Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 019 - The War in Vietnam 1964
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter eighteen, Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:05Speaker 1: by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:11Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:14Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Chapter
- 0:19Speaker 1: eighteen The War in Vietnam nineteen sixty four. Once asked
- 0:24Speaker 1: why the United States should not have command over the
- 0:27Speaker 1: Vietnamese Armed Forces, General Harkins replied that this would be
- 0:31Speaker 1: contrary to US national policy. More to the point, the
- 0:35Speaker 1: Vietnamese government would not agree to the arrangement since it
- 0:39Speaker 1: jealously guarded its sovereign right to accept or reject American advice.
- 0:44Speaker 1: Although this question and this position were never officially challenged,
- 0:48Speaker 1: certain other command problems continued to vex the carrying out
- 0:52Speaker 1: of the counterinsurgency, among them with the tie in of
- 0:56Speaker 1: Macvee and MAAG, the role an influence of the US
- 1:01Speaker 1: Air Force and directing policy in the country, chiefly in
- 1:05Speaker 1: the controversy over the single management of aircraft and the
- 1:09Speaker 1: organization of the Vietnamese Air Force. These received attention in
- 1:13Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four in the USAF view the principal command
- 1:19Speaker 1: problem in Vietnam since nineteen sixty two was the absence
- 1:23Speaker 1: of experienced, high ranking air officers on the mcv joint
- 1:27Speaker 1: staff to explain what airpower could and could not do.
- 1:31Speaker 1: The MACV staff was dominated by Army officers rather than
- 1:35Speaker 1: really jointly manned. No component Army and Navy units existed
- 1:40Speaker 1: under McVie, with the equivalent status of the Second Air Division.
- 1:45Speaker 1: Admiral Felt was sympathetic to having a senior USAF officer
- 1:50Speaker 1: in the mainstream of MACV current operations. In September nineteen
- 1:54Speaker 1: sixty three, he had proposed filling the McVie Chief of
- 1:58Speaker 1: Staff slot with the USA a F officer when it
- 2:01Speaker 1: became vacant in mid nineteen sixty four. The Joint chiefs
- 2:05Speaker 1: of Staff approved, but the Secretary of Defense did not.
- 2:09Speaker 1: After talking with Harkins during his December nineteen sixty three
- 2:13Speaker 1: visit to Saigon, the Defense Secretary was set on making
- 2:17Speaker 1: changes along lines suggested by the Army. Early in nineteen
- 2:22Speaker 1: sixty four, he created the new position of Deputy Commander
- 2:25Speaker 1: McFie and named Army Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland to
- 2:30Speaker 1: do it. He placed Brigadier General Ben Sternberg USA in
- 2:34Speaker 1: the J one personnel niche he downgraded the USAF colonel
- 2:40Speaker 1: serving as J two intelligence to Deputy J two and
- 2:45Speaker 1: put a Marine Corps brigadier general over him. He directed
- 2:48Speaker 1: Harkins to reorganize McFee, and the subsequent alteration shrunk the
- 2:53Speaker 1: USAF allocation of J staff jobs to the post of
- 2:58Speaker 1: J five, held by Major General Milton B. Adams. Macnamara
- 3:04Speaker 1: nevertheless believed the Air Force to be well represented. He
- 3:07Speaker 1: pointed to the second Air Division Commander in the MAAG
- 3:12Speaker 1: Air Force Section Chief, who were both general officers and
- 3:15Speaker 1: president in Saigon. Admiral felt General Jacob E. Smart Pack
- 3:21Speaker 1: Air Force Commander, questioned the wisdom of revampping Macvee. While
- 3:26Speaker 1: the Vietnamese government was trying to recover from the shock
- 3:29Speaker 1: of two coups, they had not concurred in a joint
- 3:32Speaker 1: chief suggestion on February fifteen to merge MAAG and MCV,
- 3:38Speaker 1: But a study by General Sternberg addressed the broader question.
- 3:42Speaker 1: The existence of the two headquarters had surely led to
- 3:45Speaker 1: duplication of effort, occasional lapses and coordination, and a needlessly
- 3:51Speaker 1: complicated advisory program. If the functions were fused under MCVEE.
- 3:56Speaker 1: Sternberg favored MCVEE as a specified Army command in lieu
- 4:01Speaker 1: of a subordinate joint command that would enhance the Army's
- 4:04Speaker 1: role at the expense of the Navy and Air Force.
- 4:07Speaker 1: While General Smart assented to the need for a large
- 4:10Speaker 1: Army share in the advisory assistance effort, he failed to
- 4:14Speaker 1: understand the logic of army predominance. When Macnamara and Taylor
- 4:18Speaker 1: came to Hawaii in March, Smart argued for placing senior
- 4:22Speaker 1: US Air Force officers in decision making positions in the
- 4:26Speaker 1: reorganized headquarters so that air power could be best employed.
- 4:31Speaker 1: The Secretary said he knew of no operation that had
- 4:34Speaker 1: suffered from want of air support. Taylor had heard of
- 4:37Speaker 1: such instances, but blamed poor communications instead of faulty organization
- 4:43Speaker 1: or unsound policy. Admiral Felt asserted that at times Army
- 4:48Speaker 1: advisers neglected to pass along air support requests because they
- 4:51Speaker 1: wanted to use army aircraft to further army doctrinal concepts.
- 4:56Speaker 1: Macnamara refused to change his outlook. General was west Moreland,
- 5:00Speaker 1: former commander of the eighteenth Airborne Corps, became the deputy
- 5:05Speaker 1: commander of MCBE. On January twenty seventh, nineteen sixty four,
- 5:10Speaker 1: Major General Joseph H. Moore, a close friend of west
- 5:13Speaker 1: Moreland since boyhood, replaced General Anthos as Second Air Division
- 5:17Speaker 1: commander on the thirty first. Air Force officials hoped that
- 5:21Speaker 1: Moore's close ties with west Moreland would help brighten the image,
- 5:26Speaker 1: expand the influence, and enlarge the number of senior staff
- 5:29Speaker 1: personnel of the Air Force, as well as clear up
- 5:33Speaker 1: air problems. General Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, ordered west
- 5:37Speaker 1: Moreland to get the air mission straightened out. He said
- 5:40Speaker 1: he would not tolerate a fight for high bound doctrinal concepts.
- 5:45Speaker 1: If army doctrine got in the way of the war effort,
- 5:48Speaker 1: Wheeler could and would change doctrine with a stroke of
- 5:50Speaker 1: his pen. Besides one hundred and four aircraft, the Second
- 5:54Speaker 1: Air Division had about forty six hundred people in January
- 5:58Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four, six on the MCV staff, four hundred
- 6:03Speaker 1: MG and more than four thousand in the U. S
- 6:07Speaker 1: Air Force units. Yet hope for a bigger Air Force
- 6:10Speaker 1: part in counterinsurgency soon vanished. The MCV J three complained
- 6:16Speaker 1: that his US Air Force deputy, who was highly regarded
- 6:19Speaker 1: by the second Air Division, was unable to look at
- 6:22Speaker 1: J three matters except through US Air Force tinted glasses,
- 6:27Speaker 1: knew nothing about ground operations and was of little use.
- 6:31Speaker 1: The deputy was succeeded by an Army officer. General Moore
- 6:35Speaker 1: pressed for the assignment of a US Air Force officer
- 6:39Speaker 1: as McVie Chief of Staff when General Wead of the
- 6:42Speaker 1: Marine Corps wound up his tour in May. Instead, Major
- 6:46Speaker 1: General Richard G. Stillwell moved from J three to Chief
- 6:49Speaker 1: of Staff, and another Army officer, Brigadier General William E. Depew,
- 6:55Speaker 1: took over the J three job, perhaps foreshadowing the end
- 6:59Speaker 1: of the advisory era. MAAAG was closed out on May fifteenth,
- 7:04Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four. Its functions went to an expand at
- 7:08Speaker 1: McVie headquarters, and the Army Corps advisory groups fell directly
- 7:12Speaker 1: under MCVIV. The MAAAG Air Force Section became the Air
- 7:17Speaker 1: Force Advisory Group, assigned to McVie and with operational control
- 7:22Speaker 1: vested in General Moore as the US Air Force component Commander.
- 7:27Speaker 1: Moore also came to be the senior advisor to the
- 7:29Speaker 1: Vietnamese Air Force, General Rowland, Chief of the Air Force
- 7:34Speaker 1: Advisory Group acted as Moore's deputy for the Vietnamese Air
- 7:38Speaker 1: Force Military Assistance Program. To General Smart, the new setup
- 7:43Speaker 1: did little to extend air knowledge and experience at MCVV
- 7:47Speaker 1: rather than trimming the headquarters. The change triggered a request
- 7:50Speaker 1: to raise staff spaces by three hundred and ten, two
- 7:54Speaker 1: hundred and eighty three U S Army, twenty four Navy
- 7:57Speaker 1: Marine Corps, and three US Air Force. Smart recommended at
- 8:01Speaker 1: least thirty eight more U S. Air Force officers as
- 8:04Speaker 1: directorate and branch chiefs. Disregarding his desires, McVie in September
- 8:09Speaker 1: asked for seventy one new United States Air Force spaces,
- 8:13Speaker 1: mostly for field advisory work. General Westmoreland rose to McVie
- 8:17Speaker 1: commander when General Haskins reached retirement age on June twentieth.
