
  Speaker 1: voting for rulers. But in the large towns of America
• 44:33
  Speaker 1: there is more danger. A matter of a vessel may
• 44:37
  Speaker 1: put votes into the hands of his crew for the
• 44:40
  Speaker 1: purpose of carrying an election for a party. Such things
• 44:44
  Speaker 1: have actually taken place in America. Besides, the Middle States
• 44:50
  Speaker 1: are receiving emigrations of poor people who are not at
• 44:54
  Speaker 1: once judges of the characters of men, and who cannot
• 44:58
  Speaker 1: be fairly trusted with the choice of legislators. Some may
• 45:02
  Speaker 1: object to their continuance in power two years, but I
• 45:07
  Speaker 1: cannot see any danger arising from this quarter. On the contrary,
• 45:12
  Speaker 1: it creates less trouble for their representatives, who by such
• 45:16
  Speaker 1: choice are taken from their professions and obliged to attend Congress,
• 45:23
  Speaker 1: some of them at the distance of at least seven
• 45:27
  Speaker 1: hundred miles. While men are chosen by the people and
• 45:32
  Speaker 1: responsible to them, there is but little danger from ambition
• 45:36
  Speaker 1: or corruption. If it should be said that Congress may
• 45:40
  Speaker 1: in time become triennial and even septennial, like the English parliaments.
• 45:46
  Speaker 1: I answer, this is not in their power. The English
• 45:51
  Speaker 1: Parliament had power to prolong the period of their existence.
• 45:55
  Speaker 1: But Congress will be restrained by the different legislatures, without
• 46:00
  Speaker 1: whose constitutional concurrence no alteration can be made in the
• 46:06
  Speaker 1: proposed system. The fourth section, Article one of the new
• 46:11
  Speaker 1: Constitution declares that the times, places and manner of holding
• 46:17
  Speaker 1: elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each
• 46:22
  Speaker 1: state by the legislature thereof. But the Congress may at
• 46:26
  Speaker 1: any time by law make or alter such regulations, except
• 46:32
  Speaker 1: as to the places of choosing senators. Here let us pause,
• 46:37
  Speaker 1: What did the Convention mean by giving Congress power to
• 46:41
  Speaker 1: make regulations prescribed by the legislatures? Is this expression accurate
• 46:47
  Speaker 1: or intelligible? But the word alter is very intelligible, and
• 46:52
  Speaker 1: the clause puts the election of representatives wholly and the
• 46:57
  Speaker 1: senators almost wholly in the power of Congress. The views
• 47:03
  Speaker 1: of the Convention I believe to be perfectly upright. They
• 47:07
  Speaker 1: might mean to place the election of representatives and senators
• 47:11
  Speaker 1: beyond the reach of faction. They doubtless had good reasons
• 47:15
  Speaker 1: in their minds for the clause. But I see no
• 47:19
  Speaker 1: occasion for any power in Congress to interfere with the
• 47:22
  Speaker 1: choice of their own body. They will have power to
• 47:26
  Speaker 1: suppress insurrections, as they ought to have. But the clause
• 47:30
  Speaker 1: in italics gives needless and dangerous powers. I hope the
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: states will reject it with decency and adopt the whole
• 47:39
  Speaker 1: system without altering another syllable. The method of passing laws
• 47:45
  Speaker 1: in Congress is much preferable to that of ancient Rome
• 47:49
  Speaker 1: or modern Britain, not to mention other defects. In Rome,
• 47:54
  Speaker 1: it lay in the power of a single tribune to
• 47:58
  Speaker 1: obstruct the passing of a law. Law. As the tribunes
• 48:01
  Speaker 1: were popular magistrates, the right was often exercised in favor
• 48:06
  Speaker 1: of liberty, but it was also abused, and the best
• 48:10
  Speaker 1: regulations were prevented to gratify the spleen, the ambition or
• 48:16
  Speaker 1: the resentment of an individual. The King of Great Britain
• 48:21
  Speaker 1: has the same power, but seldom exercises it. It is, however,
• 48:26
  Speaker 1: a dangerous power. It is absurd and hazardous to lodge
• 48:31
  Speaker 1: in one man the right of controlling the will of
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: a state. Every bill that passes a majority of both
• 48:40
  Speaker 1: houses of Congress must be sent to the President for
• 48:43
  Speaker 1: his approbation, but it must be returned in ten days,
• 48:48
  Speaker 1: whether approved by him or not, and the concurrence of
• 48:52
  Speaker 1: two thirds of both houses passes the bill into a law,
• 48:57
  Speaker 1: notwithstanding any objections of the President. The Constitution therefore gives
• 49:04
  Speaker 1: the Supreme Executive a check but no negative, upon the
• 49:08
  Speaker 1: sense of Congress. End of Section three. Section four an
• 49:20
  Speaker 1: Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution. This
• 49:26
  Speaker 1: is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the
• 49:31
  Speaker 1: public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit
• 49:37
  Speaker 1: LibriVox dot org. Read by Janet Wedge and Examination into
• 49:43
  Speaker 1: the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution by Noah Webster.
• 49:49
  Speaker 1: Section four. The powers lodged in Congress are extensive, but
• 49:55
  Speaker 1: it is presumed that they are not too extensive. The
• 49:59
  Speaker 1: first of the Constitution is to unite the States into
• 50:03
  Speaker 1: one compact society for the purpose of government. If such
• 50:08
  Speaker 1: union must exist, or if the States be exposed to
• 50:13
  Speaker 1: foreign invasions, internal discord, reciprocal encroachments upon each other's property,
• 50:20
  Speaker 1: to weakness and infamy which no person will dispute, what
• 50:25
  Speaker 1: powers must be collected and lodged in the Supreme head
• 50:29
  Speaker 1: or the legislature of these states. The answer is easy.
• 50:34
  Speaker 1: This legislature must have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters in
• 50:39
  Speaker 1: which the states have a mutual interest. There are some
• 50:43
  Speaker 1: regulations in which all the states are equally concerned. There
• 50:48
  Speaker 1: are others which, in their operation are limited to one state.
• 50:53
  Speaker 1: The first belong to Congress, the last to the respective legislatures.
• 50:59
  Speaker 1: One state has a right to supreme control in any
• 51:03
  Speaker 1: affair in which the other states have an interest, Nor
• 51:07
  Speaker 1: should Congress interfere in any affair which respects one state only.
• 51:12
  Speaker 1: This is the general line of division which the Convention
• 51:16
  Speaker 1: have endeavored to draw between the powers of Congress and
• 51:21
  Speaker 1: the rights of the individual states. The only question, therefore,
• 51:27
  Speaker 1: is whether the new Constitution delegates to Congress any powers
• 51:32
  Speaker 1: which do not respect the general interest and welfare of
• 51:36
  Speaker 1: the United States. If these powers entrench upon the present
• 51:41
  Speaker 1: sovereignty of the state, without having for an object the
• 51:45
  Speaker 1: collective interest of the whole, the powers are too extensive.
• 51:50
  Speaker 1: But if they do not extend to all concerns in
• 51:54
  Speaker 1: which the states have a mutual interest, they are too limited.
• 51:59
  Speaker 1: If in any instance the powers necessary for protecting the
• 52:03
  Speaker 1: general interest interfere with the constitutional rights of an individual state.
• 52:09
  Speaker 1: Such state has assumed powers that are inconsistent with the
• 52:14
  Speaker 1: safety of the United States, and which ought instantly to
• 52:19
  Speaker 1: be resigned. Considering the states as individuals on equal terms
• 52:24
  Speaker 1: entering into a social compact, no state has a right
• 52:29
  Speaker 1: to any power which may prejudice its neighbors. If therefore,
• 52:34
  Speaker 1: the Federal Constitution has collected into the federal legislature, no
• 52:39
  Speaker 1: more power than is necessary for the common defense and interest.
• 52:44
  Speaker 1: It should be recognized by the states. However, particular clauses
• 52:49
  Speaker 1: may supersede the exercise of certain powers by the individual states.
• 52:55
  Speaker 1: This question is of vast magnitude. The states have very
• 53:00
  Speaker 1: high ideas of their separate sovereignties. Although it is certain
• 53:06
  Speaker 1: that while each exists in its full latitude, we can
• 53:10
  Speaker 1: have no federal sovereignty. However flattered each state may be
• 53:15
  Speaker 1: by its independent sovereignty, we can have no union, no respectability,
• 53:22
  Speaker 1: no national character, and what is more, no national justice.
• 53:28
  Speaker 1: Till the states resigned to one supreme head the exclusive
• 53:33
  Speaker 1: power of legislating, judging, and executing in all matters of
• 53:39
  Speaker 1: a general nature. Everything of a private or provincial nature
• 53:45
  Speaker 1: must still rest on the ground of the respective states. Constitutions.
