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The origin story of modern antisemitism _ The Story of Money · Economy & Finance

0:00
Speaker 1: This was the first time that we get this notion
0:04
Speaker 1: that Jewish people are operating some kind of secret financial
0:09
Speaker 1: cabal and using that to control the world.
0:12
Speaker 2: Why do you think these journalists and these kind of...
0:16
Speaker 2: Jungers did this? I mean, was it just to have
0:19
Speaker 2: a scapegoat?
0:20
Speaker 1: They were trying to make a name for themselves. That
0:23
Speaker 1: was certainly the case of Bill Elmar. He had tried
0:26
Speaker 1: all sorts of ways to make a reputation. This was
0:29
Speaker 1: just the last of his ventures. Oddly enough, he didn't
0:33
Speaker 1: actually believe what he was writing. He had been married
0:36
Speaker 1: four times. Three of his wives had been Jewish.
0:49
Speaker 2: Today on the story of money, a financial crash that
0:53
Speaker 2: mutates into pure political poison. And sure, yes, every financial
0:58
Speaker 2: crash leaves people poorer, but some leave something far more
1:02
Speaker 2: dangerous behind. And in this case, it ultimately, arguably paved
1:06
Speaker 2: the way to genocide. So Gillian is away this week,
1:10
Speaker 2: but to tell today's story, I'm joined by Liaquat Ahmed,
1:13
Speaker 2: He's the author of Lords of Finance, one of my
1:15
Speaker 2: favorite books on financial history, and now 1873, which covers
1:20
Speaker 2: the numerous financial crises that happened around the world in
1:23
Speaker 2: that fateful year. Liaket, thanks so much for being here.
1:27
Speaker 2: This is a real pleasure.
1:29
Speaker 1: Thanks for having me, Robert.
1:31
Speaker 2: So, Liaket, in today's show, we're going to be talking
1:33
Speaker 2: about how a spectacular... stock market crash led to the
1:38
Speaker 2: birth of a new, virulent, modern brand of antisemitism. In fact,
1:43
Speaker 2: it was in the wake of this crash that the
1:45
Speaker 2: term antisemitism was coined, right?
1:48
Speaker 1: Yes, it was actually coined in 1879 by a rabble-rousing
1:54
Speaker 1: journalist who was trying to use the opportunity to make
1:59
Speaker 1: a name for himself.
2:00
Speaker 2: Well, that sounds sadly very familiar. Well, we're going to
2:04
Speaker 2: be meeting a lot of people along the way. The
2:06
Speaker 2: banker who became the main scapegoat, naturally he was Jewish.
2:10
Speaker 2: The government leaders who failed to quash this pernicious phenomenon
2:15
Speaker 2: when it arose. And ultimately how Adolf Hitler would exploit
2:19
Speaker 2: these same ideas decades later with terrible, terrible consequences. Welcome
2:25
Speaker 2: to the story of money from the Financial Times. I'm
2:28
Speaker 2: Robin Williamsworth.
2:35
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3:10
Speaker 2: So we're going to get to all those events I mentioned,
3:13
Speaker 2: but let's start at the beginning. Let's go back to
3:17
Speaker 2: 1871 in Germany and Austria. And there's this huge, insane,
3:22
Speaker 2: never-seen-before boom happening on the stock markets in both countries
3:26
Speaker 2: at the same time. Ljarke, can you tell me, help
3:30
Speaker 2: me paint a picture of what it was like at
3:32
Speaker 2: the time?
3:33
Speaker 1: Well, until then... both the German and the Austrian stock
3:38
Speaker 1: markets were pretty sleepy places.
3:41
Speaker 2: This wasn't London or even Paris at the time. They
3:43
Speaker 2: were small stock markets.
3:45
Speaker 1: Exactly. And from 1871, though, a giant boom develops. Over
3:52
Speaker 1: the next two years, 900 new companies are formed on
3:57
Speaker 1: the Berlin Stock Exchange and 600 on the Viennese Stock Exchange.
4:03
Speaker 1: So the number of companies quoted expanded enormously. Stock prices
4:09
Speaker 1: start going up. The new companies go up even more.
4:14
Speaker 1: The total value of the German and Viennese stock markets
4:20
Speaker 1: rise fourfold in a period of two years. There was
4:24
Speaker 1: a real estate boom. So there were lots of real
4:26
Speaker 1: estate companies being formed. Credit was expanding. There were a
4:32
Speaker 1: whole lot of new banks being formed. But a good
4:36
Speaker 1: portion of these small companies were purely paper companies established
4:43
Speaker 1: by promoters in order to get money from shareholders.
4:48
Speaker 2: And quite often they would give journalists shares in return
4:54
Speaker 2: for positive press, right?
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Speaker 1: Right. Not only journalists, but they also... induce minor aristocrats
5:01
Speaker 1: to join their boards to lend their names. The governance
5:06
Speaker 1: of these companies was not of the highest standards.
5:10
Speaker 2: No, no, this does not sound entirely above board. And obviously,
5:15
Speaker 2: minor aristocrats and journalists are unfortunately going to be a
5:18
Speaker 2: bit of a sort of underlying villain of our story today.
5:21
Speaker 2: But there was one, of course, from your book I
5:23
Speaker 2: was delighted to read. There was a Viennese journalist who
5:26
Speaker 2: made fun of all this stuff. He could clearly see
5:28
Speaker 2: where things were going. And there's this great quote where
5:31
Speaker 2: he said that companies were founded to transport the Aurora
5:34
Speaker 2: Borealis in pipelines to St. Stephen's Square and to win
5:38
Speaker 2: mass sales for boot polish among the natives of the
5:41
Speaker 2: South Sea Islands. So he's clearly mocking this giant boom
5:45
Speaker 2: that started in 1871 and continued until 1873. It became
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Speaker 2: known as the Grundersite, or in English, the Founders' Era,
5:55
Speaker 2: the boom of the founders. It's kind of a hot
5:57
Speaker 2: tech bubble. What caused it?
6:00
Speaker 1: Well, to understand it, you actually have to go back
6:03
Speaker 1: to 1871 and the Franco-Prussian War, which was a war
6:09
Speaker 1: between France and Prussia, engineered by the leader of Prussia, Bismarck,
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Speaker 1: And he was the one who caused the war, hoping
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Speaker 1: that this would be a vehicle for unifying Germany and
6:25
Speaker 1: putting France in its place.