- 8:22Speaker 1: Ambassador Lodge resigned on the twenty third to join in
- 8:25Speaker 1: the national elections at home, and President Johnson selected General
- 8:29Speaker 1: Taylor for the post. On July fifteenth, Admiral Felt retired
- 8:33Speaker 1: and Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Junior became sink Pack.
- 8:38Speaker 1: A whole new leadership emerged should an Air Force officer
- 8:42Speaker 1: be named as Westmoreland's deputy. West Moreland had said in
- 8:46Speaker 1: early June that he needed no deputy, but General le
- 8:49Speaker 1: May argued in joint Chief of Staff discussions that a
- 8:52Speaker 1: deputy from another service was a must to preserve the
- 8:55Speaker 1: unified nature of mack V Because of broadening air operations.
- 9:00Speaker 1: He thought the deputy should be a US Air Force general.
- 9:04Speaker 1: The Navy and Marine Corps thought so too. General Wheeler,
- 9:07Speaker 1: Army Chief, suggested that the Second Air Division Commander be
- 9:11Speaker 1: designated Deputy Commander for Air as an additional duty of
- 9:15Speaker 1: Air Operations Group. Jaerman Taylor was for giving the deputy
- 9:20Speaker 1: position to an officer who could afford across the board
- 9:23Speaker 1: assistance to west Moreland. Owing to the nature of operations,
- 9:27Speaker 1: he wished to see a two or three star Army
- 9:29Speaker 1: general in the job. Taylor queried west Moreland, who then
- 9:33Speaker 1: said he wanted an Army general. After McNamara's approval, on
- 9:37Speaker 1: June eighteenth, Lieutenant General John L. Throck Morton was assigned.
- 9:43Speaker 1: General LeMay reiterated the need for United States Air Force
- 9:47Speaker 1: expertise on the McRee staff. In September, west Moreland proposed
- 9:51Speaker 1: to give the Second Air Division commander the second hat
- 9:55Speaker 1: of Deputy Commander for Air Operations MCVEE. The Air Staff
- 9:59Speaker 1: and Pacific Air Force Command opposed this action because it
- 10:02Speaker 1: offered the MACV staff no real additional help. Westmoreland nonetheless
- 10:07Speaker 1: went ahead with the proposal on November twelfth. Sinkpak bowed
- 10:11Speaker 1: to the political climate and put it forward to the
- 10:14Speaker 1: Joint Chiefs. Not until seven months later was the new
- 10:17Speaker 1: title approved. Still, the reshuffling of May fifteenth bestowed some benefits.
- 10:23Speaker 1: Tucking the Air Force Advisory Group under Second Air Division
- 10:26Speaker 1: was long overdue in fostered unity and control. The harmony
- 10:31Speaker 1: between west Moreland and more nurtured better working relations between
- 10:35Speaker 1: MACV and Second Air Division. Yet General west Moreland continued
- 10:39Speaker 1: to command U S Army components, violating the principle that
- 10:44Speaker 1: commanders of unified activities must be divorced from service operations.
- 10:49Speaker 1: In effect, the MACV Air Component Commander answered to the
- 10:52Speaker 1: Army component commander. Moreover, the sparse service expertise on the
- 10:57Speaker 1: MACREE staff made it hard to pue joint matters properly.
- 11:02Speaker 1: A case in point was the MACV Airlift Allocation Board,
- 11:05Speaker 1: run by one overworked United States Air Force officer in
- 11:09Speaker 1: j four Army officers so ruled the MACVI Joint Research
- 11:13Speaker 1: and Test Activity that the Air Force hesitated to test
- 11:17Speaker 1: combined concepts for combinations of equipment. Just eight of the
- 11:21Speaker 1: forty five authorized officer spaces and J three were Air Force.
- 11:25Speaker 1: Only one was a Colonel Slut the newly created Deputy
- 11:28Speaker 1: Assistant Chief of Staff J three for Air. J three,
- 11:33Speaker 1: for the most part trusted air matters to the Second
- 11:36Speaker 1: Air Division staff, but more and more assumed control of
- 11:39Speaker 1: day to day air operations. This was done at first
- 11:42Speaker 1: through an American MACVI staff element in the Vietnamese Armed
- 11:46Speaker 1: Forces Joint Operations Center. Later, an Army Air Operations Section
- 11:51Speaker 1: was formed with J three personnel to allocate Army aircraft
- 11:55Speaker 1: to the corps and to control other army aviation resources.
- 12:00Speaker 1: To coordinate Army and Air Force infrared reconnaissance, the MACV
- 12:04Speaker 1: Target Research and Analysis Center was founded in December nineteen
- 12:08Speaker 1: sixty four. This J two function took care of centralizing targeting.
- 12:14Speaker 1: The tactical air control system survived and outwardly appeared to
- 12:17Speaker 1: meet doctrinal needs. Still, it was soon evident that the
- 12:21Speaker 1: status of the tactical Air commander was severely eroded. The
- 12:25Speaker 1: Second Air Division Commander had no command authority, no direct
- 12:29Speaker 1: operating duties, and no staff support. Senior United States Air
- 12:34Speaker 1: Force officers perceived that the local situation in Vietnam dictated
- 12:38Speaker 1: several deviations from proven tactical air doctrine, but they cautioned
- 12:43Speaker 1: against adopting the MACV Air Control System as a model
- 12:47Speaker 1: for worldwide air command in control procedures. The performance of
- 12:52Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force also stirred concern. Central to the
- 12:56Speaker 1: Vietnamese military concept was the parceling out of resource forces
- 13:00Speaker 1: among the four corps commanders, who governed all ground, air, naval,
- 13:04Speaker 1: and paramilitary forces within their areas. Air Force officers, notably
- 13:09Speaker 1: General Smart, protested splintering the meager Vietnamese airpower. Even so,
- 13:15Speaker 1: many army officers believed this grouping was required and what
- 13:18Speaker 1: they saw as largely a ground struggle. Colonel nun kaal
- 13:23Speaker 1: Kai had one command of the Vietnamese Air Force for
- 13:26Speaker 1: his part in the Ming Kup, and polished his prestige
- 13:30Speaker 1: by supporting the Kang Kup. He assured Generals Moore and
- 13:34Speaker 1: Roland that he did not intend to relinquish centralized control
- 13:37Speaker 1: over air power. New wings Kai said were to be
- 13:41Speaker 1: assigned to geographical Corps areas rather than to core commanders.
- 13:46Speaker 1: On March fifteenth, Vietnamese tactical wing headquarters were transferred to
- 13:50Speaker 1: the Corps areas and located at Dinang Phliku and Benoit,
- 13:55Speaker 1: and another was projected for Kang Foe. When the new
- 13:59Speaker 1: airfield was finish, a composite airlift and reconnaissance wing continued
- 14:03Speaker 1: to operate under the Air Operations Center. The proposal to
- 14:08Speaker 1: place liaison and helicopter squadrons under the Corps came up
- 14:12Speaker 1: in April. Kai dissented and Macvi siught it with him.
- 14:16Speaker 1: The transfer was not carried out. General Moore worked to
- 14:20Speaker 1: keep the tactical air control system intact, including the air
- 14:24Speaker 1: support operation centers. Since the Vietnamese wing commanders that Dnang
- 14:29Speaker 1: and play Coup advised and planned with CORP commanders the
- 14:33Speaker 1: roles of the first and second Corps Air Support Operation
- 14:36Speaker 1: Center's decline, the sub operations Center at Nang Tran was
- 14:41Speaker 1: shut down on the whole. More considered the Vietnamese Air
- 14:45Speaker 1: Force organization a deviation, but close enough to classical air
- 14:50Speaker 1: concepts to be acceptable. Major General Sam Mattox, Junior thirteenth
- 14:55Speaker 1: Air Force Commander, decided not to dwell on the defects.
- 15:00Speaker 1: By retaining the integrity of his command, Kai could deploy
- 15:03Speaker 1: his units as a national counter coup force. Yet American
- 15:07Speaker 1: influence over Vietnamese air operations diminished. For example, the forty
- 15:12Speaker 1: first Tactical Wing and First Corps staffs planned for March
- 15:16Speaker 1: thirty a night medium level bombing rate against the viet
- 15:20Speaker 1: Com Training Center. Army and Air Force advisers first learned
- 15:24Speaker 1: of the attack when planning was well under way and
- 15:26Speaker 1: white phosphorus bombs were requested from American stocks. Twelve T
- 15:32Speaker 1: twenty eights and four A one h s participated. Colonel Chai,
- 15:37Speaker 1: who rode in one of the T twenty eighths, depicted
- 15:40Speaker 1: the strike as a highly successful demonstration of a new
- 15:43Speaker 1: night bombing capability. Vietnamese Army photo interpreters gave a glowing
- 15:48Speaker 1: account of damages to the viet Cong, but the U. S.
