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What Happened When a Presidential Election Tied in 1801? - The Constitutional Crisis of 1801 and the Twelfth Amendment | Sleepy Facts About History · Sleepy Facts About History

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  Welcome to Sleepy Facts About History. The presidential
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  election of 1800 ended in an unexpected tie between
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  Thomas Jefferson and his own running mate, Aaron
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  Burr, forcing the House of Representatives to
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  vote 36 times before the deadlock finally broke.
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  The original constitution required electors to
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  cast two undifferentiated votes. assuming that
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  independent men of judgment would naturally select
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  the two most qualified candidates without the
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  interference of organized national parties. By
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  the winter of 1801, however, the reality of strict
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  party discipline had exposed a dangerous flaw
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  in that constitutional machinery. This episode
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  examines how the framers' failure to anticipate
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  the rise of the Federalist and Democratic Republican
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  parties led to a contingent election in an unfinished
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  capital city. It explores the intense political
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  maneuvering, the role of Alexander Hamilton in
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  convincing his fellow Federalists to accept Jefferson,
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  and the very real threat of civil disorder that
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  loomed over the transfer of power. The resolution
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  of the crisis prompted the ratification of the
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  12th Amendment, fundamentally changing the Electoral
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  College by requiring separate ballots for President
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  and Vice President. While working on this episode,
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  I kept returning to one question. How does a
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  constitution survive its own blind spots? The
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  election of 1800 reveals the early American political
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  system not as a flawless monument, but as a working
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  document that had to be rapidly repaired when
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  its design collided with the reality of party
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  politics. The constitution of 1787 created a
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  machine for choosing a president. It assumed
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  a world that did not yet exist, and by 1800,
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  that assumption had become dangerous. The framers
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  imagined electors as independent men of judgment,
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  deliberating in their separate states to select
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  the two best qualified candidates for the nation's
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  highest office. Each elector would cast two votes.
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  The candidate receiving the most votes would
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  become president. The runner -up would become
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  vice president. There was no separate ballot
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  for the second position. There was no mechanism
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  for a party to designate its presidential and
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  vice presidential candidates distinctly. The
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  very idea of organized national parties was something
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  the framers generally distrusted and did not
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  design around. By the winter of 1800, this system
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  had collided with a reality it could not accommodate.
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  The election of 1796 had already exposed the
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  strain. Federalist John Adams won the presidency.
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  But because Democratic -Republican electors had
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  also cast votes for Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson
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  finished second and became vice president. The
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  executive branch was divided between two men
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  who opposed each other on nearly every fundamental
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  question of governance. The system had not produced
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  a harmonious administration. It had produced
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  deadlock and mutual suspicion. Between 1796 and
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  1800, the division hardened into something more
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  systematic. The Federalists of Adams and Hamilton
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  favored a strong central government, commercial
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  development, and alignment with Britain. The
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  Democratic Republicans of Jefferson and Madison
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  favored decentralized power, agrarian interests,
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  and closer ties with France. Both parties developed
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  congressional caucuses, partisan newspapers,
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  and state -level organizations. Oath began running
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  coordinated tickets. Yet the Constitution remained
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  unchanged. The machine still required electors
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  to cast two undifferentiated votes, as if no
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  party existed to instruct them. The Democratic
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  -Republicans entered the election of 1800 with
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  a clear plan. The Congressional Caucus designated
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  Thomas Jefferson for president and Aaron Burr
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  for vice president. Their electors were expected
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  to cast one vote for Jefferson and one for Burr,
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  ensuring that Jefferson finished first and Burr
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  second. The Federalists ran John Adams for President
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  and Charles Coatsworth Pinckney for Vice President
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  with a similar expectation. The campaign itself
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  was ferocious. Federalists warned that Jefferson
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  would bring godlessness and radicalism. They
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  warned that his supporters would unleash the
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  violence of the French Revolution. upon American
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  shores. Democratic Republicans attacked the Alien
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  and Sedition Acts of 1798, which had criminalized
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  the publication of false, scandalous, and malicious
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  writing against the federal government and had
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  expanded presidential power to deport non -citizens.
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  The Sedition Act had been used to prosecute newspaper
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  editors, including Benjamin Franklin's grandson,
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  Benjamin Franklin Bache, who had edited the Aurora.
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  A Democratic -Republican paper in Philadelphia.
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  Bash was arrested in June 1798, though he died
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  of yellow fever before his trial could conclude.
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  The prosecutions made tangible what abstract
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  constitutional principle could not. Federalist
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  power was being used to silence opposition voices.
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  Democratic -Republicans also condemned the military
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  build -up associated with the quasi -war against
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  France. They argue that standing armies and navies
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  threatened Republican liberty. The undeclared
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  naval conflict had produced actual engagements
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  in the Caribbean, where American merchant vessels
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  clashed with French privateers. Adams had expanded
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  the regular army from roughly 3 ,000 to more
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  than 10 ,000 men. Appointing Hamilton as a major
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  general, the election became, in effect, a referendum
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  on whether the Federalist program of centralized
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  national power would continue. When the electoral
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  votes were counted in February 1801, the result
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  revealed the structural flaw that the Framers
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  had not anticipated. Jefferson and Burr each
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  received 73 electoral votes. Adams received 65.