6:27
Speaker 2: And he succeeded on both accounts, right?
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Speaker 1: Very much so. France was defeated on the battlefield in
6:33
Speaker 1: a few weeks. The German army surrounded Paris and starved
6:38
Speaker 1: it into submission. So France was on its knees.
6:43
Speaker 2: And then they also had to, humiliation upon humiliation, pay
6:46
Speaker 2: a massive indemnity to Germany for having lost the war
6:50
Speaker 2: that Germany tricked them into starting, essentially, right?
6:53
Speaker 1: Exactly.
6:54
Speaker 2: I mean, you mentioned Otto von Bismarck. He's obviously a
6:57
Speaker 2: huge figure in German politics and European and really in
7:01
Speaker 2: the world. Can you tell me a little bit more
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Speaker 2: about him?
7:04
Speaker 1: He was of aristocratic origins, born in a you know,
7:09
Speaker 1: as a Junker. The Junkers were the political elite of Prussia.
7:15
Speaker 1: Over a 30-year career, by a combination of an incredibly
7:21
Speaker 1: forceful personality and very astute reading of the political tea leaves,
7:28
Speaker 1: he made himself the most important figure in Prussia, even
7:33
Speaker 1: more important than the king and then the Kaiser. His
7:37
Speaker 1: forceful personality was sort of, I mean, it was an
7:42
Speaker 1: odd personality. He was thin-skinned. He was given to, you know,
7:48
Speaker 1: towering rages. He ate and drank to excess. And he
7:53
Speaker 1: was a terrible hypochondriac. He suffered from insomnia. Does not
7:59
Speaker 1: sound like like an astute political genius.
8:03
Speaker 2: Sounds like a very bad mix of things. I have
8:06
Speaker 2: some sympathy with the eating and drinking to excess.
8:08
Speaker 1: Yeah.
8:09
Speaker 2: And nobody's going to make me leave Germany that way.
8:12
Speaker 1: But he actually used his personality very effectively because he
8:17
Speaker 1: would threaten to resign. And he, in effect, had the
8:22
Speaker 1: emperor under his thumb by his constant threats of resignation.
8:28
Speaker 1: And his goal after the war was.
8:31
Speaker 2: To- Against France in 1871, right?
8:33
Speaker 1: Yes. Was to hobble France financially and leave it permanently weakened.
8:40
Speaker 2: So ensuring German or the new unified German state also- amazingly,
8:46
Speaker 2: it was announced in Versailles, right, after the war, the
8:50
Speaker 2: unification of Germany, to make that the dominant power, the
8:55
Speaker 2: undisputed dominant power on continental Europe of the era.
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Speaker 1: Yeah, very much so. The financial indemnity was part of
9:03
Speaker 1: that strategy. But he may be a political genius, but
9:09
Speaker 1: by his own admission, he knows nothing about money. So
9:14
Speaker 1: he enlists his private banker and close friend to help
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Speaker 1: him come up with how much money he should extract
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Speaker 1: from France. And his personal banker is a man by
9:30
Speaker 1: the name of Gershon von Bleikrode.
9:33
Speaker 2: Okay, so this Gershon von Bleikrode, he's obviously an important
9:37
Speaker 2: character that we're going to be hearing a lot about
9:40
Speaker 2: because he's kind of, the unfortunate, crucial figure in terms
9:46
Speaker 2: of the rise of antisemitism that happens after this boom ends,
9:50
Speaker 2: as most booms do. And he was Bismarck's basically personal banker, right?
9:55
Speaker 2: He was a guy that helped come up with a
9:57
Speaker 2: number for the indemnity that France had to pay the
10:00
Speaker 2: war reparations that France had to pay Germany after the
10:04
Speaker 2: war as part of the peace settlement, essentially, right?
10:08
Speaker 1: Yes. And let me tell you a few things about him.
10:12
Speaker 1: The most important thing to know about him was that
10:15
Speaker 1: he was Jewish. which was unusual to have that important
10:23
Speaker 1: a person in the German hierarchy be Jewish. He came
10:28
Speaker 1: from modest origins. His grandfather had come to Berlin to
10:35
Speaker 1: be the grave digger for the local Jewish community. Oh, wow.
10:39
Speaker 1: His father established a connection with the Rothschilds and became
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Speaker 1: a banker. So Gershom von Bleichroder inherited, to some degree,
10:51
Speaker 1: his bank.
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Speaker 2: That's pretty impressive, going in within two generations from being
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Speaker 2: a gravedigger to being essentially the personal banker to the
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Speaker 2: most powerful man in Europe, one of the most powerful
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Speaker 2: people in history. He must have been an incredibly clever
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Speaker 2: man as well.
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Speaker 1: Well, he was, but he parlayed his connection to Bismarck.
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Speaker 1: to make himself one of the richest men in Germany.
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Speaker 1: And Bismarck really depended on him. He's not only a
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Speaker 1: very wealthy man, he's given a title. So in 1871,
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Speaker 1: he becomes Gershon von Bleichroder. He was the second Jewish
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Speaker 1: person to be titled. Bleichroder helps Bismarck. determine the size
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Speaker 1: of the reparations, uh, that to be imposed on, on France.
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Speaker 2: How does he do that though?
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Speaker 1: He consults lots of other bankers and they come up
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Speaker 1: with a range of recommendations that go from the equivalent
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Speaker 1: of $ 600 million to $ 6 billion, which is a hundred
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Speaker 1: percent of France's GDP. So it's a giant amount. Yes. And, uh,
12:13
Speaker 1: So it's not an especially scientific process. It ends up
12:19
Speaker 1: in Bismarck's hands and he comes up with a number
12:23
Speaker 1: and he picks it out of thin air. It's a
12:26
Speaker 1: billion dollars or five billion French francs. Wow.
12:30
Speaker 2: But that's still, I mean, okay, so it's not the
12:32
Speaker 2: 6 billion that they could have had floated out there
12:34
Speaker 2: as well, but it's still an enormous sum for the era.
12:37
Speaker 2: I think it's something like $ 1. 2 trillion today, right?