- 15:52Speaker 1: Army interpreters failed to find the same results. The word
- 15:56Speaker 1: for the Air Force in Vietnam, General Anthus, had written
- 15:59Speaker 1: in Novae number nineteen sixty three as austerity having both
- 16:03Speaker 1: American and Vietnamese components in mind. War weary air Commando
- 16:08Speaker 1: aircraft a fledgling Vietnamese Air Force and a slow air
- 16:13Speaker 1: request that made it difficult to seize combat opportunities. The
- 16:17Speaker 1: United States Air Force thirty fourth Tactical Group was scheduled
- 16:21Speaker 1: to phase out of Vietnam. Withdrawal would begin in mid
- 16:24Speaker 1: nineteen sixty four with the departure of the nineteenth Tactical
- 16:28Speaker 1: Air Support Squadron, which furnished forward air controllers. The first
- 16:33Speaker 1: Air Commando Squadron due to receive in June nineteen sixty four.
- 16:37Speaker 1: The first two of eighteen rebuilt on Mark B twenty
- 16:41Speaker 1: six k's was to leave in mid nineteen sixty five.
- 16:45Speaker 1: Farm gates B twenty six's were nearly worn out, but
- 16:49Speaker 1: the Second Air Division expected them to survive with careful
- 16:52Speaker 1: flying if the viet Cong introduced no heavy weapons. With
- 16:56Speaker 1: anti aircraft sighting devices, the new Vietnamese five eighteenth Fighter
- 17:02Speaker 1: Squadron was to get a one HS in March nineteen
- 17:05Speaker 1: sixty four. Also that month, the seven hundredth and sixteenth
- 17:10Speaker 1: Composite Reconnaissance Squadron was programmed to have its eighteen r
- 17:15Speaker 1: T twenty eighth and three RC forty seven during the
- 17:19Speaker 1: second quarter of nineteen sixty four. The United States Air
- 17:23Speaker 1: Forces T twenty eights were to be replaced on a
- 17:27Speaker 1: one for one basis with dual piloted A one hs.
- 17:31Speaker 1: By nineteen sixty four, Vietnamese and American aircraft were furnishing,
- 17:36Speaker 1: but one half of the support asked for. The reasons
- 17:39Speaker 1: lay in air request net troubles and the rising damage
- 17:42Speaker 1: to planes from viet Com ground defenses. On February eleventh,
- 17:47Speaker 1: after the wing of a B twenty six at Eggland
- 17:50Speaker 1: Air Force Base broke off in flight, all B twenty
- 17:53Speaker 1: six's and Vietnam were taken out of combat. They could
- 17:56Speaker 1: fly only straight level with the lightest of ordnance loads.
- 18:00Speaker 1: The uncertain combat worthiness of the old B twenty sixes
- 18:03Speaker 1: led led Pacific Air Force Command to suggest deploying a
- 18:07Speaker 1: squadron of the third Bombardment Wings light jet B fifty
- 18:11Speaker 1: sevens from Japan to Benoi. These planes were being withdrawn
- 18:16Speaker 1: from the wing, but they were admirable for the war.
- 18:19Speaker 1: Their jet speed spelled swift response to air support requests.
- 18:24Speaker 1: The Macbe commander in sink Pack voiced great concerns over
- 18:27Speaker 1: the loss of the B twenty sixes, which General Westmoreland
- 18:31Speaker 1: called his Sunday punch. Both headquarters proposed a squadron of
- 18:35Speaker 1: B fifty sevens with Vietnamese markings and mixed crews to
- 18:39Speaker 1: operate out of Benoit under farm Gate rules. On March second,
- 18:43Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs made the same suggestion to Defense Secretary
- 18:47Speaker 1: Macnamara At March conferences and Saigon, Macnamara questioned General Moore
- 18:52Speaker 1: regarding Vietnamese Air Force needs. The Secretary judged it cheaper
- 18:57Speaker 1: to give the Vietnamese further aircraft than to bring in
- 19:00Speaker 1: fresh United States Air Force planes. He settled on equipping
- 19:05Speaker 1: all Vietnamese fighter units with A one HS twenty five
- 19:09Speaker 1: tagged for the five hundred and fourteenth Fighter Squadron in
- 19:13Speaker 1: the Third Core Area to replace the T twenty eights.
- 19:17Speaker 1: In addition, he ear marked thirty for the First Air
- 19:20Speaker 1: Command Squadron to take over from the worn out B
- 19:23Speaker 1: twenty six's and T twenty eights. General Smart told Macnamara
- 19:27Speaker 1: and why that tactical air chucked up more than thirty
- 19:31Speaker 1: percent of the enemy casualties in South Vietnam fourteen thousand,
- 19:35Speaker 1: nine hundred and forty four out of forty nine thousand,
- 19:38Speaker 1: one hundred in nineteen sixty two and nineteen sixty three.
- 19:43Speaker 1: If a few obsolete aircraft could do this damage, think
- 19:46Speaker 1: of what new and better planes could achieve. McNamara replied
- 19:50Speaker 1: that he appreciated why B fifty sevens were desired first, However,
- 19:55Speaker 1: the United States should exploit the easier method of sending
- 19:58Speaker 1: him more non jet planes to to help win the war.
- 20:01Speaker 1: What interested him was the possible use of B fifty
- 20:04Speaker 1: sevens in covert operations against North Vietnam. The Defense Secretary's recommendations,
- 20:11Speaker 1: approved by President Johnson embodied equipping the Vietnamese with twenty
- 20:15Speaker 1: five A one hs in exchange for T twenty eight.
- 20:20Speaker 1: At the close of March forty eight B fifty sevens
- 20:23Speaker 1: and crews flew from Yakota Air Base in Japan to
- 20:26Speaker 1: Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Colonel Benjamin S. Preston,
- 20:32Speaker 1: junior commander of the thirty fourth Tactical Group at Benoit,
- 20:36Speaker 1: went all out to keep his B twenty six's in
- 20:39Speaker 1: the air, but clearly they could not be saved. Every
- 20:42Speaker 1: plane had cracked stress plates and loose rivets throughout its wings.
- 20:46Speaker 1: On April eighth, the last of the B twenty six's
- 20:49Speaker 1: and RB twenty six's were to be ferried to Clark
- 20:52Speaker 1: air base for salvage. So long as the T twenty
- 20:56Speaker 1: eighth faced no heavy ground fire, they did the job
- 20:59Speaker 1: despite their fairly slow speed and small armament load. As
- 21:03Speaker 1: Vietcom firing heated up, however, they became vulnerable. On February eighteenth,
- 21:08Speaker 1: a T twenty eight took a hit while flying interdiction,
- 21:12Speaker 1: but the crew fortunately escaped serious injury in the crash landing.
- 21:16Speaker 1: The next day, a second T twenty eight was shot
- 21:19Speaker 1: down while strafe in support of a ground operation, and
- 21:22Speaker 1: the crew men were killed. Three Vietnamese A one H
- 21:26Speaker 1: shared a like fate in February. Since the T twenty
- 21:29Speaker 1: eights had outlived their safe employment in Vietnam, replacement A
- 21:34Speaker 1: one sky Raiders came in. On March eighteenth, the newly
- 21:38Speaker 1: formed Vietnamese five hundred and eighteen Fighter Squadron with ten
- 21:42Speaker 1: of twenty five authorized A one hs began to fly
- 21:46Speaker 1: combat from Benois. Colonel George I. Roddell, deputy to the
- 21:51Speaker 1: macv J three, surveyed the ground fire threat. He thought
- 21:55Speaker 1: that a return to the Air Force's standard four aircraft
- 21:59Speaker 1: fighter flights was in order, with each chelon of two
- 22:02Speaker 1: protecting the other two during low level passes. This called
- 22:06Speaker 1: for more plaines, so Radell recommended that the thirty fourth
- 22:10Speaker 1: Tactical Group did two squadrons each of twenty five A
- 22:15Speaker 1: one e's in lieu of a single squadron of thirty arkins.
- 22:19Speaker 1: Smart and Felt approved and passed the proposal to the
- 22:23Speaker 1: Joint chiefs of Staff. Compelled to stand down the combat
- 22:27Speaker 1: worn B twenty sixes, Colonel Preston wondered how he could
- 22:31Speaker 1: keep the first air command of Squadron going. On March
- 22:34Speaker 1: twenty fourth, a T twenty eight B lost a wing
- 22:37Speaker 1: and crashed while on a bomb run near Sak Trang,
- 22:41Speaker 1: killing the pilot, Captain Edwin G. Shank Junior and the
- 22:45Speaker 1: Vietnamese crewmen. All T twenty eighths had been closely inspected,
- 22:49Speaker 1: and aircraft maintenance was excellent. Even so, the loss of
- 22:53Speaker 1: the T twenty eight so soon after the B twenty
- 22:55Speaker 1: six wing failures impaired pilot morale. By April first, the
- 23:00Speaker 1: second Air Wing Division was practically flat out of business.
