Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / What Recent Court Decisions Reveal About Website Privacy Liability
Transcript
- 0:02Welcome to today's program, What Recent Court
- 0:06Decisions Reveal About Website Privacy Liability.
- 0:09I'm Alapoli Castro, Director of Education and
- 0:12Professional Development at Beverly Hills Bar
- 0:14Association. And today I'm delighted to introduce
- 0:17our speaker, Usama Koff. Osama is a partner at
- 0:21Fisher Phillips and a certified information privacy
- 0:24professional. Osama co -chairs Fisher Phillips's
- 0:28AI data and analytics practice group, as well
- 0:31as the privacy and cyber practice group. His
- 0:34primary areas of practice are workplace privacy
- 0:36and data security, employee defections, unfair
- 0:39competition, trade secret theft, corporate espionage,
- 0:43and artificial intelligence. As co -leader of
- 0:46the firm's consumer privacy team, Usama advises
- 0:49clients on compliance and state consumer privacy
- 0:51laws, including the California Consumer Privacy
- 0:54Act and the California Invasion of Privacy Act.
- 0:58He regularly conducts trainings and authors articles
- 1:00relating to consumer and employee privacy and
- 1:03data security. We can't wait to hear what he
- 1:06has to share with us today. So I'm now going
- 1:08to turn it over to him. Thank you to the Beverly
- 1:11Hills Bar Association. Thank you all for the
- 1:14introduction, for hosting this very timely event.
- 1:17There is a lot of need for it. A lot of folks
- 1:20out there are wondering what is going on with
- 1:22website privacy litigation. And so my goal today
- 1:27is to provide you with an update on the recent
- 1:31court decisions. This is going to be more of
- 1:33a survey of the recent court decisions and the
- 1:37trends as opposed to an argument in support of
- 1:40one side or another. You know, obviously I'm
- 1:42a defense attorney and I am always on the defense
- 1:46side on these cases. But today I'm here to just
- 1:49present a neutral perspective on as much as possible.
- 1:53You can never really be. entirely neutral, but
- 1:56as much as possible on recent court decisions
- 2:00involving use of website technology. So I'll
- 2:04start by sharing my slides. The first is I just
- 2:12want to put this in context historically. Where
- 2:14are we today? The SIPA litigation started a number
- 2:20of years ago. The turning point was at the end
- 2:24of May 2022. when the Javier case was decided
- 2:28and then that's when we started seeing an upswing
- 2:31in these cases being filed. I believe that's
- 2:34when litigants and plaintiffs' attorneys recognized
- 2:38that the door has been opened by the court and
- 2:42now those claims could be asserted. And so over
- 2:45that time period, so a little over four years,
- 2:48there have been thousands of these lawsuits that
- 2:50are filed, not just in California, but all over
- 2:53the country. Most of them are in California,
- 2:56about 80%, close to 3 ,900 lawsuits. And a number
- 3:03of the lawsuits outside of California that have
- 3:05been filed are also under SIPA, under the California
- 3:09Invasion of Privacy Act. The lawsuits focus primarily
- 3:13on website technology, some relate to apps, but
- 3:17they're mostly focused on tracking technology
- 3:20that is embedded in a website or provided by
- 3:24third parties. Many of the claims target routine
- 3:28analytics, but some also go beyond that to ad
- 3:31tech tools that provide advertising or retargeting,
- 3:36session replay, which is where there's a record
- 3:40essentially of the session and what a user did
- 3:43during the time that they were on the website.
- 3:47Chatbots has also been at the center of a lot
- 3:49of this litigation, especially in the early years,
- 3:52going back to 2022, 2023. The search bar remains
- 3:57a subject of a lot of the demand letters, not
- 4:00all of the lawsuits, but at least a lot of the
- 4:02demand letters that we currently see out there.
- 4:06And so that thread of the litigation focused
- 4:10on a user typing data into a form, whether it's
- 4:14the search bar or something else. And the claim
- 4:17and the theory is that when a third party is
- 4:20receiving... that communication, that text that
- 4:23a person is typing into the chatbot, that is
- 4:27wiretapping unless there is specific disclosure
- 4:30and consent that this third party may be receiving
- 4:33the data and using the data for their own commercial
- 4:36purposes outside of the scope of just being exclusively
- 4:40a vendor. If they're exclusively a vendor, just
- 4:43simply processing data subject to a data processing
- 4:47agreement or restrictions on their use of data,
- 4:50with some disclosures to the end consumer, the
- 4:52argument is that that would be sufficient. And
- 4:55in these cases, the argument is that the defendant
- 5:00did not do that. The outcomes have been very
- 5:04inconsistent over the years. often the same exact
- 5:08complaint by two different plaintiffs and sometimes
- 5:11by actually the same exact individual plaintiff
- 5:14and same law firm in front of two different judges
- 5:17have resulted in different outcomes. And the
- 5:21SIPA litigation has primarily focused on three
- 5:24sections, 631, 632. and 638 .51. 631 is the wiretapping
- 5:32claim. That means interception of the contents
- 5:35of a communication when in transit, meaning the
- 5:42equivalent of someone listening in to a phone
- 5:44call secretly. right, but in the electronic sense.
- 5:48632 claim related to the recording without disclosure
- 5:53or the interception without disclosure of confidential
- 6:00communication. So that focuses more on sensitive
- 6:02information that is being provided and shared.
- 6:06there is a third party that is receiving that
- 6:09data. And then the last section is the pen register,
- 6:12trap and trace section. That's 638 .51. And those
- 6:15theories are based on third party technology
- 6:19automatically sharing data the second that a
- 6:22user accesses the website. And the argument is
- 6:25that that constitutes a pen register or a trap
- 6:28and trace device under SIPPUP. And there was
- 6:32a court decision called Greenlee that started
- 6:36that trend by opening the door, by interpreting
- 6:39the language of the statute to apply to potentially
- 6:44a tracking tool that is on the website. And since
- 6:47then, the courts have disagreed on that issue
- 6:49as well. There are courts that have looked at
- 6:52the exact same text of the statute and said,
- 6:55The pen register section doesn't apply to the
- 6:57internet, and others have said, yes, it does,
- 7:00with no appellate authority at the moment and
- 7:03only one court of appeal so far that is currently
- 7:06in briefing and expected to hear oral argument
- 7:11in the fall on this issue. But it just took several
- 7:14years for us to get to that point. So that's
- 7:16where we are today. The outcomes remain inconsistent.