12:41
Speaker 1: Exactly. Yeah.
12:43
Speaker 4: Yeah.
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Speaker 1: Wow. And it's 20% of France's GDP. So it's just
12:49
Speaker 1: a giant sum.
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Speaker 2: How does that money basically end up in the German
12:54
Speaker 2: and Austrian stock market?
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Speaker 1: Well, so the German authorities... are bewildered by what to
13:00
Speaker 1: do with all this money. And some of it they
13:05
Speaker 1: pay towards further building up their military. Some they put
13:11
Speaker 1: into infrastructure. Some they put into accumulating gold. But half
13:20
Speaker 1: of it goes to the individual German states to pay
13:25
Speaker 1: off their debts. And they paid off their debts by
13:28
Speaker 1: redeeming bonds they'd issued. So suddenly the public, the German public,
13:36
Speaker 1: which thought they had state bonds in their portfolios, suddenly
13:42
Speaker 1: found themselves with torrents of cash. And it is this
13:47
Speaker 1: cash that feeds the stock market bubble.
13:51
Speaker 2: That makes sense. If you put half a yard... into
13:55
Speaker 2: ordinary people's hand at a time like that. Obviously, it
13:57
Speaker 2: is going to start circulating quite quickly. We saw what
14:00
Speaker 2: happened with COVID checks. So they'd redeemed all the bonds
14:03
Speaker 2: and all the money just flowed into, you know, maybe
14:06
Speaker 2: initially some well-intentioned ideas and stock market companies, but eventually
14:12
Speaker 2: just complete frauds. But who were the investors in this?
14:16
Speaker 2: Who got kind of wrapped up in the bubble?
14:18
Speaker 1: Well, actually, almost everyone. But, you know, the typical German
14:25
Speaker 1: or Austrian burger, middle class burger, had until then kept
14:30
Speaker 1: their life savings in government bonds. And maybe if they
14:35
Speaker 1: were wanting to take some extra risk in mortgage bonds.
14:40
Speaker 1: And that has all changed in the two years from
14:43
Speaker 1: 1871 to 73. They start investing. in all sorts of
14:49
Speaker 1: exotic instruments. But the most popular investment are shares on
14:56
Speaker 1: the stock exchange.
14:57
Speaker 2: So, Liake, I'm curious, what about the Prussian Junker class?
15:01
Speaker 2: These were the rulers of the Prussian state that became
15:04
Speaker 2: kind of the core of the enlarged, unified Germany in 1871, right?
15:10
Speaker 2: What role did the Junkers play in this massive boom?
15:13
Speaker 1: They typically thought that Commerce was below them.
15:20
Speaker 2: Yeah, they were landowners, right? They owned farms and castles.
15:23
Speaker 1: And things like that. Yeah, and they weren't terribly enlightened people.
15:28
Speaker 1: But seeing all this money being made was just too irresistible.
15:37
Speaker 1: So they started leveraging their influence to obtain shares in
15:41
Speaker 1: the new startups at preferential prices.
15:45
Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean, that sounds also incredibly familiar, right? Who
15:49
Speaker 2: was it that said there's nothing so terrible for your
15:51
Speaker 2: mental health as seeing your neighbor get rich?
15:53
Speaker 4: Right.
15:54
Speaker 1: Yeah. And this is, you know, if you're a Junker,
15:58
Speaker 1: seeing a middle-class person get rich while you're languishing.
16:03
Speaker 2: Travesty.
16:04
Speaker 1: Yes.
16:04
Speaker 2: And I cannot stand for that. Unfortunately, my German is
16:07
Speaker 2: too rusty to be able to translate to German, but
16:10
Speaker 2: I will not stand for it, I will say, with
16:12
Speaker 2: a Junker accent. But This seems to be a scenario
16:16
Speaker 2: where at least some people should be sensing some trouble ahead, essentially.
16:21
Speaker 2: Didn't anybody stop to say this is a little bit mad?
16:25
Speaker 1: Ironically, Bismarck and his banker, Bleichroder, sort of raised some
16:35
Speaker 1: questions about this. Now, Bleichroder had always historically been been
16:42
Speaker 1: very conservative in his investment strategy. He never invested in
16:47
Speaker 1: the stock market. And he managed Bismarck's portfolio. So he
16:54
Speaker 1: would always put the money into bonds. And when the
16:58
Speaker 1: bonds were redeemed, he started investing in foreign government bonds.
17:04
Speaker 1: So in Russian state bonds and British securities, but never
17:11
Speaker 1: in the German stock market.
17:13
Speaker 2: Okay, so in two short years, Germany's gone from the
17:16
Speaker 2: high of winning a war against France, which must have
17:18
Speaker 2: felt pretty great, unifying into one state, becoming the preeminent
17:24
Speaker 2: power of continental Europe, to a financial high, the Gründerzeit,
17:29
Speaker 2: the founder's boom, because of all these new companies that
17:32
Speaker 2: are getting started, people throwing money at the stock market. Um,
17:37
Speaker 2: maybe you can actually help me out with this review.
17:39
Speaker 2: What are the most concerning signs, right? Because I mean,
17:43
Speaker 2: stocks going up isn't in isolation enough to start worrying
17:47
Speaker 2: about a bubble, uh, in a financial crisis. What were
17:50
Speaker 2: the ones that people maybe at the time, and certainly
17:53
Speaker 2: in hindsight were obvious signs that things were going completely insane.
17:58
Speaker 1: So, uh, three signs, uh, first, uh, you know, in, uh,
18:05
Speaker 1: Part of the boom had been fueled by a liberalization
18:10
Speaker 1: of the regulation on forming companies. And so many of
18:16
Speaker 1: the new companies have not been vetted properly. And, you know,
18:21
Speaker 1: I should say the boards of many of these companies
18:26
Speaker 1: were filled with minor aristocrats and politicians who are happy
18:32
Speaker 1: to lend the prestige of their names in return for
18:35
Speaker 1: fat fees. I mean, for example, the directors of the
18:39
Speaker 1: Austrian Railroad Company, which included a former Minister of the Interior,
18:45
Speaker 1: was paid $ 50, 000 a year, which is the equivalent of $ 1. 5
18:51
Speaker 1: million today, to just sit on the board. And there's
18:56
Speaker 1: very little protection against potentially sort of very speculative or
19:02
Speaker 1: fraudulent companies.
