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Chuck House: Lessons on Intrapreneurship & Innovation Resistance · The Innovation Show

• 0:01
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• 0:30
  I wanted to start today with many quotes from the book, permission Denied.
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  We are joined once again by the author of this book, Chuck House.
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  Welcome back to the show, man.
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  Pleasure to be here.
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  It's great to have you back, and from last week's episode of The Innovation
• 0:44
  Show, which was with three other guests.
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  I kept talking about you, I'll share a little excerpt of what we talked about
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  and see what your thoughts are about this.
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  So here we go.
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  I'm reading this book, permission Denied.
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  It's called 'cause Chuck House, this guy, he was told by Packard,
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  don't be working on this project.
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  I don't wanna see this project in a lab in a year.
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  He interpreted it purposely.
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  He selectively heard what he heard.
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  And he said, okay, so you want it in the field in a year.
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  He was told specifically not to do it, and he did it behind closed doors.
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  And he himself, he's an engineer, went out with his family on a tour,
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  drove around to different types of customers, took out his front seat of
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  his Volkswagen Beetle and put in this machine and showed it to customers.
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  And the only way that project took off was because one of his
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  colleagues had had a heart attack and wanted to see his heart monitor.
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  On a heart monitor, and his wife was a nurse and his wife said, this
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  would be a very valuable project.
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  Now I say all that to say a, he was told by the leader of the company, the owner of
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  the company, the founder of the company.
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  Who, and this is where I did the re do the research.
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  I looked at his book, and in his book he said, give engineers the space to explore.
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  Yes.
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  And that is a paradox that you see time and time again.
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  And I really wanted you guys to share your view of that because you work with CEOs
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  and I think sometimes they believe they're giving people permission, but if those
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  permissions, you mentioned the fire phone.
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  If they fail.
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  Yeah.
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  And I use that term.
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  You keep a receipt.
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  Yeah.
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  You're, you have a blemish in your career.
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  Chuck House said this about himself.
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  He said he did a second project after having that hero project.
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  Yeah.
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  He himself said, we need to kill the project.
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  And he lost all his management.
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  All his budget and all of a sudden he was starting, he was, he went from hero
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  to zero and he had to build that again.
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  Yeah.
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  That is a problem.
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  And that makes people like him give up.
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  Now he didn't, but they're very, very rare and the corporate immune
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  system doesn't let them flourish.
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  And that's because we still have that hero syndrome.
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  It's that one person who needs to fight the system.
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  Like, yeah.
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  Well then you'll get one innovation every, you know, 50 years.
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  So why didn't NE Nestle come up with one Nespresso?
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  Right.
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  Because that's the hero system, right?
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  So what we need is actually a real system that leadership supports.
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  So that many can explore.
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  And if you fail, it's not gonna blemish you.
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  And, and you know, you can love Amazon or hate Amazon, but when j Bezos was CEO,
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  he did say like, you know, invention.
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  He called it invention.
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  Success and invention, like the the flip side, you cannot invent,
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  do new things without failure.
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  And then he would say, which is kind of crazy, right?
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  The bigger we get with Amazon, the bigger our failures need to get, otherwise
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  we're not gonna move the needle.
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  Yeah.
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  But what he didn't say is people will get that one wrong.
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  Everything starts with small failures until they get to a big failure.
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  There's often very many iterations.
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  Right.
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  Yeah.
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  But you mentioned that, right?
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  The Kindle fire phone team was not fired.
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  They, they moved.
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  They moved and be, those engineers came up with Alexa.
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  Alexa afterwards.
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  But what is interesting is you could actually audit a company.
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  To what extent they could embrace that resilience or that thick skin.
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  You just ask, how do you conduct your after action review?
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  Do you write it down to what extent you will share?
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  So in a microcosm.
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  People wrote about it, and you're looking@booking.com, right?
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  They do tons of experiment and engineers need to log their
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  experiment in a centralized system, and then no permission needs to ask.
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  So a junior guy in Sydney can look up what's going on with a VP in amda.
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  Is, you know, right to know, not need to know basis.
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  And so there are actually day-to-day habit, we as external can help
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  audit and to what extent we are embracing radical transparency.
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  Without transparency, there's no learning because knowledge doesn't flow around.
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  Yeah.
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  And I'll just add one point to, because these are very interesting perspectives.
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  Going back to your point about architecture as well.
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  And.
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  I think it's absolutely, you know, you are absolutely spot on about the fact
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  that there is no way to really get to the next breakthrough without that
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  permission to fail and without letting so-called a thousand flowers bloom.
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  And what helps kind of at the company, what's important for you
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  to then succeed with it because you want things to succeed, but
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  then how do they fit together?
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  What's that picture?
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  So you need to be very clear about what do we want to become?
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  As the world is changing, what do we wanna become in, in, in a
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  year from now, two years from now?
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  You know, it's not a one year, two year plan.
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  You can't plan when, when the structure is uncertain.
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  But you need to have a vision of here's what we wanna be, here's
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  the logic of how we will operate one to three years from now.
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  And constantly update that based on how things are changing.
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  But then as these experiments succeed, see how they align towards that.
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  Because you're not just sharing financial returns and this is the only mild
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  deviation from venture capital where.
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  The portfolio model itself is sufficient Here.
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  You don't want this a portfolio.
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  You want architecturally cohesive returns, and so you need to have that vision,
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  that architecture of capabilities, and then say, okay, that maps back here.
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  . So there you go, Chuck.
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  What are your thoughts on that?
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  Man?
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  you captured the essence of of what it was no question about that.
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  I was reading your post last night and you have about 500 quotes of people
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  you know, Galileo and Copernicus and right on down through the list of
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  people that have bucked the system.
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  And the feedback you got was from many people that have had
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  essentially the same experience.
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  And I think you're playing to an audience that understands this issue.
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  It's an issue that those of us that have lived it understand pretty
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  well those that get in the way of it have all their good reasons.
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  And the question is, how can you make that, how can you ritualize that in
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  a more positive way for everyone?
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  And that's why I wrote the book in the first place.
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  And we're gonna get to that chuck has just agreed kindly to do part three.
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  You'll be sick of me, Chuck, by the end of all this as well, because I really
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  want to share Chuck's intrapreneur's handbook because it's so, so valuable.
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  But there in this part, and I'm really focusing on part three or four
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  of the book here, there's so many lines and quotes that are just gold.
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  And I'd love you to elaborate on them.
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  So I'll pull these out.
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  I'm gonna pick up the story here.
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  Maybe you'll give us a bit of context.
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  , Because you said here, you'd just turned down a job with AMD to build
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  the same thing that now HP wanted.
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  And while you'd been very nervous about the assignment at AMD, their reward
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  package was disproportionately higher.
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  And all of a sudden you wondered, oh, have I made the wrong,
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  have I made the wrong choice?
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  Have I made a big mistake?
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  Maybe we'll pick up the story there and you tell us what
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  was going on at this stage.
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  the basic issue was I had been fairly successful at my division.
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  We were a thousand miles from headquarters.
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  We didn't get observed all that often.
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  So you had a fair amount of freedom.
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  And within that Colorado Springs group, I'd developed a reasonable
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  following, I guess you would say.
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  I had credibility and and I was allowed by and large to pick my own projects.
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  And so I had actually gotten pretty used to that and was having a pretty good
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  time and a fair amount of success for the company and for our own projects.
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  And and because we'd been fairly visible in the competitive space
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  I, my name got known elsewhere.
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  And there's a phenomena we call headhunters that they, find you and
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  they solicit You We just had that in college football here in the States.
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  Big hoorah for some of the coaches.
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  But anyway, the point was I got found by one of these groups.
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  They introduced me to the, founder of a MD applied Microsystems
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  which has spun out of Fairchild.
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  The guy that founded Jerry Sanders was a close colleague with the Gordon
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  Moore and Bob Noyce over at Intel.
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  But his decision was, I'm gonna copy what they're doing, and he actually fashioned
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  a a legal document that he could be the second source for some of Intel's chips.
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  And then as these things have a way of happening they got in a war and
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  they didn't want him to have access.
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  And And the point of that all was there was a product line called
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  program development systems was enabling the use of these chips.
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  Basically, you could emulate how the chip performed and have a second computer.
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  You're actually writing the code for that.
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  The microcode for the, for the microprocessor in question, if
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  you could write it for your own microprocessor you being a chip
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  manufacturer you had essentially a heads up a leadership position.
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  A MD all of a sudden didn't have access to the intel chip set or to the emulators.
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  And Jerry Sanders being the enterprising guy that he was deciding he wanted
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  to build a competing program.
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  And so that's what they recruited, that's what they tried to recruit me to do.
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  And this was.
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  Competitive to a degree with logic analyzers, but it was a very different
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  technology, much more software intensive.
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  I was still pretty much a hardware guy and I went and listened and he's a pretty
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  bombastic tub thumping kind of guy.
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  And and he he made the offer pretty attractive Hey, take a look out there
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  in that garage there's a Bentley and a Ferrari and and Aston Martin
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  and I mean, my God, it was a lineup.
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  Now it also happened to be at a time that gas was pretty much at a premium.
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  This would be like 1978 or so, and people are at long lines of the gas
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  station and OPEC had kind of closed down the US supply and, his wife served
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  breakfast in a very filmy kind of thing.
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  She's a, was a model.
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  And she was known for her risque dress.
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  she first of all served us breakfast and I was bedazzled.
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  And then she jumped in one of the cars and drove off and ran outta
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  gas about two miles from home.
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  And so he gets a call while we're interviewing from the fire
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  department who had found her.
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  And she's basically still dressed in this basically Scandy nightgown,
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  but she's out of gas three miles from a gas station, right.
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  So it was it was almost laughable.
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  But anyway, the point was as he described it and how it would work and it would be
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  a partnership with Siemens in Germany.
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  And this was all I'm a Colorado Springs country boy, it's like, holy smokes.