- 23:05Speaker 1: On April ninth, the T twenty eight crew was completing
- 23:08Speaker 1: a third strafing pass over a well defended target when
- 23:11Speaker 1: the wings snapped off and the plane crashed. Two specialists
- 23:15Speaker 1: from the North American Aviation Incorporated flew to Benoit ran inspections.
- 23:21Speaker 1: They said that the T twenty eight could not take
- 23:23Speaker 1: the slam bang type flying because it was a trainer,
- 23:27Speaker 1: not a properly stressed fighter pilot. At their suggestion, Colonel
- 23:32Speaker 1: Preston retired the five remaining farm Gate T twenty eights
- 23:36Speaker 1: that had been in combat since November nineteen sixty one.
- 23:40Speaker 1: He borrowed nine newer T twenty eights from the Vietnamese,
- 23:44Speaker 1: bringing the first Air Commando Squadrons combat ready aircraft to fifteen.
- 23:49Speaker 1: He warned pilots about g limits, cautioned them not to
- 23:52Speaker 1: land if carrying external ordinance, and placed limits on loading
- 23:56Speaker 1: the wing stations of B model T twenty eights to
- 24:00Speaker 1: cut damages from small arms fire pressed and set a
- 24:03Speaker 1: minimum altitude of one thousand feet for attack runs. The
- 24:07Speaker 1: T twenty eighth stayed in operation until a one ease
- 24:10Speaker 1: took their place. At least one thousand, five hundred and
- 24:14Speaker 1: forty six air strike requests were received in the first
- 24:17Speaker 1: three months of nineteen sixty four of the four hundred
- 24:20Speaker 1: and twenty four not honored. Two hundred thirty were due
- 24:24Speaker 1: to a shortage of planes. These figures did not present
- 24:27Speaker 1: a true picture for ground commanders, and forward air controllers
- 24:31Speaker 1: disliked to file new request after being turned down. Air
- 24:35Speaker 1: ground operations yielded slight results. Between January sixteenth and nineteenth,
- 24:40Speaker 1: the twenty first Division in Anhuan Province was was supported
- 24:45Speaker 1: by the most tactical air sorties yet flown in the
- 24:48Speaker 1: division area forty four. On the first day, however, the
- 24:51Speaker 1: helleborn troops came to grips with no sizeable enemy forces
- 24:55Speaker 1: on the ground. During January seventeenth through the twenty eighth,
- 24:59Speaker 1: the seventh Division mounted a massive search and clear helleborne
- 25:02Speaker 1: and water invasion into the thin Peu district of kien
- 25:06Speaker 1: Hoi Province. Artillery fire and pre landing strikes by B
- 25:11Speaker 1: twenty SIXUS and T twenty eight supported the operation. Still,
- 25:15Speaker 1: the enemy poured withering ground fire into the first waves
- 25:18Speaker 1: of helicopters, peppering all thirty two craft and downing one
- 25:23Speaker 1: a U H one gunship. On the eighteenth, another armed
- 25:27Speaker 1: UH one was hit and plunged into the water. Only
- 25:31Speaker 1: the co pilot and a crewman were rescued. Even with
- 25:34Speaker 1: constant air cover, friendly losses totaled twenty dead twenty five
- 25:38Speaker 1: wounded and two UH ones destroyed. The Viacong lost forty
- 25:43Speaker 1: six killed and ninety seven captured. The main problem probably
- 25:48Speaker 1: lay in the lack of directness on aerial coordination and
- 25:51Speaker 1: command over a helleborne landing area. The sole person actually
- 25:55Speaker 1: allowed to tell tactical air what to do was the
- 25:58Speaker 1: Vietnamese forward AIRCS controller, and he had neither the rank
- 26:02Speaker 1: nor the experience to be an air commander. Problems also
- 26:06Speaker 1: pervaded the smaller air operations for provincial forces in the
- 26:11Speaker 1: fifth divisionary of Third Corps. For example, the United States
- 26:15Speaker 1: Air Force Leaisan officer pointed out that the viacom kindled
- 26:19Speaker 1: cooking fires at dusk. They could take this risk because
- 26:23Speaker 1: Vietnamese strike pilots were not routinely ready to fly at night.
- 26:27Speaker 1: An exception occurred on January sixteenth, when a Vietnamese C
- 26:32Speaker 1: forty seven flair ship and four A one h is
- 26:35Speaker 1: struck an assembly point in Taynin Province. Most night air
- 26:40Speaker 1: requests were not honored as for day pinpoint strikes. Just
- 26:44Speaker 1: fourteen of sixty seven requested interdiction targets were attacked. In February,
- 26:49Speaker 1: pilots of the five hundred and fourteenth Fighter Squadron said
- 26:53Speaker 1: they were sick and tired of expending their ordinance on
- 26:55Speaker 1: nothing but empty fields, trees, and jungles. This frustration stem
- 27:00Speaker 1: from the drawn out air request handling required by the
- 27:03Speaker 1: fifth Division commander. All immediate sightings of the enemy vanished
- 27:08Speaker 1: before being targeted. There were, however, some good results from
- 27:12Speaker 1: strikes against enemy held areas that provincial troops could not enter.
- 27:16Speaker 1: These were the remote locations in the East Coast provinces
- 27:20Speaker 1: of Third Corps. The FU two Enemies Movements forward air
- 27:25Speaker 1: controller had good rapport with the province chief, who knew
- 27:28Speaker 1: the enemy's movements and could and would approve targets for
- 27:31Speaker 1: air action. Elsewhere, air strikes were hindered by controllers unfamiliar
- 27:36Speaker 1: with the area and by popular force commanders who feared
- 27:39Speaker 1: close fire support by artillery, armed helicopters or fighters. In
- 27:45Speaker 1: light of the lag and strike aircraft response, Army advisers
- 27:49Speaker 1: in Third and Fourth Corps accent at the importance of
- 27:52Speaker 1: helicopter assaults. The Vietnamese as a rule, needed thirty minutes
- 27:56Speaker 1: to scramble fighters while processing a request commonly consumed one hour.
- 28:01Speaker 1: Colonel Melish, air liaison officer of Third Corps urged the
- 28:05Speaker 1: forward staging of aircraft to shave this delay. Three T
- 28:09Speaker 1: twenty eights were sent on ground alert to fan Thiet,
- 28:12Speaker 1: where Viatcong attacks were foreseen. When the foe failed to appear,
- 28:17Speaker 1: the little used T twenty eighths remained exposed to the
- 28:20Speaker 1: hazards of a primitive airstrip. The number of tactical air
- 28:24Speaker 1: sorties available to the Third Corps on a busy day
- 28:27Speaker 1: was around thirty. This contrasted sharply with the average two
- 28:31Speaker 1: hundred and seventy five sorties a day flown by U
- 28:35Speaker 1: S Army planes in support of Third Corps. The Army
- 28:38Speaker 1: aviation assigned to the Corps was sizeable seventeen utility UH one's,
- 28:43Speaker 1: eleven U H one gunships, two C V two transports
- 28:47Speaker 1: for U one utility transports, two O V one armed
- 28:52Speaker 1: reconnaissance planes, and eight L nineteen liaison aircraft. Lesser operations
- 28:58Speaker 1: in the difficult Fourth Corps entailed up to four or
- 29:01Speaker 1: five helleborne missions every day. In the seventh and twenty
- 29:04Speaker 1: first division areas, five U S Air Force T twenty
- 29:08Speaker 1: eights at sak Train could react swiftly, but it took
- 29:11Speaker 1: one and a half hours to get ground alert aircraft
- 29:14Speaker 1: from Bien Ho. Though the Vietnamese one hundred and twelfth
- 29:18Speaker 1: Liaison Squadron kept a detachment of five O one's at Canto,
- 29:23Speaker 1: the planes were confined to forward air control and target
- 29:27Speaker 1: marking duty. The United States Air Force liaison officers hitch
- 29:31Speaker 1: rides on the Army Liison aircraft when they could. Most
- 29:35Speaker 1: of the time, however, they were grounded at the division
- 29:37Speaker 1: command post. Hence, their sole knowledge of the air situation
- 29:41Speaker 1: at a target area came from an Army Liaison communication
- 29:45Speaker 1: relay plane that flew cover over Helliborne landing operations. During March,
- 29:51Speaker 1: barely seventy one of one hundred and twenty six air
- 29:54Speaker 1: support requests from the seventh Division could be satisfied in
- 29:59Speaker 1: the Fourth Corps, and in April, merely eighty four of
- 30:02Speaker 1: one hundred and forty eight requests were approved. The Air
- 30:05Speaker 1: liaisan officer and forward air controllers spent a lot of
- 30:09Speaker 1: their time in keeping ground officers from becoming discouraged with
- 30:12Speaker 1: the sparse air support. According to Lieutenant Colonel Clarence R. Osborne,
- 30:18Speaker 1: junior instant air support from arm U H one helicopters
- 30:23Speaker 1: often saved the day On April twelfth, the Vietcong destroyed
- 30:27Speaker 1: the district town of Kien Long in chiuand En Province.
