Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / Sequoia Fund’s Modern Value Investing Strategy Explained
Transcript
- 0:00You know, there is this, this legendary piece of Wall Street
- 0:03lore that I think perfectly sets the stage for today's deep dive.
- 0:07So picture this. It's 1969 and Warren Buffett,
- 0:11who is, you know, already becoming a massive force in the
- 0:14investing world, he decides to close his legendary Investment
- 0:17Partnership. Right, he wanted to focus
- 0:19entirely on Berkshire Hathaway. Exactly.
- 0:22But he has all these clients, right?
- 0:24Clients who still need someone to manage their capital.
- 0:27So what does he do? He points them to exactly one
- 0:29man, Just one. His former classmate from
- 0:33Benjamin Graham's 1951 Columbia Business School seminar?
- 0:37A guy named Bill Ruane. I mean, it is just the ultimate
- 0:40endorsement If Warren Buffett hands you his personal Rolodex
- 0:43and is basically like, take care of my people.
- 0:45That is a level of trust that, well, most fund managers just
- 0:49can't even fathom. And that really set the
- 0:50foundation for what became the flagship Sequoia Fund back in
- 0:541970. Yeah, and, you know, back in
- 0:561969, clients really had to rely on Buffett's personal Rolodex to
- 1:00find an edge. But today, you don't need a
- 1:02billionaire's phone book. You just need the right tools
- 1:04right in your pocket. Oh, definitely.
- 1:05Actually, if you want to track the modern movements of funds
- 1:08like Sequoia or access more advanced researches, follow
- 1:12Guru's latest movements and leverage our latest Deep Values
- 1:15agents. Welcome to download the Deep
- 1:17Values APP from the App Store. Yeah, having that kind of real
- 1:22time data at your fingertips is crucial today.
- 1:24Totally. And to track the overall stock
- 1:27market temperature, welcome to download the iOS app Buffett
- 1:31Indicator from the Apple App Store or Bubble Watch from
- 1:35Google Play. Because honestly, the underlying
- 1:37economy has changed so much, right from physical
- 1:40manufacturing to, well, digital infrastructure.
- 1:43Right. And so the foundational
- 1:44investment principles, they have to evolve with it.
- 1:46OK, let's unpack this because before we analyze what Sequoia
- 1:49is buying for 2026, we have to look at, you know how they
- 1:52think. Because they are adapting that
- 1:54old Benjamin Graham value investing playbook in ways that
- 1:57might actually surprise people. Oh, absolutely.
- 1:59They essentially run every potential investment through
- 2:02this brutal underwriting gauntlet, and it's built on five
- 2:06specific filters. OK, what's the first one?
- 2:08So it starts with structural pricing power.
- 2:10Basically, can the business pass inflation onto its customers
- 2:14without losing them? Right, a durable economic Moat.
- 2:18Exactly. And if they pass that test,
- 2:20Sequoia looks at the math of their growth, like, do they
- 2:24generate superior cash returns on any new capital they invest?
- 2:27And can they do it without relying on, you know, a massive
- 2:30mountain of debt? Which I imagine is what gives
- 2:33them the staying power to survive economic panics.
- 2:35Yeah, precisely. And if a company survives this
- 2:39first three tests, Sequoia demands absolute management
- 2:42integrity. Which means what exactly in
- 2:44their? Eyes.
- 2:44It means executive pay has to be tied to long term per share
- 2:48value, not just, you know, short term stock bums.
- 2:51And finally, they require a massive discount to their own
- 2:54conservative appraisal of the company's normalized earnings
- 2:57before they'll even consider pulling the trigger.
- 2:59Right. Which brings us to the classic
- 3:01Graham concept of a margin of safety.
- 3:03Like the old analogy, you engineer a bridge to hold 10
- 3:06tons, but you only let three ton trucks drive across it.
- 3:09Or to protect against, I don't know, analytical errors or macro
- 3:12shocks. Yeah, exactly.
- 3:13But what's fascinating is how Sequoia calculates the weight of
- 3:17that truck today compared to the 1970s.
- 3:20Because they're applying these strict old school principals to
- 3:24a highly concentrated portfolio. We're talking just 20 to 35
- 3:28stocks with single digit turnover while totally blowing
- 3:31up their legacy structure. Oh, man, Yeah.
- 3:33What's fascinating here is the underlying structural reason for
- 3:37that recent blow up you mentioned.
- 3:38So on May 11, 2026, the board of this, you know, legacy mutual
- 3:43Fund, they approved a plan to convert into an actively managed
- 3:47ETF. Which sounds a bit wild, right?
- 3:49And 1970s mutual fund doing ETFs.