- 7:20So it very often depends on what judge you're
- 7:23assigned to. That could determine the outcome.
- 7:26Some judges. and will say, no, this doesn't apply
- 7:29to the internet. Others will not. And the risk
- 7:31often turns on the facts. It's becoming a lot
- 7:34more fact -specific. Sometimes it depends on
- 7:37the form, depends on your consent design, whether
- 7:40you had a cookie banner, whether it was presented
- 7:43appropriately, whether it had the right language,
- 7:46whether the technology was active the second
- 7:48the person goes to the website or if there's
- 7:50a delay from when the technology starts working
- 7:55and sharing data. All of these are considerations
- 7:57that anybody on both sides would need to look
- 8:01at to determine whether there is a viable claim
- 8:05or not. So here are the litigation numbers just
- 8:10to put it into perspective. Currently, last I
- 8:14checked is about 3 ,926 lawsuits in California
- 8:18under SIPA alleging claims for privacy violations
- 8:24related to pixels, cookies, software development
- 8:27kits, chatbots, search bar, anything related
- 8:30to technology on a website and the sharing of
- 8:32data with third parties. However, the court filings
- 8:36is not the only number. Anecdotally, and as well
- 8:41as getting information that has been compiled
- 8:47by other sources, The estimate out there is that
- 8:51for every lawsuit there is probably 10 to 15
- 8:54times the number, demand letters that never see
- 8:58the light of day because they are settled or
- 8:59resolved before litigation or the claim is dropped,
- 9:04or arbitrations that are actually filed with
- 9:07arbitration agencies also that don't see the
- 9:09light of day and are not part of the public record.
- 9:12The average settlement out there ranges in the
- 9:1615 ,000 to 25 ,000. Some are actually less than
- 9:19that. Some are more depending on the firm, depending
- 9:21on the facts, again, and the issues. But that
- 9:24has been generally the trend. Some have requested
- 9:27a lot more. These are for individual settlements.
- 9:30There have also been some significant class action
- 9:33settlements in this space. that you can look
- 9:37up and research. But generally, if 90 % of the
- 9:40lawsuits and the arbitrations and the demand
- 9:43letters that are out there end up in a settlement
- 9:46in the average of 15 to 25 ,000 per claim, that
- 9:51means that this has resulted in settlements in
- 9:56the range of 800 million to 1 .3 million, which
- 9:59is a large number. That's a significant impact
- 10:01on the economy. one way or the other. So let's
- 10:07talk about the technology itself. What's the
- 10:09technology that is driving the facts and the
- 10:12allegations in all these cases? The first is
- 10:14Pixels, cookies, software development kits. And
- 10:18these are all different types of technologies.
- 10:20There are also tags I would add on here, I didn't
- 10:22include it on the slide, but they're slightly
- 10:24different types of technology that exist on many
- 10:28websites these days. Session replay, I already
- 10:31talked about that one, the search bar, and then
- 10:33any kind of interactive form. including dropdown
- 10:37menus, forms where a user is making a selection,
- 10:42which can potentially identify or explain what
- 10:45is the user interested in, what are they trying
- 10:47to do on the website. Then there's the concept
- 10:50of real -time bidding that has appeared in a
- 10:53lot of complaints. The allegation is that third
- 10:56parties, particularly data brokers, have this
- 11:00bidding system on data in real time to obtain
- 11:04data on users and track it and sell it downstream
- 11:09for various purposes. Then there's the concept
- 11:13of server -to -server transfers or server -side
- 11:16tracking is another terminology for it, which
- 11:20has been a way for businesses or website operators
- 11:24to potentially avoid a wiretapping claim. Although
- 11:27part of the trend lately is an increase in allegations
- 11:32by plaintiffs, that server -side tracking still
- 11:35potentially constitutes wiretapping due to when
- 11:41data is actually being shared. And the allegations
- 11:44are that it is happening simultaneously with
- 11:47the user's interaction with the website. But
- 11:50just to break down what that really means, if
- 11:51you're not familiar with server -side tracking,
- 11:54it's when a third -party cookie is essentially
- 11:57configured to... not be a third party cookie.
- 12:01So on the website, it appears to be a first party
- 12:04cookie, meaning it's the website, server, and
- 12:06domain that the user is interacting with. The
- 12:10data is going from the browser of the individual
- 12:12from their device and browser to the website
- 12:15server, to the actual owner operator of the website,
- 12:20their own first party domain. Then, that server
- 12:24is then communicating certain data points to
- 12:27third party servers. So the argument on the defense
- 12:31side is that this can never be wiretapping because
- 12:36it is after the fact. It is like recording a
- 12:39phone call between two people and then turning
- 12:41around and playing that phone call to a third
- 12:43party. that by definition is not wiretapping
- 12:47because there's no interception in real time
- 12:50in the session. No one is actually listening
- 12:53in. The data is being sent after the fact or
- 12:57even if it is at the same time, it's not during
- 13:00the actual interaction as part of it, meaning
- 13:04someone is not listening in. Whether or not that
- 13:07ends up being found to still potentially be wiretapping
- 13:12under section 631 of SIPA is yet to be determined.
- 13:16That hasn't gone all the way on an actual motion
- 13:21for summary judgment, as far as I know. There
- 13:24has been a motion for summary judgment last year
- 13:27in one of these cases in which the court found
- 13:30that a 0 .2 second delay from when data is received
- 13:34to when it is sent to the third party constitutes
- 13:38enough. of a break for there to be no wiretapping
- 13:42by definition. And it's because the data wasn't
- 13:45being sent in transit, which emphasizes the significance
- 13:49of really digging into the facts. And even if
- 13:52the case isn't winnable at the motion to dismiss
- 13:54stage for the defendant, it could be winnable
- 13:58downstream. This also creates risk for the plaintiffs.
- 14:01So if you're on the plaintiff's side of this,
- 14:03it's an issue to be aware of, to study up on,
- 14:06and to become very familiar with as you did.
- 14:09get into this type of issue. The legal theories,
- 14:16I guess I jumped ahead of myself here. A lot
- 14:19of them focus on section 631 and then 632 and
- 14:23then the pen register claim. However, one thing
- 14:25that's important to note is that... there's a
- 14:29significant amount of the lawsuits out there
- 14:32that are focusing exclusively on the pen register
- 14:35claim, meaning that's the only claim that is
- 14:38being asserted, maybe with a common law claim
- 14:41that's thrown in with it, like inclusion upon
- 14:43seclusion or a constitutional invasion of privacy
- 14:47claim. But in terms of statutory claims, there's
- 14:51probably half of the lawsuits out there Half
- 14:57of the lawsuits that do include a pen register
- 14:59claim, which is about two thirds of all lawsuits,
- 15:03are focused exclusively on the pen register.
