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07 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Chapter one. After these things, making another beginning, it must be observed
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by us that there are three species of things which are to be avoided in
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manners, viz. Vice, incontinence, and brutality. But the contraries to
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two of these are indeed evident, For we call one of the contrary's virtue,
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and the other countenance to brutality. However, it will be most appropriate
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to say that the virtue is opposed, which is a certain heroical and divine
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virtue. As Homer represents Priam saying of Hector that he was a very good
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man. Quote wretch that I am my bravest offspring. Slain you the disgrace
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of Priam's house, Remain mist or the brave renowned in ranks of war with
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troylis dreadful in his rushing car And last great Hector more than man divine,
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for sure he seemed not of terrestrial line. Close quote. Hence, if
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as it is said, men from being men become gods through excess of virtue,
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the habit which is opposed to a brutal habit will indeed be such as
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this. For as there is neither the vice nor virtue of a brute,
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so neither is there of a God. But the one habit, indeed is
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more honorable than virtue, and the other is of a different genus from vice.
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Since, however, the existence of a divine man is rare bracket,
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just as the Lacedaemonians, when they very much admire a man, are accustomed
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to say, O, divine man, close bracket. Thus, also the
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brutal nature is rare among men, but when it does exist, it is
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principally found among the barbarians. Some men, however, become brutalized through diseases
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and mutilations of the body, and we thus denominate by a defamatory appellation,
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those who surpass other men in vice. But of such a disposition of the
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soul. Is this we shall hereafter make mention. And we have before spoken
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concerning vice. Let us now therefore speak concerning incontinence and effeminacy and luxury,
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and concerning their opposites continence and endurance. For each of these must not be
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considered as if they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor yet
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as if they were of a genus different from them. It is necessary,
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however, as we have done in other things, Having first premised what is
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apparent i e. What is commonly admitted as true and proposed doubts in the
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next place, to show everything which is especially probable about these passions. But
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if not everything, at least the greater part and the principle, For if
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such doubts as are difficult are dissolved, and those things which are probable are
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left, we shall have sufficiently accomplished our purpose. Continents, therefore, and
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endurance appear to be among the number of worthy and laudable things, but incontinence
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and effeminacy among the number of things bad and blameable. And the continent man
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and he who abides in the decision of reason are the same person, and
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the incontinent man is the same with him who departs from the decision of reason.
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And the incontinent man, indeed, knowing that the things are bad,
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does them through passion. But the continent man, knowing that desires are bad,
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does not follow them in consequence of being obedient to reason. And all
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men indeed admit that the temperate man is continent and possesses the virtue of endurance.
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But with respect to a man of this description, some say that he
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is in every respect temperate, but others say that he is not, And
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some confusedly say that the intemperate man is incontinent, and the incontinent man is
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intemperate. But others say that they differ from each other. But with respect
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to the prudent man, sometimes they say that he cannot be incontinent, and
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sometimes that certain persons who are prudent and skillful are incontinent. And farther still,
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men are said to be incontinent of anger, of honor, and of
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gain. Such therefore are the assertions concerning continence and incontinence. Chapter two.
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It may, however, be doubted how he who thinks rightly can act incontinently.
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Some say, therefore, that it is impossible for a man to act
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incontinently who knows that he ought not, for it would be a dreadful thing
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when science is inherent, as Socrates thought that anything else should have dominion,
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and draw the man about like a slave. For Socrates, in short,
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opposed reason by this opinion, as if there were no such thing as incontinence,
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since he said that no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was
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best to do, except from ignorance of what was best. This assertion,
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therefore is adverse to those things which are clearly apparent. And it is requisite
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to inquire concerning the passion. If anyone acts incontinently through ignorance, what the
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mode of this ignorance is. For it is evident that he who acts incontinently
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does not think he ought so to act till he is under the influence of
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the passion. There are, however, certain persons who admit some of these
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things but not others. For they grant, indeed that nothing is better than
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science, but they do not admit that no one acts contrary to what appears
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to him to be better. And on this account they say that the incontinent
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man, not having science but opinion, is vanquished by pleasures. If,
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however, it is opinion and neither science nor a strong but a weak hypolepsis
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which resists, as it is in those who are dubious. Pardon is to
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be granted to him who yields to strong desires, but improbity is not to
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be pardoned, nor anything else which is blameable. The incontinent man therefore is
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vanquished by desire prudence at the same time resisting, for this is most strong.
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But this is absurd, for the same person will be at the same
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time prudent and incontinent. No One, however, will say that it is
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the province of a prudent man to perform volunteer rarely the most base actions,
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to which may be added what we have before shown that the prudent is a
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practical man, for he is conversant with particulars and possesses the other virtues.
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Again, if the continent man consists in having strong and base desires, the
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temperate man will not be a continent man, nor the continent a temperate man.
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For it is not the province of the temperate man to have too much
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desire or to have base desires, but it would be requisite that he should,
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if this were admitted. For if indeed the desires are good, the
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habit which prevents a man from following them is bad, so that not all
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continents will be good. If, however, the desires are weak but not
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bad, there is nothing venerable in continence, And if they are bad and
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weak, there is nothing great in it. Farther still, if continence gives
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permanency to every opinion, and even to false opinion, it is a bad
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thing. And if incontinence produces a departure from every opinion, there will be
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a certain incontinence which is good, such as that of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes
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of Sophocles, For he is to be praised for not persevering in what he
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was persuaded to do by Ulysses, because it was painful to him to lie.
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Again. That reasoning of the Sophists, which is denominated lying or dissembling,
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is perplexed with doubt. For with these men, in consequence of wishing
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to produce an ascent to paradoxes, in order that when they obtain their end,
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they may appear to be skillful persons, the syllogism formed by their reasoning
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becomes very dubious, for the discoursive energy of reason is bound when the person
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whose ascent they wish to procure is unwilling to persist because the conclusion does not
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please him, but is unable to proceed because he cannot dissolve the argument from
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a certain reason. However, it may happen that imprudence together with incontinence,
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is a virtue. For a man, through incontinence may do the contrary to
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what he apprehends ought to be done, but he apprehends that good things are
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evil, and that they ought not to be done. Hence he will do
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what is good and not what is evil. Again, he who performs and
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pursues what is delectable, in consequence of being persuaded and deliberately choosing so to
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do, will appear to be a better character than the man who does so
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not from reasoning but from incontinence. For he may be more easily cured,
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because he may be induced to change his opinion. But the incontinent man is
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obnoxious to the proverb in which we say, quote when water suffocates, what
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occasion is there to drink close? Quote? For if indeed he were persuaded
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to do what he did, if he had been induced to change his opinion,
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he would have desisted. But now, not being persuaded, he nevertheless
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acts in this manner. Farther still, if incontinence in continence are conversant with
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all things, who is the man that is simply incontinent? For no one
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has every species of incontinence. And we say that some persons are simply incontinent.