- 3:52On the surface, yeah, it looks like a 1970s institution just
- 3:56jumping on a modern trend. But it is actually a highly
- 3:59calculated tax shield. Let's breakdown the mechanics of
- 4:01that, because the flaw in the Old Mutual fund wrapper is
- 4:04pretty punishing for long term holders.
- 4:06Oh, it's brutal. Like under the traditional open
- 4:08end mutual fund format, if a bunch of shareholders suddenly
- 4:11panic and decide to redeem their shares, the portfolio managers
- 4:14are basically forced to sell off underlying assets to raise the
- 4:18cash to pay them. And when they sell those assets,
- 4:22they trigger taxable capital gains.
- 4:24And the kicker, and this is the part that always blows my mind,
- 4:27is that those tax hits fall on the remaining investors who
- 4:31didn't even sell. It is entirely counterproductive
- 4:33to the concept of long term compounding.
- 4:35You are literally penalizing your most loyal investors.
- 4:39But the active ETF structure utilizes the specific tax code,
- 4:43section 852B6, which allows for a mechanism called in kind
- 4:47creation and redemption. OK.
- 4:49So just to clarify for everyone listening, instead of the fund
- 4:52manager selling Apple stock for cash to pay out a redeeming
- 4:56investor, which is what creates that capital gain, they just
- 4:59hand a basket of the actual underlying stock to an
- 5:01institutional market maker. Yes, exactly.
- 5:03So the ETF shares disappear, the stock changes hands, but no cash
- 5:07sale ever actually happened inside the fund, so there's zero
- 5:10tax event for the people who stayed.
- 5:11Put precisely, it totally insulates the taxable
- 5:14shareholders from distribution events and plus it lowers
- 5:17administrative operating expenses.
- 5:19It completely eliminates the need for the managers to hold a
- 5:21buffer of, you know, dead cash just to handle daily
- 5:24redemptions. Which is such a drag on returns.
- 5:27Right. It strips away the friction so
- 5:28the investment engine can just run harder.
- 5:31That structural flexibility is crucial when you're making, you
- 5:34know, decades long bets on specific business models.
- 5:38And if we look at what actually survives their underwriting
- 5:40gauntlet, a really clear pattern emerges.
- 5:43They absolutely love inescapable toll booths.
- 5:46Oh, big time. And sometimes those are literal
- 5:49physical machines, like their massive position in Rolls Royce
- 5:53holdings. Rolls Royce is the perfect
- 5:56physical manifestation of their strategy.
- 5:58I mean they operate in a wide body commercial aircraft engine
- 6:01duopoly alongside GE Aerospace. But the genius here isn't just
- 6:05the engineering of the jet engines themselves, it's the
- 6:09engine flying hours, accounting model, or EFH.
- 6:12Right, the way the source has detailed this EFH model is just
- 6:15wild to me. So Rolls Royce sells these
- 6:17massive propulsion engines to airlines at incredibly low
- 6:20initial margins? Like they might barely break
- 6:23even on the physical sale of the engine.
- 6:24Almost like a loss leader. Exactly.
- 6:27But that creates A captive fleet.
- 6:29Because engine propulsion is so mission critical and so heavily
- 6:32regulated by aviation authorities, the airline
- 6:35operators have 0 viable alternative suppliers once that
- 6:38engine is bolted under the wing. And that leads to the trap,
- 6:41which is the 25 year exclusive maintenance contract.
- 6:45The airlines have to pay Rolls Royce a fee for every single
- 6:49hour that engine is in the air. Wow.
- 6:52Yeah, it operates exactly like a specialized toll booth
- 6:55delivering recurring high margin revenue over a multi decade life
- 6:59cycle through, you know, shop overhauls and billable flying
- 7:02hours. It's.
- 7:03An incredible mode, but physical toll booths don't just exist in
- 7:06aviation. Sequoia also owns a massive
- 7:10stake in Formula One through Liberty Media and I have to
- 7:13admit, when I first read this I was genuinely confused.
- 7:15Oh, a lot of people are. Right, because from what I
- 7:17understand, racing is notoriously expensive.
- 7:20It's like a bottomless money pit.
- 7:21You've got teams burning hundreds of millions of dollars
- 7:24just to shave 1/10 of a second off a lap time.
- 7:26That sounds like the gag opposite of a conservative
- 7:29Graham Dodd value play. See, that paradox is exactly
- 7:32what makes the investment so brilliant.
- 7:34But you have to separate the racing teams from the commercial
- 7:37rights holder. OK, break that down.
- 7:38Well, Formula One itself, which Liberty Media owns, has as a 100
- 7:44year commercial rights agreement with the FIA.
