Latest / DEEP INSIGHT / What the delayed opening of China-North Korea bridge says about their ties

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What the delayed opening of China-North Korea bridge says about their ties · DEEP INSIGHT

• 0:01
  Speaker 1: Twelve years ago, North Korea and China began work on
• 0:04
  Speaker 1: a new bridge between them. On Thursday, it finally opened.
• 0:08
  Speaker 1: But what took so long, and what is it for
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: now that it's opened? The four-lane, three-kilometre crossing connects Dangdong
• 0:16
  Speaker 1: in northeast China to Sinuiju in North Korea. Beijing says
• 0:21
  Speaker 1: the bridge over the Yalu River will promote economic, trade
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  Speaker 1: and people-to-people exchanges. The bridge is the biggest of at
• 0:28
  Speaker 1: least 17 active road and rail links between the two countries.
• 0:32
  Speaker 1: This new link opens a month after the bridge was
• 0:35
  Speaker 1: inaugurated between North Korea and Russia. Let's get more on
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  Speaker 1: this from Dr Edward Howell. He's a lecturer in international
• 0:44
  Speaker 1: relations at the University of Oxford and author of a
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  Speaker 1: new axis of upheaval.
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  Speaker 3: Dr.
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  Speaker 1: Howell, who would you say stands to benefit more from
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  Speaker 1: the opening of this bridge, North Korea or China?
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  Speaker 3: Thank you very much.
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  Speaker 2: Well, trade between China and North Korea has now returned
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  Speaker 2: to pre-coronavirus levels. And last year, Chinese exports to North
• 1:10
  Speaker 2: Korea rose by 25% to just over $ 2 billion. So
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  Speaker 2: the bridge is a telling signal that neither North Korea
• 1:20
  Speaker 2: nor China intends to divorce itself from the other and
• 1:26
  Speaker 2: that the economic relationship is expected to continue. Trade and
• 1:31
  Speaker 2: tourism between North Korea and China is likely to continue
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  Speaker 2: and to grow. And this bridge, which is the largest
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  Speaker 2: border crossing between the two countries, is likely to be
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  Speaker 2: a key bridge.
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  Speaker 3: Hub for this.
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  Speaker 2: We must remember that Sinuiju, where the bridge connects in
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  Speaker 2: North Korea, is North Korea's largest import and export hub
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  Speaker 2: for trade with China. And all of this trade is
• 2:00
  Speaker 2: not just legal, but also illegal. I think we need
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  Speaker 2: to bear in mind and remember that China as with Russia,
• 2:08
  Speaker 2: is a big enabler and a key facilitator of North
• 2:12
  Speaker 2: Korea's sanctions evasion.
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  Speaker 3: For North Korea, though, this is a big benefit.
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  Speaker 2: And as you've mentioned, only last month, the first road
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  Speaker 2: bridge linking North Korea and Russia, Tumangang, was opened. And
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  Speaker 2: this road bridge only took just over a year to
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  Speaker 2: be completed, so far faster than the North Korean bridge
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  Speaker 2: with China. What we're seeing here, therefore, is Pyongyang wanting
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  Speaker 2: to make sure that it benefits both from Russia and
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  Speaker 2: from China.
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  Speaker 1: There are a number of things to unpack there. I
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  Speaker 1: do want to talk about the China versus Russia relationship
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  Speaker 1: and how North Korea might be profiting from both at
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  Speaker 1: the same time. But just on that point of the
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  Speaker 1: time it takes to build a bridge, right? I mean,
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  Speaker 1: North Korea and Russia, one year, the bridge is complete.
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  Speaker 1: North Korea and China, 14 years. Why so long? And
• 3:11
  Speaker 1: what explains this delay?
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  Speaker 2: So on the part of the North Korea-China bridge, the
• 3:18
  Speaker 2: delay was largely due to issues on North Korea's side,
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  Speaker 2: infrastructure issues on North Korea's side.
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  Speaker 3: We must also remember that that coronavirus.