- 15:05The other half of the lawsuits that allege a
- 15:09pen register claim also allege a 631... claim
- 15:12or a 632 claim. And there are a lot of attorneys
- 15:17in the space that are alleging both types of
- 15:20claims, sometimes in the alternative. So the
- 15:22allegation is the same technology constitutes
- 15:25both a pen register on the one end as well as
- 15:28is resulting in interception of the contents
- 15:32of a communication in transit. But let's talk
- 15:37about what is a pen register real quick for those
- 15:40who aren't familiar with it. It's traditionally
- 15:44a law enforcement device that would be attached
- 15:48to a telephone line. It wouldn't allow law enforcement
- 15:52to listen in on the contents of the communication,
- 15:55but they would learn metadata about the incoming
- 15:57and outgoing call to potentially identify the
- 16:01individuals on the other side. And the law was
- 16:06amended in 2015 to add language prohibiting the
- 16:11installation or use of the pen and register or
- 16:13trap and trace device without a court order.
- 16:16And that is the part of the statute that is courts
- 16:19have looked at to determine whether it could
- 16:21apply to the internet or to cookies and pixels.
- 16:26Some courts have looked at this and said the
- 16:29reason why this could apply to the internet is
- 16:31because the statute is written very broadly.
- 16:34So there's an emphasis on the need for a broad
- 16:37interpretation of the statute. of the words or
- 16:41process instead of just simply a device now we're
- 16:44talking about a process and that a process could
- 16:46be software however some courts have read the
- 16:51exact same language cited to the exact same language
- 16:54and said this would not possibly have applied
- 16:59to the internet. The most recent case on that
- 17:06is from a state court, the Netscout decision.
- 17:10Blaker, I believe, is what it's called, versus
- 17:12Netscout, where the state trial court analyzed
- 17:17this issue. Another one was the plaintiff's name
- 17:20was Shalert. This was, I believe, decided in
- 17:23December 2025. where the state court analyzed
- 17:26the language of the statute and said it could
- 17:28not possibly apply. to the internet and to technology,
- 17:31it only applies to telephone lines. And the reason
- 17:33for that is because the same statute section
- 17:36that prohibits the installation of pen registers
- 17:39or traffic -trade devices without a court order
- 17:42cross -references another section where the court
- 17:45order process is established. And so if you read
- 17:50that other section that talks about how law enforcement
- 17:53can obtain a court order to install a pen register,
- 17:56that one is written specifically for telephone
- 17:59lines. lines with the presumption, as you read
- 18:02it, that the only way this could possibly be
- 18:04interpreted is that section only applies to telephone
- 18:08lines. And so the courts have said that 638 .51
- 18:12needs to be read with the section that it cross
- 18:15-references directly to mean that it could not
- 18:19possibly apply to anything but telephone lines.
- 18:22Otherwise, why would the process by which you
- 18:24obtain court orders be limited to telephone lines
- 18:28and nothing else? Then here comes the fourth
- 18:32bullet point here, which is ECPA, that's the
- 18:35Electronic Communications Privacy Act, that is
- 18:37federal law. So we're going to talk a little
- 18:40bit about some of the recent court decisions
- 18:41in the space. There has been more and more litigation
- 18:46involving federal wiretapping based on the same
- 18:50theories that a user's interaction with the website
- 18:53conveys content and that when you have a third
- 18:56party that is allegedly listening in, that that
- 18:59is wiretapping or at least aiding and abetting
- 19:02a third party in the wiretapping of the communication.
- 19:06The federal law has the one party consensual.
- 19:10Unlike California, that's a two party state.
- 19:12But there is an exception to that, and that is
- 19:14the crime tort exception. And so some courts
- 19:17have applied the crime tort exception to allow
- 19:20wiretapping claims to proceed past the motion
- 19:23to dismiss. Others have not. There has been a
- 19:26lot of inconsistent decisions in that area and
- 19:28no appellate authority addressing that issue
- 19:31directly. Very recently, the only court to appellate
- 19:34court on the federal level to potentially even
- 19:38address it is the First Circuit Court of Appeals
- 19:41in a Cape Cod health care case that went up for
- 19:45oral argument on April 1st. There hasn't been
- 19:48a decision issued yet, but expect a decision
- 19:50on that soon. But that's the First Circuit. It's
- 19:53not going to be controlling in the Ninth Circuit,
- 19:55but it certainly would be persuasive authority
- 19:57for those practicing out here. Then, of course,
- 20:01we see a lot of common law, privacy, negligence
- 20:04theory type claims, unjust enrichment, and so
- 20:08on. And I'm sure there are a lot of other claims
- 20:10that are out there. Some of you may be thinking,
- 20:13see DAFA, CMIA. There's a number of others that
- 20:17are sprinkled across some of this litigation.
- 20:21But these are the main theories at play. So let's
- 20:25jump into actual case law. So first is a number
- 20:32of court decisions very recently that are focused
- 20:36on standing and turned on the issue of standing.
- 20:40And it really comes down to two things. One is
- 20:42a concrete injury is required in federal court.
- 20:46The state standard is slightly different. and
- 20:49that courts tend to agree at the end of the day,
- 20:51at least on the federal level, the general browsing
- 20:54metadata is treated differently than more sensitive
- 20:58data. So in the context of healthcare or financial
- 21:02businesses, where there is sensitive data actually
- 21:07exchanged on the website or some of the data
- 21:10on a healthcare website, could be interpreted
- 21:14under the circumstances to be medical information
- 21:17or health information. Outside of those contacts,
- 21:21just the mere fact that you went to a website
- 21:23doesn't establish standing. And that's what's
- 21:27been consistently ruled upon by multiple courts,
- 21:30that you can't just simply go to a random website
- 21:33and then say, aha, I got you, and just think
- 21:37that you're going to be able to establish a claim
- 21:39in federal court. you're going to need something
- 21:41more than that, which is what some of the successful
- 21:43plaintiff's lawyers out there have done in surviving
- 21:46motions to dismiss by showing and establishing
- 21:49in the allegations that there's more than that.
