Latest / Faster, Please! โ The Podcast / ๐ Why progress stops : My chat (+transcript) with economist Carl Benedikt Frey
Transcript
- 0:06SPEAKER_00: Welcome to Faster Please, the podcast.
- 0:10SPEAKER_00: I'm your host, Jim Pethokoukis.
- 0:12SPEAKER_00: Several times a month,
- 0:13I'll feature a lively conversation with a fascinating and
- 0:16provocative guest about
- 0:18SPEAKER_00: how to make the world a better place through scientific discovery,
- 0:21SPEAKER_00: technological innovation,
- 0:23SPEAKER_00: and economic growth.
- 0:24SPEAKER_00: You're also going to want to check out my Faster Please newsletter.
- 0:27SPEAKER_00: You're on Substack throughout the week for fresh essays,
- 0:30SPEAKER_00: Q&As,
- 0:31SPEAKER_00: and stories from around the internet and around the world.
- 0:36SPEAKER_00: History seems to repeat a similar story.
- 0:39SPEAKER_00: As groundbreaking technological advancements spark optimism,
- 0:43SPEAKER_00: rapid takeoff fails to launch sustained progress.
- 0:47SPEAKER_00: Why does innovation stall?
- 0:48SPEAKER_00: Why do productivity gains fade?
- 0:51How do culture and policy alternatively promote and undercut
- 0:55society's growth?
- 0:57SPEAKER_00: Today on Faster Please,
- 0:58SPEAKER_00: the podcast,
- 0:59I talk with Carl Benedict Frey about why societies misjudge
- 1:03their trajectory and
- 1:04SPEAKER_00: what it takes to reignite lasting growth.
- 1:07Frey is a professor of AI and work at the Oxford Internet
- 1:10Institute and a fellow of
- 1:11SPEAKER_00: Mansfield College,
- 1:12SPEAKER_00: University of Oxford.
- 1:13He is director of the Future of Work program and Oxford Martin
- 1:16City Fellow at the
- 1:17SPEAKER_00: Oxford Martin School.
- 1:19SPEAKER_00: He's the author of several books,
- 1:20SPEAKER_00: including the brand new one,
- 1:22SPEAKER_00: How Progress Ends,
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: Technology,
- 1:25SPEAKER_00: Innovation and the Fate of Nations.
- 1:27SPEAKER_00: Since 2020,
- 1:28SPEAKER_00: we've seen the emergence of generative AI,
- 1:34SPEAKER_00: mRNA vaccines,
- 1:36SPEAKER_00: you know,
- 1:37SPEAKER_00: reusable rockets that have sort of returned America to space.
- 1:41SPEAKER_00: We're seeing this ongoing nuclear renaissance,
- 1:44SPEAKER_00: including sort of advanced technologies,
- 1:46SPEAKER_00: maybe even fusion,
- 1:48SPEAKER_00: geothermal,
- 1:49SPEAKER_00: the expansion of solar.
- 1:50SPEAKER_00: There seems to be a lot cooking.
- 1:53SPEAKER_00: Is worrying about the end of progress happening?
- 1:56SPEAKER_00: a bit too preemptive.
- 1:59Well,
- 1:59in a way,
- 2:00it's always a bit too preemptive to worry about the future.
- 2:05SPEAKER_01: You don't know what's going to come.
- 2:07SPEAKER_01: But let me put it this way.
- 2:09SPEAKER_01: If you had told me back in 1995,
- 2:12SPEAKER_01: and if I was a little bit older then,
- 2:17SPEAKER_01: that computers and the internet would lead to a decade streak,
- 2:24SPEAKER_01: of productivity growth and then peter out,
- 2:28I would probably have thought you nuts because it's hard to
- 2:30think about anything
- 2:32SPEAKER_01: that is more consequential.
- 2:35Computers have essentially given people the world store
- 2:39knowledge basically in their pockets.