- 30:31Speaker 1: The Vietnamese Air Force turned in a splendid performance, featuring
- 30:35Speaker 1: an a one h hit on a one hundred and
- 30:38Speaker 1: five millimeter howitzer before dawn and a steady stream of
- 30:42Speaker 1: air support strikes throughout the day. The tactical air support
- 30:46Speaker 1: system squeezed thirty to forty five sorties out of the
- 30:50Speaker 1: aircraft at Benoit, but this was not enough to stave
- 30:53Speaker 1: off a serious government defeat. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs asked
- 30:57Speaker 1: if two separate air control systems operated in Vietnam and
- 31:01Speaker 1: if Vietnamese commanders were getting conflicting advice from US Army
- 31:06Speaker 1: and United States Air Force advisors. Macvieh replied that one
- 31:10Speaker 1: system directed Air Force aircraft, while the other was a
- 31:13Speaker 1: separate aviation headquarters that managed Army and Marine Corps air units.
- 31:18Speaker 1: Since these units afforded special assistance and had no role
- 31:21Speaker 1: in the development of the Vietnamese air structure, I've been
- 31:25Speaker 1: free to employ them as I see fit to the
- 31:27Speaker 1: maximum support of the ground effort. The U. S Army
- 31:31Speaker 1: senior advisor at Third Corps A colonel was an extreme
- 31:35Speaker 1: partisan of Army aviation who slighted tactical air support. He
- 31:39Speaker 1: never invited the corps United States Air Force liaison officer
- 31:43Speaker 1: to planning conferences, and as a matter of fact, was
- 31:46Speaker 1: not on speaking terms with him. The senior advisor prepared
- 31:50Speaker 1: pacification plans that made no mention of tactical air support.
- 31:54Speaker 1: When General Moore offered help, he was turned down. Moore
- 31:58Speaker 1: told General Westmoreland of this directed that province pacification plans
- 32:03Speaker 1: contained an air operations annex drawn by United States Air
- 32:07Speaker 1: Force advisors. From then on, the colonel called the Air
- 32:11Speaker 1: liaison officer to all briefings and planning conferences. Air advisers
- 32:16Speaker 1: were few among the ground units. The second Air Division
- 32:19Speaker 1: had authority for seventeen lieutenant colonels as air liaison officers
- 32:23Speaker 1: with corps and divisions, and Army advisors outright them. There
- 32:27Speaker 1: were thirty two captains and lieutenants's Air advisor forward air
- 32:31Speaker 1: controllers with regiments. In comparison, Army advisors numbered up to
- 32:35Speaker 1: five hundred and a corps with assignments going down to
- 32:38Speaker 1: company level. General Moore had kept the rank of air
- 32:42Speaker 1: advisors low to avoid dwarfing relatively junior Vietnamese counterparts. General Maddox,
- 32:48Speaker 1: thirteenth Air Force Commander, wanted a senior United States Air
- 32:52Speaker 1: Force colonel to be assigned to the Joint General Staff.
- 32:56Speaker 1: He further wished Corps Air liaison officers to be colonels,
- 32:59Speaker 1: thus giving them equal prestige with Army senior Corps advisers.
- 33:04Speaker 1: General west Moreland was dead set against raising the Corps
- 33:07Speaker 1: Air liaison officers to the rank of colonel. He regarded
- 33:10Speaker 1: the Army senior advisers as MACV senior advisers, responsible for
- 33:15Speaker 1: all military matters, to include the use of air power.
- 33:19Speaker 1: Corps air liaison officers were supposed to advise the senior advisers,
- 33:23Speaker 1: and Westmoreland assure General more that they would be listened to.
- 33:27Speaker 1: When Moore learned that Vietnamese wing commanders would be the
- 33:30Speaker 1: chief air advisor to the CORP commanders, he acceded to
- 33:33Speaker 1: the MACV commander's point of view. Indeed, the second Air
- 33:37Speaker 1: Division commander felt that conflict between the two distinct control
- 33:41Speaker 1: systems was overdrawn. Confident of cooperation, he said, the Army
- 33:46Speaker 1: is just as strongly opposed to air force control of
- 33:49Speaker 1: its aircraft as we are for the army to control ours.
- 33:53Speaker 1: Even so, More desired to enlarge the tactical air control
- 33:57Speaker 1: system by adding an air request communications net manned and
- 34:01Speaker 1: operated by the Air Force. It would resemble the United
- 34:05Speaker 1: States Strike Command tactical air command system worked out during
- 34:09Speaker 1: maneuvers in the United States. He hoped to do away
- 34:13Speaker 1: with the long delays in passing air requests up through
- 34:16Speaker 1: channels over Vietnamese Army communications. General Moore's proposed net for
- 34:21Speaker 1: handling Vietnamese air requests would enhance United States Air Force
- 34:25Speaker 1: advice at lower ground echelons. An Air Force pilot, forward
- 34:29Speaker 1: air controller, and two radio operators were demand tactical air
- 34:33Speaker 1: control parties at all levels down to battalion. They would
- 34:37Speaker 1: process air support requests, provided vice and direct close air
- 34:41Speaker 1: support strikes demand. This country wide set up, the second
- 34:46Speaker 1: Air Division was to draw pilots from the United States
- 34:48Speaker 1: Air Force nineteenth Tactical Air Support Squadron. More envisioned a
- 34:53Speaker 1: continuing need for Vietnamese controllers to mark remote and hard
- 34:57Speaker 1: to find interdiction targets. However, he saw no reason why
- 35:01Speaker 1: Air Force controllers, Army liaison pilots, and and Vietnamese forward
- 35:06Speaker 1: air guides could not measure their efforts to designate targets
- 35:10Speaker 1: for air strikes. More counted on speeding up the reaction
- 35:14Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese Air Force by training and assigning Vietnamese
- 35:18Speaker 1: down to battalion level, first as counterparts and eventually to
- 35:22Speaker 1: replace United States Air Force personnel. He also wanted an
- 35:26Speaker 1: Air Force Liaison officer appointed to the Joint General Staff
- 35:30Speaker 1: and more Vietnamese working in its operations center. General Westmoreland
- 35:34Speaker 1: added a United States Air Force colonel as advisor to
- 35:37Speaker 1: the Joint General Staff, and he authorized More to use
- 35:41Speaker 1: Pacific Air Force Command resources to establish the Air Request
- 35:45Speaker 1: Net in the third COREP area in Washington. Joint Chief
- 35:49Speaker 1: of Staff Chairman Wheeler secured Macnamara as assent for the
- 35:53Speaker 1: Air Request Net. The Defense Secretary let the Air Force
- 35:56Speaker 1: deploy combat ready tactical Air Control parties from the Tactical
- 36:01Speaker 1: Air Command. They were to serve on temporary duty in Vietnam,
- 36:05Speaker 1: pending the procurement of personnel and equipment for the second
- 36:08Speaker 1: Air Division, with plans for the new Air Request that
- 36:12Speaker 1: nearing fruition with the B twenty six as already retired
- 36:16Speaker 1: with the T twenty eights in stress trouble with Macnamara
- 36:20Speaker 1: against having a B fifty seven squadron in South Vietnam.
- 36:24Speaker 1: General Moore wrote to General le May and April asking
- 36:27Speaker 1: for an expansion from two to three A one E
- 36:31Speaker 1: squadrons of twenty five planes each. Two of these units
- 36:35Speaker 1: at Benoit would permit standard four ship fighter formations and
- 36:39Speaker 1: provide for the predicted upturn in air strikes created by
- 36:43Speaker 1: the air Request system. The third squadron was to be
- 36:46Speaker 1: based at the new Canto Airfield, being built in a
- 36:49Speaker 1: Maikon delta and slated for completion in early nineteen sixty five.
- 36:54Speaker 1: Without disparaging Vietnamese progress. More stressed than a third United
- 36:59Speaker 1: States Air Force A one E squadron would enable planes
- 37:02Speaker 1: to respond quickly to oncol air support missions. This would
- 37:06Speaker 1: set a proper example for Vietnamese airmen, whose morale tended
- 37:11Speaker 1: to be low. Richard T. Sanborn, Second Air Division operations
- 37:15Speaker 1: analysts showed that fifty A one e's and seventy five
- 37:19Speaker 1: A one hs would generate three thousand and thirty eight
- 37:22Speaker 1: sorties per month, with ten percent for training. Considering the
- 37:27Speaker 1: rise in air support requests in the demand for larger
- 37:29Speaker 1: aircraft flights, Sanborn computed combat sorties add four thousand, four
- 37:35Speaker 1: hundred and seventy six by August nineteen sixty four. He
- 37:39Speaker 1: foresaw further rises in the future. General Maddox, thirteenth Air
- 37:43Speaker 1: Force Commander, pointed out that a third A one E
- 37:47Speaker 1: squadron might end retention of the B fifty sevens at Clark,
- 37:51Speaker 1: but he saw no reason for making an issue of
- 37:53Speaker 1: the new unit so soon, since it could not be
- 37:56Speaker 1: accommodated at Cantoe until nineteen sixty five. However, General William H. Blanchard,
- 38:03Speaker 1: Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, stated that the Air
- 38:06Speaker 1: Force was planning for the third squadron to be fully
- 38:08Speaker 1: equipped at canto by March nineteen sixty five. General Wheeler
- 38:12Speaker 1: justified the A one E expansion because of low Vietnamese performance. Nevertheless,
- 38:18Speaker 1: the additional United States Air Force planes would delay Vietnamese
- 38:22Speaker 1: self sufficiency and undermine the principle that Americans were to
- 38:26Speaker 1: help rather than to fight. Two events revealed that the
- 38:30Speaker 1: rule restricting United States Air Force advisers from engaging in
- 38:34Speaker 1: battle was being strained, if not entirely broken. The first
- 38:39Speaker 1: took place on March eighth, when Colonel Thomas M. Hergert,
- 38:42Speaker 1: Deputy Chief of the m A a G Air Force
- 38:46Speaker 1: section was killed. He was flying an A one h
- 38:49Speaker 1: as wingman to a Vietnamese flight leader on an interdiction mission.
