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02 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

• Book two, Chapter one. Since, however, virtue is twofold, one kind being dionoetic, but the other ethic. The dionoetic indeed, for the most part, receives both its generation and increase from doctrine, on which account it requires experience and time. But the ethic is produced from custom, from whence also it derives the name, which declines but a little from ethos, custom, from which, likewise it is evident that no one of the ethical virtues is ingenerated in us by nature. For nothing that has a natural subsistence can by custom be brought to act differently from its natural tendency. Thus, a stone which naturally tends downward, cannot be accustomed to tend upward, though some one should hurl it upward ten thousand times. Nor can fire be accustomed to tend downward. Nor can anything else among the things which have natural tendencies different from these, be accustomed to any other tendency than that which it has from nature. The virtues, therefore, are neither from nature nor are ingenerated in us preternaturally. But they are produced in us in consequence of our being naturally adapted to receive them and becoming perfect through habit. Again, with respect to such things as are ingenerated in us, by nature of these we first receive the powers, but afterwards employ the energies of those powers, which is evident in the senses. For it is not from frequently seeing or frequently hearing that we receive these senses. But on the contrary, having these senses, we use them, and we do not have them by using them. With respect to the virtues, however, we receive them by first energizing according to them in the same manner as in the other arts. For those things which it is necessary to do, in consequence of having learned how to do them, these by doing we learn how to do. Thus, by building, we become builders, and by playing on the harp we become harpers. Thus, too, by acting justly, we become just prudent by acting prudently, and brave by acting bravely. But what happens in cities bears testimony to the truth of this. For the legislators, by accustoming the citizens to virtue, render them worthy characters. And this indeed is the intention of every legislator. But such as do not affect this well. Err And in this one polity differs from another, the good from the bad. Farther still, from the same things, and through the same things, every virtue is generated and corrupted, and in a similar manner every art For from playing on the harp, both good and bad harpers are produced, and analogously builders of houses and all other artists. For from building well, they will be good builders, but bad from building ill, since if it were not so, there would be no occasion for a preceptor, but all men would be naturally good or bad artists. The like also takes place in the virtues. For by acting in our compacts with men, we become some of us indeed just, but others unjust. And by acting in things of a dreadful nature, and by being accustomed either to be terrified or to be confident in danger, some of us become brave, but others timid. The reasoning likewise is similar with respect to desire and anger, For some men indeed become temperate and mild, but others intemperate and irrascuable. These from being in this way conversant with these things, but those from being conversant with them in that way. And in one word, habits are produced from similar energies. Hence it is necessary to render energies endued with a certain quality, for habits follow from the differences of these. It is of no small consequence therefore, to be thus or thus accustomed immediately from our youth. But it is of very great consequence, or rather it is everything Chapter two. Since therefore the present treaties is not for the sake of theory, like other discussions, For our attention is not directed to this business that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good men, since otherwise no advantage would be derived from it. This being the case, it is necessary to consider with respect to actions, how they are to be performed, For as we have said, they are the mistresses of the qualities which habits possess. To act therefore according to right reason in common and is now assumed to be so. We shall, however, hereafter, speak concerning this and show what right reason is and how it subsists with reference to the other virtues. But this must be previously granted that every treatise of practical affairs ought only to be an adumbration and not an accurate discussion, as also we observed in the beginning, Because reasonings are required conformable to the subject matter, and in practical affairs and things contributing to them, there is nothing stable, as neither is there in things which are salubrious, such therefore being the universal reason. In a still greater degree will the discussion of particulars be deficient in accuracy, for it neither falls under art nor under any precept. It is, however, necessary that those who are engaged in practical affairs should always direct their attention to an opportune time, in the same manner as in medicine and in the pilot's art. But though the present discussion is of this nature, we must endeavor to give it assistance in the first place. Therefore, this must be observed that things of this kind viz. Actions which produce in us the habits of the virtues, are naturally adapted to be corrupted by excess and defect, as we see in strength and health, which are the virtues of the body. Bracket. For it is necessary to use things apparent as testimonies in things which are unapparent close bracket, since exercises which are excessive, and also those which are deficient, corrupt the strength of the body. In like manner. Meat and drink, when taken in too great or too small a quantity, corrupt the health, but these, when commensurate, produce increase and preserve it. This