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  This would be.
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  Way outta my league.
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  And so I basically said no.
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  And it took a while and he was unhappy with my decision, but
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  you know, that's how it is.
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  Never spoke to him again in my life.
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  He wouldn't have spoken to me if I'd met And so about two
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  months later, I'm being hosted.
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  I was on a magazine cover and I had even more notoriety and I at a meeting
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  up in Canada and one of HP's vice presidents from California was there.
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  And he asked me to go for a walk along the Ottawa River, and it's colder than
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  blue blazes and fall color around.
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  And he says, here's what we'd like your group to do.
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  We want you to build.
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  Exactly what was asking me to build.
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  And I said that's thank you very much for your input, but you know, I'm in
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  charge of my own program out here.
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  He said, no, I don't think you understand.
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  You work for Hewlett Packard and we call the shots when we need to and
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  you're gonna build this damn thing.
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  go, wait a minute there's no pretty girl in the negative, Hey,
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  there's no Bentley, I don't know.
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  I didn't know what a stock option really was like, did I make the wrong decision?
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  is this?
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  And So it took a little soul searching day.
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  To wrap my mind around it.
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  Years later, I gave a TED X talk.
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  I don't know if you know about the TED Talks, but I gave a talk
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  on, I said, resilience is the most important single thing you can do.
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  in fact, I've been thinking if I did a second edition of the book, I'd have
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  one last chapter that says, what are some of the important things to learn?
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  And resilience is the one, and in this case, the resilience was realizing,
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  a, I don't have a choice with what Palo Alto is telling me I have to do.
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  B why don't you get with the program and decide it'd be a good thing and
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  see let's bring some of that same inventive capability of the team you've
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  already built to this new project.
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  So that's the story.
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  There was a couple of little things here and this one resonated
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  with me on a personal level.
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  It was regards to the PDS challenge and.
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  Here.
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  You said you didn't feel victorious, even though in a way you'd been headhunted
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  inside the organization, this was an honor, but you felt that it came back
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  to control because you liked being in charge of creating change and you
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  bridled when someone else told you what to do and you wondered, had it
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  something to do with the long simmering issues you had with your father.
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  Being ordered to change has often been an emotional hurdle.
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  The reason that I'd love you to share that is I see that as a very common
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  trait with intrapreneurs or change.
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  Change makers for sure.
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  For sure.
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  They don't like being told what to do.
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  that certainly is true in my case.
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  Certainly true in my case.
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  And I guess I did put it in the book that it was probably issues with my father.
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  I don't know whether that's would I say that today?
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  Probably still would.
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  there's always a galvanizing reason for what we do.
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  You look in the mirror and you think you're a pretty good fellow
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  and other people are saying, why the hell is he doing that?
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  And you go I was, when I was four years old.
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  See I didn't get a bicycle.
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  For sure but Chuck, I'd love you to share how that manifested in the
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  workplace, because this often gets us in trouble in the workplace.
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  Oh yeah,
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  In fact, I think you hit the nail on the head.
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  What happens in the workplace is more or less the company thinks that they own you.
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  You're I wouldn't say you're chattel, but you're an employee.
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  They're the employer.
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  They should be able to dictate.
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  What you work on and what the goals are.
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  Okay.
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  And I've I've found that limiting often.
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  And and so, one response to that is, is to design your own world.
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  Another is to fight it.
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  a third is to leave that environment and go become an intrapreneur.
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  And so you have several different choices.
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  But in my case it, that was one of the fueling ambitions, if you will.
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  was to be in control.
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  But a bigger thing for me than often was I just saw something
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  different that could be done.
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  And the people I'm with didn't see it and didn't appreciate it.
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  And so it isn't just a question of you'd like control, it's a question
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  of you just have this dream or this insight and you say, my God, we this.
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  We could drive a MRE through this hole in the front line, and so that more
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  often than not, that's what drove me.
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  But subconsciously, I'm sure it was some of this control element as well.
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  we'll discover later sometimes the innovator, the intrapreneur sees it
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  way earlier than anyone else, and by the time the organization then look
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  at the opportunity, you're number 43 as an entrant into that marketplace.
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  Like, happened with the PDS, but we'll get to that Shook because that's
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  that's a part of the story as well.
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  There's a few key quotes here.
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  That I just loved, and they're just applicable to everybody in, every role.
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  Whether you're an incumbent or a new entrant to a marketplace.
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  You write here that "innovation changes everything.
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  Your opportunity is also open to others who, other innovators, that's who you say.
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  And strange as it may seem, because existing competitors know the old rules.
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  They are among the least likely to be your key competitors in the new order.
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  Very important point.
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  Existing competitors almost always follow the same pattern.
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  First, they redouble their efforts to improve the old existing products
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  to show that the new approach is really not yet necessary.
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  Second, when it becomes dramatically clear that the shift is happening, they'll
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  awkwardly try to meld the two ideas.
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  I'd love you to share that because that happens even today.
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  There's a set of sayings about the four stages that, that people go through.
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  Page 21 of this book, I'll just kinda read it.
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  First year original idea gets ignored.
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  Okay.
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  And then when they realize it's growing, it's seen as a threat its too radical.
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  and so they try to stop it, and then they try to corrupt it.
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  Oh let me here's what's wrong with it.
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  If you could do this, you could meld it in with what's going on today.
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  And then when it finally gets instituted, they say actually that was mine.
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  They take credit for it instead of you.
• 18:50
  It's just, it's a beautiful story.
• 18:53
  And it's something that you happened to you many times as we talked about
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  in part one, but he here, I'd love you to give us context of your actual story
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  here because you say in hindsight.
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  You should have seen Intel rather than Techtronics as the real competitor.
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  And this is what happens.
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  You start looking over here at the existing competitors and
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  somebody comes from nowhere.
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  But as you say, it's extremely hard to do, especially if you've been locked
• 19:16
  in a head-to-head battle for years.
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  And this new idea seems like a breakthrough you've
• 19:21
  sought for so many years.
• 19:22
  And of course you'll focus on beating your biggest foe and you go,
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  whoops, who's this other company?
• 19:29
  So, oscilloscopes had been the, weakness for HP forever.
• 19:34
  When I say forever something like the mid fifties set up their own Salesforce and
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  took it away from the distributors that were handling both HP and Techtronics in,
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  in switching circuits things like radar, things like computers were just starting
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  to happen compared to analog radio and television and all the things that,
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  that the entertainment world knew about.
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  And so the point was they got a tremendous headstart.
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  We, we were Johnny come lately, we weren't 43rd, but we were like fifth or sixth.
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  And they had a, like a 90% market share.
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  And so I joined in 62.
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  They'd been at that for seven or eight years.
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  We tried end runs.
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  We tried hit head on for like a 15 years and didn't make a whole lot of
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  progress until the Logic Analyzer line.
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  And when, and all of a sudden logic it we're doing better than they are.
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  I'd done a nice job with displays, but that was a kind of a niche area,
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  and now we've got this logic line and we're just, we're whipping them
• 20:44
  and it was such a delicious feeling.
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  But I, kept feeling and, fretting about we're getting under-resourced for our
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  own development plan and they're gonna redouble their effort and catch us.
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  Right.
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  So that was my entire focus.
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  And then we kept hearing from people that were buying our logic they kept saying,
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  there's this thing called an emulator.
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  What's that?
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  And we, didn't, I mean, we didn't even know the word.
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  And so we for about a year, we keep hearing they're selling as many of those
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  things as you're selling logic analyzers.
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  And you go, oh, really?
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  That's interesting.
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  And, then I'm with the a MD guy you go, he thinks that's the business.
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  How come I don't, and then I'm up in Canada, walking along
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  this river freezing holy shit.
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  This is I've been missing the whole point.
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  is how the new designs are happening.
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  The paradigm has completely changed.
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  And the question is, how do you write the code and then de debug it with our tools?
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  But the question is, the hard job is writing it.
• 21:58
  And you go, oh, that's our real competitor I mean, this didn't happen.
• 22:04
  It didn't happen at 10 at night and you wake up with a light bulb it was
• 22:08
  like a slow you had to, they had to kind of eat away at my belief system.
• 22:16
  I represent in that case, the old guard and they represent the new thing.
• 22:21
  And , so the idea that I had to learn.
• 22:24
  Their way and embrace it.
• 22:25
  That's a hard thing.
• 22:27
  And it would've been harder.
• 22:29
  It is harder when you've been successful doing what you're doing.
• 22:33
  If I was still looking for a new way to break through,
• 22:36
  you'd go, oh, hey, that's it.
• 22:38
  But I'm writing my own success bubble.
• 22:42
  And so that's what's hard to get your mind out of, I used to describe it
• 22:48
  with a little diagram and you say you don't know what you don't know.
• 22:51
  And and the problem is you do know what you do know.
• 22:56
  And the question is, if you wanna think about an area that you don't know much
• 22:59
  about, you have to almost forget what you know in order to imagine the new thing.
• 23:05
  That, that's a tricky proposition.
• 23:07
  Chuck, I'm gonna, I'm gonna share that diagram 'cause I thought it
• 23:09
  was brilliant and this is one of the pieces and I'm glad you brought it up
• 23:14
  because it is one of the key pieces I wanted to share was you were brilliant.
• 23:18
  You are a brilliant innovator, you're still entrepreneur.
• 23:20
  You were an intrapreneur, you had a team who was brilliant, who had succeeded.
• 23:25
  And even with that success, it blinds you to new opportunities.
• 23:29
  And I think that's the cycle that continues time and time again,
• 23:32
  there's this, there's a saying I use, which is you cannot read the
• 23:35
  label when you're inside the jar.
• 23:38
  So from the outside you're looking at other people and you're kind of going,
• 23:41
  oh my God, they're such laggards, or they don't get it, et cetera.
• 23:45
  But when it's your turn, because you've created this reality
• 23:49
  for yourself, you miss it.