- 2:42The internet has enabled us to connect inventors and scientists
- 2:48around the world.
- 2:49SPEAKER_01: There are few tools that aided the research process more.
- 2:53There should hardly be any technology that had done more to
- 2:58boost scientific discovery.
- 3:00SPEAKER_01: And yet we don't see it.
- 3:01We don't see it in the aggregate productivity statistics that
- 3:04petered out after a decade.
- 3:06SPEAKER_01: Research productivity is in decline.
- 3:08SPEAKER_01: Measures of breakthrough innovation is in decline.
- 3:12SPEAKER_01: And so, you know, it's always good to be optimistic, I guess.
- 3:15SPEAKER_01: And I agree with you that,
- 3:17SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 3:17SPEAKER_01: when you say I and when you,
- 3:20SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 3:21SPEAKER_01: read about many of the things that are happening now,
- 3:24SPEAKER_01: it's very,
- 3:24SPEAKER_01: very exciting.
- 3:25But I remain somewhat skeptical that we are actually going to
- 3:29see that leading to,
- 3:31you know,
- 3:32SPEAKER_01: huge revival of economic growth.
- 3:35I would just be surprised if we don't see any upsurge at all,
- 3:38to be clear.
- 3:40SPEAKER_01: But we do have global productivity stagnation right now.
- 3:44SPEAKER_01: It's not just Europe.
- 3:45SPEAKER_01: It's not just Britain.
- 3:47SPEAKER_01: The US is not doing too well either over the past two decades or so.
- 3:51China's productivity is probably in the negative territory or
- 3:56stagnant by more
- 3:57SPEAKER_01: optimistic measures.
- 3:59SPEAKER_01: And so we're having a growth problem.
- 4:01SPEAKER_00: If tech progress were inevitable,
- 4:03why have predictions from the 90s and certainly earlier decades
- 4:07like the 50s and
- 4:0860s about transformative breakthroughs and just really fast
- 4:13economic growth by now
- 4:14SPEAKER_00: consistently fail to materialize?
- 4:17How does your thesis account for why those visions of rapid
- 4:21growth and progress
- 4:22SPEAKER_00: have fallen short?
- 4:24So I'm not sure if my thesis explains why those expectations
- 4:28didn't materialize,
- 4:30but I'm hopeful that I do provide some framework for thinking
- 4:35about why we've often
- 4:37seen historically rapid growth spurts followed by stagnation
- 4:44and even decline.
- 4:48SPEAKER_01: And the story I'm telling is not rocket science exactly, right?
- 4:56It's basically built on the simple intuitions that once you
- 5:01exploit the technology,
- 5:03SPEAKER_01: the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns,
- 5:08SPEAKER_01: you have a lot of incumbents,
- 5:10SPEAKER_01: you have some vested interests around established technologies,
- 5:14SPEAKER_01: and you need something new to revive.
- 5:17SPEAKER_01: growth.
- 5:18And so,
- 5:19for example,
- 5:20the Soviet Union actually did reasonably well in terms of
- 5:24economic growth.
- 5:25A lot of it,
- 5:26or most of it,
- 5:27was centered on heavy industry,
- 5:29you should say.
- 5:29SPEAKER_01: So people didn't necessarily see the benefits in their pockets.
- 5:34SPEAKER_01: But the economy grew rapidly for about
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: Four decades or so, then growth petered out and eventually it collapsed.
- 5:43SPEAKER_01: And so for exploiting mass production technologies,
- 5:49SPEAKER_01: the Soviet system worked reasonably well,
- 5:51SPEAKER_01: right?
- 5:51And so Soviet bureaucrats could hold factory managers
- 5:56accountable by benchmarking
- 5:58SPEAKER_01: performance across factories.
- 6:02SPEAKER_01: But that became much harder.
- 6:03when something new was needed,
- 6:05because when something is new,
- 6:08what's the benchmark?