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Such therefore are the doubts which happen on this subject. But of these
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it is necessary to take away some and to leave others. For the solution
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of a doubt is the discovery of what is investigated Chapter three. In the
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first place, therefore, it must be considered whether the incontinent act knowingly or
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not, and in what manner they act knowingly. In the next place,
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with what kind of things the incontinent and the continent man are conversant, I
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mean, whether they are conversant with all pleasure and pain or with certain definite
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pleasures and pains. And whether the continent and the enduring man are the same
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or different characters, And in a similar manner. We must consider such other
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things as are allied to this theory. The beginning, however, of the
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speculation, is whether the continent and incontinent man differ in the things with which
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they are conversant, or in the mode in which they are conversant with them.
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My meaning is this, whether the incontinent man is alone incontinent or not
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because he is conversant with these particular things, or whether it is because he
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is thus affected or not, or whether it is from both of these.
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In the next place, whether incontinence and continence are conversant with all things or
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not. For he who is simply incontinent is not conversant with all things,
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but with those things with which the intemperate man is conversant. Nor is he
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denominated incontinent from being simply affected towards these, for if he were, incontinence
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would be the same with intemperance, but from being affected towards them in this
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particular manner. For the intemperate man, indeed is led by his desires from
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deliberate choice, thinking that it is always necessary to pursue the present delight.
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But the incontinent man does not think this is necessary, yet pursues it with
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respect. Therefore, to the assertion that it is true opinion and not science
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through which men act incontinently, it is of no consequence to the present discussion,
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for some of those who form opinions of entertain no doubt of their truths,
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but think that they know accurately. If therefore, those who form an
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opinion act in a greater degree contrary to their opinion than those who have a
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scientific knowledge, because they believe negligently. Science will in no respect differ from
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opinion. For some persons believe no less firmly in things of which they form
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an opinion than others. In things which they know scientifically. But this is
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evident from heraclitis, Since, however, we say that a man knows scientifically
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in a twofold respect. For both he who possesses science indeed but does not
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use it, and he who uses it are said to have scientific knowledge.
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It makes a difference whether a man possessing science but not contemplating, does what
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he ought not to do, or whether possessing science and contemplating he acts improperly.
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For this appears to be absurd, but it is not if he does
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not contemplate. Again, since there are two modes of propositions, i e.
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Universal and particular propositions, nothing hinders but that he who possesses both these
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may act contrary to science, using indeed the universal proposition, but not the
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particular one. For particulars are practicable. There is a difference also as to
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the universal. For one difference, indeed, is in the man himself,
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but the other is in the thing. Thus, for instance, a man
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may know that dry food is beneficial to every man, and that this person
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is a man, or that a thing of such a kind is dry food.
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But whether this is a thing of such a kind he either does not
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know or he does not energize as if he did know. There is an
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immense difference therefore, according to these modes, so that no absurdity follows for
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a man thus to know, but for him to know in any other way,
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it would be wonderful. Farther still, science may be inherent in men
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in a way different from that which we have just now mentioned. For we
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see that habit differs in possessing, indeed, but not using science, so
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that a man possesses in a certain respect, and does not possess science,
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as is the case with him who is asleep, or insane or intoxicated.
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But in this way men are disposed who are under the influence of the passions
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for anger, and the desire of venereal pleasures, and certain other things of
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this kind evidently produce a change in the body, and in some persons also
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they produce insanity. It is manifest therefore, that the incontinent man must be
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said to be affected similarly to these persons. Nor is it any indication of
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the contrary if such persons utter sentences which are the progeny of science. For
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those who are under the influence of these passions will recite demonstrations and the verses
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of Empedocles. And those who first learn a science connect indeed the words,
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but do not yet know their meaning. For it is necessary that science should
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increase with advancing age, but this requires time. Hence it must be admitted
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that the incontinent speak after the manner of players, i e. Without attending
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to the meaning of what they say. Again, the cause of this may
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also be physically surveyed, as follows. Opinion indeed is either universal or particular,
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of which latter sense is now the mistress. But when one reason is
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produced from both these, it is necessary that, so far as pertains to
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theory, the soul should enunciate the conclusion, but so far as pertains to
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practice should immediately act. Thus, for instance, if every sweet thing ought
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to be tasted, but this thing is sweet as being some one of particulars,
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it necessarily follows that he who is able and is not impeded, must,
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at the same time that he says this act i e. Tastes the
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sweet thing. When therefore the universal proposition is indeed inherent, which prohibits a
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thing from being tasted. But another proposition says, then everything which is sweet
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is delectable, And another that this particular thing is sweet, and this causes
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the man to energize. And when also desire happens to be inherent, then
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the universal proposition indeed says this thing is to be avoided, but desire leads
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to the fruition of it, for each of the parts of the soul is
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able to move or excite. Hence, it happens that a man acts incontinently
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both from reason in a certain respect and opinion, though opinion is not essentially
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but from accident contrary to reason, for desire but not opinion is contrary to
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right reason. Hence, on this account also brutes are not incontinent, because
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they have not a perception of universal but an imagination and memory of particulars.
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With respect to the manner, however, in which ignorance is dissolved and the
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incontinent man again becomes in possession of scientific knowledge, the reasoning is the same
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as concerning him who is intoxicated or asleep, and is not peculiar to this
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passion, but the explanation of it must be obtained from physiologists, because,
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however, the last proposition is the opinion of the sensible object, and is
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the mistress of actions. He who is under the influence of passion either has
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not this proposition, or he has it in such a way that from possessing
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he has not a scientific knowledge of it, but merely enunciates it, just
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as he who is intoxicated recites the verses of Empedocles. And likewise, because
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the last proposition is not universal and does not appear to be similarly scientific with
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the proposition which is universal, that also which Socrates investigated, appears in this
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case to happen. For the passion is not produced when that which is science,
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properly so called is seen to be present, nor is this science drawn
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about so as to co operate with passion. But this must be asserted of
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the sensitive power. And thus much concerning the knowledge and ignorance of the incontinent
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man, and how he may act incontinently accompanied with knowledge Chapter four. But
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whether any one is simply incontinent, or all that are incontinent are partially so.