• 23:50
  The paradigm, so many, so often, and I have a brilliant quote here
• 23:54
  from you, you say, the biggest resistance to innovation in our place
• 23:58
  was centered in our own leaders.
• 24:01
  Our executive staff did not understand, and hence could not support our
• 24:05
  logic program in good conscience.
• 24:08
  They had to be shown coaxed, cajoled into understanding the
• 24:12
  issues enough to quit resisting.
• 24:14
  Even though they weren't being asked to invent in the new arena, it would've
• 24:18
  helped if they had fought those who were, but now I was staring head on
• 24:23
  the fact that, I and my own staff were exhibiting , analogous, narrow-mindedness
• 24:29
  when seen from Palo Alto.
• 24:32
  Creativity and innovation, often lauded are actually feared more when
• 24:36
  they are embraced by most managements.
• 24:38
  They espouse innovation, but actions belie the words why?
• 24:42
  True innovation clouds the future and predictably goes out of the window.
• 24:47
  Most managers really want to avoid risk, especially if visible
• 24:51
  failure might be involved.
• 24:53
  Our division management was no exception, and it was a struggle with these attitudes
• 24:58
  to find an approach to win their support.
• 25:01
  Such a key paragraph.
• 25:03
  I'd love you to elaborate.
• 25:05
  the essay I used to write was you can't see the picture when you're in the frame.
• 25:10
  Brilliant.
• 25:11
  what the problem was.
• 25:12
  And and all of a sudden you say, my God I must look to the new group.
• 25:18
  Like old group looked to me I we're the stodgy ones.
• 25:24
  We, we don't get it.
• 25:26
  And and yeah it took a and and not everybody made that transition.
• 25:33
  I, when we first put the logic team together we got a, we, it was like
• 25:38
  putting a draft baseball team together, a rugby in your case, and the, all
• 25:43
  the old teams give you their castoffs and their aging players and the new
• 25:48
  recruits that haven't yet made it.
• 25:50
  they don't really want you to succeed.
• 25:52
  And so I got all the we did a lot of turnover, and some got it.
• 25:58
  And a whole lot didn't.
• 25:59
  And and here I am with this team that I've built and we've just
• 26:04
  conquered the world, our little world.
• 26:07
  And now I can't move them either.
• 26:10
  It's like, wait a minute, I know these guys.
• 26:12
  These are all good people.
• 26:14
  These are my people.
• 26:15
  What the hell's wrong here?
• 26:17
  And what was wrong was they had learned heavily.
• 26:21
  Dave Packard used to say, he said those who resist change led the last one.
• 26:28
  That's it.
• 26:28
  I have a few little diagrams here.
• 26:30
  I thought about this diffusion of innovation model, who you're familiar
• 26:35
  with, which is the Everett Rogers piece about how adoption happens.
• 26:39
  And you said there, not everybody made it.
• 26:43
  Like, so this, when you have a change inside an organization,
• 26:47
  this is really about diffusion of a new technology into society.
• 26:50
  But you also see it with change initiatives, even with a micro
• 26:53
  team that you had at the time.
• 26:55
  And you right here now, I had a new struggle with myself.
• 26:59
  I and my team were now the re.
• 27:01
  Calcitrant, at least as viewed from Palo Alto.
• 27:04
  Alto.
• 27:05
  We had flipped almost instantly from the proud, successful Maverick
• 27:09
  Mavericks knocking the ball outta the park into a fearful resistant
• 27:12
  group, unwilling to tackle the new challenge looming just in front of us.
• 27:16
  A surprising turn of events, as you say yourself, but I thought this diagram
• 27:21
  mapped exactly to what you saw in your team, because as you said, not everybody
• 27:26
  made it to that step When you started to work for Palo Alto, essentially.
• 27:31
  So you can pick segments of that diagram and our team was in that early
• 27:37
  maturity phase of logic analyzers.
• 27:41
  We had no one in that early adopter phase on our team.
• 27:45
  We, no one, I mean the world had a few people like that,
• 27:49
  but we didn't have anybody.
• 27:50
  So we had no one espousing this new paradigm.
• 27:55
  Other than Palo Alto who and they could see it.
• 27:59
  They didn't wanna deal with it.
• 28:01
  They wanted someone else to deal with it.
• 28:03
  And they said you guys are digital guys.
• 28:05
  Hell, you're the ones, right?
• 28:07
  And we were us.
• 28:08
  Why us?
• 28:09
  And then you go, oh, why us?
• 28:11
  Is because seeing from 30,000 feet we're the obvious player.
• 28:16
  We just aren't the obvious player psychologically or emotionally or
• 28:21
  technically, or any of those things.
• 28:23
  You.
• 28:23
  I'll show the diagram.
• 28:25
  You mentioned there, Chuck, because I thought this was helpful to
• 28:28
  understand for people where they sit
• 28:30
  look on the right side, it says unconscious and conscious.
• 28:34
  So unconscious are the bottom two boxes.
• 28:37
  Unconscious meaning it's subconscious, it's not really part of your you can't
• 28:42
  articulate it, but you probably know it.
• 28:44
  Conscious is, yeah, you can describe it.
• 28:47
  You're you're effective.
• 28:49
  Looking at the top, it says competent and incompetent.
• 28:53
  You can think skilled or unskilled whatever.
• 28:56
  But the point is, let's start in the lower right.
• 28:59
  When you're three years old, you don't know how to tie your
• 29:02
  shoes and you don't know that.
• 29:03
  You don't have to learn that.
• 29:05
  And then usually an older sister comes up and says, ha, you gotta
• 29:09
  learn this kid, and you go, okay.
• 29:12
  So you laboriously learn how to tie your shoe laces, and you move
• 29:16
  up into that upper right quadrant.
• 29:19
  Now, what you didn't know.
• 29:21
  Now you know how to tie your shoes, kind of.
• 29:24
  And somebody, friends come over and you say, let me show you.
• 29:27
  I know how to tie my shoes.
• 29:29
  And then you demonstrate that you haven't quite learned it.
• 29:32
  And so once you get it down, you're over in the do know.
• 29:36
  You do know, now you know how to do it, and you can do it
• 29:39
  with practice in a, crowd.
• 29:42
  And then as time goes on, you get so good at those things you go down to
• 29:47
  the lower left where you don't know any longer what it is you do know.
• 29:51
  You just sort of do it automatically.
• 29:53
  Let me give you an example.
• 29:55
  I would stand in a group and I'd ask how many people here know
• 30:00
  the color of their toothbrush?
• 30:02
  And about two thirds of the hands will go up.
• 30:05
  And I say to the other third, you're not married, are you?
• 30:08
  Or you've got your own bathroom.
• 30:10
  If you share a bathroom, you usually learn your toothbrush,
• 30:13
  color and the other person's.
• 30:16
  And so you don't pay attention if you don't have to.
• 30:19
  And most of our life is that way.
• 30:22
  So the question is, as you go around that loop, you get better and better
• 30:25
  at doing things until till you do a lot of 'em just almost automatically.
• 30:30
  then what happens?
• 30:31
  You're down in the lower left and the paradigm changes and and you don't
• 30:37
  realize for a while the paradigm changes because you're still busy
• 30:41
  doing what it is you do so well, you don't even have to think about it.
• 30:45
  Okay?
• 30:47
  But what's happened is the field has moved to the lower right.
• 30:52
  You don't know what you should know in that field at all.
• 30:57
  And, so when they talk about jumping the chasm you, you cited Everett Rogers and
• 31:04
  Rogers and several others or Geoffrey Moore for one described jumping the chasm.
• 31:10
  The chasm is between the lower left and the lower right.
• 31:14
  do you jump that chasm and imagine forgetting what you do know so that you
• 31:19
  can learn what you don't know gracefully.
• 31:22
  And that's, the problem we were talking about.
• 31:24
  That's where we were trying to go from logic to PDS.
• 31:28
  How do you learn this whole new thing and forget about what you had done because
• 31:33
  it's not relevant to the new case.
• 31:36
  And yet, you know damn it is, and it's built into your fiber.
• 31:39
  Brilliant, brilliant job, man.
• 31:40
  That's that's beautiful and, I'm gonna build on it because you say here, many
• 31:45
  lessons might be drawn from such a chart.
• 31:48
  First.
• 31:48
  It is fair to observe that productivity improvements are usually viewed as
• 31:53
  moving from the upper right hand quadrant to the lower left hand quadrant.
• 31:58
  The idea is to move a team from learning the initial concepts to
• 32:01
  practice in them, and then shift to an intuitive, easy operational behavior.
• 32:05
  So you go from exploration to exploitation, and then many companies
• 32:10
  prefer to hire new college graduates.
• 32:13
  Graduates so they can teach how we do things around here instead of having
• 32:18
  the new hires, waste time, unlearning at different companies, processes
• 32:22
  and values or the company themselves.
• 32:26
  The unlearning part, and I think that piece is so core that you experience
• 32:30
  was to learn something new sometimes you have to unlearn something
• 32:34
  old, and that's the difficulty.
• 32:36
  Well, that, I think that's one of the reasons people get trapped in
• 32:39
  the fields that they're in, is the unlearning process is, is a, a tough one.
• 32:45
  You know, You've gotta be introspective, you've gotta be really challenging
• 32:48
  your own beliefs and is just not a comfortable place to be.
• 32:53
  I've seen lots of companies that'll get down in the lower left hand corner.
• 32:57
  They're very good at what they do.
• 32:59
  And then the sales start dwindling and profits start eroding and and the
• 33:06
  top management will get together and say, we need to put a training course
• 33:09
  in to train people in what it is.
• 33:12
  We learned that the new kids don't know.
• 33:15
  And so we can actually build a way to make them like us.
• 33:20
  And what they should be doing is remember the girl "I park my brain at the door
• 33:25
  " what they should be doing is say, take these new ones and say, Hey, why don't you
• 33:29
  take a look around, see what we do, and then you tell us what we should be doing.
