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Why Oil Prices Are Decoupling From Geopolitical Threats · Trumponomics

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Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News. I want to just
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Speaker 1: thank you our great host Canada, but you'll probably hear
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Speaker 1: what I see and I have to be back here.
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Speaker 2: I'm Stephanie Flanders, head of Government and Economics at Bloomberg.
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Speaker 2: Welcome to Trumponomics, the podcast that looks at the economic
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Speaker 2: world of Donald Trump, how he's already shaped the global economy,
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Speaker 2: and what on earth is going to happen next. We're
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Speaker 2: recording this on Tuesday, the seventeenth of June, hours before
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Speaker 2: the official end of the fifty first g seventh Summit
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Speaker 2: being hosted in Canada, but after the US President unexpectedly
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Speaker 2: departed a day early. Maybe we shouldn't be so surprised.
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Speaker 2: He's made no secret of his disdain for these official
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Speaker 2: gatherings of world leaders, I mean, collective decision making. It's
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Speaker 2: not really his thing, nor is sharing the spotlight. Why
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Speaker 2: stick around arguing over a stupid communicate when you can
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Speaker 2: steal all the headlines by jumping on a plane unexpectedly
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Speaker 2: and posting on truth social But headlines aren't the same
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Speaker 2: as results, and so far, the president's one man banned
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Speaker 2: approach to ending foreign wars hasn't been going very well
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Speaker 2: at all. As I mentioned, we're recording this on the Tuesday,
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Speaker 2: the seventeenth of June. The conflict between Iran and Israel
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Speaker 2: appears to be intensifying today, and obviously we don't know
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Speaker 2: what will happen in the region before you listen to this,
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Speaker 2: but we can ask what the crisis in the Middle
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Speaker 2: East and potentially a soaring oil price would mean for
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Speaker 2: the US economy and for Donald Trump. And we've got
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Speaker 2: two brilliant voices to speak to that from our Bloomberg
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Speaker 2: Economics team in London here with me, which I'm like
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Speaker 2: to say is not always the case. Diaddou, chief emerging
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Speaker 2: markets economist, who's also a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy
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Speaker 2: School and a great friend of the show. We heard
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Speaker 2: him a few weeks ago in Qatar. It was great
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Speaker 2: to be here and in Washington. Jenny Welch, our chief
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Speaker 2: geoeconomics analyst. Jenny, who's also been on the show several times,
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Speaker 2: previously served as the director for China and Taiwan on
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Speaker 2: the US National Security Council under the Biden and old
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Speaker 2: Trump administrations.
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Speaker 1: Thanks so much, Stephanie, an honor to be here.
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Speaker 2: Jenny you're someone who's I spent a fair bit of
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Speaker 2: time preparing notes for G seven summits, and I was
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Speaker 2: remembering that Donald Trump in his first term, he left
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Speaker 2: the last G seven that was also held in Canada
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Speaker 2: in a half about Canadian milk quotas. Is there any
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Speaker 2: point having them these G seven meetings in the age
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Speaker 2: of Donald Trump.
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Speaker 1: Well, interestingly enough, I think we're going to get an
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Speaker 1: answer to that question today on what the remaining G
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Speaker 1: seven leader is another guest at the summit accomplished now
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Speaker 1: that President Trump has departed it. They were able to
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Speaker 1: put out yesterday a statement on the ongoing Israel Ron conflict,
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Speaker 1: but even then they had to do a lot of
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Speaker 1: backroom dealing to get President Trump to sign on to it. Otherwise,
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Speaker 1: the expectations for the summer were pretty low heading into it.
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Speaker 1: I think there was a lot of focus really more
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Speaker 1: on Trump's bilateral meetings that he was due to hold
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Speaker 1: on the sidelines on the summit, then on what the
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Speaker 1: leaders themselves are going to accomplish.