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And if there is any one who is simply incontinent, what the things
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are with which he is conversant, must, in the next place be shown
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by us that the continent, therefore and men of endurance, and the incontinent
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and effeminate, are conversant with pleasures and pains. Is evident. Of those
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things, however, which produce pleasure, some indeed are necessary, but others,
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though they are eligible of themselves, yet have excess. But necessaries,
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indeed are things which have reference to the body. I mean such things as
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pertain to food and the use of venarreal pleasures, and such like corporeal concern
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about which we place in temperance and temperance. Other things, however, are
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not indeed necessary, yet are eligible of themselves, I mean such as victory,
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honor, wealth, and such like good and delectable things. Those therefore,
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who exceed in these contrary to the right reason which is in them,
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we do not indeed denominate simply incontinent. But with an addition, we call
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them incontinent of riches, of game, of honor, and of anger.
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But we do not call them simply incontinent, as being different from those that
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are so, and denominated from similitude. Just as the name of a certain
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person who is victorious in the Olympic Games was Anthropos i e. Man,
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for he had as a proper the common name of Man, and yet at
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the same time he was different from man universal or the species man as being
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an individual. As an indication of this, incontinence indeed is blamed not only
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as an error, but also as a certain vice, either simply or partially.
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But no one blames those who are incontinent of honor or gain, et
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cetera, as simply bad. With respect however, to those who are conversant
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with corporeal enjoyments, with which we say the temperate and intemperate man are conversant,
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he who, without deliberate choice, pursues the excesses of delectable and avoids
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the excesses of painful things viz. Hunger and thirst, heat and cold,
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and everything pertaining to the touch and the taste. Yet contrary to deliberate choice
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and the reasoning power, is called incontinent, not with an addition of this
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or that thing as of an anger. But he is only simply called incontinent,
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But as an indication of this, those who are conversant with the one
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are called effeminate, but not those who are conversant with the other. Hence,
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we arrange the incontinent and intemperate and also the continent and temperate man in
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the same class, but not those who are incontinent of honor or gain,
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et cetera, because they are, in a certain respect conversant with the same
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pleasures and pains, Though however, they are conversant with the same things,
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yet not after the same manner. For the intemperate indeed pursue depraved pleasures from
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the liberate choice, but the incontinent do not. Hence we rather call him
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intemperate, who, either not at all desiring or desiring slightly, pursues excess
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of pleasures and avoids moderate pains than him who pursues the one and avoids the
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other, there in consequence of being influenced by a vehement desire. For what
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would the former character do if he were impelled by robust desire and suffered violent
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pain from the want of necessary things? Since, however, of desires and
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pleasures, some rank in the genius of things beautiful and worthy. For of
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things delectable, some are naturally eligible, others are contrary to these, and
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others have an intermediate subsistence, agreeably to the division we have before made.
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And these last are such as riches. Gain victory and honor in all these,
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therefore, and things of the like kind, and in those that have
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an intermediate subsistence. Men are not blamed for being merely influenced by the passions
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and for desiring and loving, but for the manner in which they are influenced
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by them, and for indulging them to excess. Hence, with respect to
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those who are vanquished by the passions, or pursue anything naturally beautiful and good
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contrary to reason, such as those who pursue honor more than is proper,
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or are irrationally attached to their parents and children. For these also rank among
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the number of things that are good, and those who pay attention to these
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are praised. Yet there is at the same time a certain excess even in
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these things, if any one like Naobe contends about them even with the gods,
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or like Satyris, who, for his attachment to his father was called
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Philopator, for he appeared, through this attachment to be very infatuated. There
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is therefore no depravity indeed in these things, for the reason already assigned,
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because each of these things is naturally eligible of itself, but the excesses of
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them are bad and are to be avoided. This, however, is not
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the case with incontinence, For incontinence is not only to be avoided, but
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is also among the number of blameable things. But from the similitude of the
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passion. In speaking about each of these, it is usual to add the
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term incontinence, just as we say that a man is a bad physician or
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a bad player, whom we should not simply call a bad man. As
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therefore we do not here call these simply bad men, because each of these
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is not a vice, but similar to vice from analogy. So likewise,
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there viz. In the immoderate pursuit of honor, Gain, et cetera,
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those things only are to be considered as incontinence and continence, which are conversant
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with the same things as temperance and intemperance. But with respect to incontinence and
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anger, we speak of it from similitude. Hence, also by making an
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addition, we say that a man is incontinent of anger, just as we
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say that he is incontinent of honor or gain. Chapter five. Since,
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however, some things are naturally delectable, and of these some are simply so,
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but others to the genera of animals and men. But other things are
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not naturally delectable, but some things are pleasing. In consequence of mutilations,
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and others are so partly from custom and partly from depraved natures. This being
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the case, similar habits may be perceived in each of these. But by
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savage habits I mean such a habit as that of the woman who is said
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to have cut open the bellies of pregnant women and to have devoured the fetus,
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or such habits as certain savage nations about Pontus are said to possess.
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For of these, some are delighted to feed on raw and others on human
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flesh, and others at banquets fee each other with their own children, Or
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such a habit as Phalaris is said to have possessed, for he is reported
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to have eaten his own son. These habits, therefore, are savage.
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Some of these habits, however, are produced in certain persons from disease and
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insanity, as was the case with him who immolated and ate his mother,
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and also with him who ate the liver of his fellow servant. But other
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savage habits either originate from disease or from custom, such as evulsions of the
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hairs, biting the nails, and besides these, eating coals and earth,
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to which may be added the venereal connection of males with males. For these
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habits are produced in some persons by nature, but in others from custom,
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as being accustomed to them from childhood. No one therefore would call those in
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whom nature is the cause of these habits incontinent, as neither are women called
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incontinent, because in the venereal connection they are not active but passive. And
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in a similar manner, those are not called incontinent who are in a diseased
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condition from custom. The possession therefore, of each of these is something beyond
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the boundaries of vice, in the same manner as a savage nature. But
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when possessing these propensities, to subdue or be subdued by them, is not
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simple continence or incontinence, but is only so from similitude. Just as he
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who subsists after this manner with respect to anger is incontinent of this passion.
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But passion is not to be called incontinent, for every vice, folly,
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timidity, intemperance, and ferocity, when excessive, is either savage or the
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effect of disease. For he who is naturally so disposed as to be afraid
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of everything, even though a mouse should make a noise is timid according to
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a savage timidity. But he who is afraid of a cat is timid from
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disease. And among the number of the stupid, those who are most irrational
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from nature and live only from sense resemble savage animals, as is the case
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with some nations of remote barbarians. But those who are so from disease such
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as epilepsy or insanity, these are in a morbid state. It is,
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however, possible that some one may sometimes possess these habits and yet not be
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vanquished by them. I mean as if, for instance, Valerius desiring to
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eat his son should refrain from so doing, or should abstain from absurd venereal
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pleasure. And it is not only possible to have these propensities, but also
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to be vanquished by them. As therefore with respected a press gravity, that
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which pertains to a man is simply said to be depravity, but that which
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subsists with an addition is said to be a savage or diseased depravity, but
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is not simple depravity. After the same manner, with respect to incontinence,
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it is evident that one kind is savage, but another. The effect of
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disease while that alone is simply incontinence, which subsists according to human intemperance.