19:04
Speaker 2: Yeah, there's no financial conduct authorities. There's no SEC. There's
19:09
Speaker 2: no financial regulator whatsoever at the time.
19:13
Speaker 1: Many of the people buying shares were buying on margin.
19:18
Speaker 2: So they're borrowing money to buy, essentially.
19:20
Speaker 1: Yeah, essentially borrowing from their stockbroker to be able to
19:24
Speaker 1: buy shares. And that is a very dangerous situation. And
19:31
Speaker 1: then finally, in early 1873, there are signs that stocks
19:38
Speaker 1: have reached a plateau. They stop going up. In fact,
19:47
Speaker 1: there's less and less buying. And all of these new
19:52
Speaker 1: IPOs for startups start accumulating in the books of stockbrokers.
19:59
Speaker 2: Okay, so people aren't buying shares and the stockbrokers just
20:02
Speaker 2: have to buy the shares of these new companies themselves.
20:05
Speaker 2: That is definitely a warning sign.
20:07
Speaker 1: Yes.
20:08
Speaker 2: We have obviously foreshadowed that this does not end well.
20:12
Speaker 2: This is a boom that goes from 1871 to 1873,
20:15
Speaker 2: and then it goes kaput, or it becomes what I
20:20
Speaker 2: think people at the time called the Gründer crack, the
20:24
Speaker 2: Gründer' s crash, the founder's crash. How does it all play out,
20:28
Speaker 2: the crash?
20:30
Speaker 1: Well, it starts in Austria, in Vienna. And the irony
20:35
Speaker 1: is that in April 1873, Vienna is thronged with dozens
20:42
Speaker 1: of members of European royalty who are there to celebrate
20:48
Speaker 1: the wedding of the emperor's 16-year-old daughter, Gisela, to the
20:55
Speaker 1: crown prince of Bavaria.
20:57
Speaker 2: Yeah, and who doesn't love a royal wedding, right?
21:00
Speaker 1: Right, exactly. There are balls and dinners every night. And also,
21:07
Speaker 1: everyone is anticipating that there's going to be a giant
21:11
Speaker 1: demand from millions of visitors who are coming to Vienna
21:17
Speaker 1: for the Vienna World Fair.
21:20
Speaker 2: Yeah, these world fairs were essentially gigantic carnivals to celebrate
21:25
Speaker 2: your country, that people come to visit, show off technology,
21:28
Speaker 2: everything your country had to offer. They were a big
21:31
Speaker 2: thing right at the time.
21:32
Speaker 1: Totally. So 20 million people were expected and only 7
21:37
Speaker 1: million people turned up. On top of which, there's a
21:41
Speaker 1: cholera outbreak in Vienna and the cab drivers of Vienna
21:48
Speaker 1: go out on strike. Wow.
21:50
Speaker 2: So it's almost like lions and tigers and bears, oh my,
21:53
Speaker 2: but cholera, collapsing visitors and a taxi strike. It sounds
21:57
Speaker 2: like just everything is happening at the same time for
22:00
Speaker 2: the poor Viennese.
22:01
Speaker 1: Right. And then in May of 1873, there is a
22:07
Speaker 1: rumor that the richest man in Vienna, who's Anselm von Rothschild,
22:14
Speaker 1: who's the sort of head of the Rothschild Bank in Vienna,
22:19
Speaker 1: is unloading his stock portfolio.
22:22
Speaker 2: Ah, okay. Yeah, that must have scared people. I mean,
22:25
Speaker 2: was that the trigger then?
22:27
Speaker 1: It's a combination, because then in early May, A banker collapses.
22:33
Speaker 1: So on Friday, May the 9th, the market takes a
22:38
Speaker 1: giant tumble. The index of bank stocks goes down 45%
22:43
Speaker 1: in a single day.
22:45
Speaker 2: Just in context, it never went down 45% even during
22:49
Speaker 2: the Great Depression or 2008 in the US.
22:51
Speaker 1: Yeah. And on the stock exchange, pandemonium breaks out. There
22:57
Speaker 1: are fistfights. The newspapers dub it Black Friday. And then
23:02
Speaker 1: over the next few days, the Berlin stock market falls
23:07
Speaker 1: in sympathy. Not quite so much. 15% to 20%.
23:11
Speaker 2: But then it obviously starts cascading in new and ricocheting
23:15
Speaker 2: in new ways. In an earlier show, we talked about
23:18
Speaker 2: the railway bond bust in America of 1873. And I
23:23
Speaker 2: mentioned how that had been caused by European investors losing
23:28
Speaker 2: their shirts, essentially, on German and Austrian stocks, and then
23:32
Speaker 2: having to dump US railway bonds, and then that causing
23:35
Speaker 2: all sorts of trouble in New York at the time.
23:38
Speaker 2: Is that what happened here, that that was caused by
23:41
Speaker 2: the crash, the Grunderkrack?
23:42
Speaker 1: Yes. I mean, there's an interlude. You get these crashes
23:47
Speaker 1: in May, and then you get this sort of false
23:51
Speaker 1: peace from May until September. And then in September, most famously,
24:01
Speaker 1: Jay Cook and company, they announce that that they are
24:05
Speaker 1: no longer able to raise the finance for a second
24:10
Speaker 1: transcontinental railroad. And that, you know, Jay Cooke was the
24:16
Speaker 1: premier investment bank in the US. That causes panic around
24:21
Speaker 1: the world. You get a second wave in September that
24:25
Speaker 1: sweeps across Europe. And eventually, both Austrian and Austrian German
24:34
Speaker 1: stocks are down 40% to 50% at the end of
24:38
Speaker 1: the year.
24:39
Speaker 2: Okay, wow. So that is a proper crash by any standards.
24:44
Speaker 2: But who loses from this? Who are the biggest losers
24:47
Speaker 2: in the Grunderkrack that happened in 1873?