• 53:51
  Speaker 1: After examining the limits of the proposed congressional powers, I
• 53:56
  Speaker 1: confess I do not think them too extensive. I firmly
• 54:01
  Speaker 1: believe that the life, liberty, and property of every man,
• 54:05
  Speaker 1: and the peace and independence of each state, will be
• 54:09
  Speaker 1: more fully secured under such a constitution of federal government
• 54:14
  Speaker 1: than they will under a constitution with more limited powers,
• 54:19
  Speaker 1: and infinitely more safe than under our boasted distinct sovereignties.
• 54:25
  Speaker 1: It appears to me that Congress will have no more
• 54:28
  Speaker 1: power than will be necessary for our union and general welfare,
• 54:34
  Speaker 1: and such power they must have, or we are in
• 54:38
  Speaker 1: a wretched state. On the adoption of this constitution, I
• 54:43
  Speaker 1: should value real estate twenty percent higher than I do
• 54:48
  Speaker 1: at this moment. I will not examine into the extent
• 54:52
  Speaker 1: of the powers proposed to be lodged in the Supreme
• 54:56
  Speaker 1: Federal head. The subject would be extensive and require more
• 55:01
  Speaker 1: time than I can bestow upon it. But I will
• 55:05
  Speaker 1: just take up some objections that have been made to
• 55:09
  Speaker 1: particular points of the new Constitution. Most of the objections
• 55:14
  Speaker 1: I have yet heard to the Constitution consist in mere insinuations,
• 55:20
  Speaker 1: unsupported by reasoning or fact. They are thrown out to
• 55:25
  Speaker 1: instill groundless jealousies into the minds of the people, and
• 55:30
  Speaker 1: probably with a view to prevent all government. For there
• 55:34
  Speaker 1: are in every society some turbulent geniuses whose importance depends
• 55:42
  Speaker 1: solely on faction. To shew the insidious and detestable nature
• 55:48
  Speaker 1: of these insinuations, it is necessary to mention and remark
• 55:54
  Speaker 1: on a few particulars. One. The first objection against the
• 55:59
  Speaker 1: Concert Institution is that the legislature will be more expensive
• 56:04
  Speaker 1: than our present confederation. This is so far from being
• 56:08
  Speaker 1: true that the money we actually lose by our present weakness, disunion,
• 56:15
  Speaker 1: and want of government, would support the civil government of
• 56:19
  Speaker 1: every state in the Confederacy. Our public poverty does not
• 56:23
  Speaker 1: proceed from the expensiveness of Congress, nor of this civil list,
• 56:29
  Speaker 1: but from want of power to command our own advantages.
• 56:33
  Speaker 1: We pay more money to foreign nations in the course
• 56:37
  Speaker 1: of business, and merely for want of government, than would
• 56:41
  Speaker 1: under an efficient government pay the annual interest of our
• 56:46
  Speaker 1: domestic debt. Every man in business knows this to be truth,
• 56:52
  Speaker 1: and the objection can be designed only to delude the ignorant. Two.
• 56:58
  Speaker 1: Another objection to the Constitution is the division of the
• 57:02
  Speaker 1: legislature into two branches. Luckily, this objection has no advocates,
• 57:09
  Speaker 1: but in Pennsylvania, and even here their number is dwindling.
• 57:14
  Speaker 1: The factions that reign in this state, the internal discord
• 57:18
  Speaker 1: and passions that disturb the government and the peace of
• 57:22
  Speaker 1: the inhabitants, have detected the errors of the Constitution, and
• 57:27
  Speaker 1: will some time or other produce a reformation. The division
• 57:32
  Speaker 1: of the legislature has been the subject of discussion in
• 57:35
  Speaker 1: the beginning of this essay, and will be deemed by
• 57:39
  Speaker 1: nineteen twentieths of the Americans one of the principal excellencies
• 57:45
  Speaker 1: of the Constitution. Three. A third insinuation is that the
• 57:51
  Speaker 1: proposed federal government will annihilate the several legislatures. This is
• 57:56
  Speaker 1: extremely disingenuous. Every person capable of reading must discover that
• 58:03
  Speaker 1: the Convention have labored to draw the line between the
• 58:08
  Speaker 1: federal and provincial powers, to define the powers of Congress
• 58:13
  Speaker 1: and limit them to those general concerns which must come
• 58:17
  Speaker 1: under federal jurisdiction and which cannot be managed in the
• 58:21
  Speaker 1: separate legislatures. That in all internal regulations, whether of civil
• 58:27
  Speaker 1: or criminal nature, the states retain their sovereignty and have
• 58:32
  Speaker 1: it guaranteed to them by this very Constitution. Such a
• 58:37
  Speaker 1: groundless insinuation, or rather mere surmise, must proceed from dark
• 58:43
  Speaker 1: designs or extreme ignorance, and deserves the severest reprobation. It
• 58:50
  Speaker 1: is alleged that the liberty of the press is not
• 58:54
  Speaker 1: guaranteed by the new Constitution, but this objection is wholly unfound.
• 59:01
  Speaker 1: The liberty of the press does not come within the
• 59:03
  Speaker 1: jurisdiction of federal government. It is firmly established in all
• 59:08
  Speaker 1: the States, either by law or positive declarations in bills
• 59:13
  Speaker 1: of right and not being mentioned in the Federal Constitution.
• 59:17
  Speaker 1: Is not and cannot be abridged by Congress. It stands
• 59:22
  Speaker 1: on the basis of the respective state constitutions. Should any
• 59:27
  Speaker 1: state resigned to Congress the exclusive jurisdiction of a certain district,
• 59:32
  Speaker 1: which should include any town where presses are already established,
• 59:38
  Speaker 1: it is in the power of the state to reserve
• 59:41
  Speaker 1: the liberty of the press or any other fundamental privilege,
• 59:45
  Speaker 1: and make it an immutable condition of the grant that
• 59:50
  Speaker 1: such rights shall never be violated. All objections therefore on
• 59:55
  Speaker 1: this score are baseless visions. It is insinuated that the
• 1:00:02
  Speaker 1: Constitution gives Congress the power of levying internal taxes at pleasure.
• 1:00:08
  Speaker 1: This insinuation seems founded on the eighth section of the
• 1:00:13
  Speaker 1: sixth Article, which declares that Congress shall have power to
• 1:00:18
  Speaker 1: lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay
• 1:00:24
  Speaker 1: the debts and provide for the common defense and general
• 1:00:27
  Speaker 1: welfare of the United States. That Congress should have power
• 1:00:32
  Speaker 1: to collect duties, imposts, and excises in order to render
• 1:00:37
  Speaker 1: them uniform throughout the United States will hardly be controverted.
• 1:00:42
  Speaker 1: The whole objection is to the right of levying internal taxes.
• 1:00:48
  Speaker 1: But it will be conceded that the supreme Head of
• 1:00:51
  Speaker 1: the States must have power competent to the purposes of
• 1:00:55
  Speaker 1: our union, or it will be, as it now is,
• 1:01:00
  Speaker 1: a useless body, a mere expense without any advantage. To
• 1:01:05
  Speaker 1: pay our public debt, to support foreign ministers and our
• 1:01:10
  Speaker 1: own civil government, money must be raised. And if the
• 1:01:15
  Speaker 1: duties and imposts are not adequate to these purposes, where
• 1:01:19
  Speaker 1: shall the money be obtained? It will be answered, Let
• 1:01:23
  Speaker 1: Congress apportion the sums to be raised, and leave the
• 1:01:27
  Speaker 1: legislatures to collect the money. While this is all that
• 1:01:31
  Speaker 1: is intended by the clause under confederation, with the addition
• 1:01:36
  Speaker 1: of a federal power that shall be sufficient to oblige
• 1:01:40
  Speaker 1: a delinquent state to comply with the requisition. Such power
• 1:01:45
  Speaker 1: must exist somewhere, or the debts of the United States
• 1:01:49
  Speaker 1: can never be paid. For want of such power, our
• 1:01:53
  Speaker 1: credit is lost, and our internal faith is a byword
• 1:02:00
  Speaker 1: of such power. One state now complies fully with a requisition,
• 1:02:06
  Speaker 1: another partially, and a third absolutely refuses or neglects to
• 1:02:11
  Speaker 1: grant a shilling. Thus the honest and punctual are doubly loaded,
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 1: and the knave triumphs in his negligence. In short, no
• 1:02:22
  Speaker 1: honest man will dread a power that shall enforce an
• 1:02:26
  Speaker 1: equitable system of taxation. The dishonest are ever apprehensive of
• 1:02:32
  Speaker 1: a power that shall oblige them to do what honest
• 1:02:36
  Speaker 1: men are ready to do voluntarily. End of Section.