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It is evident therefore that incontinence and continence are alone conversant with those things with
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which intemperance and temperance are conversant, and that another species of incontinence subsists about
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other things, which is denominated metaphorically and not simply. Chapter six. Let
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us, however, now consider whether the incontinence of anger is not less base
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than the incontinence of desires. For anger indeed seems to hear something of reason,
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but to hear it negligently, just like hasty servants who run away before
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they have heard the whole of what is said to them, and thus err
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in the performance of what they are order to do, or like dogs who
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bark at a noise alone before they perceive whether he who makes it is a
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friend or not. Thus, also anger, through the heat and celerity of
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its nature, hears indeed reason, but does not hear its mandates, in
32:30
consequence of impetuously tending to vengeance. For reason, indeed, or the imagination
32:37
renders it evident that something has been done attended with insolence or contempt. But
32:44
anger as if syllogistically concluding that it is necessary to be hostile to one who
32:50
has acted in this manner, is immediately enraged desire. However, if sense
32:57
or reason corrupted by sense, only says that a thing is delectable, rushes
33:02
to the enjoyment of it. Hence, anger in a certain respect follows reason,
33:08
But desire does not. Desire therefore is more base than anger. For
33:14
he who is incontinent of anger is, after a manner vanquished by reason.
33:20
But he who is incontinent of desire is subdued by desire and not by reason.
33:25
Again, it is more pardonable to follow the natural appetites, since such
33:30
desires as are common to all men, are more pardonable, and so far
33:36
as they are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than desires,
33:42
which are excessive and which are not necessary. Thus, one who was accused
33:46
of striking his father said, as an apology for it, that his own
33:51
father and even his grandfather committed the same fault, And pointing to his child,
33:55
he likewise said, he will strike me when he becomes a man,
34:00
for this is a family failing. A certain person, also being dragged about
34:05
by his son, ordered him to stop at the gates of his house,
34:08
for he likewise had dragged his father as far as to that place farther Still,
34:15
those who act more insidiously are more unjust. The irascible man, therefore,
34:21
is not insidious, nor is anger, but he is open in what
34:24
he does. Desire, however, is fraudulent, as it is said of
34:30
Venus quote, the Cyprian goddess skilled in weaving wiles close quote, and as
34:37
Homer says, speaking of her Cestus quote in this was every art and every
34:45
charm to win the wisest and the coldest, warm, fond love, the
34:51
gentle vow, the gay desire, the kind deceit, the still reviving fire,
34:58
persuasive speech and more persuasive size, silence that spoke, and eloquence of
35:05
eyes close quote. Hence, if this incontinence is more unjust, it is
35:10
also more base than that which pertains to anger. And this is simply incontinence,
35:16
and in a certain respect vice. Again, no one who is pained
35:22
acts insolently, i e. Lasciviously towards another person. But everyone who acts
35:28
from the impulse of anger acts with pain. He, however, who conducts
35:34
himself insolently towards another acts with pleasure. If therefore, those things with which
35:39
it is especially just to be angry are more unjust. The incontinence, also,
35:45
which subsists through desire, is more unjust, for anger is not attended
35:51
with insolence. Hence, it is evident that the incontinence which is conversant with
35:57
desires is more base than that which is conversant with anger, and also that
36:02
continance and incontinence are conversant with corporeal pleasures. The differences, however, of
36:08
these, must be assumed, for, as we said in the beginning,
36:14
some desires are human and natural, both in their genus and magnitude, but
36:19
others are savage, and others subsist from mutilations and diseases. But with the
36:25
first of these, temperance and intemperance are alone conversant. Hence we neither call
36:31
brutes temperate nor intemperate, except metaphorically. Though one genus of animals differs in
36:38
short from another in insolence, insolaciousness, and inveracity, for they have neither
36:45
any deliberate choice nor reasoning process, but they revolt from nature in the same
36:52
manner as insane men. Ferocity, however, is a less evil than vice,
36:58
but it is more terrible, for that which is most excellent is not
37:01
corrupted through this, as it is in men. But those that labor under
37:07
this malady are deprived of it, i e. Of reason. It is
37:12
just therefore, as if that which is inanimate should be compared with that which
37:16
is animated, in order to know which of the two is the worse.
37:22
For the improbity is always more innoxious, which is without a principle, But
37:28
intellect is a principle. Hence a similar thing takes place, as if in
37:32
justice should be compared with an unjust man, For it is possible that the
37:38
one may be worse than the other. For a bad man may be the
37:42
cause of an infinitely greater number of evils than a brute Chapter seven. With
37:49
respect however, to the pleasures and pains which subsist through the touch and the
37:54
taste, and also with respect to the desires and aversions pertaining to these about
38:00
which in temperance, in temperance have been before defined, it is possible,
38:05
indeed, that a man may be so disposed as to be vanquished by those
38:09
pleasures and pains to which the multitude are superior. And it is also possible
38:15
that he may vanquish those by which the multitude are vanquished. But of these
38:21
characters, he who is vanquished by pleasures is incontinent, and he who vanquishes
38:27
them is continent. He also, who is vanquished by pains is effeminate,
38:32
but he who vanquishes them is a man of endurance. The habits, however,
38:37
of most men, are between these, though they rather verge to the
38:42
worse habits, Since, however, of pleasures, some are necessary, but
38:46
others are not, And those that are necessary are so to a certain extent,
38:52
but the excesses and defects are not necessary. And the like also takes
38:57
place in desires and pains. The case, he who pursues the excesses of
39:01
pleasures, or who pursues pleasures excessively, or from deliberate choice, and on
39:08
their own account, and not from anything else which may happen, is an
39:13
intemperate man. For this man will necessarily not repent of his conduct, so
39:17
that he is incurable. But he who is deficient in the pursuit of pleasures
39:22
is opposed to this character, and he who subsists in a meeting between both
39:28
is the temperate man. In a similar manner, also he is intemperate who
39:32
avoids corporeal pains, not because he is vanquished by them, but from deliberate
39:37
choice. But of those who pursue pleasures, yet not from deliberate choice,
39:43
one indeed is led to the pursuit through pleasure, but another through an avoidance
39:47
of pain, so that they differ from each other. It will, however,
39:52
be obvious to everyone that he is a worse character who, not desiring
39:57
or desiring, but slightly does any thing which is base, than him who
40:01
desires vehemently. And also that he who, not being angry, strikes a
40:07
man, is a worse character than the man who strikes another through the impulse
40:12
of anger, For what would such a one do if he were influenced by
40:16