- 6:09SPEAKER_01: How do you benchmark against that?
- 6:12SPEAKER_01: And more broadly,
- 6:14SPEAKER_01: when something is new,
- 6:16SPEAKER_01: you need to explore,
- 6:17SPEAKER_01: and you need to explore often different technological trajectories.
- 6:21SPEAKER_01: And so in the Soviet system,
- 6:23SPEAKER_01: if you are an aircraft engineer,
- 6:26SPEAKER_01: you wanted to develop your prototype,
- 6:30SPEAKER_01: you could go to the Red Army and ask for funding,
- 6:33SPEAKER_01: If they turned you down, you maybe had two or three other options.
- 6:36SPEAKER_01: If they turned you down, your idea would die with you.
- 6:42SPEAKER_01: Conversely,
- 6:42SPEAKER_01: in the US,
- 6:43SPEAKER_01: back in 1999,
- 6:45SPEAKER_01: Bessemer Venture declined to invest in Google,
- 6:48SPEAKER_01: which seemed like a bad idea with the benefit of hindsight.
- 6:53SPEAKER_01: But it also illustrates that Google was no safe bet at the time.
- 6:58SPEAKER_01: Yahoo and AltaVista were dominating search.
- 7:01SPEAKER_01: And so...
- 7:02You need somebody to invest in order to know if something is
- 7:05going to catch on.
- 7:07SPEAKER_01: And in a more decentralized system,
- 7:09SPEAKER_01: you can have more people taking different bets and you can explore more
- 7:14SPEAKER_01: technological trajectories.
- 7:15And that is one of the reasons why the US ended up leading the
- 7:21computer revolutions
- 7:22SPEAKER_01: to which Soviet contributions were basically none.
- 7:28And so,
- 7:29going back to your question,
- 7:30why didn't those dreams materialize?
- 7:34SPEAKER_01: Well, I think we've made it harder to explore.
- 7:38SPEAKER_01: Part of the reason is protective regulation.
- 7:42SPEAKER_01: Part of the reason is lobbying by incumbents.
- 7:47SPEAKER_01: Part of the reason is,
- 7:49SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 7:49a revolving door between institutions like the US Patent Office
- 7:54and incumbents,
- 7:55SPEAKER_01: where we see in the data that
- 7:58Examiners tend to grant large firms some patents that are of
- 8:03low quality and then
- 8:05SPEAKER_01: get lucrative jobs at those places.
- 8:08SPEAKER_01: That's creating barriers to entry.
- 8:10SPEAKER_01: That's not good for new startups and inventors.
- 8:15SPEAKER_01: entering the marketplace.
- 8:17And so I think that is one of the reasons that we haven't seen
- 8:22some of those
- 8:22SPEAKER_01: streams materialize.
- 8:24SPEAKER_00: I wonder if your analysis of pre-industrial China,
- 8:27if there's any lessons you can draw about modern China as far
- 8:32as the way in which
- 8:35SPEAKER_00: bad governance can undermine innovation and progress.
- 8:40SPEAKER_01: The pre-industrial of China has a long history.
- 8:42And so China was the technology leader during the Song and Tang
- 8:46dynasties.
- 8:46SPEAKER_01: It had a meritocratic civil service.
- 8:50It was building infrastructure on scales that were unimaginable
- 8:58in Europe at the time.
- 9:00SPEAKER_01: And yet it didn't have an industrial revolution.
- 9:05SPEAKER_01: And so while China is...
- 9:08SPEAKER_01: Bureaucracy enabled scale.
- 9:10SPEAKER_01: Chinese bureaucracy did not really permit much in terms of decentralized
- 9:17SPEAKER_01: exploration,
- 9:18SPEAKER_01: which European fragmentation aided.
- 9:23And because there was a lot of social status attached to
- 9:26becoming a bureaucrat and
- 9:29SPEAKER_01: passing the civil service examination,
- 9:32SPEAKER_01: if Galileo was born in China,
- 9:35SPEAKER_01: he would probably become a bureaucrat.
