Latest / USA Daily News / IRAN’S DANGEROUS CALCULATION WHY TEHRAN MAY FEAR ITS OWN PEOPLE MORE THAN AMERICAN BOMBS

Transcript

IRAN’S DANGEROUS CALCULATION WHY TEHRAN MAY FEAR ITS OWN PEOPLE MORE THAN AMERICAN BOMBS · USA Daily News

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: The most consequential battle in Iran may not be taking
• 0:03
  Speaker 1: place in the skies, at military bases, or along the
• 0:07
  Speaker 1: waters of the Persian Gulf. It may be taking place
• 0:10
  Speaker 1: inside the minds of millions of ordinary people who are
• 0:13
  Speaker 1: being forced to choose between anger at their government and
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: fear of what an expanding war could bring. That is
• 0:19
  Speaker 1: the argument at the center of a warning from human
• 0:22
  Speaker 1: rights activist Majid Sadeghpour, who says the Iranian leadership may
• 0:26
  Speaker 1: have a powerful reason to tolerate, or even prefer. continued
• 0:31
  Speaker 1: confrontation with the United States rather than quickly embrace a
• 0:34
  Speaker 1: durable peace. His assessment turns the usual picture of the
• 0:38
  Speaker 1: conflict upside down. Instead of assuming that Tehran sees American
• 0:42
  Speaker 1: pressure only as a military threat that must be removed
• 0:46
  Speaker 1: as quickly as possible, the argument suggests that the regime
• 0:49
  Speaker 1: may also view an outside enemy as politically useful. A
• 0:53
  Speaker 1: foreign confrontation can provide a ready-made explanation for hardship and
• 0:57
  Speaker 1: create a climate in which dissent is portrayed as disloyalty,
• 1:01
  Speaker 1: and keep the public focused on national survival rather than
• 1:05
  Speaker 1: domestic failures. That does not mean every Iranian leader wants
• 1:09
  Speaker 1: an endless war, nor does it prove that every military
• 1:12
  Speaker 1: decision is designed around internal politics. It means that the
• 1:16
  Speaker 1: regime has political incentives that can complicate the search for peace.
• 1:21
  Speaker 1: Iran has faced repeated waves of public unrest in recent years,
• 1:25
  Speaker 1: with protesters challenging government policies, economic conditions, restrictions on personal freedoms,
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: and the broader political system. Those demonstrations have often been
• 1:36
  Speaker 1: met with arrests, censorship, force, and efforts to sever communication
• 1:41
  Speaker 1: between people. When the country is at war, those same
• 1:44
  Speaker 1: control mechanisms can be justified differently. A government can tell
• 1:49
  Speaker 1: citizens that national unity must come before political disagreement, that
• 1:53
  Speaker 1: emergency measures are necessary because enemies are searching for weakness
• 1:57
  Speaker 1: and that criticism could encourage foreign adversaries. The argument becomes
• 2:02
  Speaker 1: powerful because fear changes behavior. People who might normally gather
• 2:06
  Speaker 1: in protest may hesitate when missiles are falling or when
• 2:10
  Speaker 1: authorities have expanded security checkpoints. Families worried about food, fuel, electricity, employment,
• 2:17
  Speaker 1: and basic safety may have less energy to devote to
• 2:21
  Speaker 1: political organizing. Communities become fragmented by uncertainty. The state can
• 2:26
  Speaker 1: use that fragmentation to its advantage. Yet the strategy is
• 2:30
  Speaker 1: inherently unstable. War does not merely distract people. It can
• 2:34
  Speaker 1: also make their frustrations worse. Economic sanctions can tighten, transportation
• 2:40
  Speaker 1: can be disrupted, businesses can close, prices can climb, and
• 2:44
  Speaker 1: ordinary families can experience losses that have nothing to do
• 2:48
  Speaker 1: with political ideology. When a government asks citizens to accept
• 2:52
  Speaker 1: hardship in the name of national defense, it must eventually
• 2:56
  Speaker 1: convince them that the sacrifice has a purpose. If people
• 2:59
  Speaker 1: stop believing that explanation, the same hardship can become evidence
• 3:04
  Speaker 1: against the government. That is where the warning about internal
• 3:07
  Speaker 1: uprising becomes important. The Iranian leadership may fear the moment
• 3:12
  Speaker 1: when the external battle quiets and citizens once again ask
• 3:15
  Speaker 1: who is responsible for the conditions they face at home.