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Speaker 2: There is so much focus on who gets the bilateral
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Speaker 2: with Donald Trump, and I guess the ones who were
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Speaker 2: shortchanged have got an excuse. They say, oh, well, they
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Speaker 2: had to leave. But did he get anything done before
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Speaker 2: he left in any of these meetings.
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Speaker 1: Well, we got additional progress. I say progress because there's
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Speaker 1: still some unsolved elements of the US UK trade deal,
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Speaker 1: but we didn't get progress on Japan, South Korea, India,
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Speaker 1: which were kind of the other major trade deals that
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Speaker 1: were building anticipation for some sort of announcement at this meeting.
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Speaker 1: But Japan had their meeting and was surprisingly not able
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Speaker 1: to come out of it with any major announcements. All
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Speaker 1: of this, by the way, and just under a month
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Speaker 1: until the deadline for reciprocal terrorists coming back in at
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Speaker 1: those higher rates. Another leader who also wasn't able to
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Speaker 1: have a meeting with President Trump was President Zelenski, who
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Speaker 1: was a guest at this year's G seven as he
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Speaker 1: has been in years past, and was probably very interested
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Speaker 1: in having that conversation in light of negotiations with Russia
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Speaker 1: continuing to sell out, concerns about us A continuing not
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Speaker 1: to come through, and kind of the broader game plan
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Speaker 1: for Russia Ukraine under President Trump.
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Speaker 2: The reason that Donald Trump went back to White House
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Speaker 2: was apparently to think harder potentially respond to the intensifying
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Speaker 2: conflict between Iran and Israel over the last few days.
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Speaker 2: I'm sure people listening will have been following most of
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Speaker 2: the twists and turns. But just in terms of the
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Speaker 2: market and the potential economic impact, just talk us through
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Speaker 2: briefly how markets have responded to all intense purposes outbreak
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Speaker 2: of war since the end of last week.
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Speaker 3: Right the main market that we're talking about that's relevant
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Speaker 3: for the global economy is obviously the oil market. All
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Speaker 3: prices did go up or have gone up since Friday thirteenth.
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Speaker 3: Before the conflict, oil was around sixty seven dollars per barrel.
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Speaker 3: Now is around seventy five dollars per barrel. It did
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Speaker 3: go up. There are some attacks on refineries in Israel
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Speaker 3: and Iran, but nothing major, no major disruption. They're up
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Speaker 3: because of worries about potential disruption and oil supply and
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Speaker 3: our two risks here. There's one risk, which is basically
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Speaker 3: Israel hitting Iranian energy facilities oil and gas and at
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Speaker 3: risk here we're talking about Iran's oil productions about three
5:38
Speaker 3: percent of global supply. And there is the second risk,
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Speaker 3: which is potential Iranian retaliation on all facilities in the
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Speaker 3: Gulf and the arp Golf countries. In Saudi, in the Oe,
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Speaker 3: in Kuwait and so on, and at risk. Here we're
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Speaker 3: talking about one third of global supply or a closure
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Speaker 3: of the Strait of Hormus, through which goes one fifth
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Speaker 3: of global oil supply, so large quantities, and that will
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Speaker 3: have implications for all prices. We looked at the scenarios.
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Speaker 3: If you get the first scenario in which you get
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Speaker 3: just a disruption an Iranian all supply and you lose
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Speaker 3: three percent or most of the three percent of global
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Speaker 3: all supply, we're talking about all prices in the mid seventies,
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Speaker 3: which is roughly where they are now. If we get
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Speaker 3: a major disruption and then shut down of the Strait
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Speaker 3: of Humers and the world loses one fifth of its
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Speaker 3: global all supply, which is something based by the way,
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Speaker 3: is unprecedented, never happened. We're talking about a major oil
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Speaker 3: shock that could take all prices to one hundred and
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Speaker 3: thirty dollars per barrel.
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Speaker 2: Okay, and if in the past we've had oil shops.
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Speaker 2: I know you've also looked at what history shares on
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Speaker 2: that front. What does that look like for the broader economy.