• 33:34
  But that's not the way most management teams operate.
• 33:37
  I used to do that, Chuck.
• 33:38
  When I had a team and not as big a team as you, , I used to do a thing called
• 33:41
  reverse onboarding, which was to ask them to report back to me all the stuff
• 33:46
  we were doing wrong after six to 12 weeks with no receipts kept on them.
• 33:51
  Every time I change jobs I spent the first week journaling.
• 33:55
  What is it you're seeing?
• 33:57
  Because that's, that, that week is you're seeing things with such fresh eyes and the
• 34:03
  things that are strange to you have gotta be written down because you'll forget
• 34:08
  it 10 days later, the press of things.
• 34:11
  But that often is where the jewels are of what the outsider could see at least
• 34:18
  briefly that no one inside could see.
• 34:21
  that's key.
• 34:22
  I think that it's briefly because then you get used to it and you
• 34:25
  stop seeing it after a while.
• 34:27
  There's a great quote Alvin Tofler the sci-fi writer in, in Future Shock.
• 34:31
  I'm sure you've read that book.
• 34:32
  He said the illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who
• 34:36
  cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn.
• 34:40
  And that is just branded into my brain.
• 34:43
  But again, I'm sure there's loads of stuff I do that I can't see the picture when
• 34:47
  I'm inside the frame to use your, saying.
• 34:51
  But you say here and I think this is key again, I might put the diagram back up
• 34:55
  for those people that are watching this on YouTube, because I loved what you said.
• 35:00
  Imagine that as events move along, things get harder.
• 35:03
  Profits become more elusive and efficiency's less pertinent.
• 35:08
  The response often is to try and figure out what happened or what we need to do
• 35:12
  to recapture what once we did so well.
• 35:15
  And a classic response often from higher level management in conjunction with
• 35:19
  HR or a training department, is to go back to the basics, to revisit what
• 35:25
  made us great in the first place and to reinstill the things we once knew so well.
• 35:29
  And in effect, the result is, let's go back to quadrant three from quadrant
• 35:34
  four, instead of trying to move from quadrant four to one and two all over
• 35:39
  again, I thought that was a core message
• 35:42
  and so I would interpret that as, okay, you're down in four.
• 35:46
  The kids you know, that new hires from a couple years ago are stuck in three
• 35:52
  not doing as well as you'd like, they don't know as much as you'd like.
• 35:55
  So the quadrant four folk go up to the training team up in quadrant
• 36:00
  two say, why don't you train them better so they can do three?
• 36:05
  Right.
• 36:05
  So they completely skipped that first quadrant.
• 36:10
  And the point of course of what I was writing is it very often the
• 36:14
  breakthroughs are in the first quadrant, have to be in the first quadrant.
• 36:19
  So, yeah, you're You summed it Well
• 36:22
  Man, I'm just quoting your, brilliance here.
• 36:24
  Okay.
• 36:25
  So I'll move along here.
• 36:26
  So this quote I thought was important to call out as well.
• 36:29
  You said being open to new ideas.
• 36:31
  In effect, being willing to stop in the midst of something that has
• 36:35
  felt comfortable but has changed character somehow is not all that easy.
• 36:40
  Often it seems that the more expert or powerful someone is or has been, the
• 36:44
  more they tend to want to stay in the comfort zone rather than admit that they
• 36:49
  really don't know what to do In this new instance, the new Paradigm, I chuckled
• 36:55
  as I read that because ironically it's how Thomas Kuhn behaved who, the guy
• 37:00
  who, for those who don't know, the guy who popularized the concept of the
• 37:03
  paradigm shift, he reacted like that when you approached him with a new idea.
• 37:08
  I mean, talk about ironic, here's this guy writing about understanding
• 37:14
  how new paradigms get adopted and, he missed one himself.
• 37:18
  But so did I. And I think you'll find late in the book, I've got an example
• 37:24
  where like 40 years later I was running a digital arts college and we
• 37:29
  were just talk about blowing it away.
• 37:31
  We, we were named the number two digital arts college in the
• 37:34
  world next to one in, China.
• 37:37
  One in France was third.
• 37:39
  and And we had this guy who was our director of, these digital films.
• 37:47
  these were all computer generated films like an eight minute film.
• 37:50
  And it, it took many hundreds of hours of compute time to
• 37:54
  do these things and all that.
• 37:57
  And he came to me and for his team, he wanted to take three
• 38:01
  people to Cigraph, which is the big international graphics and film show
• 38:08
  for the computer industry, right?
• 38:11
  And it turned out it was maybe 10 or $20,000, which
• 38:16
  our little school didn't have.
• 38:18
  And so I basically I met with my staff.
• 38:23
  I was the chancellor of the university, and I turned it down
• 38:27
  and he just blew a head gas.
• 38:29
  and and my HR director came to me and says, aren't you writing?
• 38:34
  I was in the middle of writing the book that you're talking about,
• 38:37
  and she says, aren't you talking about how great intrapreneuring is?
• 38:41
  And people inside the organization try to do different things, she
• 38:44
  said, and you turned him down.
• 38:47
  And I'm sitting there writing this book about how intrapreneuring
• 38:51
  should work, and I have just been the chief violator of the whole promise,
• 38:55
  that's the point.
• 38:56
  There's another funny one I came across.
• 38:58
  There's a guy called Howard Gardner.
• 39:00
  Brilliant writer.
• 39:02
  The guy who created different types of learning, different kinds of minds that
• 39:05
  people have, and he met Stanley Milgram.
• 39:09
  Do you remember the famous Milgram experiments, which were on speaking truth
• 39:13
  to power or authority bias, where you had these groups of people and they were.
• 39:18
  There was a, there were actors, but you had an actor, and then you had somebody
• 39:21
  who wasn't an actor, and the person who wasn't an actor would ask you a question.
• 39:27
  So it was a learner and a teacher.
• 39:29
  And then if you got the answer wrong as the learner, I would give you a
• 39:34
  mild electric shock, but in all cases, and it went up to something like
• 39:38
  80%, 80% of people were willing to give it a shock that was potentially
• 39:43
  fatal only by the listening to the person who was wearing a white coat.
• 39:49
  So they'd turn and they go, Hey, wait a second.
• 39:50
  What if this guy dies?
• 39:52
  And they go, it's my responsibility.
• 39:54
  And then they'd continue.
• 39:55
  So that's the guy, he did those famous studies and they were about stuff like
• 39:59
  how atrocities, like the holocaust happen
• 40:02
  Oh
• 40:02
  because people just they outsource responsibility, right.
• 40:07
  But the same guy, Howard Gardner was taking a class with Stanley Milgram
• 40:12
  and he opposed one of his ideas in the class, and Milgram lost it.
• 40:16
  And I was like, the irony of this,
• 40:19
  Yeah, we're all victims of our own space,
• 40:22
  . big time.
• 40:23
  It's easy to point the finger.
• 40:25
  There's a great saying, Chuck, when you point the finger, there's three
• 40:27
  pointing back to yourself or else or else even worse, that if you've
• 40:32
  heard of the three asshole rule.
• 40:34
  So if you meet three assholes in a day, maybe you're the asshole.
• 40:38
  I love it.
• 40:39
  Yeah,
• 40:40
  Yeah.
• 40:41
  So, okay.
• 40:43
  Okay.
• 40:43
  we'll keep going man.
• 40:45
  So, so you say here, an additional complication is that the new paradigm,
• 40:50
  the change situation is usually cloudy, fuzzy, and in explicit.
• 40:54
  The old paradigm, paradigm from which we've come has rules, is
• 40:58
  well established, and has well articulated procedures and processes.
• 41:03
  The new one is at best, dimly viewed half conceived and dichotomous, even for the
• 41:09
  visionary who senses or even grasps it.
• 41:12
  I think that's the, one of the biggest challenges as the intrapreneur is trying
• 41:16
  to explain the feeling you have, because usually it's a feeling and usually you
• 41:21
  sense the world in a different way.
• 41:23
  That because they're so expert at being managers, they don't, and because
• 41:27
  maybe we're a bit neurodivergent or we see the world differently, we
• 41:32
  read different things, we're into different music, whatever it is.
• 41:35
  You see things differently, but then you try and articulate it
• 41:38
  and it doesn't make any sense to the person who's listening to you.
• 41:41
  I've got a diagram where you go from being lost at sea to you're working on
• 41:47
  the right th you know you're working on effective things, but you're
• 41:50
  not sure they're the right things.
• 41:52
  Then you're working right things, but you
• 41:54
  I'll pull it.
• 41:55
  it's sufficient.
• 41:56
  You know that, that.
• 41:57
  That is the way of somebody trying to work their way through a cloudy situation.
• 42:03
  so I got rid of a project called Next Gen before the Logic Line.
• 42:10
  And I knew what I was working on wasn't any good, but I didn't have any
• 42:14
  vision of what to do different and I started describing some things that
• 42:20
  we'd seen in the Techtronics booth.
• 42:24
  I'm, going back to some examples in the book, but we started talking about things
• 42:28
  we'd seen that were dichotomous in at a trade conference using the competitions
• 42:35
  newest, latest, and greatest product.
• 42:37
  But it clearly didn't address the issue.
• 42:40
  That gave us a clue of some useful things, but it gave the clue to were the two
• 42:45
  of us that were there, the whole team.
• 42:48
  Right?
• 42:49
  Then we spent a little more time and we said hey, a couple of these
• 42:53
  are actually the right things.
• 42:55
  They may not be sufficient, but they're the right things.
• 42:58
  Then you've got this team of 20 and you say, let me describe that.
• 43:02
  These are the right things.
• 43:03
  And they say, huh, are you sure?
• 43:05
  What's the vision?