- 21:51It's not just merely, oh, my IP address and a
- 21:55couple of things about my browser. Well, what
- 21:57actual data was disclosed? Is there actual harm?
- 22:01And the harm has to be a harm that federal courts
- 22:05have traditionally recognized that common law
- 22:07for which you could recover for. It cannot be
- 22:11just simply the mere disclosure of information
- 22:14supporting the potential for harm. There has
- 22:18to be some actual harm, the allegation of actual
- 22:21harm at least, which is you can see how that
- 22:24can potentially be established in contexts that
- 22:28involve more sensitive data already and a more
- 22:30sensitive audience and a user base, as well as
- 22:34the context where the person interacting, the
- 22:37plaintiff is someone who is actually in the market
- 22:40of interacting with the business they're suing,
- 22:42as opposed to a tester plaintiff who had no business
- 22:46whatsoever visiting the website or ever interacting
- 22:48with it in their lifetime, somehow finding the
- 22:50website either directly or because the attorney
- 22:54found them and had them become the plaintiff.
- 22:58So in those cases, it's difficult. for the planet
- 23:00to establish standing because there is no harm.
- 23:04No one has suffered harm by just simply going
- 23:07to the website. There has to be more. is from
- 23:14Illinois and it addresses federal law, but it
- 23:18also included California law. This is an example
- 23:21of how many of the simple lawsuits and the decisions
- 23:24in this area are actually outside of California.
- 23:27So courts outside of California are being asked
- 23:30to interpret California law and they are coming
- 23:33out inconsistently with their own interpretations
- 23:36because they're also looking to California state
- 23:38and federal courts that are themselves divided
- 23:41on these issues. So White's alleged that TransUnion
- 23:47trackers collected their IP address, device,
- 23:51and browser fingerprinting. They also alleged
- 23:55the collection of the email address of the person,
- 23:58geolocation at a general level, different than
- 24:01precise geolocation. The pages visited, mobile
- 24:06advertising IDs, and future browsing. And the
- 24:09claims included SIPA, ACPA and intrusion upon
- 24:13seclusion. The court granted dismissal for lack
- 24:17of Article 3 standing, and it reasoned that routine
- 24:21identifiers and general geolocation were not
- 24:24embarrassing. They were not invasive or private
- 24:26enough to be highly offensive. And that's really
- 24:29the standard at the federal level. It's got to
- 24:30be highly offensive. You've got to ask yourself,
- 24:33so what at the end of the day? What happened?
- 24:36What happened to you? What harm did you say?
- 24:38Why is it highly offensive? Which can be established
- 24:41potentially in certain contexts, but not generally
- 24:44in just going to a website and Yeah, they shared
- 24:48your geolocation data, your IP address, your
- 24:52advertising ID, your browsing activity, even
- 24:57an email address itself and the sharing of an
- 24:59email address. If you typed it into the website
- 25:02contact form, not necessarily sensitive to the
- 25:07point of establishing Article 3 standing. Data
- 25:16that establishes generic browsing on websites
- 25:23isn't going to be sensitive enough to establish
- 25:27standing. That's the holding in white. The court
- 25:31emphasized that class -wide allegations of sensitive
- 25:33data could not manufacture standing for the named
- 25:35plaintiff. That's one of the other themes across.
- 25:39decisions that have gone for the defense is a
- 25:42lot of the complaints out there spend 99 % of
- 25:45the complaint on what the technology is what
- 25:47it could be the business model of the third parties
- 25:50of the internet it's usually a dossier on on
- 25:54the internet and how it how it works at least
- 25:57from the plaintiff's perspective with very little
- 26:00on what happened to the actual plaintiff. In
- 26:02this case, what did the plaintiff actually do?
- 26:05Why were they there? What were they doing? What
- 26:07data did they communicate that allegedly went
- 26:10to the third party? What happened with their
- 26:12data? Did they receive direct targeted advertising
- 26:16on TikTok or social media related to the specific
- 26:21thing they were searching for and how can they
- 26:23link the two? What if they searched for this
- 26:26on other websites or TikTok already knew that
- 26:30they were interested in this kind of product
- 26:31anyways before even visiting the site? So all
- 26:34these are things that are rarely addressed in
- 26:37at least the first complaint, maybe the first
- 26:41or second amended complaint, but at least in
- 26:42the first complaints that are being filed, they
- 26:46tend to be a lot about the third parties and
- 26:48the technology and what it could do and its potential,
- 26:51but not really telling the court anything about
- 26:53what happened to this particular plaintiff and
- 26:56their data. Watson is also an Illinois decision
- 27:02in an ECPA case, and it involved a healthcare
- 27:07website. And the allegations were against Franciscan
- 27:10Alliance under ECPA, intrusion upon seclusion,
- 27:14unjust enrichment. The court recognized that
- 27:17disclosure of private medical information can
- 27:19support standing, but still dismissed in this
- 27:22case because the named plaintiffs allegations
- 27:25were too thin. She just simply alleged searches
- 27:28for provider locations, doctors, OBGYN and internal
- 27:32medicine, but nothing specific about her diagnosis.
- 27:35So that's where you get into what is medical
- 27:37information versus what is not. So you got to
- 27:40have specific diagnosis, treatments, appointment
- 27:43scheduling, login activity or targeted ad, you
- 27:47know, receiving specific targeted ads related
- 27:51to a diagnosis that you shared on a healthcare
- 27:54website, but just simply going. and browsing,
- 27:58anybody can go on a healthcare website and browse.
- 28:01It doesn't mean that there is medical information
- 28:03that is being shared or any kind of sensitive
- 28:05data. That is why the court dismissed, recognizing
- 28:08that there is a context in which there could
- 28:11be standing based on the information that is
- 28:14shared. Next up is a set of court decisions that
- 28:21I call the good, the bad, the ugly. But again,
- 28:23that's a subjective description depending on
- 28:25how you get at this. So take that for great assault.
- 28:28Let's just focus on this set of decisions here
- 28:31first. And these two highlight two points, the
- 28:39importance of focusing on routine metadata versus
- 28:42sensitive data. If it's routine metadata, You're
- 28:45going to have a hard time as a plaintiff establishing
- 28:47that there is harm or that there is standing,
- 28:50at least in federal court. If it's sensitive
- 28:52data, you're going to have a better shot at surviving
- 28:55a motion to dismiss. there's also a potential
- 29:00path for defendants to show that there's a lack
- 29:05of consent. But if there is standing plus consent,
- 29:09that can be an independent path. So here's what
- 29:12happened in these cases. So SISTI versus Bosley,
- 29:18the defense won the motion to dismiss in that
- 29:21case. It involved a health adjacent website and
- 29:25alleged that pixel disclosure of browser or browsing
- 29:29activity, browsing behavior, device identifiers,
- 29:33usage patterns, and scheduler page activity.