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Speaker 3: Let's just talk about recent history and then we talk
6:44
Speaker 3: about the longer history, the recent history, past twelve to
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Speaker 3: twenty months, we've had every imaginable geopolitical us has materialized.
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Speaker 3: A war in Gaza and devastation and Gaza that has happened,
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Speaker 3: an expansion of the war, and to eleven on, a
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Speaker 3: c area that has happened. Regime change in the Middle East.
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Speaker 3: Look at whos in the presidential palace in Damascus now
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Speaker 3: a different person to a year ago. A direct war
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Speaker 3: between Iran and Israel. It's not a one day it's
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Speaker 3: a multi day war, and that is happening right now.
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Speaker 3: So everything that we thought was remote and unlikely has materialized,
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Speaker 3: and yet there's no pass through to all prices. In fact,
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Speaker 3: even after the increase in all prices over the past week,
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Speaker 3: oil today is lower than October six, when it was
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Speaker 3: eighty five dollars per barrel. So this decoupling between oil
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Speaker 3: and geopolitical risk is something that we have witness over
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Speaker 3: the past twenty months. Let's now look at the longer
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Speaker 3: time horizon. Over the past fifty years, there's been I
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Speaker 3: think seven major turmoils in the Middle East, from the
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Speaker 3: nineteen seventy three war all the way out to twenty
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Speaker 3: twenty three. October seventh attacks. Of these seven turmoils, three
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Speaker 3: of them have had little impact on all prices. Two
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Speaker 3: did have an impact on oil, but that was short lived,
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Speaker 3: only lasted for a few months, and only the remaining
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Speaker 3: two have had the lasting impact on all prices. These
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Speaker 3: were the nineteen seventy three war, Arab Israeli War and
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Speaker 3: the Iranian Revolution of nineteen seventy nine. These also happened
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Speaker 3: to be the oldest two events in our sample. So
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Speaker 3: it seems that recently oil is getting decoupling from geopolitical
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Speaker 3: events and escalation, but it's also something that has been
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Speaker 3: happening over the past few decades as well.
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Speaker 2: This is an administration that has talked more about oil
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Speaker 2: than most, I mean, has been very keen on expanding
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Speaker 2: US energy production. Donald Trump has also talked about and
8:40
Speaker 2: his Treasury sectary has talked about wanting to get oil
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Speaker 2: prices down as one of the key parts of the
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Speaker 2: economic strategy. This sort of decoupling of what's going on
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Speaker 2: in the Middle East geopolitical conflict from the oil price.
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Speaker 2: Do you think that is changing the way the administration
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Speaker 2: will look at the risks of this situation. They will
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Speaker 2: feel sort of a sense of reassurance that none of
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Speaker 2: this is really going to come back to bite them
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Speaker 2: in terms of the price of the pump.
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Speaker 1: It does strike me that we don't see the same
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Speaker 1: sort of sense of urgency to act and diffuse tensions
9:14
Speaker 1: this time around that we might have expected a few
9:17
Speaker 1: years ago when the US was more concerned about its
9:20
Speaker 1: energy dependence on the Middle East. You know, for example,
9:23
Speaker 1: President Trump's comments over the weekend that he was contemplating
9:26
Speaker 1: just letting Israel and Iran fight it out, I think
9:29
Speaker 1: would have been unthinkable a decade ago, certainly, you know,
9:33
Speaker 1: twenty years ago. That being said, you know, it's very
9:37
Speaker 1: difficult to see inside this administration's current calculus, for lack
9:41
Speaker 1: of a better word, on the conflict. There's been a
9:44
Speaker 1: lot of mixed signals, including you know, President Trump's early
9:47
Speaker 1: departure from the G seven last night was a rather
9:50
Speaker 1: unusual step that had a lot of folks worried, in
9:52
Speaker 1: combination with the movement of military assets out to the regions.
9:56
Speaker 1: I'm very concerning true social posts. And yet we woke
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Speaker 1: up this morning in Washington to seeing US hasn't acted yet.