• 1:02:41
  Speaker 3: Four, Section five of an Examination into the Leading Principles
• 1:02:51
  Speaker 3: of the Federal Constitution. This is a LibriVox recording. All
• 1:02:57
  Speaker 3: LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information
• 1:03:02
  Speaker 3: or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Read by
• 1:03:07
  Speaker 3: Robert H. Cherney An Examination into the Leading Principles of
• 1:03:11
  Speaker 3: the Federal Constitution by Noah Webster. Permit me to ask
• 1:03:15
  Speaker 3: those who object to this power of taxation, How shall
• 1:03:19
  Speaker 3: money be raised to discharge our honest debts, debts which
• 1:03:23
  Speaker 3: are universally acknowledged to be just. Have we not already
• 1:03:28
  Speaker 3: experienced the inefficiency of a system without power? Has it
• 1:03:33
  Speaker 3: not been proved to demonstration that a voluntary compliance with
• 1:03:37
  Speaker 3: the demands of the union can never be expected to
• 1:03:41
  Speaker 3: what expedient shall we have recourse? What is the resort
• 1:03:45
  Speaker 3: of all governments in case of delinquency? Do not the
• 1:03:49
  Speaker 3: states vest in the legislature, even in the governor and council,
• 1:03:54
  Speaker 3: a power to enforce laws, even with the militias of
• 1:03:58
  Speaker 3: the states, And how rarely does there exist a necessity
• 1:04:02
  Speaker 3: of exerting such a power. Why should such a power
• 1:04:05
  Speaker 3: be more dangerous in Congress than in a legislature? Why
• 1:04:10
  Speaker 3: should more confidence be reposed in a member of one
• 1:04:13
  Speaker 3: legislature than of another. Why should we choose the best
• 1:04:17
  Speaker 3: men in the state to represent us in Congress, and
• 1:04:20
  Speaker 3: the moment they are elected, arm ourselves against them as
• 1:04:23
  Speaker 3: tyrants and robbers? Do we not, in this conduct act
• 1:04:28
  Speaker 3: the part of a man who, as soon as he
• 1:04:30
  Speaker 3: is married a woman of unsuspected chastity, locks her up
• 1:04:34
  Speaker 3: in a dudgeon is there any spell or charm that
• 1:04:39
  Speaker 3: instantly changes a delegate to Congress from an honest man
• 1:04:43
  Speaker 3: into a knave a tyrant. I confess freely that I
• 1:04:48
  Speaker 3: am willing to trust Congress with any powers that I
• 1:04:51
  Speaker 3: should dare lodge in a state legislature. I believe life, liberty,
• 1:04:56
  Speaker 3: and property would be as safe in the hands of
• 1:04:58
  Speaker 3: a federal legislat lature organized in the manner proposed by
• 1:05:02
  Speaker 3: the Convention as in the hands of any legislature that
• 1:05:06
  Speaker 3: has ever been, or ever will be chosen in any
• 1:05:09
  Speaker 3: particular state. But the idea that Congress can levy taxes
• 1:05:14
  Speaker 3: at pleasure is false, and the suggestion wholly unsupported. The
• 1:05:20
  Speaker 3: Preamble to the Constitution is declaratory of the purpose of
• 1:05:24
  Speaker 3: our union, and the assumption of any powers not necessary
• 1:05:28
  Speaker 3: to establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,
• 1:05:33
  Speaker 3: promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings of
• 1:05:37
  Speaker 3: liberty to ourselves and our posterity, will be unconstitutional and
• 1:05:44
  Speaker 3: endanger the existence of Congress. Besides, in the very clause
• 1:05:49
  Speaker 3: which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the
• 1:05:52
  Speaker 3: purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are specified
• 1:05:57
  Speaker 3: vis a vie. To pay the debts and for the
• 1:06:00
  Speaker 3: common defense and general welfare of the United States. Footnote.
• 1:06:07
  Speaker 3: For these purposes, money must be collected, and the power
• 1:06:10
  Speaker 3: of collection must be lodged sooner or later in a
• 1:06:14
  Speaker 3: federal head, or the common defense and the general welfare
• 1:06:18
  Speaker 3: must be neglected. Footnote. The clause may at first appear ambiguous.
• 1:06:24
  Speaker 3: It may be uncertain whether we should read and understand it. Thus,
• 1:06:29
  Speaker 3: the Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
• 1:06:34
  Speaker 3: and excises in order to pay the debts, et cetera.
• 1:06:39
  Speaker 3: Or whether the meaning is Congress shall have power to
• 1:06:42
  Speaker 3: lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and shall
• 1:06:47
  Speaker 3: have power to pay the debts, et cetera. On considering
• 1:06:53
  Speaker 3: the construction of the clause and comparing it with the preamble,
• 1:06:56
  Speaker 3: the last sense seems to be improbable and absurd. But
• 1:07:00
  Speaker 3: it is not very material. For no powers are vested
• 1:07:03
  Speaker 3: in Congress, but what are included under the general expressions
• 1:07:08
  Speaker 3: of providing for the common defense and general welfare of
• 1:07:14
  Speaker 3: the United States. Any powers not promotive of these purposes
• 1:07:20
  Speaker 3: will be unconstitutional. Consequently, any appropriations of money to any
• 1:07:25
  Speaker 3: other purpose will expose the Congress to the resentment of
• 1:07:29
  Speaker 3: the states, and the members to impeachment and loss of
• 1:07:34
  Speaker 3: their seats. End footnote. The states in their separate capacity
• 1:07:39
  Speaker 3: cannot provide for the common defense. Nay, in case of
• 1:07:43
  Speaker 3: a civil war, a state cannot secure its own existence.
• 1:07:48
  Speaker 3: The only question, therefore, is whether it is necessary to
• 1:07:51
  Speaker 3: unite and provide for our common defense and general welfare.
• 1:07:56
  Speaker 3: For this question, once being decided in the Affirmative, leaves
• 1:08:00
  Speaker 3: us no room to controvert the propriety of constituting a
• 1:08:03
  Speaker 3: power over the whole United States adequate to these general purposes.
• 1:08:09
  Speaker 3: The States, by granting such power, do not throw it
• 1:08:12
  Speaker 3: out of their own hands. They only throw each its
• 1:08:17
  Speaker 3: proportion into a common stock. They merely combine the powers
• 1:08:21
  Speaker 3: of these several states into one point, where they must
• 1:08:26
  Speaker 3: be collected before they can be exerted. But the powers
• 1:08:31
  Speaker 3: are still in their own hands and cannot be alienated
• 1:08:35
  Speaker 3: till they create a body independent of themselves, with a
• 1:08:39
  Speaker 3: force of command superior to the whole yeomanry of the country.
• 1:08:46
  Speaker 3: It is said that there is no provision made in
• 1:08:48
  Speaker 3: the New Constitution against a standing army in time of peace.