• 3:19
  Speaker 1: A temporary pause in fighting might therefore be politically uncomfortable
• 3:23
  Speaker 1: for leaders who have benefited from the diversion created by
• 3:26
  Speaker 1: a national emergency. The end of a foreign crisis could
• 3:30
  Speaker 1: expose unresolved domestic grievances with renewed intensity. Questions about corruption, inflation, unemployment,
• 3:37
  Speaker 1: political repression, and living standards could return to the center
• 3:41
  Speaker 1: of public conversation. Security forces could find themselves facing crowds
• 3:46
  Speaker 1: rather than foreign missiles. Officials who spent months speaking about
• 3:50
  Speaker 1: enemies abroad might suddenly have to explain failures at home.
• 3:54
  Speaker 1: For a regime that depends heavily on controlling the political narrative,
• 3:58
  Speaker 1: that transition could be extremely dangerous. The result is a paradox.
• 4:03
  Speaker 1: The public may desperately want the war to end, while
• 4:06
  Speaker 1: the people holding power may calculate that continued tension protects
• 4:10
  Speaker 1: them from an even greater threat. The more exhausted society becomes,
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: the more difficult organized opposition can be. but the more
• 4:18
  Speaker 1: angry society becomes, the greater the potential for a sudden eruption.
• 4:23
  Speaker 1: Iran's leaders, therefore, face a political equation in which almost
• 4:27
  Speaker 1: every option carries risk. Escalation may increase casualties, economic damage,
• 4:33
  Speaker 1: and isolation. De-escalation may allow the public to redirect its
• 4:37
  Speaker 1: attention toward domestic grievances. A fragile ceasefire may create time
• 4:42
  Speaker 1: for the government to rebuild its position, but it may
• 4:45
  Speaker 1: also create space for opposition movements to reconnect. A decisive
• 4:49
  Speaker 1: military defeat could threaten the regime directly, but an apparent
• 4:53
  Speaker 1: victory by the United States could equally empower those who
• 4:56
  Speaker 1: want change. This is why the domestic dimension of the
• 5:00
  Speaker 1: conflict deserves as much attention as the military map. The
• 5:04
  Speaker 1: role of the United States in this environment is unusually
• 5:07
  Speaker 1: complicated because American military pressure can weaken the Iranian regime
• 5:12
  Speaker 1: while simultaneously giving Tehran the narrative it needs to justify
• 5:15
  Speaker 1: stronger control at home. Washington can strike military targets, impose
• 5:21
  Speaker 1: economic restrictions, defend its forces and partners, and attempt to
• 5:25
  Speaker 1: keep critical maritime routes open, but every action also becomes
• 5:29
  Speaker 1: part of Iran's domestic political messaging. Iranian officials can point
• 5:34
  Speaker 1: to American attacks as proof that the country is under siege.
• 5:38
  Speaker 1: They can argue that the threat makes internal unity essential.
• 5:42
  Speaker 1: They can use the existence of a foreign enemy to
• 5:44
  Speaker 1: frame political opposition as dangerous or irresponsible. This creates a
• 5:49
  Speaker 1: strategic dilemma for American policymakers. A policy designed to increase
• 5:54
  Speaker 1: pressure on the Iranian government may unintentionally strengthen the government's
• 5:58
  Speaker 1: ability to mobilize fear. Yet reducing pressure without obtaining meaningful
• 6:03
  Speaker 1: concessions could allow Tehran to recover capabilities and rebuild its
• 6:07
  Speaker 1: regional position. The problem becomes even more difficult when the
• 6:11
  Speaker 1: stated American objective includes changing the behavior of the Iranian
• 6:15
  Speaker 1: regime without necessarily seeking to dictate the future political structure
• 6:19
  Speaker 1: of the country. If Washington says it wants to weaken
• 6:22
  Speaker 1: military threats but not force regime change, Tehran may still
• 6:26
  Speaker 1: interpret pressure as an existential danger. If American leaders openly