- 7:46So they are an asset light global sports monopoly.
- 7:50They control the three main revenue streams, race
- 7:53promotions, media broadcast rights and global sponsorships.
- 7:58So they aren't the ones actually buying the tires and paying the
- 8:00mechanic. Exactly.
- 8:01They don't fund the team cars and they don't build the race
- 8:04tracks. Even still, though, if the
- 8:06underlying sport is financially unstable, the commercial rights
- 8:10are kind of built on sand, aren't they?
- 8:12Historically, yes, but the real game changer was the regulatory
- 8:16introduction of the team cost caps a few years ago.
- 8:18Oh. Right, because capping the
- 8:20expenses stopped that endless financial arms race.
- 8:23That is exactly the mechanism. By enforcing a hard ceiling on
- 8:26what teams could actually spend to develop their cars,
- 8:29regulators instantly transform those teams into highly
- 8:32profitable franchises, and this stabilized the entire base of
- 8:35the ecosystem. Which in turn massively
- 8:38increased Liberty Media's commercial leverage.
- 8:40Yes, because they monetize the spectacle without taking on the
- 8:44capital expenditure of the spectacle.
- 8:46Formula One's top line revenue now just scales effortlessly.
- 8:50And the numbers back that up, right?
- 8:52The sources show this operating model is now producing free cash
- 8:55flow conversion rates exceeding 85% of Adjusted EBITDA.
- 8:59It's unbelievable. Yeah.
- 9:01For anyone not in the weeds on the accounting, Adjusted EBITDA
- 9:04is basically the core operating cash the business generates
- 9:07before you take out taxes and weird accounting charges.
- 9:10Converting 85, 5% of that into pure free cash flow is just
- 9:13staggering. They really just sit there and
- 9:15collect the ticket money while the teams do all the driving.
- 9:18It is. It's a phenomenal capital
- 9:21allocator's dream. But what if you want that exact
- 9:23same pricing power, that inescapable business model,
- 9:27without the massive capital burden of manufacturing jet
- 9:30engines or managing a global racing circuit?
- 9:32That's where Sequoia's modern playbook pivots toward digital
- 9:35assets. Because if your goal is a
- 9:37structural monopoly, you don't actually need physical assets.
- 9:41You just need the right intellectual property or the
- 9:43right code. And this transition is where we
- 9:45see Sequoia truly modernizing its framework.
- 9:48They are applying that strict 1950s logic to assets that have
- 9:530 marginal cost of reproduction, starting with Universal Music
- 9:58Group or UMG. UMG, right?
- 10:01They control over 1/3 of the global recorded music and
- 10:04publishing catalog. We are talking about the master
- 10:07recordings for The Beatles, Queen, Taylor Swift, Drake.
- 10:10Yeah, it's a massive catalog. And the Moat is incredibly
- 10:13simple. Streaming platforms like Spotify
- 10:15or Apple Music literally cannot exist without, UM, GS catalog.
- 10:19If Spotify loses Taylor Swift and The Beatles, a massive chunk
- 10:23of their subscribers will just cancel the exact same day.
- 10:25Yeah. They'd be dead in the water.
- 10:26And that dynamic gives UMG tremendous leverage in their
- 10:30multi year licensing negotiations.
- 10:32So as those streaming platforms inevitably increase their
- 10:35subscription prices to, you know, try and turn a profit, UMG
- 10:38automatically captures a proportional share of that
- 10:40upside. Yeah, it is a non dilutive free
- 10:44cash flow royalty stream. There is no factory required, no
- 10:48supply chain to manage, and no raw materials to buy just to
- 10:51produce another stream of a Taylor Swift song.
- 10:54Here's where it gets really interesting, though.
- 10:56Sequoia takes that exact same logic of mission critical
- 11:00digital assets and applies it to niche software companies,
- 11:04specifically Constellation Software and Roper Technologies.
- 11:09Both of these companies are masters of acquiring vertical
- 11:12market software or VMS. Now this is hyper specific software for
- 11:16things like transit agencies, medical clinics, or you know,
- 11:19school districts. I look at Constellation software
- 11:22as products like municipal plumbing.
- 11:23Oh, I like that analogy. It perfectly captures the
- 11:26operational reality of those products.
- 11:27Right, It's completely unglamorous.
- 11:29Nobody is writing viral tech blogs about the software that
- 11:32manages a local transit agency's bus routes, but it is entirely
- 11:37mission critical for that city. And because the cost of the
- 11:40software license is just a tiny, tiny fraction of that agency's
- 11:44total budget, the switching costs are too agonizing to even
- 11:48consider leaving. Like if the software works, the
- 11:51city manager isn't going to RIP it out and risk shutting down
- 11:53the entire bus system just to save a few pennies.