24:52
Speaker 1: Well, in relative terms, it's the hundreds of thousands of
24:58
Speaker 1: middle-class investors who piled into the stock market at the
25:04
Speaker 1: height of the bubble. I mean, as often happens, they
25:08
Speaker 1: were the last ones to get in. Many of them
25:11
Speaker 1: lost all their life savings. He also had a sort
25:16
Speaker 1: of odd thing, which is anyone who'd bought stocks on
25:21
Speaker 1: margin now owed money to their stockbrokers, and they had
25:28
Speaker 1: no way of paying it back. So you got a
25:32
Speaker 1: spate of fake suicides. It was particularly prevalent in Vienna.
25:37
Speaker 1: Someone who owed money to a stockbroker would go to
25:41
Speaker 1: a canal, disrobe, dive into the canal so people would
25:46
Speaker 1: think that they drowned, swim to the other side, get
25:51
Speaker 1: a new set of clothes waiting for them, and disappear.
25:55
Speaker 1: And this was a way of avoiding their creditors.
25:58
Speaker 2: Fair enough. I probably wouldn't want to pay back the
26:02
Speaker 2: stockbroker that let me lots of money to invest in
26:05
Speaker 2: essentially worthless, quite often fraudulent shares either. What about the
26:08
Speaker 2: economic impact of this?
26:10
Speaker 1: Well, there is a long run economic fallout. It's actually
26:14
Speaker 1: surprisingly modest initially. The Industrial production in Germany didn't go
26:22
Speaker 1: down dramatically. Railroad construction stayed up, in part because it
26:27
Speaker 1: was financed by the government. There's a more pernicious effect
26:32
Speaker 1: over the long haul, which is prices start going down.
26:38
Speaker 2: Deflation.
26:39
Speaker 1: Over the next 20 years, prices both in Europe and
26:45
Speaker 1: in the U.S. go down by 40%. And that has
26:49
Speaker 1: some dramatic consequences.
26:53
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, quite a lot of people think that
26:55
Speaker 2: falling prices is a good thing. But obviously, it means,
26:57
Speaker 2: you know, companies are making less money, people are making
27:00
Speaker 2: less money, debts are fixed in nominal terms, they still
27:04
Speaker 2: stay high. You can easily see how that goes from
27:08
Speaker 2: being a bit of a panic on the stock market
27:11
Speaker 2: to being something that becomes a little bit nastier, more virulent,
27:15
Speaker 2: and maybe chronic. in the economy for years afterwards.
27:20
Speaker 1: Well, it fractures societies because it essentially, there's a whole
27:24
Speaker 1: group of people who, who, who believe that they've been
27:29
Speaker 1: hard done by.
27:31
Speaker 2: Well, we obviously going to be going to be exploring
27:34
Speaker 2: the social fractures that happened, but I'm curious before we
27:37
Speaker 2: get to that, what happened with Otto von Bismarck? How
27:40
Speaker 2: did he do?
27:41
Speaker 1: Bismarck escapes quite unscathed, unscathed. But, you know, Lots of
27:48
Speaker 1: people have lost money. And typically, when they lose money,
27:55
Speaker 1: they start looking for someone to blame.
27:58
Speaker 2: And there was obviously a hunt for a scapegoat. And unfortunately,
28:01
Speaker 2: that did turn very, very ugly. And we're going to
28:04
Speaker 2: be talking about that after the break.
28:13
Speaker 4: Alternatives play a key role in investor portfolios. Traditional stocks
28:17
Speaker 4: and bonds are becoming increasingly correlated. In the most recent downturn,
28:21
Speaker 4: equities and fixed income were both significantly negative. Alternatives can
28:26
Speaker 4: add diversification to your portfolios and lower correlations between the
28:30
Speaker 4: asset classes. Both of those can help your portfolio behave
28:33
Speaker 4: in a more resilient manner during the economic ups and downs.
28:49
Speaker 2: And we are back. So it's around 1874 by now.
28:54
Speaker 2: The stock markets of Germany and Austria have collapsed the
28:57
Speaker 2: year before, and the economies are getting worse and worse
29:00
Speaker 2: and worse, and people are getting angry. Understandably, they're getting
29:03
Speaker 2: angrier and angrier. And as so often, unfortunately, happens, this
29:10
Speaker 2: anger is getting weaponized by a group of rabble-rousing journalists
29:15
Speaker 2: who sorry about that, guys, and writers who explicitly decide
29:20
Speaker 2: to blame this financial crash and the economic calamity that
29:24
Speaker 2: followed on the Jewish community. But before we get to that, Jarket,
29:28
Speaker 2: can you give me some background on the Jewish community
29:31
Speaker 2: living in Germany and Austria around then?
29:33
Speaker 1: They had gone from being essentially a poor rural community, uh,
29:40
Speaker 1: on the margins of society to moving into the cities
29:44
Speaker 1: and joining the new prosperous middle class that was developing.
29:50
Speaker 1: So by 1873, they accounted for 4% of the population
29:57
Speaker 1: of Berlin and even higher close to 10% of Vienna.
30:03
Speaker 1: But more importantly, they accounted for a third of the
30:06
Speaker 1: city's doctors and a third of the city's lawyers. Even
30:10
Speaker 1: though there continued to be discrimination against Jews, their position
30:16
Speaker 1: was becoming transformed. They had got the vote and they
30:20
Speaker 1: were gradually the social restrictions on what Jews could do
30:25
Speaker 1: were being eliminated.
30:27
Speaker 2: So the lot is improving a little bit. So going
30:30
Speaker 2: from a heavily discriminated against, very poor community, they are
30:35
Speaker 2: becoming a semi-prosperous middle class. They are playing an important
30:39
Speaker 2: civic role. And although still discriminated against, things are pointing
30:45
Speaker 2: at least roughly in the right direction. And then this
30:49
Speaker 2: crash happens, right? And the media suddenly decides to blame
30:54
Speaker 2: the Jewish community for the losses, the economic calamity that followed.
31:00
Speaker 1: How did that happen? It starts in December 1874. A
31:06
Speaker 1: Prussian journalist named Otto Glagau began publishing a highly sensational
31:15
Speaker 1: series of articles in Die Gartenlaube, which is the most
31:20
Speaker 1: read magazine in Berlin, which essentially blames the Jews. Otto
31:27
Speaker 1: Glagau had his own personal problems. He'd lost money in
31:32
Speaker 1: an investment scheme, gone wrong. He was venting his own
31:38
Speaker 1: personal anger. But he falsely claims that that the financial
31:44
Speaker 1: devastation was entirely the result of fraud and speculation orchestrated
31:51
Speaker 1: by Jewish stockbrokers. He falsely claims that 90% of the
32:00
Speaker 1: German and Austrian stockbrokers are Jewish, which is not true.