- 9:37SPEAKER_01: rather than a scientist.
- 9:38SPEAKER_01: And I think that's part of the reason too.
- 9:42SPEAKER_01: But China mostly did well when the state was strong rather than weak.
- 9:49SPEAKER_01: And a strong state was underpinned by
- 9:52SPEAKER_01: intensive geopolitical competition.
- 9:54SPEAKER_01: And once China had unified and there were fewer peer competitors,
- 9:59SPEAKER_01: you see that the center begins to fade.
- 10:06SPEAKER_01: They struggle to tax local elites in order to keep the peace.
- 10:13people begin to erect monopolies in their local markets and
- 10:20collide with guilds to
- 10:22SPEAKER_01: protect production and their crafts from competition.
- 10:28SPEAKER_01: And so during the Qing Dynasty, China begins to decline.
- 10:35SPEAKER_01: Whereas we see the opposite happening in Europe.
- 10:42SPEAKER_01: So European fragmentation aids exploration and innovation.
- 10:51SPEAKER_01: But it doesn't necessarily aid scaling.
- 10:55And so that is something that Europe needs to come to terms
- 10:58with at the later stage
- 11:00SPEAKER_01: when the Industrial Revolution starts to take off.
- 11:03SPEAKER_01: And even before that,
- 11:05market integration played an important role in terms of
- 11:09undermining the guilds.
- 11:12SPEAKER_01: in Europe.
- 11:12And so part of the reason why the guilds persist longer in
- 11:16China is that distances
- 11:17SPEAKER_01: are much longer between cities.
- 11:19SPEAKER_01: And so the guilds are less exposed to competition in the end.
- 11:25Europe ends up overtaking China in large part because vested
- 11:31interests are undercut
- 11:34SPEAKER_01: by governments,
- 11:36SPEAKER_01: but also because of investments in things that spur market integration.
- 11:41This is like a great sort of McKinsey kind of way of looking at
- 11:43the world.
- 11:46The notion that what drives innovation is sort of maximum
- 11:50competitive intensity.
- 11:52So you're talking about the competitive intensity in both
- 11:54Europe and in China when
- 11:56SPEAKER_00: it was not so centralized.
- 11:58SPEAKER_00: You're talking about the competitive intensity of a fragmented Europe.
- 12:03Do you think that the current level of competitive intensity
- 12:07between the United
- 12:08SPEAKER_00: States and China,
- 12:09SPEAKER_00: and I really wish I could add Europe in there,
- 12:13plenty of white papers I know are written about Europe's
- 12:16competitive state and its
- 12:18SPEAKER_00: innovativeness,
- 12:19SPEAKER_00: and I hope those white papers are helpful and someone reads them,
- 12:23but it seems to be that the real competition is between the
- 12:25United States and
- 12:26SPEAKER_00: China.
- 12:27Do you not think that that competitive intensity will keep
- 12:30those countries
- 12:32progressing despite any of the barriers that might pop up and
- 12:37that you've already
- 12:38SPEAKER_00: mentioned a little bit.
- 12:39Isn't that a more powerful tailwind than any of the headwinds
- 12:41that you've mentioned?
- 12:44SPEAKER_01: It could be,
- 12:45SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 12:46SPEAKER_01: if people learn the right lessons from history,
- 12:50SPEAKER_01: at least that's a key argument of the book.
- 12:52SPEAKER_01: So,
- 12:52SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 12:53SPEAKER_01: right now,
- 12:54what I'm seeing is the United States moving more towards
- 12:58protectionist with
- 12:59SPEAKER_01: protective tariffs.
- 13:01Right now,
- 13:02what I see is move towards,
- 13:05we could even say crony capitalism.