• 6:31
  Speaker 1: encourage the Iranian population to challenge the government, they may
• 6:35
  Speaker 1: energize dissidents, but also give the regime a powerful argument
• 6:39
  Speaker 1: that protesters are acting on behalf of foreign interests. The
• 6:43
  Speaker 1: distinction between supporting human rights and intervening in domestic politics
• 6:48
  Speaker 1: becomes politically sensitive. Iranian activists who want democratic change may
• 6:53
  Speaker 1: welcome international pressure, but they may also fear that visible
• 6:56
  Speaker 1: foreign sponsorship could place them at greater risk. That is
• 7:00
  Speaker 1: why the human rights dimension of the Domestic opponents of
• 7:07
  Speaker 1: the Iranian government live under the same security apparatus that
• 7:11
  Speaker 1: responds to external threats. When that apparatus becomes more alert
• 7:15
  Speaker 1: because of war, dissidents can face additional surveillance, arrests, restrictions,
• 7:21
  Speaker 1: and accusations of collaboration. A foreign conflict can therefore make
• 7:26
  Speaker 1: political organizing harder even when the outside pressure is intended
• 7:30
  Speaker 1: to weaken the regime. At the same time, Military pressure
• 7:34
  Speaker 1: can expose weaknesses within the government that opposition groups might
• 7:37
  Speaker 1: otherwise struggle to reveal. If senior institutions appear divided, if
• 7:42
  Speaker 1: officials blame one another for failures, or if state propaganda
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: becomes less credible, citizens may conclude that the government is
• 7:51
  Speaker 1: weaker than previously believed. That perception can have profound consequences
• 7:55
  Speaker 1: because authoritarian systems depend heavily on the belief that resistance
• 7:59
  Speaker 1: is futile. Once citizens begin to believe the state can
• 8:03
  Speaker 1: be challenged, the fear barrier can weaken. This is why
• 8:07
  Speaker 1: every side is fighting an information war as well as
• 8:10
  Speaker 1: a military war. Tehran wants its population to believe that
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: the government remains capable and that foreign enemies can be resisted.
• 8:18
  Speaker 1: Washington wants Iran's leaders to believe that continued confrontation will
• 8:23
  Speaker 1: become increasingly costly. Dissidents want citizens to believe that change
• 8:27
  Speaker 1: is possible. Regional governments want their populations to believe they
• 8:31
  Speaker 1: can remain secure despite the conflict. Each message competes for
• 8:35
  Speaker 1: attention in a crowded and uncertain environment. The result is
• 8:40
  Speaker 1: a strategic contest over who controls the meaning of events.
• 8:44
  Speaker 1: An airstrike can be described as evidence of American dominance,
• 8:47
  Speaker 1: proof of Iranian vulnerability, an act of aggression, or a
• 8:51
  Speaker 1: rallying point for resistance, depending on who is speaking. A
• 8:55
  Speaker 1: protest can be portrayed as a grassroots demand for freedom
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: or as a foreign-backed disturbance. A ceasefire can be called
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: a victory, a surrender, a tactical pause, or a dangerous compromise.
• 9:07
  Speaker 1: These competing narratives matter because political systems are shaped by
• 9:12
  Speaker 1: the stories citizens believe about their own circumstances. The United
• 9:16
  Speaker 1: States must therefore consider whether certain forms of pressure help
• 9:20
  Speaker 1: or hurt the people it claims to support. Broad economic
• 9:23
  Speaker 1: measures can weaken the regime's resources but may also increase
• 9:27
  Speaker 1: hardships for civilians. Military strikes can destroy dangerous capabilities but
• 9:32
  Speaker 1: may create fear and resentment. Public calls for uprising can
• 9:36
  Speaker 1: inspire activists but can also expose them to greater danger.