32:05
Speaker 1: They were maybe 20% of the stockbrokers. of the stockbroking community.
32:10
Speaker 1: And he even accuses them of dominating the stock exchanges
32:14
Speaker 1: of Paris and London. So he, you know, he concocts
32:18
Speaker 1: this giant fabric of lies and the articles become incredibly
32:24
Speaker 1: widely read. People even quote them in parliament, in the
32:29
Speaker 1: rights tag. The magazine had a circulation of 400,000. you know,
32:35
Speaker 1: a very large part of Berlin was reading this stuff.
32:39
Speaker 1: He then compiles these articles into a best-selling book, further
32:45
Speaker 1: spreading the claims.
32:47
Speaker 2: Gosh, I mean, this is when the term anti-Semitism first
32:51
Speaker 2: starts to emerge, right?
32:52
Speaker 1: Yes. I mean, it's actually, it's first coined in 1879
32:59
Speaker 1: by another journalist, Will Elmar, who publishes a massive bestseller
33:04
Speaker 1: that's The Victory of Judaism over Germanism. He takes it further.
33:09
Speaker 1: He alleges that there's been a vast 2,000-year conspiracy by
33:14
Speaker 1: Jews to dominate European society. And he claimed that Jewish
33:20
Speaker 1: materialism was poisoning German life. And he coins the term anti-Semitism,
33:30
Speaker 1: which when he coins it, it's a term of approbation.
33:35
Speaker 1: He wants to use it as a sort of scientific
33:38
Speaker 1: term to give racial prejudice a pseudoscientific.
33:44
Speaker 4: Veneer.
33:46
Speaker 2: Oh, wow. But the whole sort of 1800 year conspiracy stuff,
33:50
Speaker 2: that sounds like it bleeds directly into some of the
33:53
Speaker 2: infamous protocols of the elders of Zion later on. Another
33:57
Speaker 2: sort of touchstone of the anti-Semitic era. sort of hate industry,
34:01
Speaker 2: I guess, even today, sadly. This idea that the Jewish
34:05
Speaker 2: people have controlled the world and controlled finance and things
34:08
Speaker 2: like that.
34:09
Speaker 1: More ominously, in 1875, there is a Juncker newspaper, which
34:20
Speaker 1: then focuses its anger on Gershon von Bleikroeder.
34:27
Speaker 2: Yeah, I suspected that might've been coming at some point.
34:31
Speaker 1: They essentially, uh, they run a series of articles which
34:36
Speaker 1: say that Bleichroder has controlled Bismarck and that Bismarck has
34:43
Speaker 1: fallen victim to Judenpolitik, uh, which is Jewish policy, uh, policy.
34:52
Speaker 1: And that Bleichroder is the intellectual author. of the entire
34:58
Speaker 1: economic policy that has brought this crisis onto Germany. And
35:03
Speaker 1: the article even says it's Jews that actually govern us now.
35:08
Speaker 2: Well, it's fairly awful stuff. I mean, did this come
35:11
Speaker 2: out of the blue? Was this sort of anti-Semitism prevalent
35:16
Speaker 2: among the Junkers at the time then?
35:19
Speaker 1: You know, there'd always been discrimination against Jews. There'd even
35:23
Speaker 1: been some historical resentment against Jews. Jewish bankers in local communities,
35:31
Speaker 1: but it was mainly based on religion. And this was
35:34
Speaker 1: the first time that we get this notion that Jewish
35:40
Speaker 1: people are operating some kind of secret financial cabal and
35:46
Speaker 1: using that to control the world. You know, that was
35:49
Speaker 1: all entirely new.
35:51
Speaker 2: Okay, so that's what flowed from the crash of 1873,
35:54
Speaker 2: the the term anti-Semitism, giving it sort of a desperate
35:59
Speaker 2: attempt to give it some scientific veneer, and this kind
36:02
Speaker 2: of crazy conspiracy theories that, you know, sadly are with
36:05
Speaker 2: us still today, that the Jewish people control finance and
36:09
Speaker 2: the world of money and the global economy and all
36:11
Speaker 2: that stuff.
36:12
Speaker 1: Exactly.
36:13
Speaker 2: Why do you think these journalists and these kind of
36:17
Speaker 2: yungas did this? I mean, was it just to sort
36:19
Speaker 2: of have a scapegoat? I mean, to blame somebody for
36:22
Speaker 2: their own losses?
36:23
Speaker 1: The few that did... were essentially a bunch of rabble-rousers
36:28
Speaker 1: and opportunists. And, you know, they were trying to make
36:31
Speaker 1: a name for themselves. I mean, that was certainly the
36:35
Speaker 1: case of Vilhelm Ma. He had tried all sorts of
36:38
Speaker 1: ways to make a reputation. And, you know, this was
36:43
Speaker 1: just the last of his ventures. Oddly enough, he didn't
36:47
Speaker 1: actually believe what he was writing. He had been married
36:50
Speaker 1: four times. Three of his wives had been Jewish. You know,
36:55
Speaker 1: many years later, when this was all over, he would
36:58
Speaker 1: actually recant and express regret for his views. Wow.
37:04
Speaker 2: So it's just an incredibly cynical pivot to hate as
37:08
Speaker 2: a way of kind of making your name.
37:09
Speaker 1: Right.
37:09
Speaker 2: Wow. That's, I mean, I'm glad he recanted, but that
37:13
Speaker 2: sounds pretty despicable.
37:15
Speaker 4: It is.
37:16
Speaker 2: Though sadly not also unknown in the present day, of course.
37:19
Speaker 2: But what about Bismarck? I mean, did he try to
37:22
Speaker 2: stop this? I mean, he was friends with Black Roeder
37:25
Speaker 2: and surely would have had an interest in tamping down
37:28
Speaker 2: on this, right? He was Germany's most powerful man and
37:31
Speaker 2: people saying his strings were getting pulled. Why didn't he
37:36
Speaker 2: do anything?