- 13:08with tariff exemptions that some larger firms that are better
- 13:13connected to the
- 13:13SPEAKER_01: president are able to navigate,
- 13:15SPEAKER_01: but certainly not challengers.
- 13:19You're seeing the United States embracing things like golden
- 13:24shares in Intel and
- 13:26SPEAKER_01: perhaps even extending that to a range of companies.
- 13:31Back in the 2000s,
- 13:32people predicted that China would become more like the United
- 13:35States.
- 13:36SPEAKER_01: Now it looks like the United States is becoming more like China.
- 13:41And China today is having similar problems and on,
- 13:46I would argue,
- 13:47an even greater basis.
- 13:50SPEAKER_01: And so growth used to be the key objective in China.
- 13:55SPEAKER_01: And so for local governments,
- 13:58SPEAKER_01: provincial governments competing on such targets,
- 14:01SPEAKER_01: it was fairly easy to benchmark and measure and hold up.
- 14:05provincial governors accountable and they will be promoted
- 14:08inside the communist
- 14:09party based on meeting targets now we have drive towards common
- 14:15prosperity more
- 14:16SPEAKER_01: national security oriented concerns and so in China
- 14:23Most progress has been driven by private firms and foreign
- 14:26invested firms.
- 14:27State-owned enterprises has generally been a drag on innovation
- 14:32and productivity.
- 14:34SPEAKER_01: And what you're seeing,
- 14:35SPEAKER_01: though,
- 14:36SPEAKER_01: as China is shifting more towards political objectives,
- 14:39it's harder to mobilize a private enterprise where the
- 14:44yardsticks are market share
- 14:45SPEAKER_01: and profitability for political goals.
- 14:48SPEAKER_01: And that means that China is increasingly relying more again
- 14:52SPEAKER_01: on state-owned enterprises, which again have been a drag on innovation.
- 14:58SPEAKER_01: And so in principle,
- 15:00SPEAKER_01: I agree with you that historically you did see,
- 15:03SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 15:03SPEAKER_01: Prussian defeat to Napoleon leading to the Stein-Hardenberg reforms and,
- 15:09SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 15:10the abolishment of gilded restrictions and a more competitive
- 15:15marketplace for both
- 15:16SPEAKER_01: goods and ideas.
- 15:19SPEAKER_01: You saw that, you know,
- 15:21Russian losses in the Crimean War led to the abolition of
- 15:28serfdom and so there are
- 15:31many times in history where defeat in particular led to
- 15:37striking reforms but right
- 15:40now the competition itself doesn't seem to lead to the kinds of
- 15:44reforms I would
- 15:46SPEAKER_01: have hoped to see in response.
- 15:50I certainly wrote enough pieces and talked to enough people
- 15:54over the past decade
- 15:56SPEAKER_00: who have been worried about competition in the United States.
- 16:01And the story went something like this,
- 16:03that you had these big tech companies
- 16:06SPEAKER_00: Google and Meta,
- 16:08Facebook and Microsoft and that these were that these companies
- 16:13were what they
- 16:14SPEAKER_00: would call forever companies,
- 16:16that they had that they had such dominance in their core
- 16:20businesses and they were
- 16:21SPEAKER_00: throwing off so much cash that
- 16:26that these were unbeatable companies and this was going to be
- 16:29bad for America.
- 16:31And people who made that argument just could not imagine how
- 16:35any other companies
- 16:36SPEAKER_00: could threaten their dominance.
- 16:38And yet at the time I pointed out that it seemed to me that
- 16:43these companies were
- 16:44SPEAKER_00: constantly in fear that there was there were one technological advance
- 16:48SPEAKER_00: from being in trouble.
- 16:49SPEAKER_00: And then lo and behold, that's exactly what happened.
- 16:53SPEAKER_00: And while in AI,
- 16:54SPEAKER_00: certainly Google's super important and Facebook is super,
- 16:58SPEAKER_00: and MetaFacebook are super important,
- 17:01SPEAKER_00: so are OpenAI,
- 17:03SPEAKER_00: and so is Anthropic,
- 17:04SPEAKER_00: and there are other companies.