• 9:40
  Speaker 1: There is no simple formula. The challenge is to distinguish
• 9:44
  Speaker 1: between pressure that weakens the state's coercive capacity and pressure
• 9:48
  Speaker 1: that merely increases the population's suffering. If the goal is
• 9:52
  Speaker 1: long-term political change, the United States would need to think
• 9:56
  Speaker 1: beyond immediate battlefield victories and consider what conditions allow Iranian
• 10:01
  Speaker 1: citizens to organize, communicate, and participate safely in a future
• 10:05
  Speaker 1: political process. The Strait of Hormuz adds another dimension to
• 10:09
  Speaker 1: the struggle because it connects the internal survival of the
• 10:12
  Speaker 1: Iranian regime to an international contest over trade, energy, and
• 10:17
  Speaker 1: military power. Iran has long understood the strategic value of
• 10:21
  Speaker 1: its geography. Its position near one of the world's most
• 10:24
  Speaker 1: important energy corridors gives Tehran leverage that extends beyond its
• 10:28
  Speaker 1: conventional military capabilities. Threats to shipping can unsettle markets, force
• 10:34
  Speaker 1: foreign governments to respond, and remind the world that Iran
• 10:38
  Speaker 1: cannot easily be ignored. At the same time, however, using
• 10:42
  Speaker 1: that leverage carries substantial risks. Actions that disrupt commercial traffic
• 10:47
  Speaker 1: can provoke stronger military responses and encourage other countries to
• 10:52
  Speaker 1: develop alternatives. From Tehran's perspective, the challenge is to apply
• 10:57
  Speaker 1: enough pressure to demonstrate strength without creating a coalition powerful
• 11:01
  Speaker 1: enough to eliminate its advantages. From Washington's perspective, The goal
• 11:06
  Speaker 1: is to prevent Iran from turning geography into a permanent weapon.
• 11:10
  Speaker 1: That explains why maritime security has become so intertwined with
• 11:14
  Speaker 1: the broader conflict. Every commercial ship that moves safely reinforces
• 11:18
  Speaker 1: the idea that the strait can remain open despite Iranian threats.
• 11:23
  Speaker 1: Every incident that causes vessels to change course reinforces the
• 11:27
  Speaker 1: opposite perception. The economic impact can spread rapidly because energy
• 11:32
  Speaker 1: prices respond to anticipated scarcity as well as actual shortages.
• 11:37
  Speaker 1: A threat to the strait, therefore, becomes an economic message
• 11:40
  Speaker 1: aimed at the entire world. Yet the domestic political implications
• 11:44
  Speaker 1: for Iran are equally important. If Tehran can present itself
• 11:48
  Speaker 1: as defending national interests and preserving sovereignty, it may strengthen
• 11:53
  Speaker 1: support among citizens who are wary of foreign intervention. National
• 11:57
  Speaker 1: identity can temporarily override other disagreements when people believe their
• 12:01
  Speaker 1: country is being threatened. This is one of the oldest
• 12:04
  Speaker 1: dynamics in international politics. Governments facing internal criticism can gain
• 12:10
  Speaker 1: breathing room when an outside adversary becomes the central focus.
• 12:14
  Speaker 1: Citizens who might otherwise criticize leaders may feel compelled to
• 12:18
  Speaker 1: support them against what they perceive as external aggression. But
• 12:22
  Speaker 1: nationalism is not limitless. the public can distinguish between defending
• 12:26
  Speaker 1: the country and defending a political elite, especially when sacrifices
• 12:31
  Speaker 1: become severe. If people conclude that leaders are using national
• 12:35
  Speaker 1: security to protect their own positions, patriotic rhetoric can lose power.
• 12:40
  Speaker 1: That is where the allegation that Iran prefers conflict becomes
• 12:44
  Speaker 1: so provocative. It suggests that the leadership may be willing
• 12:48
  Speaker 1: to accept national hardship because the political benefits of continued
• 12:52
  Speaker 1: tension outweigh the costs from its perspective. Whether that is
• 12:55
  Speaker 1: fully accurate cannot be determined simply from public statements, but
• 12:59
  Speaker 1: the possibility itself matters because it changes how outside governments
• 13:03
  Speaker 1: interpret Iranian behavior. If Tehran truly believes peace threatens regime survival,
• 13:09
  Speaker 1: then traditional deterrence may have limited effectiveness. Threatening Iran with
• 13:14
  Speaker 1: more destruction may not produce the desired concession if the
• 13:17
  Speaker 1: leadership thinks the alternative is losing power at home. In
• 13:21
  Speaker 1: that scenario, the regime could view continued resistance as rational
• 13:26
  Speaker 1: even when it is materially costly. This is why pressure
• 13:29
  Speaker 1: strategies need an understanding of political incentives. Military planners focus
• 13:34
  Speaker 1: on targets and capabilities. Political leaders must focus on incentives
• 13:39
  Speaker 1: and fears. Human rights activists focus on the population. Economic
• 13:44
  Speaker 1: decision-makers focus on markets. These perspectives overlap but are not identical.