- 29:36Those were the specific allegations involved.
- 29:40There is pixels that were sharing data with their
- 29:44parties specifically related to these things.
- 29:46the court dismissed with prejudice, finding no
- 29:50Article 3 standing and finding consent occurred
- 29:55in this particular case through a structured
- 29:57sign -in agreements in terms of service. So this
- 30:00was a little bit different than just simply lack
- 30:02of standing. In this case, on the pleading stage,
- 30:07especially with the introduction of documents
- 30:09with a request for judicial notice, and sometimes
- 30:13relying on the plaintiff's own allegations, the
- 30:16court found that it was established that the
- 30:18plaintiff was presented conspicuously with notice
- 30:21about these things and agreed to it. And therefore
- 30:23there was already consent. And so that's another
- 30:27pathway to potentially for defendants and plaintiffs
- 30:30to focus on is if the person consented, then
- 30:35it's going to be harder for the plaintiff to
- 30:37proceed. presented with an actual terms of use
- 30:43or an agreement, and they became a member or
- 30:46a user of the service, they're sort of past that
- 30:50line where they should know. Even if they think
- 30:54they didn't know, they should have known because
- 30:56they were already presented with the terms of
- 30:58use that disclose specifically the fact that
- 31:01third parties were allegedly receiving data.
- 31:05In Diaz, the court dismissed for lack of a concrete
- 31:09injury. distinguishing sensitive medical, financial,
- 31:13or highly personal communications from routine
- 31:15behavioral metadata associated with free streaming
- 31:18activity. And the point here, the lesson learned,
- 31:23is that plaintiffs must plead specific sensitive
- 31:25information that is actually disclosed, not just
- 31:28broad categories of personal information. Let's
- 31:32talk about consent architecture, because that
- 31:35is resulting in a series of court decisions that
- 31:40can provide lessons for both sides of the bar
- 31:45on this one. So Fedorov alleged that rocket mortgage
- 31:50disclosed sensitive mortgage refinancing information
- 31:53through embedded tracking tools. The court did
- 31:57not reach the merits. because it enforced a forum
- 32:00selection clause in Rocket's online terms and
- 32:03transferred the case to the Eastern District
- 32:05of Michigan. The court treated the application
- 32:07page as a sign -in wrap. The user provided contact
- 32:11information and then clicked confirm and continue,
- 32:15next to a notice that had a link to the terms
- 32:18of use and the privacy policy. And the court
- 32:20found that that was... the terms were reasonably
- 32:24conspicuous. So that brings us to the point of
- 32:28click wrap versus sign in wrap versus browse
- 32:32wrap. That is the weakest of all of those. Courts
- 32:34tend to not enforce terms of use that are just
- 32:38simply presented in a link. And so for defendants,
- 32:45a pathway towards enforcing a choice of form
- 32:48or a choice of law provision, as well as an arbitration
- 32:51agreement and a class action waiver in terms
- 32:54of use, is to make sure that it is presented
- 32:56conspicuously to users of the website or the
- 32:58service before data is collected, before they
- 33:02can say, I didn't consent to this. If they were
- 33:06presented with those terms in advance, of that
- 33:09happening, then you have a better shot at enforcing
- 33:14those terms. In Penning, the plaintiff alleged
- 33:20that NVIDIA permitted third -party tracking after
- 33:23the user declined or turned off cookies. NVIDIA
- 33:27then moved to compel arbitration based on the
- 33:30terms of service linked in their cookie banner.
- 33:34And the court granted arbitration and stayed
- 33:36the case. finding that the plaintiff had actual
- 33:39notice because his own claims depended on having
- 33:42reviewed and relied on the cookie ban. The court
- 33:45also analyzed constructive notice and mutual
- 33:48assent through the ban. And so lesson learned
- 33:52is banner timing matters. And that means that
- 33:57when you present the banner and the language
- 33:59in the banner and whether it has a link to your
- 34:01terms of use is critical, which is why For plaintiffs,
- 34:07it's going to be difficult for them to get out
- 34:10of arbitration agreements and in terms of use
- 34:13if the cookie banner on a website is set up as
- 34:16a gatekeeper banner, where a user cannot even
- 34:19enter the site without interacting with it, without
- 34:22making a selection and agreeing. to the terms
- 34:26of service if they were presented with it and
- 34:28have an opportunity to review it before entering
- 34:30the site. So that's a scenario where some of
- 34:34the court decisions recently are headed. So I
- 34:40have Bosley here again, SISTI versus Bosley,
- 34:43just to compare the affirmative assent argument.
- 34:49It really provides a clear path to the terms
- 34:54of use being presented to the user upfront versus
- 34:58a passive footer. And so a passive footer link
- 35:02to the terms of use is just simply not going
- 35:04to be sufficient to enforce in these cases. Then
- 35:08there are court decisions that went entirely
- 35:10for the plaintiffs on these issues and created
- 35:13just more confusing and inconsistent case law.
- 35:16And that's why I put them in this bucket. So
- 35:19Garcia, in the first case, Garcia versus Anschutz
- 35:22Entertainment Group, the plaintiff alleged that
- 35:25AEG's website used third party cookies, pixels,
- 35:30that activated immediately upon them accessing
- 35:33the website. And the court dismissed the ECPA
- 35:38claim, the federal ECPA claim under the party
- 35:42exception, the crime tort exception, and dismissed
- 35:48the injunctive relief where the plaintiff said
- 35:52she would not return to the website at all in
- 35:55the first place. And so the court said, well,
- 35:57why are you asking for injunctive relief if you
- 36:00have already said that you're just not going
- 36:01to visit the website again? pen register claim,
- 36:05however, survived. And it's because of a number
- 36:10of reasons. First, the court, of course, agreed
- 36:13with a number of other court decisions that the
- 36:15pen register section does apply to cookies and
- 36:18pixels and to the internet. But The claim also
- 36:21survived because the tracking allegedly began
- 36:24before the user had an opportunity to reject
- 36:27it. And that's where we are seeing more and more
- 36:29allegations of the collection of data happening
- 36:34the very second that a user goes to the website
- 36:37as opposed to after a certain amount of delay.