37:37
Speaker 1: Bismarck was in this odd position. Black Roeder was his
37:40
Speaker 1: closest friend. His doctor was Jewish. His lawyer was Jewish.
37:46
Speaker 1: So Bismarck was not an anti-Semite. But at this point,
37:52
Speaker 1: after the crash, he faced a political problem. And with Bismarck,
37:59
Speaker 1: everything was about politics. Until the 1860s and early 1870s,
38:06
Speaker 1: he had a close alliance with the Liberals.
38:09
Speaker 2: Yeah, he championed Jewish emancipation in the 50s and 60s, right? Yes.
38:13
Speaker 1: Exactly. And he championed liberal policies like free trade. But
38:20
Speaker 1: after the crash and the economic troubles that started emerging,
38:25
Speaker 1: and the liberals started losing votes. So he changed direction
38:33
Speaker 1: and started championing conservatives.
38:35
Speaker 2: Yes.
38:37
Speaker 1: All for political reasons to have his majority in Parliament secure.
38:43
Speaker 1: And in the process, he ends up embracing anti-Semitism, or
38:51
Speaker 1: he ends up forming an alliance with the Conservatives where
38:58
Speaker 1: anti-Semitism is prevalent. So he faces a political problem. Does
39:04
Speaker 1: he sort of rock the boat with his new allies,
39:09
Speaker 1: or does he speak out?
39:13
Speaker 2: But as more and more vitriol starts getting thrown at Blackroader, who's,
39:18
Speaker 2: like you say, a personal friend, and he clearly has,
39:22
Speaker 2: although he has political expediency, he might not want to
39:25
Speaker 2: intervene too much. But at some point he must protect
39:29
Speaker 2: his own friend right? Didn't he do anything?
39:31
Speaker 1: Not really. I mean, he did. He did step in
39:35
Speaker 1: to protect himself because there were a couple of articles
39:40
Speaker 1: where Blake Roto's name came up and Bismarck's name was
39:46
Speaker 1: dragged in. And at that point, he did act vigorously.
39:52
Speaker 1: In one case, he had the writers removed from their jobs.
39:57
Speaker 1: In another case, he had the writer prosecuted for libel.
40:01
Speaker 1: But he was trying to play this double game. And
40:04
Speaker 1: he did not have, even though he was personally loyal
40:09
Speaker 1: to Blyke Roeder, he never publicly revealed his friendship.
40:16
Speaker 2: Okay.
40:17
Speaker 1: When his letters were eventually published, his letters with Bly
40:22
Speaker 1: Kroda were never made public. And it was only in
40:27
Speaker 1: the 1950s that we discovered the extent of their relationship.
40:34
Speaker 1: So he was very shy about declaring his friendship with
40:39
Speaker 1: Bly Kroda.
40:41
Speaker 2: Okay. Well, that's quite a travesty, really. And especially since,
40:44
Speaker 2: you know, This was as much his fault as anybody else's, right?
40:48
Speaker 2: It was his war against France that triggered the war
40:51
Speaker 2: reparations that pumped everything up. He was Chancellor of Germany
40:56
Speaker 2: at the time when the bubble was inflating, and he
40:59
Speaker 2: was Chancellor when the bubble collapsed, right?
41:01
Speaker 1: You know, he wasn't going to admit that he had
41:04
Speaker 1: been wrong.
41:05
Speaker 2: Maybe he was quite happy that Blackroder took the fall.
41:08
Speaker 2: He might be unhappy as his friend, but he'd rather Blackroder...
41:11
Speaker 2: for political expediency reasons, take the fall than himself.
41:16
Speaker 1: Yeah, and look, Bismarck remained Chancellor of Germany for so
41:23
Speaker 1: long because of his ability to read the political tea leaves.
41:29
Speaker 1: So he only survived by changing position when it became opportune.
41:38
Speaker 1: Once Bly Kroger... was a political liability. He wasn't going
41:44
Speaker 1: to publicly go out and support it.
41:47
Speaker 2: So in the wake of this financial crash, this bubble
41:50
Speaker 2: and then crash in 1873 and 1874 and the economic
41:55
Speaker 2: disaster that unfolded for years afterwards, you have this new
41:59
Speaker 2: form of antisemitism that isn't just religious-based. It is based
42:04
Speaker 2: on the idea that the conspiracy theory that the Jewish
42:08
Speaker 2: people control finance and the excellence of power. How long
42:13
Speaker 2: did that go on for?
42:14
Speaker 1: It permeated certain classes, but it actually began to recede
42:20
Speaker 1: because there were lots of people, the crown prince, there
42:26
Speaker 1: were mayors of major cities who actually thought Jews had
42:31
Speaker 1: contributed enormously to Germany. And, uh, spoke out. So it
42:40
Speaker 1: never became a mass movement. It permeated parts of the
42:48
Speaker 1: court because the Kaiser that followed Will Helden I was anti-Semitic.
42:58
Speaker 1: But there were large sections of the of Germany, which
43:03
Speaker 1: were untainted.
43:05
Speaker 2: But I'm curious, given that some of this antisemitism had
43:08
Speaker 2: receded by the 1890s, it still seems that those ideas
43:14
Speaker 2: were percolating very much in at least parts of German society.
43:19
Speaker 2: and helped form the worldview of Adolf Hitler and a
43:24
Speaker 2: lot of his early supporters in the 1920s, right? When
43:27
Speaker 2: you also had another major economic dislocation and those ideas,
43:33
Speaker 2: this idea that the Jewish people controlled the world and
43:36
Speaker 2: controlled finance just came roaring back, right?
43:40
Speaker 1: Yes. I mean, in the 1920s, Germany went through the wringer.
43:46
Speaker 1: It had hyperinflation. And then it had mass unemployment during
43:52
Speaker 1: the Great Depression. And the combination of those two things
43:57
Speaker 1: imposed sort of enormous pain on the German people. So
44:02
Speaker 1: it was a country rife for these ideas to be exploited.
44:06
Speaker 2: Well, again, once again, you want a scapegoat, somebody to blame.
44:10
Speaker 2: And then you had a ready-made one from a previous
44:13
Speaker 2: crisis that you could just resurrect as a bogeyman, essentially.