• 43:06
  How, they're, back at, level A. You're at level C and, trying to convince
• 43:12
  them to move from A to C with you takes a lot of time and it works
• 43:19
  better if you're explicit about it.
• 43:22
  You can't be explicit because you don't know.
• 43:25
  And then you finally get the vision to say, oh.
• 43:28
  know what we ought to do, and they say, are you sure?
• 43:33
  And you say I think I'm sure, and It, it is not very convincing.
• 43:38
  There, there's a the the doubting Thomases, the Bourne skeptics the people
• 43:44
  comfortable in their own domain are just, you have got to be kidding me.
• 43:51
  And so this traveling, this path, I is a twofold problem.
• 43:56
  You've gotta travel as the leader and then you've gotta
• 44:01
  persuade others to come along.
• 44:03
  When you know where you're going, kind of, but you can't be explicit.
• 44:08
  You're describing a gut feel or a, an intangible or a
• 44:13
  an ephemeral kind of thing.
• 44:15
  It's a it's an interesting act.
• 44:18
  And it's a huge challenge for the intrapreneur as you tell us.
• 44:22
  And I think it's really interesting and this worked out beautifully.
• 44:25
  'cause the next part I wanted to segue to was a challenge that people
• 44:30
  thinks is easier for an intrapreneur.
• 44:32
  So I'll set you up here.
• 44:33
  So you write that one problem that almost all entrepreneurs and
• 44:38
  intrapreneurs share is how to gain the attention of the sales channel.
• 44:42
  So something Chuck said, there is that journey that you bring people on.
• 44:47
  It depends on where they are.
• 44:49
  So message sent does not always equal message received to the person
• 44:53
  listening to you because of their different points on the scale of their
• 44:58
  advancement on the journey for you.
• 45:00
  But Chuck writes that many people say this and we, I say this.
• 45:05
  And I realize here that this is actually not always the case.
• 45:10
  intrapreneurs have it really easy compared to entrepreneurs because there
• 45:14
  is already a sales force or a marketing force, for example, for your company,
• 45:19
  and you think they have a head start.
• 45:22
  But this totally misunderstands a key point that Chuck points out.
• 45:26
  It is actually harder to get an existing sales force to switch allegiance from
• 45:32
  existing products that already work, and they know how to sell to become
• 45:37
  true believers in a brand new product.
• 45:40
  And then later on, you're right.
• 45:42
  Did our existing sales channel have the skills and the motivation
• 45:45
  to sell Logic State analyzers?
• 45:47
  Nope.
• 45:48
  We had to train and motivate the whole sales force to sell our products.
• 45:53
  We had to get specific sales quotas for our product line.
• 45:56
  We had to get a share of mind of our salespeople.
• 46:00
  This is if we, if anybody gets anything outta this show, I think this point is
• 46:05
  probably one of the most important one.
• 46:07
  I'd say there, there are two important points that I would
• 46:10
  really make in retrospect.
• 46:12
  That's one and the other is the management of intrapreneurs is a lot
• 46:19
  different than being an intrapreneur.
• 46:22
  And and so I spend time in the book on how to think about
• 46:28
  being a manager of intrapreneurs successfully and stimulating.
• 46:32
  I don't spend as much time on this sales question, but you're right.
• 46:36
  It is a crucial question.
• 46:38
  And it doesn't take long to think about it.
• 46:41
  You know what, what happens if you have a startup?
• 46:44
  done plenty of startups at this point.
• 46:47
  The true believers come with you.
• 46:49
  They see what you're doing and they say, hell, I could sell that.
• 46:52
  I could sell that to a ice cubes to an Eskimo kind of thing.
• 46:56
  But in in a comfortable.
• 46:59
  Corporate environment where the sales team has been in place for quite
• 47:03
  a while, selling something else.
• 47:06
  And then you say hey, new deal.
• 47:09
  We want you to take time out of what you're really good at and concentrate on
• 47:14
  this thing you don't know anything about.
• 47:16
  And trust me, it'll work out really well.
• 47:18
  It's just like, you gotta be kidding.
• 47:21
  And so we We spent an invaluable time finding a few converts
• 47:27
  that could be in that group.
• 47:30
  And then the secret of one of the old timers came up with was a chaska
• 47:34
  that happened to actually build competitive juices around the group.
• 47:40
  And so, he framed it that if you can sell 10 of these things
• 47:45
  you'll get a hero badge basically.
• 47:48
  And and salespeople always go for our I'm kind of stereotyping here,
• 47:54
  but sales teams love contests so he was able to reframe the problem
• 48:00
  instead of learning new skills.
• 48:03
  We'll teach you where to go and get cheap sales, but we'll give you reward
• 48:07
  if we do it a differential reward.
• 48:10
  So, yeah, you nailed it.
• 48:12
  That is and in re retrospect, I didn't spend that much time on it but but
• 48:18
  I, it was a crisp little nugget.
• 48:22
  And Chuck , I just wanna tell our audience, for the people who are
• 48:24
  joining us for this, and I'm pointing to the book on the shelf there behind
• 48:27
  me, we're gonna go to part three.
• 48:29
  In part three of this series.
• 48:31
  We're gonna cover Chuck's guides to be both a manager of an intrapreneur, but
• 48:35
  also to be the intrapreneur you gotta see it from both sides of the coin.
• 48:40
  But there was an interesting story, I dunno if you ever heard
• 48:42
  of this company, Sono site.
• 48:45
  They create like these if you had an injury on a football field or say your
• 48:50
  tennis elbow, and they kind of have this ultrasound to check your injuries.
• 48:55
  So this is an ultrasound, so this company, SonoSite.
• 48:58
  And the CEO, a guy called Kevin Goodwin, he couldn't understand why they'd produced
• 49:04
  this brand new version that was half the size of the existing one, but it was third
• 49:10
  the price and they couldn't sell them.
• 49:12
  And he is like, what the heck's going on?
• 49:14
  This is not as profitable for us, but it's more portable for our clients.
• 49:19
  It's a better product for our clients and nobody's buying it.
• 49:22
  And they all said they wanted it.
• 49:23
  So he attended a meeting with his top sales guy, went out with this guy, sat
• 49:29
  there, and during the whole meeting the guy never took out the new product.
• 49:33
  And he's like kicking them and nudging them under the table.
• 49:35
  He is going show 'em the product, show 'em the product, and the
• 49:38
  guy wouldn't show the product.
• 49:39
  And afterwards he said, what the heck was going on in there?
• 49:42
  Why didn't you show him the product?
• 49:43
  And he goes, what's my job?
• 49:44
  This is the sales guy.
• 49:45
  What's my job for you sir? And he is like going, you're to sell.
• 49:49
  And he is like going to make you money.
• 49:51
  He goes, I only need to sell one of those.
• 49:54
  And I need to sell three of those.
• 49:57
  And it was like it.
• 49:58
  The penny dropped and he is like, oh my God.
• 50:00
  And on top of that, think about the commission.
• 50:03
  I need to sell three of those to get the same commission as one of those.
• 50:07
  And then you see the real drivers of resource allocation in a company.
• 50:12
  You find these examples everywhere.
• 50:13
  I had one daughter was working for a retailer.
• 50:17
  They sold it was a women's dress shop.
• 50:21
  Okay?
• 50:21
  And so they sold dresses and bracelets and scarves and shoes, the whole nine yards.
• 50:30
  Okay?
• 50:31
  And, it was a national chain.
• 50:33
  And all of a sudden she went to be in the top salesperson outta 700 stores.
• 50:39
  And the and they sent someone out to audit.
• 50:42
  And it turned out she was in the lower half on most of the items, she
• 50:48
  was number one on selling fur coats.
• 50:50
  And and it turns out this was in Louisiana and you shouldn't ever
• 50:54
  need a fur coat in Louisiana.
• 50:57
  And so the question was, what's going on here?
• 50:59
  And she said, the guys on the offshore oil rigs get paid in cash once every
• 51:06
  four weeks and they get a weekend off.
• 51:10
  And she said, I would put the fur coats in the hall of the mall on sale, supposedly.
• 51:17
  And she said I'd sell three coats to the same guy in three nights.
• 51:21
  And, and one coat was equal to a hundred scars.
• 51:25
  Brilliant example.
• 51:26
  And, that's one of the things I shared you was running a workshop with a
• 51:30
  team and I was suggesting that they, needed to get out of the building more.
• 51:35
  And I told them the story of your team and , a guy who just never
• 51:38
  really left his apartment and he accidentally posted his passport.
• 51:42
  But I told him that story.
• 51:44
  And for those who don't know that, listen to part one, but the
• 51:47
  importance of understanding your customer and your customer's habits
• 51:51
  there, like to your point of the fur coats, that was understanding.
• 51:55
  The ambition, when they have revenue, when the buying cycle, is this understanding
• 52:01
  is so vital to the success of a product.
• 52:04
  And I had one tour, this was during the display days when I was going through
• 52:10
  I think it was Grumman on the East coast a Navy fighter ship provider.
• 52:16
  And I didn't know anything about any of their product
• 52:19
  lines, but I'm going through it.
• 52:21
  And they had a bunch of tetro scopes that looked like they'd been stripped down.
• 52:26
  I stopped to look at 'em.
• 52:27
  I said what's the deal here?
• 52:29
  They don't have attenuators, they don't have a way to adjust the voltage.
• 52:33
  How'd this happen?
• 52:35
  They said we took all that stuff out.
• 52:37
  I said, have you talked to Techtronics about Why would we talk to them?
• 52:41
  I said why'd you take 'em out?
• 52:43
  It turns out they get in the way of the measurement, and they had
• 52:45
  a couple of technical reasons.
• 52:48
  and I'm like, So, and back home, like a year and a half later on an entirely
• 52:54
  different project I'm building a display.
• 52:57
  I thought, we don't need that stuff, do we?
• 53:01
  And that's how the display happened without being a scope.
• 53:04
  Brilliant.