- 36:40And so if there is a delay, let's say 10, 15
- 36:43seconds after the user accesses the site, they
- 36:45would have had a chance to start to at least
- 36:47look at the cookie banner. Is that delay sufficient?
- 36:51you'd have to obtain, to look at it under the
- 36:55facts and the circumstances. It may be or may
- 36:58be not depending on the issue. So that will continue
- 37:01to be an issue to litigate. So a banner, a cookie
- 37:07banner that appears after data is already flowing
- 37:10may not support consent, at least at the completing
- 37:12stage. It may support consent down the road during
- 37:15discovery. and for other purposes, but at least
- 37:19at the pleading stage, to use it as a way to
- 37:22get the claim dismissed is unlikely, especially
- 37:25in federal court in California. But some courts
- 37:31have gone the other way. I can't tell you that
- 37:34it's dispositive. These are just the trends and
- 37:37a survey of the most recent court decisions.
- 37:41Then we can look at Ortiz, the second case here.
- 37:43It involves crypto .com and allegations that
- 37:47third -party cookies were placed even after users
- 37:50disabled cookies. This is a faulty cookie banner
- 37:52type claim that is out there among many that
- 37:56are premised on theory of a false misrepresentation
- 38:00or that there was an expectation of privacy that
- 38:04was created by the opt -out mechanism and then
- 38:08the opt -out mechanism failed or didn't work
- 38:11or didn't properly classify certain cookies resulting
- 38:15in data still being shared and collected after
- 38:17the user had assumed that their choice would
- 38:20be respected. The court dismissed the 631 claim,
- 38:25the wiretapping under SIPA 631 because plaintiffs
- 38:30did not plead with specificity the communications
- 38:33or the contents that were allegedly intercepted.
- 38:36So this was a mixed bag decision where the court
- 38:41split the baby. There is no wiretapping at the
- 38:44pleading stage, the court said, because the plaintiff
- 38:47didn't say, well, what communications were actually
- 38:50intercepted? This goes back to the point I was
- 38:52saying about how most of the complaints out there
- 38:56are typically about the potential for the third
- 38:59party technology to do all of these things. profile
- 39:05everybody and track you across the internet,
- 39:07but then nothing about what is happening with
- 39:11this particular plaintiff. That's what the courts
- 39:13are focusing on in some of these cases. But the
- 39:17court still allowed the pen register claim to
- 39:20proceed, reasoning that the statutory tax and
- 39:24the history could reach internet -based routing,
- 39:27addressing, and signaling information. The court
- 39:31declined to treat the pending SB 690 as interpretive
- 39:35evidence of current law, one of the arguments
- 39:38that defendants have brought up. And this is
- 39:40the interpretation of a lot of federal courts
- 39:43lately is that the pen register provision does
- 39:46apply to the internet and technology. But note
- 39:49that there is also a number of court decisions
- 39:52that go the exact opposite, especially in state
- 39:54court, looking at the exact same language. And
- 39:57for some reason, federal courts are refusing
- 40:00to follow what several state court decisions
- 40:03have found refusing to defer, to provide any
- 40:09kind of deference to what state judges have found,
- 40:12because it's obviously not controlling. It may
- 40:14be persuasive authority, but hasn't been persuasive
- 40:17enough, apparently, in federal court to lead
- 40:20most federal courts to find that in interpreting
- 40:23California law. They're all waiting for an appellate
- 40:25level decision to tell everybody whether this
- 40:29pen register section does or does not apply.
- 40:40more on browser app and the enforceability of
- 40:44website terms. So in these cases that are favorable
- 40:47to the plaintiffs, we looked at these issues
- 40:51that are on the screen on the slide. In Padraza,
- 40:55it involved nourish and allegations that tracking
- 40:59technology captured communications in a healthcare
- 41:02nutrition type context. The plaintiffs asserted
- 41:06federal ECPA and SIPA Section 631 claims, and
- 41:10the court on a motion to dismiss allowed both
- 41:13to proceed, finding that browser app consent
- 41:16just simply doesn't get you over the hump. It's
- 41:19inadequate at the pleading stage. And also the
- 41:22court allowed the ECPA crime tort exception theory
- 41:25in the healthcare context. So meaning you're
- 41:28alleging an independent tort based on a violation
- 41:32of HIPAA So if there is medical information that
- 41:35is allegedly being shared that is subject to
- 41:37HIPAA, and you say, well, there is a HIPAA violation
- 41:40as a result that potentially, at least according
- 41:43to this court, can get you over the crime tort
- 41:47exception to the one party consensual under the
- 41:50CPA. But note that many courts are still divided
- 41:54on that issue. And the issue is whether There
- 41:57has to be a criminal or tortious purpose to establish
- 42:01that, not whether the interception itself allegedly
- 42:04resulted in some other violation of the law.
- 42:07It's whether the interception itself was committed
- 42:10for the purpose of committing the tort or crime.
- 42:14That's a point that many courts disagree upon.
- 42:18And there's been inconsistent decisions. And
- 42:20that's the issue that's up on appeal in a couple
- 42:22of cases. Then you have Castro, which is a state
- 42:27court opinion in California involving a restaurant
- 42:31group. It's a near total plaintiff win on the
- 42:37demurrer with four of five causes of action surviving,
- 42:41including the SIPA pen register theory. State
- 42:44courts tend to, you know, maybe less receptive
- 42:46to federal Article III standing is really kind
- 42:49of the point of this one. Standing seems to be
- 42:52a lower standard in state court. Some judges
- 42:55believe that just merely alleging, merely alleging
- 43:01a statutory violation, meaning a technical statutory
- 43:04violation, is sufficient to establish standing
- 43:06and you didn't need to go as far as what federal
- 43:10courts do, which is there's got to be some harm
- 43:13beyond just simply a statutory violation. And
- 43:17the other thing is that state courts are just...
- 43:21tends to simply not get involved upfront with
- 43:24consent arguments about whether the person consented
- 43:28or not based on the consent architecture of the
- 43:31website, whether or not that can be judicially
- 43:33noticed or not. Just the courts will simply defer
- 43:37that into discovery and say, we're not going
- 43:39to decide that upfront at the pleading stage.