• 1:08:53
  Speaker 3: Why do not people object that no provision is made
• 1:08:56
  Speaker 3: against the introduction of a body of Turkish janissaries, or
• 1:09:00
  Speaker 3: against making the al Koran the rule of faith and
• 1:09:04
  Speaker 3: practice instead of the Bible. The answer to such objections
• 1:09:08
  Speaker 3: is simply this, No such provision is necessary. The people
• 1:09:13
  Speaker 3: in this country cannot forget their apprehensions from a British
• 1:09:17
  Speaker 3: standing army quartered in America, and they turn their fears
• 1:09:22
  Speaker 3: and jealousies against themselves. Why do not the people of
• 1:09:27
  Speaker 3: most of the states apprehend danger from standing armies from
• 1:09:31
  Speaker 3: their own legislatures? Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe, are
• 1:09:36
  Speaker 3: the only states that have provided against this danger at
• 1:09:39
  Speaker 3: all events. Other states have declared that no standing armies
• 1:09:43
  Speaker 3: shall be kept up without the consent of the legislature,
• 1:09:47
  Speaker 3: But this leaves the power entirely in the hands of
• 1:09:49
  Speaker 3: the legislature. Many of the states, however, have made no
• 1:09:54
  Speaker 3: provision against this evil. What hazards these states suffer? Why
• 1:10:00
  Speaker 3: does not a man pass a law in his family
• 1:10:03
  Speaker 3: that no armed soldier shall be quartered in his house
• 1:10:07
  Speaker 3: by his consent? The reason is very plain. No man
• 1:10:11
  Speaker 3: will suffer his liberty to be abridged or endangered. His
• 1:10:15
  Speaker 3: disposition and his power are uniformly opposed to any infringement
• 1:10:20
  Speaker 3: of his rights. In the same manner, the principles inhabits,
• 1:10:25
  Speaker 3: as well as the power of the Americans, are directly
• 1:10:28
  Speaker 3: opposed to standing armies, and there is as little necessity
• 1:10:32
  Speaker 3: to guard against them by positive constitutions as there is
• 1:10:36
  Speaker 3: to prohibit the establishment of the Mohometan religion. But the
• 1:10:41
  Speaker 3: Constitution provides for our safety, And while it gives Congress
• 1:10:45
  Speaker 3: power to raise armies, it declares that no appropriation of
• 1:10:50
  Speaker 3: money to their support shall be for a longer term
• 1:10:53
  Speaker 3: than two years. Congress, likewise, are to have the power
• 1:10:59
  Speaker 3: to provide for orca organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
• 1:11:02
  Speaker 3: but have no other command of them except when in
• 1:11:05
  Speaker 3: actual service. Nor are they at liberty to call out
• 1:11:09
  Speaker 3: the militia at pleasure, but only to execute the laws
• 1:11:12
  Speaker 3: of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. For these purposes,
• 1:11:19
  Speaker 3: government must always be armed with a military force, if
• 1:11:23
  Speaker 3: the occasion should require it. Otherwise laws are nugatory and
• 1:11:28
  Speaker 3: life and property insecure. Some persons have ventured to publish
• 1:11:34
  Speaker 3: an intimation that by the proposed Constitution, the trial by
• 1:11:38
  Speaker 3: jury is absolved in all civil cases, others very modestly
• 1:11:44
  Speaker 3: insinuate that it is in some cases only. The fact
• 1:11:48
  Speaker 3: is that trial by jury is not affected in any
• 1:11:51
  Speaker 3: case by the Constitution, except in cases of impeachment, which
• 1:11:56
  Speaker 3: are to be tried by the Senate. None but persons
• 1:11:59
  Speaker 3: in office us in or under Congress can be impeached,
• 1:12:03
  Speaker 3: and even after a judgment upon an impeachment, the offender
• 1:12:08
  Speaker 3: is liable to a prosecution before a common jury in
• 1:12:12
  Speaker 3: a regular course of law. The insinuation, therefore, that trials
• 1:12:17
  Speaker 3: by jury are to be abolished is groundless and, beyond conception, wicked.
• 1:12:23
  Speaker 3: It must be wicked, because the circulation of such a
• 1:12:26
  Speaker 3: bare faced falsehood respecting a privileged dear to freeman can
• 1:12:31
  Speaker 3: proceed only from a depraved heart and the worst intentions. Eight.
• 1:12:37
  Speaker 3: It is also intimated as a probable event that the
• 1:12:40
  Speaker 3: federal courts will absorb the judiciaries of several states. This
• 1:12:45
  Speaker 3: is a mere suspicion without the least foundation. The jurisdiction
• 1:12:50
  Speaker 3: of the Federal courts is very accurately defined and easily understood.
• 1:12:54
  Speaker 3: It extends to the cases mentioned in the Constitution and
• 1:12:58
  Speaker 3: to the execution of the laws of Congress respecting commerce
• 1:13:03
  Speaker 3: revenue and other general concerns. With respect to all other
• 1:13:09
  Speaker 3: civil and criminal actions, the powers and jurisdictions of these
• 1:13:13
  Speaker 3: several judiciaries of each state remain unimpaired. Nor is there
• 1:13:19
  Speaker 3: anything novel in allowing appeals to the Supreme Court. Actions
• 1:13:23
  Speaker 3: are mostly to be tried in the state where the
• 1:13:26
  Speaker 3: crimes are committed, but appeals are allowed under our present confederation,
• 1:13:32
  Speaker 3: and no person complains. Nay, were they no appeal, every
• 1:13:37
  Speaker 3: man would have reason to complain, especially when a final
• 1:13:40
  Speaker 3: judgment in an inferior court should affect property to a
• 1:13:44
  Speaker 3: large amount. But why is an objection raised against an
• 1:13:48
  Speaker 3: appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court representing fact as well
• 1:13:55
  Speaker 3: as law. Is it less safe to have the opinions
• 1:14:00
  Speaker 3: of two juries than of one? I suspect many people
• 1:14:04
  Speaker 3: will think this no defect in the Constitution, but perhaps
• 1:14:07
  Speaker 3: it will destroy a material requisite of a good jury
• 1:14:12
  Speaker 3: vis a vis their vicinity to the cause of action.
• 1:14:16
  Speaker 3: I have no doubt that when cases were tried in
• 1:14:19
  Speaker 3: periods prior to the Christian era, before twelve men seated
• 1:14:24
  Speaker 3: upon twelve stones arranged in a circular form under a
• 1:14:28
  Speaker 3: large oak, there was a great propensity in submitting causes
• 1:14:32
  Speaker 3: to men in the vicinity. The difficulty of collecting evidence
• 1:14:37
  Speaker 3: in those rude times rendered it necessary that juries should
• 1:14:40
  Speaker 3: judge mostly from their own knowledge of facts, or from
• 1:14:45
  Speaker 3: information obtained out of court. But in these polished times,
• 1:14:51
  Speaker 3: when juries depend almost wholly on the testimony of witnesses,
• 1:14:55
  Speaker 3: and when a complication of interests introduced by commerce and
• 1:14:59
  Speaker 3: others causes renders, it almost impossible to collect men in
• 1:15:04
  Speaker 3: the vicinity of the parties who are wholly disinterested. It
• 1:15:08
  Speaker 3: is no disadvantage to have the cause tried by a
• 1:15:11
  Speaker 3: jury of strangers. Indeed, the latter is generally the most eligible.
• 1:15:18
  Speaker 3: But the truth is the creation of all inferior courts
• 1:15:22
  Speaker 3: is in the power of Congress, and the Constitution provides
• 1:15:26
  Speaker 3: that the Congress shall make such exceptions from the right
• 1:15:30
  Speaker 3: of appeals as they shall judge proper. When these courts
• 1:15:35
  Speaker 3: are erected, their jurisdictions will be ascertained, and in small actions,
• 1:15:41
  Speaker 3: Congress will doubtless direct that a sentence in a subordinate
• 1:15:44
  Speaker 3: court shall to a certain amount be definitive and final.
• 1:15:49
  Speaker 3: All objections therefore to the judicial powers of the federal
• 1:15:53
  Speaker 3: courts appear to me as trifling of any of the
• 1:15:57
  Speaker 3: proceeding nine, but say the enemies of slavery negroes may
• 1:16:03
  Speaker 3: be imported for twenty one years. This exception is addressed
• 1:16:07
  Speaker 3: to the Quakers, and a very pitiful exception it is.
• 1:16:12
  Speaker 3: The truth is Congress cannot prohibit the importation of slaves
• 1:16:17
  Speaker 3: during that period, but the laws against the importation into
• 1:16:21
  Speaker 3: particular states stand unrepealed. An immediate abolition of slavery would
• 1:16:28
  Speaker 3: bring ruin upon the whites and misery upon the Blacks
• 1:16:32
  Speaker 3: in the Southern States. The Constitution has therefore wisely left
• 1:16:37
  Speaker 3: each state to pursue its own measures with respect to
• 1:16:42
  Speaker 3: this article of legislation during the period of twenty one years.
• 1:16:47
  Speaker 3: This is the end of section five Section six of
• 1:16:56
  Speaker 3: an Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution.
• 1:17:01
  Speaker 3: This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in
• 1:17:05
  Speaker 3: the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please
• 1:17:10
  Speaker 3: visit LibriVox dot org. Read by Robert H. Churney An
• 1:17:15
  Speaker 3: Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution by
• 1:17:20
  Speaker 3: Noah Webster. Such are the principal objections that have yet
• 1:17:24
  Speaker 3: been made by the enemies of the New Constitution. They
• 1:17:28
  Speaker 3: are mostly frivolous or founded on false constructions and a
• 1:17:32
  Speaker 3: misrepresentation of the true state of facts. They are evidently
• 1:17:36
  Speaker 3: designed to raise groundless jealousies in the minds of well
• 1:17:40
  Speaker 3: meaning people who have little leisure and opportunity to examine
• 1:17:44
  Speaker 3: into the principles of government. But a little time and
• 1:17:48
  Speaker 3: reflection will enable most people to detect such mischievous intentions.