- 17:07SPEAKER_00: So the point here after my little soliloquy is
- 17:11SPEAKER_00: Can we overstate these problems,
- 17:14SPEAKER_00: at least in the United States,
- 17:16when it seems like it is still possible to create a new
- 17:21technology that breaks the
- 17:23SPEAKER_00: apparent stranglehold of these incumbents?
- 17:27I mean,
- 17:27Google search does not look quite as solid a business as it
- 17:32did,
- 17:32you know,
- 17:32in 2022.
- 17:33SPEAKER_00: So can we overstate sort of...
- 17:37SPEAKER_00: the competitive problems of the United States?
- 17:39SPEAKER_00: Or is what you're saying more forward looking,
- 17:42SPEAKER_00: that perhaps we overstated the competitive problems in the past,
- 17:45SPEAKER_00: but now due to sort of this,
- 17:48due to tariffs and executives having to like travel to the
- 17:53White House and give the
- 17:54SPEAKER_00: president gifts,
- 17:56that that creates a stage for the kind of competitive problems
- 17:58that we should
- 17:59SPEAKER_00: really worry about.
- 18:00I'm very happy to support the notion that technological changes
- 18:08can lead to
- 18:09unpredictable outcomes that incumbents may struggle to predict
- 18:15and respond to.
- 18:16SPEAKER_01: Even if they predict it,
- 18:18they struggle to act upon it because doing so often undermines
- 18:24the existing
- 18:25SPEAKER_01: business model.
- 18:26SPEAKER_01: So if you take Google,
- 18:28SPEAKER_01: where the transformer was actually conceived,
- 18:32SPEAKER_01: the seven people behind it,
- 18:33SPEAKER_01: I think,
- 18:34SPEAKER_01: have since left
- 18:35the company and one of the reasons that they probably didn't
- 18:40launch anything like
- 18:41chat dpt was probably for the fear of cannibalizing search and
- 18:49so you know i think
- 18:51the most important mechanisms for dislodging incumbents are
- 18:57dramatic shifts in
- 18:58SPEAKER_01: technology and you know
- 19:00SPEAKER_01: None of the legacy media companies ended up leading social media.
- 19:05SPEAKER_01: None of the legacy retailers ended up leading e-commerce.
- 19:08SPEAKER_01: None of the automobile leaders are leading NAVs.
- 19:14None of the bicycle companies,
- 19:15which all went into automobile,
- 19:17so many of them ended up leading.
- 19:19SPEAKER_01: And so there is a pattern there.
- 19:21SPEAKER_01: At the same time,
- 19:21I think you do have to worry that there are anti-competitive
- 19:28practices going on
- 19:30SPEAKER_01: that makes it harder and that are costly.
- 19:35And so the revolving door between the USPTO and companies is
- 19:40one example of that.
- 19:41We also have a reasonable amount of evidence on killer
- 19:45acquisitions whereby firms buy up
- 19:49SPEAKER_01: a competitor just to shut it down.
- 19:52SPEAKER_01: So those things are happening.
- 19:54SPEAKER_01: And so I think you need to have tools that allow you to combat that.
- 20:01SPEAKER_01: And I think more broadly,
- 20:02SPEAKER_01: the United States has a long history of fairly vigorous antitrust policy.
- 20:07I think you'd be hard-pressed to suggest that that has been a
- 20:11tremendous drag on
- 20:13SPEAKER_01: American business or American dynamism.
- 20:17SPEAKER_01: So if you don't think,
- 20:18SPEAKER_01: for example,
- 20:19that the American Iditrust policy has contributed to innovation
- 20:26and dynamism,
- 20:27At the very least,
- 20:28you can't really say either that it's been a huge drag on it,
- 20:31right?