- 11:56Never going to happen. That's exactly why their
- 11:58customer retention rates sit above 95%.
- 12:01And that 95% retention rate provides a bedrock of steady
- 12:05recurring maintenance revenue. Plus it allows for regular
- 12:09contract pricing increases to match inflation.
- 12:12Constellation requires negligible capital expenditures
- 12:15to maintain these old software systems, so they convert like 85
- 12:19to 90% of their earnings straight into free cash flow.
- 12:22Which is insane. It is, and then they
- 12:24systematically reinvest that cash into acquiring more private
- 12:27VMS businesses. And the sources show they're
- 12:29targeting internal rates of return above 20% on those
- 12:33acquisitions. And they can target those 20%
- 12:35returns precisely because it's municipal plumbing, right?
- 12:39Like private equity firms aren't starting massive bidding wars
- 12:41over transit agency software. Right, it's too boring for them.
- 12:44Exactly so Constellation can buy these micro monopolies at cheap
- 12:48valuations, plug them into their holding company and instantly
- 12:51realize high cash flow without spending a dime on marketing.
- 12:55It is just a flawless capital deployment engine, and it
- 12:59perfectly aligns with Sequoia's pillar of superior return on
- 13:02invested capital. OK.
- 13:03That makes perfect sense for quiet markets.
- 13:06Well, what about the recent panic we saw?
- 13:07Oh. You mean the AI scare?
- 13:09Yeah, over the last couple of years, everyone was terrified
- 13:12that artificial intelligence coding tools were going to just
- 13:15commoditize software overnight. If an AI can write code for
- 13:19free, doesn't that destroy Constellation and Roper's Moat
- 13:22and wipe out that pricing power? Well, if we connect this to the
- 13:25bigger picture, that market panic is exactly what allowed
- 13:29Sequoia to capitalize during that broad market markdown of
- 13:33enterprise software assets. Ruane Conniff actually leaned
- 13:36in. Really.
- 13:37They didn't sell. Nope, They didn't just hold on
- 13:39to Constellation. They initiated a massive new
- 13:42stake in Roper Technologies, making it roughly a 3.55% weight
- 13:46in their portfolio. They bought the fear.
- 13:49Because they saw something the rest of the market was missing
- 13:52about how software actually functions inside a business.
- 13:55Precisely, they understood that deep workflow integration and
- 13:59regulatory compliance create barriers that a stand alone AI
- 14:03coding tool simply can't break. I mean, sure, you can have an AI
- 14:07write a string of code in five seconds, but replacing a deeply
- 14:11embedded regulatory compliant property and casualty insurance
- 14:15management system, which by the way, Roper owns through its
- 14:19subsidiary Vertifor, is a monumental operational risk for
- 14:23the client. So the AI doesn't solve the
- 14:25switching cost problem? Exactly.
- 14:27It's not about how fast the code is to write, it's about how hard
- 14:31the system is to untangle and RIP out of the client's office.
- 14:34You nailed it. Sequoia bought a high margin
- 14:36vertical software compounder at a massive discount because they
- 14:39recognize the difference between generating code and replacing
- 14:42integrated enterprise workflows. Which really demonstrates their
- 14:45ability to stick to their discipline margin of safety even
- 14:48when the market narrative is screaming the sky is.
- 14:50Falling. It takes a lot of nerve, but.
- 14:52So Speaking of AI, that brings us to the ultimate stress test
- 14:56for a 1950 value framework, the bleeding edge of the artificial
- 15:00intelligence hardware boom itself, Taiwan Semiconductor, or
- 15:04TSMC in Alphabet. Oh yeah, these are the
- 15:06heavyweights. TSMC manufacturers over 90% of
- 15:09the world's leading edge semiconductors.
- 15:12We're talking the sub 3 nanometer and five nanometer
- 15:14nodes. Apple, NVIDIA, AMD, they all
- 15:17rely entirely on TSMC's foundries to build their chips.
- 15:21The scale required to operate at that level is almost
- 15:23incomprehensible. It really is.
- 15:25TSMC requires over $30 billion in annual capital expenditures
- 15:29just to build and tool these fabrication facilities And
- 15:33Alphabet, the parent company of Google's and other core holding,
- 15:36they are pouring 10s of billions into their high intent digital
- 15:38advertising infrastructure and their custom tensor processing
- 15:42units or TP use to train AI models.