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Speaker 1: What exactly is the next step, I think is something
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Speaker 1: that We're continuing to watch Keenlee. Maybe by the time
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Speaker 1: this podcast there as we'll have an answer to that question.
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Speaker 1: But at the moment a lot of uncertainty about exactly
10:15
Speaker 1: what the US strategy is here.
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Speaker 2: We've had the most sort of extreme examples of that
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Speaker 2: tea coupling of geopolitics from the old price in the
10:22
Speaker 2: last two years. But the indication of what you were
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Speaker 2: saying is that this has been something that's been coming
10:27
Speaker 2: for a long time. I mean, if we look at
10:28
Speaker 2: the amount of instability across the world, but particularly in
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Speaker 2: the Middle Aged if there's a conflict that becomes much
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Speaker 2: more regional in scale, do you think that would be
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Speaker 2: the thing that would change the way markets were thinking
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Speaker 2: about this moment because it kind of brings into question
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Speaker 2: broader global stability, or you just think you can throw
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Speaker 2: anything at these markets.
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Speaker 3: I mean, right now market seems quite relaxed and calm,
10:54
Speaker 3: given the level of escalation that we're seeing now. It's
10:57
Speaker 3: not normal to see Daranga and bomb tel Aviv gain bomb.
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Speaker 3: That's absolutely not normal. So I think it's important to
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Speaker 3: think why there is a decoupling between geopolitics and oil,
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Speaker 3: and also to think about the link between oil and
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Speaker 3: the global economy. So I think the reasons why geopolitics
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Speaker 3: seems to be decoupling from oil, I think there's multiple
11:17
Speaker 3: factors here. There's a factor in which there is probably
11:21
Speaker 3: more oil storage now than the early nineteen seventies, so
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Speaker 3: the world is better prepared for it. There is a
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Speaker 3: factor in which we do have more supply from the
11:29
Speaker 3: rest of the world. The Middle eas share is still important,
11:32
Speaker 3: but it's not just a supply of oil. It's general
11:34
Speaker 3: supply of energy. We're talking about dirty energy like coal,
11:37
Speaker 3: but also cleaner energy like renewables. And also typically when
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Speaker 3: you have an oil price shock, what happens to the world.
11:43
Speaker 3: He gets slower growth, you get higher inflation, and you
11:45
Speaker 3: get higher interest rates. That's the sort of rule of
11:47
Speaker 3: thumb that we have in our global economic models. But
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Speaker 3: I think the pass through is weaker now. My colleague
11:53
Speaker 3: Jamie Rush brought a piece this week and he looked
11:56
Speaker 3: at the reasons, and now there are a couple of reasons. First,
11:59
Speaker 3: there has been inflation in the world, so one hundred
12:02
Speaker 3: dollars oil today is not one hundred dollars oil a
12:05
Speaker 3: decade ago. There is more supply that is actually coming
12:09
Speaker 3: from rshield, which is more responsive to higher oil prices.
12:13
Speaker 3: And there is also we need less oil to produce
12:15
Speaker 3: one dollar of GDP. The energy intensity or the oil
12:19
Speaker 3: intensity of our economies have fallen in recent decades and
12:25
Speaker 3: thus reducing the responsiveness of the global economy to all prices.
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Speaker 3: But also we have reasons why all prices are also
12:31
Speaker 3: less responsive to geopolitical risks.
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Speaker 2: Jenny, it seems as though, at least to some degree,
12:37
Speaker 2: the fear of sort of economic blowback from conflict in
12:41
Speaker 2: the Middle East failing to stop conflict in the Middle
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Speaker 2: East is less than it would have been in the past.