• 53:04
  Yeah.
• 53:04
  Just understanding stuff you don't need is important.
• 53:07
  Yeah.
• 53:08
  There's a, another important point I've pulled here, and I, for our point,
• 53:11
  our audience I thought was important to share because sometimes what we
• 53:15
  think is innovation is just updating or an incremental improvement because
• 53:20
  this is when you were on the plane, I think you were coming back from Canada
• 53:24
  here, and you sketched diagrams and a different perspective occurred to you
• 53:29
  as the plane neared your destination.
• 53:32
  Actually all the technology and approach of the HP 1600 s was virtually
• 53:38
  unchanged from the HP 1601 L. So I'll let you fill in the gaps here.
• 53:44
  But it seemed different because it had been two years later, there was
• 53:49
  new cabinetry with connections back to true scopes, and there was much
• 53:54
  more capable features, but it was essentially identical in terms of
• 53:58
  circuit technology, user interface, display, and signal connections.
• 54:04
  To the customer it was refinement, not breakthrough.
• 54:07
  And you say, no one looks far ahead if they feel behind the power curve, giving
• 54:12
  all their attention to gaining traction in the tough environment of the moment.
• 54:17
  There's a lot in there.
• 54:18
  But this idea of being stuck in the cycle of just gradual improvement
• 54:23
  and thinking this is great, but the customer doesn't really care.
• 54:27
  Yeah.
• 54:27
  So the situation you're describing, or that I was describing was we had
• 54:32
  been let me just think about it from probably early 72 or three until
• 54:41
  maybe 76, we were building variants of the first logic, state analyzers.
• 54:48
  And and so we had changed the package from being inside a scope
• 54:53
  as a scope plugin to being a standalone like our portable scopes.
• 54:58
  We had expanded the memory depth.
• 55:02
  We'd expanded the channel count.
• 55:05
  We, we'd made a lot of improvements based on what customers wanted,
• 55:09
  and we mistakenly, or at least mistakenly the - way I viewed it
• 55:13
  on that plane ride -were treating that evolution as a two phase move.
• 55:19
  Phase one was the first stuff we did and then we learned a lot and we improved
• 55:23
  it significantly and did it again.
• 55:26
  But in truth, it was all the same technology driving it, the same technology
• 55:33
  in terms of screen interaction in terms of the inside signal capture, et cetera.
• 55:39
  And then we had the inspiration we're helping people design with Microcomputers.
• 55:44
  Why aren't we using 'em inside our own products?
• 55:48
  And that generated a whole new wave of product line.
• 55:52
  So we were calling phase one and two, the first one, and then phase and
• 55:57
  phase three and four with the new one.
• 56:00
  And if you backed off, 30,000 feet or even actually several tens of feet, and you
• 56:08
  looked at 'em, they all looked the same.
• 56:11
  I had two phases, not four.
• 56:13
  And once you looked at it that way, then it was easy to see this PDS thing
• 56:18
  that I'd been ordered to do that I couldn't hardly get my arms around.
• 56:23
  I saw that as the logical third phase.
• 56:26
  And I think I've got a picture of three phases of scopes and
• 56:30
  three phases of these products.
• 56:32
  If you, maybe you could show that So the one on the left basically
• 56:37
  had toggle switches for setting the controls for how many channels?
• 56:43
  it was wrapped in a, portable box that looked just like a
• 56:47
  portable oscilloscope at the time.
• 56:49
  it had a conventional screen that we wrote to ones and zeros instead of wave forms.
• 56:57
  the second one is microprocessor based.
• 56:59
  So instead of toggle switches, we had a a 10 10 point keyboard.
• 57:05
  and you could you could dial things and all that much cleaner interface
• 57:10
  in a very different form factor.
• 57:12
  then the PDS was actually in a computer terminal, actually a computer console.
• 57:18
  And so it's got a full ask keyboard, just like any typewriter.
• 57:22
  It had soft keys across the bottom of the screen.
• 57:25
  The screen was most of the big display area because you're reading text, you're
• 57:31
  not reading little numbers very different.
• 57:34
  I mean, you look at those, you could instantly tell those are three very
• 57:38
  distinct families of technology.
• 57:40
  And show, show the scope one.
• 57:42
  Here's three scopes going from 72 to 75, 78.
• 57:50
  They all look identical, much.
• 57:53
  The screen got a little bigger.
• 57:55
  The knobs all looked the same.
• 57:57
  This is the same form factor that Techtronics introduced for IBM in 1965.
• 58:02
  And so you say that works, right?
• 58:04
  And so everything tech built and everything we built for the portable
• 58:08
  lines looked the same for like 20 years, whereas in our line,
• 58:13
  everything changed every three years.
• 58:16
  And so that's a good way to tell about real phase changes as
• 58:21
  opposed to evolutionary change.
• 58:24
  The guys I showed you the clip from earlier on, I was sharing with them
• 58:26
  how the paradigm shift from vacuum tubes for many of the people you worked
• 58:32
  with, that paradigm shift left so many people in the dust because they
• 58:37
  thought maybe they'd be able to take a night course to change their skillset.
• 58:41
  But it was a really a mindset shift.
• 58:44
  And that's what you find with this when you see that's being stuck
• 58:48
  inside the incremental paradigm.
• 58:49
  But a mindset shift would be something to go we don't need the screen.
• 58:54
  absolutely.
• 58:55
  Think about it in a different way.
• 58:56
  Computers for many years, actually, until my displays you had a
• 59:01
  typewriter, keyboard printout.
• 59:03
  That's all you had.
• 59:04
  I mean, the idea of of your smartphone not having the screen
• 59:08
  would be pretty awkward, right?
• 59:10
  There's, there was a, another line here.
• 59:12
  Chuck, I thought was just gold.
• 59:14
  That, and I, shared it to a couple of intrapreneurs.
• 59:16
  I know you wrote that.
• 59:19
  You call this after the naming party.
• 59:21
  This part of the book, you said.
• 59:23
  Successful inventors have a relatively easy task to invent something new.
• 59:28
  Innovators though have to make inventions succeed in the marketplace.
• 59:32
  If the innovator is an entrepreneur, the first tasks are to build a motivated,
• 59:37
  skilled team and find patient investors.
• 59:40
  After that, a new marketing and sales team can be assembled from true believers.
• 59:45
  You don't know what you don't know.
• 59:47
  If the innovator is an intrapreneur
• 59:49
  however, the first tasks include building a motivated, capable team
• 59:55
  where the funding and instructions come from the parent company.
• 59:59
  All too often, the intrapreneur has to persuade the funders at
• 1:00:02
  headquarters to accept and be grateful for product definitions that are
• 1:00:06
  more innovative and very likely more expensive than they had imagined.
• 1:00:11
  If all of that comes to pass, the intrapreneur then has to co-opt
• 1:00:15
  attention and enthusiasm from an existing sales force that is already
• 1:00:19
  busy selling a set of products built on an older paradigm, and that usually
• 1:00:23
  is at odds with the new concepts.
• 1:00:25
  I thought that whole paragraph, it ties a little bit back into the sales team stuff,
• 1:00:30
  but the challenge for the intrapreneur here it's a political challenge and
• 1:00:35
  changing the minds from something existing is actually more difficult than creating
• 1:00:40
  something brand new in the first place.
• 1:00:43
  You're getting at the essence of why I wrote the book.
• 1:00:46
  I have met a hundred, maybe close to 500 intrapreneurs.
• 1:00:52
  And countless entrepreneurs.
• 1:00:55
  And the issue for an entrepreneur is relatively straightforward
• 1:00:59
  once something like the venture capital community existed.
• 1:01:03
  But the route for the intrapreneur hasn't changed hardly at all.
• 1:01:07
  And it's all of those points that you listed.
• 1:01:10
  So I'll give you a specific example.
• 1:01:12
  So the PDS got me into a job in Palo Alto.
• 1:01:15
  Boom, I'm in Palo Alto . Now I'm known to the world, as
• 1:01:19
  opposed to just knowing that.
• 1:01:20
  Jerry Sanders at a MD. Right?
• 1:01:23
  And so I got invited to give talks and do a whole bunch of stuff.
• 1:01:27
  The point is I got invited to the 25th anniversary of personal
• 1:01:32
  workstations by the ACM association for Computer Machinery, big meeting.
• 1:01:39
  And and it's gonna be in Palo Alto.
• 1:01:41
  And and I was one of, I don't know, two dozen featured features, and So I
• 1:01:47
  go to this thing and , every speaker with one exception plus me had worked
• 1:01:54
  on early workstations that failed.
• 1:01:58
  And they were celebrating all of these innovative breakthroughs
• 1:02:03
  they were magnificent things.
• 1:02:05
  Things that got baked in later and all that.
• 1:02:08
  And I'm like the next to last speaker and I said the problem I see in the room is
• 1:02:14
  we're not honoring the people that built something that sold in the marketplace.
• 1:02:19
  We've just honored 23 things that failed.
• 1:02:22
  And I said, and I'm working for a company that believes
• 1:02:25
  that selling is pretty useful.
• 1:02:27
  And, two of us have done that.
• 1:02:31
  And, I think it's just a different perspective.
• 1:02:34
  Are you an inventor or are you an innovator?
• 1:02:37
  And an intrapreneur.
• 1:02:40
  it wasn't a very popular talk.
• 1:02:42
  I wonder why.
• 1:02:43
  I wonder why, man.
• 1:02:44
  But it's the difference.
• 1:02:46
  It's absolutely the difference.
• 1:02:48
  But I want to move a little bit forward here and we'll conclude with this story.
• 1:02:52
  I think , you're now in HP in Palo Alto.
• 1:02:56
  You've got the new team.
• 1:02:57
  You have put a new vision together, and you've put Pisces
• 1:03:02
  together, this new product.
• 1:03:03
  I'd love you to tell us about this because Pisces eventually, like
• 1:03:07
  any product, hits a decline phase.