passion? Hence, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent man. Of the
40:22
characters therefore that we have mentioned, the one has more the form of effeminacy,
40:28
but the other is incontinent. But the continent is opposed to the incontinent,
40:34
and the man of endurance to the effeminate man. For endurance indeed consists
40:39
in resisting, but continence in subduing. It is one thing, however,
40:45
to resist, and another to subdue. Just as it is one thing not
40:50
to be vanquished and another to vanquish. Hence, continence is more eligible than
40:55
endurance. But he who fails in those things in which the multitude resists and
41:01
are able to resist, is effeminate and luxuriously delicate. For luxurious delicacy is
41:08
a certain effeminacy, as when a man draws his garments on the ground,
41:14
lest he should be pained by the labor of holding it up, and by
41:19
his manner of living, imitates one who is ill, yet does not think
41:22
he is miserable, though he resembles one who is miserable. The like also
41:28
takes place with respect to continance and incontinence. For it is not wonderful if
41:34
a man is vanquished by strong and transcendent pleasures or pains, but he deserves
41:38
to be pardoned if, though vanquished, he makes a resistance, like the
41:44
Philoctetes of Theoctates when bit by a viper, or the Cercian of Carcinus in
41:52
his elope, or like those who, endeavoring to restrain their laughter, burst
41:58
forth into a profuse laugh, as it happened to Xenophantis. But he is
42:04
very blameable who is vanquished by those pleasures which the multitude are able to resist,
42:09
and is unable to oppose them, and this not through the nature of
42:14
his race or from disease, as is the case with the Persian kings,
42:19
with whom effeminacy is hereditary, and who on this account are as females when
42:24
compared to males. The jocose man also appears to be intemperate, but he
42:30
is effeminate, for jesting is a relaxation, since it is a repose from
42:37
serious and laborious pursuits. But the jocose man ranks among the number of those
42:43
who exceed in this relaxation. With respect to incontinence, however, one kind
42:47
is precipitate, but another is from imbecility. For some, indeed, having
42:53
deliberated, do not persist in what they have deliberated on account of passion,
42:59
but others, in consequence of not having deliberated, are led captive by passion.
43:05
For some persons, just as those who have previously tickled themselves are not
43:09
tickled by others, so these, inconsequence of previously perceiving and foreseeing the future
43:15
perturbation, and having pre excited themselves and their reasoning power, are not vanquished
43:22
by passion, whether it be delectable or painful. But persons of acute feelings
43:28
and those who are melancholy are especially incontinent according to precipitate incontinence. For the
43:36
former, indeed, through celerity, and the latter survehemence, do not wait
43:40
for the decision of reason, because they are disposed to follow the imagination.
43:46
Chapter eight. The intemperate man, however, as we have before observed,
43:52
is not inclined to repentance, for he persists in his deliberate choice. But
43:58
every incontinent man is inclined to repent. Hence the thing is not as we
44:02
doubt it it might be. But the intemperate man indeed is incurable, and
44:08
the incontinent man is curable. For depravity appears to resemble the diseases of the
44:15
dropsy and consumption, but incontinent seems to resemble the epilepsy, since the former
44:21
indeed is continued without interruption, but the latter is not a continued improbity.
44:28
And in short, the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice,
44:32
for vice indeed is latent, but incontinence is not latent. But of these
44:37
characters, the precipitately incontinent are better than those who possess reason indeed, but
44:45
do not abide in its decisions, for the latter are vanquished by a less
44:49
passion, and not without previous deliberation, like the former. For the man
44:53
who is incontinent from imbecility resembles those who become rapidly in tapoxicated, and from
45:00
a little wine, and from less than that through which most men become intoxicated.
45:07
That incontinence, therefore is not a vice is evident, but perhaps it
45:12
is partially so, for incontinence is contrary, but vice is conformable to deliberate
45:17
choice. The intemperate and the incontinent man, however, are similar in their
45:23
actions, just as Demadoca said of the Milesians viz. Quote, the Milesians
45:30
are not indeed foolish, yet they act as if they were so close quote.
45:36
Thus, also, incontinent men are not indeed unjust, yet they act
45:40
unjustly. Since therefore, the incontinent man is one who does not pursue corporeal
45:46
pleasures in excess and contrary to right reason from persuasion. But the intemperate man,
45:52
because he is intemperate, is persuaded to pursue such pleasures. This being
45:58
the case, the former is is easily induced to change his opinion, but
46:01
the latter is not. For virtue preserves the principle of right conduct, but
46:07
depravity corrupts it, and in actions that for the sake of which or the
46:14
end is the principle. In the same manner as hypotheses are principles in the
46:17
mathematics, Hence, neither in the mathematics, nor here are principles to be
46:23
taught. But virtue, either physical or ethical, is the cause of right
46:30
opinion concerning the principle of conduct. A man of this description therefore is temperate,
46:36
but the contrary character is an intemperate man. There is also a certain
46:40
person who, through passion, departs from right reason, whom passion indeed so
46:46
subdues that he does not act conformably to right reason. But yet passion does
46:52
not so far subdue him as to cause him to be persuaded that pleasures of
46:58
this description ought to be largely pursued. This person is the incontinent man,
47:04
who is better than the intemperate, and is not absolutely a bad man,
47:08
for in him that which is best the principle of right conduct is saved.
47:15
But there is another person contrary to this viz. The continent man who persists
47:21
in the decision of reason and is not diverted from it through passion. From
47:25
these things, therefore, it is evident that one of these habits is worthy,
47:30
but the other bad. Chapter nine. Whether therefore, is he the
47:37
continent man who persists in any kind of reason and in any kind of deliberate
47:43
choice, or he who persists in right reason? And whether is he the
47:49
incontinent man who does not persist in any kind of deliberate choice, nor in
47:54
any kind of reason, or he who persists in a false reason and in
48:00
an erroneous deliberate choice, as it was doubted by us before? Or shall
48:05
we say that the continent man is one who persists, from accident in any
48:09
kind of reason and deliberate choice, but essentially in true reason and right deliberate
48:16
choice, But that the incontinent man does not thus persist. For if anyone
48:22
chooses or pursues that thing on account of this, he pursues, indeed and
48:29
chooses this thing per se. But the former thing from accident. We speak,
48:34
however, of that which is per se simply. Hence, it is
48:38
possible that the one may persist in any kind of opinion, but that the
48:43
other may abandon any kind of opinion. But the one simply persists in true
48:47
opinion, and the other does not. There are, however, some persons
48:52
who are disposed to persist in an opinion, and these are those who are
48:57
called pertinacious, such as the obstinate, and those who are not easily persuaded
49:02
to relinquish their opinions, who have indeed something similar to the continent man in
49:08
the same manner as the prodigal has to the liberal, and the audacious to
49:14
the confident man. But in many things they are different. For the confident
49:19
man, indeed is not changed through passion and desire, since when it so
49:23
happens, he is easily persuaded. But the pertinacious man is not persuaded by
49:29
reason, since most of this description admits desire and are led by pleasures.