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Speaker 2: But we know this is an administration that has a
12:51
Speaker 2: particular divide when it comes to the willingness of certain
12:55
Speaker 2: members to be quite interventionist and to be imposing America's
12:59
Speaker 2: will on the world, whether it's regard to China or
13:01
Speaker 2: other things, and those who are really deeply isolationist, and
13:06
Speaker 2: the America first rhetoric goes to the point of really
13:09
Speaker 2: just wanting to pull back from US involvements. Depending on
13:13
Speaker 2: how things go in the next few days, what kind
13:16
Speaker 2: of conclusions do you think we should be drawing the
13:20
Speaker 2: way that the administration approaches the situation in Iran. Do
13:23
Speaker 2: you think that will hold some lessons about the underlying
13:27
Speaker 2: dynamics of the administration.
13:29
Speaker 1: I think almost certainly it will, And I think at
13:31
Speaker 1: the end of the day, what it's going to reveal
13:33
Speaker 1: and what was true in the first Trump administration, but
13:36
Speaker 1: I think has come into even sharper relief in his
13:40
Speaker 1: second term is the idea that President Trump is ultimately
13:44
Speaker 1: the decider, the man in charge. And we saw this
13:46
Speaker 1: dynamic in his first term, where he liked, for lack
13:50
Speaker 1: of a better term, this team of rivals dynamic of
13:52
Speaker 1: having multiple voices within his administration that would cultivate different
13:56
Speaker 1: options for him and he could kind of weigh them
13:59
Speaker 1: and tease out the complexities of each of them and
14:02
Speaker 1: then make ultimately the decision right. And that's what we
14:05
Speaker 1: see in this time around. Except this time around it
14:08
Speaker 1: is complicated by this dynamic that he is also staffed
14:11
Speaker 1: his administration with people that, regardless of their different perspectives
14:14
Speaker 1: on issues, are ultimately very loyal to him, and I
14:18
Speaker 1: think that that has become especially an important influence on
14:21
Speaker 1: how he's approached Iran. In his first term, he was
14:23
Speaker 1: surrounded by people who were largely hawks on Iran and
14:26
Speaker 1: who urged his sort of maximum pressure campaign with the
14:29
Speaker 1: idea that there may ultimately be the second phase of
14:33
Speaker 1: eventually getting to negotiations, but you have to start with
14:35
Speaker 1: the pressure that was his first term play. Now in
14:38
Speaker 1: his second term, he's clearly still has people hawkish on
14:42
Speaker 1: Iran around him, but he is not necessarily following their
14:45
Speaker 1: advice on going back to that maximum pressure campaign. First
14:48
Speaker 1: he launched in with the negotiations, which I think was
14:50
Speaker 1: a surprise to a lot of people who had watched
14:52
Speaker 1: his first term policy. The question is now he seems
14:56
Speaker 1: to be seeing this latest conflict as sort of giving
14:59
Speaker 1: him leverage at the negotiating table, even though from Tehran's perspective,
15:04
Speaker 1: it is not going to engage at the negotiating table
15:07
Speaker 1: while it's involved in an active conflict. And so I
15:10
Speaker 1: think the question is how does Trump see this playing out.
15:13
Speaker 1: Does he really think that this is going to give
15:15
Speaker 1: him leverage? Is he still ultimately focused on a deal
15:18
Speaker 1: or is it some part he going to walk away
15:20
Speaker 1: from the table and say I can achieve my goals
15:23
Speaker 1: through other, albeit military means.
15:26
Speaker 2: This is slightly a process question, but I think it
15:29
Speaker 2: also matters because it affects how the decisions being made.
15:33
Speaker 3: You were in the.
15:33
Speaker 2: National Security Council. There is almost no National Security Council
15:37
Speaker 2: now in terms of your equivalent, the staff who are
15:41
Speaker 2: expert in their field and are writing memos and advising
15:45
Speaker 2: the principles. That is a skeleton operation now barely exists
15:50
Speaker 2: at all, And as far as we can see, all
15:51
Speaker 2: the policy planning, or at least the preparation for policy
15:54
Speaker 2: and the option papers is all coming out of the
15:57
Speaker 2: State Department. Is your sense that that expertise around the
16:00
Speaker 2: Middle East is still there within the State Department, That
16:04
Speaker 2: kind of knowledge of the region is feeding into some
16:07
Speaker 2: of the deliberations, even if Donald Trump and the people
16:10
Speaker 2: around him aren't themselves expert what's your sense of that.