• 1:03:09
  And you say affirming your fears, HP's logic analyzers sales.
• 1:03:13
  Soon flattened.
• 1:03:14
  In fact, they dropped.
• 1:03:15
  As techs knew.
• 1:03:17
  This is Techtronics Techs new products took a toll.
• 1:03:20
  Once momentum is lost, you say it's very hard to regain.
• 1:03:24
  This was a hard pill for you to swallow.
• 1:03:26
  Four years elapsed before a significant HP R&D resources were
• 1:03:29
  again applied to logic analyzers.
• 1:03:32
  HP didn't regain the leadership mantle for eight years.
• 1:03:36
  This was a major mistake.
• 1:03:38
  You never abandoned a hard fought win just as the momentum builds.
• 1:03:42
  But we did.
• 1:03:43
  HP did.
• 1:03:44
  The philosophy behind this error was a legacy of Hewletts, decentralized
• 1:03:49
  belief that each division can autonomously choose its R&D programs.
• 1:03:54
  I thought that whole piece, there's a lot in it, but it's important to understand
• 1:03:59
  how sometimes the rules, you write, as the organization can actually backfire.
• 1:04:04
  so lemme put a little context on what you say.
• 1:04:07
  We were in Colorado Springs.
• 1:04:09
  We were part of the Scope division.
• 1:04:11
  We had separated out to be a separate reporting division onto the the
• 1:04:18
  main corporate spreadsheets if you will quota setting and all that.
• 1:04:23
  But we still, we had what I would call a site management
• 1:04:26
  team, site being SITE the locale.
• 1:04:31
  So we had the Colorado Springs Management team managing displays, scopes, and logic.
• 1:04:37
  I'd started two of the three.
• 1:04:39
  They were the profitable pieces of the three, but scopes was still the.
• 1:04:45
  Concern of Palo Alto because of Techtronics.
• 1:04:49
  We, we had not really blunted techtronics.
• 1:04:52
  so here's this line that I'm afraid is gonna get cannibalized if we
• 1:04:58
  have to follow Palo Alto's lead and take the logic team to build Pisces.
• 1:05:03
  Okay?
• 1:05:04
  Which we had to do.
• 1:05:05
  Okay?
• 1:05:06
  So what happened is two thirds of the logic team moved over to do Pisces.
• 1:05:10
  And my sentiment with the locale management team was, you ought to
• 1:05:17
  take most of the resources in the scope line, which has been dog
• 1:05:22
  beat now for 22 years or 24 years.
• 1:05:25
  And say, look, that battle isn't worth fighting a whole lot longer.
• 1:05:30
  We need to reinforce the logic team that we're now, we're pirating, okay?
• 1:05:37
  And they chose not to do that.
• 1:05:39
  And Palo Alto's stance was you guys in Colorado Springs are able to
• 1:05:44
  manage your own destiny best wishes, and if it was a truly strategically
• 1:05:49
  managed thing from Palo Alto, they would've said, what are you thinking?
• 1:05:53
  And of course, what they were thinking in Colorado Springs was,
• 1:05:55
  look, we just put a major second generation logic line on the street.
• 1:06:01
  It's selling extremely well.
• 1:06:03
  Why can't I rest on my laurels?
• 1:06:06
  it'll work well.
• 1:06:07
  And Techtronics, meanwhile, I was saying, Jesus, those guys
• 1:06:10
  took it right out of our hide.
• 1:06:12
  We're gonna try and whip them again.
• 1:06:15
  And, so to put numbers on it, we were doing probably 50 million a year in logic.
• 1:06:23
  Pisces looked like it might do 150, but it was only doing like 10.
• 1:06:28
  We only had the initial salvo.
• 1:06:30
  The displays are doing maybe 20 and scopes are doing maybe a hundred.
• 1:06:36
  So you could take that a hundred and say, let download some of that to the 50.
• 1:06:41
  What happened was tech basically took the 50 we had in Logic and smothered
• 1:06:48
  it and it declined almost 50%.
• 1:06:52
  Now not only have you lost the actual sales and the profit from 'em
• 1:06:56
  you've lost the customer mindset.
• 1:06:59
  Customers are say, oh the current leader now is techtronics,
• 1:07:03
  just like they were in scopes.
• 1:07:05
  So all of a sudden they're back in the driver's seat on both scopes and logic.
• 1:07:10
  the logic has completely lost its momentum.
• 1:07:13
  And all of the intrapreneurs have moved over to Pisces.
• 1:07:17
  Now, Pisces itself went on and became a couple hundred million dollar line.
• 1:07:22
  In terms of corporate's view, it was great, but its
• 1:07:26
  competitor was Intel, not tech.
• 1:07:29
  tech didn't get damaged by us, and they could have been.
• 1:07:32
  Intel did get damaged, which was good in its own right.
• 1:07:36
  But my view was, my God we squandered something that was just crazy to squander.
• 1:07:42
  And of course, the problem I had was my emotions were still with
• 1:07:46
  the logic line, so I'm sitting there you've just killed my child.
• 1:07:52
  Yeah.
• 1:07:52
  Yeah, but that's something I discussed again with Alex Osterwalder
• 1:07:56
  Sangeet, Paul Choudary, and Howard Yu, and the last week's show.
• 1:08:00
  Because you also did kill your own project, where with the second
• 1:08:05
  project, after the display, you decided you were gonna kill it, but
• 1:08:10
  it's very hard to kill projects.
• 1:08:12
  And I wondered how you went about that in hp.
• 1:08:15
  How did you do so other than the way you did, was there some format to do that?
• 1:08:21
  If you did it were, you frowned upon?
• 1:08:24
  Did they blacklist you?
• 1:08:25
  How did it work?
• 1:08:26
  A lot of projects die of their own weight.
• 1:08:29
  You've got a schedule, you've got a budget, you've got a set
• 1:08:32
  of features you're trying to hit that's the project definition.
• 1:08:36
  Okay.
• 1:08:37
  And you have an annual review, if not more often.
• 1:08:40
  You had an annual review from Palo Alto, and you had a quarterly
• 1:08:44
  review from your own team.
• 1:08:46
  Or your own management area.
• 1:08:49
  And we would draw diagrams.
• 1:08:50
  I think I had a Brunnergram in there somewhere.
• 1:08:53
  And a Brunnergram allows you to see how are you doing?
• 1:08:56
  Are you spending a lot of money and making no progress on the schedule?
• 1:09:01
  That's a bad idea.
• 1:09:02
  Are you spending just a little bit of money and making great
• 1:09:05
  progress on the schedule?
• 1:09:06
  Terrific.
• 1:09:08
  And so a lot of projects might go three reviews with no schedule progress.
• 1:09:15
  And then people start saying is this what's wrong here?
• 1:09:18
  And so a lot of 'em get killed in those kind of reviews.
• 1:09:22
  That was what was gonna happen to display.
• 1:09:24
  We weren't, we didn't have any sales.
• 1:09:28
  We didn't know where you might even sell it, but, so we were making
• 1:09:31
  good progress on the schedule.
• 1:09:33
  But when it came time for the market forecast the guy running
• 1:09:37
  the marketing group said, 30 is all we're ever gonna choose.
• 1:09:41
  Packard said, oh, that's crazy.
• 1:09:42
  Why would you do that?
• 1:09:44
  Which makes sense, doesn't it, Chuck?
• 1:09:45
  You gotta see it from corporate's perspective sometimes.
• 1:09:48
  'cause sometimes we see corporate as the enemy, but a lot of it's,
• 1:09:52
  we talked about timing the core the value of timing being too early can
• 1:09:57
  also be as bad as being too late.
• 1:10:00
  And actually too late's probably easier to been too early.
• 1:10:02
  At least the market's proven by then.
• 1:10:04
  that was run by a guy who could shield intrapreneurs beautifully got labeled
• 1:10:09
  the Science Fair Division because they built all sorts of wonderful things,
• 1:10:14
  including measuring the Perihelion (the point in a planet’s orbit where
• 1:10:15
  it is closest to the Sun) of Mercury to prove that Einstein was right.
• 1:10:19
  It turns out not that many people wanted to measure the Perihelion of Mercury.
• 1:10:23
  Corporate didn't like that one.
• 1:10:25
  You need to have a balance in all this thing.
• 1:10:27
  The way a lot of projects got killed
• 1:10:29
  was all of a sudden the numbers really don't work.
• 1:10:31
  The schedule isn't working, the market isn't, doesn't look like it's there.
• 1:10:35
  You can't master the technology of some esoteric thing.
• 1:10:39
  And, in the case of the one I canceled my conclusion was we were building it be as
• 1:10:46
  an answer to the big box from Techtronix.
• 1:10:49
  And, my conclusion standing in their booth was, their big box was gonna be a
• 1:10:53
  failure, and I didn't need to follow that and which turned out substantially true.
• 1:11:00
  Yeah, it's, and it's tough, man.
• 1:11:02
  It's a tough thing to go and kill something.
• 1:11:04
  I just wanted to tip the hat to how successful, I mean, this is
• 1:11:08
  a product that you worked on.
• 1:11:09
  You wrote that in the year 2000 logic analyzer revenues reached
• 1:11:14
  sales of a quarter billion dollars.
• 1:11:16
  It had been a $6 billion revenue market for over four decades, 60% of it garnered
• 1:11:22
  by the Hewlett Pachard and Agilent teams.
• 1:11:25
  And you mentioned to me as well, Agilent a lot of people
• 1:11:29
  don't know that's a HP spinoff.
• 1:11:31
  Oh my.
• 1:11:32
  Yeah.
• 1:11:32
  A lot of people don't know that.
• 1:11:34
  you know?
• 1:11:34
  Do you want, do you wanna just do, you wanna just say a word on
• 1:11:37
  how successful this logic analyze revenue was for the company?