• 1:17:54
  Speaker 3: And the spirit and firmness which have distinguished the conduct
• 1:17:57
  Speaker 3: of the Americans during the conflict for independence, will eventually
• 1:18:02
  Speaker 3: triumph over the enemies of our union and bury them
• 1:18:07
  Speaker 3: in disgrace or oblivion. But I cannot quit this subject
• 1:18:12
  Speaker 3: without attempting to correct some erroneous opinions respecting freedom and
• 1:18:19
  Speaker 3: tyranny and the principles by which they are supported. Many
• 1:18:24
  Speaker 3: people seem to entertain an idea that liberty consists in
• 1:18:27
  Speaker 3: a power to act without any control. This is more
• 1:18:34
  Speaker 3: liberty than even the savages enjoy. But in civil society,
• 1:18:39
  Speaker 3: political liberty consists in acting conformably to the sense of
• 1:18:44
  Speaker 3: a majority of the society. In a free government, every
• 1:18:50
  Speaker 3: man binds himself to obey the public voice or the
• 1:18:54
  Speaker 3: opinions of a majority, and the whole society engages to
• 1:18:59
  Speaker 3: protect each individual. In such a government, a man is
• 1:19:04
  Speaker 3: free and safe. But reverse the case. Suppose every man
• 1:19:09
  Speaker 3: to act without control or fear of punishment. Every man
• 1:19:13
  Speaker 3: would be free, but no man would be sure of
• 1:19:17
  Speaker 3: his freedom one moment. Each would have the power of
• 1:19:22
  Speaker 3: taking his neighbour's life, liberty, or property, and no man
• 1:19:26
  Speaker 3: would command more than his own strength to repel the invasion.
• 1:19:31
  Speaker 3: The case is the same with states. If the states
• 1:19:35
  Speaker 3: should not unite into one compact society, every state may
• 1:19:40
  Speaker 3: trespass upon its neighbor, and the injured state has no
• 1:19:44
  Speaker 3: means of redress but its own military force. The present
• 1:19:50
  Speaker 3: situation of our American states is very little better than
• 1:19:54
  Speaker 3: a state of nature. Our boasted state sovereignties are so
• 1:19:58
  Speaker 3: far from securing our liberty and property that they every
• 1:20:02
  Speaker 3: moment expose us to the loss of both. That state
• 1:20:07
  Speaker 3: which commands the heaviest purse and longest sword, may at
• 1:20:11
  Speaker 3: any moment lay its weaker neighbor under tribute. And there
• 1:20:15
  Speaker 3: is no superior power now existing that can regularly oppose
• 1:20:19
  Speaker 3: the invasion or redress the injury from such liberty. O
• 1:20:25
  Speaker 3: Lord deliver us. But what is tyranny, or how can
• 1:20:29
  Speaker 3: a free people be deprived of their liberties. Tyranny is
• 1:20:34
  Speaker 3: the exercise of some power over a man which is
• 1:20:37
  Speaker 3: not warranted by law or necessary for the public safety.
• 1:20:41
  Speaker 3: A people can never be deprived of their liberties while
• 1:20:45
  Speaker 3: they retain in their own hands a power superior to
• 1:20:49
  Speaker 3: any other power in the state. This position leads me
• 1:20:53
  Speaker 3: directly to inquire in what consists the power of a
• 1:20:57
  Speaker 3: nation or of an order of men. In some nations,
• 1:21:01
  Speaker 3: legislators have derived much of their power from the influence
• 1:21:05
  Speaker 3: of religion, or from that implicit belief which an ignorant
• 1:21:09
  Speaker 3: or unsuperstitious people entertain of the gods and their interposition
• 1:21:15
  Speaker 3: in every transaction of life. The Roman Senate sometimes availed
• 1:21:20
  Speaker 3: themselves of this engine to carry their decrees and maintain
• 1:21:24
  Speaker 3: their authority. This was particularly the case under the aristocracy,
• 1:21:29
  Speaker 3: which succeeded the abolition of the monarchy. The augurs and
• 1:21:34
  Speaker 3: priests were taken wholly from patrician families. Footnote quad nemo
• 1:21:41
  Speaker 3: plebeius aspecia hyberet idioc de semivarius canobum diarmis n inserte
• 1:21:50
  Speaker 3: prole aspecia tera berture Titus Libus Library four, caption six.
• 1:22:01
  Speaker 3: They constituted a distinct order of men, and had power
• 1:22:05
  Speaker 3: to negative any law of the people by declaring that
• 1:22:08
  Speaker 3: it was passed during the taking of the auspices. Footnote
• 1:22:14
  Speaker 3: auguris certe sacradostique augurum tantus honus acetate ute neili ballet
• 1:22:22
  Speaker 3: dominique posti nisi aspiciato jeritour concilia populi exsia vocati sumo
• 1:22:31
  Speaker 3: rerum ubi avs non emissant derrimantur Titus Livius Library one
• 1:22:40
  Speaker 3: caption thirty seven end footnote. The influence derived from the
• 1:22:45
  Speaker 3: authority of opinion was less perceptible, but as tyrannical as
• 1:22:48
  Speaker 3: a military force. The same influence constitutes at this day
• 1:22:53
  Speaker 3: a principal support of several governments on the Eastern Continent
• 1:22:57
  Speaker 3: and perhaps in South America, but in North America, by
• 1:23:01
  Speaker 3: a singular concurrence of circumstances, the possibility of establishing this
• 1:23:07
  Speaker 3: influence as a pillar of government is wholly precluded. Another
• 1:23:12
  Speaker 3: source of power in government is a military force, but
• 1:23:16
  Speaker 3: this to be efficient must be superior to any force
• 1:23:20
  Speaker 3: that exists among the people or which they can command,
• 1:23:24
  Speaker 3: for otherwise this force would be annihilated. On the first
• 1:23:28
  Speaker 3: exercise of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can rule,
• 1:23:34
  Speaker 3: the people must be disarmed, as they are in almost
• 1:23:37
  Speaker 3: every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot
• 1:23:41
  Speaker 3: enforce unjust laws by the sword, because the whole body
• 1:23:45
  Speaker 3: of the people are armed and constitute a force superior
• 1:23:50
  Speaker 3: to any band of regular troops that can be, on
• 1:23:53
  Speaker 3: any pretense raised. In the United States, a military force
• 1:23:59
  Speaker 3: at the command and of Congress can execute no laws
• 1:24:03
  Speaker 3: but such as the people perceived to be just and constitutional,
• 1:24:07
  Speaker 3: for they will possess the power, and jealousy will instantly
• 1:24:11
  Speaker 3: inspire the inclination to resist the execution of a law
• 1:24:15
  Speaker 3: which appears to them unjust and oppressive. In spite of
• 1:24:20
  Speaker 3: all the nominal powers vested in Congress by the Constitution,
• 1:24:23
  Speaker 3: where the system, once adopted in its fullest latitude, still
• 1:24:28
  Speaker 3: the actual exercise of them would be frequently interrupted by
• 1:24:32
  Speaker 3: popular jealousy. I am bold to say that ten just
• 1:24:37
  Speaker 3: and constitutional measures would be resisted where one unjust or
• 1:24:41
  Speaker 3: oppressive law would be enforced. The powers vested in Congress
• 1:24:45
  Speaker 3: are little more than nominal, Nay, real power cannot be
• 1:24:50
  Speaker 3: vested in them, nor in anybody, but in the people.
• 1:24:54
  Speaker 3: The source of power is in the people of this
• 1:24:57
  Speaker 3: country and cannot for ages, and probably never will be removed.
• 1:25:03
  Speaker 3: In what, then, does real power consists? The answer is
• 1:25:07
  Speaker 3: short and plain, in property. Could we want any proofs
• 1:25:12
  Speaker 3: of this which are not exhibited in this country? The
• 1:25:15
  Speaker 3: uniform testimony of history will furnish us with multitudes. But
• 1:25:20
  Speaker 3: I will go no further for proof than the two
• 1:25:22
  Speaker 3: governments already mentioned. The Roman and the British Rome exhibited
• 1:25:28
  Speaker 3: a demonstrative proof of the inseparable connection between property and dominion.
• 1:25:33
  Speaker 3: The first form of its government was an elective monarchy,
• 1:25:37
  Speaker 3: its second and aristocracy. But these forms could not be
• 1:25:41
  Speaker 3: permanent because they were not supported by property. The kings
• 1:25:45
  Speaker 3: at first and Afterwhids the patricians had nominally most of
• 1:25:49
  Speaker 3: the power, but the people possessing most of the lands
• 1:25:53
  Speaker 3: never ceased to assert their privileges till they established a commonwealth.
