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Governor John de Jongh's Motion To Dismiss The Epstein Survivors Lawsuit (Part 4) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

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  Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
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  In this episode, we're going to pick up where we
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  left off with the memorandum of law and support of
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  John Dejong's motion to dismiss the lawsuit brought against them
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  by the Epstein survivors. Six second CoA no aiding and
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  a betting liability under section fifteen ninety five. The second
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  CoA alleges that defendants and their officers, agents, and employees aided, abetted,
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  and induced Epstein sex trafficking venture in violation of US
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  Code Section eighteen fifteen ninety one A one, fifteen ninety
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  one A two, and fifteen ninety five. To be clear,
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  aiding and a betting liability is not provided for the
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  section fifteen ninety five Noble three thirty five f. Dot
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  supp three D five oh four. Moreover, when Congress enacts
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  a statute under which a person may sue and recover
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  damages from a private defendant for the defendants violation of
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  some statutory norm, there is no general presumption the plaintiff
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  may also sue aiders and a betters. CoA two must
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  be dismissed because there is no aiding and a betting
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  liability under Section fifteen ninety five seven third CoA no
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  individual cause of action for civil conspiracy. The third CoA
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  for civil conspiracy must be dismissed because under New York law,
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  civil conspiracy is not a separate tour Jasper versus Black
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  versus Carolina Pad Company twenty twelve, WL forty one three
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  eighty nine sixty nine twelve SDN Y twenty twelve. Consequently,
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  civil conspiracy cannot be asserted as an individual cause of action,
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  including a TVPR case Sodobin versus Kilwanen twenty twenty two
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  w L four forty five one zero zero five fourteen
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  ed n Y twenty twenty two TVPR case. The third
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  CoA must therefore be dismissed. Relatedly, as discussed here in,
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  in the context of the untimeliness of the claims, the
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  FAA fails to allege any conspiracy at all sufficient to
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  tell the statute of limitations. Eight. Fourth CoA fac fils
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  to plead negligence, duty breach or causation. Plaintiffs. Fourth CoA
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  alleges that mister DeJong owed and negligently breached the duty
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  of care, including but not limited to ensuring the citizens
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  aliens and travelers to USVII are protected by the USVI
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  government uniformly under the federal law, including US Code Section eighteen,
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  fifteen ninety one, fifteen ninety four, and fifteen ninety five,
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  also one ninety nine, two hundred through two twenty three.
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  A VI governor could not enforce federal law. States have
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  no inherent power to enforce federal statutory law. Lamos Margaret
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  State enforcement of federal law and y U l. Rev.
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  June twenty fourteen. The USVII Department of Justice is administered
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  under the supervision of the direction of the Attorney General
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  and not the governor. The authority of the Attorney General
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  to prosecute offenses against the laws of the Virgin Islands
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  cannot be seriously questioned. George versus People, sixty nine, VII,
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  five point fifty three five sixty two, twenty eighteen. Plaintiff's
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  fourth CoA fails the state of claim because the VI
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  Governor had no duty and can not breach any duty
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  to enforce the tvpr B. VI Attorney General enforces section
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  fifteen ninety one fifteen ninety five, not the VI governor or.
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  Mister DeJong Section fifteen ninety five d contains tvpra's sole
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  mechanism for state enforcement of TVPR, allowing only the attorney
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  general of a state to bring a civil action against
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  a person who violates section fifteen ninety one US Code eighteen,
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  Section fifteen ninety five D. The TVPR does not authorize
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  a state or territorial governor to enforce or bring a
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  civil action, even when he would governor. Mister DeJong was
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  unauthorized to bring civil action under the TVPR. The FAC
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  fails to state mister Dejong's duty or ability to enforce
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  the TVPR. Ce FAC fails to plead causation. Mister DeJong
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  incorporates his causation argument from his article to standing discussion above.
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  The plaintiffs have failed to plead causation nine all coas
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  failure to distinguish conduct during a DeJong term. The FAC
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  specifically alleges that mister DeJong was at all all relevant
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  times the governor of the USVII. Mister DeJong was governor
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  of the USVII from one one, two thousand and seven
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  to one five, twenty fifteen. DeJong Avid David People versus
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  DeJong sixty four Virgin Islands fifty three fifty five VII
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  Super twenty sixteen. The FAC alleges conduct from two thousand
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  and one to twenty nineteen. The FAC fails to allege
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  which conduct fell within mister de Jong's term as governor.
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  Ten all CoA failure to pleade exception to USVII immunity.
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  The FAC specifically alleges that mister DeJong was at all
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  relevant times the governor of the USVII. Therefore, at all
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  relevant times, mister DeJong was not a private person. He
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  has only sued in his capacity as the governor. The
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  Governor of the Virgin Islands is absolutely immune from suit
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  for the performance of his official duties or acts within
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  the scope of his line of duty. Moreover, to the
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  extent mister DeJong is named in his official capacity. Whereas
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  the Government of the VI the Revised Organic Act grants
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  sovereign immunity to the Virgin Islands for toward claims. While
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  the government has waived immunity in certain situations, the FAC
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  does not begin to allege that waiver applies here the
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  plaintiffs have not pleaded or shown any exception to the
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  governor's immunity. Similarly, in New York, it's well settled that
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  public entities remain immune from negligence claims arising out of
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  performance of their governmental functions. Nicholson versus State, eight seventy
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  two n YS two d eight forty six, eight fifty
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  one eleven. Failure to comply with Virgin Islands Towards Claims Act.