49:36
Those persons, however, are pertinacious who have certain opinions of their own,
49:40
and also unlearned and rustic men. And those indeed who have certain opinions of
49:46
their own are pertinacious through pleasure and pain, for they rejoice when they are
49:52
victorious. If they are not induced to change their opinion, and they are
49:57
grieved when their opinions, as if they were to decrees, are without efficacy.
50:01
Hence they resemble the incontinent more than the continent man. But there are
50:07
certain persons who do not persist in their opinions, yet not through incontinence,
50:13
such as Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, since he did not persist in
50:19
his opinion, yet not on account of pleasure, but on account of the
50:23
beautiful in conduct. For to him it was beautiful to speak the truth,
50:29
though he was persuaded by Ulysses to lie. For not every one who does
50:34
anything on account of pleasure is intemperate or a bad or an incontinent man.
50:40
But he is intemperate who does it on account of base pleasure. Since,
50:45
however, there is a character of such a kind as to be delighted less
50:50
than is proper with corporeal pleasures, and not to abide in the decisions of
50:53
reason, the continent man is a medium between this character and the incontinent.
51:00
For the incontinent man, indeed does not abide in the decisions of reason,
51:06
because he is delighted with corporeal pleasures more than is proper, but this man,
51:10
because he is delighted with them less than is proper. The continent man,
51:15
however, abides in the decision of reason and is not changed through anything
51:21
else. It is also necessary, if continence is a good thing, that
51:25
both the contrary habits should be bad, as it appears that they are,
51:30
because, however, one of these characters viz. The man who is delighted
51:35
less than is proper with corporeal pleasures, exists but among a few men,
51:39
and is rarely seen. Hence, as temperance appears to be contrary to intemperance
51:45
alone, thus also continents to incontinence. But since many things are denominated from
51:52
similitude, the continence also of the temperate man, follows according to similitude.
51:58
For both the continent and the temperate man do nothing contrary to reason through the
52:04
influence of corporeal pleasures. But the one, indeed viz. The continent man,
52:09
possesses but the other does not possess the prey of desires. And the
52:14
one indeed is a man of such a description as not to be delighted contrary
52:19
to reason, But the other is delighted. Indeed, it is not led
52:22
by this delight. The incontinent and the intemperate man also resemble each other,
52:29
though indeed they are different characters. Both, however, pursue corporeal delights,
52:35
but the latter indeed thinking that it is proper, and the other not thinking
52:39
that it is proper to pursue them. Chapter ten. Nor is it possible
52:45
that the same person can, at one and the same time be prudent and
52:50
incontinent, For it has been shown by us that a prudent man is at
52:54
the same time a man of worthy manners. Again, a man is not
52:59
only prudent from knowing what ought to be done, but also from acting properly.
53:04
But the incontinent man does not act properly. Nothing, however, prevents
53:09
the incontinent man from being skillful. Hence, also sometimes certain persons appear to
53:15
be prudent but incontinent, because skillfulness differs from prudence in the way we have
53:22
before explained. And these, so far as pertains to reason, indeed are
53:27
near to each other, but they differ according to deliberate choice. Neither therefore,
53:32
does the incontinent man possess reason as one who knows and contemplates, but
53:38
as one who is asleep or intoxicated, and he acts indeed voluntarily, for
53:45
after a certain manner, he acts, knowing both what he does and for
53:50
the sake of what he acts as he does. But he is not depraved,
53:54
for his deliberate choice is good, so that he is half depraved and
54:00
not unjust, because he is not insidious. For one incontinent man indeed,
54:06
i e. The man who is incontinent from debility does not persist in what
54:10
he has deliberated. And he who is of a melancholy temperament i e.
54:15
The man who is precipitately incontinent, is not, in short disposed to deliberate.
54:22
The incontinent man therefore resembles a city which decrees indeed everything that is proper,
54:30
and has good laws, but uses none of them as anaxandrates revilingly said
54:36
quote. The state consults, but its own laws neglects close quote. But
54:44
the bad man resembles a city which uses indeed laws, but uses bad laws
54:49
in continents, however, and continents are conversant with that which exceeds the habit
54:53
of the multitude. For the continent man persists more, but the incontinent man
55:00
less. Then the multitude are able to do in the decisions of reason.
55:05
The incontinence, however, of the melancholy, is more easily cured than the
55:10
incontinence of those who deliberate, indeed, but do not persist in doing what
55:15
they have deliberated to do. Those also, who are incontinent from custom,
55:21
may be more easily cured than those who are naturally so, for it is
55:25
more easy to change custom than nature. For on this very account, it
55:30
is difficult to change custom viz. Because it resembles nature, as Evanous also
55:36
says, quote, by long attention, custom is produced and is at length
55:42
as nature to mankind close quote. We have shown, therefore, what continence
55:47
and incontinence, and also what endurance and effeminacy are, and how these habits
55:53
subsist with reference to each other. Chapter eleven. The discs ession, however,
56:00
of pleasure and pain, pertains to him who philosophizes about the political science,
56:07
for he is the architect, as it were, of the end looking
56:10
to which we say that one thing is evil but another is simply good.
56:15
Again, it is likewise necessary that we should make these the objects of consideration,
56:22
for we admit that ethical virtue and vice are conversant with pleasures and pains,
56:28
and most men assert that felicity is accompanied with pleasure. Hence also they
56:34
denominate the blessed man from especially rejoicing some. Therefore, no pleasure appears to
56:40
be good, neither essentially nor from accident, for good and pleasure are not
56:46
the same thing. But to others, some pleasures appear to be good,
56:51
but many of them to be bad. Others, again, in the third
56:54
place, assert that though all pleasures were good, yet at the same time
56:59
that which is most excellent cannot be pleasure. In short, therefore they say
57:04
pleasure is not good, because all pleasure is a generation tending to a sensible
57:09
nature as to its end. But no generation is allied to ends, as
57:15
no act of building a house i e. The energy of building is allied
57:21
to the house. Again, the temperate man avoids pleasures. Farther still,
57:25
the prudent man pursues a freedom from pain and not the delectable, to which
57:31
may be added that pleasures are an impediment to the energy of prudence, and
57:37
this in proportion to the delight which they afford, as is the case with
57:42
venereal pleasures. For no one, when engaged in this pleasure, can intellectually
57:46
perceive anything. Again, pleasure is not the offspring of art, though everything
57:52
which is good is the work of art. Farther still, children and brutes
57:58
pursue pleasures. But that all pleasures are not worthy is indicated by this that
58:04
some are base and disgraceful and pernicious, for some pleasures produced disease. It
58:09
is also evident that pleasure is not the best of things, because it is
58:14
not an end but generation. Such. Therefore, nearly are the assertions respecting
58:20
pleasure Chapter twelve, that it does not happen. However, from these arguments,
58:28
that pleasure is neither good nor the best of things is evident from the
58:31
following considerations. In the first place, indeed, because good is predicated in
58:37
a twofold respect, for one kind of good is simply and absolutely good,
58:44
but another is good to a certain person, and natures and habits receive the
58:49
same division, so that this will also be the case with motions and generations.