• 1:11:42
  The so there's several metrics you can use, but usually revenue and profits
• 1:11:47
  are the ones that top managements and shareholders like we we managed over.
• 1:11:54
  I think if you brought it current, we probably have sold
• 1:11:57
  $7 billion worth of this stuff.
• 1:12:00
  that's that's a fair amount of loose change, particularly for essentially
• 1:12:05
  a field that has no retail market.
• 1:12:08
  We're selling tools to engineers to do things.
• 1:12:12
  We're not selling to consumer markets or anything like that.
• 1:12:16
  $7 billion is is not chump change.
• 1:12:19
  We, in general, earned on the order of 16% net profit I'm sorry, 16%
• 1:12:26
  gross profit, which is pretty heady.
• 1:12:29
  The PC world would typically be gross profits in the three to 4% range.
• 1:12:35
  so we felt pretty good about it.
• 1:12:37
  And, Palo Alto felt pretty good about it which was, I suppose that's how I
• 1:12:41
  got the assignment to go to Palo Alto.
• 1:12:43
  Yeah.
• 1:12:44
  Too successful man.
• 1:12:45
  As you say, it was a kind of a pyrrhic victory for you.
• 1:12:49
  There, there was a part I thought was really important that which is
• 1:12:52
  how silos form, and I pulled a little quote here to give it context and I'd
• 1:12:57
  love you to fill in the gaps here.
• 1:12:59
  You wrote that in order to create Pisces, our team took advantage
• 1:13:03
  of a historic strength in hp.
• 1:13:06
  HP's wildly decentralized divisional organization was a legacy of Hewlett's
• 1:13:10
  belief that small, nimble teams unhampered by corporate strategic plans
• 1:13:15
  and rules were best at contribution, creativity, and market success.
• 1:13:19
  I thought this was important.
• 1:13:20
  Hewlett's expectation was that divisions would share technologies.
• 1:13:24
  If you knew somebody in another division with a device or a component
• 1:13:28
  or a process that could help you, you could ask for their help.
• 1:13:32
  And it was expected that they would grant that help.
• 1:13:35
  Parts in production could be transfer that factory costs for your own new design
• 1:13:41
  and products under development might even be done jointly if both parties agreed.
• 1:13:46
  For the most part, they did agree, but here's the important piece,
• 1:13:50
  so I think this has happened to anyone who's been an intrapreneur.
• 1:13:53
  As groups evolve, the rules change somewhat.
• 1:13:57
  You were collegial within your own group, but not so much with other
• 1:14:01
  groups, and particularly if they're taking your resource allocation.
• 1:14:04
  So you're building, for example, chips or some type of component for the business
• 1:14:10
  internally and somebody's asking for it, and now you're like going I have targets
• 1:14:15
  to achieve over here if I don't achieve those targets and be collegial here.
• 1:14:19
  So sorry buddy, you're on your own.
• 1:14:21
  So those kind of dynamics play out and can go against the intrapreneur who's
• 1:14:25
  trading a lot on favors and goodwill.
• 1:14:28
  Oh yeah.
• 1:14:28
  so all those passages are, I remember writing that.
• 1:14:33
  I remember living that.
• 1:14:35
  and and the reason I got the job in Palo Alto was because
• 1:14:39
  we were successful at that.
• 1:14:41
  we melded technologies and product pieces from 14 divisions
• 1:14:47
  out of 91 to build Pisces.
• 1:14:50
  In words we were borrowing everywhere and and cobbling all this stuff together.
• 1:14:57
  So the first secret that Palo Alto noticed about team's leadership was that we
• 1:15:04
  were able to fashion the system out of disparate parts that different people had.
• 1:15:09
  And the question was, how did you, how were you able to construct
• 1:15:12
  that system and make it work?
• 1:15:15
  A and b, how did you persuade those people to be part of the team given
• 1:15:19
  that they had their other tasks?
• 1:15:21
  Okay.
• 1:15:22
  Now the problem was it wasn't always smooth sailing.
• 1:15:25
  And I'll use the disc drive division as the stocking horse.
• 1:15:30
  the disc drive division was building these big wash tub disc drives that would be
• 1:15:35
  10, 20, 50, a hundred megabyte drives.
• 1:15:38
  Big whirling dish these are 12 inch to 15 inch platters.
• 1:15:43
  And, and about that time, the Winchester Drive came out from IBM, was a
• 1:15:48
  small lightweight relatively minimal disc in terms of memory content.
• 1:15:56
  But but had some features that, it didn't look like a wash tub.
• 1:16:00
  It was more like a benchtop kind of product.
• 1:16:04
  Okay.
• 1:16:04
  And we wanted that, so we voted for that.
• 1:16:08
  And they agreed to supply some for us.
• 1:16:12
  then it turned out that the product they were building it for
• 1:16:15
  was a product HP called Amigo.
• 1:16:18
  And Amigo as a technology failed so they were selling maybe a hundred
• 1:16:25
  a month to their, to the division that defined what they built.
• 1:16:31
  They're selling 300 a month to us.
• 1:16:33
  Okay.
• 1:16:34
  So all of a sudden we're the tail wagging the dog and we're telling them
• 1:16:38
  about features we want included and the evolution we want, and fixes we want.
• 1:16:43
  And they're like now wait a minute.
• 1:16:45
  Our real customers, this one over here, they aren't buying anything, but you
• 1:16:49
  know, you aren't our real customer.
• 1:16:51
  Okay?
• 1:16:52
  So that that was problem one.
• 1:16:55
  and in fact they at one point threatened to stop us.
• 1:16:59
  so this caused a little bit of Palo Alto angst.
• 1:17:02
  I went into the disc drive business.
• 1:17:05
  I set up my own division of disc drives I, I was given an opportunity to not do that,
• 1:17:11
  but fairly big meeting, and, they were given an opportunity to be more collegial
• 1:17:17
  and so anyway, it all worked out.
• 1:17:20
  But then we put this damn thing on the market and the structure of our
• 1:17:24
  design was that we were building a shared controller system which
• 1:17:30
  was the first one of its kind.
• 1:17:31
  No computer company had built that yet.
• 1:17:34
  This was something that basically the Unix operating systems allowed, but
• 1:17:40
  all the major computer players were still building proprietary systems.
• 1:17:44
  And so we had this thing, we had up to six terminals running with one disc.
• 1:17:49
  So it's a shared disc environment.
• 1:17:52
  It's a terrific cost saver compared to a disc per terminal
• 1:17:57
  which is what the model was.
• 1:18:00
  The problem was if the disc wasn't reliable, you shut all
• 1:18:03
  six developers down, right?
• 1:18:06
  And it turned out the disc wasn't very reliable.
• 1:18:09
  And so we've got this wonderful system out there that is
• 1:18:13
  crashing design teams like crazy.
• 1:18:16
  So I wind up doing a study of failure rates around the corporation
• 1:18:23
  discovered that the computer group failure rate as a group was 10 times
• 1:18:29
  worse than the instrument group.
• 1:18:31
  10 times.
• 1:18:32
  And so I'm basically building to instrument group standards, and
• 1:18:36
  they're building the computer group standards and they're making me look
• 1:18:40
  like the dumbest guy in the world because my stuff is failing at a rate
• 1:18:44
  nobody in the instrument group ever had . And we were called on the carpet.
• 1:18:47
  I mean, we had to go to Palo Alto and explain ourselves and explain it
• 1:18:50
  to all the quality assurance people.
• 1:18:52
  And it was a real pain.
• 1:18:54
  and and so the way I, dealt with it, I said they're just terrible,
• 1:19:00
  and let me explain how terrible.
• 1:19:02
  And so I put up these graphs of how terrible the entire computer group was.
• 1:19:07
  Oh man.
• 1:19:07
  Now I had not just the disc division mad at me.
• 1:19:10
  I had everybody mad at me.
• 1:19:11
  So it was a terrific learning.
• 1:19:15
  It changed the computer group approach to quality, but it took a couple years.
• 1:19:20
  While meanwhile I'm I was persona non grata.
• 1:19:23
  What you do for the company.
• 1:19:24
  I mean, that was the thing.
• 1:19:27
  When you did the display, there's a quote in Packard's book about you and it says,
• 1:19:32
  you say in that quote I never considered, I could have possibly got fired.
• 1:19:36
  I was doing what was best for hp.
• 1:19:38
  The same with calling out shoddy discs, disc drives.
• 1:19:43
  You're doing what's best for the company, but somebody inside the company, now you
• 1:19:46
  have a target on your back and you're kind of going who are we working for here?
• 1:19:49
  I just find that stuff incredible and it all went well in the end.
• 1:19:54
  HP and its spin out test company, Agilent sold $6 billion of data domain
• 1:19:59
  equipment fueling incredible designs of almost every digital electronic
• 1:20:03
  product that society uses today.
• 1:20:06
  I thought that was just a nice way to, tip it off, and there's loads of
• 1:20:10
  personal stories in there as well for people who like the personal story.
• 1:20:14
  A lot of challenges you've been through Chuck as well, and it's important
• 1:20:18
  to recognize that as well, because.
• 1:20:20
  You both managed to be an intrapreneur and create amazing products and manage a
• 1:20:25
  lot of personal challenges along the way.
• 1:20:28
  You went through a lot and it's, a great story and I'm so delighted to check to, to
• 1:20:33
  share it with people and get it out there.
• 1:20:34
  The book is Permission Denied, Odyssey of intrapreneur Behind Me on the Shelf There.
• 1:20:39
  Great read.
• 1:20:39
  Highly recommended available on Amazon, available on Lulu as well.
• 1:20:43
  And I'll link to that.
• 1:20:45
  For now, for the end of part two, author of Permission denied Chuck House.
• 1:20:49
  Thank you for joining us.
• 1:20:51
  You bet.
• 1:20:51
  Thank
• 1:20:51
  you.
• 1:20:52
  Take care.
• 1:20:52
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