• 13:50
  Speaker 1: A policy that looks successful through one lens can fail
• 13:53
  Speaker 1: through another. Destroying a weapons site may reduce a threat
• 13:57
  Speaker 1: while strengthening hardliners. Opening the strait may improve global markets
• 14:02
  Speaker 1: while giving the regime an opportunity to claim that it
• 14:05
  Speaker 1: forced concessions. A peace agreement may reduce casualties while allowing
• 14:09
  Speaker 1: security institutions to redirect their resources against domestic opponents. Conversely,
• 14:15
  Speaker 1: a continued campaign may weaken the military leadership but also
• 14:19
  Speaker 1: produce conditions that make civilians more vulnerable. The strategic challenge
• 14:24
  Speaker 1: is therefore to identify which actions change the underlying political
• 14:27
  Speaker 1: equation rather than merely changing the headlines. The Iranian people
• 14:32
  Speaker 1: remain central to that calculation. If they become convinced that
• 14:35
  Speaker 1: the regime is unable to protect them, prosperity becomes impossible,
• 14:40
  Speaker 1: and change is achievable, the political balance could shift. But
• 14:44
  Speaker 1: for that to happen, people must feel that collective action
• 14:47
  Speaker 1: is possible. Fear of repression can prevent that perception from
• 14:51
  Speaker 1: taking hold. External intervention can complicate it because the regime
• 14:56
  Speaker 1: can use foreign involvement to claim that opposition is unpatriotic.
• 15:00
  Speaker 1: The most powerful political change may therefore come from internal
• 15:04
  Speaker 1: developments that are perceived as genuinely Iranian rather than externally directed.
• 15:10
  Speaker 1: The possibility of a post-conflict political reckoning may be what
• 15:13
  Speaker 1: the Iranian leadership fears most because the end of an
• 15:16
  Speaker 1: emergency can expose everything that the emergency temporarily concealed. During
• 15:21
  Speaker 1: active war, citizens are encouraged to think about survival, defense, sacrifice,
• 15:27
  Speaker 1: and national unity. After the fighting stops, those priorities can
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: change quickly. People begin asking where the money went, why
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: infrastructure failed, why prices rose, why young people cannot find work,
• 15:41
  Speaker 1: why political prisoners remain detained, and why the country entered
• 15:45
  Speaker 1: a confrontation that caused so much suffering. A government can
• 15:49
  Speaker 1: prepare for war more easily than it can prepare for
• 15:51
  Speaker 1: those questions. That is why the period immediately following a
• 15:55
  Speaker 1: conflict can be politically unstable even when the fighting ends successfully.
• 16:00
  Speaker 1: Iran's leadership would have to decide how much political space
• 16:03
  Speaker 1: to reopen, how to manage veterans and families affected by
• 16:07
  Speaker 1: the war, how to address economic damage and how to
• 16:11
  Speaker 1: prevent public anger from becoming a new protest movement. If
• 16:15
  Speaker 1: security restrictions remain severe, people may conclude that the emergency
• 16:20
  Speaker 1: never truly ended. If restrictions are loosened, opposition networks may
• 16:25
  Speaker 1: gain room to organize. Either path contains risks. The situation
• 16:29
  Speaker 1: becomes even more complicated if the population believes that foreign
• 16:33
  Speaker 1: military pressure exposed weaknesses within the state. A government that
• 16:38
  Speaker 1: once projected absolute control may suddenly be seen as vulnerable.
• 16:42
  Speaker 1: That perception can be psychologically more important than the actual
• 16:46
  Speaker 1: military balance. Authoritarian stability often depends on the assumption that
• 16:51
  Speaker 1: the regime will remain in power regardless of circumstances. Once
• 16:55
  Speaker 1: that assumption is shaken, Elites may reconsider their loyalty and
• 16:59
  Speaker 1: citizens may reconsider their fear. Political scientists often describe this
• 17:04
  Speaker 1: as a coordination problem. People may oppose a government individually
• 17:08
  Speaker 1: but hesitate to act because they believe others will not
• 17:11
  Speaker 1: act with them. A visible crisis can change that calculation.