therefore is also the case in temperance and fortitude and the other virtues. For he who flies from and is afraid of all things and into nothing becomes timid, and he who, in short, is afraid of nothing but marches up to all things becomes audacious. In a similar manner, he indeed, who gives himself up to the enjoyment of every pleasure and abstains from none, is intemperate. But he who flies from all pleasures, like rustic men, is an insensate person. For temperance and fortitude are corrupted by excess and defect, but are preserved by mediocrity. Not only, however, generations, increments, and corruptions are produced from and by the same things, but the energies also of the virtues will subsist after the same manner, since this likewise is the case in other things which are more apparent, as for instance, in strength, for strength is produced by taking much food and enduring many labors, and the strong man is especially able to do both. These Thus, too, it is in the virtues or by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate, we are especially able to abstain from them. The like also takes place in fortitude, for by being accustomed to despise things of a terrible nature and to endure them, we become brave, And having become brave, we are specially able to endure terrible things. Chapter three. It is necessary, however, to consider as an indication of habits the pleasure or pain which is attendant on actions. For he who abstains from corporeal pleasure and is delighted in doing so is a temperate man. But he who is grieved when he abstains from them is intemperate. And he, indeed, who endures dreadful things and is delighted with his endurance or feels no pain from it, is a brave man. But he who feels pain from the endurance of them is a timid man. For ethical virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, for we act basely through the influence of pleasure, but we abstain from beautiful conduct through the influence of pain. Hence, it is necessary as Plato says, to be so educated in a certain respect immediately after our youth, that we may be delighted and pained with things from which it is requisite to feel pleasure or pain. For this is right education. Farther still, if the virtues are conversant with actions and passions, but pleasure and pain are consequent to every passion and action, on this account, also virtue will be conversant with pleasures and pains. The punishments, likewise, which are inflicted through these, indicate the truth of this, for they are certain remedies. But remedies are naturally adapted to operate through contraries. Again, as we have also before observed, the nature of every habit of the soul is referred to and conversant with those things by which it is adapted to become better and worse. But habits become depraved through pleasures and pains by pursuing or avoiding these, either such as ought not to be pursued or avoided, or when it is not proper, or in such a way as is not proper, or in as many other modes. As such things are distinguished by reason. Hence, some persons divine the virtues to be certain apathies and tranquilities, but they do not define them well, because they speak simply, and do not add in such a way as is proper, and when it is proper, and such other additions as are usually made. It is admitted therefore that virtue is a thing of this kind, which is conversant with pleasures and pains, and practices things of the most excellent nature. But vice is the contrary from what has been said. Likewise, we may obtain still greater evidence about these things, for as there are three things which pertain to choice, and also three which pertain to aversion, viz. The beautiful in conduct, the advantageous, and the delightful, and three the contraries to these, the base, the disadvantageous, and the painful. The good man indeed acts rightly in all these, but the bad man erroneously, and especially in what pertains to pleasure. For pleasure is common to all animals, and is consequent to everything which is the object of choice. For the beautiful and the advantageous appear to be delightful. Again, pleasure is co nourished with all of us from our infancy, on which account also it is difficult to wipe away this passion with which our life is imbued. We likewise direct our actions by pleasure and pain, as by our rule, some of us in a greater and others in a less degree. On this account, therefore, it is necessary that the whole of this discussion should be conversant with these things. For to rejoice or be pained properly or improperly, is of no small consequence in actions. Farther still, it is more difficult to fight with pleasure than with anger, as Heraclitis says. But both art and virtue are always conversant with that which is more difficult, for that which is well done is better when it is affected with greater difficulty. Hence, on this account also the whole business, both of ethics and politics, is conversant with pleasures and pains, for he who employs these well will be a good man, and he will be a bad man who employs them badly. We have shown therefore, that virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and corrupted by the same things by which it is produced when they did not exist after the same manner, and that it likewise energizes about the things from which it originated Chapter four. It may, however, be doubted what our meaning is in asserting that men, by acting justly, become just and temperate by acting temperately. For if they act justly and temperately, they are already just and temperate, just as those who perform things pertaining to grammar and music are grammarians and musicians. Or shall we say that this is not the case in the arts. For it is possible that a man may do something grammatical both from chance and the suggestion of another person. He will therefore then be a grammarian if he both does something grammatical and grammatically, that is, according to the grammatical