• 1:25:58
  Speaker 3: And the kings and senate could not have held the
• 1:26:01
  Speaker 3: reigns of government in their hands so long as they did,
• 1:26:05
  Speaker 3: had they not artfully contrived to manage the established religion
• 1:26:10
  Speaker 3: and play off the superstitious credulity of the people against
• 1:26:14
  Speaker 3: their own power. Thus, this weak constitution of government, says
• 1:26:19
  Speaker 3: the ingenious mister Moyle, speaking of the aristocracy of Rome,
• 1:26:23
  Speaker 3: not founded on the true center of dominion land, nor
• 1:26:27
  Speaker 3: on any standing foundation of authority, nor riveted in the
• 1:26:32
  Speaker 3: esteem and affections of the people, and being attacked by
• 1:26:36
  Speaker 3: strong passion general interest in the joint forces of the
• 1:26:39
  Speaker 3: people molded away, of course, and pined of a lingering
• 1:26:43
  Speaker 3: consumption till it was totally swallowed up by the prevailing faction,
• 1:26:48
  Speaker 3: and the nobility were molded into the mass of the people.
• 1:26:53
  Speaker 3: Footnote Essay on the Roman government, end footnote. The people,
• 1:26:59
  Speaker 3: notwithstate the nominal authority of the patricians, proceeded regularly in
• 1:27:04
  Speaker 3: enlarging their own powers. They first extorted from the Senate
• 1:27:08
  Speaker 3: the right of electing tribunes with a negative upon the
• 1:27:11
  Speaker 3: proceedings of the Senate footnote Titus Livius two thirty three,
• 1:27:18
  Speaker 3: end footnote. They attained the right of proposing and debating laws,
• 1:27:22
  Speaker 3: which before had been vested in the Senate, and finally
• 1:27:25
  Speaker 3: advanced to the power of enacting laws without the authority
• 1:27:28
  Speaker 3: of the Senate. Footnote Titus Livius three thirty four, end footnote.
• 1:27:35
  Speaker 3: They had gained the rights of election in their committee
• 1:27:39
  Speaker 3: of which they had been deprived by Servius Telius footnote
• 1:27:44
  Speaker 3: Titus Livius three thirty three end footnote. They procured a
• 1:27:51
  Speaker 3: permanent body of laws collected from the Grecian institutions. They
• 1:27:56
  Speaker 3: destroyed the influence of augurs or diviners by estate bablishing
• 1:28:00
  Speaker 3: the tributes commetia, in which they were not allowed to
• 1:28:05
  Speaker 3: consult the gods. They increased their power by large accessions
• 1:28:09
  Speaker 3: of conquered land. They procured a repeal of the law
• 1:28:13
  Speaker 3: which prohibited marriages between the patricians and plebeians. Footnote Titus
• 1:28:20
  Speaker 3: Livius four six endoe. The Lycinian law limited all politicians
• 1:28:27
  Speaker 3: to five hundred acres of land, which, had it been
• 1:28:30
  Speaker 3: fully executed, would have secured the commonwealth. The Romans proceeded thus,
• 1:28:35
  Speaker 3: step by step to triumph over the aristocracy and to
• 1:28:39
  Speaker 3: crown their privileges. They procured the right of being elected
• 1:28:43
  Speaker 3: to the highest offices of the state by acquiring the
• 1:28:47
  Speaker 3: property of the plebeians. The nobilities several times held most
• 1:28:51
  Speaker 3: of the power of the state, but the people, by
• 1:28:53
  Speaker 3: reducing the interest of money, abolishing debts, or by forcing
• 1:28:57
  Speaker 3: other advantages from the patricians, generally held the power of
• 1:29:02
  Speaker 3: governing in their own hens. In America, we begin our
• 1:29:07
  Speaker 3: empire with more popular privileges than the Romans ever enjoyed.
• 1:29:13
  Speaker 3: We have not to struggle against a monarch or an aristocracy.
• 1:29:19
  Speaker 3: Power is lodged in the mass of the people. On
• 1:29:23
  Speaker 3: reviewing the English history, we observe a progress similar to
• 1:29:27
  Speaker 3: that in Rome, an incessant struggle for liberty from the
• 1:29:32
  Speaker 3: date of the Magna Carta in John's reign to the Revolution.
• 1:29:37
  Speaker 3: The struggle has been successful by abridging the enormous power
• 1:29:41
  Speaker 3: of the nobility. But we observe that the power of
• 1:29:45
  Speaker 3: the people has increased in exact proportion to their acquisitions
• 1:29:51
  Speaker 3: of property. Wherever the right of primogeniture is established, property
• 1:29:57
  Speaker 3: must accumulate and remain in fame emilies. Thus, the landed
• 1:30:02
  Speaker 3: property in England will never be sufficiently distributed to give
• 1:30:07
  Speaker 3: the powers of government wholly into the hands of the people.
• 1:30:11
  Speaker 3: But to assist the struggle for liberty, commerce has interposed,
• 1:30:16
  Speaker 3: and in conjunction with manufactures, thrown a vast weight of
• 1:30:20
  Speaker 3: property into the democratical scale. Wherever we cast our eyes
• 1:30:26
  Speaker 3: we see this truth that property is the basis of power,
• 1:30:33
  Speaker 3: and this being established as a cardinal point directs us
• 1:30:37
  Speaker 3: to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws irrevocable
• 1:30:43
  Speaker 3: laws in every state, destroying and barring entailments. Leave real
• 1:30:49
  Speaker 3: estates to revolve from hand to hand as time and
• 1:30:53
  Speaker 3: accident may direct, and no family influence can be acquired
• 1:30:58
  Speaker 3: and established for a series of generations. No man can
• 1:31:02
  Speaker 3: obtain dominion over a large territory. The laborious and saving,
• 1:31:08
  Speaker 3: who are generally the best citizens, will possess each his
• 1:31:12
  Speaker 3: share of property and power, and thus the balance of
• 1:31:15
  Speaker 3: wealth and power will continue where it is in the
• 1:31:20
  Speaker 3: body of the people. A general and tolerably equal distribution
• 1:31:25
  Speaker 3: of landed property is the whole basis of national freedom.
• 1:31:28
  Speaker 3: The system of the Great modusque will ever be erroneous
• 1:31:33
  Speaker 3: till the words property or lands in fee simple are
• 1:31:37
  Speaker 3: substituted for virtue throughout his spirit of laws. Virtue, patriotism,
• 1:31:45
  Speaker 3: or love of country. Never was and never will be
• 1:31:49
  Speaker 3: till men's natures are changed a fixed, permanent principle and
• 1:31:54
  Speaker 3: support of government. But in an agricultural country, a general
• 1:31:58
  Speaker 3: possession of land in fee simple may be rendered perpetual,
• 1:32:04
  Speaker 3: and the inequalities introduced by commerce are too fluctuating to
• 1:32:09
  Speaker 3: endanger government. An equality of property with a necessity of alienation,
• 1:32:15
  Speaker 3: constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families is the
• 1:32:21
  Speaker 3: very soul of a republic. While this continues, the people
• 1:32:27
  Speaker 3: will inevitably possess both power and freedom. When this is lost,
• 1:32:34
  Speaker 3: power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will eventually assume
• 1:32:42
  Speaker 3: some other form. This is the end of section six.
• 1:32:54
  Speaker 3: Section seven of An Examination into the Leading Principles of
• 1:32:57
  Speaker 3: the Federal Constitution is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings
• 1:33:03
  Speaker 3: are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer,
• 1:33:08
  Speaker 3: please visit LibriVox dot org. Read by Robert H. Churney.
• 1:33:14
  Speaker 3: An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution
• 1:33:18
  Speaker 3: by Noah Webster, The liberty of the press, trial by jury,
• 1:33:24
  Speaker 3: the habeas corpus writ even Magna carta itself, although justly
• 1:33:29
  Speaker 3: deemed the palladia of freedom, are all inferior considerations when
• 1:33:35
  Speaker 3: compared with a general distribution of real property among every
• 1:33:40
  Speaker 3: class of people. Footnote. Montesquieu proposed virtue to be the
• 1:33:46
  Speaker 3: principle of a republic. He derived his notions of this
• 1:33:50
  Speaker 3: form of government from the astonishing firmness courage and patriotism
• 1:33:55
  Speaker 3: which distinguished the republics of Greece and Rome. But this
• 1:33:59
  Speaker 3: virtue view consisted in pride, contempt of strangers, and a
• 1:34:04
  Speaker 3: martial enthusiasm which sometimes displayed itself in defense of their country.
• 1:34:10
  Speaker 3: These principles were never permanent. They decay with refinement, intercourse
• 1:34:15
  Speaker 3: with other nations, and increase of wealth. No wonder, then,
• 1:34:19
  Speaker 3: that these republics declined, for they were not founded on
• 1:34:23
  Speaker 3: fixed principles, and hence authors imagine that republics cannot be durable.