58:53
With respect to these pleasures likewise, which appear to be bad, some
58:59
indeed are simple bad, but are not bad to a certain person, but
59:02
to him are eligible. And some are not pleasures to this person except once
59:07
and for a short time, But they are not eligible to him, and
59:13
some are not pleasures, but only appear to be so, viz. Those
59:16
which are attended with pain and are for the sake of a remedy, such
59:22
as those of the sick again sins of good. One kind is energy,
59:27
but another is habit. Those pleasures which restore their possessor to his natural habit
59:31
are delectable in desires. However, there is the energy of an indigent and
59:38
imperfect habit and nature. There are also pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain and
59:45
desire, such as the energies of contemplation nature, in these not being indigent,
59:52
but that some pleasures are delectable of themselves, and others only on account
59:57
of the indigence which they remove. He is indicated by this that men are
1:00:01
not pleased with the same delectable thing when the indigence of nature is removed and
1:00:07
when it is not. For in the former case they are delighted with things
1:00:12
simply and absolutely pleasant, but in the latter with their contraries. For they
1:00:17
are then delighted with things sharp and bitter, none of which are either naturally
1:00:23
or absolutely delectable, so that neither are they pleasures. For as things delectable
1:00:30
are to each other, so likewise are the pleasures produced by these Farther Still,
1:00:35
it is not necessary that something else should be better than pleasure, as
1:00:38
some say the end of generation is better than generation. For pleasures are not
1:00:45
generations, nor are all of them accompanied with generation, but they are energies
1:00:51
end an end. Nor do pleasures happen when things are passing into existence but
1:00:57
from the use of things. Nor is the end of all pleasures something different
1:01:00
from them, but of those only which lead to the perfection of nature.
1:01:06
Hence, it is not well said that pleasure is a sensible generation. But
1:01:10
it must rather be said that it is the energy of habit according to nature.
1:01:15
And instead of saying that it is a sensible it must be said that
1:01:20
it is an unimpeded generation. It appears, however, to be a certain
1:01:24
generation, because it is properly good. For they fancied that energy is generation,
1:01:30
but it is different from it. To say also that pleasures are bad
1:01:36
because some delectable things produce diseases is what may likewise be said of things to
1:01:40
lubrious, For some of these are bad as to pecuniary affairs. In this
1:01:46
respect, therefore, both will be bad, and yet they are not on
1:01:51
this account bad, for contemplation is likewise sometimes injurious to health. Yet the
1:01:57
pleasure proceeding from each habit is neither an impediment to prudence nor to any habit.
1:02:02
But the pleasures which are an impediment to these are such as our forum.
1:02:07
Since the pleasures arising from contemplation and discipline produce in a greater degree contemplation
1:02:15
and learning. But it reasonably happens that no pleasure is the work of art,
1:02:21
since neither is there an art of any other energy, but of power,
1:02:25
though the arts pertaining too unguents and cooking appear to be the arts of
1:02:30
pleasure. With respect to the assertions also that the temperate man avoids pleasures,
1:02:37
and that the prudent man pursues a life unattended with pain, and that children
1:02:42
and brutes pursue pleasure, all these are solved after the same manner, For
1:02:47
since we have shown how all pleasures are in a certain respect simply good,
1:02:52
and how they are not good. Hence, children and brutes pursue such pleasures
1:02:58
as are accompanied with desire and pain, and are corporeal, and the prudent
1:03:04
man pursues a freedom of pain from these. For of such a kind are
1:03:07
these pleasures, viz. They are accompanied with pain. Children and brutes also
1:03:14
pursue the excesses of these, according to which the intemperate man becomes intemperate.
1:03:20
Hence the temperate man avoids these, since there are also pleasures which belong to
1:03:24
the temperate man. Chapter thirteen. It is also admitted that pain is an
1:03:31
evil and is to be avoided. For one kind of pain, indeed,
1:03:36
is simply evil, but another in a certain respect, because it is an
1:03:39
impediment. That, however, which is contrary to what is to be avoided.
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So far as it is something to be avoided and is evil, is
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good. Pleasure therefore is necessarily something good, for the solution of spucipis is
1:03:54
not appropriate viz. Then pleasure is contrary to pain, just as the greater
1:04:00
is contrary to the less and the equal. Since no one will say that
1:04:04
pleasure is a certain evil, but nothing prevents a certain pleasure from being the
1:04:09
best of things if certain pleasures are bad, just as a certain science viz.
1:04:15
Wisdom is the best of sciences, though some sciences are bad. Perhaps
1:04:20
too, it must necessarily be the case that if of every habit, there
1:04:25
are unimpeded energies, Whether felicity is the energy of all habits or of some
1:04:30
one of them, this energy, if it is unimpeded, is most eligible.