• 17:16
  Speaker 1: If enough people believe that the system is weaker than
• 17:18
  Speaker 1: it appears, collective action becomes easier to imagine. Iran's authorities
• 17:24
  Speaker 1: therefore have incentives to prevent not only protests, but the
• 17:27
  Speaker 1: perception that protests could succeed. Information control is part of
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: that strategy. So is the cultivation of fear. So is
• 17:36
  Speaker 1: the constant emphasis on foreign enemies. Each element reinforces the
• 17:40
  Speaker 1: message that the safest choice is obedience. But the longer
• 17:44
  Speaker 1: the conflict continues, the harder it becomes to maintain that
• 17:47
  Speaker 1: message without creating contradictions. The government may promise strength while
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: citizens see damage. It may promise stability while prices rise.
• 17:57
  Speaker 1: It may promise victory while military strikes continue. It may
• 18:01
  Speaker 1: blame outsiders for every failure while domestic corruption remains visible.
• 18:06
  Speaker 1: Over time, those contradictions can weaken credibility. No single event
• 18:11
  Speaker 1: necessarily causes collapse. Instead, confidence erodes gradually until a relatively
• 18:16
  Speaker 1: small incident triggers a large response. That is why forecasts
• 18:21
  Speaker 1: about regime stability are so difficult. analysts can measure military assets,
• 18:26
  Speaker 1: economic indicators, and protest activity, but they cannot easily measure fear, trust,
• 18:32
  Speaker 1: or the precise moment when a population decides that obedience
• 18:36
  Speaker 1: is no longer safer than resistance. Iran's leaders understand that
• 18:40
  Speaker 1: uncertainty because they have watched previous waves of unrest spread rapidly.
• 18:45
  Speaker 1: The government's response has often focused on preventing coordination and
• 18:49
  Speaker 1: isolating protesters from one another. In wartime, those methods become
• 18:55
  Speaker 1: easier to justify. Security checkpoints, restrictions on movement, internet controls,
• 19:01
  Speaker 1: and arrests can all be framed as measures needed to
• 19:03
  Speaker 1: protect the country. From the regime's perspective, that may be
• 19:08
  Speaker 1: a rational survival strategy. From the perspective of human rights advocates,
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: it is evidence of a government using conflict to suppress
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: legitimate opposition. The political consequences of that disagreement extend far
• 19:21
  Speaker 1: beyond Iran's borders. If international governments believe the regime is
• 19:25
  Speaker 1: deliberately prolonging conflict to suppress its own citizens, they may
• 19:29
  Speaker 1: increase pressure. If they believe the conflict could destabilize the
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: country completely, they may become more cautious. If they believe
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: the opposition movement lacks organization, they may focus on containment
• 19:42
  Speaker 1: rather than political transformation. None of these approaches guarantees a
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: peaceful outcome. The greatest danger is that domestic political change
• 19:51
  Speaker 1: and foreign military escalation could intersect at the same time.
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: A major strike could trigger protests. Protests could trigger repression.
• 20:00
  Speaker 1: Repression could produce international outrage. International outrage could lead to
• 20:05
  Speaker 1: more sanctions or military measures. those measures could increase economic pressure,
• 20:10
  Speaker 1: creating more unrest. That is a self-reinforcing cycle that would
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: make de-escalation extremely difficult. For policymakers watching the conflict from
• 20:20
  Speaker 1: outside Iran, the most important lesson may be that a
• 20:23
  Speaker 1: strategy built only around military degradation is unlikely to answer
• 20:28
  Speaker 1: the political question at the heart of the crisis. Destroying weapons,
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: degrading military infrastructure, and protecting shipping can alter Tehran's capabilities,
• 20:39
  Speaker 1: but they do not automatically determine how Iranian society will respond.
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: A weakened government can become more vulnerable, but it can
• 20:47
  Speaker 1: also become more repressive. A government facing greater pressure can
• 20:51
  Speaker 1: seek compromise, but it can also become more defiant. The
• 20:55
  Speaker 1: difference depends on political incentives, and those incentives are shaped
• 20:59
  Speaker 1: by what happens inside Iran as much as by what
• 21:01
  Speaker 1: happens outside it. That means any serious strategy has to
• 21:05
  Speaker 1: distinguish between pressure on the state and pressure on society.
• 21:09
  Speaker 1: Broad measures that increase civilian hardship can weaken a government's
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: resources while simultaneously making ordinary people more dependent on state-controlled systems.