art which he possesses. Again, neither is the thing similar in the arts and the virtues, For things produced by the arts contain in themselves efficient excellence. It is sufficient, therefore, to these to be effected with a certain mode of subsistence. But things which are performed according to the virtues are not done justly or temperately if they subsist in a certain way. But if he who does them does them in consequence of being disposed in a certain way, and in the first place, indeed, if he does them knowingly in the next place, if with deliberate choice, and also deliberately choosing to do them on their own account, and in the third place, if he does them with a firm and immutable disposition of mind. These things, however, are not co enumerated as requisites to the possession of the other arts, except the knowledge of them alone. But to the acquisition of the virtues. The knowledge of them is of little or no efficacy, while the other particulars pertaining to them are capable of affecting no small thing, but are all powerful. And these are obtained from frequently acting justly and temperately. Things therefore are said to be just and temperate when they are just as a just or temperate man would perform. But he is a just and temperate man, not who merely does these things, but who does them so as just and tempera men do them. It is well said, therefore a man becomes just from acting justly, and temperate from acting temperately, but that from not doing these things, no one will ever become a good man. The multitude, however, do not thus act, but flying towards they fancy they shall philosophize and thus become worthy characters. Acting similarly to sick persons who attentively indeed hear what the physicians say, but do nothing which they order them to do. As Therefore, these by such a method of cure never have their body in a healthy condition. So neither is the soul of those, ever well who thus philosophize Chapter five. In the next place, we must consider what virtue is, Since therefore three things are produced in the soul viz. Passions, powers, and habits. Virtue will be some one of these. But I call passions indeed desire, anger, audacity, envy, joy, love, hatred, cupidity, emulation, pity, and in short, those things to which pleasure or pain are consequent. And I denominate powers those things according to which we are said to be susceptible of the passions, viz. According to which we are able to be angry or pained, or are inclined to pity. But I call habits those things according to which we are well or ill disposed towards the passions. Thus, for instance, with respect to being angry, if we are vehemently or were missly disposed towards it, we are badly affected. But if moderately we are well affected and in a similar manner with respect to the other passions. Neither the virtues, therefore, nor devices are passions. Because we are not said to be worthy or depraved according to the passions, but we are said to be so according to the virtues or vices. And because according to the passions we are neither praised nor or blamed. For neither he who is afraid, nor he who is angry, is praised, nor is he who is simply angry blamed, but he who is angry after a certain manner. But we are praised or blamed according to the virtues and vices. Further still, we may be angry and afraid without any deliberate intention of being so, but the virtues are certain deliberate elections, or are not without deliberate choice. In addition to this, also we are said to be moved according to the passions, but we are not said to be moved according to the virtues and vices, but to be disposed in a certain way. In this account, neither are the virtuos powers, for we are neither said to be good nor bad, from being able simply to suffer, Nor are we, through this either praised or blamed. And again we possess powers indeed from nature, but from nature we do not become either good or bad. We have, however, spoken concerning this before. If therefore the virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits. And thus we have shown what virtue is generically Chapter six. It is necessary, however, not only to show that virtue is a habit, but likewise to show what kind of a habit it is. We must say, therefore, that every virtue renders that of which it is, the virtue well disposed, and causes its work to be well accomplished. Thus, for instance, the virtue of the eye causes both the eye and the work of it to be good, For by the virtue of the eye we see well in a similar manner, the virtue of a horse causes the horse to be good for the race, for carrying his rider, ends sustaining the enemy in battle. But if this be the case in all things, the virtue of man will also be a habit from which man becomes good and from which he accomplishes his own work. And how this indeed will be affected, we have already shown, but it will again be now manifest if we consider what the quality is of the nature of virtue. In everything, therefore, which is continued and divisible, it is possible, indeed, to assume the more, the less, and the equal, and this either with respect to the thing itself or with reference to us. But the equal is a certain middle between excess and defect. I call, however, the middle of a thing that which is equally distant from each of the extremes, and which is one and the same in all things. But with reference to us, the middle is that which neither exceeds nor falls short of the becoming. This, however, is neither one nor the same in all things. Thus, for instance, if ten things are many, but two a few, six are assumed as a medium with reference to the thing, For six equally surpasses and is surpassed. But this is a middle according to arithmatical proportion. The middle or medium, however, with reference to us, is not thus to be assumed. For if to eat ten pounds is to eat much, but two pounds a little, it does not follow that the master of the gymnastic exercises will order six pounds