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  Pinckney received 64. The Democratic -Republican
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  electors had done exactly what their party instructed.
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  They had voted for Jefferson and Burr. But because
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  the Constitution made no distinction between
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  a vote for president and a vote for vice president,
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  their discipline had produced an unintended tie.
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  Jefferson and Burr were now indistinguishable
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  in the constitutional machinery. The presidency
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  would not be decided by the electors. It would
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  be decided by the House of Representatives. This
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  was not a minor procedural inconvenience. Under
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  Article 3, the House would choose the president
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  from the top candidates, with each state delegation
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  casting one vote. The candidate needed a majority
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  of states to win. The outgoing House, which would
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  conduct this contingent election, was still controlled
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  by Federalists. Many Federalists saw an opportunity
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  they could not ignore. Jefferson was their ideological
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  opponent. The leader of a party they believed
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  endangered the Republic. Burr was harder to read.
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  Some Federalists believed he was more moderate,
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  more pragmatic, more susceptible to influence.
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  Others simply preferred the confusion of a deadlock
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  to the certainty of Jefferson's elevation. The
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  House began bolloting on February 11, 1801. Jefferson
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  presided over the Senate that morning, in his
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  capacity as Vice President. and announced the
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  electoral vote totals that placed him in a tie
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  with his own running mate. Then the representatives
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  withdrew to their chamber to determine who would
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  lead the nation. The Capitol itself was barely
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  finished. The Senate occupied a completed wing,
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  but the House chamber was a temporary wooden
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  structure attached to the unfinished building.
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  The streets of Washington were unpaved, muddy
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  from winter rains. The boarding houses where
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  congressmen lodged were scattered across a city
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  that existed more on paper than in stone. Some
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  representatives had fallen ill from the damp
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  and cold. Others had left the city and could
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  not return quickly given the state of the roads.
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  The physical conditions matched the procedural
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  paralysis. The first ballot produced eight states
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  for Jefferson, six for Burr, and two divided
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  delegations that could not cast a vote. Jefferson
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  needed nine states to win. He remained one short.
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  The second ballot produced the same result, and
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  the third. The House voted multiple times each
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  day, and the pattern held with remarkable stubbornness.
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  Individual congressmen occasionally shifted their
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  personal positions, but the state delegation
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  totals, the only votes that counted, refused
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  to move. Some states were divided because their
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  delegations were evenly split between Federalists
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  and Democratic -Republicans. A single absent
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  or ill member could prevent a state from casting
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  any vote at all. The representatives voted again
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  and again, and the numbers refused to shift.
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  Some congressmen slept in the chamber between
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  ballots. Others negotiated in corridors and the
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  winter weather in the new capital pressed against
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  the unfinished building. The constitutional mechanism
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  had produced not deliberation but exhaustion.
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  Federalist maneuvering took several forms. Some
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  representatives have genuinely preferred Burr,
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  believing him more acceptable than Jefferson.
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  Others sought to prolong the deadlock indefinitely,
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  hoping that the confusion might allow some alternative
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  to emerge, or that the outgoing Adams administration
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  might find a way to retain power. The constitutional
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  deadline of March 4, when the new presidential
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  term would begin, approached with no resolution
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  in sight. The situation carried genuine danger.
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  Democratic Republican voters had cast their ballots,
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  or their state legislatures had chosen electors,
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  with the clear expectation of Jefferson's presidency.
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  To deny him the office through Federalist manipulation
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  in the House risked a crisis of legitimacy. that
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  could not be easily contained. There were rumors
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  of militia mobilizations, of state governments
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  preparing to resist a usurpation. The transfer
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  of power, which later memory would smooth into
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  effortless tradition, was in fact a moment of
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  real uncertainty. Into this deadlock stepped
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  Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was a Federalist,
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  the former Treasury Secretary, the architect
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  of Federalist economic policy. and no friend
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  of Thomas Jefferson. He had spent years attacking
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  Jefferson's political philosophy and his fitness
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  for office. Yet Hamilton believed that Burr was
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  worse. In letters to Federalist congressmen,
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  most notably to Representative Harrison Gray
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  Otis of Massachusetts, Hamilton argued that Jefferson
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  was at least principled, that his views were
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  known and could be opposed through normal political
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  means. Burr, by contrast, Hamilton described
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  as unprincipled and dangerously ambitious, a
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  man who would sacrifice any institution or alliance
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  for personal advancement. Burr is the most unfit
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  man in the United States for the office of president,
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  Hamilton wrote. He urged Federalists to prefer
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  Jefferson as the lesser danger. Historians differ
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  about the precise weight of Hamilton's intervention.
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  Some emphasize his letters as decisive in breaking
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  Federalist resistance. Others argue that exhaustion,
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  political calculation, and fear of civil conflicts
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  would have produced a resolution in any case.