- 43:42There are also a number of recent court decisions
- 43:45involving financial data that are significant
- 43:48to address. Ingram Capital One involved credit
- 43:53card application and preapproval pages on the
- 43:56website. The alleged disclosure included employment
- 44:01information, bank account information. citizenship
- 44:04status, approval or denial outcomes of their
- 44:07applications, FICO score segments, income bands,
- 44:11names, emails, phone numbers, cookies, and application
- 44:15status. The ruling is important because it focuses
- 44:21on sensitive application data. whether it supports
- 44:26a stronger privacy injury theory than ordinary
- 44:29browsing metadata. And that's a decision that
- 44:33is important to look at because it focuses on
- 44:37the sensitivity of the data. And that's why there
- 44:40is plaintiffs could allege standing in this case.
- 44:45In Allison versus PHH mortgage, The plaintiff
- 44:50alleged that the defendant disclosed personal
- 44:52and financial information through Google, Hadjar,
- 44:55Microsoft, Yahoo, Blend, Sentry, and other tools.
- 44:59And the court found that the privacy contracts
- 45:02did not clearly establish consent because they
- 45:06contain language suggesting that PHH, the defendant,
- 45:11did not covertly capture specific user activity
- 45:14and disclosed only the aggrieved non -identifying
- 45:18information. Several of these claims that were
- 45:23asserted survived the motion to dismiss in the
- 45:30Northern District of California in May, but some
- 45:35were dismissed and they survived in varying degrees
- 45:37and it really focused on the sensitivity of the
- 45:40data. So it's a higher risk profile for any defendant
- 45:44in these kind of cases to address. And then Fedorov,
- 45:51Fedorov versus Rocket Mortgage. So Federov demonstrates
- 45:56that forum selection clause is a potential path
- 46:00in a financial data case, or really in any other
- 46:03case for that matter. So even where the underlying
- 46:06allegations involve sensitive mortgage refinancing
- 46:09data, there are circumstances where terms of
- 46:14use could be enforceable to kick the case to
- 46:16a favorable forum for the defendant. And that
- 46:21more favorable forum may or may not end up giving
- 46:24the defendant a favorable ruling, but it's at
- 46:27least a way for the defendants to get a win,
- 46:32to move out of California where their risk is
- 46:36much higher. There are a number of health data
- 46:42cases to address here that have come out in the
- 46:45last couple of months. Furlidge versus Petrosian
- 46:50is an interesting one. It alleged that the website
- 46:53used Google tracking tools on appointment scheduling
- 46:56pages and transmitted sensitive health information,
- 47:00including appointment scheduling and reason for
- 47:02visit information. The claims included invasion
- 47:05of privacy, the usual kitchen sink, ECPA, and
- 47:08SIPA. The court rejected the broad Google terms
- 47:13consent theory at the pleading stage that was
- 47:15presented by the defendant because the defendants
- 47:17had not shown, according to the court, that the
- 47:20disclosure specifically covered this third party's
- 47:26collection of sensitive health information. And
- 47:30so the consent argument just simply didn't work.
- 47:35The court held that the alleged appointment and
- 47:38reason for visit data plausibly qualified as
- 47:41contents of a communication. So it's more than
- 47:43just merely visiting the page. There was some
- 47:47indication that the user had provided or maybe
- 47:51clicked on drop down menus or added some information
- 47:54to show the reason for their visit or their appointment.
- 48:00And the court said, well, that could be the contents
- 48:02of an electronic communication. The ECPA claim
- 48:06survived because the court found that the crime
- 48:09tort exception was plausibly supported by a separate
- 48:14invasion of privacy tort. And this is another
- 48:17issue that courts are divided on, whether just
- 48:20simply alleging a different tort gets you over
- 48:23the hump of the crime -tort exception to the
- 48:26one -party consensual. Some courts are saying
- 48:28yes, some courts are saying no. The SUPA 631
- 48:31claim was dismissed with leave to amend because
- 48:34plaintiffs did not adequately allege that Google
- 48:36read or learned the contents while in transit.
- 48:39That last point is critical and important because
- 48:42And one of the things that is always missing
- 48:45is an allegation that the third party actually
- 48:48read the contents of the communication. That's
- 48:51for a wiretapping claim. And very often, the
- 48:56third party doesn't read the information or at
- 48:58least doesn't read it right away. So if they
- 48:59don't read it right away, then there is no interception
- 49:02because it's just simply receiving a recording.
- 49:04And then after the fact, you're actually reading
- 49:05it and listening to it. That issue remains a
- 49:11thread that defendants can latch on in other
- 49:14cases. In Watson, it's a little bit different.
- 49:21The court acknowledged that disclosure of private
- 49:23medical information can support standing, but
- 49:26found the named plaintiff did not plead enough
- 49:29about her own specific health information appointment
- 49:31and scheduling and blah, blah, blah to establish
- 49:34standing. Another example of a whole lot of stuff
- 49:38in the complaint about what the third parties
- 49:41could do and what they might do and the business
- 49:43model of digital tracking on the internet without
- 49:48something specific about the actual plaintiff
- 49:50themselves. More on the ECPA third party except
- 49:54these are all decisions literally in the last
- 49:57couple of months. It just tells you how often
- 50:02these decisions get issued. Every week there's
- 50:04another decision. that goes one way or the other.
- 50:08So in Baker, Baker alleged that the index exchange
- 50:13intercepted communications with Biblegateway
- 50:17.com. And the court found there was personal
- 50:23jurisdiction based on billions of Illinois ad
- 50:28impressions and knowledge by index of Illinois
- 50:35users through location data. On the ECPA claim,
- 50:39however, the court found that Baker didn't really
- 50:45contest publisher consent, so the court considered
- 50:47whether the crime toward exception applied. The
- 50:50court held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged
- 50:53a predicate violation of the Department of Justice
- 50:57bulk data transfer rule, and that if you show
- 51:01a violation of that, that is sufficient to get
- 51:03you through the crime toward exception. So it's
- 51:06the first case of its kind that has gone that
- 51:09far to open the door for an ACPA claim based
- 51:13on a potential violation of the bulk data transfer
- 51:18rule. So, you know, Garcia, we already talked
- 51:23about, it's a little bit different than this
- 51:24one, but also about the crime toward exception.
- 51:29Several cases involved the pen register decision
- 51:31that you should know about. Ortiz is a leading
- 51:35federal plaintiff side pen register ruling, at
- 51:37least, you know, more recently, the court held
- 51:41that the statutory text in the legislative history
- 51:43could support applying this section to the internet.