to be eaten, for this perhaps will be too much or too little for him who is to take food for milot, indeed, it would be too little, but for him who is beginning the exercises it would be too much. And the like must be understood of the coarse and bristling. Thus, therefore every scientific man will avoid excess and defect, but will search for the medium and make this the object of his choice. He will, however, explore that medium, which is not the middle of the thing, but is a middle, with reference to us. If therefore, every science thus well accomplishes its work when it looks to the middle, and refers its work to this. Whence, it is usual to say of works that are well finished, that nothing can be added to or taken away from them, acknowledging by this that excess and defect corrupt that which is excellent in them, but that mediocrity preserves this. And if good artists, as we say, operate looking to this, but virtue in the same manner as nature is more accurate and better than all art. If this be the case, it will tend to the medium as a boundary. I speak, however, of ethical virtue, for this is conversant with passions and actions. But in these there is excess and defect in the middle. Thus, for instance, it is possible to be afraid, to be confident, to desire and abhor, to be angry and to pity, and in short, to be pleased and pained in a greater and less degree, and to be both these improperly. But to have these passions when it is proper, and in such things towards such persons, and for the sake of that which, and as it is proper, This is the middle and the best, and pertains to virtue. In a similar manner. Also, in actions there is excess and defect, and the middle. But virtue is conversant with passions and actions in which the excess, indeed is erroneous, and the defect is blamed. But the medium is praised and possesses rectitude, And both these pertain to virtue. Hence, virtue is a certain medium and tends to the middle as a boundary. Again, to air is manifold for evil, as the Pythagorean's conjecture, belongs to the infinite, and good to the finite. But it is only possible to act rightly in one way. Hence the one is easy, but the other difficult. It is easy, indeed, to deviate from the mark, but difficult to hit it, and on this account excess and defect belong to vice, but the medium to virtue. For simple the good, all various are the bad. Virtue therefore, is a pre elective habit, or a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, existing in a medium with reference to us, and which is defined by reason and in such a way as a prudent man would define it. It is also the medium between two vices, the one being characterized by excess but the other by defect, and farther still it is defined by this that some of the vices fall short of but others surpass, the becoming both in passions and actions. But virtue both discovers and chooses the medium. Hence, according to the essence and the definition which explains the very nature of a thing, virtue is a medium, but according to that which is best and subsists well, it is a summit. Not every action, however, nor every passion, receives a medium. For some passions, as soon as they are named, are complicated with depravity, such as malevolentce rejoicing in the evils of us, impudence, envy, and in actions, adultery, theft, and murder. For all these and others of the like kind are thus denominated because they are themselves bad, and not the excesses nor the defects of them. Hence, it is not possible at any time to act rightly in these, but they are always attended with error. Nor it is acting well or not acting well in things of this kind consist in committing adultery when and as it is proper. But simply to do any of these things is to act wrong. To require therefore a medium in these is just as if some one should think it proper that there should be a medium excess and defect in doing an injury and in acting timidly and intemperately, For thus there would be a middle of excess and defect, and an excess of excess and a deficiency of defect. As however, there is no excess and defect of temperance and fortitude, because the middle is in a certain respect to the summit. So neither is there a middle excess and defect in those passions and actions. But in whatever manner they are exerted, they are attended with air. For in short, neither is there a middle of excess or defect, nor are there excess and defect of the middle Chapter seven. It is necessary, however, not only to assert this universally, but also to adapt it to particulars. For in what is said concerning actions, universal assertions indeed are more common, but those that are particular are more true, since actions are conversant with particulars with which assertions ought to accord. These therefore are to be assumed from description of fear and confidence. Therefore, fortitude is the medium of the characters, however, which exceed the one. Indeed, which exceeds by a privation of fear is anonymous. But that which exceeds in confidence is audacious. And he who exceeds in being afraid, but is deficient in confidence, is timid. In pleasures and pains, however, though not in all pleasures, but in such as are corporeal, and in those especially which pertain to the touch, and in a less degree in pains, the medium, indeed is temperance, but the excess in temperance. But those who are deficient in the pursuit of pleasures do not very frequently occur, on which account, neither have they obtained a name. They may, however, be called insensate in giving and receiving money, the medium, indeed is liberality, but the excess and defect are prodigality and illiberality, in which men exceed and are deficient in a contrary way. For the prodigal indeed exceeds in spending money, but is deficient in receiving it, and the illiberal man exceeds in receiving but is deficient in spending money. At present, therefore we think it sufficient summarily to adumbrate these things, but