- 38:53Speaker 1: Both had made a dozen passes to deliver ordinance when
- 38:57Speaker 1: Hargert's plane crashed. Smoke was billowing from the right wing
- 39:01Speaker 1: route just before the right wing exploded. Investigation disclosed that
- 39:06Speaker 1: eighty nine United States Air Force pilots were flying Vietnamese aircraft,
- 39:10Speaker 1: but no adviser could lead a flight, be the first
- 39:13Speaker 1: to expend ordinance or continue a mission of the Vietnamese
- 39:17Speaker 1: flight leader aborted. Colonel Hergert was the twenty eighth United
- 39:21Speaker 1: States Air Force combat fatality in Vietnam since January nineteen
- 39:26Speaker 1: sixty two. The second event concerned Captain Schenk, who had
- 39:30Speaker 1: died in a T twenty eight crash on March twenty fourth.
- 39:33Speaker 1: On April twenty first, US congressmen and the press were
- 39:36Speaker 1: furnished several letters Shank had written home. He had criticized
- 39:40Speaker 1: the airworthiness of US aircraft and told of First Air
- 39:44Speaker 1: Command OLED pilots flying combat missions with Vietnamese basic airmen,
- 39:49Speaker 1: popularly called sandbags. The airmen went along as the required
- 39:53Speaker 1: Vietnamese crewmen. For to obtain qualified crew members meant diverting
- 39:58Speaker 1: fifty to seventy five vta Namese pilots from their own planes.
- 40:02Speaker 1: Seeing that these pilots were assigned on the basis of
- 40:05Speaker 1: one point five for each cockpit, this would severely hamper
- 40:09Speaker 1: Vietnamese air power. If legitimate Vietnamese observers flew with Americans,
- 40:14Speaker 1: the liaison and forward air controller programs would be bankrupt. Consequently,
- 40:19Speaker 1: General Moore suggested that the arbitrary requirement for a Vietnamese
- 40:24Speaker 1: aboard a US strike aircraft be lifted. Non rated airmen
- 40:28Speaker 1: scarcely contributed to the missions normally flown to augment Vietnamese planes.
- 40:34Speaker 1: On April twenty ninth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed
- 40:36Speaker 1: that the number of United States Air Force A one
- 40:39Speaker 1: e's in Vietnam be upped at once to fifty two
- 40:43Speaker 1: squadrons and to a third squadron. Later, Secretary of Defense
- 40:47Speaker 1: Macnamara consented to the immediate increase to two squadrons, which
- 40:51Speaker 1: was in line with Admiral Felt's hope for a third
- 40:54Speaker 1: squadron in nineteen sixty five. Macnamara also accepted General Smart's
- 40:59Speaker 1: suggestion hold the B fifty sevens at Clark as an
- 41:02Speaker 1: ace in the whole for a contingency. Visiting Saigon and May,
- 41:07Speaker 1: Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were cool toward a third
- 41:11Speaker 1: A one E squadron. Taylor said it would not sell
- 41:15Speaker 1: in Washington. McNamara reiterated that US forces were not to
- 41:19Speaker 1: take part in combat. The Secretary directed at General Moore
- 41:23Speaker 1: to get the Vietnamese train so that they could do
- 41:25Speaker 1: everything themselves. He ordered the Vietnamese pilot ratio raised from
- 41:30Speaker 1: one point five to two per plane in the Vietnamese
- 41:34Speaker 1: seven hundred and sixteenth Composite Reconnaissance Squadron fitted out with
- 41:38Speaker 1: twenty five A one hs by October first, and converted
- 41:43Speaker 1: to a fourth fighter squadron. This would take the place
- 41:46Speaker 1: of a third U S A one E Squadron. Upon
- 41:50Speaker 1: return to Washington. The Defense Secretary, in a news interview
- 41:53Speaker 1: emphasized that United States Air Force personnel were in Vietnam
- 41:57Speaker 1: to train the Vietnamese to fight annas Thai guerrilla war.
- 42:01Speaker 1: Within the Defense establishment, he made known his intention to
- 42:05Speaker 1: phase down the strike operations of the first Air Commando
- 42:09Speaker 1: Squadron and his goal to have that unit out of
- 42:12Speaker 1: Vietnam in one hundred and twenty days. A few days later,
- 42:16Speaker 1: Taylor reaffirmed the policy that United States military personnel were
- 42:20Speaker 1: not to join combat. Farm Gate aircraft could only fly
- 42:24Speaker 1: bonafide operational training missions against hostile targets to prepare the
- 42:28Speaker 1: participating Vietnamese Air Force personnel for eventual replacement of US pilots.
- 42:36Speaker 1: US helicopter missions would keep on introducing Americans into combat situations,
- 42:41Speaker 1: but helicopters are for use as transport, their weapons were
- 42:46Speaker 1: for self protection. Armed helicopters will not be used as
- 42:50Speaker 1: a substitute for close air support strikes. On June third,
- 42:54Speaker 1: Smartest felt in Westmoreland to clarify the Joint Chiefest Staff
- 42:58Speaker 1: directive that for bayed Farmgate from entering into combat but
- 43:03Speaker 1: let Americans fly operational training mission against hostile targets. They
- 43:08Speaker 1: replied that Farmgate was to fly combat, but to be
- 43:11Speaker 1: more circumspect, Farmgate was to further ensure that Vietnamese personnel
- 43:16Speaker 1: aboard American aircraft were pilot aspirants or undergoing flight training.
- 43:21Speaker 1: Westmoreland thought that mcvee could live with the directive and
- 43:25Speaker 1: keep Farmgate fighting. Its effect, he said, would not be
- 43:29Speaker 1: appreciable on the Second Air Division and on US helicopters.
- 43:34Speaker 1: Toward the close of April seventeen, Vietnamese A one h
- 43:39Speaker 1: s were combat loaded and deployed from Benoit to Deneng.
- 43:44Speaker 1: The unannounced mission turned out to be the start of
- 43:46Speaker 1: a seven battalion search and clear helleborne sweep in the
- 43:50Speaker 1: Second Corps during April twenty seventh through May thirty first.
- 43:55Speaker 1: The sorties flown by the Vietnamese Air Force totaled two
- 43:58Speaker 1: hundred and sixty six L nineteen and L twenty four,
- 44:02Speaker 1: hundred and twenty A one h and T twenty eight
- 44:06Speaker 1: and one hundred and two H thirty four missions. The
- 44:11Speaker 1: helicopters did psychological warfare, medical evacuation, resupply, and crop destruction.
- 44:17Speaker 1: A daily average of ten A one hs were on
- 44:20Speaker 1: tap at Danang, and the five hundred and sixteenth Fighter
- 44:23Speaker 1: Squadron kept five T twenty eights at the Qua Neng
- 44:27Speaker 1: Airfield for immediate air support. The operation apparently caught the
- 44:32Speaker 1: viet Com by surprise. Not only were many automatic weapons
- 44:36Speaker 1: captured and destroyed, but enemy installations were broken up. Yet,
- 44:40Speaker 1: when the fighting was over, it was impossible to leave
- 44:43Speaker 1: three irregular companies behind as planned because the floe had
- 44:47Speaker 1: been scattered but not wiped out. Nevertheless, this example of
- 44:51Speaker 1: well coordinated combat aviation gave smart confidence that Vietnamese air
- 44:56Speaker 1: power was clearly on the upswing. Despite this burn furnishing
- 45:00Speaker 1: of Vietnamese Air Force prestige, the month long operation consumed
- 45:04Speaker 1: almost one half of all Vietnamese combat sorties in May. Besides,
- 45:09Speaker 1: Vietnamese and United States Air Force aircraft conversions were cutting
- 45:13Speaker 1: into Vietnamese aircraft. The first Air Commando Squadron had borrowed
- 45:18Speaker 1: fifteen T twenty eighth from the five hundred and sixteenth
- 45:22Speaker 1: Fighter Squadron, which sent pilots to Benoit for A one
- 45:27Speaker 1: transition training given by the United States Pacific Fleets Naval
- 45:32Speaker 1: Air Squadron VA one fifty two. The A one h
- 45:36Speaker 1: was bigger than the T twenty eight and twisted about
- 45:39Speaker 1: more from the propeller tor. It had a tailwheel rather
- 45:42Speaker 1: than the tricycle landing gear that the pilots were used to,
- 45:46Speaker 1: Hence several A one hs suffered damaging ground accidents. When
- 45:51Speaker 1: ten A one hs arrived in May, they sat on
- 45:53Speaker 1: the ramps at Dunang. Since the Vietnamese forty first Cameron
- 45:57Speaker 1: was unfamiliar with the aircraft, the incommissioned rate average merely
- 46:02Speaker 1: four or five a day, and at times dipped to three.