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  The FAC fails to comply with the notice and filing
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  requirements of the Virgin Islands Toward Claims Act, which warrants dismissal.
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  VI Code Title thirty three, Section thirty four oh eight
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  twelve no CoA. For failure to enforce law stop crime.
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  The state territory cannot be held liable for negligent failure
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  to perform governmental activities such as providing police protection or
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  law enforcement, generally unless a special relationship is established between
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  the state territory and the person injured. The Long versus
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  County of Erie sixty n y two d two ninety six,
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  nineteen eighty three. Garrett versus townt of Greece fifty five
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  and y two D seven seventy four, nineteen eighty one.
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  The FAC must be dismissed in so far as it
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  cannot state a claim for the governor's failure to prevent
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  crime or enforce Law thirteen. Mister DeJong not an agent
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  of First Lady Cecil Dejeong. The FAC makes specific allegations
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  as to mister de Jong's wife, Cecial Dejeong. However, one
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  spouse is not an agent of another ce City of
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  New York versus Chemical Bank one twenty two Miscellaneous two
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  D one oh four Superior Court, nineteen eighty three, and
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  cannot be held liable for spouses independently wrongful act because
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  of their marital relationship. Specific allegations as to First Lady
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  DeJong are not imputed to mister DeJong. Seven fed R Civp.
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  Twelve b seven, nineteen Failure to join Epstein Estate. This
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  Court may dismiss the FAC under rule twelve B seven.
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  For a failure to join a necessary party. Under fed
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  Ar SIEVP Garner versus Berman Brothers two sixty f Dot
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  su Pp. Three D three sixty nine three eighty sdn
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  Y twenty seventeen, the Court must dismiss an action where
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  a party was not joined is if one an absent
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  party is required, two it's not feasible to joinder the
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  absent party, and three it's determined in equity and good
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  conscience that the action should not proceed among the existing parties.
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  The primary allegations of assault, abuse, imprisonment, and sex trafficking
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  were committed by Jeffrey Epstein. The FAC does not allege
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  mister de Jong abused anyone. The deceased mister Epstein, his
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  unidentified abuser friends, and his estate are absent from the FAC.
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  Epstein is an indispensable party under the fed R siv
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  P nineteen B factors. One, a judgment rendered in Epstein's
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  absence will prejudice the estate or related parties to the
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  prejudice could not be alleviated. Three, a judgment in Epstein's
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  absence would be inadequate. In four, the plaintiff would have
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  an adequate remedy if the court dismissed the suit. Fed
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  rciv p nineteen B six thirty two, f Dot supp
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  three D two thirty nine to sixty one, SDNY twenty
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  twenty one, applying fedarciv p twelve B seven and nineteen.
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  In TVPR cases A feder siev P. Twelve f Immaterial
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  scandalous loan arrest allegations must be stricken. The FAC seventy
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  seven gratuitously includes impertinent, scandalous, and prejudicial criminal allegations about
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  mister DeJong that have no real bearing on the case.
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  These allegations should be stricken because they have no real
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  bearing on the case, will likely prejudice the move in,
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  or they have criminal overtones. First, the alleged depstein to
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  John DeJong loan as pleded is completely immaterial. There are
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  no allegations that the loan was part of a corrupt
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  quid pro quo or that the loan had anything to
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  do with abuse or trafficking. Second, even if the plaintiffs
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  had pleaded, a nexus between the loan and the abuse
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  or the trafficking to the extent the allegations relate to
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  dissimilar criminal conduct and appear to be included solely to
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  demonstrate mister Dejong's willingness to violate applicable laws. The allegations
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  are scandalous and immaterial, and are appropriate targets of emotion.
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  To Strike nine, any dismissal must be with prejudice. ASA's
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  one year window closed eleven twenty four to twenty twenty
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  three statute is run if the court dismisses the fac
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  dismissal should be with prejudice. Plaintiffs cannot refile a complaint
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  or fix their allegations because the one year look back
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  window under the ASA expired on eleven twenty four to
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  twenty twenty three. Ordinarily, as in the case cited, supra
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  district courts will dismiss without prejudice to allow the plaintiffs
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  to correct their deficient pleading. However, because the look back
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  window has expired, the plaintiffs can no longer refile this
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  FAC and any dismissal must be with prejudice, even if
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  the court deems this a harsh remedy. The plaintiff's attorneys
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  elected to wait until two days before the ASA window
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  closed to file the original complaint on eleven twenty two,
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  twenty three, when plaintiffs have the opportunity to amend and
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  file this FAC on twelve thirteen, twenty three after the
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  ASA window closed. Conclusion. Rarely are there so many grounds
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  to ask for dismissal of a complaint to this stage,
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  especially pursuant to so many subsections are Rule twelve. This
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  is one of those rare instances. The FAC fails to
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  minimally allege specific conduct that involved a specific dough plaintiff
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  and a specific defendant. Mister de Jong insufficient allegations are
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  insufficient allegations, even if they are spread out over forty
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  eight pages and two hundred and twenty five paragraphs to
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  conceal this fact. That's why so many independent grounds exist
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  for dismissal and transfer of the case. The court should
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  dismiss the FAC. If it does not dismiss the FAC,
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  it should transfer the case to the DVII. Finally, the
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  court should strike the unnecessary impertinent allegations. This article was
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  signed by Daniel Savalis and it was dated January twenty first,
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  twenty twenty four. All right, so that's going to conclude
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  the memorandum of law filed by John DeJong in hopes
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  to get the case transferred or have it struck from
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  the docket. All of the information that goes with this
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  episode can be found in the description box.