• 3:29
  Speaker 2: played a huge role in delaying any kind of North
• 3:33
  Speaker 2: Korean involvement with the outside world, including China. After North
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  Speaker 2: Korea closed its borders for just over three years in
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  Speaker 2: January 2020, trade with China plummeted by over 85% within
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  Speaker 2: a year. So this highlights how China is North Korea's
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  Speaker 2: main economic benefactor, and it gives a clear reason as
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  Speaker 2: to why North Korea doesn't want to divorce itself from
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  Speaker 2: China completely. But with respect to the bridge with Russia,
• 4:02
  Speaker 2: the Tumen River Bridge, it was built phenomenally quickly.
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  Speaker 3: It opened last month. And this is a key sign.
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  Speaker 2: That the relationship between Russia and North Korea, particularly the
• 4:14
  Speaker 2: security cooperation, but also beyond, is expected to outlive the
• 4:20
  Speaker 2: end of the Ukraine war, however and whenever the Ukraine
• 4:24
  Speaker 2: war ends.
• 4:25
  Speaker 1: So help us understand this. You have this security cooperation
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  Speaker 1: with Russia. I mean, North Korean troops are fighting in Ukraine.
• 4:34
  Speaker 1: Some of them have been captured as well. And in 2024,
• 4:38
  Speaker 1: Vladimir Putin visits North Korea. Earlier this year, Xi Jinping
• 4:43
  Speaker 1: visits North Korea. From the Chinese perspective, how did they
• 4:50
  Speaker 1: react to the Russians... coming closer to the North Koreans
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  Speaker 1: and this keen cooperation that seemed to be developing between
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  Speaker 1: the two countries, given that it is China, as you
• 5:00
  Speaker 1: yourself said, is the biggest economic benefactor for North Korea?
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  Speaker 2: I think one of the biggest misconceptions we have is
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  Speaker 2: that China is angry at the Russia-North Korea alliance. And
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  Speaker 2: this is now an alliance. As of last year, both
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  Speaker 2: Russia and North Korea call it an alliance, an invincible alliance.
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  Speaker 2: I think China is feeling queasy. China is a little
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  Speaker 2: bit uncomfortable. China wants to ensure that it maintains its
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  Speaker 2: influence over the Korean Peninsula. But the visits by Xi
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  Speaker 2: Jinping to North Korea and the multiple exchanges between high-level
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  Speaker 2: Russian and North Korean ministers and obviously Kim Jong-un and
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  Speaker 2: Putin highlight how this is a clear strategy on the
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  Speaker 2: part of North Korea. diversify from China, not reduce Pyongyang's
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  Speaker 2: relationship with Beijing in so doing, and benefit from both countries.
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  Speaker 2: China is not angry at the Russia-North Korea alliance, because
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  Speaker 2: if China were truly angry, it would do one or
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  Speaker 2: both of two things. Firstly, Beijing could stop helping North
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  Speaker 2: Korea evade sanctions. And China has done nothing of the sort. Indeed,
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  Speaker 2: China has continued to help North Korea evade sanctions. And secondly,
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  Speaker 2: China could stop supplying Russia with dual-use technologies and fuel
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  Speaker 2: the Kremlin's war against Ukraine. we must remember that China
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  Speaker 2: is the biggest enabler of Russia's war against Ukraine. China
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  Speaker 2: has certainly not stopped doing that as well. So I
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  Speaker 2: think we need to dispute the narrative that China is
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  Speaker 2: angry at the Russia-North Korea relationship. I think in a
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  Speaker 2: more nuanced fashion, Beijing is uncomfortable, a little bit nauseous,
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  Speaker 2: but definitely not angry in my view.
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  Speaker 1: But then clearly China... is it fair to say has
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  Speaker 1: no other choice but to go along with the arrangement
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  Speaker 1: that the North Koreans and the Russians are developing? Because
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  Speaker 1: North Korea, if earlier Russia wasn't completely on side, now
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  Speaker 1: North Korea has another option. And in the past, the
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  Speaker 1: regime of Kim Jong-un has shown that it is willing to, well,
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  Speaker 1: not listen to what China is saying and what Beijing
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  Speaker 1: is saying. And that has been a source of annoyance
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  Speaker 1: in the past. So to come back to what I
• 7:34
  Speaker 1: was saying earlier, Is it not fair to say also
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  Speaker 1: that China has no option but to go along with
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  Speaker 1: the way North Korea is dealing with Russia?