- 20:32And so in Japan,
- 20:34for example,
- 20:35in its post-war history,
- 20:37antitrust was extremely lax.
- 20:40SPEAKER_01: In the United States, it was very vigorous.
- 20:43SPEAKER_01: And it was very vigorous throughout the computer revolution as well,
- 20:48SPEAKER_01: which it wasn't at all in Japan.
- 20:51And so if you take the lawsuit against IBM,
- 20:53for example,
- 20:54you can debate this and,
- 20:56you know,
- 20:56SPEAKER_01: To what extent did it force it to unbundle hardware and software?
- 21:02SPEAKER_01: And would Microsoft have been the company it is today without that?
- 21:07SPEAKER_01: I think AT&T, it's both the breakup and it's deregulation as well.
- 21:12SPEAKER_01: But I think by basically all accounts,
- 21:14SPEAKER_01: that was a good idea,
- 21:16particularly at the time when the National Science Foundation
- 21:19released ARPANET into
- 21:21SPEAKER_01: the world.
- 21:22SPEAKER_01: And so I think what antitrust does
- 21:26SPEAKER_01: At the very least,
- 21:27it provides a tool that means that businesses are thinking
- 21:35twice before engaging in
- 21:38SPEAKER_01: anti-competitive behavior.
- 21:40SPEAKER_01: And so there's always a risk of antitrust being heavily politicized.
- 21:45SPEAKER_01: And that's always been a bad idea.
- 21:51SPEAKER_01: But,
- 21:52SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 21:52SPEAKER_01: at the same time,
- 21:53SPEAKER_01: I think having tools on the books that,
- 21:55SPEAKER_01: you know,
- 21:56allows you to check monopolies and steer their investments more
- 22:01towards innovation
- 22:03SPEAKER_01: rather than anti-competitive practices,
- 22:06SPEAKER_01: I think is broadly speaking a good thing.
- 22:08SPEAKER_01: And I think in the European Union, you often hear that, you know,
- 22:11SPEAKER_01: competition policies, a drag on productivity.
- 22:16SPEAKER_01: I think it's the least of Europe's problem.
- 22:18SPEAKER_00: Let's talk about Europe as we sort of finish up.
- 22:21SPEAKER_00: You know, we don't have to write how progress ends.
- 22:22SPEAKER_00: It seems like progress has ended.
- 22:24SPEAKER_00: So maybe we want to think about how progress restarts.
- 22:28SPEAKER_00: And is the problem in Europe, is it institutions or is it
- 22:35sort of the reveal preference of Europeans that they're getting
- 22:38what they want,
- 22:40SPEAKER_00: that they don't value progress and dynamism,
- 22:45SPEAKER_00: that it's a that is a cultural preference as being that is manifested in
- 22:50SPEAKER_00: institutions.
- 22:52SPEAKER_00: And if that's the case,
- 22:52SPEAKER_00: you can tell me if that's not the case,
- 22:54SPEAKER_00: I kind of feel like it might be the case.
- 22:55SPEAKER_00: How do you restart progress in Europe since it seems I've already ended?
- 23:00So the most puzzling thing to me is not that Europe is less
- 23:04dynamic than the United States.
- 23:06That's not very puzzling at all,
- 23:09but that it hasn't even managed to catch up in digital,
- 23:12right?
- 23:13SPEAKER_01: So if you take the post-war period, at least Europe catches up
- 23:18SPEAKER_01: in most key industries, and actually lead in some of them.
- 23:23SPEAKER_01: Take automobiles, electrical machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals.
- 23:28Nobody would say that Europe was behind in those industries,
- 23:33or at least not for long.
- 23:34SPEAKER_01: And so Europe has very robust catch-up growth in the post-war period,
- 23:39SPEAKER_01: but doesn't do the same in digital.
- 23:42SPEAKER_01: And so the question in my mind is, why is that?
- 23:46SPEAKER_01: I think part of the reason is that