• 1:34:29
  Speaker 3: None of the celebrated writers seem to have laid sufficient
• 1:34:33
  Speaker 3: stress on a general possession of real property in fee simple.
• 1:34:38
  Speaker 3: Even the author of the political Sketches in the Museum
• 1:34:41
  Speaker 3: for the month of September seems to have passed it
• 1:34:44
  Speaker 3: over in silence. Although he combats Mondescue's system to prove
• 1:34:50
  Speaker 3: it falls, enumerates some of the principles which distinguish our
• 1:34:54
  Speaker 3: governments from others, and which he supposes constitute the support
• 1:34:59
  Speaker 3: of republics. The English writers on law and government consider
• 1:35:04
  Speaker 3: magna carta, trial by juris, the Habeas Corpus Act, and
• 1:35:08
  Speaker 3: the liberty of the press as the bulwarks of freedom
• 1:35:12
  Speaker 3: all of this as well, But in no government of
• 1:35:15
  Speaker 3: consequence in Europe is freedom established to its true and
• 1:35:19
  Speaker 3: immovable foundation. The property is too much accumulated, and the
• 1:35:24
  Speaker 3: accumulations too well guarded to admit the true principle of republics.
• 1:35:32
  Speaker 3: But few centuries have elapsed since the body of the
• 1:35:35
  Speaker 3: people were vassals two such men. The smallest extension of
• 1:35:40
  Speaker 3: popular privileges was deemed an invaluable blessing, hence the economiums
• 1:35:47
  Speaker 3: upon trial by juries, and the articles just mentioned. But
• 1:35:51
  Speaker 3: these people have never been able to mount to the
• 1:35:54
  Speaker 3: full source of liberty as states in fee, or at
• 1:36:00
  Speaker 3: least but partially, they are yet able to drink at
• 1:36:04
  Speaker 3: the streams. Hence the English jealousy of certain rights which
• 1:36:09
  Speaker 3: are guaranteed by parliament. But here in America, and here alone,
• 1:36:14
  Speaker 3: we have gone at once to the fountain of liberty
• 1:36:18
  Speaker 3: and raised the people to their true dignity. Let the
• 1:36:22
  Speaker 3: lands be possessed by the people in fee, simple, and
• 1:36:27
  Speaker 3: the fountain be kept pure, and the streams will be pure.
• 1:36:32
  Speaker 3: Of course, our jealousy of trial by jury and the
• 1:36:36
  Speaker 3: liberty of the press, etc. Is totally groundless. Such rights
• 1:36:41
  Speaker 3: are inseparably connected with the power and dignity of the
• 1:36:47
  Speaker 3: people which rests on their property. They cannot be abridged.
• 1:36:53
  Speaker 3: All other nations have rested property and freedom from barons
• 1:36:59
  Speaker 3: and tyrants. We begin our empire with full possession of
• 1:37:04
  Speaker 3: property and all its attending rights. End footnote. The power
• 1:37:11
  Speaker 3: of entailing estates is more dangerous to liberty and republican
• 1:37:15
  Speaker 3: government than all the constitutions that can be written on
• 1:37:18
  Speaker 3: paper or even with a standing army. Let the people
• 1:37:23
  Speaker 3: have property, and they will have power, a power that
• 1:37:27
  Speaker 3: will forever be exerted to prevent a restriction of the press,
• 1:37:32
  Speaker 3: an abolition of trial by jury, or the abridgment of
• 1:37:36
  Speaker 3: any other privilege. The liberties of America, therefore, and her
• 1:37:41
  Speaker 3: forms of government stand on the broadest basis, removed from
• 1:37:46
  Speaker 3: the fears of a foreign invasion and conquest. They are
• 1:37:49
  Speaker 3: not exposed to the convulsions that shake other governments, and
• 1:37:54
  Speaker 3: the principles of freedom are so general and energetic as
• 1:37:58
  Speaker 3: to exclude the possible disability of a change in our
• 1:38:02
  Speaker 3: republican constitutions. But while property is considered as the basis
• 1:38:08
  Speaker 3: of the freedom of the American yeomanry, there are other
• 1:38:13
  Speaker 3: auxiliary supports, among which is the information of the people.
• 1:38:19
  Speaker 3: In no country is education so general. In no country
• 1:38:24
  Speaker 3: have the body of the people such a knowledge of
• 1:38:27
  Speaker 3: the rights of men and the principles of government. This knowledge,
• 1:38:32
  Speaker 3: joined with a keen sense of liberty and a watchful jealousy,
• 1:38:36
  Speaker 3: will guard our constitutions and awaken the people to an
• 1:38:40
  Speaker 3: instantaneous resistance of encroachments. But a principal bulwark of freedom
• 1:38:46
  Speaker 3: is the right of election. An equal distribution of property
• 1:38:51
  Speaker 3: is the foundation of a republic. But popular elections form
• 1:38:57
  Speaker 3: the great barrier which defends it from assault and guards
• 1:39:00
  Speaker 3: it from the flow and imperceptible approaches of corruption. Americans
• 1:39:07
  Speaker 3: never resign that right. It is not very material whether
• 1:39:11
  Speaker 3: your representatives are elected for one year or two, but
• 1:39:15
  Speaker 3: the right is the magna carter of your governments. For
• 1:39:20
  Speaker 3: this reason, expunge that clause of the new Constitution before mentioned,
• 1:39:25
  Speaker 3: which gives Congress an influence in the election of their
• 1:39:29
  Speaker 3: own body. The time, place, and manner of choosing senators
• 1:39:33
  Speaker 3: or of representatives are of little or no consequence to Congress.
• 1:39:38
  Speaker 3: The number of members and the time of meeting in
• 1:39:41
  Speaker 3: Congress are fixed. But the choice should rest solely with
• 1:39:45
  Speaker 3: the several states. I repeat it reject the clause with decency,
• 1:39:52
  Speaker 3: but with unanimity and firmness accepting that clause. The Constitution
• 1:39:58
  Speaker 3: is good. It guarantees the fundation mental principles of our
• 1:40:02
  Speaker 3: several constitutions. It guards our rights, And while it vests
• 1:40:06
  Speaker 3: extensive powers in Congress, it vests no more than are
• 1:40:11
  Speaker 3: necessary for our union, without powers lodged somewhere in a
• 1:40:15
  Speaker 3: single body, fully competent to lay and collect equal taxes
• 1:40:20
  Speaker 3: and duties, to adjust controversies between different states, to silence
• 1:40:26
  Speaker 3: contending interests, to suppress insurrections, to regulate commerce, to treat
• 1:40:32
  Speaker 3: with foreign nations. Our confederation is a cobweb, liable to
• 1:40:37
  Speaker 3: be blown asunder by every blast of faction that is
• 1:40:41
  Speaker 3: raised in the remotest corner of the United States. Every
• 1:40:45
  Speaker 3: motive that can possibly influence men ever to unite under
• 1:40:49
  Speaker 3: civil government. Now urges the unanimous adoption of the new Constitution.
• 1:40:54
  Speaker 3: But in America we are urged to it by a
• 1:40:58
  Speaker 3: singular necessity, by the local situation of the several states.
• 1:41:03
  Speaker 3: A few command all the advantages of commerce. Those states
• 1:41:09
  Speaker 3: which have no advantages, made equal exertions for independence, loaded
• 1:41:13
  Speaker 3: themselves with immense debts, and are now utterly unable to
• 1:41:17
  Speaker 3: discharge them, while their richer neighbors are taxing them for
• 1:41:22
  Speaker 3: their own benefit merely because they can. I can prove
• 1:41:26
  Speaker 3: to a demonstration the Connecticut, which has the heaviest internal
• 1:41:30
  Speaker 3: or state debt in proportion to its number of inhabitants
• 1:41:33
  Speaker 3: of any in the Union, cannot discharge its debt on
• 1:41:38
  Speaker 3: any principles of taxation ever yet practiced. Yet the state
• 1:41:43
  Speaker 3: pays in duties at least one hundred thousand dollars annually
• 1:41:48
  Speaker 3: on goods consumed by its own people but imported by
• 1:41:53
  Speaker 3: New York. This sum, could it be saved to the
• 1:41:57
  Speaker 3: state by an equal system of revenue, would enable that
• 1:42:01
  Speaker 3: state gradually to sink its debt. Footnote. The state debt
• 1:42:06
  Speaker 3: of Connecticut is about three million, five hundred thousand dollars,
• 1:42:10
  Speaker 3: its proportion of the federal debt about the same sum.