- 15:45But I have to ask the question on behalf of any traditionalist
- 15:47listening right now. Value investing is supposed to
- 15:50be about finding boring redictable companies with low
- 15:54price to earnings multiples. Buying Alphabet an A chip
- 15:57manufacturer pouring 10s of billions into AI infrastructure.
- 16:02Doesn't that break the old school rules?
- 16:04See, this raises an important question about what value
- 16:07actually means in the modern era.
- 16:09It is not just about screening for companies with low price to
- 16:12earnings multiples, right? Because if you just buy cheap
- 16:15stocks, you often end up with value traps.
- 16:18Buying dying, obsolete companies simply because they're multiple
- 16:21looks like a bargain. Sequoia defines value as a
- 16:25margin of safety rooted in the scale of the infrastructure and
- 16:28normalized owner earnings. So they aren't looking at these
- 16:31tech giants as speculative growth bets at all.
- 16:34Not at all. When they look at TSMC and
- 16:36Alphabet, they don't see software fads.
- 16:38They see the fundamental utility grids of the digital economy.
- 16:41Utility grids. I like that.
- 16:43Yeah. For TSMC, there are $30 billion
- 16:46annual CapEx requirement and their operational packaging
- 16:49scale, like their proprietary Call West technology, which
- 16:53literally stacks chips in three dimensions to boost computing
- 16:56power without expanding the physical footprint.
- 16:59Right, that scale is the Moat. Nobody else can afford to
- 17:02compete. So the immense cost to compete
- 17:04is actually what makes them safe investments.
- 17:06If it takes $30 billion a year and decades of proprietary 3D
- 17:10packaging research just to stay in the game, you're not going to
- 17:14see a startup disrupt TSMC from a garage tomorrow.
- 17:17Definitely not. The capital intensity is the
- 17:19barrier to entry. That is the modern margin of
- 17:21safety. They are buying the foundational
- 17:23infrastructure, not the speculative end product.
- 17:26And TSMC funds its entire multi year technology cycle with its
- 17:30own massive operating cash flow. They don't have to borrow to
- 17:33build the foundries. Exactly.
- 17:35They maintain a net cash position, and that perfectly
- 17:38aligns with Sequoia's pillar of unleveraged balance sheets.
- 17:42Alphabet operates the same way, really.
- 17:44Their global data centers and proprietary Tpus provide a
- 17:48durable advantage relative to the massive free cash flow their
- 17:51search monopoly generates. OK, so synthesizing this whole
- 17:55journey, what does this all mean for you if you are trying to
- 17:59navigate your own portfolio or just understand how the smartest
- 18:02money in the room is positioning itself?
- 18:04Modern value investing isn't about avoiding technology or
- 18:07clinging to the past. But it's not.
- 18:09It's about finding structural pricing power, high customer
- 18:12switching costs, and incredible capital allocators.
- 18:16It doesn't matter if that pricing power takes the form of
- 18:18a physical jet engine under a long term maintenance contract,
- 18:21a Taylor Swift master track that Spotify desperate needs to
- 18:24survive, or a silicon wafer that NVIDIA literally cannot exist
- 18:28without. The framework remains exactly
- 18:30the same, you just have to look past the surface level labels
- 18:33and understand the underlying mechanics of the cash flow.
- 18:36Perfectly said, and I would leave you with this final
- 18:38thought to Mull over. We've just seen a fund built on
- 18:41the legendary shoulders of Benjamin Graham and Warren
- 18:43Buffett placing massive concentrated bets on leading
- 18:47edge semiconductor foundries, generative AI infrastructure and
- 18:51digital music royalties, all while legally restructuring into
- 18:55a modern ETF, right? If traditional value investing
- 18:58now requires a deep understanding of sub three
- 19:01nanometer chip fabrication just to find a margin of safety, is
- 19:05the old Wall Street divide between value and growth
- 19:08completely obsolete in the modern economy?
- 19:10Man, that is a fantastic question to leave off on.
- 19:12Those old labels might just be getting in the way of seeing the
- 19:15compounding machines right in front of us.
- 19:17I think so. Well, before we go, I need to
- 19:19read our required disclaimer to ensure total compliance and
- 19:23transparency for you. Disclaimer All analysis is based
- 19:27on publicly available sources and may be subject to revisions
- 19:30or differing interpretations. All contents from this channel
- 19:33is for research and entertainment purposes only and
- 19:36does not constitute any investment or financial advice
- 19:39or service. Conduct your own due diligence
- 19:41before making investment financial decisions.
- 19:44Thanks for diving deep with us today.
- 19:46Keep questioning the fundamentals.
- 19:47We'll see you on the next deep dive.
- 19:49Keep building those bridges with a wide margin of safety.