• 21:19
  Speaker 1: Highly visible military attacks can demonstrate American power while giving
• 21:24
  Speaker 1: Tehran a rallying cry. Diplomatic outreach can create an opening
• 21:28
  Speaker 1: for de-escalation while giving the regime time to recover. Support
• 21:32
  Speaker 1: for civil society can empower activists while also creating opportunities
• 21:37
  Speaker 1: for authorities to accuse them of foreign collaboration. None of
• 21:41
  Speaker 1: these choices is simple. A more sustainable approach would likely
• 21:45
  Speaker 1: require multiple forms of pressure operating together with clear distinctions
• 21:49
  Speaker 1: between the Iranian government and the Iranian population. That could
• 21:53
  Speaker 1: mean maintaining pressure on institutions directly involved in military aggression
• 21:58
  Speaker 1: and repression while avoiding unnecessary steps that intensify civilian suffering.
• 22:04
  Speaker 1: It could mean expanding channels that allow independent information to
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: reach Iranian citizens without pretending that outside actors can dictate
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: the outcome of domestic politics. It could mean documenting abuses
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: and supporting international accountability while leaving political leadership ultimately in
• 22:20
  Speaker 1: the hands of Iranians. It could also mean preparing for
• 22:24
  Speaker 1: several possible futures rather than assuming that regime change, negotiated peace,
• 22:29
  Speaker 1: or continued conflict is inevitable. This matters because the collapse
• 22:33
  Speaker 1: of a government does not automatically produce a peaceful democracy.
• 22:37
  Speaker 1: A power vacuum can generate competition among armed institutions, political factions,
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: ethnic groups, or foreign-backed actors. The aftermath of political upheaval
• 22:47
  Speaker 1: can be more dangerous than the original confrontation if institutions
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: are too weak to maintain order. That possibility should shape
• 22:54
  Speaker 1: any discussion of regime change. Activists and outside governments may
• 22:59
  Speaker 1: both agree that the current system is repressive, yet they
• 23:02
  Speaker 1: can differ sharply over what comes next. The Iranian population
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: itself is not a single political bloc. People may want
• 23:10
  Speaker 1: economic reform without wanting foreign intervention. They may oppose the
• 23:14
  Speaker 1: regime without supporting every opposition organization. They may want democratic
• 23:19
  Speaker 1: institutions while also demanding a strong national defense. They may
• 23:23
  Speaker 1: reject religious authoritarianism while retaining cultural or national identities that
• 23:28
  Speaker 1: outside observers do not understand. Any future political settlement would
• 23:32
  Speaker 1: have to account for that diversity. The central mistake would
• 23:36
  Speaker 1: be to assume that weakening the leadership automatically answers the
• 23:39
  Speaker 1: country's deeper questions. Iran would still have to manage its economy,
• 23:44
  Speaker 1: security services, borders, infrastructure, political institutions, and relationships with neighboring states.
• 23:51
  Speaker 1: The international community would need to decide how much support
• 23:55
  Speaker 1: to provide and how to avoid replacing one form of
• 23:58
  Speaker 1: external dependence with another. Meanwhile, ordinary Iranians would have to
• 24:03
  Speaker 1: live through the consequences. That is why the domestic uprising
• 24:06
  Speaker 1: warning is so significant. It directs attention toward the people
• 24:11
  Speaker 1: who are rarely visible in military reporting. They are not
• 24:14
  Speaker 1: simply an audience for government propaganda or a source of
• 24:17
  Speaker 1: political pressure. They are the population that must eventually decide
• 24:21
  Speaker 1: whether the current system can continue. Their actions will be
• 24:25
  Speaker 1: shaped by fear, opportunity, organization, and the credibility of alternatives.
• 24:30
  Speaker 1: If the government succeeds in keeping them isolated and exhausted,
• 24:34
  Speaker 1: protest may remain fragmented. If the government loses control of
• 24:39
  Speaker 1: the narrative and security institutions begin to fracture, change could
• 24:43
  Speaker 1: accelerate dramatically. Neither outcome can be predicted with certainty. The conflict, therefore,
• 24:49
  Speaker 1: needs to be viewed as a contest over time. Military
• 24:52
  Speaker 1: operations happen in hours. Economic pressure works over months. Political
• 24:57
  Speaker 1: transformation can take years. A government can survive battlefield losses
• 25:02
  Speaker 1: if it believes time will restore its advantage. An opposition
• 25:06
  Speaker 1: movement can survive repression if it believes time will eventually
• 25:09
  Speaker 1: create an opening.