afterwards we shall discuss them more accurately. With respect to wealth, however, there are other dispositions of the mind, and the medium indeed is magnificence. For the magnificent differs from the liberal man in this that the former is conversant with greater but the latter with small things. The excess, however, is an ignorance of elegance and decorum and illiberal profusion, but the defect is an indecorous parsimony in spending money. And these vices differ from those which surround liberality. But in what they differ we shall afterwards show. With respect to honor and ignominy, the medium, indeed is magnanimity, but the excess is called a certain inflation. Of the mind and the defect pusillanimity. As we have said, however, that liberality corresponds to magnificence, but differs from it in this that it is conversant with small things. So too magnanimity, which is conversant with great honor. Another certain virtue, corresponds, and which also is itself conversant with what is small. For it is possible to aspire after honor in such manner as is proper, and more and less than is proper. But he who exceedes in his desires of honor is said to be ambitious, but he who is deficient is unambitious. And the middle character between both is anonymous. The dispositions also are anonymous, except the disposition of the ambitious man, which is denominated ambition. Hence the extremes contend for the middle place. And we indeed sometimes call the middle character ambitious and sometimes unambitious. And sometimes we praise the ambitious and sometimes the unambitious man. But from what cause we do this will be shown hereafter. Now, however, conformably to the manner in which we begun, let us speak about the rest with respect to anger. Therefore, there is likewise excess, defect, and a medium. But since these are nearly anonymous, we call the middle character a mild man, and the medium mildness. But of the extremes, let him who exceeds be wrathful, and the vice be wrathfulness, and let him who is deficient be a man void of anger, and a defect a privation of anger. There are likewise three other media, which have indeed a certain similitude to each other, but differ from each other. For all of them are conversant with the communion of words and actions. But they differ because one of them is conversant with the truth which is in them. But the others are conversant with the delectable. And of this viz. The delectable one kind consists in jest, but another in all the concerns of life. We must, therefore all so speak concerning these, in order that we may in a greater degree perceive that in everything the medium is laudable, but the extremes are neither right nor laudable, but reprehensible. Of these, therefore, the greater part also are anonymous. But we must endeavor, in the same manner as in the rest, to give names to them, For the sake of perspicuity and the facility of understanding what follows. With respect to truth, therefore, the middle character may be called voracious, and the medium truth, but of dissimulation. That kind which exaggerates may be called arrogance, and he who possesses it an arrogant man. And that which extenuates may be called irony, and he who employs it may be denominated ironical or a dissembler. With respect, however, to the delectable and that kind which consists in jest, the middle character indeed may be called facetious, and the disposition itself facetiousness. But the excess may be denominated scurrility, and he who possesses it a scurrilous man. And he who is deficient may be called a rustic man, and the habit itself rusticity. In the other species of the delectable, which pertains to the concerns of life, he who delights in such a way as is proper is a friend, and the medium is friendship. But he who exceedes, if it is not with a view to any advantage, is studious of pleasing, But if for the sake of advantage, is a flatterer. And he who is deficient and in all things unpleasant, is contentious and difficult to be pleased. There are likewise media in the passions and in things pertaining to the passions. For bashfulness is not a virtue, and yet the modest man is praised. For in these things, one indeed is called the middle character. Another is said to exceed, and another to be deficient. And he, indeed, who exceedes and is bashful in all things, is as it were, astounded. But he who is deficient and is not ashamed of anything, is impudent, And the middle character is the modest man. Indignation is a medium between envy and joy for the calamities of others. But these habits are conversant with the pain and pleasure arising from what happens to others. For he who is propense to indignation is indeed pained from those that do well undeservedly. But he who is envious, surpassing the indignant man, is pained from all that do well. And he who rejoices in the calamities of others is so much deficient in feeling pain from the prosperity of bad men, that he is delighted with it. These things, however, are discussed by us elsewhere, i e. In the second book of the Rhetoric with respect to justice. However, since it is not predicated simply, we shall make it the subject of discussion hereafter viz. The Fifth Book, and show how each of its parts is a medium. In a similar manner, also we shall speak concerning the rational or intellectual virtues in the sixth book, Chapter eight. Since, however, there are three dispositions of the soul, two indeed, devices, of which the one subsists according to excess, but the other according to defect, And since virtue is one of these dispositions and is a medium, all these three dispositions are in a certain respect opposed to all four. The extremes are contrary to the middle and to each other. But the middle is contrary to the extremes. For as the equal is with reference to the less greater, but with reference to the greater less, Thus the middle habits exceed with reference to the deficiencies, but are defective with reference