• 1:42:14
  Speaker 3: The annual interest of the whole four hundred and twenty
• 1:42:19
  Speaker 3: thousand dollars end footnote. New Jersey and some other states
• 1:42:25
  Speaker 3: are in the same situation, except that their debts are
• 1:42:28
  Speaker 3: not so large in proportion to their wealth and population.
• 1:42:32
  Speaker 3: The boundaries of these several states were not drawn with
• 1:42:35
  Speaker 3: a view to independence, and While this country was subject
• 1:42:38
  Speaker 3: to Great Britain, they produced no commercial or political inconveniences.
• 1:42:43
  Speaker 3: But the Revolution has placed things on a different footing.
• 1:42:47
  Speaker 3: The advantages of some states and the disadvantages of others
• 1:42:51
  Speaker 3: are so great and so materially affect the business and
• 1:42:55
  Speaker 3: interest of each that nothing but an equalizing system of
• 1:42:59
  Speaker 3: revenue that shall reduce the advantages to some equitable proportion,
• 1:43:04
  Speaker 3: can prevent a civil war and save the national debt.
• 1:43:08
  Speaker 3: Such a system of revenue is the sinequon non of
• 1:43:11
  Speaker 3: public justice and tranquility. It is absurd for a man
• 1:43:15
  Speaker 3: to oppose the adoption of the Constitution because he thinks
• 1:43:20
  Speaker 3: some part of it defective or exceptionable. Let every man
• 1:43:23
  Speaker 3: be at liberty to expunge what he judges to be exceptionable,
• 1:43:28
  Speaker 3: and not a syllable of the Constitution will survive the scrutiny.
• 1:43:32
  Speaker 3: A painter, after executing a masterly piece, requested every spectator
• 1:43:37
  Speaker 3: to draw a pencil over the part that did not
• 1:43:40
  Speaker 3: please him. But to his surprise, he soon found the
• 1:43:45
  Speaker 3: whole piece defaced. Let every man examine the most perfect
• 1:43:49
  Speaker 3: building by his own taste, and, like some microscopic critics,
• 1:43:55
  Speaker 3: condemn the whole for small deviations from the rules of architecture,
• 1:44:00
  Speaker 3: and not a part of the best constructed fabric would escape.
• 1:44:04
  Speaker 3: But let any man take a comprehensive view of the whole,
• 1:44:08
  Speaker 3: and he will be pleased with the general beauty and proportions,
• 1:44:12
  Speaker 3: and admire the structure. The same remarks apply to the
• 1:44:16
  Speaker 3: new Constitution. I have no doubt that every member of
• 1:44:20
  Speaker 3: the late Convention has exceptions to some part of the
• 1:44:25
  Speaker 3: system proposed. Their constituents have the same. And if every
• 1:44:30
  Speaker 3: objection must be removed before we have a national government, lord,
• 1:44:35
  Speaker 3: have mercy on us. Perfection is not the lot of humanity.
• 1:44:39
  Speaker 3: Instead of censuring the small faults of the Constitution, I
• 1:44:43
  Speaker 3: am astonished that so many clashing interests have been reconciled,
• 1:44:47
  Speaker 3: and so many sacrifices made to the general interest. The
• 1:44:52
  Speaker 3: mutual concessions made by the gentlemen of the Convention reflect
• 1:44:56
  Speaker 3: the highest honor on their candor and liberality. At the
• 1:45:00
  Speaker 3: same time, they prove that their minds were deeply impressed
• 1:45:05
  Speaker 3: with a conviction that such mutual sacrifices are essential to
• 1:45:11
  Speaker 3: our union. They must be made sooner or later by
• 1:45:16
  Speaker 3: every state or jealousies, local interests and prejudices will unsheathe
• 1:45:22
  Speaker 3: the sword, and some Caesar or Cromwell will avail himself
• 1:45:27
  Speaker 3: of our divisions and weighed to a throne through streams
• 1:45:32
  Speaker 3: of blood. It is not our duty as freemen to
• 1:45:36
  Speaker 3: receive the opinions of any men, however great and respectable,
• 1:45:41
  Speaker 3: without an examination. But when we reflect that some of
• 1:45:45
  Speaker 3: the greatest men in America, with the venerable Franklin and
• 1:45:50
  Speaker 3: the illustrious Washington at their head, some of them the
• 1:45:56
  Speaker 3: fathers and saviors of their country men who have labored
• 1:46:01
  Speaker 3: at the helm during a long and violent tempest and
• 1:46:05
  Speaker 3: guided us to the haven of peace, and all of
• 1:46:09
  Speaker 3: them distinguished for their abilities, their acquaintance with the ancient
• 1:46:14
  Speaker 3: and modern governments, as well as with the temper, the passions,
• 1:46:19
  Speaker 3: the interests, and the wishes of the Americans. When we
• 1:46:24
  Speaker 3: reflect on these circumstances, it is impossible to resist impressions
• 1:46:30
  Speaker 3: of respect, and we are almost impelled to suspect our
• 1:46:35
  Speaker 3: own judgments when we call in question any part of
• 1:46:40
  Speaker 3: the system which they have recommended for adoption. Not having
• 1:46:45
  Speaker 3: the same means of information, we are more liable to
• 1:46:49
  Speaker 3: mistake the nature and tendency of particular articles of the Constitution,
• 1:46:54
  Speaker 3: or the reasons on which they were admitted. Great confidence
• 1:46:58
  Speaker 3: therefore should be posed in the ability, the zeal and
• 1:47:03
  Speaker 3: integrity of that respectable body. But after all, if the
• 1:47:08
  Speaker 3: Constitution should, in its future operation be found defective or inconvenient,
• 1:47:15
  Speaker 3: two thirds of both Houses of Congress, or the application
• 1:47:19
  Speaker 3: of two thirds of the legislatures, may open the door
• 1:47:22
  Speaker 3: for amendments. Such improvements may then be made, as experience
• 1:47:28
  Speaker 3: shall dictate. Let us and then consider the new Federal
• 1:47:32
  Speaker 3: Constitution as it really is, an improvement on the best
• 1:47:37
  Speaker 3: constitutions that the world ever saw. In the House of Representatives,
• 1:47:43
  Speaker 3: the people of America have an equal voice in suffrage.
• 1:47:47
  Speaker 3: The choice of the men is placed in the freemen
• 1:47:50
  Speaker 3: or electors at large, and the frequency of elections and
• 1:47:54
  Speaker 3: the responsibility of the members will render them sufficiently dependent
• 1:47:59
  Speaker 3: on their construct The Senate will be composed of older men,
• 1:48:04
  Speaker 3: and while their regular dismission from office once in six
• 1:48:07
  Speaker 3: years will preserve their dependence on their constituents, the duration
• 1:48:12
  Speaker 3: of their existence will give firmness to their decisions and
• 1:48:16
  Speaker 3: temper the factions which must necessarily prevail in the other branch.
• 1:48:21
  Speaker 3: The President of the United States is elective, and what
• 1:48:24
  Speaker 3: is a capital improvement on the best governments. The mode
• 1:48:28
  Speaker 3: of choosing him excludes the danger of faction and corruption.
• 1:48:32
  Speaker 3: As the supreme executive, he is invested with power to
• 1:48:36
  Speaker 3: enforce the laws of the Union and give energy to
• 1:48:39
  Speaker 3: the federal government. The Constitution defines the powers of Congress,
• 1:48:44
  Speaker 3: and every power not expressly delegated to that body remains
• 1:48:48
  Speaker 3: in the several state legislatures. The sovereignty and the republican
• 1:48:53
  Speaker 3: form of government of each state is guaranteed by the Constitution,
• 1:48:58
  Speaker 3: and the bounds of jurisdiction between the federal and respective
• 1:49:02
  Speaker 3: state governments are marked with precision. In theory, it has
• 1:49:07
  Speaker 3: all the energy and freedom of the British and Roman
• 1:49:10
  Speaker 3: governments without their defects. In short, the privileges of free
• 1:49:16
  Speaker 3: men are interwoven into the very feelings and habits of
• 1:49:20
  Speaker 3: the Americans. Liberty stands on the immovable basis of a
• 1:49:25
  Speaker 3: general distribution of property and diffusion of knowledge. But the
• 1:49:30
  Speaker 3: Americans must cease to contend to fear and to hate
• 1:49:34
  Speaker 3: before they can realize the benefits of independence and government,
• 1:49:38
  Speaker 3: or enjoy the blessings which Heaven has lavished in rich
• 1:49:43
  Speaker 3: profusion upon this Western world. This is the end of
• 1:49:49
  Speaker 3: Section seven and the end of an examination into the
• 1:49:52
  Speaker 3: leading principles of the Federal Constitution by Noah Webster,