16:13
Speaker 1: I think there's two simultaneous truths here. There is still
16:17
Speaker 1: a tremendous amount of expertise in the United States government
16:20
Speaker 1: on the Middle East that exists at various centers, the
16:23
Speaker 1: intelligence community, the State Department, Defense Department. But part of
16:26
Speaker 1: the function of the NSC was to coordinate and bring
16:29
Speaker 1: up into a higher level those expertise opinions and formulate
16:33
Speaker 1: policy options for the principle for the President and his
16:36
Speaker 1: senior advisors. The NSC not playing that function as well
16:41
Speaker 1: today because it's been so whittled down, and because even
16:43
Speaker 1: at senior levels it's been whittled down, I think creates
16:47
Speaker 1: questions about whether or not that expertise is still floating
16:50
Speaker 1: up to the top, and whether there's the same sort
16:52
Speaker 1: of very thought through options that are being presented at
16:56
Speaker 1: the same time. I think there has been a tendency
16:58
Speaker 1: in the Trump administration, even before the recent gutting of
17:01
Speaker 1: the NSC, for decisions to be made outside what we
17:04
Speaker 1: would call the normal policy process, for the President to
17:08
Speaker 1: be making these decisions based on his conversations with individuals,
17:11
Speaker 1: including people who are not in government, but he is,
17:13
Speaker 1: for example, very much influenced by people outside of government
17:16
Speaker 1: who are major voices in the MAGA community, and for
17:20
Speaker 1: those conversations to be happening simultaneous and not necessarily taking
17:24
Speaker 1: into stock some of the internal government expertise and policy
17:28
Speaker 1: options that are normally the foundation of those conversations.
17:33
Speaker 2: The desks officers' worst nightmare is when all these unofficial
17:36
Speaker 2: conversations happened that they can't control. Yeah, I'm just sort
17:39
Speaker 2: of interested. I'm looking at you, because we were sitting
17:42
Speaker 2: in Doha not long ago, just after Donald Trump had
17:46
Speaker 2: been to the region. Donald Trump went to the region,
17:49
Speaker 2: had all these conversations with the various leaders in different
17:52
Speaker 2: countries seem to go down pretty well, and they played
17:55
Speaker 2: their part with their commitments of investments in the US
17:58
Speaker 2: and other things. The US unexpectedly actually becomes in behind
18:03
Speaker 2: Israel on this effort quite aggressively. How will those same
18:08
Speaker 2: leaders who saw him a few weeks ago be thinking
18:10
Speaker 2: about that, and specifically how their own people will be
18:13
Speaker 2: reacting to that.
18:15
Speaker 3: I think in terms of the leader, they're already probably
18:17
Speaker 3: disappointed now when we sat down a few weeks ago
18:20
Speaker 3: and we said that Trump's visit was a success for them.
18:23
Speaker 3: It was a success because Trump was perceived to have
18:26
Speaker 3: gotten funds from the region in return for common the
18:28
Speaker 3: region now and not escalating with Iran. And he sat
18:32
Speaker 3: next to the Amir of Qatar saying, I'm talking to
18:34
Speaker 3: Iran because my friend, the Emir of Qatar is getting
18:36
Speaker 3: me to do this, and I like him, and this
18:38
Speaker 3: is why we're doing this. How do the leaders feel.
18:41
Speaker 3: I think they feel a bit. Obviously all is high
18:44
Speaker 3: and that's good for their economies, but the risk of
18:46
Speaker 3: instability is much bigger, and the risk of instability is
18:50
Speaker 3: that they're caught between the two fires, Iran and Israel.