44:16
Speaker 1: Yeah. And it didn't help that many of the politicians
44:22
Speaker 1: who had negotiated the Treaty of Versailles on the behalf
44:26
Speaker 1: of Germany were Jewish.
44:28
Speaker 2: Yeah, no, it does show that, you know, financial crises
44:31
Speaker 2: sometimes lead to these huge societal fractures that you talk
44:34
Speaker 2: about that have these horrific long-term consequences.
44:39
Speaker 1: I mean, they leave large sections of the public with
44:42
Speaker 1: the strong feeling that the system does not work, And
44:47
Speaker 1: that the cards are stacked against them. I mean, that
44:51
Speaker 1: happened in 1873. It happened in 2008. I mean, it's
44:56
Speaker 1: not totally irrational to argue that someone must be responsible.
45:03
Speaker 1: The problem is who is very common for them to
45:07
Speaker 1: start looking for a scapegoat to blame. Yeah.
45:11
Speaker 2: But, Jakob, I'm curious, what happened to Bismarck and Black
45:14
Speaker 2: Rota after all this? Did they fall out? How did
45:19
Speaker 2: things shake out for the two of them?
45:20
Speaker 1: OK, so let me talk about Bismarck first. I mean,
45:25
Speaker 1: as I mentioned, in the 1880s, he treads this fine path.
45:32
Speaker 1: He's allowing anti-Semitism to fester. So it stays under the
45:37
Speaker 1: surface for decades to come. He finally loses his grip
45:42
Speaker 1: on power, though. His position had always depended on his
45:47
Speaker 1: ability to manipulate the Kaiser. And when the Kaiser dies
45:54
Speaker 1: in 1888, and the new Kaiser comes in, who's the grandson,
46:01
Speaker 1: he has very different ideas, mainly to do with foreign policy,
46:06
Speaker 1: not domestic policy. But he falls out with Bismarck. And eventually,
46:13
Speaker 1: in 1890, Bismarck resigns. And then spends the next eight
46:19
Speaker 1: years at his estate in Prussia, lamenting his lot and
46:26
Speaker 1: dies a very bitter man. As for Bleichroder, he remained
46:33
Speaker 1: Bismarck's personal banker until the very end.
46:38
Speaker 2: Okay, so they didn't fall out over this.
46:41
Speaker 1: No, they didn't. Because Blake Roda understood that he was
46:47
Speaker 1: only protected because of his connection to Bismarck. Bismarck had
46:52
Speaker 1: been essential to his rise and he wasn't going to
46:55
Speaker 1: lose that one prop. And so for the sake of
47:00
Speaker 1: his own family and his wealth, he continues to ally
47:05
Speaker 1: himself with Bismarck. The problem for him is that the
47:09
Speaker 1: rest of the Jewish community stays with the liberals. And
47:14
Speaker 1: Bismarck has moved in a conservative direction. Bleichroder essentially becomes
47:20
Speaker 1: isolated and loses his leadership position in the Jewish community
47:27
Speaker 1: by remaining with the conservatives. Bleichroder dies in 1893, so
47:33
Speaker 1: he doesn't have long to live. I think it's very instructive.
47:38
Speaker 1: that his three sons all become baptized. He essentially cuts
47:45
Speaker 1: his ties with the Jewish community.
47:48
Speaker 2: He wanted to be assimilated back into the full German elite.
47:52
Speaker 1: Very much so. Okay.
47:53
Speaker 2: Well, that's quite a sad way of ending it, though.
47:55
Speaker 2: I'm somehow glad that Bismarck and Black Roader didn't fall
47:59
Speaker 2: out personally, at least, over Bismarck's tolerance of the anti-Semitic
48:04
Speaker 2: wellspring that came forth after 1873. But turning a bit
48:09
Speaker 2: back to these social fractures we've talked about that sometimes
48:13
Speaker 2: happen after financial crises, why do you think this always happens?
48:19
Speaker 2: Because this isn't the only time we've seen some sort
48:21
Speaker 2: of economic calamity lead to racial or religious tensions, right?
48:27
Speaker 1: Yeah. And I think it's that financial crises reveal a
48:33
Speaker 1: system that doesn't work. And people sort of try to
48:39
Speaker 1: figure out who's to blame for the system not working.
48:45
Speaker 1: And it leads to, one, conflicts between debtors and creditors,
48:52
Speaker 1: but it also leads to, both on the right and
48:55
Speaker 1: on the left, people looking for groups to blame. Yeah.
49:00
Speaker 1: It's very fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Yeah.
49:06
Speaker 2: So they do reveal something that doesn't work, but then
49:09
Speaker 2: opportunists or misguided people will seize and find some scapegoat that,
49:15
Speaker 2: you know, whatever scapegoat that works in that situation, essentially. Yeah.
49:21
Speaker 1: We saw it in 2008, but in the rise of
49:24
Speaker 1: the Tea Party movement, we saw it in the fracturing
49:27
Speaker 1: on the left. So it is not a happy time
49:31
Speaker 1: for societies.
49:32
Speaker 2: Well, that's obviously quite an unfortunate note to end on,
49:36
Speaker 2: albeit an unfortunately accurate one as well. Ilyaka, thanks so
49:40
Speaker 2: much for being here today to discuss just one aspect
49:44
Speaker 2: of your tremendous book, which I loved. But yeah, it's
49:48
Speaker 2: been wonderful. Thanks.
49:49
Speaker 1: Well, thank you for having me.
49:51
Speaker 2: Well, that is it for this week's episode of The
49:54
Speaker 2: Store of Money. If you like this episode, please make
49:57
Speaker 2: sure to subscribe, review the show, comment underneath, all that
50:01
Speaker 2: good stuff. We do read them all. I'm a sad person.
50:04
Speaker 2: I read all the comments. So please be nice to me.
50:07
Speaker 2: I'm Robin Wigglesworth and we'll see you all here next week.
50:17
Speaker 5: Hi, it's Gillian here and I hope you enjoyed today's
50:20
Speaker 5: episode of The Story of Money. And if you want
50:24
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50:26
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50:49
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50:53
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50:57
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51:03
Speaker 2: So hope to see you there.