- 46:06Speaker 1: At Benoit, the first Air Commando Squadron stayed operational with
- 46:10Speaker 1: the borrowed T twenty eighth. One was lost in a
- 46:13Speaker 1: take off accident, and six were transferred on May twentieth
- 46:16Speaker 1: to combat and laos. This left only eight. Due chiefly
- 46:20Speaker 1: to fewer T twenty eighths, Combat sorties dwindled in May,
- 46:24Speaker 1: even as requests for air support climbed. In Midmoth, United
- 46:29Speaker 1: States Air Force personnel followed MacNamara's guidance to the letter.
- 46:33Speaker 1: They worked to lift the Vietnamese fighter pilot ratio to
- 46:36Speaker 1: two per plane. They pushed the enlargement of the fighter
- 46:39Speaker 1: force to four A one H squadrons so that the
- 46:42Speaker 1: first Air command of Squadron could be withdrawn, the Defense
- 46:46Speaker 1: Secretary one at the Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron converted to the
- 46:50Speaker 1: fourth Fighter Squadron by October, and the authorized air transport
- 46:54Speaker 1: and other Vietnamese pilots to fly fighters. As the crash
- 46:59Speaker 1: planned for the Sick Terry's program neared completion, the Joint
- 47:02Speaker 1: Chief of Staffs directive banning US planes from combat without
- 47:06Speaker 1: giving bonafide training to Vietnamese crew members foreshadowed a decline
- 47:11Speaker 1: in United States Air Force combat sorties. This came at
- 47:14Speaker 1: the time when there were too few aircraft to meet
- 47:17Speaker 1: requirements and the Vietnamese were building two new A one
- 47:21Speaker 1: aged squadrons. Recognizing the emergency, mcve ruled that the First
- 47:26Speaker 1: Air Commando Squadron could continue to fly its eight T
- 47:29Speaker 1: twenty eights carrying Vietnamese crewmen who were not potential pilots
- 47:34Speaker 1: as soon as A one e's replaced T twenty eights. However,
- 47:38Speaker 1: A one e combat operations would be held strictly to
- 47:41Speaker 1: genuine training. On May twenty eighth, McVie decided to equip
- 47:45Speaker 1: the present three Vietnamese fighter squadrons to attain two pilots
- 47:50Speaker 1: per plane by October first. It likewise intended to form
- 47:53Speaker 1: three more fighter squadrons as soon as aircraft became available
- 47:57Speaker 1: by February fifteenth, nineteen six five. If all went well,
- 48:02Speaker 1: only Vietnamese pilots were to attend the intensive A one
- 48:06Speaker 1: h pilot training program. The thirty fourth tactical Group would
- 48:10Speaker 1: present the initial two week in doctrination. Naval Air Squadron
- 48:15Speaker 1: VA one fifty two was to furnish the five week
- 48:18Speaker 1: transition course, and the thirty fourth would administer the final training.
- 48:23Speaker 1: Meeting with the Joint Chiefs on June eighth, Secretary McNamara
- 48:27Speaker 1: directed that the first four Vietnamese fighter squadrons received primary attention,
- 48:32Speaker 1: the two others secondary. On June seventeenth, Admiral Felt accepted
- 48:36Speaker 1: a Pacific Air Force Command evaluation and reported to the
- 48:40Speaker 1: chiefs that McVie was trying to do too much, too fast.
- 48:44Speaker 1: He suggested that the five hundred and sixteenth Fighter Squadron
- 48:47Speaker 1: be brought to full strength in September and that the
- 48:51Speaker 1: five hundred and twentieth Fighter Squadron be made operational at
- 48:54Speaker 1: Canto by the end of the year. He judged that
- 48:57Speaker 1: the Vietnamese could man four fighter squadron without inactivating their
- 49:01Speaker 1: two C forty seven transport units. On July twenty fourth,
- 49:06Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the four squadron projection.
- 49:10Speaker 1: On May thirtieth, Lieutenant Colonel John M. Porter, commander of
- 49:14Speaker 1: the first Air Commando Squadron, had led the original flight
- 49:18Speaker 1: of six A one e's from the Philippines to Benoit.
- 49:22Speaker 1: Colonel Preston noted that his thirty fourth Tactical Group had
- 49:25Speaker 1: moved up into the big league with a first line aircraft.
- 49:29Speaker 1: On the thirty first, the A one ees flew their
- 49:31Speaker 1: maiden strike sorties. Colonel William E. Bethea, who assumed command
- 49:36Speaker 1: of the thirty fourth Group in June, was impressed by
- 49:39Speaker 1: the plane's large and varied ordinance, take off from a
- 49:43Speaker 1: four thousand foot runway, fully loaded, extremely long range in
- 49:47Speaker 1: good loitering. Still, the A one e's normal cruising speed
- 49:50Speaker 1: of one hundred and fifty five knots retarded rapid response
- 49:54Speaker 1: to air support requests, chiefly in the far reaches of
- 49:58Speaker 1: the Mekong Delta. In the air could barely defend itself
- 50:01Speaker 1: in aerial combat. With twelve A one e's on site,
- 50:05Speaker 1: by June thirtieth, the T twenty eighth were retired. The
- 50:09Speaker 1: thirty fourth Tactical Group set about giving transition training to
- 50:13Speaker 1: Vietnamese pilots. Air support requests totaled one thousand, five hundred
- 50:18Speaker 1: and forty six during January through March nineteen sixty four,
- 50:22Speaker 1: and two thousand and forty from April through June. Lack
- 50:26Speaker 1: of aircraft counted for sixty eight of the one hundred
- 50:29Speaker 1: and seven requests that could not be hundred in the
- 50:32Speaker 1: second quarter. Generally, United States Air Force communications were deemed
- 50:37Speaker 1: better than those of the U. S. Army. General Westmoreland
- 50:40Speaker 1: therefore ordered the Army Aviation Battalion Control Center, situated in
- 50:45Speaker 1: the Joint Operations Center of the Joint General Staff, to
- 50:48Speaker 1: relocate within the United States Air Force Vietnamese Air Operations Center.
- 50:54Speaker 1: General Moore expected the move, which commenced on May eighteenth,
- 50:58Speaker 1: to enhance coordination among our Army Air Force in Vietnamese
- 51:01Speaker 1: air activities. This did not occur. The single sideban PRC
- 51:06Speaker 1: forty seven and KWM two A radios were the backbone
- 51:11Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese air Request Net, but the sets did
- 51:14Speaker 1: not always work properly due to the tropical climate and
- 51:18Speaker 1: inexperienced operators. In addition, ground commanders were unwilling to allow
- 51:23Speaker 1: the air request system to function as designed. The Joint
- 51:27Speaker 1: General Staff issued no directive and the ground commanders refused
- 51:30Speaker 1: to be bypassed on strike firepower. In consequence, the air
- 51:35Speaker 1: Request Net served merely to provide information. All official requests
- 51:39Speaker 1: continued to travel the tortuous route over the old Vietnamese
- 51:43Speaker 1: Army Air Request Net, nor did the Joint General Staff
- 51:47Speaker 1: relax its ban on strike aircraft releasing ordinance close to
- 51:51Speaker 1: ground forces, except that the direction of the Vietnamese forward
- 51:54Speaker 1: air controller. On April twenty third, the United States Air
- 51:58Speaker 1: Force T twenty eights were over Vietnamese rangers who were
- 52:01Speaker 1: trapped near Trung Lap. Although the planes had voiced communications
- 52:06Speaker 1: with the U. S. Army L nineteen and with wounded
- 52:09Speaker 1: American advisers on the ground, they were not permitted to attack.
- 52:13Speaker 1: Armed Army helicopters arrived, were fired upon and returned the fire,
- 52:18Speaker 1: but the T twenty eighths jettisoned their unused ordinance and
- 52:21Speaker 1: returned to base. There were other problems. Unless Vietnamese pilots
- 52:26Speaker 1: could speak English, United States Air Force controllers were unable
- 52:30Speaker 1: to communicate with them. Air Liaison officer and forward air
- 52:34Speaker 1: controller duties were clearly unpopular among Vietnamese, and the manning
- 52:39Speaker 1: ratio of two pilots to each fighter aircraft sharply curtailed
- 52:43Speaker 1: the number and caliber of Vietnamese pilots who could be
- 52:46Speaker 1: spared for such duties. Finally, the human and natural environment
- 52:50Speaker 1: worked against ground tactical air controlled parties. Their heavy bulky
- 52:55Speaker 1: radial gear was hard to load through the jungle. Sometimes
- 52:58Speaker 1: it was out of the questioning to direct an air
- 53:01Speaker 1: strike safely from the ground because of the presence of
- 53:04Speaker 1: civilians could be seen solely from the air. Mountains and
- 53:08Speaker 1: heavy vegetation hampered the ground view, and the flat ground
- 53:11Speaker 1: of the delta offered no elevations to help determine range.