1:04:36
But this is pleasure, so that a certain pleasure will be the best
1:04:41
of things many pleasures, if it should so happen being simply bad. And
1:04:45
on this account all men are of opinion that a happy is a delectable life,
1:04:51
and they reasonably connect pleasure with felicity. For no energy is perfect when
1:04:58
it is impeded, but felicity is among the number of perfect energies. Hence,
1:05:03
the happy man requires the goods pertaining to the body and external possessions,
1:05:10
and also good fortune, lest the want of these should be an impediment to
1:05:15
his felicity. Those, however, who say that a man, if he
1:05:19
is a good man, may be happy, though he should be tormented in
1:05:24
a wheel and fall into the greatest calamities, say nothing to the purpose,
1:05:29
whether they assert this willingly or unwillingly, Because however, happy man requires good
1:05:34
fortune. Prosperity appears to some persons to be the same with felicity, though
1:05:40
it is not the same, since prosperity when it is excessive is an impediment
1:05:45
to felicity. Perhaps likewise, it is no longer just to call prosperity when
1:05:51
it is excessive good fortune, For the definition of prosperity has a reference to
1:05:58
felicity. That all bruce to and all men pursue pleasure is an indication that
1:06:03
pleasure is, in a certain respect the best of things. Quote that fame
1:06:10
which crowds of humankind extol, will ne'er completely perish close quote Because however,
1:06:17
neither the same nature, nor the same habit either is or appears to be
1:06:23
the best. Neither do all men pursue the same pleasure. Though pleasure is
1:06:27
pursued by all men, perhaps also they pursue not the pleasure which they fancy,
1:06:32
nor that which they say they pursue, but the same pleasure. For
1:06:36
all things naturally possess something divine. Corporeal pleasures, however, obtain the inheritance
1:06:43
of the name, because men are for the most part occupied in them,
1:06:47
and all animals partake of them. Because therefore these pleasures alone are generally known,
1:06:54
these are the only pleasures which are fancied to have in existence. It
1:06:59
is, however, evident that unless pleasure is good and also energy. It
1:07:02
will not be possible for the happy man to live delectably, For on what
1:07:08
account would delight be requisite to a happy life if it is not good?
1:07:12
But it would also be possible for life to be happy though attended with pain,
1:07:16
For pain will neither be evil nor good. If pleasure is not good,
1:07:21
Why therefore is pain to be avoided? Neither therefore will the life of
1:07:27
the worthy man be more delectable unless his energies are more delectable Chapter fourteen.
1:07:33
With respect, however, to corporeal pleasures, we must direct our attention to
1:07:39
the assertions of those who say that some pleasures are very eligible viz. Such
1:07:44
as are worthy, but not corporeal pleasures with which the intemperate man is conversant.
1:07:49
Why therefore are the pains contrary to these pleasures depraved? For good is
1:07:55
contrary to evil? Or shall we say that necessary pleasures are so far good
1:08:00
because that which is not evil is good, or that they are good to
1:08:04
a certain extent. For in those habits and motions in which there is no
1:08:10
excess of that which is better, there is no excess of pleasure. But
1:08:15
in those in which there is an excess of what is better, there is
1:08:17
also an excess of pleasure, but of corporeal goods there is an excess,
1:08:24
and the bad man becomes bad by pursuing the excess of pleasure and not necessary
1:08:30
pleasures. For all depraved men are delighted with meats and wine and venery,
1:08:35
but not in such a manner as is proper, And they are affected in
1:08:40
a contrary way with respect to pain, For they do not avoid the excess
1:08:45
of pain, but pain altogether. For pain is not contrary to excess,
1:08:49
but to him who pursues excess. Since, however, it is not only
1:08:54
necessary to speak the truth, but also to assign the cause of a false
1:08:58
assertion for or this contributes to credibility, since when the cause why a thing
1:09:03
seems to be true though it is not, appears to be reasonable, it
1:09:09
then gives greater credibility to the truth. This being the case, it must
1:09:13
be shown why corporeal pleasures appear to be more eligible in the first place.
1:09:17
Therefore, they appear to be so because they expel pain, and because excessive
1:09:24
and in short, corporeal pleasure is pursued on account of the excesses of pain
1:09:29
as a remedy. But the remedies are vehement, and on this account,
1:09:33
corporeal pleasures are pursued because they become more apparent when placed by that which is
1:09:40
contrary to them. Pleasure therefore does not appear to be good for these two
1:09:45
reasons, as we have before observed. Because some pleasures indeed are the actions
1:09:49
of a depraved nature, either from the birth of the animal, as those
1:09:54
of a brute, or they originate from custom, such as those of bad
1:09:59
men. But other pleasures are remedies because they are the pleasures of that which
1:10:03
is in want, and it is better to have them than for them to
1:10:08
be passing into existence. And others happen to be pleasures of that which is
1:10:13
in a perfect condition from accident. Therefore they are worthy pleasures. Again,
1:10:18
pleasures that are vehement are pursued by those who are incapable of being delighted with
1:10:25
other pleasures. These therefore procure for themselves certain thirsts. Hence, when pleasures
1:10:30
are innoxious, they are not to be reprehended, but when they are noxious,
1:10:35
they are bad. For those that pursue these pleasures have no other with
1:10:41
which they are delighted. And if neither these nor any others are present,
1:10:45
the vulgar are in pain through the indigence of nature, for the animal always
1:10:50
labors, as physical arguments testify, since, as physiologists say, to see
1:10:57
and to hear are painful. But we are now accustomed to these energies,
1:11:00
and therefore do not perceive the pain in a similar manner. In youth,
1:11:05
in consequence of the augmentation which then takes place, we are affected like those
1:11:11
who are intoxicated. And youth is a delectable period of human life. But
1:11:16
the melancholic naturally always require a remedy, for their body experiences a continual molestation
1:11:24
from its temperament through the acrimony of the bile, and they are always agitated
1:11:30
with vehement appetite. Pleasure, however, always excels pain as well, the
1:11:36
pain, which is contrary to pleasure, as that which is casual if the
1:11:42
pleasure is strong, and on this account the melancholic becomes intemperate and depraved.
1:11:47
But the pleasures which are without pain have no excess. And these are such
1:11:53
as are derived from things naturally delectable, and which are not accidentally so.
1:11:58
I mean, however, by things delectable from accident remedies, for because it
1:12:03
happens that we are cured of a malady, the part which is sane performing
1:12:08
something. On this account, the remedies appear to be delectable. But by
1:12:13
things naturally delectable, I mean those which produce the action of such a nature,
1:12:17
i e. Which produce an energy essentially adapted to such a nature.
1:12:23
Nothing, however, which remains the same, is always delectable. Because our
1:12:27
nature is not simple, but there is also something in it different, according
1:12:31
to which it is corruptible. Hence, if the one part does anything,
1:12:36
this to the other nature is preternatural. But when both the parts are equalized,
1:12:43
that which is performed neither appears to be painful nor pleasing. For if
1:12:47
there is any being the nature of which is simple to this being, the
1:12:51
same action will always be most delectable. Hence God always rejoices according to one
1:12:59
simple pleasure sure, for there is not only an energy of corporeal motion,
1:13:03
but also of immobility, And pleasure exists more abundantly in rest than in motion.
1:13:10
But mutation is the sweetest of all things, according to the poet,
1:13:15
through a certain depravity. For as a depraved man is mutable, so likewise
1:13:20
is the nature which requires mutation, for it is neither simple nor good.
1:13:26
And thus we have spoken concerning continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, and
1:13:31
have shown what each of them is, and how some of them are good
1:13:35
but others bad. It now remains that we speak concerning friendship. End of Book seven