to the excesses, both in passions and actions. For the brave, with reference to the timid man, appears to be audacious, but with reference to the audacious man timid. In a similar manner, also, the temperate man, with reference to him who is insensate, appears to be intemperate, but with reference to the intemperate man insensate. But the liberal, when contrasted with the illiberal man, appears to be a prodigal, but when compared with the prodigal illiberal. Hence, the extremes propel the medium each to the other, and the timid calls indeed the brave man audacious, but the audacious man calls him timid, and analogously in the other extremes, these, however, being thus opposed to each other, there is a greater contrariety in the extremes to each other than to the medium, for these are more remote from each other than from the medium, just as the great is more remote from the small, and the small from the great, than both of them from the equal. Farther still, in some extremes there appears to be a certain similitude to the medium, as in audacity to fortitude, and in prodigality to liberality. But in the extremes there is the greatest dissimilitude to each other. Things, however, which are very distant from each other are defined to be contraries, so that those things which are more distant are more contrary to each other, but to the medium. In some things, indeed, the deficiency is more opposed, and in others the excess. Thus to fortitude audacity indeed, which is an excess, is not opposed, but timidity, which is defect, And to temperance, the want of sensibility, which is an indigence, is not opposed, but intemperate, which is an excess. This, however, happens from two causes, one indeed from the thing itself, for one of the extremes being near to and more similar to the medium than the other. Hence not this, but the contrary is more opposed to it. Thus, for instance, since audacity appears to be more similar and nearer to fortitude, but timidity appears to be more dissimilar, on this account, we oppose the latter, too, fortitude, rather than the former, For things which are more distant from the medium appear to be more contrary. This therefore is one cause from the thing itself. But another cause is from ourselves, for those vices to which we are naturally more adapted appear to be more contrary to the medium. Thus, because we are naturally more adapted to pleasures, we are more easily impelled to intemperance than to moderation in the pursuit of pleasure. Those things therefore are said to be in a greater degree contraries to which a greater accession is made. And on this account, in temperance, which is an excess, is more contrary to temperance than the other extreme. Chapter nine. That ethical virtue, therefore is a medium, and how it is so, and that it is a medium between two vices, the one existing according to excess, but the other according to defect, And that it is such in consequence of looking to the medium in passions and actions, as to a mark has been so efficiently shown. Hence also it is laborious to be worthy, For in everything it is laborious to obtain the middle. Thus, the middle of a circle cannot be discovered by everyone but by him who is skilled in geometry in lank manner. To be angry and to give and spend money is in the power of everyone, and is easy. But to be angry and to give and spend money to whom, and as much and when and on what account, and as it is proper, cannot be accomplished by everyone, nor is it easy. For this is to act rightly, and is rare and laudable and beautiful. Hence, it is necessary that he whose attention is directed to the medium as to a mark, should first recede from that which is more contrary, as calypso also admonishes far from the smoke and waves direct the helm. For of the extremes, the one, indeed is more erroneous, but the other bless, Since therefore it is difficult to obtain the medium accurately by making a second navigation. As they say, the least of the evils must be assumed, but this will especially be affected in the way we have mentioned. It is likewise requisite to consider what devices are to which we are most propense, For different men are naturally prone to different vices. But this will be known from the pleasure and pain with which we are affected. We ought, however, to draw ourselves to the contrary part, for by removing ourselves very far from air, we shall arrive at the medium, which those do who straighten distorted pieces of wood. But in everything we should especially avoid the delectable and pleasure, for we are not uncorrupted judges of it in the same manner. Therefore, as the Trojan nobles were affected towards helen, we ought to be affected towards pleasure, and in everything where pleasure is concerned, to employ their decision. For thus, by dismissing it, we shall err in a less degree by thus acting. Therefore, in short, we shall be especially able to obtain the medium. Perhaps, however, this is difficult, and principally in particulars, for it is not easy to determine how and with whom, and on what account, and for how long a time it is requisite to be angry. For we indeed sometimes praise those who are defective in anger and call them mild, But at other times we praise those who are exasperated and call them virile. He, however, who deviates but a little from rectitude, whether he inclines in the more or the less, is not blamed. But he who deviates much from it, For the air of such a one is not latent. It cannot, however, be easily determined to what extent and how much he is blameable, as neither is this easy in any other sensible thing. But things of this kind rank among particulars, and the judgment of them pertains the sense. Thus much. Therefore is indeed manifest that the Middle habit is in all things laudable, and that it is necessary at one time to incline to access, and at another two deficiency. For thus we shall easily obtain the medium and rectitude of conduct. End of Book two.