18:53
Speaker 3: There is a risk of retaliation from Iran on their
18:56
Speaker 3: energy facilities, on their land or maritime borders. And there's
19:01
Speaker 3: also the risk of the people, the fact that people
19:04
Speaker 3: in the region are probably not happy with that, and
19:06
Speaker 3: they may take out their anger on the leaders. So
19:09
Speaker 3: I think everyone in the Middle East is watching, it's
19:12
Speaker 3: probably feeling nervous about this.
19:14
Speaker 2: Many people who voted for Donald Trump will not particularly
19:17
Speaker 2: care about the Middle East, but they had heard this
19:21
Speaker 2: mantra from the president that he was either not going
19:25
Speaker 2: to get involved in the rest of the world or
19:27
Speaker 2: was just going to very quickly achieve piece he wasn't
19:29
Speaker 2: going to get involved in what he would call Democrat wars.
19:32
Speaker 2: How much will they be concerned in the administration about
19:35
Speaker 2: the broader impact on the Mega Coalition of having this
19:39
Speaker 2: very obvious involvement, because you can see Donald Trump wanting
19:42
Speaker 2: to be the strong man in Middle East, wanting to
19:44
Speaker 2: take big gambles and do things that people hadn't dared
19:47
Speaker 2: to do before with Iran. But if the result is
19:50
Speaker 2: kind of what it's been in the past, which is
19:51
Speaker 2: American president's kind of stumble in and then can't get out.
19:54
Speaker 2: How much does that hurt him? How much will you
19:56
Speaker 2: worry about that?
19:57
Speaker 1: It's a fair question, especially because right now we're serving
20:00
Speaker 1: the MAGA movement does seem quite divided on this issue,
20:03
Speaker 1: and we even sol overnight President Trump taking aim at
20:06
Speaker 1: someone who has been an ally in the movement, so
20:10
Speaker 1: to speak for him, Tucker Carlson on this very point
20:14
Speaker 1: of who is ultimately the decider of what makes America
20:17
Speaker 1: great again? And President Trump saying he is, and he
20:20
Speaker 1: decides that making sure that around doesn't have a nuclear
20:22
Speaker 1: weapon is very much about making America grade again. But
20:26
Speaker 1: I think, ultimately, and this is a bit of a
20:27
Speaker 1: bold claim as a foreign policy expert, I think it
20:31
Speaker 1: tends to be, with rare exceptions, that foreign policy is
20:35
Speaker 1: not necessarily the major determinant of domestic political opinion towards
20:39
Speaker 1: a president, unless they really botch things and we get
20:42
Speaker 1: dragged into a major and very deadly war. It's probably
20:47
Speaker 1: going to be other things, and namely the economy and
20:50
Speaker 1: namely what happens, for example, with the Big Beautiful Bill
20:53
Speaker 1: and how it affects DUX policy, in the coming years
20:56
Speaker 1: and people's sense of how much money is in their wallet.
20:59
Speaker 1: I think is probably going to be what drives more
21:01
Speaker 1: of how people perceive the effectiveness of the President and
21:05
Speaker 1: his ability to come through our major promises that he's made.
21:08
Speaker 1: I think it's a whole host of other issues that
21:10
Speaker 1: are at play.
21:11
Speaker 2: We'll be down not to Iran but the irs. Yeah. Maybe,
21:14
Speaker 2: Jenny Sad, thank you very much, thanks for listening to
21:22
Speaker 2: Trumpnomics from Bloomberg. It was hosted by me, Stephanie Flanders
21:25
Speaker 2: and I was joined by Jennifer Welch and Ziad Daud
21:28
Speaker 2: from Bloomberg Economics. Trumpnomics is produced by Sammasadi and Moses
21:33
Speaker 2: and m with help from Chris Martlu and Amy Keen,
21:36
Speaker 2: with special thanks to Rachel Lewis Krisky. Sound design is
21:40
Speaker 2: by Blake Maples and Brendan Francis. Newnan is our executive
21:44
Speaker 2: producer and to help others find the show, please rate
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Speaker 2: it highly and review it wherever you listen to podcasts.