- 51:48Again, a lot of courts disagreed. But the Section
- 51:51631 contents claim failed. It didn't have enough
- 51:56allegations in this case. Sandoval is a California
- 52:02Superior Court decision also favorable to the
- 52:06plaintiff. So just another example, the court
- 52:08overruled a demurrer where the plaintiff alleged
- 52:10that several third parties collected IP addresses,
- 52:14browser, device information, mouse movements,
- 52:17clicks, referral, refer URLs, geolocation, session
- 52:22duration, the list goes on, very long list. And
- 52:25the court treated consent as an affirmative defense.
- 52:28didn't want to address it at the pleading stage.
- 52:30Just another example of what I mentioned earlier,
- 52:33that the courts wanted to defer that to discovery
- 52:36rather than deciding it upfront. In Heiting versus
- 52:42Powerfleet, it's a case in which the defendants
- 52:48won. The plaintiff alleged that data broker software
- 52:51captured identifiers on Powerfleet's website.
- 52:55The court granted dismissal for lack of Article
- 52:573 standing and personal jurisdiction, deeming
- 53:01the substantive arguments essentially conceded
- 53:04after a plaintiff opposed only based on a local
- 53:13rule issue regarding their meet and confer process.
- 53:16But regardless, the court still found that merely
- 53:18visiting a website was not enough without facts
- 53:20about what information was provided, captured,
- 53:23or de -anonymized. In Blaker, another state court
- 53:31opinion, the court granted M Particles' motion
- 53:34to quash the service of the subpoena because
- 53:36the plaintiff did not show purposeful availment
- 53:39direction toward California from just simply
- 53:42alleging website tracking on the site. The court
- 53:46discussed Briskin versus Shopify, which a lot
- 53:49of you would be familiar with from last year,
- 53:50the Ninth Circuit opinion, as a potentially different
- 53:53scenario involving targeted extraction and commercial
- 53:56use of California consumers' data, but that is
- 53:59not what the allegations were before the court
- 54:01in that case. We are running close on time, so
- 54:05I'm going to try to go quickly through some of
- 54:07these. The Variety Media Appeal is one to talk
- 54:15about. So Variety Media appealed a decision,
- 54:19Rose v. Variety Media is the name of the case
- 54:22at the trial court level, where the court overruled
- 54:26a demurrer finding that the pen register section
- 54:30does apply to the internet and therefore there
- 54:33is a viable claim. Variety Media appealed. The
- 54:37Court of Appeal has been getting the briefing
- 54:39so far. two rounds of questions from the Court
- 54:44of Appeal, where the court asked the courts to
- 54:48brief additional issues. And it's gonna potentially
- 54:52be set for oral argument in the next few months.
- 54:56And then I would expect a decision by the end
- 54:58of the year, unless if the court pulls the plug
- 55:00on it because of SB 690, the legislation that
- 55:04is pending in Sacramento. that in its current
- 55:07form, if it passes, would eliminate the private
- 55:11right of action for any online conduct under
- 55:13the pen register section of SIPO. If SB 690 goes
- 55:19away, there's an open question as to whether
- 55:21the Court of Appeal would just simply remand
- 55:23the case because now this claim would potentially
- 55:26go away without having to decide the issue. But
- 55:29the problem is there are court decisions, there
- 55:31are cases that will still continue because the
- 55:36current status of SB 690 is that the language
- 55:39would be retroactive only to pending cases that
- 55:42were filed on or after January 1st, 2025. So
- 55:45if you have a pen register claim that was filed
- 55:47prior to that, then under the current language
- 55:50of SB 690, that would continue and no one is
- 55:54deciding in those cases the actual issue that
- 55:57everyone wants the court to decide, which is
- 56:00whether the law applies to the internet in the
- 56:03first place. And I jumped the gun by telling
- 56:09you about the status of SB 690, but it has to
- 56:13the Appropriations Committee now. And the deadline
- 56:17is August 31st for it to pass in whatever form.
- 56:22And then the governor has until the end of September
- 56:26to sign or veto. It currently would take effect
- 56:30January 1st unless if an urgency clause is added.
- 56:35between now and the end of August. So not all
- 56:42PEN cases are going to be affected. Like I said
- 56:44at the beginning, although there are a lot of
- 56:47PEN register cases, about half of those cases
- 56:50involve a 631 claim as well. So those claims
- 56:54are going to continue. And plaintiffs may pivot
- 56:58to wiretapping claims, ECPA claims, other claims
- 57:02that are still out there, as opposed to just
- 57:05putting all their eggs into the basket of the
- 57:07pen register claim. And then the variety media
- 57:11appeal is going to be a big one that everyone
- 57:14will be paying attention to. So in my last minute
- 57:17here, we're going to talk about practical checklists
- 57:20for businesses dealing with these issues. There
- 57:23are lessons learned from all of these court decisions.
- 57:26It's the importance of inventorying all of the
- 57:29tracking tools and learning about them before
- 57:32a lawsuit occurs or even during a lawsuit, because
- 57:34that can help you in the defense. And then the
- 57:37plaintiffs are getting better and better at doing
- 57:39that on their end using sophisticated technology
- 57:42and tools. Identifying vendors and data flows,
- 57:47testing whether trackers fire before consent,
- 57:50testing whether consent and opt -outs actually
- 57:53work. and classify cookies, tags, and pixels
- 57:56all appropriately. And then classifying data
- 58:00sensitivity and treating it differently. That's
- 58:02going to be a one way to go. Reviewing consent
- 58:05language and the user interface is going to be
- 58:08important for parties in these cases. And then
- 58:13comparing privacy policy statements to the actual
- 58:15practice because more and more allegations are
- 58:20being made that The company said one thing in
- 58:22the privacy policy, but yet they're doing something
- 58:24completely different. So catching businesses
- 58:28in that kind of inconsistency has become the
- 58:32focus of some of the litigants in these areas
- 58:34rather than just your basic wiretapping claim
- 58:40or pen register claim. The theory is misrepresentation,
- 58:44which is a stickier claim to make than a wiretapping
- 58:47claim. I know there are a couple of questions.
- 58:51I'm happy to answer them by email because we're
- 58:54out of time. But thank you all very much. Here's
- 58:57my contact information. Feel free to email me.
- 59:00And thank you to the Beverly Hills Bar Association
- 59:03for hosting this very important CLE. And I encourage
- 59:07everyone to continue to watch the Variety Media
- 59:09Appeal and to follow these court decisions as
- 59:12they come up. And to also keep track of SB 690.
- 59:15It will certainly impact all litigants in this
- 59:18space.