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  Speaker 2: China's ultimate priority is to maintain the status quo and
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  Speaker 2: the stability of its border with the Korean Peninsula. Stability
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  Speaker 2: and an aversion to chaos are the current ruling regime,
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  Speaker 2: the Chinese Communist Party's main priorities.
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  Speaker 3: What we must remember.
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  Speaker 2: is that China's stance on North Korea's denuclearisation seems to
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  Speaker 2: have evolved over time. After North Korea conducted its first
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  Speaker 2: nuclear test in October 2006, Beijing expressed its dissatisfaction, even
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  Speaker 2: its ire, at having a North Korean neighbour that was
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  Speaker 2: getting nuclear weapons, a naughty nuclear neighbour.
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  Speaker 3: Right. But.
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  Speaker 2: This year, when Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang in June, the
• 8:33
  Speaker 2: word nuclear, let alone denuclearization, did not cross either Xi
• 8:39
  Speaker 2: or Kim Jong-un's lips. We see China changing its strategy
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  Speaker 2: from one of reluctant tolerance of a naughty nuclear neighbor
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  Speaker 2: to quasi-tacit acceptance. China does not want to be responsible
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  Speaker 2: for the North Korean nuclear issue.
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  Speaker 3: It has bigger problems to deal with.
• 8:59
  Speaker 1: We started talking about a bridge and we now have
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: two bridges, China, North Korea and North Korea, Russia, becoming
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  Speaker 1: this sort of metaphor for this alliance that has developed,
• 9:11
  Speaker 1: as you also called it that. How do you see
• 9:14
  Speaker 1: this developing, whichever way the Ukraine war goes or whenever
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  Speaker 1: this war ends? Will this alliance stand the test of time?
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  Speaker 1: Will it continue to develop or was this just an
• 9:25
  Speaker 1: alliance of convenience during the Ukraine war?
• 9:30
  Speaker 2: Crucially, China, Russia and North Korea are not in a
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  Speaker 2: tripartite alliance. They are not in a formalised alliance. At
• 9:38
  Speaker 2: the moment, these alliances that we see are bilateral. North
• 9:42
  Speaker 2: Korea and Russia, China and North Korea. China and North
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  Speaker 2: Korea signed a mutual defence treaty in 1961. But the
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  Speaker 2: fact that China, Russia and North Korea are not in
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  Speaker 2: a formalised alliance means that we in the West, in
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  Speaker 2: the US, even in Europe, must pay more, not less,
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  Speaker 2: attention to these actors. Because however and whenever the Ukraine
• 10:05
  Speaker 2: war ends, these three countries are going to continue helping
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  Speaker 2: each other in order to undermine the US-led international order.
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  Speaker 3: If the Ukraine war ends.
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  Speaker 2: And Russia no longer needs North Korean troops, Russia does
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  Speaker 2: need a plentiful supply of cheap labour. North Korea is
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  Speaker 2: going to offer that supply, because even before the Ukraine
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  Speaker 2: war began, North Korea supplied labour both to Russia and
• 10:35
  Speaker 2: to China. China and Russia are going to continue helping
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  Speaker 2: North Korea evade sanctions. And as I've mentioned, we know
• 10:42
  Speaker 2: about North Korean workers working in slave labor conditions, both
• 10:48
  Speaker 2: in China and in Russia. These factors are likely to
• 10:52
  Speaker 2: continue after the end of the Ukraine war. So even
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  Speaker 2: though China, Russia and North Korea are not in a
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  Speaker 2: formalized alliance, and it's important to be clear, These relations
• 11:03
  Speaker 2: are going to strengthen and solidify over time, and this
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  Speaker 2: is why we should pay more, not less, attention to them.
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  Speaker 1: We'll leave it there for the moment.
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  Speaker 3: Dr.
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  Speaker 1: Edward Howell, thanks so much for your time.
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  Speaker 3: Thank you.
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  Speaker 1: So what do you think? Will the cooperation between the
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  Speaker 1: three countries in the manner in which Dr. Howell described
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  Speaker 1: it continue to grow? And what is the role that
• 11:29
  Speaker 1: the bridges between these individual countries will play in that?
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  Speaker 1: Write in the comments and let us know. I'm Biresh
• 11:36
  Speaker 1: Banerjee in Berlin. Thanks so much for watching.