- 53:15Speaker 1: Numerous tree lines and canal ridges also obstructed the view.
- 53:20Speaker 1: In mid nineteen sixty four, it was generally agreed that
- 53:22Speaker 1: ground tactical air control parties could not take the place
- 53:26Speaker 1: of airborne control. Yet potent air support demanded something better
- 53:30Speaker 1: than the plotting Vietnamese l nineteens and their often indifferent observers.
- 53:35Speaker 1: Strong pleas to prevent the demise of the nineteenth Tactical
- 53:38Speaker 1: Air Support Squadron proved futile. The unit remained under orders
- 53:43Speaker 1: to transfer its aircraft to the Vietnamese. Like the building
- 53:47Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese Air Strike Force, the Vietnamese air strike
- 53:51Speaker 1: system held promise for the future. However, neither Vietnamese air
- 53:55Speaker 1: power nor control procedures were able to withstand Vietcong attacks.
- 54:00Speaker 1: Over the earlier months of nineteen sixty four C. Forty
- 54:03Speaker 1: seven and C one twenty three flare support for outposted
- 54:06Speaker 1: villages more than double the night Sorties group. But on
- 54:10Speaker 1: the night of July sixth, when the Viet Cong assaulted
- 54:13Speaker 1: the Nandang Special Forces camp near the demilitarized Zone, a
- 54:18Speaker 1: flair ship orbited overhead and dropped flares till dawn. Not
- 54:21Speaker 1: until first light did two A, one HS and IN
- 54:25Speaker 1: one forward air controller arrive over the target. Then they
- 54:28Speaker 1: were unable to strike because the controller could not make
- 54:31Speaker 1: radio contact with the besieged forces to verify the target.
- 54:36Speaker 1: The insurgents partially overran the camp, killed fifty five South Vietnamese,
- 54:41Speaker 1: two U S Special Forces soldiers and an Australian adviser.
- 54:45Speaker 1: The delay in a one h reaction stem from the
- 54:48Speaker 1: five hundred and sixteenth Fighter Squadron pilots being unable to
- 54:52Speaker 1: fly at night. A further factor was the operating rule
- 54:55Speaker 1: that barred the one from making a target close to
- 54:58Speaker 1: friendly forces without positive identification. A more grievous failure ensued
- 55:03Speaker 1: on July twenty first in Cheung Tien Province. Viet Kang
- 55:08Speaker 1: stormed the Shang Kut outposts before dawn and set ambush
- 55:12Speaker 1: positions along the road to be taken by relief forces
- 55:15Speaker 1: within the one hour needed to get a Vietnamese controller
- 55:18Speaker 1: to the scene. The ambush decimated the friendly troops, killing
- 55:22Speaker 1: forty one and wounding fifty six. Two Vietnamese A one
- 55:26Speaker 1: hs on ground alert came one and one half hours
- 55:29Speaker 1: after the air support mission was requested. On the morning
- 55:32Speaker 1: of July twenty eighth, the Vietcong hit two hamlets in
- 55:36Speaker 1: a post immediately north of Ben Kot in Bien Duang Province.
- 55:41Speaker 1: A battalion responded, lost a lead tank to fifty seven
- 55:45Speaker 1: millimeter ACILISS rifle fire, and broke apart under assault. In
- 55:50Speaker 1: an initial air support strike, four United States Air Force
- 55:54Speaker 1: A one ease except the targets from a US Army
- 55:57Speaker 1: O one pilot, but the Vietnamese A one on H
- 56:00Speaker 1: pilots next on station refused to act without a Vietnamese
- 56:04Speaker 1: air controller, even though the Army LIES on pilot and
- 56:07Speaker 1: Vietnamese ground observer marked enemy positions with smoke rockets. By
- 56:12Speaker 1: the time a Vietnamese controller got there, the guerrillas had
- 56:15Speaker 1: faded into the jungle. The policy of defining counterinsurgency as
- 56:20Speaker 1: something distinctly different from other states of armed conflict resulted
- 56:24Speaker 1: in not developing enough air firepower to defeat the Viet Kong.
- 56:28Speaker 1: Occasional two plane air strikes on well known enemy base
- 56:32Speaker 1: areas did little more than varas. One proposed solution was
- 56:35Speaker 1: to ask the civilians to leave Viet Kong havens and
- 56:39Speaker 1: large scale bombing of these havens could be carried out
- 56:42Speaker 1: by United States Air Force tactical aircraft from basis in Thailand,
- 56:46Speaker 1: Okinawa and the Philippines within flight refueling. The planes need
- 56:50Speaker 1: not ever land. In South Vietnam in mid nineteen sixty four,
- 56:54Speaker 1: General Westmoreland was deeply concerned with a surge in successful
- 56:59Speaker 1: Viet Kong hamlet and outpost attacks and ambushes of troop
- 57:02Speaker 1: units and convoys. His basic approach lay in sending more
- 57:07Speaker 1: US forces into provinces at the district level. Their presence
- 57:11Speaker 1: spurred Vietnamese paramilitary and lower level units to speed up pacification.
- 57:17Speaker 1: Concluding that the air reaction time to night attacks was
- 57:20Speaker 1: too slow, Westmoreland directed Army advisors to keep armed helicopters
- 57:25Speaker 1: some flare equipped on night alert at provincial headquarters. He
- 57:30Speaker 1: requested more Army Special Forces troops, and he asked for
- 57:33Speaker 1: one helicopter company in direct support of each Vietnamese Division
- 57:37Speaker 1: plus additional armed helicopter companies and platoons. In addition, the
- 57:42Speaker 1: MACV commander instructed General Moore and Brigadier General DELK. M Odin,
- 57:47Speaker 1: commander of the United States Army Support Command Vietnam, to
- 57:51Speaker 1: shore up all American air support of troop movements, convoys,
- 57:54Speaker 1: and reaction forces. Moore and Odin issued a formal agreement
- 57:59Speaker 1: that Westmoreland and placed in a mac V directive date
- 58:02Speaker 1: at September seventh, to refine co ordination. Army and Marine
- 58:07Speaker 1: Corps aviation was to be co located, as would Air Force.
- 58:11Speaker 1: In Vietnamese control agencies. Ground reaction forces would not normally
- 58:15Speaker 1: move without air support. In many cases, armed helicopters would
- 58:20Speaker 1: engage in pinpoint the enemy until more heavily armed fighters arrived.
- 58:24Speaker 1: If too few fighters were to be had, extra armed
- 58:28Speaker 1: helicopters would be used. The more Odin agreement was perhaps
- 58:32Speaker 1: useful as an interim measure required by conditions in South Vietnam. Still,
- 58:37Speaker 1: it differed in important respects from proven tactical air doctrine.
- 58:41Speaker 1: The agreement perpetuated two separate air control systems, Air Force
- 58:46Speaker 1: and Army Marine Corps, which made it possible for a
- 58:49Speaker 1: ground commander to receive conflicting advice time and again. General
- 58:53Speaker 1: le May protested the presence of armed helicopters in Vietnam
- 58:57Speaker 1: because tactical fighters performed better. Even so, the more Odin
- 59:02Speaker 1: Agreement recognized complimentary needs for both types of aircraft. Some
- 59:07Speaker 1: United States Air Force officers believed that the Second Air
- 59:10Speaker 1: Division was being hoodwinked into the Rolls and Missions Agreement,
- 59:14Speaker 1: but theory had to give way to practicality. With the
- 59:17Speaker 1: absence of enemy air power, armed helicopters proved useful. Their
- 59:22Speaker 1: instant replied to ground fire offset their inaccurate and rather
- 59:26Speaker 1: light fire power, but the Viet Cong's introduction of more
- 59:29Speaker 1: fifty caliber and forty millimeters weapons trimmed the helicopter's advantages.
- 59:35Speaker 1: The Air Force concept of centralized control of all air
- 59:38Speaker 1: resources remained fundamental in sound. In the words of Colonel
- 59:42Speaker 1: Allison C. Brooks, General Moore's deputy, However, since the fairly
- 59:47Speaker 1: slow A one aircraft in Vietnam could not be moved
- 59:50Speaker 1: rapidly from one base to another, Brooks agreed that they
- 59:54Speaker 1: should be dispersed into the areas where the battles occurred,
- 59:58Speaker 1: so long as there was no deviation from them. The
- 1:00:00Speaker 1: principle of centralized control. The planes could be shifted as
- 1:00:03Speaker 1: required without fragmenting the effort. End of Chapter eighteen.