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  What is clear is that Hamilton's influence mattered.
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  It was one significant factor among several,
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  and it came from an unexpected direction, a leading
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  Federalist urging his party to accept the leader
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  of the opposition. The deadlock finally broke
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  on February 17, after 36 ballots. Enough Federalists
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  abstained or switched to allow Jefferson to carry
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  ten states. Burr received four. Two states remained
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  divided. Jefferson became President. Burr became
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  Vice President, as the Constitution required,
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  though the relationship between the two men was
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  now poisoned by the weeks of uncertainty. and
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  by Burr's perceived willingness to entertain
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  Federalist overtures. The crisis had been averted,
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  but the system that produced it remained unchanged.
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  The 36 ballots in the House had revealed the
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  flaw precisely. The Constitution could not tell
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  the difference between a presidential candidate
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  and a vice -presidential candidate on the same
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  ticket. The amendment that followed was designed
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  to make that distinction explicit. The response
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  came in the form of the 12th Amendment, proposed
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  by Congress in December 1803 and ratified by
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  the requisite number of states in 1804. The amendment
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  required electors to cast separate ballots for
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  president and vice president, specifying which
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  vote was for which office. It eliminated the
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  possibility that running mates would tie for
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  the presidency. It also clarified the contingent
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  election procedures. requiring the House to choose
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  from the top three candidates and the Senate
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  to choose the Vice President from the top two.
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  The amendment was not a minor technical adjustment.
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  It was a significant constitutional adaptation,
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  an acknowledgement that the original system could
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  not function under conditions of organized national
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  party competition. The 12th Amendment did not
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  solve every problem the Electoral College would
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  face. But it did address the specific vulnerability
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  exposed in 1800, the collision between undifferentiated
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  votes and coordinated tickets. The election of
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  1800 thus stands as a moment when the Constitution
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  had to be repaired because its authors had not
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  imagined the political world it would actually
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  govern. The framers were not foolish in their
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  assumptions. They were working within a tradition
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  that regarded organized parties with suspicion.
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  as factions that would corrupt republican virtue
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  the willingness to set aside private or factional
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  interest for the public good but parties developed
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  anyway as mechanisms for organizing disagreement
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  and contesting elections the constitutional system
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  had to accommodate a reality it had not anticipated
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  we should be careful not to smooth this history
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  into comfortable myth the transfer of power in
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  1801 was peaceful in the sense that no violence
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  occurred, that no army marched on the capital,
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  that the institutions eventually functioned as
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  designed. But it was not effortless. It required
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  36 ballots in the House, intense political maneuvering,
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  the intervention of a man who had no formal role
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  in the process, and the implicit threat of civil
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  disorder if the deadlock persisted. The Revolution
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  of 1800, as Jefferson later called it in a letter
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  describing the restoration of republican principles,
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  was not a revolution in the ordinary sense. It
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  was a transfer of power between competing parties
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  achieved through constitutional mechanisms that
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  had nearly broken down. Nor should we assume
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  that Aaron Burr was simply a villain in this
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  story, plotting from the outset to steal the
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  presidency from his running mate. The evidence
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  does not support that clarity. Burr did not publicly
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  campaign for the presidency during the contingent
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  election, though he also did not withdraw. His
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  private communications are less fully documented
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  than we might wish. The ambiguity matters because
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  it preserves the uncertainty that the participants
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  themselves faced. Federalist congressmen had
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  to judge Burr's character and intentions without
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  reliable information. Some judged him preferable
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  to Jefferson. Others found him dangerously opaque.
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  The seed of later hatred between Burr and Hamilton,
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  which would culminate in their fatal duel in
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  1804, was planted in these weeks of suspicion
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  and maneuver. The office of the presidency did
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  not change in 1801, but the system surrounding
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  it did. The 12th Amendment forced the constitutional
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  machinery to acknowledge the permanent reality
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  of parties the amendment did not create parties
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  it recognized them it built into the constitutional
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  machinery a feature that the original design
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  had assumed away this is the deeper significance
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  of the election of 1800 it reveals the constitution
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  not as a finished monument but as a working document
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  subject to strain and capable of adaptation.
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  The original electoral college was designed for
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  a world of independent electors exercising personal
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  judgment. The political world that developed
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  was one of coordinated parties running discipline
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  tickets. The gap between design and reality produced
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  a crisis, and the crisis produced an amendment.
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  The Constitution survived because it could be
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  changed, not because it had anticipated everything.
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  When we look back at the winter of 1801, we see
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  representatives voting through 36 ballots in
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  an unfinished capital, sleeping in their chamber,
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  calculating the risks of deadlock against the
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  dangers of concession. We see a nation that had
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  not yet decided whether its constitutional experiment
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  would endure. And we see, finally, a system that
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  had to be repaired because its authors, however
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  wise, could not foresee the political world their
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  creation would help to bring into being. The
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  presidency was designed without parties. The
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  election of 1800 forced the constitution to adapt
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  to a party system that was already permanent
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  and that would shape every presidential election
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  to follow.